INTRODUCTION

The Paquete Habana often cited prize cases decided by the US Supreme Court in 1900. The case
arose at the outbreak of the Spanish- American war when two Cuban fishing vessels, the PH was
captured by a US naval blockade squadron. The vessel was removed from Cuban waters and sold
by the United States as prizes of war. Appeals challenging these sales subsequently were filed in
the Supreme Court, and the cases were consolidated for argument and decision.
HISTORY
The Spanish-American 21 Apr was a conflict that took place in 1898 between Spain
War 1898 and
the United States. The main cause of the war was the US support for Cuban independence,
which
led to a Spanish-American confrontation in the Philippines, Guam, and the Caribbean. The wa r
lasted only a few months and ended in August 1898 with the Treaty of Paris, which resulted in
Spain ceding control of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States. The war
marked the beginning of US imperialism and the emergence of the United States as a global
power.
FACTS
The Paquete Habana was a fishing vessel, forty three feet long, having 25 tons. It was owned by
Justa Galban, a woman of Spanish descent living in Havana and captained by Juan Pasos, a
Cuban
of Spanish descent. It carried 4 members including 3 crew members. Both ship and Pasos had
License from the Spanish Government to fish. The ship left Havana on March 25, 1898 and
proceeded to Cape San Antonio, where the crew fished for 25 days before sailing back to
Havana
With a cargo of 8,800 pounds of live fish.
By the time fisherman began their journey, the blockade of the northern coast of Cuba was in
effect. On April 25, 1898, the first day of the war, the Paquete Habana was captured off by the
U.S.S Castine. At the time of capture, the crew of the Paquete Habana knew nothing of the
blockade or the war. Although the ship was not suited for naval combat, both the crew and vessel
immediately were taken to Key West for adjudication.
The Lola was a larger ship than Paquete Habana, 51 feet long, displacing 35 tons, owned by
Severo
Gonzales, a Cuban born in Spain. It was captained by Tomas Betancourt, a Spanish subject
living
in Havana. Neither the ship nor the Betancourt had any license or commission. The ship
departed
Havana on April 11, 1989, eleven days prior to President McKinley’s proclamation of the
Blockade. After taking some 10,000 pounds of live fish, the Lola set course for Havana. She
was
Captured by unarmoured cruiser U.S.S Dolphin and just like Paquete Habana, was taken into
Key West and libelled as prize.
The cases came before District Court Judge James W. Locke on May 23, 1898. On May 28, 1898
Judge Locke entertained motions from the side of the counsel for the paquete Habana and the
lola.
Judge Locke de nied the motions in decrees of May 30, 1898, stating that the court, “not being
satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, treaty or proclamation, fishing vessels
of
this case are exempt from seizure,” ordered condemnation, for feiture and sale of the vessels
and
cargo.
Both the vessels were auctioned, apparently in July or August of 1898, by US Marshal John F.
Horr. The paquete Habana brought $490 and the lola $800. On August 12, 1898, the counsel for
the vessel filed appeals in both cases with the SC. The two cases were consolidated.
JUDGE- The court raises sua sponte a jurisdictional issue that it asked the parties to brief and
argue. Whether the jurisdiction of the case lies to the Supreme Court of US?
ARGUMENT 1
RESPONDENT- The Act of March 3, 1891 impose a $1000 jurisdiction limit only to cases
made
final in the circuit court of appeals. The paquete Haban a had come from district court thus the
old
$2,000 limit in R.D. 695 applied. Because $2,000 was not a stake in the paquete Habana, the
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction.
APPEALLANT- 1891 circuit court of appeal act has repealed the $2,000 jurisdict ional limit of
R.S. 695 and consequently direct appeals can now be taken to the Supreme Court from final
decrees in prize cases, regardless of the amount at issue.
JUDGE-

