Bontempi - Psa

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PSA:
CARATTERISTICHE
FENOMENO INCENDIO
Prof. Ing. Franco Bontempi
Ing. Chiara Crosti
Facolta’ di Ingegneria Civile e Industriale
Universita’ degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”
PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE
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INCENDIO
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• Incendio = combustione autoalimentata ed

incontrollata di materiali combustibili.
• Carattere estensivo (diffusione nello spazio):
1. wildfire
2. urbanfire
3. all’esterno di un edificio
4. all’interno di un interno
• Carattere intensivo (andamento nel tempo).
• Natura accidentale.
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Diffusione nello spazio
CARATTERE ESTENSIVO
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1. WILDFIRE
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2. URBANFIRE
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The Great Fire of London Sunday, 2 September
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to Wednesday, 5 September 1666.
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The Great Fire of the City of New York, www.francobontempi.
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16 December 1835
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The Great Fire of Chicago, October 7-10, 1871
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3. ALL’ESTERNO DI UN EDIFICIO
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4. ALL’INTERNO DI UN EDIFICIO
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NUMERICAL
MODELING
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Andamento temporale
CARATTERE INTENSIVO
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ISO 13387: Example of Design Fire

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EVOLUZIONE NEL TEMPO DELLA www.francobontempi.
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POTENZA TERMICA
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ANTINCENDIO
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Summary of periods of typical fire development

Incipient Growth period Burning period Decay period
T period
Fire Heating Fuel controlled burning Ventilation controlled Fuel controlled

Behavior of fuel burning burning
Human Prevent Extinguish by hand, Death
behavior ignition escape
Detection Smoke Smoke detectors, heat External smoke and flame
detectors detectors
Active Prevent Extinguish by sprinklers Control by fire-fighters
control ignition or fire fighters; control
of smoke
Passive - Select materials with Provide fire resistance;
control resistance to flame contain fire, prevent collapse
spread
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Buchanan, 2002
ANTINCENDIO time 52
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Curva naturale d’incendio

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Temperatura T(t)
flashover
FIRE MODEL
Fire thermal exposure
HEAT TRANSFER
MODEL
STRATEGIE STRATEGIE
ATTIVE PASSIVE
Thermal gradients
(approccio (approccio
STRUCTURAL
sistemico) strutturale)
MODEL andamento di T(t) a
seguito del successo
delle strategie attive
Load capacity
Tempo t
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ANTINCENDIO
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Fire Safety Strategies
prevention protection robustness
active F passive
L
 Limit ignition  Detection measures  Create fire  Prevent the
sources (smoke, heat, flame A compartments propagation
 Limit hazardous detectors) S  Prevent damage of collapse,
human behavior  Suppression H in the elements once local
 Emergency measures (sprinklers,  Prevent loss of damages
O
procedure and fire extinguisher, functionality in occurred (e.g.
evacuation standpipes, firemen) V the building redundancy)
 Smoke and heat E
evacuation system R
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ANTINCENDIO
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Fire Safety Strategies

1 2 3 4
prevention
doesn’t
N trigger
Y
extinguishes
Y
active
triggers protection no failures
Y
N
spreads passive
protection Y no collapse
N
damages robustness
N
collapse
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ANTINCENDIO
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Evento
CARATTERE ACCIDENTALE
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ANTINCENDIO
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Situazioni HPLC
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DOI: 10.3267/HE2008
High Probability Low Consequences

