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Operation Winter Storm (German: Unternehmen Wintergewitter), the small-scale German-Italian 1944 Christmas offensive on the Apennine Mountains in Italy, was the last
meaningful feat of arms of the dying World War II Rome-Berlin Axis, and one of the last examples of the German tactical and operational mastery. This offensive badly
mauled an American infantry division and achieved some minor results, slightly and inconclusively improving the Axis situation over the Western Apennines Gothic Line
sector. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Wintergewitter_(Winter_Storm)_-_Italian_Front
Wintergewitter ("temporale dinverno o Winter Storm"), scatt alla mezzanotte del 25 dicembre 1944, con lobiettivo
iniziale di occupare la valle del Serchio ed arrivare eventualmente a Lucca e Livorno. Nonostante le pretese della
propaganda fascista, che voleva far passare loperazione WGW come una sorta di controffensiva delle Ardenne
italiana, la battaglia fu di proporzioni quantomeno limitate, sia per i risultati ottenuti (far ripiegare un gruppo di
combattimento reggimentale americano) sia per le dimensioni dei reparti impegnati (4 battaglioni tedeschi e 4
repubblicani, pi i supporti dartiglieria per un totale di poco superiore ai 5.ooo uomini ). Entro il 31 dicembre il
fronte si sarebbe nuovamente stabilizzato sulle posizioni di partenza, senza alcun mutamento strategico o tattico
di rilievo.
This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Operation
Wintergewitter (Winter Storm) - Italian Front".
http://comandosupremo.com/winter.html
The best, most experienced units, no doubt, were the
two German assault battalions of the 3rd column,
attached to the 148th Division, and called "special
battalions" in Italian sources. They were entirely made
up by well trained and fast-moving assault troops. The
two weak, understrength German battalions of the
285th Grenadier Regiment instead were of poor
quality. Most of their men came from Alsace, and had
been forcibly enlisted in the Wehrmacht after the 1940
campaign and the German annexation of their native
land. Desertion rate was high and on November 26th 27th an Italian Alpine company joined them to have
them toe the line.
The Attack
On December 24th, 92nd Division was ordered to call the scheduled attack off and prepare to fend off an Axis offensive which would be launched on December 27th. But the
Axis third attack column was ready to go at midnight, December 25th - 26th!
At 04:50 (3:00 according to some sources) hours, December 26th, elements of the two German assault battalions, coming out from darkness, suddenly attacked the
Sommocolonia garrison (elements of F Company, 2nd Battalion, 366th Regiment, supported by some partisans). Some authors state that the resistance there was tough but
quickly overwhelmed; others say that it lasted all day and the attackers were even forced to call for artillery support. The latter account sounds more credible. When fin ally the
town was completely occupied by the Germans, only 18 defenders managed to disengage and withdraw. In the morning, 200 men of the Mittenwald battalion seized the
American positions at Bebbio and Scarpello, villages placed south of Sommocolonia and held by the 92nd Recon Troop, which withdrew to Coreglia.
At 14:00 hours, the German spearheads attacked Barga, and its garrison, the 2nd Battalion, 366th Regiment. Here, too, the defenders put up a good fight and the garrison
succumbed to the German onrush by the following morning.
In the meantime, Axis mortars had opened fire along the whole front and the other two columns had started moving forward. The center column in the Serchio valley - east o f
Serchio river, the two German Grenadier battalions together with the attached company of the Italian Brescia Alpine battalion; west of the same river, the other Brescia
companies - overcame a weak initial resistance, but their opponents were falling back already and the attackers got to Fornaci smoothly, almost without a fight. Fornaci i tself
American OOB
The unit that would bear the brunt of the upcoming
battle was the 370th Regimental Combat Team (Col.
Sherman) of the 92nd Buffalo Infantry Division:
370th Infantry Regiment (less 3rd Battalion); 2nd
Battalion, 366th Infantry Regiment; 598th Field
Artillery Battalion; 92nd Reconnaissance Troop;
support guns company, 366th Regiment; B Company
B, 760th Armored Battalion; A Company, 317th
Engineer Battalion.
fell quickly, although the two German (in fact mostly Alsatian) battalions were heavily criticized for their sluggishness and lack of aggressiveness.
The all-Italian right column, however, faced a much more vigorous defense. The San Marco easily seized the village of Molazzano and pushed the defenders back, but the
Regimental Headquarters Company suffered losses and could not take the village of Brucciano. The Cadelo Group, supported by the Intra battalion which was engaging the
enemy by launching little diversionary attacks, occupied Calomini, but the Vergemoli garrison - 370th Infantry Regiment elements, and some partisan groups - proved a toug h
nut to crack and could not be dislodged. A wide minefield, artillery shelling and deadly machinegun and rifle fire stopped the advancing Italian platoons and inflicted he avy
casualties, in spite of a relentless Axis artillery barrage fire hammering the American positions. In the evening of December 26th, the town still was in American hands, but the
Cadelo broke off its attacks because the whole US line had elsewhere crumbled. The stout Vergemoli garrison could be encircled and cut off. It eventually retreated, leavi ng in
place a partisan group as a covering party. By December 27th, the mini-offensive was over. In the morning, the German assault troops entered Pian di Coreglia, their final
objective, and patrols went forward as far as the relatively distant village of Calavorno, reporting that the enemy still was in full retreat. The other columns had also reached
their objective points, and an entire Allied Division had been routed. Nearly 200 prisoners were taken, along with many weapons (including several Browning M2HB heavy
machineguns, mortars and some bazookas), foodstuff and assorted materials. Axis attack forces had wedged themselves into an area 20 km wide, 8 km deep. The Allied air
forces were caught off guard and the usually ubiquitous USAAF P-47 fighter-bomber aircraft did not seriously oppose the enemy's advance until the morning of December
27th.