ARGUMENT 2- APPEALLANT/ VESSEL

In my appeal I would like to make four assignments of error by the district court.
First- is a basic point in International Law: that the fishing vessel are not subject to condemnation
as lawful prize
Second- is based on the statement made in President McKinley’s proclamation of April 26, 1898,
that war should be conducted in accordance with recent practice of nations. As per this seizure of
fishing vessels are not included
Third, that the joint resolution of April 20, 1898 has recognized Cuban Independence therefore
the fishing vessels are neutral and not enemy property.
Fourth- that district court erroneously excluded evidence regarding the immunity of the vessels.
Counsel seeks permission to advance with the argument
JUDGE- permission granted.
Firstly, As per law of nations, it does not sanction the capture and condemnation of boast
exclusively
Engaged in coastal fishing. According to President McKinley’s proclamation of April 26, 1898,
The US intends to follow the principle of modern international law in waging the war. I hereby,
quote “Therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim and
declare that the United States of America has in due form of law, and in accordance with the law
of nations, recognized the existence of a state of war between the United States and the Kingdom
of Spain.”
The actions of the government and the almost uniform opinions of the publicists provided
sufficient evidence that immunity to coastal fishing vessel existed as a rule of IL.
As per Lord Phillimore in The queen v. Keyn, 1876, “the opinions of jurists are good evidence of
what is International Law.”
In book “Froissart’s Chronicle’s” by Jean Froissart are a prose history of the Hundred years’ War
written in the 14 the century and Henry IV’s order of 1406, granting protection to fishermen, as
evidence of the rule’s ancient origins.
It was cited in a French case La Nostra signora de la piedad, 1856, that immunity for coastal
fishing vessels was a binding rule of International law. In the court's decision, several legal
precedents were cited, including the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (which ended the war between
Mexico and the United States), the Law of Nations, and various cases related to prize law and
international law. The court ultimately found that the seizure of the ship was illegal and ordered
it to be released and its cargo returned.
The case was significant in establishing the principle that international law supersedes domestic
law when it comes to the rights of foreign vessels in a nation's ports. This principle is now known
as the "La Piedad doctrine."
Also French actions in the Crimean war, 1853 and Franco- Prussian Wars, 1870 are the evidence
of recent practice.
Your honor, do note that during the Mexican war, 1846 exemption for fishing boats was allowed
by the US. Also your honor, prior to Secretary Long’s April 30, 1898, letter to rear Admiral
Sampson, instructions has been given not to harm fishing boats.
RESPONDENT- I object your honor, as no proof of such letter has been submitted.
JUDGE- Maintained.
Lastly, your honor I would like to point out that officers and crews of the vessels lacked
knowledge
of the blockade and the war and thus could not have intended to participate in the hostilities or
aid
the enemy.
RESPONDENT- I object your honor, as no proof of such letter has been submitted.
Hoyt cited a number of Civil War cases, notably the Prize Cases 134 and Mrs. Alexander's
Cotton, for the proposition that all persons who reside in enemy territory and do not remove
themselves on the outbreak of war are enemies and will be treated as such, without inquiries into
individual sentiments. Because Cuba was not independent, it continued to be Spanish and,
therefore, enemy territory.
Hence, the Cuban owners of the vessels were alien enemies. 136 Finally, Hoyt argued that the
language of President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation did not change United States
policy; references in the proclamation to modern practice in international law related to the
specific subjects that followed, the "days of grace" and the Declaration of Paris.
Hoyt's second contention addressed the primary question of whether an exemption for fishing
vessels existed in international law. He began by admitting that some exemption existed. He
posited that the exemption existed for humanitarian reasons, or because of the insignificance of
the property involved.
Hence, the fishing vessels at issue did not fall within the ambit of the exception because they
were relatively large vessels capable of remaining at sea for some time.
ARGUMENT 2
APPEALLANT- The joint resolution of April 20, 1898 was a piece of legislation passed by the
US Congress authorizing the use of military force against Spain in response to the situation in
Cuba.