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ANTINCENDIO
LPHC events www.francobontempi.
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ANTINCENDIO
HPLC – LPHC EVENTS www.francobontempi.
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LPHC
HPLC
Low Probability
High probability
High
Low Consequences
Consequences
release of energy SMALL LARGE
numbers of breakdown SMALL LARGE
people involved FEW MANY
nonlinearity WEAK STRONG
interactions WEAK STRONG
uncertainty WEAK STRONG
decomposability HIGH LOW
course predictability HIGH LOW
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ANTINCENDIO
LINEAR interactions NONLINEAR
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TIGHT
couplings
Perrow
LOOSE
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ANTINCENDIO
Complexity
NON LINEAR
BEHAVIOR
TIGHT
LINEAR
COUPLING
INTERACTIONS
CONNECTIONS
LOOSE LOW
AMBIGUITY
UNCERTAINTY
HIGH
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Nonlinearity www.francobontempi.
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MAIN CABLES
TOWERS GEOMETRIC NONLINEARITY
HANGERS
777 183 3300 183 627
+383.00 +383.00
+118.00
+54.00 +52.00 +77.00 m +63.00
CONTROL DEVICES
MATERIAL NONLINEARITY
SOIL BEHAVIOR
SOIL/STRUCTURE INTERFACE CONTACT
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Uncertainty www.francobontempi.
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GEOMETRY AND MATERIAL
777 183 3300 183 627
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+118.00
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LOADING SYSTEM
STRUCTURAL MODEL
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Interactions www.francobontempi.
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TRAFFIC – STRUCTURE
777 183 3300 183 627
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+118.00
+54.00 +52.00 +77.00 m +63.00
WIND - STRUCTURE
SOIL - STRUCTURE
GLOBAL/LOCAL STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOUR
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DOI: 10.3267/HE2008 Approcci di analisi www.francobontempi.
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HPLC LPHC
Eventi Frequenti con Eventi Rari con
Conseguenze Limitate Conseguenze Elevate
Impostazione
del problema:
ANALISI ANALISI
Deterministico QUALITATIVA PRAGMATICA
DETERMINISTICA CON SCENARI
Complessità:
Aspetti non lineari e
ANALISI Meccanismi di interazioni
Stocastico QUANTITATIVA
PROBABILISTICA
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ANTINCENDIO
Scenari (D.M. 14 settembre 2005) www.francobontempi.
org
Il Progettista, a seguito della classificazione e della caratterizzazione delle azioni,

deve individuare le possibili situazioni contingenti in cui le azioni possono
cimentare l’opera stessa. A tal fine, è definito:
 lo scenario: un insieme organizzato e realistico di situazioni in cui l’opera
potrà trovarsi durante la vita utile di progetto;
 lo scenario di carico: un insieme organizzato e realistico di azioni che
cimentano la struttura;
 lo scenario di contingenza: l’identificazione di uno stato plausibile e
coerente per l’opera, in cui un insieme di azioni (scenario di carico) è
applicato su una configurazione strutturale.
Per ciascuno stato limite considerato devono essere individuati scenari di carico
(ovvero insiemi organizzati e coerenti nello spazio e nel tempo di azioni) che
rappresentino le combinazioni delle azioni realisticamente possibili e
verosimilmente più restrittive.
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ANTINCENDIO
Overview of scenario analysis
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Establish
Determine geometry,
performance
construction and
requirements
use of the building
Establish maximum likely

fuel loads
Estimate maximum likely

number of occupants
and their locations
Buchanan, 2002
Assume certain fire protection
features
Carry out fire engineering

analysis
Modify fire No Yes

Acceptable Accept
protection
performance design
features PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE
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ANTINCENDIO
ISO 13387: Example of Event Tree
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ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
CONTROLLING FIRE SPREAD

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• The larger a fire, the greater its destructive

potential.
• The control of fire movement, or fire spread, is
discussed in four categories:
1. within the room of origin;
2. to other rooms on the same level;
3. to other storey of the same building;
4. to other buildings.
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ANTINCENDIO
ISO 13387: Examples of Fire Spread Routes
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ANTINCENDIO
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Fire spread within the room of origin

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• Fire spread within the room of origin depends largely on

