25.

dianoia

Estratto

25.dianoia
Rivista di filosofia anno XXii, dicembre 2017

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 25.dianoia

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dianoia
Rivista di filosofia del Dipartimento di Filosofia e Comunicazione
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25. dianoia

Lutero e la filosofia
a cura di E. Caramelli e C. Gentili

Introduzione
385 Eleonora Caramelli, Carlo Gentili, Lutero e la filosofia. Lutero
in philosophicis

395 Joachim Ringleben, Prospettive di filosofia del linguaggio in

Martin Lutero

411 Emmanuel Cattin, «Nous luthériens». Hegel et Luther

427 Christoph Bultmann, «La lingua artificiale della teologia bruli-

ca di fraintendimenti». Johann Gottfried Herder critico di Martin
Lutero

445 Christian Danz, «La riforma fu quindi fin dall’inizio incompiu-

ta, non ciò che doveva diventare, bensì solo il suo inizio». L’inter-
pretazione schellinghiana della riforma luterana

467 Philippe Soual, Hegel luthérien

487 Dennis Vanden Auweele, Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree

509 Carlo Gentili, Il «monaco impossibile». Nietzsche pro e contra

Lutero

535 Eleonora Caramelli, La cultura luterana della traduzione e

Hegel. La traducibilità della poesia nelle Lezioni di Estetica
 Lutero e la filosofia

a cura di E. Caramelli e C. Gentili

Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree
Dennis Vanden Auweele

The atheist philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer is not readily associated with theo-
logical discussions. Nevertheless, his works are replete with positive references
to numerous theologians such as Augustine, Meister Eckhart and, interestingly,
Martin Luther. n positive in uence of the theologian of the eformation ho
emphasized literalism, fideism and unmerited grace ith the atheist, pessimistic
and misanthropic sage of Frankfurt seems somewhat of a far stretch. If we take
Schopenhauer’s positive references to Luther seriousl , e can find three areas in
which Luther’s theology might have impacted positively on Schopenhauer. First,
Luther’s understanding of the bondage of the will which necessitates external as-
sistance seems to resonate with the way Schopenhauer understands the soteriolog-
ical potential of knowledge to quell the will to life. Second, Luther’s removal of a
hermeneutic assistant in reading the bible – such as the Catholic Church – comes
close to how Schopenhauer thinks the truth of pessimism is crystal clear to anyone
unin uenced b academic, philosophical optimism. hird, Luther’s a of render-
ing all human works null in acquiring grace is similar to how Schopenhauer be-
lieves that the will itself lacks any soteriological principle.

Keywords: Schopenhauer; Luther; Bondage of the Will; Hermeneutics; Salvation.

The positive in uence of the theologian Martin Luther on the phi-

losophy of Arthur Schopenhauer 1 is not widely recognized 2. This

1
 References to the work of Schopenhauer follow the Sämmtliche Werke edition by Hüb-
scher: A. Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke in 7 Bänden, ed. by Arthur Hübscher, Leipzig, F.A.
Brockhaus, 1937. When available, translations are taken from The Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Schopenhauer: A. Schopenhauer, n the ourfold oot of the Principle of Su cient ea-
son and Other Writings, ed. by D. Cartwright, E. Erdmann and Chr. Janaway, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2012, abbreviated as VW ( ourfold oot) or WN (On Will in
Nature); A. Schopenhauer, he orld as ill and epresentation olume , ed. by J. Norman,
A. Welchman and Chr. Janaway, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, abbrevi-
ated as WWV1; A. Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, ed. by Chr. Jan-
away, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, abbreviated as BGE; A. Schopenhauer,
he orld as ill and Presentation. olume II, transl. by D. Carus and R. Aquila, Upper Sad-
dle River, Prentice Hall, 2011, abbreviated as WWV2; A. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipo-
mena. olume , transl. and ed. by Chr. Janaway and S. Roehr, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2014, abbreviated as PP1; A. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena. olume ,
transl. and ed. by Chr. Janaway and A. Del Caro, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2015, abbreviated as PP2.
2
 A few noteworthy exceptions are as follows: W. Die , Servum arbitrium. Zur Konzepti-
on der Willensunfreiheit bei Luther, Schopenhauer und Kierkegaard, Neue Zeitschrift für Syste-
matische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie , 42 (2000), pp. 181-194; M. Kossler, Empirische
Ethi und christliche Moral. ur i erenz einer areligi sen und einer religi sen Grundlegung der

«dianoia», 25 (2017)
488 Dennis Vanden Auweele

is interesting because literally all of Schopenhauer’s references to

Luther express approval (see especially: WWV1 457; BGE 63 and
66-68; PP2 386; WWV2 183 and 665). Obviously, Schopenhauer’s
explicit praise of Kant’s and Plato’s philosophy, and his increasing
appreciation for the profound wisdom of the Vedantic Upanishads,
has received infinitely more attention. And to be sure, these afore-
mentioned founts of wisdom appear to have fairly little in common
with Lutheran theology. The claim is to be made, however, that
Schopenhauer’s philosophy can be misunderstood if its Lutheran
inspiration is not given su cient attention even though its effects
might have gone unnoticed by Schopenhauer himself There are
indeed structural and hermeneutical parallels between the misan-
thropic sage of Frankfurt and Dr. Luther that merit highlighting so
as to emphasize a sense of continuity between the Protestant reform
and Schopenhauer’s semi-Kantian, semi-Romantic pessimism.
Immanuel Kant was himself no stranger to some form of pessi-
mism, and even his re ections on the natural recalcitrance to ration-
ality (the so-called Hang zum se) bear a striking resemblance to the
Lutheran thesis of the bondage of the will as I have argued in full
elsewhere 3. Because Kant recognizes the extent of human finitude
and depravity, he was moved to a rational theology and a rational-
ized version of religion as moral pedagogy in order to counter the
despair that might arise from the ready recognition of human infir-
mity 4. From this “darker side” of Kant’s transcendental anthropol-
ogy, a convincing argument could be made that reads Schopenhau-
er’s philosophy as the correct conclusion of Kantian philosophy
(WWV2 13), or at least one potential conclusion of Kantian thought.
But presently, the focus will be on those elements in Lutheran theol-
ogy that resonate with Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Through recog-
nizing the Lutheran pedigree of Schopenhauer’s pessimism and the
striking structural similarities between these two, certain elements
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy can be clarified.

