Magic and Religious Individualization On

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r eligion u m
h i stor i a
Direttore
Natale Spineto (Università di Torino)
Comitato scientifico
Gustavo Benavides (Villanova University)
Philippe Borgeaud (Université de Genève)
Bernard Faure (Columbia University)
Giovanni Filoramo (Università di Torino)
Jean-Marie Husser (Université Marc Bloch, Strasbourg)
Massimo Raveri (Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia)
Jörg Rüpke (Erfurt Universität)
Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (Università di Messina)

Guy G. Stroumsa (Hebrew University of Jerusalem · University of Oxford)
Emilio Suárez de la Torre (Universidad de Valladolid)
Redazione scientifica
Augusto Cosentino (Università di Messina)
Alberto Pelissero (Università di Torino)
Alessandro Saggioro (Sapienza, Università di Roma)
Roberto Tottoli (Università degli Studi di Napoli ‘l’Orientale’)
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Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Pisa n. 36 del 30/10/2007.
issn 2035-5572
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SOMM A R IO
sezione monografica
historical variations and continuities in the history of religions
A cura di Natale Spineto
Natale Spineto, Introduzione 11
Jeppe Sinding Jensen, « Religion is the word, but, what is the thing – if there is
one ? ». On generalized interpretations and epistemic placeholders in the study of re-
ligion 17
Bernd-Christian Otto, Magic and religious individualization. On the construct-
ion and deconstruction of analytical categories in the Study of Religion 29

Luigi Berzano, Spiritualità. Persistenza e trasformazioni 53
Davide Ermacora, Invariant cultural forms in Carlo Ginzburg’s « Ecstasies » : A
thirty-year retrospective 69
Emilio Suárez de la Torre, Continuidad, innovación y contexto : Eros en los papi-
ros mágicos griegos 95
Jörg Rüpke, Crafting complex place : Religion, antiquarianism and urban development
in late republican Rome 109
Alberto Pelissero, Continuità e mutamento nelle religioni indiane. Contributo all’a-
nalisi di un tema centrale per gli studi indologici 119
Ignazio E. Buttitta, “Memorie dal sottosuolo”. Una prospettiva di indagine sul sim-
bolismo rituale delle feste religiose “tradizionali” 135
saggi
Giovanni Filoramo, Relocating religion as a historiographical task. Aims and per-
spectives 169
Gaetano Riccardo, Agamben e i Maori. Homo sacer e il problema dell’ambiva-
lenza del sacro 179
Recapito dei collaboratori del presente fascicolo 201
Norme redazionali della casa editrice 203
M AGIC A ND R ELIGIOUS INDI V IDUA LIZATION
on the construction and deconstruction
of analytical categor ies in the study of r eligion
Ber nd-Chr istian Otto
Abstract
This article opens a new methodological pathway towards the persistent problem of so-called
‘critical categories’ in the (post)modern Study of Religion : How should scholars deal with ver-
satile or polyvalent concepts that lack generally accepted conceptualizations and continuously
evoke misunderstandings or even fierce debates about their proper usage ? Instead of arbitrarily
reducing the semantic complexity of such categories by means of ‘definitions’, the article calls
for acknowledging polysemantics as a core feature or inescapable quality of many, if not all, ba-
sic categories in the Study of Religion. Accordingly, the article introduces a new methodologi-
cal strategy – here coined ‘polysemantic analysis’ –, which consists of two parts : first, through
discourse analysis and conceptual reverse-engineering a disputed category is dissected into its
components in the form of a semantic matrix, or ‘net of notions’, which may then, second, be
applied to religious data. This procedure allows for applying a polysemantic concept to reli-
gious data without losing any of its potential analytical value, thus opening the floor for more
nuanced and fine-grained analyses. In the article, said strategy is applied to the concept of ‘re-
ligious individualization’, a process category that has caught enhanced scholarly attention over
the past years. ‘Polysemantic analysis’ reveals a matrix with no less than 26 different notions of
the category, which are grouped in four basic domains. This ‘net of notions’ is then applied to
the conceptual history of ‘magic’, both to polemical and affirmative discourses. The textual-rit-
ual tradition of ‘Western learned magic’ triggers a wide range of notions ascribed to ‘religious
individualization’ and might therefore be interpreted as a particularly noticeable example case
of such dynamics, even though there remain some ambiguities to the matter.
Keywords : Individualization, secularization, de-traditionalization, pluralization, privatization,
religion, magic, study of religion, religious studies, methodology, critical categories, poly-
semantics.
1. Introduction
ebates about large-scale historical dynamics in the History of Religion have un-
D leashed a range of terms equipped with the suffix « ization » in the scholarly litera-
ture : process categories that usually indicate overarching changes concerning the social
context and status of religion which are often attached to the notion of « modernity ».
The most infamous of these concepts is clearly « secularization », which has been wide-
ly discussed over the past decades, both as an allegedly inevitable concomitant of other
modern « izations » (such as scientifization, rationalization, or even westernization), 1 as
1 See for two recent opposing interpretations Rob Warner, Secularization and its discontents, London, Con-
tinuum, 2010. Steve Bruce, Secularization : In defence of an unfashionable theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2011. Readable overviews of the debate can be found in Jeffrey Cox, Master Narratives of long-term religious change,
in The decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000, edited by Hugh McLeod, Werner Ustorf, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 201-217. Peter L. Berger, The desecularization of the world : a global over-
https://doi.org/10.19272/201704901003 · «historia religionum» · 9 · 2017

30 bernd-christian otto
well as a powerful factor within religion. 1 Related « izations » such as detraditionaliza-
tion, deinstitutionalization, privatization, or pluralization have been discussed either
as important supplements or as counter-evidence to the secularization thesis. In addi-
tion, they were used to conceptualize further seemingly modern phenomena such as
invisible religion, religious hybridity, and multi-religious or patchwork identities – for
instance, in the debate about new religious movements. 2 While the secularization de-
bate will most likely continue despite the apparent continuity or even « resurgence of
religion » in an alleged « age of terror » 3 or of « multiple modernities », 4 this paper will
scrutinize yet another « ization » that has popped up in the aforementioned debates,
namely, « religious individualization ». 5
Compared to secularization, the concept of religious individualization has not
evoked much of a debate so far, yet it is, as we shall see, at least as complex (concern-
ing its semantic contents), compelling (concerning its analytical value), and problem-
atic (concerning its – often implicit – background assumptions). What is more, the
concept has caught enhanced scholarly attention over the past years, as it has been
the topic of a large collaborative research project, namely the DFG-funded (2009-2017,
FOR1013) Kollegforschergruppe « Religious individualization in historical perspective »
based at the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies at the Uni-
versity of Erfurt. As was to be expected from a collaborative research project in the
(post-)modern humanities, the very concept of religious individualization was under
constant fire and remained heavily disputed all throughout its funding phase. One key
agenda of this project was to dismantle the master narrative of religious individual-
ization being an essentially modern Western phenomenon, 6 but it turned out that
view, in The desecularization of the world : resurgent religion and world politics, edited by Idem, Washington, Ethics
and Public Policy Center, 62005, pp. 1-18. Kocku von Stuckrad, Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and early mod-
ern Europe : Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities, Leiden, Brill, 2010, pp. 7-18. Severely critical : Rodney Stark,
Roger Finke, Acts of faith : explaining the human side of religion, Berkeley, University of California Press, 82007,
pp. 57f. Moderate assessment : Ulrich Beck, Der eigene Gott : von der Friedensfähigkeit und dem Gewaltpotential der
Religionen, Frankfurt a. Main, Verlag der Weltreligionen, 2008, pp. 34f. (English translation A God of one’s own :
religion’s capacity for peace and potential for violence, translated by Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge, Polity, 2010).
1 See partly Secularization and the world religions, edited by Hans Joas, Klaus Wiegandt, Liverpool, Liverpool
University Press, 2009.
2 See, exemplarily, Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion : The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, New
York, Macmillan, 1967. Detraditionalization : critical reflections on authority and identity, edited by Paul Heelas, Scott
Lash, Paul Morris, Cambridge, Blackwell 1996. Meredith B. McGuire, Lived Religion : Faith and Practice in every-
day life, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. Religions in the modern world : traditions and transformations, edited
by Linda Woodhead, Hiroko Kawanami, Christopher Partridge, London, Routledge, 22009 (therein foremost
Peter L. Berger, Secularization and de-secularization, pp. 336-344). Religion and the State : A comparative sociology,
edited by Jack Barbalet, Adam Possamai, Bryan S. Turner, London, Anthem Press, 2011. See also Jörg Rüpke,
Individualization and Privatization, in The Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Stausberg,
Steven Engler, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 702-717. On pluralization see the agenda underlying Eu-
ropäische Religionsgeschichte : ein mehrfacher Pluralismus, 2 vols., edited by Hans G. Kippenberg, Jörg Rüpke, Kocku
von Stuckrad, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009.
3 See, e.g., Martin Riesebrodt, Die Rückkehr der Religionen : Fundamentalismus und der ‘Kampf der Kulturen’,
München, Beck, 2000. Terror in the mind of god : the global rise of religious violence, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 32003. David Zeidan, The resurgence of religion : a comparative study of se-
lected themes in Christian and Islamic fundamentalist discourses, Leiden, Brill, 2010.
4 See Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Comparative civilizations and multiple modernities, 2 vols., Leiden, Brill, 2003.
Beck, Der eigene Gott, pp. 58f.
5 For aesthetic reasons, I will abstain from double quotations marks when using the term in the following,
despite its apparent ambiguities (see below).
6 See foremost Martin Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization : Stocktaking and Issues for the Future, « Re-
ligion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 330-343. Rüpke, Individualization and Privatization, pp. 707-708.
magic and religious individualization 31
the concept itself encompasses a large variety of semantic notions which tend to be
evoked by different scholars on different occasions and with regard to different obser-
vations, thus hampering interdisciplinary or even basic inter-subjective understanding
on the matter.
In the light of these experiences – I have been part of said Kollegforschergruppe
since 2014 –, the aim of the present article is twofold. In the first part, I will review the
recent debate on religious individualization in the form of a semantic matrix, which
displays the most important notions that have been evoked in the research literature.
This matrix may, it is hoped, facilitate inter-textual and -disciplinary understanding
among scholars who wish to use the category hereafter. Furthermore, some general
problems concerning the concept of religious individualization will be discussed. In
the second part, this matrix is applied to a specific research object, namely, the (con-
ceptual) history of « magic ». As will become apparent, even after revealing and disen-
tangling 26 different notions of religious individualization – that is, after a thorough
« reverse-engineering » of the entire category –, 1 it is in fact possible and reasonable to

