1 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

1.2 PROCESS FORMULATE

2.3 LEX IULIA
3.4 ACTIO REI UXORIE
4.5 INHERITANCE PETITION ACTION
5.6 THEFT
6.7 SURFACE
7.8 IUDICIUM
8.9 PRAETORIAN STIPULATIONS
10 SOCIETAS
9.
11 MODAL CLAUSE
10.
12 CONDITION
11.
13 PAYMENT ACTION
12.
14 MUTUAL
13.
15 ACTIO PUBLICIANA
14.
16 ABILITY TO ACT ON LEGAL ACTS
15.
17 LEGAL ACTS
16.
18 PRESCRIPTION
17.
19 DATIO IN SOLUTUM
18.
20 FRAUD
19.
21 ACTIO DE DOLO
20.
22 DOLUS MALUS
21.
23 EMPHYTEUSIS
22.
24 PROPERTY PRETORIA (in bonis habere)
23.
25 NATURALIS POSSESSION
24.
26 BAN
25.
27 CUMULATIVE AND JOINT AND SEVERAL PARTIAL BONDS (in solutum)
26.
28 SHOP
27.
29 MODE
28.
30 FAITHCOMMESSO
29.
31 SUCCESSIONS
30.
32 SALE
31.
33 WAYS OF BUYING THE PROPERTY
32.
34 PREDIAL SERVICES AND WAYS OF PURCHASE/EXTINGUISHING
33.
35 LOCATIO CONDUCTIO
34.
36 LEX AEQUILIA
35.
37 DIFF. BETWEEN DOTIS DICTIO AND DOTIS PROMICTIO
36.
38 TRADITION
37.

39

40

41

42

43
44

45

1) PROCESS FOR FORMULAS

46

1 Self-protection (I sec. a.C.), 2 Legis Actiones (12 tables\Lex Iulia Iudiciorum Privatorum 17 a.C.), 3 Per
47
Formulas (from II sec. a.C.\ Lex Aebutia VI sec d.C.)
48

2) LEX IULIA
49

Lex Iuliae means the laws issued by Augustus among these we find lex iulia iudiciorum privatorum for the
50
transition from legis actiones to process formulate. For Le Iulia de civitate latinis et sociis danda was a
51
Roman law promulgated by Lucius Julius Caesar in 90 BC.C., later supplemented by two other laws. During
52
the period of the Social War, years 91-88 a.C. Rome, aware of not being able to manage the anti-Roman
53
revolt with the mere use of weapons, extended citizenship to the Latins who remained faithful or who had
54
laid down their arms against Rome, a later, or contemporary lex, gave faculty to the Roman commanders to
55
grant citizenship to the Italic and Spanish fighters who took the defense of Rome at their orders. A later lex
56
Plautia Papiria of 89 a. C., supplemented by a consultative senate, then granted all the Latins and the Italic
57
allies Roman citizenship as long as they requested it to the urban praetor within a set term.
58

3) ACTIO REI UXORIE

59

The dowry was part of the estate of her husband or her head of the family. Strictly speaking, the husband
60
was not liable to prosecution if he did not actually use it for the burdens of marriage. Nor was he required
61
to return the dowry in the event of dissolution of the marriage: this unless he had explicitly committed
62
himself to restitution by means of a stipulation, in which case we spoke of receptive dowry (dos recepticia).
63
Against this original regime and against its excessive rigidity reacted, since the pre-classical age, the
64
honorary right, introducing an action for the restitution of the dowry ( actio rei uxorie) when the marriage
65
was dissolved. The judge therefore had the power to determine from time to time the right amount of
66
assets to be returned. 3 hypotheses
67

Depending on divorce, the action was exercised by the same wife sui iuris or, being alien wives iuris, by the
68
paterfamilias of her, but with her specific consent; Depending on the death of the husband, the same
69
rules applied, but with the warning that, if the husband had left anything to the wife in the will, the wife (or
70
for her the father) could not obtain the bequest and the dowry together, but had the choice between one
71
and the other; Depending on the death of his wife, the action for restitution belonged to the
72
paterfamilias of her, but only within the limits of the dos profecticia (coming from the father), while the
73
dowry not coming from the father remained with the husband.
74