Ethi am eispiel der Gegen berstellung Schopenhauers mit ugustinus, der Scholasti und Luther,
Würzburg, Königshausen Neumann, 1999; Id., Grenzbestimmungen der ernunft bei Luther
und Schopenhauer, Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch , 78 (1997), pp. 11-29.
3
 D. Vanden Auweele, he Lutheran In uence on ant’s epraved ill, International Jour-
nal for Philosophy of Religion , 73 (2013), pp. 117-134.
4
 For a sustained defence of these claims: D. Vanden Auweele, ant on eligious Moral
Education, Kantian Review , 20 (2015), pp. 373-394; Id., The Pietist Premise of Kant’s Postula-
tion of God, Jahrbuch fur Religionsphilosophie , 12 (2013), pp. 162-188.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 489

The claim that modern philosophy is intimately linked to Prot-

estantism is obviously not new 5. For instance, Reiner Schürmann
reads the epoch of modern philosophy as accomplishing two inver-
sions, one Lutheran and the other Kantian:

These inversions discover the I as at first subject to an extrinsic de-

termination, then as exercising its own determination. To establish
its epochal regime, self-consciousness becomes passive before it
becomes spontaneous. The first gesture is an inversion in the sub-
jective apparatus forming the experience of speech or the word
(Luther); the second gesture is a parallel inversion in the subjective
apparatus of sensible experience (Kant) 6.

Indeed, the general Lutheran lesson that modern philosophy

took to heart was that the self/ego has to become receptive to a “giv-
en” (a datum) before its own spontaneous activity could authentical-
ly follow. For Luther, this is the case because of the severe and crip-
pling depravity which is part and parcel of human nature: to rise
above the Flesh, one must first become receptive to an “other”; for
Kant, this signals about ethics that human beings ought to be con-
fronted with the moral law before they can act morally; for Scho-
penhauer, this means that some sense of intuitive insight which is
communicated by art, religion or philosophy can release human
beings from their penal servitude to the will.
Such a frame of thought wherein human agents have to be jolted
into moral action appears to become a premise to modern philos-
ophy. Friedrich Nie sche would even opine at one point that, for
this and other reasons, the Protestant pastor is the grandfather of
German philosophy; Protestantism itself is its peccatum originale 7.
But even Nie sche himself, as Jacob Taubes would come to argue,
shares striking religious characteristics that mirror Pauline theolo-

5
 For discussion of Luther’s in uence on modern philosophy: M. Timmann Mjaaland, The
Hidden God. Luther, Philosoph , and Political heolog , Bloomington, Indiana University Press,
2016; R. Malter, Das reformatorische Denken und die Philosophie, Bonn, Bouvier, 1980; Th. Diet-
er, er unge Luther und ristoteles Eine historisch s stematische ntersuchung zum erh ltnis von
Theology und Philosophie, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2001. For an interesting overview of how the Prot-
estant reform led to contemporary, secularized society: B. Gregory, he nintended eforma-
tion Ho a eligious evolution secularized Societ , Harvard, The Belknap Press, 2012.
6
 R. Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, transl. by R. Lilly, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 2003, p. 367.
7
 F. Nie sche, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols. And Other Writings, ed. by
A. Ridley and J. Norman, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 9 10 .
490 Dennis Vanden Auweele

gy (St. Paul who was, obviously, a central inspiration for the Prot-
estant reform): Paul haunts Nie sche all the way to the deepest
intimacies 8. While philosophers such as Kant, Schopenhauer and
even Nie sche believed that they themselves were highly critical of
contemporary Protestantism, they can be read these days as actually
paving the way for a more authentic sense of Christianity (a similar
thing could indeed be said of Luther). Friedrich Paulsen in uential-
ly argued that Kant might have been the philosopher of Protestantism
and Paul Deussen lifelong friend of Nie sche and founder of the
Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft famously pointed out how Schopen-
hauer could be read as a philosophus Christianus, i.e. someone who
peered into the very soul of Christianity 9.
There is little doubt these days that there was a decisive Christian
in uence on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s philosophical projects. But
why would this in uence be specifically Protestant, even Lutheran
One way to explain this is to point out the predominantly Lutheran
religious upbringing of many German philosophers of the modern
era. For example, Kant was raised by his fairly strict Lutheran-Pie-
tist parents and attended school at the Pietist Collegium Frideri-
cianum. Although Schopenhauer’s religious education was mini-
mal (he was raised initially to become a merchant), he spent some
of his formative years (11-15 years) in the Pietist private school of
Johann Heinrich Christian Runge. Runge, who was notorious as a
progressive maverick, was educated (among other places) at Halle
under August Niemeyer who happened to be the great-grandson of
August Francke (founder of Halle University). In Runge’s school,
religious instruction was basically moral instruction 10.
Indeed, biography has been a powerful way to discover some of
the formative in uences on a philosopher’s thought. All forms of
happenings from Napoleon’s invasion of Prussia over his father’s
suicide to his love of dogs could have played an important role
in shaping Schopenhauer’s philosophy. One can speculate endless-
ly on this subject. What is a certainty, however, is that at least three

8
 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, transl. by D. Hollander, Stanford, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2004, p. 83. See also: S. Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless, London and New
ork, Verso, 2012, pp. 155-156.
9
 F. Paulsen, Kant der Philosoph des Protestantismus, Kant-Studien , 4 (1900), pp. 1-31; P.
Deussen, Die Philosophie der Bibel, Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1923.
10
 See: D. Cartwright, Schopenhauer iograph , Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2010, pp.27-33.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 491

areas of Schopenhauer’s philosophy show a striking resemblance to

some key aspects of Lutheran theology. These are the bondage of
the will, philosophical hermeneutics and salvation through grace.
Though there are profound in uences here of Kant, Plato, Goethe,
Indian philosophy and Schelling as well, we presently will investi-
gate how these topics facilitate a Lutheran reading of Schopenhau-
er’s philosophy.