apply the concept as an analytical tool to religious data.
On a more theoretical level, the article is an attempt to add further thoughts to the
persistent problem of so-called « critical categories » in the (post-)modern Study of Re-
ligion : how should scholars deal with versatile or polyvalent concepts that lack proper
conceptualizations or definitions and evoke misunderstandings or even fierce debates
about their proper usage ? How should basic categories in the Study of Religion be
construed in order to minimize their semantic ambivalencies and maximize their ana-
lytical value ? And, finally, how can scholars of religion continue to successfully com-
municate in times when every major and minor scholarly category may fall prey to
deconstructionist agendas ?
2. Religious individualization
The historical roots of the concept of religious individualization can be traced back
to 20th century sociological theories of modernization, 2 which have often conceptu-
alized the former as an underlying force or concomitant of various ruptures of social
bonds, i.e. processes of detraditionalization, deinstitutionalization and privatization
of religion (or religiosity), which seem to have gained steady pace from the 19th cen-
tury onwards. The geographical prototype that inspired this narrative was (North-
western) Europe, i.e., only a small part of what is usually regarded as the « West »,
and eventual generalizations already fail in acknowledging deviating developments in
Southern or Eastern Europe or the United States of America. 3 One might go as far as
1 On « reverse-engineering » see Ann Taves, Reverse-engineering complex cultural concepts : Identifying building
blocks of »religion », « Journal of Cognition and Culture », xv, 2015, pp. 191-216. Even though her method is derived
from cognitive studies, and mine from discourse analysis, the formulation fits perfectly to what I will be doing
in this article.
2 (German) Overviews of the sociological debate on « individualization » (with or without the prefixed adjec-
tive « religious ») can be found in Flavia Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ? Die Antworten soziologischer Klas-
siker, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998. Individualisierung, edited by Thomas Kron, Martin Horáček, Biele-
feld, transcript, 2009. Individualisierungen : ein Vierteljahrhundert « jenseits von Stand und Klasse » ?, edited by Peter A.
Berger, Ronald Hitzler, Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010. For a concise argument see recently
Beck, Der eigene Gott, pp. 107f.
3 See on this critique von Stuckrad, Locations of Knowledge, pp. 7-9. On (Western) Europe as an « exceptional
case » (instead of being the historical prototype) see Grace Davie, Europe : The Exceptional Case : Parameters of
to suspect that the concept of religious individualization was first invented and long
applied as a scholarly tool of modern Western (European) self-description, and it is
therefore hardly surprising that the concept is often accompanied by ideological, if
not severely Eurocentric undertones and background assumptions (for example, con-
cerning a large number of allegedly « un-individualized » non-Western or pre-modern
religious actors). 1
For our purposes, it is important to note that religious individualization is clearly
an etic, second-order category of sociological analysis. In other words, the observa-
tion or recognition of processes of religious individualization within a given empirical
framework or historical sample depends first and foremost on the scholarly observer.
In fact, even in research groups exclusively devoted to exploring religious individual-
ization (such as the aforementioned Kollegforschergruppe « Religious individualization
in historical perspective ») one rarely comes across a specific object of research or case
study where « individualization » would have been applied as a first-order concept of
self-interpretation or -designation by historical actors. However, the etic (i.e., scholarly)

category is, as we shall see, far from self-evident. Thus, instead of purporting to know
what religious individualization is and tracing its manifestation in a given historical
scenario, this paper takes a critical step back and aims – largely inspired by the method
of discourse analysis – at determining how this concept is actually interpreted and con-
ceptualized in the scholarly literature. This implies the need to identify the notions (be-
low also called « triggers ») that have been applied by scholars when interpreting a given
set of data as evidence for religious individualization. Once these notions are made
explicit, it will be easier to acknowledge both the difficulties as well as the potential of
the category, and thus to determine its analytical value.
2. 1. Religious individuation and individualization

It may be helpful to begin with a conceptual clarification proposed by Jörg Rüpke,
namely, the differentiation between (religious) individuation and individualization. Ac-
cording to Rüpke, individuation refers to the « process of a gradual […] integration into
society and the development of self-reflection and of a notion of individual identity ». 2
This process naturally implies all aspects of what is usually called socialization, that is
of « the biographical process of being integrated into ever larger social contexts […]
by the individual’s appropriation of social roles and traditions – and more specifically
religious roles and traditions – and the development of individual identity ». 3 Religious
individuation, then, points to the process of becoming a distinct individual within an
established religious tradition (note that this process is not necessarily self-reflexive)
and thereby also covers the awareness of inter-individual differences – that is, the self-
Faith in the Modern World, London, Darton Longman & Todd, 2010. See also Beck, Der eigene Gott, pp. 37f. On
Europe as a strikingly heterogenous religious field that forbids across-the-board arguments see The decline of
Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000, edited by Hugh McLeod, Werner Ustorf, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004.
1 See Rüpke, Individualization and Privatization, p. 707 : « The diagnosis of modern privatization and individual-
ization and the ascription of a public and collective character to premodern and non-Western religion reinforce
each other ».
2 Jörg Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, in The Individual in the Reli-
gions of the Ancient Mediterranean, edited by Jörg Rüpke, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 3-38 : 7.
3 Ibidem.
conscious differentiation from other religious individuals –, up to the degree of what
Rüpke calls « competitive individuality ». 1
If one interprets individuation in this way, that is, as the result of a process of social-
ization, individuation may not necessarily (or even usually) be accompanied by process-
es of religious individualization. In fact, in the realm of religion, individuation rather
seems to contradict typical notions of individualization, as it mainly refers to one’s in-
tegration and governance within a given religious tradition, for example by becoming
initiated (e.g., by birth, baptism, uttering the shahāda, taking monastic vows, etc.) or
by advancing through the different offices and social statuses that religious institutions
tend to provide (e.g., in hierarchical priesthood or monasticism). This might also per-
tain to what Rüpke calls « representative individuality » where the aim is, in an ancient
Mediterranean context, « perfection in fulfilling a social or religious role, whether as
Roman general, Christian martyr, or male Jew ». 2 Seen from this perspective, individu-
ation appears to be a rather conservative process – as it reifies and perpetuates religious
institutions –, whereas individualization rather implies notions of change, such as an

enhanced range of religious options, creativity and innovativeness, or critique and re-
form (see below). These notions surely play a role within the individuation of some
individuals, but the process of individuation may often occur without any of them. In
fact, as individualization has been said to loosen or dissolve traditional socio-cultural
framings and determinants 3 and thereby to liberate individuals from surrounding re-
ligious and societal « powers of normalization », 4 it cuts the ground from under those
very religious structures and institutions that had been responsible for religious indi-
viduation previously.
2. 2. A semantic matrix of religious individualization

Even though this initial differentiation may give a first insight into some of the notions
ascribed to religious individualization, this category (or the phenomenon or process it
allegedly signifies) remains all but clear-cut and easily comprehensible. Thus, as argued
above, instead of advocating a specific interpretation of the concept, the goal of the
first part of this paper is to present a semantic matrix that maps different uses and inter-
pretations of religious individualization in the research literature. 5 Thereby, the trig-
gers that have – consciously or not – informed scholars while interpreting a given em-
pirical material or historical scenario as an instance of religious individualization will
be revealed and disentangled. For reasons of clarity, I will distinguish four main groups
of notions (which shall be called « domains » hereafter) ; furthermore, all notions will be
numbered in order to facilitate the pragmatic handling of the matrix and its potential
application to religious data (as will be done in the second part of this paper).
Religious Individualization is said to encompass (or to underlie) :
(A) Notions focusing on an enhanced range of individual options or choices (these
1 Ibidem, pp. 12-13. 2 Ibidem, p. 13.

3 See Hubert Knoblauch, Religionssoziologie, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999, pp. 201f.
4 Heiner Keupp, Individualisierung. Riskante Chancen zwischen Selbstsorge und Zonen der Verwundbarkeit, in Indi-
vidualisierungen : ein Vierteljahrhundert « jenseits von Stand und Klasse » ?, edited by Peter A. Berger, Ronald Hitzler,
Wiesbaden, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010, pp. 245-261 : 245.
5 The focus of this survey has been on recent literature, in parts coming from scholars of the afore-mentioned
Kollegforschergruppe « Religious individualization in historical perspective ».
notions might also be dubbed modernist notions, as they are often associated with
wide-ranging, societal developments of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries that have ac-
companied further dynamics associated with modernity, such as secularization or
rationalization)
(A1) De-traditionalization (« Individual action is less and less determined by traditional
norms handed down by family and the larger social context ») ; 1 thereby enhanced
individual autonomy and « freedom of choice » 2
(A2) De-institutionalization (« Non-collective modes of religiosity or spirituality […]
become a mass-phenomenon ») 3
(A3) Pluralization (this may imply basic « extensions of social orbits », 4 but also multi-
religiosity, syncretism, hybridity, patchwork, entanglement ; 5 the reverse stereotype
is « one person – one religion » 6)
(A4) Privatization (also : « invisible religion ») 7
(A5) Individuality becomes a normative ideal (« individuality takes on a normative char-
acter : you have to be an individual. Should anything less be called individualiza-

tion ? ») 8 or even a « cult » ; 9 striving for « authenticity » or an alleged « individualism of
uniqueness » 10
(A6) Individuality becomes « mainstream » and thereby compulsory – paradoxically, as
individualization now shines out as an utterly anti-individualistic process 11
1 Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, p. 7. See also Kippele, Was heißt
Individualisierung ?, pp. 204f.
2 Thomas Kron and Martin Horáček have coined the term « Prozess des Raus und Rein » (« process of out
and in ») here : « Der Akteur gewinnt mit den Auflösungen von traditionalen Strukturen (Raus) und der parallelen
Eingliederung in neue Sinnzusammenhänge (Rein) an Individualitätsoptionen » (Kron, Horáček, Individualisier-
ung, pp. 8-14 : here 9) ; an alternative sociological catchphrase is « disembedding » (see ibidem, p. 133). See also Kip-
pele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp. 208f.
3 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, 331. See on this notion also Angelika Malinar, Religious Plu-
ralism and Processes of Individualization in Hinduism, « Religion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 368-408. See on the « decoupling of
(institutional) religion and (subjective) faith », Beck, Der eigene Gott, pp. 42f.
4 See Georg Simmel, Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Frankfurt a. Main,
Suhrkamp, 1992, pp. 791f. On Simmel see also Kron, Horáček, Individualisierung, pp. 38-45.
5 See on these notions, e.g., Malinar, Religious Pluralism and Processes of Individualization in Hinduism. Rich-
ard Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality : Three Studies in the Roman Empire, « Religion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp.
367-385. Vera Höke, Approaching the rasa-lila of the Great Men : Interlinking Western Intuitive Theologies with Tradi-
tions of Bengal in the Brahmo Samaj, « Religion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 451-476. See also various articles in Individualisierung
durch christliche Mission ?, edited by Wolfgang Reinhard, Antje Linkenbach, Martin Fuchs, Wiesbaden, Harrasow-
itz, 2014. Further Beck, Der eigene Gott, 48f., 161f.
6 Von Stuckrad, Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, p. 15.
7 See Jörg Rüpke, Religious agency, identity, and communication : reflections on history and theory of religion, « Re-
ligion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 344-366 : 347 (with reference to Luckmann, The Invisible Religion). Idem, Individualization
and Privatization. See also Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality. Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?,
pp. 233f.
8 Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, p. 8. Consider also the notion of
« reflexive individuality » – ibidem, p. 13 –, here understood as « the formation of an individualistic discourse – an « in-
dividualist ideology » ; see also Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality, p. 368 : « ideology of emancipation ».
9 See Kron, Horáček, Individualisierung, pp. 120-124 and passim. Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp.
221f.
10 See Mathew Lipman, Some Aspects of Simmel’s Conception of the Individual, in Georg Simmel, 1858-1918. A Collec-
tion of Essays, edited by Kurt H. Wolff, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, p. 129, for the latter formulation ;
see Kron, Horá ček, Individualisierung, pp. 45-46, on Simmel’s idea of « qualitative individualization ». See also
Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp. 217f.
11 See Rüpke, Individualization and Privatization, pp. 711f. In the words of Kron, Horáček, Individualisierung,
pp. 151f., we might also speak of an « illusion of liberation » (« Befreiungsillusion »).
(B) Notions focusing on self and creativity