The preclassical and classical jurisprudence formulated, in the practical application of the action of the
75
dowry heritage, a real stable regime of the restitution of the dowry (more precisely of the "reintegration of
76
the dowry") (other stuff to know but too much).
77 Justinian established the absolute
presumption that, in connection with the stipulation of dowry, a stipulation of restitution of the same had
78
taken place
79

4) INHERITANCE PETITION ACTION

80

The petition of inheritance was an action due to the heir against anyone who, neglecting this qualification,
81
concretely prejudiced the rights (absolute or relative) acquired by him because of the succession: it tended,
82
 therefore, first of all to ascertain the status of heir and, subordinately, to the condemnation of the one who
83
had usurped the absolute and relative rights constituting the hereditary estate.
84

Despite this vast range of application, it was, however, in the form of an actio in rem, so that the defendant
85
was always qualified possessor: which can be explained only by referring to the origins of the institute,
86
which in the system of the ius Quiritium, that is, before the juridical recognition of the obligationes,
87
consisted of a vindicatio (later transfused into legis actio sacramenti in rem) with which the heres claimed
88
the objects of the mancipium of its predecessor at the abusive owner. In the procedure of the ordo
89
iudiciorum privatorum, the defendant was ordered to pay the equivalent of the inheritance at the time of
90
the judgment of the court; however, since the hereditas petitio is an iudicium arbitrarium, he could secure
91
absolution by the spontaneous preventive restoration of the status quo ante. Defendant could be in
92
classical law: The cd. possessor pro herede, that is, the one who possessed the hereditary patrimony
93
affirming himself, in good or bad faith, heres and trusting to be able to prove it - The cd. possessor pro
94
possessore, that is, the one who possessed all or part of the hereditary patrimony without asserting
95
himself heres, but with the simple and unequivocal animus sibi habendi, trusting that the plaintiff would
96
not be able to prove his title of heir. On the basis of a Senateconsultation of Juvenzianus (129 d.C.),
97
classical jurisprudence held that even those who no longer possessed the res hereditariae for having
98
previously alienated them could be agreed; cue according to which the postclassical law admitted that the
99
action could be exercised even against the fictus possessor (fictitious possessor), that is, against the one
100
who had maliciously got rid of the res herediatriae or who had maliciously given himself to understand
101
himself as the possessor of the same in order to leave in the meantime to the true possessor the time to
102
buy them for usucapione. The interdicted quorum bonorum was given to the successor by honorary right
103
(bonorum possessor) to obtain from those who possessed them (and possibly also from the civil heir, in the
104
case of bonorum possessio re) the restitution of the goods attributed to him by the praetor. It is doubtful
105
whether the praetor granted him, for this purpose, a fictitious action (that is, a proposed hereditary
106
petition action assuming the title of heir by fiction). What is certain, however, is that Justinian created, in
107
parallel with the action of petitioning the inheritance, a fictitious action of the same (hereditatis petitio
108
possessoria). I wouldn't put this stuff or at least not all
109

5) VARIOUS TYPES OF THEFT

110

Theft, an almost as ancient offense as iniuria, consisted in the voluntary but non-violent subtraction of a
111
mobile thing (including subhuman animals and slaves) from its current "holder". It was the 12 Tables that
112
introduced a first discipline. They distinguished 2 hypotheses: 1. furtum manifestum (flagrant theft) that is,
113
of the thief caught on the fact in order to which they admitted that the robbed could operate on the
114
moment the manus iniectio of the thief and bring him before the judge magistrate , so that he pronounced
115
the assignment (addictio) of the thief to him. The direct reaction to night theft and armed theft in case of
116
flagrante by killing the thief always remained lawful.
117
2. furtum nec manifestum (non-flagrant theft) in respect of which they established that the robbed person
118
should sue the alleged thief (or the avente potestas su di lui) by means of the legis actio sacramenti in
119
personam, in order to prove his guilt and to obtain the sentence of double (duplum) of the value of the
120
stolen thing.
121 A search carried out b y the robbed in the
house of the suspect: a search to which the suspect could not refuse, as long as it was carried out in certain
122
ritual ways.
123 Two hypotheses of aggravated theft that led the penalty to the
triplum: hidden theft and transferred theft.
124