heat release rate of the initially burning object.
• Vertical and horizontal fire spread will be greatly
increased if the room is lined with combustible materials
susceptible to rapid flame spread on the walls and
especially on the ceilings.
• The properties of interest are ignitability, flame spread
and the amount of smoke produced; these are often
called early fire hazard properties or reaction to fire
properties; these properties can be improved with the
use of special paints or pressure treatment.
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ANTINCENDIO
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Fire spread to adjacent rooms (1)
org
• Spread of fire and smoke to adjacent rooms is a major
contributor to fire deaths. Fire and smoke movement depends
vey much on the geometry of the building. If doors are open,
they can provide a path for smoke and toxic combustion
products to travel from the upper layer of the fire room into the
next room or corridor.
• Keeping doors closed is essential to preventing fire spread from
room to room. Doors through fire barrier must be able to
maintain the containment function of the barrier through which
they pass, whether for smoke control or fire resistance.
• Door closing devices which operate automatically when a fire is
detected are very effective for greatly increasing fire safety.
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ANTINCENDIO
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Fire spread to adjacent rooms (2)
org
• Concealed spaces are one of the most dangerous paths for the
spread f fire and smoke. Concealed cavities are a particular
problem in old buildings, especially if a number of new ceilings
or partitions have been added over the years.
• Fire can also spread to adjacent rooms by penetrating the
surrounding walls. Fire resisting walls must extend through
suspended ceilings to the floor or roof above so that the fire
does not spread by traveling through concealed space above
the wall.
• The wall can be extended above the roof line to form a parapet,
or the roof can be fire-rated for some distance either side of the
top of the wall.
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ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
Fire spread to others storey (1)
org
• Vertical shafts and stairways must be fire-stopped or separated
from the occupied space at each level to avoid producing a path
for spread of fire and smoke from floor to floor. A particularly
dangerous situation can arise if there are interconnected
horizontal and vertical concealed spaces, within the building or
on the façade.
• This is particularly important of curtain-wall construction where
the exterior panels are not part of the structure. Careful
detailing and installation is necessary to ensure that the entire
gap is sealed, especially at corners and junctions, to eliminate
any possible path for fire spread.
• Gaps such as these between structural and non-structural
elements are often filedPROGETTAZIONE
with non-rigid
STRUTTURALE
fire-stopping materials
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to allow for seismic or thermal movement.
ANTINCENDIO
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Fire spread to others storey (2)
org
• Vertical fire spread can also occur outside the building
envelope, via combustible cladding materials or exterior
windows.
• Vertical spread of fire from window is a major hazard in multi-
story buildings. This hazard can be partly controlled by keeping
windows small and well separated, and by using horizontal
aprons which project above windows openings.
• Flames from small narrow windows tend to project further
away from the wall of the building than flames from long wide
windows, leading to lower probability of storey fire spread.
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ANTINCENDIO
Fire spread to other buildings www.francobontempi.
org
• Fire can spread from a burning building to adjacent buildings by

flame contact, by radiation from windows, or by flaming brands.
• Fire spread can be prevented by providing a fire-resisting barrier
or by providing sufficient separation distances. If there are
openings in the external wall, the probability of fire spread
depends greatly on the distances between the buildings and the
size of the openings. It depends also on relative buildings
heights.
• Collapse of exterior walls can be a major hazard for fire-fighters
and bystanders, and can lead to further spread of fire to
adjacent buildings.
• Fire spread by flame contact is only possible if the buildings are
quite close together, whereas fire spread by radiation can occur
over many meters. Fire PROGETTAZIONE
can alsoSTRUTTURALE
travel large distances between
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buildings if combustible vegetation
ANTINCENDIO is present.
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Rischio
IMPOSTAZIONE DELLA SICUREZZA
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ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.org RISK CONCERN
SYSTEM
RISK HAZARD SISTEMA
RISCHIO PERICOLO (hole (walking person
tombino) pedone)
cause EXPOSURE
ESPOSIZIONE
causa
VULNERABILITY
VULNERABLITA'
(path
percorso)
ENVIRONMENT
effect CONSEQUENCES
AMBIENTE
CONSEGUENZE
effetto (distraction
(sidewalk
marciapiede)
distrazione)
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Risk treatment www.francobontempi.
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START
100 %
Option 1 : No
RISK 50 %
AVOIDANCE
Yes
50 %
Option 2 : No
RISK
REDUCTION 30 %
Yes
20 %
Option 3 : No
RISK 25 %
TRANSFER
Yes
5%
Option 4 :
RISK
ACCEPTANCE
No
STOP
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ANTINCENDIO
Option 1 – Risk avoidance, which usually means not proceeding to
www.francobontempi.
continue with the system; this is not always a feasible
org
option, but may be the only course of action if the
hazard or their probability of occurrence or both are
particularly serious;
Option 2 – Risk reduction, either through (a) reducing the
probability of occurrence of some events, or (b) through
reduction in the severity of the consequences, such as
downsizing the system, or (c) putting in place control
measures;
Option 3 – Risk transfer, where insurance or other financial
mechanisms can be put in place to share or completely
transfer the financial risk to other parties; this is not a
feasible option where the primary consequences are not
financial;
Option 4 – Risk acceptance, even when it exceeds the criteria, but
perhaps only for a limited time until other measures can
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be taken. ANTINCENDIO
Risk Analysis, Assessment, www.francobontempi.
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Management (IEC 1995)
Luur, 2002
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ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
Quantitative Risk Analysis