(B1) Creative, independent, original thinking on religion (« individualisation marks the
potential of creativity and inventiveness to an even larger degree ») 1
(B2) Developing or creating religious ideas, concepts, choices, norms, practices 2
(B3) « Reforming » or « Inventing » religions : weren’t founding figures like Moses, Bud-
dha, Christ, Mohammed, Luther or Joseph Smith Jr. highly individualized ? 3
(B4) Enhanced focus on the « self » or individual salvation 4
(B5) Development of religious self-reflection, the idea of an individual religious « iden-
tity » or « self hood », 5 eventually accompanied by moments of liberation (« An earlier
underdetermined, or only partially determined, self […] finds new articulation, new
possibilities of expression and new options of realization during this process, a self
thus, which undergoes transformation and elaboration ») 6
(B6) Struggle for distinctiveness (« competitive individuality ») 7
(B7) Awareness of « individual responsibility for one’s actions », 8 of moral responsibility, 9

or the formation of a sophisticated concept of conscience 10
(B8) Development of the notion of human dignity and/or individual human rights, 11 or
of the « conception of the unique value of one’s own personhood » 12
(C) Notions focusing on deviance & critique
(C1) Individual appropriations that lead to more or less significant individual devia-
tions from established religious or ritual norms (consider data usually subsumed
under the labels « folk religion » or « folk magic », respectively ; some have used the
label « popular religion » in this sense ; 13 the matter has also been conceptualized as
« Individualreligiosität » ; 14 there is also the issue of an increased lack of control by
religious elites or institutions, eventually facilitating the « self-empowerment of the
religious subject ») 15
1 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 334.

2 Ibidem, p. 334 : « potential of creativity ». See also Malinar, Religious Pluralism and Processes of Individualization
in Hinduism. Höke, Approaching the rasa-lila of the Great Men.
3 On this notion see partly Höke, Approaching the rasa-lila of the Great Men.
4 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 335. See also Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp. 230f.
Beck, adopting a Weberian interpretation of Protestantism as his prime example, has coined the label « Indivi-
dualisierung Eins » (« individualization one »), which for him means « individualization within religion » (Beck, Der
eigene Gott, pp. 107f.), as opposed to « Individualisierung Zwei » (« individualization two »), which for him means
« individualization from religion ». 5 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 335.
6 Ibidem, p. 339. See on this notion also Malinar, Religious Pluralism and Processes of Individualization in Hinduism.
7 Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, pp. 12-13.
8 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization : Stocktaking and Issues for the Future, p. 335.
9 See Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, pp. 12-13, on « moral individuali-
ty » ; see on morality also Sabine Sander, Between acculturation and self-assertion : Individualization in the German-Jewish
context of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic and its contribution to the development of modern sociology, « Reli-
gion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 429-450. Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp. 211f. On different facets of this notion see al-
so Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self : The making of the modern Identity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989.
10 See on this notion Nicole Reinhardt, How individual was conscience in the early modern period ? Observations
on the development of Catholic moral theology, « Religion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp. 409-428.
11 See Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 336. Sander, Between acculturation and self-assertion.
12 Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality, p. 368.
13 See, e.g., Knoblauch, Religionssoziologie, p. 186f.
14 See Bernd-Christian Otto, Magie. Rezeptions- und diskursgeschichtliche Analysen von der Antike bis zur
Neuzeit, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2011, pp. 186-190 and passim.
15 See Winfried Gebhardt, Martin Engelbrecht, Christoph Bochinger, Die Selbstermächtigung des re-
(C2) Social, cultural and/or religious « Dis-embeddedness, temporary rupture of social
bonds » 1
(C3) Intellectual « autonomy » (as opposed to « heteronomy ») while thinking about re-
ligion 2
(C4) Questioning established religious norms, concepts, persons, institutions (« mo-
ments of […] dissatisfaction with religious regulations and dogmas, or with social
rules and practices in a wider sense, and with the structures of power within reli-
gious as well as political contexts ») 3
(C5) Openly criticizing established religious norms, concepts, persons, and/or institu-
tions (this notion is stronger than C4, which may be private)
(C6) Conscious choice of religious heterodoxy or heteropraxy (« heresy ») ; 4 consciously
practising or writing the forbidden while risking persecution or even death (this may
pertain to parts of Martin Mulsow’s « underground literature » 5 and particularly to
the tradition of « Western learned magic », on which see below)
(C7) Open rebellion or revolt against established religious norms or institutions (seen
from this perspective, Luther, Calvin and Zwingli were highly individualized ?)
(D) Notions focusing on experience
(D1) Forms of inwardness (« Innerlichkeit ») 6
(D2) Focus on individual, experience-based « spirituality » 7
(D3) Special attention given to « intuition » and other forms of inspired knowledge 8
(D4) Intense experiences, for example « direct encounters » with the « divine », that may
lead to individualized off-book perspectives on religion 9 (thus, all kinds of charis-
matics, saints, prophets, « mystics », « magicians », « shamans », etc. may attest high de-
grees of religious individualization ?)
(D5) Traditional experience-based religious paths towards « Enlightenment » or « divine
union » (e.g. in monastic Buddhism 10 or Indian bhakti traditions 11)
ligiösen Subjekts. Der « spirituelle Wanderer » als Idealtypus spätmoderner Religiosität, « Zeitschrift für Religionswissen-
schaft », 2, 2005, pp. 133-152. The notion is also touched upon in Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality ;
Jörg Rüpke, Aberglauben oder Individualitat ? Religiöse Abweichung im römischen Reich, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck,
2011.
1 Rüpke, Individualization and Individuation as Concepts for Historical Research, p. 13.
2 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 331, with reference to Cornelius Castoriadis, World in
Fragments. Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination, Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1997.
3 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization : Stocktaking and Issues for the Future, p. 336.
4 See Beck, Der eigene Gott, pp. 123f.
5 See Martin Mulsow, Moderne aus dem Untergrund. Radikale Frühauf klärung in Deutschland, 1680-1720, Ham-
burg, Meiner, 2002 ; Idem, Prekäres Wissen. Eine andere Wissensgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit, Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2012.
7 See Rüpke, Religious agency, identity, and communication, p. 347, with reference to Karel Dobbelaere, The
contextualization of definitions of religion, « Revue Internationale de Sociologie », xxi, 2011, 1, pp. 191-204.
8 See on this notion Höke, Approaching the rasa-lila of the Great Men.
9 See Religiöse Individualisierung in der Mystik : Eckhart, Tauler, Seuse, edited by Freimuth Löser, Dietmar Mieth,
Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 2014.
10 See Sven Bretfeld, Buddhistische Laien, buddhistische Profis : Individualisierung von Religiosität als Folge einer
Neuverteilung religiösen Wissens im modernen Buddhismus Sri Lankas, « Transformierte Buddhismen », 1, 2008, pp.
108-135.
11 See partly Malinar, Religious Pluralism and Processes of Individualization in Hinduism. Höke, Approaching the
rasa-lila of the Great Men.
2. 3. Arising problems
Clearly, the diversity and heterogeneity of the above matrix is alarming. Nonetheless,
scholars dealing with the topic usually purport to know what religious individualiza-
tion is, how to observe and conceptualize it, and they even engage in large-scale histori-
cal narratives on the matter. 1 But heterogeneity is only one of several obstacles that
arise from the above matrix. A range of further methodological and theoretical prob-
lems will be discussed in the following. For the sake of convenience, I shall distinguish
three problem areas : conceptual heterogeneity ; dualism ; and experience.
2. 3. 1. The problem of conceptual heterogeneity

