REPERTORIO BIBLIOGRAFICO

Gesù respinge il significato letterale e la spiega citando Is 6, 10: gli arconti cioè producono l’oscuramento
della coscienza affinché Adamo non possa accorgersi dell’epinoia di luce (la futura Eva, incarnazione di
Sofia) celata dentro di lui (p. 239). Ma come mai l’inquieto ondeggiare che in Gn 1,2 connotava la rūah
divina viene qui attribuito a Sofia? Perché l’associazione, anzi quasi l’identificazione fra la rūah nel suo
ruolo cosmogonico e la divina hākmāh era già stata suggerita negli scritti sapienziali dell’Antico
Testamento (Pr 8,22; Sir 24,5 e Sap 7,22) i quali altresì facevano risaltare il «movimento» con cui la
Sapienza percorre in lungo e in largo l’universo. Quanto all’ekstasis intesa in accezione gnoseologica e
morale, un concetto simile era già presente nell’esegesi che Filone (Qu.Gen., I,24) aveva dato dell’episodio
sul sonno di Adamo (pp. 234-240). Ciò consente a P. un’osservazione che mi sembra estremamente
importante circa la strategia ermeneutica messa in bocca al Gesù dell’Apocrifo. Il passaggio dal significato
letterale, palese, al significato spirituale, nascosto, del testo biblico non avviene con un puro e semplice
salto fra i due livelli contrapposti ma è mediato dalla letteratura giudaica ellenistica sia del genere
sapienziale sia filosofico-religioso, giacché in essa si verificherebbe, secondo il pensatore gnostico, un
primo scostamento dal livello superficiale che prelude, pur senza arrivarci, alla comprensione del livello
profondo (p. 239). Ciò veniva motivato dalla ben nota teoria secondo cui Sofia talvolta avrebbe
invisibilmente inserito alcune verità frammezzo alle false «profezie» che Jaldabaoth trasmetteva ai suoi
servi ignari (p. 237).
Ultimo argomento del libro è l’episodio della ritirata di Sofia nell’«Enneade», dopo essersi sollevata dai
livelli più bassi dell’Ogdoade e dell’Ebdomade ove Jaldabaoth ha appena completato la sua «creazione»
del mondo. Ancora una volta abbiamo la figura d’un movimento locale che va interpretato come metafora
di un movimento morale, e cioè della «conversione» di Sofia derivante dal suo «pentimento». Nel decorso
degli avvenimenti in ApocrGv, risalita all’Enneade e conversione sono in apparenza due eventi diversi che
il racconto distingue nel tempo, ma concettualmente si tratta solo di due aspetti della medesima cosa (p.
244). Dopo un’approfondita indagine semasiologica del termine (pp. 247-263), l’A. sottolinea
l’ambivalenza della μετάνοια, che in quanto mutamento di pensiero sollecitato dalla passione è qualcosa
di negativo (stoicismo), mentre in quanto riconoscimento del male commesso e disposizione a scegliere il
suo opposto, è un bene, anzi una virtù (Filone). Ancora più essenziale è l’ambivalenza per cui il moto di
Sofia dalla sfera degli arconti all’Enneade è insieme rappresentazione spaziale di un moto interiore (a
differenza del mito valentiniano dove il moto interiore di disagio, la planē, si «oggettiva» in materia
cosmica) ma anche moto interiore che ha una effettiva, e cioè «poetica» valenza cosmogonica nel produrre
una differenza fra diversi livelli dell’universo (pp. 260-261). A ciò si aggiunge però il significato
antropologico «esistenziale», perché «the struggle of Sophia is, in fact, the story of everyone’s inner life»
(p. 263).
[Aldo Magris]

Origene
Origen. Omilii, comentarii i adnotări la Geneză [Origen. Homilies, Commentaries and Annotations on
Genesis]; Omilii i adnotări la Exod [Homilies and Annotations on Exodus]; Omilii i adnotări la Levitic
[Homilies and Annotations on Leviticus]. Bilingual editions. Translations into Romanian with
introductions and commentaries by Adrian MURARU (Tradiţia cretină, 1-3), Editura Polirom, Iai 2006,
pp. 672; 480; 608.
Adrian MURARU, Libertate i liber arbitru la Origen [Freedom and Free Will in Origen], Editura
Universităţii «Alexandru Ioan Cuza», Iai 2006.
 e name of Origen brings to mind rather the complex picture of an age than an author’s oeuvre. While
the Origenian/Origenist posterity endured throughout Late Antiquity and the Middles Ages, few during
this time actually read his works. Today, we find ourselves even more in a context wherein those knowing
about the Origen «affair» far outnumber those who have actually taken the trouble to read his works.  e
titles under review here, a series of translations from Origen and a book about his concept of freedom, are
the work of Adrian Muraru (University of Iai, Romania) and represent a worthy effort to do just that, i.e.