Ius civile: For the flagrant theft the system of judicial assignment of the thief to the robbed was abolished
125
and an action of ascertainment was introduced against the thief for the quadruple of the king For the cases
126
of non-flagrant theft remained the actions (double and triple) prepared by the 12 Tables but the ancient
127
search ceased.
128 The honorary
 right formulated 2 other hypotheses of aggravated theft, granting actions in quadruplum to the robbed: 1.
129
furtum prohibitum (prohibited theft) which occurred in the event that the suspect of theft had refused to
130
undergo the search 2. furtum non exhibitum (theft not exhibited ) which occurred in the event that the
131
receiver had not shown on request the things then found following a search in his house.
132

The essential requirements of the theft were recognized: a. in the reference only to movable things b. in
133
the theft of a thing of the robbed c. in the voluntariness of the stealth effect by the thief. d. in the
134
opposition to the act by the robbed
135

6) LEX AQUILIA (liability for unjust damage)

136

introduced at the beginning of the third century a.C. by the law Aquilia de damno (a plebiscitum). He
137
established: in the 1st chapter, anyone who had killed slaves or cattle from flocks owned by others, was
138
required to pay to the domino, the highest value reached by the object in the last year;
139 In the
3rd chapter, anyone who had committed material damage of another type or of minor magnitude (eg
140
simple injuries to slaves or flock livestock) was required to pay the owner the highest value reached by the
141
object during the last 30 days.
142

7) SURFACE
143

Born as a result of the concessions of public land especially in the forum in preclassical age; in the classical
144
age it also expanded to private relationships. The surface was an absolute relationship in the improper
145
sense, by virtue of which a subject (surface) could build and maintain on a soil of others, in perpetuity or
146
for a long period of time, a building: with the 'right' to defend its enjoyment against everything (erga
147
omnes); but with the 'obligation' to pay the soil domain a periodic fee, called "solario".
148

8) IUDICIUM (iudici formula)

149

The result of the litis contestatio, indicates the formula of the trial, which the private judge should have
150
followed. It consisted of four parts: 1 Assignment of the judge, 2 Part in favor of the plaintiff 3 Part in favor
151
of the defendant, 4 Order of judgment.
152

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. INTENT

153

154 CONDAMNATIO

INCIDENTAL ELEMENTS Demostratio (brief description), Award (division of a common object), Taxatio (limit
155
on pecuniary compensation), Premise (do not use extension of the action)
156

157

158

9) PRAETORIAN STIPULATIONS (CAUTIONES)

159

One of the complementary means of the praetor in the process of formulating. It was a precautionary
160
measure by which the praetor could order a counterparty to make a solemn promise of guarantee in the
161
event of a certain harmful event. If the addressee of the Praetorian Command did not undertake to pay a
162
sum of money to the other party in order to guarantee it in relation to the occurrence of a feared event,
163
the sanction against him was a rejection of the action he brought (denegatio actionis), an entry into
164
 possession of his assets (missio in possessionem) or other measure detrimental to his interests . . could be:
165
1 only a promise of the interested party simple 2 promised with guarantee of third parties.
166

10) SOCIETAS
167

11) MODAL CLAUSE

168

The modal clause was widely applied, used only in shops free of charge (e.g. testamentary attributions,
169
donations). It consisted in imposing on the recipient of the gratification a "modest burden" (modus): such
170
(for its modesty) as not to transform the act itself into an act of payment (eg obligation to erect a funeral
171
monument to the beneficiary, to devolve a share of the goods received to public games, etc.). If the person
172
charged did not fulfill the modal obligation, the gratification shop was, as a rule, equally effective, so that
173
to force the burdened to fulfill or compensate had to resort to various "expedients". "Expedients" that
174
were, in fact, created by the authors of the store, for example, were: the stipulation of a penalty that the
175
beneficiary undertook to pay in case of non-fulfillment, the imposition of sepulchral fines against the
176
defaulting legatee. "Expedients" of judicial creation were, for example: the rejection of the action
177
(denegatio actionis) of the legatee who asked for the thing related to the heir without having fulfilled the
178
burden, the imposition on the beneficiary of a prior precautionary promise, the treatment of the modal
179
testamentary disposition as "fedecommesso" in favor of the beneficiary of the modus.
180