Given the diversity and heterogeneity of the above matrix, religious individualization
appears to be a strikingly ambiguous concept that is given a broad range of meanings
in the research literature. 2 Even though ambiguity is a common feature of many ba-
sic categories in the Study of Religion (consider the polysemantic fields of « religion »,
« culture », « ritual », etc.), it comes at a price : as scholars usually believe that the triggers
which they have observed in their respective material represent main aspects of reli-
gious individualization, and as other scholars may apply different triggers, the current
procedure implies the risk of misunderstandings and talking at cross purposes. I would
thus suggest that scholars should begin to specify the triggers that led them to believe
that they are dealing with cases or processes of religious individualization (according
to the above matrix or any other). This procedure might enhance inter-textual coher-
ence and understanding across the disciplines, at least on a pragmatic level.
On a more theoretical level, the above catalogue raises the question whether we are
actually dealing with a coherent or comparable phenomenon or process. In the lively
debate on basic or « critical categories » in the Study of Religion various solutions have
been proposed to the apparent impossibility of properly defining and conceptualizing
basic concepts in the (post)modern humanities. 3 While the very idea of « critical cate-
1 See, for instance, Rudolph Enno, Die Renaissance und die Entdeckung des Individuums in der Kunst, Tübingen,
Mohr Siebeck 1998. Richard van Dülmen, Entdeckung des Ich : Die Geschichte der Individualisierung vom Mittelalter
bis zur Gegenwart, Köln, Böhlau, 2001. A crucial yet curious facet of such narratives is the desire to pinpoint the
actual « invention » of the « self » (or of the « Individual », respectively) to a particular date ; for positions that opt for
the European Renaissance see Geoff Baldwin, Individual and Self in the Late Renaissance, « The Historical Jour-
nal », xliv, 2001, 2, pp. 341-364 ; for an earlier medievalist standpoint see Caroline W. Bynum, Did the 12th century
discover the Individual, « Journal of Ecclesiastical History », xxxi, 1980, 1, pp. 1-17. See for a related argument Vin-
cent Caudron, Being My-Self ? Montaigne on Difference and Identity, in Identity and Difference : Contemporary Debates
on the Self, edited by Rafael Winkler, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2016, pp. 89-104.
2 One can make similar observations in the debate about « secularization » – see von Stuckrad, Locations of
Knowledge, p. 11 – and there are also numerous semantic overlaps between the two categories. One might suspect
that the secularization thesis still has a strong (yet eventually implicit) impact on the debate on religious individu-
alization.
3 See, exemplarily, Critical Terms for Religious Studies, edited by Mark C. Taylor, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1998. Guide to the Study of Religion, edited by Willi Braun, Russel T. McCutcheon, London, Cassell, 2000.
The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion, edited by John R. Hinnels, London, Routledge, 2005. The Blackwell
Companion to the Study of Religion, edited by Robert A. Segal, Malden, Blackwell, 2006. The Cambridge Companion
to Religious Studies, edited by Robert A. Orsi, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012. Vocabulary for the
Study of Religion, edited by Robert A. Segal, Kocku von Stuckrad, Leiden, Brill, 2015. The Oxford Handbook of the
Study of Religion, edited by Michael Stausberg, Steven Engler, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016. Crucial for
the German debate (yet largely neglected in Anglophone discussions) was the Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher
Grundbegriffe, 5 vols., edited by Hubert Cancik et al., Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1988-2001.
gories » – as envisaged by Mark C. Taylor in 1998 (who acknowledged equivocation as a
potentially positive feature while, at the same time, stressing the cultural and historical
specificity of « critical terms », their incompleteness and arbitrariness, and a « constantly
shifting cultural a priori ») 1 – was only rarely adopted in the subsequent debate, various
other strategies can be found in the recent literature. Taking religious individualization
as our reference point, we might fabricate a (usually monothetic) working definition
that fits a specific case study but that should not be generalized or universalized in a
comparative manner (admittedly, this procedure makes no sense in an interdisciplinary
research project where comparison is one of the main goals). We might strip the con-
cept of several of its (alleged) secondary encrustations and rehabilitate the (alleged) el-
ementary forms of religious individualization, which could then be explained as such.
For example, notions focusing on experience – D1-D5 – could be interpreted as triggers
that might increase or lead to religious individualization, even though they are based
on distinct (e.g. psycho-spiritual) processes and thus secondary. We might conceptual-
ize religious individualization as a (polythetic) umbrella term whose definiens implies

a variety of notions (based on the idea of « family resemblances ») that can, but need
not, be interrelated to one another. Finally, we might consider religious individualiza-
tion to be a purely « heuristic » tool that may (or may not) open up interesting questions
while investigating specific empirical materials, but that lacks any further conceptual
or theoretical coherence. The label « heuristic », however, despite being used quite ex-
cessively in the modern Study of Religion, to my eyes often only disguises the fact
that scholars wish to avoid defining the (supposedly) undefinable and instead resort to
pre-theoretical or even everyday language, thereby leaving the task of sense-making to
their readers.
Whatever option one chooses : 2 the heterogeneity of the above matrix remains prob-
lematic. Interpreting religious individualization as a polythetic umbrella term may, at
first sight, appear as a convenient solution to the problem of conceptual heteroge-
neity, but it is probably not the way to go. Apart from the fact that it undermines
any serious attempt to theorize religious individualization as a coherent phenomenon
or process, polythetic umbrella terms usually do not specify how many definitional
criteria are actually necessary for the definiendum to apply (« just one, some, several,
many, or most » ?), 3 and whether these are conceptually or logically related. For ex-
ample, if one observes a limited number of triggers in a given case study (such as A2-
A4 and C1 in Western polemical discourses about « magic » – see below), the question
remains whether one is then permitted to speak of religious individualization in an
overall sense. Is there a minimum number of triggers that must be observed in order
to interpret a given case as an instance of religious individualization ? Are all triggers
1 Taylor, Introduction, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, pp. 1-20 : here 16-18 : « Rather than a limitation or
shortcoming, such rich equivocity lends terms and openness and flexibility. The terms […] harbor a multiplicity
and complexity that extend their analytic range and enhance their interpretive potential. […] Rather than positing
a universal grid or seamless organism, critical reflection articulates an incomplete web of open and flexible terms.
This seamy network of constraint, which is riddled with gaps that can be neither bridged nor closed, constitutes
a constantly shifting cultural a priori that renders critical knowledge possible while circumscribing its unavoid-
able limits. […] the historical specificity and cultural relativity of cognitive structures means that terms are not
universally translatable. […] To the contrary, we insist that every cultural a priori that renders knowledge possible
and interpretation necessary is always incomplete ».
2 The following argument is based on Michael Stausberg, Mark Q. Gardiner, Definition, in The Oxford
Handbook of the Study of Religion, edited by Michael Stausberg, Steven Engler, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2016, pp. 9-32. 3 Ibidem, p. 19.
comparable in this respect or could some be considered stronger than others ? These
questions, again, call for a proper theorization of religious individualization which is
precisely avoided by the idea of a polythetic umbrella term.
In contrast, a proper theorization of religious individualization would begin by ask-
ing whether the triggers compiled in the above matrix actually point to a coherent
phenomenon or process, and whether it is therefore possible or even necessary to trace
connecting points, specific relationships or even a logical hierarchy between these dif-
ferent notions. In this respect, it may be too simplistic to speak of the « wide range of
forms individualization can take ». 1 Critical readers may be tempted to argue that there
is apparently no coherent phenomenon that underlies the above notions, and that the
matrix actually refers to very different processes, which may or may not be interrelated
– and which have been falsely subsumed under an overall label in the first place. If we
want to preserve the concept of religious individualization in the light of such decon-
structionist arguments, we must therefore look for more nuanced tools of conceptual
engineering.
One such tool may be the « homeostatic property cluster » (HPC) as suggested by
Richard Boyd in 1988 (and 1999). 2 Essentially, HPCs are polythetic categories – that
is, they are terms whose definiens mentions more than one definitional criterion, but
not all definitional criteria must be met for the definiendum to apply. In contrast to
purely polythetic categories – which are vulnerable due to the aforementioned prob-
lems (the number of and relationship between definitional criteria remain unclear or
entirely arbitrary) – an HPC is a « family of natural properties which are non-acciden-
tally related – i.e. the presence of one of them increases the likelihood of the pres-
ence of others – in virtue of common underlying “mechanisms” ». 3 What is more,
« the individual properties of the cluster are allowed to be hierarchically ordered, in
the sense that the presence of some might provide greater weight than others for ap-
plying the definiendum ». 4 Hence, if we conceptualize religious individualization as a
« homeostatic property cluster », we might allow for a wide range of semantic notions
or triggers in the definiens, but it will be all the more crucial to determine whether
these notions are « non-accidentally related » and whether they should therefore be
arranged in a hierarchical order. 5
Conceptualizing religious individualization as a « homeostatic property cluster » can
be a solution to the problem of conceptual heterogeneity, but it obviously calls for a
coherent theory of religious individualization. Such a theory should determine which
of the above notions are necessary (and which appear to be only accidental), which are
« non-accidentally related » (the presence of one increases the likelihood of the pres-
ence of others), and whether the above notions should be hierarchized (as some might
provide greater weight than others for the definiendum to apply). Once such a theory
is formulated, the above matrix might also function as a fruitful comparative tool, as
similar domains or notions could be meaningfully compared across case studies from

2 See Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a Moral Realist, in Essays on Moral Realism, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-Mc-
Cord, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 181-228. Idem, Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa, in Species : New
Interdisciplinary Essays, edited by Robert A. Wilson, Cambridge, MIT Press, pp. 141-185.
3 Stausberg, Gardiner, Definition, p. 21. 4 Ibidem.
5 Flavia Kippele has likewise proposed to quantify or attach weight (« Gewichtung ») to different dimensions
of individualization, but her suggestions are tentative at best : Kippele, Was heißt Individualisierung ?, pp. 240-241.
different times and cultures – bearing in mind that they are in fact « non-accidentally
related », thus pointing to a basic sociological phenomenon or process.
To date, no such theory has been formulated, and we are far from knowing whether
stipulating such a theory is actually possible or even plausible. Yet, as long as there is no
proper theorization of religious individualization that would take into account the ap-
parent multiplicity of triggers or notions applied in the research literature, the problem
of conceptual heterogeneity calls into question large-scale narratives on the history of
religious individualization. Since the category is understood in such variegated ways,
narratives that indicate or explain overall processes or « shapes and grades » 1 (enhanced,
reduced, stagnating, etc.) of religious individualization remain dubious. In the light of
the above matrix, readers might wonder which of the various domains (A, B, C, D) or
notions associated with the category are actually addressed in such narratives. To put it
bluntly, in its current – conceptually heterogeneous and theoretically under-exposed –
design, religious individualization is too versatile and unspecific to meaningfully refer
to any large-scale historical dynamics.
2. 3. 2. The problem of dualism

The concept of religious individualization implies an antithesis which could be re-
ferred to as de- or non-individualization. Thus, the problem of conceptual heteroge-
neity (see above) also pertains to this « other », that is, to the opposite of religious indi-
vidualization. This relates to the (often implicit) idea of an un-individualized collective
that forms the backdrop of ascribed processes of religious individualization. Even if
one acknowledges structures of religious power and standardization as a contrasting
foil for processes of religious individualization, one still needs to determine how and
why these structures of power actually maintain or stimulate de- or non-individual-
ization. 2 It might turn out that the implicit dualism that accompanies the concept of
religious individualization fails to address the complexity of reality or, in other words,
the relationship and interplay between standing-out individuals and social groups or
collectives. It is crucial to reflect more on the theoretical implications of this implicit
dualism ; otherwise, case studies might emphasize the singularity of a certain scenario
precisely by underexposing all those un-individualized « others » that allegedly stand in
stark contrast to an investigated case.
Another problem that surfaces in the light of the individual-collective-dualism is that
religious individualization might be associated with both an individual as well as a soci-
etal process. It is, in fact, necessary to distinguish these two options : even if one finds
triggers on the individual level (such as intense religious experiences – notion D4 – in
the case of Christian « mysticism »), 3 the societal dimension of religious individualiza-
tion (understood as an overall or collective process – notion A) may not necessarily
be involved or reinforced. 4 However, scholars rarely specify whether they are actu-
1 Martin Fuchs, Jörg Rüpke, Religious Individualization in Historical Perspective, « Religion », xlv, 2015, 3, pp.
329-29 : 324.
2 See for some recent thoughts on de-individualization Rüpke, Individualization and Privatization, pp. 711-713.
3 See, exemplarily, Löser, Mieth, Religiöse Individualisierung in der Mystik.
4 In other words (i.e., in the words of the above matrix), as long as only a limited number of individuals in a
society engage in an enhanced reflection on the self (domain B), in deviance and critique (domain C), or in in-
tense religious experiences (domain D), these do not necessarily point to (or are influenced by) large-scale societal
dynamics that provide enhanced religious options for the majority of people (domain A).
ally aware of these two options, whether they regard these as distinct or inter-related
phenomena, and which of the two they have actually observed in their respective ma-
terial. 1 I would thus suggest that, apart from specifying the triggers that scholars have
observed in or applied to their specific material, they should also indicate whether
they actually have an individual or societal process in mind. Both processes may be con-
ceptualized and explored with equal right, but it will heighten inter-textual and -disci-
plinary understanding if they are properly differentiated in the research literature. In
this respect, it might also be helpful to find distinct names or labels for individual and
societal processes of religious individualization – I shall leave this task to the scholarly
community.
2. 3. 3. The problem of experience