. Luther and the ondage of the ill

Most of Schopenhauer’s explicit praise of Luther regards the latter’s

analysis of the freedom of the will. This is an area in which Luther’s
teachings gave rise to profound controversy. It might be helpful to
recollect the history and content of Luther’s teaching on this sub-
ject 11. While Luther bases his argumentation, for the most part, on
his reading of Scripture, Schopenhauer will come to a similar con-
clusion by means of philosophical argumentation.
The events leading up to Luther’s De servo arbitrio start with
Luther’s most famous public display of dissent, namely the nail-
ing of the 95 theses to the door of the church of Wittenberg (1517).
After this open call for “dialogue”, Luther was engaged in numer-
ous academic disputations, the most famous of these was hosted by
the Augustine order in Heidelberg (1518). This meeting has become
particularly notorious for Luther’s virulent attack on the traditional
notion of free will. The whole disputation, but especially theses thir-
teen through eighteen, clarify how Luther deduces from Scripture
that free will was actual in a pre-lapsarian state, but became dead
after the Fall. This was considered to be a slap in the face of Scholas-
tic theology. The Scholastic notion of free will is far from uniform,
but the consensus roughly reads that the Fall has only corrupted
the human Flesh, leaving the human Spirit and Intellect untouched.
While the Intellect is permanently exposed to the seductions of the
Flesh, it retains the possibility to orient itself towards God through
the inborn Spirit. This traditional position will be Desiderius Eras-

11
 For a more comprehensive outline of Luther’s theology: H. Loewen, Ink against the
evil Luther and his pponents, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2015; M. Gaebler,
he ourage of aith Martin Luther and the heonomous Self, Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2013.
492 Dennis Vanden Auweele

mus’ recourse in his response to Luther in the De libero arbitrio 12. To

put things succinctly: for traditional Scholastics, the problem creat-
ed by the Fall is that the human being is tempted by the Flesh; for
Luther, the problem is that the human being is nothing but Flesh
retaining only an equivocal sense of Spirit that allows for the recep-
tivity to God’s revelation.
The most impressive consequence of this position is that human
works (labora) in no way navigate towards God for Dr. Luther. One
historical reason why Luther comes out so strongly against works
obviously concerns the then highly debated practice of indulgences.
His attack on works in general provides a theological argument to
discourage, disparage or even dismantle the practice of indulgences.
Indulgences are gifts, often of a monetary nature, that individuals
make to the church to redeem themselves or their loved ones from
sin. Particularly controversial were the indulgences that supposed-
ly delivered unbaptized, still-born children from limbo 13. Erasmus
similarly opposed indulgences on the count that these were hypo-
critically purchased by a so-called repentant, who often was happy
to commit that sin again (and pay for atonement, again). Erasmus
did not oppose the practice of penance, but simply believed that his
had to be accompanied with the proper spirit. Interestingly, in the
95 theses, Luther left the door open for a true indulgence, one that
is accompanied by a spirit of faith (thesis 31). While Luther might
have been (partially) motivated by the atrocity of indulgences, the
outcome of his attack on works had much wider significance. In
Luther’s view, human works, whether moral or intellectual, are
always the expression of the depraved human Flesh.
Such a point of view might easily disparage good works or even
lead to a serious sense of despair. If works in no way navigate to
goodness or salvation, why commit to them Indeed, Luther’s
famous adage to sin boldly could be read as opposing self-cultiva-
tion of whatever kind. His intentions were nobler, however Luther
aimed to cultivate a desire to humble oneself and seek the grace
of Christ 14. Works of whatever kind easily lead to self-aggran-

12
 For a reconstruction of the ongoing debate between Erasmus and Luther: R. Marius,
Martin Luther he hristian bet een God and eath, Cambridge (MA), The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 442-468.
13
 For Luther’s attack on indulgences, ivi, pp. 128-147.
14
 M. Luther, Heidelberg Disputation (1518), transl. by H.J. Grimm, in Id., Selected Writ-
ings of Martin Luther , ed. by Th. Tappert, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1967, p. 77.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 493

dizement or self-righteous pride. When this is combined with the

human-all-too-human tendency to be in awe of great works, it easi-
ly leads to the worship of false idols. Luther probably had the Cath-
olic worship of saints, popes and kings in mind. Saints are to be
adored, according to Luther, for their humility and piety, not the
awesomeness of their achievements. Schopenhauer says something
similar: the main thing in life is not to stack up great achievements
in the world, but the very rejection of worldly achievement: The
most important and most significant appearance that the world can
show us is not someone who conquers the world, but rather some-
one who overcomes it (WWV1 456).
In a lesser known essay by his hand, i.e. On Will in Nature which
is an attempt to use the then recent advances of science to corrobo-
rate his metaphysics of will, Schopenhauer touches on a subject sim-
ilar to indulgences. Schopenhauer is adamant that monetary con-
cerns, but also ambition, easily lead one to stray from the truth. He
felt that his contemporaries, especially those who were academic
professors of philosophy, did not deal with truth because they were
overly concerned with pleasing their masters, and securing their
pay-check. Schopenhauer himself was financially independent and
would therefore, in his own view at least, refuse an academic posi-
tion: I take philosophy too seriously to have succeeded in becom-
ing a professor of it (BGE ). Schopenhauer excused Kant from
this accusation because Kant did not lecture on his own philosophy,
but used state-ordained textbooks. This is why Kant was so revo-
lutionary in philosophy: his own thought was unencumbered by
concerns of propriety or monetary gain. Regrettably, many philos-
ophers after Kant returned to the “philosophical trade”, something
which Schopenhauer feels obligated to combat (much like Luther).
Schopenhauer signals that he shares a position similar to Luther on
this score (WN ).
The sincere concern with human finitude and the nullity of
human works for salvation notwithstanding, Luther’s teachings
appear paradoxical. If the human being is utterly and completely
depraved (nothing but Flesh), how is a desire to humble oneself
not likewise an expression of depraved Flesh In some odd way,
one could easily pride oneself on one’s humility. Kant, who was
as a young man frequently solicited to humbly confess his sins
and screen his own consciousness by his teachers at the Pietist col-
lege, felt that pride easily masks as humility. In his view, there are
494 Dennis Vanden Auweele