Assessment
It is difficult to assess Axis losses as the available sources do not provide any figures. The left and center columns casualties were most likely negligible; the heavies t losses
were those suffered by the (Italian) right wing of the Axis array.
As for the 92nd Division, the relatively few prisoners taken by the Axis indicate a headlong retreat, although some small units held out to the last. On the other hand, r outing an
enemy division, surrounding the remnants and bagging thousands of prisoners was a task beyond the very limited capabilities of the Axis forces - few "leg" infantry battal ions
crossing rugged mountain terrain, under the threat of the deadly Allied air raids. During the American retreat instances of panic, feeble resistance and utter disorganiza tion
actually took place, as Gallicano civilians witnessed.
The responsibility for these episodes, as Gen. Mark Clark himself pointed out, rests almost entirely with the high level commanders, not with the 92nd Division's black tr oops
nor with the majority of their platoon, company and battalion leaders. A night assault took them by surprise, they did what they could do, and not rarely they fought vali antly; a
number of black soldiers were later awarded decorations. In the Italian and German officers' opinion, the American black soldiers were not much aggressive, but in defense
they could be stubborn and tough. In several little local attacks October through November, the "Buffalo soldier" troops had fought fairly well. Gen. Almond and Col. Sher man
deserve criticism. Although they later tried to blame it on the troops, the American setback was mainly caused by their muddled orders, their slow reaction and some
misunderstandings, as well as the tactical surprise achieved by the Axis and the effectiveness of the German assault troops. The inadequate leadership of several American
company and platoon commanders compounded 92nd Division's failure. The Allies also underrated Monterosa Gothic Line troops' morale. A mid-December US intelligence
report stated that "the morale in the [Monterosa] Division is very low". While the Italian unit was not a topnotch outfit, and did have its morale troubles, it was far fr om being a
total failure. It also seems the Americans were unlucky. The blasting charges placed on some important bridges in order to blow them up in case of a sudden Axis attack di d
not explode.
Aftermath
All of the limited objectives of the Garfagnana
offensive were attained. The US 5th Army got a minor
beating. Allied reserves were shifted to a secondary
sector. The success cheered the Italian RSI troops up,
though just for a while. Some local Italian partisan
bands and groups were eventually scattered. The Axis
gained a slightly better defensive situation on the
Western Appennines, and indeed, the new line stayed
more or less intact until April 1945 and the final Axis
collapse.
Given the awful conditions under which the Axis units
were operating in the Italian theater, and the
disproportionate numbers and firepower, it's
unthinkable they could achieve more than they
historically did. Assuming it was a realistic proposition,
which is highly doubtful, an all-out, Ardennes-style
offensive, if successful, would probably have led to the
capture of Leghorn and pushed 5th Army further back,
but it would never have "driven the Allies into the
sea". And an extra German effort in Italy would just
have quickened the collapse of the Western and
Eastern fronts.
L'offensiva scatt alle ore 0 del 26 Dicembre ed ebbe pieno successo: le colonne avanzanti conquistarono Sommocolonia, Barga, Coreglia,
Fornaci di Barga, Promiana, Calomini e altri paesi fino alla sponda settentrionale del torrente Turrite di Gallicano. Il nemico, costituito
dalla 92a Div. Buffalo USA, dopo aver aspramente combattuto, era in rotta e il comando americano fu costretto a spostare sulle linee
reparti della 8a Div. di fanteria indiana e il 370 Regg. Fanteria USA con artiglieria, per arrestare l'avanzata. Contemporaneamente il
tempo miglior e ci' permise un intervento massiccio dell'aviazione americana che effettu continue azioni di bombardamento e
mitragliamento. Il comando tedesco decise quindi di non proseguire l'offensiva e di formare una nuova linea difensiva pi' avanzata di
quella di partenza. Le truppe italo-tedesche, oltre a conquistare terreno e un notevole bottino di armi, materiali e viveri, avevano creato una
situazione di pericolo per la tranquillit di rifornimenti che da Livorno affluivano alle linee americane a sud di Bologna. Nel volume "The
Mediterranean Theater of Operations-Cassino to the Alps" pubblicato nel 1977 dal Center of Military History del USA ARMY a Washington
a pag. 410 si legge: "Il Generale Von Tippelskirch, comandante della 14 Armata, non aveva dubbi sulla validit dell'operazione. La breve
offensiva, secondo la sua opinione, aveva migliorato il morale delle truppe dando ai suoi uomini una necessaria vittoria sugli Americani e
le unit partecipanti avevano ricevuto un notevole addestramento ed esperienza di combattimento. Ma pi' importante ancora la V Armata
USA era stata costretta a ritirare truppe dal critico settore a sud di Bologna per rinforzare il traballante settore della Valle del Serchio. Ma il
Gen. Von Tippelskirch sarebbe stato ancor pi compiaciuto se avesse saputo che l'operazione Wintergewitter aveva anche creato tali
incertezze nella V Armata al punto di contribuire a un quarto rinvio, che poi si rivel essere "definitivo, fino a primavera, dell'attacco a
"Bologna."