The domain of experience (D) encompasses some of the most fascinating yet tricky
and problematic notions of the above matrix. Apart from the issues already mentioned
with regard to the problem of heterogeneity (notions focusing on experience could be
interpreted as phenomena that may eventually reinforce religious individualization,
but which are based on distinct [e.g. psycho-spiritual] processes) and dualism (the in-
tense experiences of Christian « mystics » may involve individual dimensions of reli-
gious individualization, but not necessarily large-scale societal dynamics), there is also
the problem of standardized or even normative « experiences deemed religious ». 2 Ap-
parently, in some traditions, seeking intense « experiences deemed religious » is not the
exception (as in the case of the rather marginal currents of Jewish, Christian, or Islamic
« mysticism »), but rather the regular case. Tibetan Buddhism may serve as a good ex-
ample here. At least before the Chinese Cultural Revolution, several thousand Tibetan
Buddhist monasteries provided a wide range of more or less standardized ritual prac-
tices that were geared towards facilitating different types of intense psycho-spiritual or
physical experiences in order to accelerate the practitioner’s path towards Enlighten-
ment. Differences between Tibetan Buddhist schools and their respective ritual portfo-
lios notwithstanding : from the perspective of the above notion D, one might speak of
a traditional ritual infrastructure that regularly provided intense « experiences deemed
religious » for large groups of practitioners. Would this imply that Tibetan Buddhism
encouraged religious individualization long before an experience-oriented approach to
religion (or religiosity) became popular in the Western world – say, during the prolif-
eration of « New Age » discourses since the 1960s and 1970s ?
That this ritual infrastructure was traditional, collectivist, normative, and in certain
ways repressive renders it difficult to ascribe large-scale processes of religious individu-
alization to Tibetan Buddhism without reservation. 3 In fact, in monastic Buddhism
not only the practices, but also the experiences can be compulsory (consider the Lam-
1 See Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, for further critical reflections on the matter.
2 See on this formulation (which is intended to overcome essentialist interpretations of « religious experi-
ence ») Ann Taves, Religious experience reconsidered : a building block approach to the study of religion and other special
things, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, pp. 22f.
3 The theoretical reason may be that only a very limited number of notions of the above matrix of religious
individualization are triggered. To be more precise, even though we may find some D notions, Tibetan Buddhism
seems to lack relevance with regard to the A and C domains ; in the B domain, only B4 and, possibly, B5 and B7,
are triggered.
rim in the Tibetan Kadampa tradition 1 or the Ten Ox Herding Pictures in Japanese Zen-
Buddhism). 2 This observation once again raises the question whether « experiences
deemed religious » inevitably attest or lead to (individual or societal) religious individu-
alization, or whether such experiences should rather count as a secondary encrustation
to this process. When « experiences deemed religious » become normative or standard-
ized, they might merely attest religious individuation (as opposed to religious individu-
alization – see above).
The same pertains to the problem of stereotypical « experiences deemed religious ».
Spiritualist séances, Catholic exorcism, the prophetic channeling of divine messages
by « New Age » prophets, or the glossolalia evoked thousandfold in charismatic Pente-
costalism till today are all examples of allegedly « intense » or even « authentic » expe-
riences ; yet, they often appear to follow pre-established cultural scripts. This, again,
calls into question a close relationship between « experiences deemed religious » and
religious individualization. In fact, accounts of such experiences may neither point
to individual (as the experiences may be standardized, stereotypical, or even staged)

nor societal (as they may not affect larger groups) processes of religious individual-
ization.
2. 4. Preliminary conclusions
All in all, compelling as the concept of religious individualization may be (due to
its thought-provoking complexity and potential analytical value), there is still some
groundwork to do on the methodological and theoretical foundation of said concept.
Even if one subscribes to an under-theorized polythetic definition or a vague « heuris-
tic » use of the concept, other scholars will want to know what « it » actually is or refers
to that one is talking about. For that reason, I proposed to specify the triggers that have
led scholars to believe that they have identified processes of religious individualization
in a given historical scenario (according to the above matrix or any other) and to clarify
whether they actually have individual or societal processes of religious individualization
in mind. Both indications might heighten inter-textual coherence and understanding
among the scholarly community.
From a methodological perspective, however, despite the current lack of a coher-
ent theory of religious individualization, the semantic matrix provided above may still
prove beneficial. In fact, the above analysis did not aim at a critical deconstruction or
even rejection of the entire category, but could, in contrast, be geared towards a more
productive and constructive agenda. The semantic matrix may itself be applied as an
analytical tool, i.e., as a « net of notions », to be cast onto historical data. In contrast to
the definitional approaches criticized above – which are usually driven by only one or
a small number of definitional criteria (which are often not even made explicit) –, it is
precisely the polysemantic design of the above matrix that might yield more nuanced
findings and interpretations when applied to empirical material. In the following sec-
tion, the concept of « magic » will serve as a test case for such a strategy.
1 See, exemplarily, Lobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen, Lamrim Delam : Der angenehme Weg zur Erkenntnis aller Phän-
omene. Die wesentlichen Unterweisungen des Stufenwegs zur Erleuchtung, Langenfeld, Choedzong, 21995.
2 See, again exemplarily, Mumon Yamada, Lectures On The Ten Oxherding Pictures, Honululu, University of
Hawaii Press, 2004.
3. Magic
As is well known by now, « magic » is an extremely problematic concept in the Study
and History of Religion. Apart from being similarly controversial, it is even more
value-laden, Eurocentric and conceptually fuzzy than religious individualization may
ever be. The lists of potential semantic and theoretical notions of « magic » compiled
in Defining Magic : A Reader includes no less than 39 1 semantic and 35 2 theoretic no-
tions – and these were by far not exhaustive. On various occasions, I have therefore
argued that the concept of « magic » should be dismissed as an etic, second-order cat-
egory in scholarly research, 3 and that it should instead be historicized on the grounds
of a discourse theoretical approach. 4 Such an historicization does not lead to its mere
deconstruction, but rather to the (re-)construction of several novel and promising do-
mains of research. 5 Most importantly, it helps to disentangle the variegated semantic
notions and evaluative patterns ascribed to « magic » in different historical contexts,

thus contributing to a better understanding of the social dynamics and phenomena
that have underlain Western talk about « magic », be they scholarly or non-scholarly,
modern or pre-modern.
In what follows, the concept of « magic » will again be approached in this manner,
while the above matrix of religious individualization will serve as an analytical tool
that shall be applied to (Western) discourses of « magic ». In other words, Western dis-
courses of « magic » form the object of the analysis, whereas the matrix shall determine
whether these discourses could be held to signal or point towards underlying processes
of religious individualization. The goal of this procedure is to explore potential coher-
ences and/or fruitful implications that both concepts may have for one another, and
to elucidate whether the above matrix could function as an analytical lens or « detec-
tor » 6 for processes of religious individualization. As it will turn out, there are different
discourses of « magic » that attest different notions of religious individualization. The
tradition of « Western learned magic » may even be interpreted as a particularly strong
and eye-catching example of processes of religious individualization.
1 See Defining Magic : A Reader, edited by Bernd-Christian Otto, Michael Stausberg Sheffield, Equinox, 2013, pp.
2-3. 2 Ibidem, pp. 9-10.
3 See, e.g., Otto, Magie. Idem, Towards historicizing “Magic” in Antiquity, « Numen », lx, 2013, 2-3, pp. 308-347.
Idem, A discourse historical approach towards medieval ‘learned magic’, in Ashgate Research Companion to medieval mag-
ic : ca. 1000-1500, edited by Sophie Page, Catheline Rider, Farnham, Ashgate, forthcoming. See also Otto, Staus-
berg, Defining Magic, pp. 1-10.
4 On the discursive turn in the academic study of « magic » see, exemplarily, Randall B. Styers, Making
Magic : Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. Kimberly B. Strat-
ton, Naming the Witch : Magic, Ideology, & Stereotype in the Ancient World, New York, Columbia University Press,
2007. Marco Pasi, Magic, in The Brill Dictionary of Religion. Volume iii : m-r, edited by Kocku von Stuckrad, Leiden,
Brill, 2006, pp. 1134-1140. Otto, Magie. Henrik Bogdan, Introduction : « Modern Western Magic », « Aries », xii, 2012,
pp. 1-16. Wouter Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy : Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 164-177. Otto, Stausberg, Defining Magic. Kennet Granholm, Dark En-
lightenment : The Historical, Sociological, and Discursive Contexts of Contemporary Esoteric Magic, Leiden, Brill, 2014.
Bernd-Christian Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic » : preliminary remarks, « Aries », xvi, 2016, pp. 161-240.
5 See Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », pp. 162-163.
6 Of course, different scholars may come to different opinions of whether or not a particular notion is
attested in a given material ; applying the matrix onto historical material is a purely hermeneutic enterprise,
not a fully-fledged measurement. Yet, I hope to provide convincing arguments to substantiate the following
assessments.
3. 1. Western discourses of « magic » and religious individualization