The text of the resolution reads in part: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United Stat es of America in Congress assembled, First, that the people of the Island of
Cuba
are, and of right ought to be, free and independent; and that the government of the United States
Hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of that island."
The recognition of the freedom and independence of a whole people must of necessity regard
them as a state for all purposes of war, and the use of the expression the ‘the people of Cuba’ in
the joint resolution of Congress must certainly have that effect.
Also the owners and mariners of the ships in question are domiciled in Cuba and hence were
‘Cubans’ within the meaning of joint resolution.
RESPONDENT-
In making this argument, however, Kirlin completely ignored the principle, established in the
United States at the time of Washington's presidency, that recognition of a foreign state or
government is the exclusive prerogative of the executive. Because it was an action of Congress,
the joint resolution could have no effect upon American recognition of Cuba. Only President
McKinley could receive envoys and recognize governments, and he had not done so with Cuba.
The insulting demands in the joint resolution could provoke war, but they could not recognize
Cuba.
The government, possibly for political reasons, did not use the doctrine of exclusive executive
perogative to refute Kirlin's argument; instead, all parties focused on issues of
recognition/nonrecognition and enemy versus ally or neutral status.
The government's brief on the merits, filed by Hoyt, raised two principal issues: whether, as a
matter of general law, fishing vessels were exempt from capture; and whether the Cuban owners
were entitled to the rights and privileges of neutrals. Hoyt began with his strongest argument -
that the crews were neither allies nor neutrals. Emphasizing that there was no proof the owners or
the crews were in sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, he argued that they could not therefore
be belligerent allies. Nor could they be neutrals, because the taking of provisions into Havana
was not a neutral act.

ARGUMENT 3-
HYOT/ RESPONDENT- Hoyt argued that the circumstances of the captures at issue in The
Paquete Habana were analogous to the hypothetical capture by a French cruiser of an American
vessel sailing under a Tory flag. Hoyt noted that France had entered the Revolutionary War on
the American side in 1778. Therefore, a French cruiser could not have made a valid prize of an
American vessel, because the United States had a flag and belligerent rights that were
recognized by France. 101 A French cruiser, however, could have made a valid prize of an
American vessel that was flying a British flag, because the American vessel would have been
deemed a Tory ship and thus an enemy.
Neither the paquete Habana nor the lola flew the Cuban fla g, instead
both vessels regularly sailed under the Spanish flag. Therefore, the indicia of the vessels show
their enemy character.
The position taken by the United States was that Cubans, by virtue of their status as Spanish
subjects, were alien enemies and thus their vessels were good prizes unless they openly adhered
to the Cuban cause. 106 The crews of vessels, out of fear of the Spanish, or for other reasons, had
not done so. Therefore, they were enemies, and no further evidence should be allowed to prove
otherwise.
APPEALLANT- The mere operation of fishing boat under the Spanish flag does not raise a
presumption of hostility, instead all situational factors such as ownership, cargo and
circumstances
has to be considered. The crew had no knowledge of war and therefore had no hostile intent. I
conclude by saying that presence of the Spanish flag was not sufficient to give ships a hostile
character.
ARGUMENT 4-

JUDGE- The court raises sua sponte a jurisdictional issue that it asked the parties to brief and
argue. Whether the jurisdiction of the case lies to the Supreme Court of US?
RESPONDENT- The Act of March 3, 1891 impose a $1000 jurisdiction limit only to cases
made
final in the circuit court of appeals. The paquete Haban a had come from district court thus the
old
$2,000 limit in R.D. 695 applied. Because $2,000 was not a stake in the paquete Habana, the
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction.
APPEALLANT- 1891 circuit court of appeal act has repealed the $2,000 jurisdict ional limit of
R.S. 695 and consequently direct appeals can now be taken to the Supreme Court from final
decrees in prize cases, regardless of the amount at issue.

Judgement
The announcement of the decision and the reading of the opinions in The Paquete Habana was
the main order of business on January 8, 1900. 162 After stating the facts of the captures and
condemnations, Gray addressed the jurisdictional question that the Court had raised sua sponte.
The Court rejected the government's contention that there was no jurisdiction because the $2,000
limit in R.S. 695 163 was not met and held that the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891 164
had made the nature of the case, not the amount involved, the relevant criterion for appellate
jurisdiction. The Act, by providing for direct appeal of final decrees in prize without mention of
amount, had sub silentio repealed the jurisdictional amount of R.S. 695; the $1,000 limit in the
1891 Circuit Court of Appeals Act applied only to certain cases which had been before a court of
appeals.
Recognizing the growth and dynamism of international law, Justice Gray refuted the
government's assertion that there could be no exemption without positive executive action and
resolved the comity argument:
The opinion begins by admitting the known custom in former wars not to capture such vessels;
adding, however, "but this was a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision." Assuming the
phrase "legal decision" . . . as equivalent to "judicial decision," it is true that, so far as appears,
there had been no such decision on the point in England. The word "comity" was apparently used
by Lord Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or goodwill. But the period of a hundred years
which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in
custom or comity. . . to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of
international law.
Justice Gray followed his discussion of actual practice with an examination of the writings of
contemporary jurists. He began this segment of the opinion with a statement that is perhaps the
most often-cited passage from The Paquete Habana:

“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presentedfor their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators. . . . Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”

This was a clear rebuff to the government's argument that the Court should reject the
"speculations" of theorists because they were not acceptable sources of law.