two pitfalls to be avoided which he somewhat simplistically attrib-

utes to Islam and Hinduism respectively. In Islam, Kant notes that
believers often find confirmation of their faith in victories and
in the subjugation of many peoples rather than in miracles 15. This
is an overconfidence with regard to the potentiality of works and
achievements as a sign of piety. Luther warned against such over-
confidence as well. One’s achievements in the world do not reveal
a disposition of piety (Luther) or dutiful morality (Kant). But Kant
warns, like Luther, for another extreme which he attributes to Hin-
duism. Here, Kant believes to find pusillanimity , which is total
neglect of any effort 16. Both Kant and Luther believe that there is a
passive and an active component to faith, namely revelation/grace
and humility in response to this. Both of them believe that authen-
tic Christianity balances these two attitudes appropriately. But both
also point out that Christianity is poorly taught to people. As such,
they often fall into both pitfalls at once: they believe their humility
is a prideful accomplishment. Kant writes that those who

starting with human corruption and despairing of all virtue, place

their religious principle solely in piety . For these individuals
never place any reliance in themselves but constantly look about
them in constant anxiety for a supernatural assistance, and even
think in this self-contempt (which is not humility) they possess a
means of obtaining favor 17.

While Kant’s emphasis is obviously against those Pietists who

do nothing but await grace (here, he is likely thinking of the Mora-
vians), the broader context of his comments are properly Lutheran
since he warns at the same time against overconfidence. This issue
has a simulacrum in Schopenhauer’s philosophy: if we are the a r-
mation of life, how can we deny life We will return to this di cul-
ty below, but I believe the Lutheran resolution to this di culty is
edifying. How can the human spirit recognize its own total deprav-
ity and, from this recognition, bootstrap itself to Christian humili-
ty For Luther, this is only possible given the exposure to Christian
revelation which most potently happens in reading the Bible. Some-

15
 I. Kant, eligion and ational heolog , trasnl. and ed. by A. Wood and G. di Giovanni,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 201 184n .
16
 Ibid.
17
 Ibid.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 495

thing that is thoroughly and radically other than the Flesh must
induce humility. We cannot honestly conjure this up ourselves.
Luther’s teachings were not without consequence. His assertions
(at Heidelberg and elsewhere) were condemned by Pope Leo in
1520. The philosophically more interesting response came, however,
from the Humanist Erasmus. In a public letter (not openly attacking
Luther, but nevertheless clearly directed against him) known as the
Diatribe on Free Will (1524), Erasmus attacked Luther’s point of view
from a variety of angles. Initially unwilling to respond, Luther vehe-
mently attacked Erasmus’ assertions in the Diatribe in his famous De
servo Arbitrio better known as On the Bondage of the Will (1525).
Luther’s point regarding free will can be easily summarized in
his own words: Free will without the grace of God is, absolutely,
not free but, immutably, the servant and bond slave of evil 18. Free
will is traditionally thought of as libero arbitrio indi erentiae, i.e. the
possibility to choose between good and evil. Luther notes, howev-
er, that human beings always express their natural desire for evil.
They in fact lack the very possibility to opt for the good. In as long
human beings do not experience revelation, they lack the very pos-
sibility to humble themselves and break the dominance of the Flesh.
As a result, there is no free will in the natural state. But even after
being exposed to Scripture, free will is not a given. Reading Scrip-
ture allows only for the ability to recognize one’s own depravity.
This might in turn induce a desire to humble oneself before God
and so become receptive towards grace. Such grace is given uncon-
ditionally and inscrutably, but serves as the condition for free sub-
mission to God. Good works are only really good insofar as they are
accompanied by the spirit of grace.

. Schopenhauer and the ondage of the ill

This theological and highly moralized perspective on free will

seems remarkably distant from Schopenhauer’s philosophy. While
no stranger to moralizing, Schopenhauer opposes traditional mor-
al theory and while not univocally dismissive of religion, Schopen-
hauer is certainly no theologian. Rather than engaging this subject
from the interpretation of Scripture, Schopenhauer builds a philoso-
18
 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, transl. by H. Cole, Peabody (MA), Hendrickson
Publishers, 2008, p. 58.
496 Dennis Vanden Auweele

phical argument in favor of natural determinism and transcendental

freedom. The conclusion is remarkably similar to Luther’s, however.
Following a Kantian inspiration, Schopenhauer start from the
empirical observation of the world. This is so because he holds that
a true philosophy cannot be spun out of mere abstract concepts,
but instead must be grounded on observation and experience, inner
as well as outer Philosophy must have its source in the intu-
itive apprehension of the world (PP2 9). From this perspective,
Schopenhauer argues that all objects have an empirical character,
which is the way this object appears to a spectator. This empiri-
cal character is the merging of an objective and subjective input,
both of which are impossible to separate in a representation ( or-
stellung). By philosophically re ecting upon the representation, one
can nevertheless attempt to define the objective input. By doing so,
Schopenhauer advances the thesis that the empirical character of an
object is the expression of the more general character of a species,
which in turn is the expression of the more general notion of the
Platonic Idea and finally these Platonic Ideas are the highest objec-
tification of the will to life. Despite that empirical observation sug-
gests a high level of diversity of objects in the world such as plants,
rocks, natural forces, human beings, cats, dogs, etc., these are all the
expression of one principle, namely will to life (see: WWV1 339-342;
BGE 95-97 and 175-178).
All objects are thus the expression of will to life, which uses the
roundabout way of Platonic Ideas and species to manifest itself.
et within certain species, there are individual differences as well.
While say rocks are generally, besides their shape, size, density and
weight, highly alike, plants and animals tend to be more individu-
alized with more individual characters. Human beings in particular
can differ remarkably in their individual character. This is account-
ed for by Schopenhauer through introducing the notion of the
acquired character, which molds the empirical character in terms
of specific circumstances and requirements. The acquired character
then constitutes the adaptation of the empirical character to specific
circumstances (BGE 49-50).
All objects have a specific empirical character. This empirical
character is confronted with certain causal powers, which Schopen-
hauer splits up into causes, stimuli and motives (WWV1 136-141;
BGE 29-34). Schopenhauer has a rich discussion of the differences
between the three of these, but ultimately argues that these operate
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 497