Adopting a discourse historical stance towards « magic » yields a wide range of potential
discourses – i.e. « groups of statements » 1 – where the concept is used, discussed, reject-
ed, valorized, or continuously transformed. However, the use of « magic » in, say, con-
temporary scientific discourses or in contemporary non-scholarly and non-religious
discourses (e.g. in advertisements, sports journalism, or fantasy literature) appears to
be largely irrelevant from the perspective of the above matrix. In contrast, the use
of « magic » in (both pre-modern and contemporary) polemical literature on the one
hand, and in ritual texts composed by insiders or practitioners of the art on the other,
triggers a broad range of notions of the above matrix. In what follows, I will therefore
only focus on these two particular discourses, which I have labelled « discourse of ex-
clusion » and « discourse of inclusion », respectively. However, as these two discourses
trigger different notions of the above matrix, they need to be dealt with separately. I will
begin with the « discourse of exclusion ».
3. 1. 1. The « discourse of exclusion » and religious individualization

There is no room in this paper to go into greater detail about the historical breadth and
continuity of the « discourse of exclusion », its social significance and driving forces in
different epochs and cultural-religious contexts, or its immense textual output over the
last 2,500 years. 2 For our purpose it suffices to say that « magic » has most often operat-
ed as a polemical marker of alterity in the Western « discourse of exclusion ». This « oth-
ering » 3 function of « magic » has served two main purposes : on the one hand, precisely
through applying « magic » as a signifier of allegedly a-religious practices and ideas, al-
legedly naïve concepts of ritual efficacy, or allegedly immoral or antisocial intentions,
contrasting ideals of religious truth, philosophical or scientific plausibility, and moral
integrity could be stipulated. Thereby, religious identities – be they Greek, 4 Roman, 5
Christian, 6 Jewish, 7 or Islamic 8 (all these religious traditions engaged in extensive po-
lemics against « magic ») – could be demarcated, sharpened and strengthened. 9 On the
other hand, « magic » came in handy to criticize and stigmatize, devalue and ridicule,
persecute or even eliminate religious or theological opponents, dissenters, sectarians
or even an entire « religion of the other ». 10
1 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, New York, Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 22.
2 See for some observations on the matter Otto, Magie, chapters 6-8.
3 On « othering » see recently Olav Hammer, Othering, in Vocabulary for the Study of Religion, edited by Robert
A. Segal, Kocku von Stuckrad (Brill Online 2016) : http ://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/vocabulary-
for-the-study-of-religion/othering-COM_00000398 (February 1, 2017).
4 See on polemics in Plato, Otto, Magie, pp. 169f. 5 See on Pliny the Elder, ibidem, pp. 225f.
6 See on Augustine of Hippo, ibidem, pp. 309f.
7 See Maimonides, Guide of the perplexed, book 3, ch. 37, edited / translated in The Guide of the Perplexed. Moses
Maimonides. Transl. with an introd. and notes by Shlomo Pines, with an introd. essay by Leo Strauss, vol. 2, edited by
Shlomo Pines, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1993, pp. 540-550.
8 See Ibn Khald ūn, Muqaddimah, ch. 6, section 27, edited / translated in Ibn Khaldûn. The Muqaddimah. An
Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal in three Volumes, vol. 3, edited by Franz
Rosenthal, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 156-170.
9 In the words of Wouter Hanegraaff, « magic » most often operated as a « waste-basket category » of « the
Other of science and rationality » (and, I might add, religion) : Hanegraaff, Esotericism and the Academy, p. 254.
10 See on this notion Hans G. Kippenberg, Kocku von Stuckrad, Einführung in die Religionswissenschaft.
Gegenstände und Begriffe, München, Beck, 2003, pp. 155-163. Hartmut Zinser, Der Markt der Religionen, München,
Fink, 1997, pp. 93-110. See also Otto, Stausberg, Defining Magic, pp. 7-8.
Seen from the perspective of the above matrix, both the identity-building as well
as the ostracizing function of the « discourse of exclusion » seem to contradict core
notions of religious individualization. Given its far-reaching impact and longue-durée
character, the « discourse of exclusion » could even be interpreted as one of the most ef-
ficacious Western discourses of religious normalization, standardization or homogeni-
zation and thus as a powerful force of religious de- or non-individualization in Western
history. Seen from this perspective, the « discourse of exclusion » seems to be rather ir-
relevant to processes of religious individualization – if one interprets the above matrix
as a « detector » of such processes.
However, there is another side to it, namely the side of those that have actually been
subject to the « othering » function of the « discourse of exclusion ». Western texts that
polemicize against « magic » often include descriptions of ritual practices that have ap-
parently been performed quite regularly by numerous people but that were regarded
as superstitious, inefficacious, impious, sacrilegious, or fraudulent by the respective au-
thor or the discourse s/he belongs to. In many cases, texts belonging to the « discourse
of exclusion » are the only extant sources that provide an indication of the broad range
of ritual practices performed by religious non-professionals and/or (partly illiterate,
or at least non-author) « lay » people in pre-modern Western societies. There are count-
less examples of such texts – consider, for instance, Plato’s account of asebic practices
of pharmakeía in his Laws (933c-e) for ancient Greece ; Pliny the Elder’s extensive de-
scription of healing practices for the Roman Imperial period (see Historia naturalis,
particularly books 28-32 that treat remedies made from animals) ; Augustine of Hip-
po’s account of various types of superstitio in his De doctrina Christiana for late ancient
Christianity (see particularly book 2, chapter 20-24) ; Thomas Aquinas’ related account
of superstitio in his Summa Theologiæ (2.2.96.1-4), for late medieval, and Reginald Scot’s
Discoverie of Witchcraft, for early modern, Europe ; the exuberant mass of post-Refor-
mation parish reports on the ritual practices and handbooks (in German-speaking re-
gions eventually called « Brauchbücher ») of European rural populations ; 1 and last but
not least, the various polls performed by 19th century folklorists such as Adolf Wuttke
or Wilhelm Mannhardt. 2
If one approaches these outsider accounts of « magic » from the perspective of the
above matrix of religious individualization, one makes a surprising discovery. Far from
being a coherent group or corpus of ritual practices that would deserve an overall label
– be it « magic », « superstition », « folk religion », or any other –, the described practices
rather indicate ongoing everyday dynamics of individual appropriation and instrumen-
talization of established religious symbol and ritual systems. Consider, for example,
the pragmatic use of the host as a ritual device for protection and healing in medieval
Christianity as one of countless examples. 3 Evidently, these practices come in a highly
variegated, i.e. pluralized (A3) form, they attest dynamics of privatization (A4) and de-
1 On these sources see the splendid study by Eva Labouvie, Verbotene Künste : Volksmagie und ländlicher Aber-
glaube in den Dorfgemeinden des Saarraums (16.-19. Jahrhundert), St. Ingberg, Röhrig, 1992.
2 See Adolf Wuttke, Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart, Hamburg, Agentur des Rauhen Hauses, 1860.
Wilhelm Mannhardt, Die Korndämonen. Beitrag zur Germanischen Sittenkunde, Berlin, Dümmler, 1868. Idem,
Wald- und Feldkulte, 2 vols., Berlin, Bornträger, 1875/76. One might even add academic theorists of « magic » of
the 19th and 20th century to this list, such as James George Frazer, The Golden Bough : A Study in Magic and Reli-
gion, 12 vols., London, Macmillan, 31907-15, or even Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, New York,
Scribner, 1971.
3 See Richard Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 79f.
institutionalization (A2), and could also be seen as a basic form of deviance (C1), even if
most practitioners will not have perceived themselves as evil-doers. In sum, some core
notions of religious individualization are triggered in this material. 1
One could even argue that the devaluation and prohibition of such individual appro-
priations and instrumentalizations was one of the main driving forces of the « discourse
of exclusion ». From the perspective of notion C1, the ongoing harshness of Western
polemics and legal regulations against « magic » could be held to testify the suppression
of the « self-empowerment of the religious subject » 2 over large periods of Western
history. In this regard, stereotypical semantic notions of « magic » frequently evoked
in the « discourse of exclusion » (such as « blasphemy » – in the sense of « undermining
God’s omnipotence » or the dictum « Thy will be done ») 3 could be interpreted as only
secondary supplements to this background intention. From the perspective of those
« othered » by the « discourse of exclusion », however, the millennia-long continuity of
anti-« magic » polemics suggests that the human tendency towards individual appro-
priations and instrumentalizations of religious symbol and ritual systems – which is in

recent scholarship sometimes conceptualized as « instrumental religion » – 4 was and is
so compelling that it could never be systematically inhibited.
In the light of the above matrix, the millennia-long bashing of « magic » and « super-
stition » as an allegedly widespread phenomenon among the « disorderly » populace or
« inferior » cultures thus yields an unexpected finding : that individual deviations and ab-
errations from religious and ritual norms were not the exception but rather the regular
case in Western history. In other words, on the grounds of notion C1, the « discourse
of exclusion » provides – monolithic narratives in the polemical literature of Western
elites notwithstanding – rich material for everyday dynamics of religious deinstitution-
alization (A2), privatization (A3), pluralization (A4), and even basic religious creativity
(B1, B2) throughout Western history. The « discourse of exclusion » is thus another in-
cisive example that calls into question prevalent narratives that such dynamics are an
exclusive preserve of the 20th and 21st centuries.
3. 1. 2. The « discourse of inclusion » and religious individualization