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to invite us to know Origen from his own texts. After all, only subsequent to such enterprise will one, if so
desires, be in the position to pronounce a knowledgeable and balanced judgement on his thought.
 e three volumes of Homilies represented the opening statement of a new series from the prestigious
Polirom Publishers House from Iai.  e series is entitled «Tradiţia cretină» (« e Christian Tradition»)
and aims to offer bilingual editions of Christian works from antiquity to the Reform. While not discarding
the possibility of including new critical editions (should they be presented to the editors), the volumes
comprised in this series will reproduce and translate (into Romanian) the most authoritative original texts
published previously elsewhere. Introductions and notes, chronological tables, bibliographies and indexes
make welcome seasoning to the main bulk of the work.
 is plan is exemplarily followed by Adrian Muraru in the three Origen volumes abovementioned.  ey
contain Origen’s exegetical endeavours on the first three biblical books: Genesis, Exodus and Leviticus.
 ere are several things of note. One might chiefly want to congratulate the effort to collect and translate
in one volume all the texts pertaining to the exegesis of the biblical book in question. For instance, the
Genesis volume comprises not only included the Homiliae in Genesim, but also bits found elsewhere and
grouped as under the headings, Commentaria in Genesim and Adnotationes in Genesim. Secondly, each
volume offers extensive introductions which, in fact, can be taken as reliable academic sources on their
own. While Origen scholars could only exult at their richness, one might surmise that simpler
introductions would have been more appropriate to a broader audience.  e reader of the entire triptych
will no doubt remark Muraru’s effort to offer complementary introductions, since he individually deals
with different facets of Origen’s hermeneutics. Following more or less Origen’s own threefold exegetical
approach, one learns in the beginning of the Genesis volume that Origen was, indeed, a great literalist (an
aspect too quickly dismissed); however, in the introduction to the last of the volumes (on Leviticus) one
will get familiarized with Origen’s allegorical method, as well.
If I were to single out a novel point made by Muraru in his effort to understand Origen, I would choose his
stimulating discussion on the way the Alexandrine theologian found a way to tackle the famous
philosophical problem of the «Liar Paradox» (see the Introduction to the first volume). Given that all men
are liars, does that make the Apostles themselves liars, as well? Here, Origen invokes the super-human
condition of the biblical writers. For him, the latter were not mere human beings, but gods, because the
divine Word dwelt in them (factum est uerbum Dei ad illum). It was by virtue of their godly nature that
they affirmed that all humans were liars, and this affirmation was universally true. (Muraru could consider
growing this point into an article for an international publication, as it surely deserves to be more widely
known).
All in all, we have in these three volumes a praiseworthy effort, part of a very promising editorial series
which by now also includes works by Tertullian, Epiphanius of Salamis and Peter Abelard.
Muraru’s volume on Origen’s concept of freedom constitutes a good complement to the translations. It
represents a revised version of his PhD thesis, defended in the Philosophy Department, University of Iai.
 e book is divided into two parts: one broadly deals with Origen’s life and authorship, while the other
approaches the problem of freedom and free will in Origen’s thought. To begin with, Muraru takes the
necessary preliminary steps to describe the urban roots of Origen’s formation and his philosophical
training. Alexandria is noted for its syncretism, while the author cannot but decry our poor knowledge of
the relationship between the intellectual and ecclesiastical circles.  e ever-hot debate on the existence of
one or two of Origen at the time (one Christian and one Neoplatonic) is tackled next, with Muraru
concluding that, since the little evidence can equally support either of the suppositions, it is more sensible
to assume there was only one.  e Alexandrine theologian is also supposed, at the least, to have known
Ammonius Saccas’s teachings, if not to have been his disciple proper. With Porphyry and Eusebius as his
main sources, Muraru tries to unearth Origen’s philosophical training and points to the philosophers who
might have influenced him.  us, Middle Platonists such as, Numenius, Stoics such as, Cornutus, and
Plato himself form a multicoloured spectre. Furthermore, Muraru identifies in Origen’s works the reasons
why he can be considered a genuine logician. After an interesting detour on «Eclecticism and eclectics», the
author discusses Origen within the debate/relationship between philosophy and Christianity. Was Origen a
theologian and/or a philosopher? Following, among others, C. Stead and J. Rist, Muraru holds that
Origen’s philosophical competence is beyond doubt and means more than mere borrowings from one