with the same strict sense of determinism. Like rocks, plants and
animals, human beings are subject to pure causal necessity: The
cause is more complicated, the effect more heterogeneous, but the
necessity with which it occurs is not one hair’s breadth smaller
(BGE 38). The relative force of a cause, stimulus or motive interacts
with the character of an object and then necessarily evokes a certain
response. A rock that is pushed with su cient strength will neces-
sarily move. A human being with an acquired character that tends
towards bravery will opt to fight when confronted with an oppo-
nent while someone more prone to cowardice will opt to ee. None
of this is left to free will, but is causally determined by the relative
force of a cause, stimulus of motive that interacts with certain traits
of the character.
While Luther imports a moral context to his discussion of free
will, his account aligns well with Schopenhauer’s view. Both are
convinced that human beings are easily deluded in thinking that
they have special capacity that would allow them to freely choose
between different options. Schopenhauer was aware of the fact that
his philosophical argument matched up with Luther’s theological
argument. Anticipating the criticism that religious grounds stand
in opposition to the truth defended by him , he appeals to Luther
who disputes free will with all of his vehemence (BGE 63).
Luther appeals repeatedly to the teachings of St. Augustine but so
did his Humanist contemporaries (especially Erasmus). The prop-
er interpretation of Augustine was a contested affair in early mod-
ern philosophy because all sorts of reformations that were critical of
Scholasticism almost naturally reached out to pre-Scholastic (such
as Augustine) and anti-Scholastic (such as Meister Eckhart) sourc-
es. Schopenhauer expresses approval for both and he is even univo-
cally positive of Meister Eckhart (WWV1 450). In fact, he writes that
nowhere is the spirit of this development of Christianity towards
asceticism and mysticism so perfectly and powerfully expressed as
in the writings of the German mystics, which is to say Meister Eck-
hart, and in the justly famous book he German heolog (WWV1
457). He adds immediately that Luther wrote that no other book,
except for the Bible and Augustine, taught him as much about the
nature of God, Christ and humanity as this book did (WWV1 457).
We will return to mysticism and asceticism below. For now, it
might be interesting to see how Schopenhauer believes that Luther’s
teachings about free will are an improvement upon Augustine’s
498 Dennis Vanden Auweele

teachings. According to Schopenhauer, Augustine had a good intui-

tion, namely to argue that unless by the grace of God the will itself
is liberated from the servitude by which it is made the servant of sin
and assisted in overcoming vice, it is not possible for mortals to live
rightly and piously (BGE 67). et, Augustine did ultimately defend
some version of freedom of the will (which renders his account some-
what unstable). This was based on three reasons. First, the Mani-
cheans denied free will and therefore located the source of evil in a
principle outside of the human being. Augustine held fast to a single,
absolute being (God) which made it necessary for human beings to
be responsible for evil. Second, Augustine misidentified freedom of
the will as agency that is voluntary, but in fact even voluntary agen-
cy (i.e. in extension of one’s will) is not free as it is determined by
motive and character. Thirdly, Augustine’s moral philosophy has a
strong emphasis on moral responsibility. If this is combined with the
need to bring responsibility into harmony with the justice of God,
then it is necessary that human beings have free will.
Schopenhauer believed that Luther made an improvement upon
this view. Luther’s investigation starts from the omnipotence of God.
If God is in fact eternal, everything must ow from Him through
necessity 19. But while Schopenhauer gladly makes use of the term
necessity, Luther was somewhat hesitant about the connotations of
this term. Since God is an absolutely necessary being, his necessary
agency is also absolutely free. But interestingly, Luther’s redefini-
tion of the necessity of God into the absolute freedom of God blends
smoothly with Schopenhauer’s views regarding the transcendental
freedom of the will as such. Luther writes: For will, whether divine
or human, does what it does, be it good or evil, not by any com-
pulsion but by mere willingness or desire, as it were, totally free 20.
From both Schopenhauer’s and Luther’s perspective, any agency fol-
lows necessarily from the nature of the subject whether this is God or
the human being. There is nothing intermediary to one’s nature and
one’s agency (such as a freedom of the will). Schopenhauer believes
that this way of thinking further resonated in the works of Lucilio
Vanini, David Hume and even Kant (BGE 68-71).
Luther and Schopenhauer ultimately agree that all agency is
determined by one’s nature. To Luther, this is our fallen Flesh; to

19
 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, cit., p. 34.
20
 Ibid.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 499

Schopenhauer, this is our empirical character which is, via some

detours, a manifestation of will to life. As such, both believe that the
primary principle of action is a morally debilitating sense of ego-
ism. Schopenhauer admits this quite openly: The chief and fun-
damental incentive in a human being, as in an animal, is egoism,
i.e. the urge to existence and well-being (BGE 196). This means
that if there is recourse from this pernicious natural condition, this
recourse must come from outside and beyond nature.

. Hermeneutics eading the orld oo

How can something arise from outside of nature that has the poten-
tial to dramatically and radically redirect human beings This occurs
only when there is a direct exposure from the transcendent upon the
human being. Any subjective buffer through which such revelation
has to pass would render it highly problematic by tainting it with
the malaise that corrupts nature. Schopenhauer and Luther therefore
argue that revelation must come directly for it to have soteriological
potential. For Schopenhauer, this means that the intuitive awareness
of ultimate reality and the miserable lot of human beings is not sub-
ject to the principle of su cient reason; for Luther, this means that
Biblical hermeneutics are a threat to authentic revelation.
The kinship between Schopenhauer and Luther (but not to Prot-
estantism) can already be discerned from the fact that Schopenhau-
er’s references to Luther are univocally positive, but his references to
Protestantism are usually rather negative. Luther prepared the way
for a radical revolution in Christianity that his followers failed to car-
ry through. Instead, these followers slipped back into certain forms
of dogmatism or Scholasticism. Schopenhauer particularly singles
out how contemporary Protestants oppose asceticism (e.g. WN 144),
how they align with a form of rationalism (WWV1 299-300) and how
they refuse to see moral virtues as a stepping stone to asceticism (PP2
412 ff.). uite strongly, Schopenhauer would emphasize that only
the Augustinian doctrine, fortified by Luther, is perfect Christianity
(PP2 386). The idea of an authentic sense of Christianity is obvious-
ly part and parcel of Luther’s teachings. Such authentic Christiani-
ty can arise only if the exposure to the transcendent is not molded in
accordance with the workings of human nature.
500 Dennis Vanden Auweele