So far, we have focused on polemical discourses of « magic » and, thereby, either on the
normative interests and idealizations of religious elites or on unspecialized, illiterate,
or « lay » ritual practitioners who have tried to make the best out of the concepts, sym-
bols or rituals provided by their respective religious environments. It is now time to dis-
cuss the « discourse of inclusion », that is, authors and practitioners who have adopted
the concept of « magic » as a positive term of self-reference and valorization in Western
1 In Otto, Magie (e.g., pp. 186-190 and passim), I have conceptualized these practices under the heading « Indi-
vidualreligiosität » (« individual religiosity ») ; said notion was inspired by the Heidelberg research project « Ritual-
dynamik » (« ritual dynamic ») – on findings of this project see, exemplarily, Ritual und Ritualdynamik : Schlüsselbeg-
riffe, Theorien, Diskussionen, edited by Christiane Brosius, Axel Michaels, Paula Schrode, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 2013.
2 On this notion see Gebhardt, Engelbrecht, Bochinger, Die Selbstermächtigung des religiösen Subjekts.
3 Beginning with Plato, Laws, books x and xi (the conceptual equivalent here is asebeía) ; see Otto, Magie, pp.
172f., and Otto, Stausberg, Defining Magic, pp. 19f.
4 See, exemplarily, David N. Gellner, Monk, householder, and Tantric priest : Newar Buddhism and its hierarchy
of ritual, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, passim. Gordon, Religious Competence and Individuality,
p. 373.
history, or, in other words, to focus on the textual-ritual tradition of « Western learned
magic ». 1 There is no room in this paper to go into greater detail about the historical
breadth and continuity of « Western learned magic » over the last (roughly) 2,000 years, 2
its transgression of numerous cultural and religious borders, 3 and its quite stunning
textual output – 4 given that it was almost permanently accompanied by legal persecu-
tion until the « crimen magiae » was removed from most European codes of law during
the late 17th and 18th centuries. 5 I shall restrict my discussion as to whether « Western
learned magic » triggers core notions of the above matrix of religious individualization.
Clearly, there is a close relationship between « Western learned magic » and religious
individualization : 6
Domain A : « Western learned magic » attests dynamics of detraditionalization (A1),
given that practitioners usually adapted to their cultural and religious environments
but tended to adopt systems of knowledge that were marginalized or rejected in con-
temporary mainstream or elitist discourses ; 7 and dynamics of deinstitutionalization
(A2), as « learned magicians » practiced their art despite being embedded in religious
institutions, for instance in late ancient 8 and medieval 9 Egypt, or in late medieval Eu-
rope. 10 However, at least since the early modern « democratization » 11 of its texts and
techniques, there were also all sorts of religious non-professionals. « Western learned
1 For a coherent conceptualization of this research topic see Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », par-
ticularly pp. 172-182. On my idea of « tradition », see ibidem, pp. 183-184 (footnote 94).
2 On the « continuity » of « Western learned magic », see ibidem, pp. 183-189 and passim.
3 On « hybridity » and « entanglement » as core features of « Western learned magic » see ibidem, pp. 199-203.
4 On the problem of « multiplicity » see ibidem, pp. 217-223. A comprehensive history of « Western learned
magic » is still an urgent desideratum, but see the partial overviews in Michael D. Bailey, Magic and Superstition
in Europe : A Concise History from Antiquity to the Present, Lanham, Maryland, 2007, and Owen Davies, Grimoires :
A History of Magic Books, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. See also Otto, Magie, chapters 9-11, and Idem,
Historicizing « Western learned magic ».
5 Beginning with the French witchcraft edict in 1682 ; see The Witchcraft Sourcebook, edited by Brian P. Levack,
New York, Routledge 2004, pp. 181-190.
6 Note that « Western learned magic » is to my eyes a « coherent (even though not homogeneous) and continuous
(even though repeatedly broken) textual-ritual tradition » (Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », p. 224), and
it is « ever-changing in a vast range of domains, be it ritual dynamics, cultural and religious frameworks, social
and practitioner milieus, concepts of ritual efficacy or physical causation, transmission media and techniques,
or organizational and grouping structures » (ibidem, p. 224). One could thus complicate the following analysis by
distinguishing different sources and currents of « Western learned magic » that might evoke different notions of
religious individualization. However, for the sake of simplicity, I shall apply the above matrix to « Western learned
magic » in its entirety, and point to eventual ambiguities and variances during the analysis.
7 See also Bernd-Christian Otto, A Catholic « magician » historicizes « magic » : Eliphas Lévi’s Histoire de la Ma-
gie, in History and Religion : Narrating a Religious Past, edited by Bernd-Christian Otto, Susanne Rau, Jörg Rüpke,
Berlin, De Gruyter, 2015, pp. 419-443 : 422.
8 See on the apparent temple milieu of the Greek Magical Papyri, Otto, Towards historicizing « Magic » in An-
tiquity, pp. 337f. ; Idem, Historicizing « Western learned magic », p. 179 ; in much greater detail David Frankfurter,
Religion in Roman Egypt : Assimilation and Resistance, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, ch. 5. See on the
matter also Jacco Dieleman, Scribal Practices in the Production of Magic Handbooks, in Continuity and Innovation in
the Magical Tradition, edited by Gideon Bohak et al., Leiden, Brill, 2011, pp. 85-118.
9 See Ancient Christian Magic : Coptic Texts of Ritual Power, edited by Marvin W. Meyer, Richard Smith, San
Francisco, Harper Collins, 1994, p. 261 ; see therein, exemplarily, papyrus No. 128, which was found in a Christian
monastery near Thebes.
10 See Richard Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages, pp. 151f., and, more recently, Sophie Page, Magic in the
Cloister : pious motives, illicit interests, and occult approaches to the medieval universe, University Park, Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2013.
11 See on dynamics of « democratization » (which pertain to the increasing accessibility of « learned magic »
texts in vernacular languages and, as a consequence, expanding practitioner milieus) Davies, Grimoires, pp. 61-67
and passim.
magic » furthermore attests dynamics of pluralization (A3), as the ritual techniques and
narrative patterns in the sources are usually extremely hybrid and inspired by a multi-
plicity of cultural and religious frameworks. Clearly, a large number practitioners were
fully-fledged « syncretists ». 1 It attests dynamics of privatization (A4), signaled by the
need to remain in secrecy often evoked in pre-modern sources ; 2 yet, even in the 20th
and 21st centuries, practitioners often remained « individualists », despite their partial
organization in initiatory fraternities. 3
Domain B : Far from being a coherent and unalterable ritual art, « Western learned
magic » changed constantly throughout the centuries : its ritual techniques and con-
cepts of ritual efficacy were continuously adopted or adapted, altered or varied, dis-
carded or invented, blended or mingled in seemingly thousandfold variations. 4 Ac-
cordingly, authors and practitioners of « Western learned magic » usually attest a high
degree of creative, independent and sometimes quite original thinking about religious
and ritual lore (B1) ; they tend to develop or create novel ritual patterns (B2), up to the
degree of inventing (B3) entire ritual genres (such as the sub-disciplines of astrological
talismans, numerological seals, or niranjāt in the medieval Arabic-Islamic realm) 5 or
even entire « religions » (if one regards Aleister Crowley’s Thelema, Gerald B. Gardner’s
Wicca, or Anton Lavey’s Satanic Church as such). At least partly, practitioners regarded
themselves as chosen, in close proximity to the Gods, or they aimed for divine union
or self-deification, 6 thus triggering the notions B4 and B5. Finally, at least some of the
sources reflect sophisticated moral considerations (B7). 7
Domain C : Apart from public critique (C5) and rebellion or revolt (C7) – both would,
at least in most pre-modern environments, have been life-threatening and quite sense-
less for practitioners or sympathizers of « Western learned magic » –, the « discourse
of inclusion » triggers all C notions of the above matrix. Even if « learned magicians »
tend to engage in justifications and self-proclamations of orthodoxy and righteous-
ness (« magic » as a « divine art », etc.), 8 their deviant status is usually quite evident, 9
and not seldom accompanied by explicit critique of established religious traditions. 10 A
1 See on « entangled rituals » Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », pp. 199-203.
2 See already (in the late ancient Greek Magical Papyri) PGM i, 41 ; i, 130f. ; i, 192 ; iv, 851-54 ; iv, 1870 ; xiii, 231f. ;
xiii, 740f., etc. For further thoughts on « Western learned magic » in relation to « deviance » see Otto, Historicizing
« Western learned magic », pp. 203-207.
3 See, for instance, the interviews gathered in Gerhard Mayer, Arkane Welten : Biografien, Erfahrungen und
Praktiken zeitgenössischer Magier, Würzburg, Ergon, 2008.
4 On « changeability » as a core feature of « Western learned magic » see Otto, Historicizing « Western learned
magic », pp. 189-199. 5 See ibidem, pp. 195-196 with further references.
6 A telling example is the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn with its dictum « make the Divine Man out of the
Human Man » (William Wynn Westcott, Flying Roll xv [~1895] ; see in greater detail Otto, Magie, pp. 595f.). See
on the whole issue also Otto, Das Motiv der ‘Perfektionierung’ im gelehrtenmagischen Diskurs des 20. Jahrhunderts, in
Die Perfektionierung des Menschen ? Religiöse und ethische Perspektiven, edited by Thomas Bahne, Katharina Waldner,
Münster, Aschendorff, forthcoming.
7 See on the « morality pendulum » Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », pp. 208-212.
8 Such justifications can be found in the PGM (see Otto, Magie, pp. 395f.), the Ġāyat al-Hºakīm (ibidem, p. 450),
the Liber Iuratus Honorii (ibidem, p. 498f.), Marsilio Ficino’s Apologia (ibidem, 433f.), Giambattista della Porta’s Ma-
giae naturalis, book 1, ch. 1 (ibidem, 504), or Francis Barrett’s The Magus (ibidem, 514f.), to name only a few examples.
See also Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », p. 208.
9 On the apparent illegality of a large collection of German manuscripts of « learned magic » from early 18th
century Leipzig see Daniel Bellingradt, Bernd-Christian Otto, Magical Manuscripts in Early Modern Europe :
‘Learned Magic’ in 18th century Germany, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming.
10 Telling examples of such criticism, based on positive notions of « magic », are Helena P. Blavatsky (see on her
Isis unveiled Otto, Magie, pp. 553f.), Aleister Crowley (on his Christian roots and anti-Christian rhetorics see Kocku
von Stuckrad, Aleister Crowley, Thelema und die Religionsgeschichte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, in Religion im kul-
culmination of this dynamic is observable in contemporary « Neopagan » and « Wicca »
movements, where « magic » is regularly used as a positive counter-concept to oppose
and criticize the allegedly obstructive and constrictive power of institutionalized Chris-
tianity. 1
Domain D : With regard to notions of experience, « Western learned magic » is an
ambivalent case. On the one hand, its rituals are sometimes geared towards intense
experiences, be they in the form of « direct encounter » with spiritual beings, 2 divine
visions, 3 altered or enhanced states of consciousness, 4 or the self-deification of the
practitioner (e.g., within a « kabbalistic » path towards the highest sephira « kether »). 5
On the other hand, even though such experiences are described or aimed for in specific
texts and milieus, the majority of sources seem to host rather « cold » manuals stipu-
lating that a pre-defined number of ritual steps must be processed more or less me-
chanically in order to achieve an aspired goal, without any indication of extraordinary
experiences whatsoever. Thus, at least in most pre-modern texts of « learned magic »,
extraordinary « experiences deemed religious » have been more of a by-product of the