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philosopher or another. Origen considers divine revelation a crucial ally to philosophy and a solution to the
latter’s crisis (pp. 116-125).
 e chapter ends with a crucial discussion on the Origenian texts available today.  e problem of textual
integrity and the quality of the extant translations (especially, regarding Rufinus’ revisionist translation
which tends to make the Origenian text clearer) are not to be swept under the carpet. After exploring the
extant possibilities, Muraru decided to rely on the Greek texts only in order to convey a greater certainty to
his conclusions. He then takes the time to answer the question of «how to read» and makes a remarkable
attempt to decipher Origen’s exegetical method (pp. 149-219). While it is clear that the Judaic exegesis, esp.
Philo, is more of a model for Origen (due to its essential dealing with a revealed text), rather than the
Greek exegesis, the Alexandrine theologian warns time and again that Christians have to go beyond the
letter of the Jews and grasp the true meaning of the Scriptures in its spirit (pp. 174-175). Actually, Origen
belongs to an ecclesiastical exegetical tradition; he assumes that his audience consists of the Christian
faithful. However, as he remains fully aware of the necessity to balance his works, he offers an
interpretation meant to address those Christians who were not capable of seeing beyond the letter and a
more insightful reading for those willing to acquire a more thorough understanding (p. 199). To
understand the Scriptures is essentially to interact with the Logos present in them. Further, in being guided
by the Logos while trying to come to terms with the Scriptures in faith, one can advance in the knowledge
of God even beyond this understanding (pp. 215-219).
 e second part of the book is devoted to Origen’s doctrine of liberty. Critically following M. Pohlenz and
the subsequent literature, including the work of A. Dihle, Muraru draws a larger picture of freedom in the
ancient philosophical context which includes, among others, Aristotle, Zeno, Chrysippus, and Epictetus.
Despite the fact that the doctrine of liberty was hardly a major debate during Origen’s lifetime, Muraru
does his best to choose the most relevant proofs of such a doctrine from Pseudo-Plutarch’s De fato, Plotin’s
Enneades 6.8 (on the liberty and will of the One) and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ De fato.
In dialogue with the Stoic and Platonic doctrines, Origen straightforwardly tackles the issue of liberty in his
Contra Celsum IV, 63-70 and Muraru proves pedantic in reading this text. Certainly, his research
determines him to use other relevant Origenian texts, such as De principiis 3, De oratione 6, or the
Commentaries to Genesis, to the Gospels of Matthew and John. Starting from the unifying common
notions (koinai ennoiai), it can be said that the human being is free insofar as it is logos; however, when
going deeper, one learns that Origen’s philosophical discourse is contradictory. While in De principiis 3,
human liberty (closely connect to the logical nature, logikos, of humankind) is explained against its absence
in animals (which lack logos); however, in De oratione 6 the logos is equally attributed to the animal reign.
 erefore, the specificity stated in De principiis is challenged, while the entire argumentation becomes
useless and only proves once more how inconsistent Origen could be. Muraru is, nonetheless, not so
discouraged and, by taking an educated guess, he continues to give credit to Origen’s logical thinking (p.
320). He is immediately rewarded in portending that the contradiction may appear less relevant if one reads
also Origen’s exegetical works.  us, the Origenian solution lies in an appeal to the revealed text, the only
guarantee to escape all contradiction.  e freedom to choose is, for Origen, the liberty to live well, kalōs
biōsai.  e will must strive for the good, that is to say, to follow the will of God (presumed omniscient and
omnipotent). While Origen takes philosophical knowledge very seriously, he argues that the Christian
Revelation is the only one able to eliminate any crisis or contradiction, to offer certitude, completeness and
coherence (p. 378). To know is to know the unique logos guided by the sustaining logos of them all.
Understood in this manner, Origen’s work appears far less unexplainable or illogical, while, it might,
indeed, trouble those contemporaries of ours who are not willing to import divine Revelation in
philosophical arguments. In conclusion, Muraru pleads for the necessity to note that liberty, according to
Origen, is never just the concept described in De principiis: getting closer to the logos will change
continuously the meaning of what liberty is.
 e scarce availability of secondary bibliography, acknowledged by Muraru (p. 396) might have prevented
him to offer an ampler research. At the same time, while there is always more room for further
bibliographical additions, his argumentation is never unreliable, but always vivid and fertile. Its weakness
may, in fact, be considered to be its strength, as the author was forced to concentrate on, and make
constant use of, what matters most: the Origenian works as such (often quoted in original in the text).