12) CONDITION
181

CLAUSES INFLUENCING the effectiveness of the store were: the terminal clause and cl. Conditional
182

TERMINAL CLAUSE stipulated that the total or partial effectiveness of the store depended on a future but
183
certain circumstance (in the occurrence).
184 CONDITIONAL
CLAUSE It established that the total or partial effectiveness of the store depended on a future and
185
uncertain circumstance. In this regard, 3 classification orders were made: --Condizioni "positive" (eg if the
186
ship will arrive) and "negative" (eg if the ship will not arrive); --"Causal" (will of the case / of a third party),
187
"potestative" (will one of the parties) and "mixed" (will of both parties ex if you get married);
188
--Suspensive conditions (when the shop became effective), Termination conditions (when the store
189
occurred it lost effectiveness).
190

In the classical period the principle that the (suspensive) condition should be considered realized as a "legal
191
fiction" in the following cases: - when the verification of it had been maliciously prevented by those who
192
had an interest in avoiding it; - when the verification of a "potestative" or "mixed" condition had been
193
prevented by a causal circumstance (or by the refusal of the third party whose cooperation was requested),
194
even though everything possible had been done to have it verified by the person required to fulfil it.
195
Anomalous conditions such as: apparent conditions (clauses affixed in the contract, but superfluous
196
because they are already necessary), terminal conditions (future certain), purely potestative conditions
197
(left to the will of the author ex if I want), impossible conditions
198

13) PAYMENT ACTION

199

14) MORTGAGE
200

The case consisting in the voluntary transfer of ownership of money or other fungible things (nec mancipi)
201
from the lender to the borrower. Legal impossibility to include interest in the loan, to overcome this
202
problem it was necessary to conclude separately a stipulation for interest; or renew the relationship
203
through a stipulation including both capital and interest. The lender was entitled to personal action to
204
 protect his right of restitution. A special figure of mortgage was the loan at maritime interest: a lender
205
assumed on himself the great risk of lending a sum of money to the owner or captain of a ship so that he
206
would use it overseas or use it for the purchase of goods to be transported and the accipiente was required
207
to repay the sum only in the hypothesis in which the navigation came to fruition; in this case the accipiente
208
repaid the lender with at least twice the sum of money received by him.
209

15) ACTIO PUBLICIANA

210

Azione Publiciana (actio Publiciana) had a formula perfectly identical to that of the claim, but it also
211
contained the invitation to the private judge to pretend that the consignee of the thing sold had already
212
accrued in favor of the term for the usucapione. In case of purchase of res mancipi without using a solemn
213
shop.
214

16) ABILITY TO ACT

215

As a rule, at least until the entire classical period, it was not required that the ability to understand and
216
want existed 'in practice', that is, the system of ascertaining 'case by case' was not followed. It was
217
considered 'sufficient', unless otherwise evidenced (eg a state of clear drunkenness), the "abstract" ability
218
to act, that is, the existence at the time of the commission of the act, of some requirements of the subject.
219
Pubertal age; belonging to the male sex; psychic and physical normality.
220

Exceptions: 1 increase in the patrimony of the father or master archaic era 2 decrease in the patrimony of
221
the father or master of the classical preclassical era 3 male son in the classical age could be bound himself
222
to a credit, even if probably the father had to intervene.
223