ritual art, but they surely gained more and more importance from the 19th century
onwards and might today even lie at the epicenter of most practitioner concepts of
« magic ». 6
Clearly, this finding is striking. If one expects the above matrix to point towards
processes of religious individualization, « Western learned magic » seems to be a par-
ticularly noticeable example case of religious individualization. While the theoretical
implications of this finding will be discussed in the concluding section (see below), it
remains to be noted that there is also some counter-evidence with regard to a strong
relationship between « Western learned magic » and religious individualization.
Firstly, we can often trace an idea (or ideal) of « traditionality » in sources of « West-
ern learned magic », which may have provoked de-individualizing dynamics. This
idea is visible, for instance, in the frequent narration of fictitious lineages, 7 the use of
turellen Diskurs. Festschrift für Hans G. Kippenberg zu seinem 65. Geburtstag, edited by Kocku von Stuckrad, Brigitte
Luchesi, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2004, pp. 307-324), or Anton S. Lavey (on anti-Christian rhetorics and inversions in
modern Satanism see Jesper Aagard Petersen, The Seeds of Satan : Conceptions of Magic in Contemporary Satan-
ism, « Aries », xii, 2012, 1, pp. 91-129).
1 See partly Tanya Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft : Ritual Magic in contemporary England, Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Press, 1989. See also Wouter Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture :
Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought, Leiden, Brill, 1996, pp. 324f.
2 See, e.g., PGM xiii where, after 41 days of ritual preparations, « the God comes » (The Greek Magical Papyri in
Translation. Including the Demotic Spells, edited by Hans D. Betz, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 189)
into the previously fabricated canopy.
3 Consider, e.g., the late medieval Latin ritual text Liber Iuratus Honorii with its final goal of beatic vision : see
Gösta Hedegård, Liber Iuratus Honorii : A Critical Edition of the Latin Version of the Sworn Book of Honorius, Stock-
holm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002, for the text and Katelyn Mesler, The « Liber Iuratus Honorii » and the Christian
Reception of Angel Magic, in Invoking Angels : Theurgic Ideas and Practices, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries, edited
by Claire Fanger, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012, pp. 113-150, for a recent discussion.
4 See, e.g., the « middle pillar technique » developed by post-Golden-Dawn author Israel Regardie (see Israel
Regardie, The Complete Golden Dawn System of Magic, Tempe, Arizona 51994, pp. 220f.). On altered states of con-
sciousness see also Tanya Luhrmann, Persuasions of the witch’s craft, pp. 222f.
5 On Aleister Crowley’s gradual ascent in the « tree of life » see Otto, Das Motiv der ‘Perfektionierung’ im geleh-
rtenmagischen Diskurs des 20. Jahrhunderts.
6 See explicitly Susan Greenwood, Magical Consciousness : A legitimate form of knowledge, in Defining Magic, pp.
197-210. See also Luhrmann, Persuasions of the witch’s craft, particularly pp. 227-229.
7 See, e.g., the curious historical digressions in Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio de hominis dignitate (see Otto,
Magie, pp. 473f.).
invariable pseudepigraphs over many centuries (consider Solomon, Hermes, etc.),
or the narration of over-arching, and thus fascinatingly counterfactual, emic his-
tories of « Western learned magic » (consider Éliphas Lévi’s Histoire de la Magie as a
splendid example). 1 What is more, one regularly encounters normative claims or
ideas about « orthopraxy » in the sources, even though there never was any institu-
tion that had the power to control or sanction deviations in the history of « Western
learned magic ». Nevertheless, polemics against other practitioners or their practice(s)
pop up quite regularly in the « discourse of inclusion », thus attesting the persistent,
albeit unrealistic desire to align and control the art. 2 Finally, particularly from the
19th century onwards, group formation gained steady pace, thus prompting typical
group dynamics such as different kinds of group pressure, the exclusion of critics or
« outsiders », or the subordination of individual practitioners under newly-invented
group rules. No surprise, then, that fraternities of « learned magic » regularly under-
went schisms over the course the 20th century. Consider, for instance, the disruption
of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn from 1900 onwards, the secession of the
Typhonian Order from the Ordo Templi Orientis between 1955 and 1962, or the schism
between the Church of Satan and the Temple of Set in 1975, to name only three promi-
nent examples. 3
Last but not least, one should bear in mind that the majority of the sources pro-
vide prescriptive manuals for ritual acts. These manuals tend to be exceptionally pre-
cise even in minor details – ritual prescriptions of « learned magic » are often much
more restrictive than the Anaphora of the divine liturgy –, thereby leaving only little
room for elaborate individuality. The aforementioned ongoing innovativity in the
realm of ritual techniques notwithstanding : at least until Peter J. Carroll’s Liber Null
(1978) and its stipulation of a pragmatic or liberal approach to the fabrication and
performance of (« Chaos magic ») rituals, practitioners will likely have followed oral
or textual instructions while exercising their art. Yet, even here we face an ambiguity :
from late antiquity onwards practitioners often had to deal with a multiplicity of dif-
ferent recipes for similar ritual goals, with the problem of false or diverging copies,
or with insufficient or missing recipe details. We may suppose that they did so in a
pragmatic – that is, necessarily, individual – manner. In other words, the overly rigid
formalism of many a « learned magic » ritual always necessitated a certain degree of
individual pragmatism, flexibility and « freedom of choice ». The idea that rituals must
be performed precisely according to the script in order to guarantee their efficacy is
constantly evoked in the sources – but it was probably discarded without further ado
whenever necessary.
1 See Otto, A Catholic « magician » historicizes « magic ».

2 See for some instances Otto, Historicizing « Western learned magic », pp. 211-212, footnote 237.
3 These schisms could also be interpreted as typical reactions to dynamics of de-individualization, thus reveal-
ing an inherent paradox in the concept of « religious individualization » – see Jörg Rüpke : « Individual behavior
that might be judged deviant, or at least non- conformist, from the point of view of the majority or the religious
mainstream, is precarious and threatened. As a consequence, it is safeguarded and institutionalized in the form
of minority groups (which can become a majority). From here the paradox takes its point of departure. A bundle
of factors and motifs lead to the increasing boundedness of those who group together to preserve their choice
and to defend their deviant religious individuality. In order to define their boundaries, groups (« sects » developing
into « churches ») dogmatize their norms and denounce outsiders as well as exclude internally deviant members.
Systematization of belief and the attempt to gain political support produce rigidity or compromises that turn
away other members » (Rüpke, Individualization and Privatization, p. 712).
4. Conclusions
The findings of the preceding section indicate that the matrix of religious individual-
ization raises interesting, unusual questions and perspectives when applied to discours-
es of « magic ». Ambiguities notwithstanding, the textual-ritual tradition of « Western
learned magic » might even be interpreted as a superb case of processes of religious
individualization, given that it triggers a wide range of notions of the above matrix. It
remains to be discussed what this finding actually means for both the theoretical status
and validity of the matrix as well as the general problem of polysemantic categories in
the Study of Religion.
Concerning the first issue – the theoretical status and validity of the matrix –, we
may argue that the matrix can be fruitfully applied to religious data, despite the current
lack of a coherent theory of religious individualization. Yet, crucial questions remain
to be answered : how many domains or notions must be triggered in a given material to

speak of religious individualization in a meaningful sense ? Are some notions stronger
or more central than others ? Could one even ascribe each notion in varying grades to
historical data (eventually in a quantitative manner, say, from 1 – low – to 5 – strong) ?
Do some notions increase the likelihood of the presence of other notions in a given
sample (as they might be « non-accidentally related », thus belonging to the same « ho-
meostatic property cluster ») ?
Furthermore, applying the matrix in its currently under-theorized form entails a
range of methodological weaknesses : when applied to historical data across-the-board,
it may conceal variations that occur in different points in time (for instance, individu-
als might yield different results depending on which facets of their biographies are as-
sessed). It also remains to be clarified whether the matrix can be applied to all types of
historical data (individuals, groups, texts, ideas, rituals, institutions, experiences, etc.),
or whether one should restrict the matrix to only some of these types. Finally, different
scholars may come to different conclusions when assessing the same case, thus dem-
onstrating that applying the matrix is a purely subjective – or hermeneutic – endeavor.
Yet, all these difficulties notwithstanding, I believe that the above matrix is an impor-
tant step forward in the debate about religious individualization and that it may – al-
ready now – enhance inter-subjective and -disciplinary communication on the matter.
Concerning the second issue – the problem of polysemantic categories in the Study
of Religion –, this article has opened a new methodological pathway for the applica-
tion of such ambiguous or multi-layered categories. Instead of continuing the helpless
search for conclusive (monothetic or polythetic) definitions – and the fierce debates
that surround these –, we might simply acknowledge polysemantics as a core feature or
inescapable quality of many, if not all, basic categories in the Study of Religion. Instead
of arbitrarily or forcefully reducing the semantic complexity of these categories by
means of definitions, the above procedure allows for applying a polysemantic concept
to religious data without losing any of its potential analytical value, thus opening the
floor for more nuanced and fine-grained analyses. In this regard, it might be reasonable
to coin a technical term for the procedure I have been pursuing in the second part of
the paper – namely, « polysemantic analysis » –, and to examine whether other critical or
disputed categories in the humanities, too, could benefit from such an analysis.
Acknowledgements
Work on this article has been inspired by fruitful discussions in the Kollegforschergruppe « Reli-
gious individualization in historical perspective » at the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultur-
al and Social Studies, located at the University of Erfurt. I am grateful to numerous colleagues
who have read and commented upon different versions of this article, foremost to Jörg Rüpke,
Martin Fuchs, and Michael Stausberg.
c omp osto in car atter e s err a d an t e d al l a
fabrizio serr a editor e , p i s a · r oma .
s tamp ato e rilegat o n e l l a
tipog r afia di agn an o, agn a n o p i s an o ( p i s a ) .
*
Ottobre 2017
(cz 2 · fg 3)

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ion and deconstruction of analytical categories in the Study of Religion 29

https://doi.org/10.19272/201704901003 · «historia religionum» · 9 · 2017

« reverse-engineering » of the entire category –, 1 it is in fact possible and reasonable to

self-interpretation or -designation by historical actors. However, the etic (i.e., scholarly)

2. 1. Religious individuation and individualization

institutions –, whereas individualization rather implies notions of change, such as an

2. 2. A semantic matrix of religious individualization

1 Ibidem, pp. 12-13. 2 Ibidem, p. 13.

acter : you have to be an individual. Should anything less be called individualiza-

(B) Notions focusing on self and creativity

(B7) Awareness of « individual responsibility for one’s actions », 8 of moral responsibility, 9

1 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 334.

2. 3. 1. The problem of conceptual heterogeneity

ize religious individualization as a (polythetic) umbrella term whose definiens implies

1 Fuchs, Processes of Religious Individualization, p. 331.

to any large-scale historical dynamics.

2. 3. 2. The problem of dualism

2. 3. 3. The problem of experience

to individual (as the experiences may be standardized, stereotypical, or even staged)

notions and evaluative patterns ascribed to « magic » in different historical contexts,

3. 1. Western discourses of « magic » and religious individualization

begin with the « discourse of exclusion ».

3. 1. 1. The « discourse of exclusion » and religious individualization

priations and instrumentalizations of religious symbol and ritual systems – which is in

3. 1. 2. The « discourse of inclusion » and religious individualization

extraordinary « experiences deemed religious » have been more of a by-product of the

1 See Otto, A Catholic « magician » historicizes « magic ».

to be answered : how many domains or notions must be triggered in a given material to

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