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Luur, 2002
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ANTINCENDIO
Risk-based decision making
www.francobontempi.
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
(social, individual,
political, organizational,
technological)
DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into a
Stewart & Melchers, 1997

number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS

(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
waht controls exist?)
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES PROBABILITIES
(magnitude) (of occurrences)
DEFINE SENSITIVITY
RISK SCENARIOS ANALYSIS
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
MONITOR option 1 - avoidance
AND option 2 - reduction
REVIEW PROGETTAZIONE
option 3 -STRUTTURALE
transfer
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ANTINCENDIO
RISK CONCERNS www.francobontempi.
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DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

(for the system are defined organization,
ANALYSIS
scenarios, and consequences of
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
REVIEW option 3 - transfer
option 4 - acceptance
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
org
DEFINE CONTEXT
technological)
RSK ANALYSIS RISK

ANALYSIS
occurences) RISK
RISK MANAGEMENT
ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
(compare risks
against criteria)
RISK TREATMENT
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ANTINCENDIO
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ANTINCENDIO
Scenarios www.francobontempi.
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DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS

(what can go wrong?
how can it happen?
RISK waht controls exist?)
ANALYSIS
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
DEFINE SENSITIVITY
FIRE
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ANTINCENDIO
EVENT
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Simulations www.francobontempi.
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DEFINE SYSTEM
(the system is usually decomposed into
a number of smaller subsystems and/or
components)
NUMERICAL HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS
MODELING (what can go wrong?

how can it happen?
waht controls exist?) RISK
ANALYSIS
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
DEFINE SENSITIVITY
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ANTINCENDIO
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
www.francobontempi.
org
1
Strategie per
1 la gestione
dell'incendio
2 3
Gestione
2 Prevenzione
dell'evento
4 15
Gestione delle
Gestione
persone e
3 dell'incendio
Buchanan, 2002
dei beni
16 17
Difesa sul posto Spostamento
4
18 19
Disposibilità
Far avvenire
delle vie
5 di fuga
il deflusso
5 10 13
Controllo Controllo
della quantità Soppressione dell'incendio
6 di
combustibile
dell'incendio attraverso il
progetto
11 12
7 Automatica Manuale
6 7 14
Controllo dei Controllo Resistenza e
8 materiali
presenti
del movimento
dell'incendio
stabilità
strutturale
8 9
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Ventilazione Contenimento
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ANTINCENDIO
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA)
www.francobontempi.
org
1
Strategie per
la gestione
1 dell'incendio
2 3
Gestione
2 Prevenzione
dell'evento
4 15
Gestione delle
Gestione
persone e
dell'incendio
3
Buchanan, 2002
dei beni
16 17
Difesa sul posto Spostamento
4
18 19
Disposibilità
Far avvenire
delle vie
il deflusso
5 di fuga
5 10 13
Controllo Controllo
della quantità Soppressione dell'incendio
6 di
combustibile
dell'incendio attraverso il
progetto
11 12
7 Automatica Manuale
6 7 14
Controllo dei Controllo Resistenza e
8 materiali
presenti
del movimento
dell'incendio
stabilità
strutturale
8 9
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Ventilazione Contenimento
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ANTINCENDIO
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FIRE SAFETY CONCEPTS TREE (NFPA)
org
Line 2
• La gestione dell’incendio non è necessaria se si previene l’ignizione.
• Può essere solo ridotta la probabilità che avvenga l’ignizione.
• Gli incendi dolosi è difficile da prevedere dal progettista
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ANTINCENDIO
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Line 4
Exposed persons and property can be managed by moving them from the building or
by defending them in place; in order for people to move, the fire must be detected,
the people must be notified, and there must be a suitable safe path for movement.
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Line 6
• There are three options for managing a fire; in the first case the fuel source can be
controlled, by limiting the amount of fuel or the geometry; the second options is to
suppress the fire; the third is to control the fire by construction.
• Control fire by construction it is necessary to both control the movement of the fire
and provide the structural stability.
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ANTINCENDIO
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FIRE SAFETY CONCEPTS TREE (NFPA) org
Line 9 - The two strategies for controlling fire movement are:

a) fire venting: venting can be by an active system of mechanically operated vents, or a passive
system that relies on the melting of plastic skylights; in either case, the increased ventilation
may increase the local severity of the fire, but fire spread within the building and the overall
thermal impact on the structure will be reduced;
b) containment of a fire to prevent spread is the principal tool of passive fire protection;
preventing fire growing to a large size is ne of the most important components of a fire safety
strategy; radiant spread of the fire to neighboring buildings must also be prevented, by limiting
the size of openings in exterior walls;
Smoke containment can also controlled by venting or containment; pressurizations and smoke
barriers can also used.
3/22/2011 100
ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA) (1)

org
• Line 4 – exposed persons and property can be managed by

moving them from the building or by defending them in place;
in order for people to move, the fire must be detected, the
Buchanan, 2002
people must be notified, and there must be a suitable safe
path for movement.
• Line 6 – there are three options for managing a fire; in the
first case the fuel source ca be controlled, by limiting the
amount of fuel or the geometry; the second options is to
suppress the fire; the third is to control the fire by
construction.
• Control fire by construction it is necessary to both control the
movement of the fire and provide the structural stability.
3/22/2011 101
ANTINCENDIO
Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA) (2) www.francobontempi.
org
• Line 9 - the two strategies for controlling fire movement are:

a) fire venting: venting can be by an active system of
mechanically operated vents, or a passive system that relies
on the meltig of plastic skylights; in either case, the increased
ventilation may increase the local severity of the fire, but fire
Buchanan, 2002
spread within the building and the overall thermal impact on
the structure will be reduced;
b) containment of a fire to prevent spread is the principal tool
of passive fire protection; preventing fire growing to a large
size is ne of the most important components of a fire safety
strategy; radiant spread of the fire to nighbouring buildings
must also be prevented, by limiting the size of openings in
exterior walls;
Smoke containment can also controlled by venting or
containment; pressurizations and
PROGETTAZIONE smoke barriers can also
STRUTTURALE
3/22/2011 102
ANTINCENDIO
used.
Design Process - ISO 13387 www.francobontempi.
org
A. Design constraints and possibilities

(blue),
B. Action definition and development
(red),
C. Passive system and active response
(yellow),
D. Safety and performance
(purple).
3/22/2011 103
ANTINCENDIO
(0)
SS0a
DESIGN
PRESCRIBED www.francobontempi.
CONSTRAINTS
DESIGN org
AND
PARAMETERS
POSSIBILITIES
DESIGN SS5
SS0b
life safety:
ESTIMATED
occupant behavior,
DESIGN
location and
PARAMETERS
condition
SAFETY & PERFORMANCE