17) LEGAL ACTS

224

225

226

18) USUCAPIONE
227

They were those for whom the property was acquired through the civil possession (ad usucapionem) of the
228
thing for a certain period of time and with the help of other requirements. The purchase for usucapione,
229
admitted already from the 12 Tables, occurred only with regard to things susceptible to quiritari domain
230
and in favor of those who could be dominoes. Some public laws proclaimed the inusucapibility of certain
231
things under certain conditions. In the 2nd century a.C. the stolen things were declared inusucapiable; 1
232
century a.C. declared itself inusucapibile the things that had been seized by violence.
233 In the classical
age the jurisprudence valued it to the point of considering it a real absolute relationship in the proper
234
sense: provisional (valid until the purchase of civil dominion over the thing for usucapione); as a substitute
235
(in this waiting period) for the quiritarian domain; even prevailing over the civil domain in case of conflict
236
between praetorian owner and civil dominoes. Until the usucapione of the thing had occurred (in 1 or 2
237
years), that is, until the possessor had turned into a civil domino by this way, the possessor was protected
238
by the judge magistrate as if he were the 'true owner' of the thing.
239

19) DATIO IN SOLUTUM

240

Performance in place of performance, i.e. the replacement of the service originally due by one of a
241
different nature
242
 20) FRAUD
243

Negotiating will made necessary in the classical period, we must distinguish two groups of errors of will A
244
and B.
245

1A Will expressed as a JOKE 2A DISCORDANCE had to be proven, excusable and the interests of third
246
parties had not been harmed 3A VALID SIMULATION unless the parties proved the simulation, a
247
fundamental requirement was missing or the action pursued was contrary to the law.
248

1B MALEVOLENT INTENT means the inexcusable behavior of a subject towards another subject, with the
249
aim of inducing him to an action prejudicial to his own interests and completely uneconomic. The fraud
250
was an accident and the shop was voidable.
251
In the classical age the legal 'means' intended to 'fight' the dolus malus were 3: • exceptio doli the shop
252
not yet executed. The deceived was put in a position to block the action of the ragiratore. The court
253
decided whether or not the action in •integrum restitutio ob dolum restored the initial factual situation (in
254
the case of a transaction already carried out and a restorable condition)• actio de dolo (the action for
255
criminal intent) obtaining the proven economic damage;
256

2B MORAL VIOLENCE in case of threat of an unjust and considerable evil; The victim could claim
257
compensation of four times as much as the year of the magistrate or the price if outside the year of the
258
magistrate. The action was also valid against anyone who took advantage of it.
259

3B ERROR NOT CAUSED EITHER BY INTENT OR MORAL VIOLENCE (error facti) Wrong or false knowledge of
260
a circumstance, the store was unusable if the error was essential for the purchase, excusable, recognizable
261
by the other party
262

263

23) EMPHYTEUSIS
264

Born in the Justinian age, it guaranteed a subject to dispose of and enjoy a fund of another subject in
265
exchange for an annual fee. In the pre-classical and classical period it was used to grant private individuals
266
the use of provincial funds in exchange for an annual fee. The praetor recognized emfitèuta as the owner,
267
as he could not be hunted.
268 Post classic the granting of public and private
funds created large landowners and was used on a large scale, to avoid misunderstandings about the
269
domain the public lands were divided into: 1 fundi rei privatae. on which the emphyteuta obtained the ius
270
perpetuum the concession was perpetual 2 fundi patrimoniales (of the emperor) his which the emphyteuta
271
obtained the ius enfiteuticarium, at least formally had to be periodically renewed.
272
In the fifth century D.C. The two institutes ended up merging it into the ius enphyteuticarium, which kept
273
the fee unchanged and in the event of maladministration the grantor could revoke the concession. Often
274
large Lady cross-country families granted in emphyteusis "their" latifundia. It was established that for
275
minor damage the emphyteuta had to intervene, for substantial damage the grantor.
276 Justinian law the
emphyteuta did not have the obligation to improve the fund but only to pay the annual fee point there was
277
the extinction of the emphyteusis if for three consecutive years the fee was not paid point the emphyteusis
278
was transferable to the heirs or to third parties, the grantor who had offered the same condition as the
279
alleged buyer should have been preferred; and in any case always warned.
280

24) PROPERTY PRETORIA (in bonis habere)