Justice Gray understood not only the dynamic nature of international custom, but the place of
jurists and commentators in the civil and international law systems. His examina
tion of the contemporary sources was as thorough as his historical research and included
American, French, Argentine, German, English, Dutch, Austrian, Spanish, Portuguese, and
Italian writers. His conclusion exhibited this understanding:

“ [A]t the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international
law, founded on considerations of humanity. . . and of the mutual convenience of belligerent
states, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed
and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt
from capture as prize of war.”

The exemption was not a universal one; it did not apply if the vessels engaged in warfare, or if
naval operations created a state of military necessity "to which all private interests must give
way. “Nor did it apply to deep-sea fishing vessels taking fish that were not brought fresh to
market. Within its limits, however, it was an effective and binding rule of international law.
Justice Gray refuted the proposition that positive executive action was required to recognize the
exemption. He cited Justice Marshall's opinion in Brown v. United States which relied on the
modern usage of nations, I 84 and Justice Strong's statement in The Scotia that "it is recognition
of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind these rules have been acquiesced in as
of general obligation. . . . Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is not so
with the law of nations.

Justice Gray closed his opinion by reviewing President McKinley's April 26, 1898, proclamation
and the correspondence between Rear Admiral Sampson and Secretary Long. 187 Justice Gray
interpreted the preamble of the proclamation as evidence of American intent to conduct the
blockade in compliance with international law. He interpreted Rear Admiral Sampson's dispatch
as evidence of his belief that, absent an express order to the contrary, coastal fishermen were not
subject to arrest. Providing Secretary Long's reply with a more lenient interpretation than it
perhaps deserved, Justice Gray viewed it as forbidding the blockade squadron from interfering
with coastal fishing vessels unless the vessels were likely to aid the enemy. 188 Justice Gray
emphasized the facts of the case, pointing out that the Paquete Habana and the Lola were small,
unarmed vessels engaged in coastal fishing. The vessels were not aiding the enemy or trying to
run the blockade. Moreover, the crews were working for a share of the cargo; thus, neither vessel
was a "commercial adventure." Therefore, Justice Gray concluded that the vessels came within
the exemption provided by international law. The decree of the district court was reversed, arid
the Court ordered the proceeds of the sales restored to the claimants, with damages and costS.18

It followed that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over The Paquete Habana.

The District Court held the shipping vessels and their cargoes liable. The District Court was of the view
that in absence of any treaty, proclamation, or ordinance it cannot be established that the fishing vessels
were exempted from seizure.

The SC ordered that

The proceeds of the auctions, as well as any profits made from the vessels’ cargo, be restored to the
claimants “with damages and costs.” Thus, barred any “controlling executive or judicial decision” and
directed its incorporation into the corpus of the United States law.

T`he fishing vessels, cargoes, and the crew shall be exempted from seizures or from capture as prizes of
war as it is a customary international law even if not reduced into a treaty or ordinance.

The fact that it has not been established as a statutory law does not allow the capture of the fishing
vessels pursuing their vocation of catching fish as it is a rule under customary international law.

With that, the court asserted the obligation should be taken into effect on that ground. Consequently, the
decrees of condemnation were reversed. Thus, the claimants of the respective vessels were provided the
compensatory damages and costs and ordered the restoration of the proceeds of the sales of both the
vessels to them.
Held. (Gray, J.). Yes. Coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews are excluded
from prizes of war. The doctrine that exempts coastal fishermen with their vessels and
crews from capture as prizes of war has been known by the U.S. (P) from the time of
the War of Independence and has been recognized explicitly by the French and British
governments. It is an established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels
with their equipment and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly pursuing
their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fish are exempt from capture as prizes
of war. Reversed.