Let us first turn to how this operates for Luther. Some theologi-
ans might, paradoxically, want to avoid Scripture, and particular-
ly certain parts of Scripture. Erasmus, for instance, would describe
Scripture at times like the mythological cave of Corycos, enticing
and exhilarating at first but, after venturing deeper, a distinct sense
of horror might overtake the explorer. This means that certain parts
of Scripture could be dangerous to the common mind, which is why
Erasmus cautions against reading Scripture without the appropri-
ate tools, which are the biblical hermeneutics of the Catholic church.
These have an important role to play in morphing Scripture into
a consistent and agreeable whole. Without a centralized authori-
ty, certain vastly divergent interpretations might arise that not only
threaten the unity of Christianity but which can also have certain
pernicious and even egregious effects. Consider for instance how
the stories of Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice Isaac or Lot’s offer-
ing of his daughters for rape to safeguard an angel could lead to
severely problematic effects if not interpreted appropriately.
Erasmus’ appeal to hermeneutical authority does not sole-
ly stem from a desire for Christian wholeness and for moral pro-
gress, but also from a specific aspect of Erasmus’ Humanism. The
sense of Humanism embraced by Erasmus (but also by Lorenzo
Valla) had profoundly Christian roots, but at the same time recog-
nized the potential in other sources of wisdom 21. This made it so
that Scripture was assumed to be commensurable with other founts
of insight, particularly with Ancient Greek philosophy. For this,
Erasmus appeals to Romans 15:4: For everything that was written
in the past was written to teach us, so that through the endurance
taught in the Scriptures and the encouragement they provide we
might have hope . This means that certain bits of the Bible have to
be interpreted in accordance with certain other truths, and should
not always be taken at face value. There is profound wisdom in
other traditions that need not be discarded by the Christian believ-
er: «For there is no doubt that Pallas Minerva also has her armor,
which is not at all to be despised. In any case, no matter where you
find truth, attribute it to Christ» 22. In ways, this stems from Eras-

21
 For more on this: J. Herdt, Putting on irtue. he Legac of Splendid ices, Chicago, Chi-
cago University Press, 2008.
22
 D. Erasmus, ollected or s of Erasmus in olumes. olume 6, Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1974-1993, p. 36.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 501

mus’ return to Christ as a moral exemplar, who obviously sought to

create peace rather than con ict. 23
Luther had a significantly different reading of the role of Jesus
Christ for Christianity and Biblical hermeneutics 24. With regard to
hermeneutics, Luther argues that, if and when the church interprets
Scripture, two things might happen: either this interpretation is in
accord with Scripture and therefore redundant or this interpreta-
tion opposes Scripture and therefore it would be untrue. He writes:
Is it not enough that you submit your opinion to the Scriptures
Do you submit it to the decrees of the church also What can the
church decree, that is not decreed in the Scriptures 25 This argu-
ment seems to miss its mark. Erasmus’ appeal to an authority other
than Scripture did not concern the content of Scripture, but mere-
ly the clarity of Scripture about its content. If everyone was left to
interpret this him or herself, then a great diversity of interpretations
would emerge. Accordingly, it would be beneficial for one author-
ity to set down the proper interpretation.
But Luther fulminates against this argument as well. While
there might be numerous things unclear about the nature of God,
Scripture itself is perfectly clear. This makes it somewhat odd that
Luther’s theology is often associated with the mysteries of faith.
Marius Mjaaland writes about Luther’s view of God: This place
cannot be rationally identified, Luther concludes; it brings reason
to rest in silent reverence of the Hidden one 26. The nature of God
might be mysterious, the Scriptures are perfectl clear that God is
mysterious. And, another thing that is perfectly clear in Scripture:
human beings are wretched. While this should be perfectly clear,
the human proclivity to self-aggrandizement has obscured it.
While Erasmus had honest concern for ecumenical dialogue and
interreligious peace, Luther is clearly more combative. He quite liter-
ally believes that Christianity is supposed to set the world a ame 27.
23
 See: Ibid., pp. 61-65 and 84-93.
24
 For the discussion between Luther and Erasmus on Christology: J. Herdt, Putting on
irtue. he Legac of Splendid ices, cit., pp. 173 ff.
25
 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, cit., p. 21.
26
 M. Mjaaland, he Hidden God. Luther, Philosoph and Political heolog , cit., p. 91.
27
 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, cit., p. 45. On August 17, 2016 deliberately close
to 500 years after Luther nailed his 95 theses to the church door the largest congregation
of American Lutherans gathered in New Orleans to sign the Declaration of the Way’ which
says that they no longer recognize any church dividing issues between them and Roman
Catholicism. See: http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2016-08/us-lutherans-approve-
document-recognizing-agreement-catholic-church.
502 Dennis Vanden Auweele

One obvious line from Scripture to support his interpretation is Mat-

thew 10:34: I did not come to bring peace, but a sword . There is a
singular truth to be found in revelation that can be accepted or reject-
ed. Everyone ought to be invariably confronted to the truth of Scrip-
ture 28. Luther had a revolutionary new way of approaching Chris-
tian truth. Traditionally, Christian teachings involved asserting
certain propositions about God such as unity, simplicity, goodness
and justice. The point for Luther is, however, that one cannot speak
determinatively about God from a purely rationalist point of view.
There is something amiss with any systematic-rationalist account of
God. In that sense, Luther is a modern philosopher that radically
uproots traditional metaphysics, or as Mjaaland puts it: This step
beyond tradition appears to be a profoundly modern thought 29.
A similar concern occurs in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. In his
view, a radical revolution in philosophy had been made possible by
the work of Immanuel Kant who had proven that subjective con-
sciousness stands in between the objective experience of the world
and accordingly there is a significant subjective contribution to our
experiences. This implies that any authentic knowledge we might
attain from the objective world ought to cancel out subjective con-
sciousness. Schopenhauer calls this waking up : We ask if this
world is nothing more than representation; in which case it would
have to pass over us like an insubstantial dream or a ghostly phan-
tasm (WWV1 118). Ironically, to wake up , one is forced to “put to
sleep” the particular subjective aspects of our experience of reality.
The central of these subjective aspects of our experience of real-
ity is the principle of su cient reason. Schopenhauer argues that
we enforce the four roots of this principle upon our experience of
reality, which means that we subjectively attribute time, space, cau-
sality and motivation to our objective experience of the world. The
mistake made by many philosophers before Kant (and even Kant,
according to Schopenhauer) is that they use the principle of su -
cient reason, specifically its logical and mathematical laws, to deter-
mine objective reality. But if this principle is a subjective contribu-
tion to objective experience, it has no legitimacy beyond experience.