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Under different auspices, Muraru might have probably found useful, for instance, E. Junod’s edition of
Origen’s Philocalia 21-27 (Sur le libre arbitre; SC 226, Paris 1976). To remind a few important ideas
belonging to Bauer (p. 29), Wolfson or Crouzel (pp. 157-161) only through D. Runia’s Philo is obviously
not commendable as a method, but is nevertheless understandable and passable. Still, the author should
have offered the interested reader the titles of their relevant works. Finally, the Romanian readers may have
expected Muraru to make use in his work (and even more so in the introductions to the aforementioned
Polirom translations) of an earlier, albeit solid, study by H. Rovenţa (Interpretarea Scripturii după Origen,
Râmnicu Vâlcea 1929).
 e compartmentalisation of the book is interesting in itself.  e insertion of two well-written excursus
which help the reader to get a better understanding of related questions such as eclecticism and the
relationship Christianity/Neo-Platonism is a notable feature of Muraru’s enterprise.
 ere are a few things one could criticise as to how the volume presents itself. A slight inconsistency in
using a reference system is noticeable, especially when one compares the first chapter with the rest of the
work. However, this minor carelessness never makes awkward the use of the references. While the inclusion
of an abstract in an international language may have been desirable, the same can more certainly be said
about the inclusion of an index. One slip in the text places Gregory of Nyssa after the Cappadocian
Fathers, thus giving the false impression that he did not belong himself to the group (p. 97).
Notwithstanding the individual quality of each of the titles presented, I hereby salute Adrian Muraru’s
impressive effort to offer a significant contribution to the contemporary rediscovery of Origen. As there is
no reason to believe Dr. Muraru will stop reading Origen, we can hope for more volumes of similar value
to follow.
[Dragos Mirsanu]

Christoph MARKSCHIES, Origenes und sein Erbe. Gesammelte Studien (Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie
der Wissenschaften – Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, 160), Walter
de Gruyter, Berlin – New York 2007, pp. X+283.
Questa raccolta offre tredici studî origeniani, già pubblicati – tranne uno – in varia sede tra il 1995 e il 2005,
in particolare due su Adamantius e due in volumi della “Biblioteca di Adamantius”. In Origenes. Leben –
Werk –  eologie – Wirkung (pp. 1-14), M. si pronuncia in favore della possibile identità tra l’Origene
cristiano e l’Origene platonico (p. 3), a mio parere con ottime ragioni1. Egli osserva anche (p. 2),
giustamente, che l’etimologia di Ὠριγένης è ‘stirpe di Horus’, nome pagano, ma non mette in dubbio che i
genitori di Origene fossero cristiani, probabilmente perché Eusebio, in polemica con Porfirio, insiste su
questo punto, e perché Leonida fu perfino martire. Tuttavia, una spia potrebbe far sospettare che Leonida
non fosse veramente il padre di Origene bensì forse suo padre spirituale: Eusebio stesso lo presenta come ὁ
λεγόμενος Ὠριγένους πατήρ (HE VI 1, 1). È anche interessante osservare, alla luce delle recenti messe in
discussione, che M. accetta (pp. 2 e 130) la paternità tradizionale del Discorso di ringraziamento di Gregorio
il Taumaturgo, discepolo diretto di Origene e fondamentale anello di congiunzione con i Cappadoci. Lo
ritiene pronunciato nel 238 ca. alla scuola di Origene a Cesarea, che egli definisce una specie di ‘università
privata’ il cui programma di studî è ricostruibile grazie a Gregorio stesso (p. 5).
In Kastration und Magenprobleme? Einige neue Blicke auf das asketische Leben des Origenes (pp. 15-34), l’unico
non ancora pubblicato all’uscita del volume, ma presentato agli Origeniana IX a Pécs nel 2005, M. offre una
rassegna delle opinioni degli studiosi riguardo all’effettiva storicità dell’evirazione di Origene e nota che a
sfavore di essa sembrano deporre le fonti e i dibattiti medici, giuridici e filosofici di età imperiale riguardo a
questa operazione, che a suo avviso non era precisamente di routine, come è presentata da Peter Brown. M.
mostra che essa sembra essere stata addirittura vietata in età imperiale, anche se la proibizione veniva
disattesa. Questo dettaglio potrebbe essere sorto, egli suggerisce, nel contesto della presentazione di Origene
come asceta e filosofo da parte di Eusebio. È tuttavia difficile che Eusebio abbia inventato una tradizione
che gli suscita imbarazzo e che cerca di scusare con la giovane età e di volgere in bene come prova di fede e

1
Cf. le mie argomentazioni in Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism: Re- inking the Christianisation of
Hellenism, VigChr 63 (2009).

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