281
 Institute that was born in the pre-classical period, as a result of the initiative taken by the praetor judge to
282
favor certain owners of a thing waiting to usucapirla, granting them without delay a procedural protection
283
similar to that which would have been due to them if and when they had become civil domains. In the
284
classical age it was valued and even became prevalent with respect to the civil domain (or domain created
285
following the solemn forms) in case of conflict between praetorian owner and civil domain. Typical
286
hypothesis: the Pretoria property arises as a result of the line of action of a thing that is missing without
287
the required formality (mancipatio; in iure cessio; but resorting to a simple traditio. It was frequent for the
288
alienator to acquire with the traditio the possession of the good and wait to use it.
289

25) POSSESSIO NATURALIS

290

In contrast to civil possession, any other hypothesis of possession, being "unsuitable" for the production of
291
legal effects, was usually said to be of natural possession (possessio naturalis or corporalis) in the sense of
292
possession exclusively de facto. But in the context of natural possession, a further subdivision gradually
293
acquired importance between: possession on his own account (possessio pro suo) exercised by a subject
294
(no matter if rightly or wrongly) for the obvious purpose of keeping the object always for himself, as his
295
own, without admitting that others could have the right to it;
296
possession on behalf of others (possessio pro alieno or detentio) exercised instead in the unequivocal
297
recognition that others had the right to the object and could sooner or later request its return.••
298

26.0)SUPPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS OF FORMS PROCEDURES

299

1 The interdicta; 2 Le in integrum restitutiones; 3 Le stipulationes praetoriae; 4 The missio in possessionem;

300
5The bonorum venditio; 6 The bonorum distractio; 7 La datio bonorum possessionis
301

26) INTERDICTA
302

Interdicted The interdicts were "emergency injunctions", issued by the magistrate in contradictory
303
between the 2 parties, in order to avoid the delays of the ordinary process in the hypothesis of certain
304
relatively simple and evident cases. The magistrate in these cases thought well to order the defendant 1 of
305
these 3 activities:
306

1. restore a state of affairs that had altered; 2. show an object that he keeps confidential or a legal entity
307
that he holds prisoner; 3. refrain from a certain behavior. The injunction was issued after a summary
308
assessment of the probable merits of the plaintiff's assertions: if the defendant refused or failed to comply
309
with them, the plaintiff could move on to bring a personal action against him by interdict, giving rise to a
310
rapid verification process aimed at confirming (or excluding) the good foundation of the interdict or the
311
unjust non-compliance of the addressee. As a rule, the procedure following the non-execution of an
312
interdict was a "criminal" procedure, in the sense that it involved (on the basis of mutual promises) the
313
payment of an appropriate pecuniary penalty from that between the 2 parties who turned out to have
314
wrongly supported their thesis.
315

27.0) OBLIGATIONS
316

The obligatio was, in Roman law, the legal bond that a free person (obligatus) contracted by obliging
317
himself to perform a certain service towards another person (crèditor). The bond was aimed at fulfillment
318
and originally had a personal nature (vinculum personæ): therefore, if the debtor defaulted, he was
319
subservient to the creditor through the manus inièctio. The obligatio therefore did not translate into the
320
duty to perform, materializing, instead, in the bond that bound the parties, with
321
personal content and value: the person of the debtor, in his physical entity, was bound (reus obligatus).
322
 Only later did the object of the obligatio become the performance, that is, the conduct that the debtor had
323
to hold to satisfy the creditor's claim and could consist of a fàcere, dare or præstare.
324

27.1) PARTIAL, CUMULATIVE, JOINT AND SEVERAL OBLIGATIONS WITH AN INDETERMINATE PERSON
325

1 partial obligations. Thus the performance was due to each creditor or burdened each debtor only in
326
proportion to his individual part 2 cumulative obligations. Such were those in which the benefit was due
327
in full (in solidum) by each co-debtor to the creditor (hypothesis of "passive cumulativity") or by the debtor
328
to each co-creditor. They had to carry out the service together all in their part 3 joint and several
329
obligations. Such were those in which the benefit was due in full (in solidum), but only once, from the 1st
330
of the multiple co-debtors to whom the only creditor requested it (hypothesis of "passive solidarity") or to
331
the 1st of the multiple co-creditors who requested it from the single debtor (hypothesis of "active
332
solidarity")
333