28
 M. Mjaaland, he Hidden God. Luther, Philosoph and Political heolog , cit., pp. 96-97.
29
 Ibid., p. 35.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 503

This is also why Schopenhauer fulminates at length against Fichte

and especially Hegel: they act as if Kant never happened 30.
The objective world must be radically different (toto genere) from
the subjective world since it is not determined by means of the prin-
ciple of su cient reason. To amount then to knowledge of this
objective world, we are in need of certain types of cognition that
happen upon us directly. This means that these types of cognition
are not subject, or at least to a lesser extent, to the principle of su -
cient reason. The two foremost of these are the experience of one’s
own body (WWV1 118-131) and aesthetic experience (WWV1 191-
236). Without entering into needless detail, Schopenhauer argues
that, on the one hand, the experience of our own body is not neces-
sarily accompanied by a representation and, on the other hand, aes-
thetic experience is the will-less experience of a pure subject. While
both senses of experience do not unambiguously forfeit the princi-
ple of su cient reason (and might be paradoxical within the broad-
er scope of Schopenhauer’s philosophy), they have the potential of
revealing something to the human agent beyond subjective con-
sciousness. These would then be revelations of an objectivity that is
vastly purer than normal cognition.
To avoid the charge of blatantly overstepping the Kantian stric-
tures on possible knowledge, Schopenhauer emphasizes the uncer-
tainty in such metaphysical knowledge. He writes, for instance, that
intuitive cognition has for the most part cast off its veils , but still
does not emerge entirely naked (WWV2 220); elsewhere, he notes
that representational reality is illuminated by the principle of suf-
ficient reason, but inside it is dim, like a well blacked telescope:
no a priori principle illuminates the night of the human being’s
own interior (BGE 22); or: There is a limit to our re ection’s pen-
etration and to how far it can illuminate the night of our existence
(WWV2 677) 31. But while the intuition necessary in amounting to
objective knowledge of the world is far from univocally clear, the
resultant analysis of the human condition is crystal-clear. Human-
ity’s lot is to be perennially moving from suffering to satisfaction
to new suffering (occasionally interrupted by boredom). A prop-

30
 Luther voices a similar opposition to Aristotelian metaphysics: M. Mjalaand, The Hid-
den God. Luther, Philosoph and Political heolog , cit., p. 43.
31
 For discussion: G.S. Neeley, Schopenhauer. onsistent eading, New ork, Edwin Mellen
Press, 2003, pp. 1-52; S. Shapshay, Poetic Intuition and the ounds of Sense Metaphor and Meton-
ymy in Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, European Journal of Philosophy , 16 (2008), pp. 211-229.
504 Dennis Vanden Auweele

er approach then to human existence is pessimism, which attempts

to offer tools that release the human agent from this circuitry of
pain. The opposite point of view, namely optimism, is mercilessly
attacked by Schopenhauer:

I cannot hold back from declaring here that optimism, where it is

not just the thoughtless talk of someone with only words in his at
head, strikes me as not only an absurd, but even a truly wicked way
of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of hu-
manity (WWV1 385).

He even adds that such optimism is entirely foreign to authen-

tic Christianity: Do not think for a moment that Christian doctrine
is favorable to optimism; on the contrary, in the Gospels, world’
and evil’ are used as almost synonymous expressions (WWV1 385).
This also shows how Schopenhauer has fairly little respect for the
Old Testament where God calls creation good (Genesis) and that
he solely takes up the New Testament as representing the real spir-
it of Christianity (with the addition of the doctrine of original sin).
Both Luther and Schopenhauer then argue that true knowledge
can only be revealed to human beings if the subjective aspects of
their knowing and willing are eliminated. The exact details in how
this occurs, whether through revelation in Scripture or through
bodily/aesthetic sensitivity, are obviously different. The resulting
analysis of the human condition that follows upon this revelation is
again remarkably similar: the lot of human beings is wretched. But
Luther and Schopenhauer do not damn human beings to eternal
depravity. There is recourse, namely through a grace.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 505

. Salvation through nconditional Grace

Luther’s views of salvation through grace are relatively clear: the

exposure to Scripture can engender a desire for humility (through
recognition of our depravity) that can make the human being recep-
tive to grace. Such grace is unconditionally and undeservingly
bestowed by God on the human being. These views are the result
of, on the one hand, his analysis of the total depravity of human
beings (because of which works of any kind are worthless) and, on
the other hand, the direct revelation of divine wisdom in the Scrip-
ture. In this final section, we will explore how something remarka-
bly similar happens at the pinnacle of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
Human beings are caught in a constant and inescapable circuity
of suffering because we naturally aspire to happiness. We are caught
in this circuitry to such an extent that we naturally believe that our
lives can be successful from within the pursuit of happiness. Schopen-
hauer calls this our only innate error, that we exist in order to
be happy (WWV2 726). et the world and life are altogether not
arranged so as to include a happy existence (WWV2 727). Success in
this world is basically impossible even though most popular philos-
ophies, both in Schopenhauer’s day and arguably even today, advo-
cate that we ought to cultivate our natural being. Schopenhauer even
believes that the Christianity of his day has forgotten the two central
tenets of authentic Christianity, namely original sin and redemption
through grace (WWV1 480-481 and 621). Where Luther aspired to re-
establish these two doctrines theologically, Schopenhauer hopes to
corroborate these notions philosophically. The common enemy they
then have in mind is (Scholastic) rationalism and optimism.
One of the things that has troubled interpreters of Schopen-
hauer’s philosophy is the paradox between the ominous nature of
Schopenhauer’s philosophy and the gaiety by which it is written
and defended. This has given rise to the question whether Scho-
penhauer is truly as pessimistic as he claims to be. For instance,
Bryan Magee notes that there is an all-pervading relish in Scho-
penhauer’s writing that gives the lie to any notion of unrelieved
pessimism 32 and Iris Murdoch notes how Schopenhauer’s irre-

