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1. Definition: We call relatives [] all such things as are said to be just what they
are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else6.
a. Morales also draws attention to the fact that for Aristotle the predica- tion
of any relational attribute always presupposes an underlying nature: Aristotle thus repudiates the idea that relations be postulated as principles of
Being (Metaph. 1088a20ff)7.
2. All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate8.
a. Christian writers picked up the property of reciprocation. They even used
some of Aristotles examples, such as master-slave and father-son.31
Aristotle, how- ever, adds a necessary qualification, namely, that all
relatives . . . are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate,
provided they are properly given (Cat. 7a2223)9.
3. Relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature []; and in most cases this is true10.
a. To prove that God the Father and God the Son are both divine and
coeternal, Christian writers also used this property of simultaneity by
nature11.
Relation in Stoicism
Here Gregory speaks of relation in Stoic terms ():
Those then who enquire precisely into the meaning of the term almighty find
that it declares nothing else concerning the divine power than that that activity (or
energy) which controls created things and is indicated by the word almighty
stands in a certain relation to something []. For as he would not be called a
physician, save on account of the sick . . . so neither would he be styled almighty,
did not all creation stand in need of one to regulate it and keep it in being.70
Nevertheless, Gregory does not seem to favor the Stoic category of relation. The
phrase [] occurs only two more times in all of his works, at CE 2.116 (NPNF 2.5:262)
and CE 2.392 (NPNF 2.5:289). In both places, the Stoic category of relation is used to
express the relation of a body to other objects and the relation between created things,
respectively. Gregory does not attach any special significance to this phrase12.
Relation in Eunomio
Cat. 6a3640. Quoted in: TURCESCU, L., Gregory of Nyssa and the concept of divine persons, American
Academy of Religion academy series, Oxford; New York 2005, 30.
7
Ibid., 35.
Cat. 6b2835. Quoted in: TURCESCU, L., Gregory of Nyssa and the concept of divine persons, American
Academy of Religion academy series, Oxford; New York 2005, 31.
9
Ibid, 30.
Cat. 7b1521. Quoted in ibid.
11
Ibid.
10
12
Ibid., 87.
Relation in Gregory
13
Ibid., 87-88.