SS1
initiation and SS6
development property
of fire and loss
(1+2)
fire efluent
BUS OF INFORMATION
ACTION
ACTION DEFINITION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
SS2 SS7
movement of business
fire effluent interruption
SS3
SS8
structural response
contamination
and fire spread
of
beyond enclosure
(3+4) environment
of origin
SYSTEM
RESPONSE PASSIVE
AND ACTIVE
RESPONSE SS4 SS9
detection, destruction
activitation and of
suppression heritage
RESULTS
3/22/2011 104
ANTINCENDIO
STRUCTURAL www.francobontempi.
CONCEPTION org
Yes
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive Yes
structural threats
characteristics
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
threats
STRUCTURAL No STRUCTURAL
SYSTEM FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS active
structural threats
Yes WEAKNESS
characteristics
No
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
Yes
threats
No
alive
MAINTENANCE
structural
& USE
characteristics
Yes
threats
No
3/22/2011 105
ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
org
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
Yes
CONCEPTION
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive Yes
structural threats
char acteristics
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
threats
No
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION Yes
active
structural
char acteristics
threats
No
Yes
threats
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
Yes
No
threats
No
alive
MAINTENANCE
structural
& USE
char acteristics
Yes
STRUCTURAL
threats
No
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
passive Yes
structural threats
characteristics
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
Yes
threats
PROGETTAZIONE No
STRUTTURALE
3/22/2011 106
ANTINCENDIO
No
FIRE DETECTION
www.francobontempi.
& SUPPRESSION org
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
Yes
active
threats
No
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
Yes
passive
structural
GEOMETRY
threats
Yes
structural threats
char acteristics
characteristics
No
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
threats
No
Yes
No
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
active Yes
structural threats
char acteristics
No
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
ORGANIZATION &
Yes
FIREFIGHTERS
threats
No
alive
MAINTENANCE
structural
& USE
char acteristics
Yes
threats
No
Yes
threats
No
alive
MAINTENANCE
structural
& USE
characteristics
Yes
threats
No
3/22/2011 107
ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
org
STRUCTURAL
CONCEPTION
STRUCTURAL
TOPOLOGY
&
GEOMETRY
STRUCTURAL
MATERIAL
& PARTS
FIRE DETECTION
& SUPPRESSION
ORGANIZATION &
FIREFIGHTERS
MAINTENANCE
& USE
CRISIS
PROGETTAZIONESTRUTTURALE
3/22/2011 108
ANTINCENDIO
FAILURE PATH www.francobontempi.
org
HAZARD
HOLES DUE TO
ACTIVE ERRORS
E
NC
FE
DE
TH
EP
-D
IN
HOLES DUE TO
PROGETTAZIONE STRUTTURALE HIDDEN ERRORS
3/22/2011 109
ANTINCENDIO
www.francobontempi.
Causes of system failure

org
Research level Design code level
100% C
Unknown phenomena
% of failure
B B B
Human errors
Known phenomena
past present future

Time
3/22/2011 110
ANTINCENDIO
111
111
StroNGER S.r.l.
Research Spin-off for Structures of the Next Generation
Energy Harvesting and Resilience
Rome – Athens – Milan – Nice Cote Azur
Sede operativa: Via Giacomo Peroni 442-444, Tecnopolo Tiburtino,

00131 Roma (ITALY) – info@stronger2012.com
112

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• Incendio = combustione autoalimentata ed

Diffusione nello spazio

The Great Fire of Chicago, October 7-10, 1871

ISO 13387: Example of Design Fire

Summary of periods of typical fire development

Fire Heating Fuel controlled burning Ventilation controlled Fuel controlled

Curva naturale d’incendio

Fire thermal exposure

Fire Safety Strategies

prevention protection robustness

Fire Safety Strategies

High Probability Low Consequences

TOWERS GEOMETRIC NONLINEARITY

777 183 3300 183 627

SOIL/STRUCTURE INTERFACE CONTACT

GEOMETRY AND MATERIAL

777 183 3300 183 627

777 183 3300 183 627

GLOBAL/LOCAL STRUCTURAL BEHAVIOUR

Il Progettista, a seguito della classificazione e della caratterizzazione delle azioni,

Establish maximum likely

Estimate maximum likely

Carry out fire engineering

Modify fire No Yes

CONTROLLING FIRE SPREAD

• The larger a fire, the greater its destructive

Fire spread within the room of origin

• Fire spread within the room of origin depends largely on

• Fire can spread from a burning building to adjacent buildings by

IMPOSTAZIONE DELLA SICUREZZA

June 2011 www.francobontempi.org 78

Management (IEC 1995)

Quantitative Risk Analysis

Stewart & Melchers, 1997

HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

RSK ANALYSIS RISK

HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS

NUMERICAL HAZARD SCENARIO ANALYSIS

MODELING (what can go wrong?

FIRE SAFETY CONCEPTS TREE (NFPA) org

Line 9 - The two strategies for controlling fire movement are:

Fire safety concepts tree (NFPA) (1)

• Line 4 – exposed persons and property can be managed by

• Line 9 - the two strategies for controlling fire movement are:

A. Design constraints and possibilities

SAFETY & PERFORMANCE

Causes of system failure

Research level Design code level

past present future

Rome – Athens – Milan – Nice Cote Azur

Sede operativa: Via Giacomo Peroni 442-444, Tecnopolo Tiburtino,

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