32
 B. Magee, The Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, p. 260.
506 Dennis Vanden Auweele

pressible empiricist gaiety is in tension with his nihilistic hatred of

the ordinary world 33. Even Nie sche mused as follows:

Schopenhauer, pessimism notwithstanding, actually played the

ute every day, after dinner. ou can read it in his biography.
And just out of curiosity: a pessimist who negates both God and
world but stops before morality, who a rms morality and plays his
ute, a rms laede neminem morality: excuse me Is this really a
pessimist 34

Two things are to be said in response. First, Schopenhauer does

not deny that there is beauty in the world, which is signaled by
the fact that objective observation of the world engenders aesthetic
relief. But to observe something is distinct from being something:

An optimist tells me to open my eyes and, looking into the world,

see how beautiful it is: in the sunshine, with its mountains, valleys,
streams, plants, animals, etc. But is the world then a peep show
These things are of course beautiful to look at, but to be them is some-
thing entirely different (WWV2 665).

A second part of the response is that Schopenhauer is, like

Luther, not absolutely pessimistic. There is hope, but not insofar
as human beings continue to yearn for and strive towards worldly
success. There is no way that (human) nature will lead towards any
sort of salvation:

So long as our will is the same, our world can be no other. To be

sure, everyone desires to be redeemed from the state of suffering
and death: they would like, as is said, to attain to eternal blessed-
ness, to enter the kingdom of heaven, but only not on their own two
feet; they would rather be carried, by the course of nature. But this
is impossible (WWV2 692).

Consciousness of the wretchedness of the world emerges most

powerfully for Luther in the epiphany that is Scripture: But now
the gospel is come, men begin to impute unto it, that the world is
evil. Whereas the truth is, that by the good gospel, it is more mani-

33
 I. Murdoch, Metaph sics as a Guide to Morals, London, Penguin Book, 1993, p. 70.
34
 F. Nie sche, e ond Good and Evil, ed. by R.-P. Horstmann and J. Norman, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 76.
Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree 507

fest how evil it was, while, without the gospel, it did all its work in
darkness 35. For Schopenhauer, human beings ought to experience
some sort of epiphany, a moment of revelation in which they intui-
tively recognize the nullity of their natural aspiration towards hap-
piness. This cannot happen via propositional argument. There has
to be a powerful conative response to the insight into the wretched-
ness of existence.
In that moment of revelation, human beings are opened to the
fact that the problem which leads to their miserableness is their
very nature. Their actions are a direct result of their being: operari
sequitur esse. We have to be delivered from our nature or redeemed,
and such redemption from our present state is depicted as the
highest goal not only by Christianity but also by Brahmanism and
Buddhism (under the name of what is expressed in English as final
emancipation) (WWV2 691). Through such redemption, we become
something entirely different from, indeed the very opposite of, what
we are which is a complete transformation of our disposition and
essence, i.e., rebirth, as a consequence of which redemption occurs
(WWV2 691). This makes clear why the express intent to experience
grace is a red herring: you cannot will not to will. The denial of the
will is something that befalls the individual. This is what Schopen-
hauer calls that great fundamental truth contained in Christian-
ity as well as in Brahmanism and Buddhism , namely that human
beings are, on the one hand, in need for redemption from an exist-
ence subject to suffering and death and, on the other hand, can
attain such redemption through denial of the will which is a
decided opposition to nature (WWV2 720).

Conclusion

A lot more could be said about this subject. The central concern of
this essay was to show how the similarities between Luther’s theol-
ogy and Schopenhauer’s philosophy are striking. Despite the some-
what nonchalant depiction of Schopenhauer as a militant atheist, he
has a distinct a nity to certain religious themes. Indeed, he does
not mince words when he accredits Luther with returning to an
authentic sense of Christianity by fortifying the Augustinian doc-

35
 M. Luther, On the Bondage of the Will, cit., p. 48.
508 Dennis Vanden Auweele

trine and adding some elements of Medieval Mysticism (especially

Meister Ekchart).
Three areas in particular were found where Schopenhauer’s phi-
losophy aligns smoothly with Luther’s theology. First, their respec-
tive doctrines of the bondage of the will are indebted to a monis-
tic point of view with regard to the nature of the human being.
For Luther, the human being is pure Flesh; for Schopenhauer, the
human being is pure will. Since human beings are the expression
of one single principle which is nefariously opposed to the sal-
vation of the individual their actions are necessarily the conse-
quence of that singular principle. Second, salvation is to be attained
through something that allows for the radical transformation of the
human being by uprooting their nature. Such salvation cannot take
effect if the information that is acquired through revelation is some-
how modified by means of the subjective principles of the human
beings. This means that any kind of hermeneutics or rationalism
is excluded for Schopenhauer and Luther insofar human soteriolo-
gy is concerned. Finally, grace happens gratuitously through which
the human agent is emptied of a self (a process that he or she can
already start by his own means to some extent), and if there no
longer is a self to upset the human being with evil and suffering,
there no longer is evil and suffering. This signals that the legacy of
Dr. Luther continues to live on in the philosophy of the melancholic
and misanthropic sage of Frankfurt.
25. dianoia

utero e a fi osofia
a cura di E. Caramelli e C. Gentili

Introduzione
ELEONORA CARAMELLI, CARLO GENTILI
Lutero e la filosofia. Lutero in philosophicis

JOAChIM RINGLEbEN
Prospettive di filosofia del linguaggio in Martin Lutero

EMMANuEL CATTIN
«Nous luthériens». Hegel et Luther

ChRIsTOph buLTMANN
«La lingua artificiale della teologia brulica di fraintendimenti».
Johann Gottfried Herder critico di Martin Lutero

ChRIsTIAN DANz
«La riforma fu quindi fin dall’inizio incompiuta, non ciò che doveva diventare,
bensì solo il suo inizio». L’interpretazione schellinghiana della riforma luterana

phILIppE sOuAL
Hegel luthérien

DENNIs VANDEN AuwEELE

Schopenhauer’s Lutheran Pedigree

CARLO GENTILI
Il «monaco impossibile». Nietzsche pro e contra Lutero

ELEONORA CARAMELLI
La cultura luterana della traduzione e Hegel.
La traducibilità della poesia nelle Lezioni di Estetica

issn 1125-1514