28) PLURILATERAL SHOP

334

For consideration and for consideration (synallagmatic) services that imply an interdependence between
335
the parties
336

29) FAITHCOMMISSION
337

Towards the end of the preclassic period, the custom of making legacies mortis causa, rather than by
338
legacy, by fedecommesso (fideicommissum), that is, by means of a formal prayer (rogatio) addressed to the
339
heir (even if in the name of the holder) or to the legatee (called therefore burdened) to transfer in whole or
340
in part an asset received by them to a third party, the fedecommissario, who was therefore the effective
341
beneficiary of the legacy. The formal prayer (rogatio fideicommissaria) did not cease to any pre-
342
established form, it could be done in the will, in the codicilli (even unsigned) or with any verbal
343
manifestation. From it initially arose a pure commitment of honor, not a juridical duty of the burden. But
344
from the time of Augustus it was entrusted first to the consuls, and then to a special praetor, the task of
345
providing extra ordinem that the execution was judicially ensured to the faith committed. Faithcommesso
346
of inheritance, that is, from the request addressed to the heir to transmit in whole or in part his
347
inheritance (or his share of the inheritance) to another person.
348

30) SUCCESSIONS
349

All chapter 5
350

31) SALE (emptio venditio)

351

The sale (emptio venditio) was the contract between seller and buyer (emptor) by virtue of which it was
352
born: the obligation of the seller to procure to the buyer the full and peaceful availability of a thing until he
353
had purchased, by usucapione or otherwise, the domain the obligation of the buyer to transfer, as
354
consideration for a sum of equivalent money••. It was used for shops between Romans and foreigners,
355
who obviously could not constitute the dominium ex iure Quiritium, a strictly civil relationship, since the
356
peregrini were excluded from the use of the ius civile vetus.
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In the postclassical age the progressive decadence of mancipatio and in iure cessio, the enhancement of
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consensual acts as constitutive also of absolute legal relationships, the economic depression were factors
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that contributed to determining the evolution of the emptio venditio from a mandatory contract to a
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 contract with real effects. All movable or immovable property could be the object of sale; The price
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consisted of cash and had to be: of course, that is, determined in an exact figure.
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32) WAYS OF BUYING THE PROPERTY already printed

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33) PREDIAL SERVITUDES AND WAYS OF EXTINCTION

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Real relations of enjoyment: 1 predial servitude; 2 usufruct; 3 surface; 4 emphyteusii

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Real guarantee relationships: 1 trust; 2 pledge; 3 mortgage

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PREDIAL SERVITUDE. The obligation of a fund (servant) to undergo an action and here a limitation to
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ensure a certain advantage to the neighboring (dominant) fund The dominante fund boasts ius in re aliena.
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Classification: 1 easement of passage 2 easements on the surface, right to build on the servant land 3
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servitudes for rustic need (ex to graze the flock) 4 urban servitudes (ex do not raise the building beyond a
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threshold). Anomalous servitù: one was based on jus honorarium and satisfied a personal utilitas
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constituted themselves by traditio. 2 concerned the funds and provincial. 3 exceptions to limits already
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imposed by law.
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Methods of constitution: 1 mancipatio, 2 la in iure cessio, 3 will, 4 agreement between owners, 5 informal
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acceptance.
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Ways of extinction: 1 confusion 2 renunciation 3 change in the state of places.

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34) LOCATIO CONDUCTIO

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36) DOWRY
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the pronouncement of dowry (dotis dictio), solemn negotiating declaration conferring a right of credit to
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the husband as regards the dowry assets; the bestowal of dowry (dotis datio), shop or complex of shops
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valid to transfer concretely to the husband the absolute or relative rights on the res dotales; the promise
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of dowry (dotis promissio) made through a stipulatio shop from which a credit of the husband in relation
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to the endowment assets arose. In the postclassical age, the pactum dotis became a typically constitutive
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act of dowry, devoid of forms, but subjected, for the most significant amounts to registration in the public
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registers.
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37) TRADITION
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