20243E00

COMPANY SPECIFICATION
ONSHORE INSTALLATIONS
DESIGN LAYOUT AND SAFETY SPACING
20243.VON.SAF.SDS.
Rev. 0
May 1996
0 REV.
EMISSION DESCRIPTION
STIN COMP.
SICI VERIF.
STIN APPR.
15.5.96 DATE
Il presente documento RISERVATO ed di propriet dell'AGIP. Esso non sar mostrato a Terzi n sar utilizzato per scopi diversi da quelli per i quali stato inviato. This document is CONFIDENTIAL and the sole property of AGIP. It shall neither be shown to third parties nor used for purposes other than those for which it has been sent.
20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 2
FOREWORD
Rev. 0
Total sheets 71 May 1996 Emission
CONTENTS 1. 1.1 1.2 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 GENERAL Scope Normative references European normative references Normative references of ISO, IEC and national organizations Normative references of other organizations Legislation Internal normative references
2. 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6 2.3.7 2.3.8 2.3.9 2.3.10 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.4.5 2.4.6
FUNCTIONAL NORMATIVE REQUIREMENT Definitions Operative environment Safety requirements for the layout Process and utility units Safety main units Critical plant units Process piping and vents Clearances Divisions Outer installations and radiation Control systems Escape ways Classification of areas with explosion hazard Safety requirements for spacing Safety spacing General requirements Fences Hydrocarbons storage tanks Hydrocarbons loading bays Well heads
2.4.7 2.4.8 2.4.9 2.4.10 2.4.11 2.4.12 2.4.13 2.4.14 2.4.15 2.4.16 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 3 3.1 3.1.1
Oil treatment plants Gas treatment plants Compression stations Glycol heating and reconditioning plants Glycol storage tanks Basins for oily waters treatment Oil/gas pipelines Process safety valves Gas flares and vents H2S process plants Requirement of work health and environmental protection Ergonomics Requirements for Quality Management and Quality Assurance Documentation SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS Enclosures and informative annexes Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 Annex 4 Annex 5 Annex 6 Annex 7 Annex 8 Plant general layout Better location - Process and utilities units Better location - Safety main units Better location - Critical plant units Safety spacing to be adopted Pool fire - Computational method Jet fire - Computational method Unconfined gas cloud explosion (pressurised) - Computational method Annex 9 Unconfined gas cloud explosion (not pressurised) Computational method Annex 10 Heavy vapours dispersion - Computational method Annex 11 Hydrogen sulphide dispersion - Computational method
1.
GENERAL
1.1
Scope This document has the aim to state the safety requirements for the layout and safety spacing to be adopted in the Oil and Gas treatment Units. These requirements represent the minimum to be applied developing the basic and detail layout for the process areas of all the onshore installations. Particular design requests, which impose alternatives not provided by this specification or by the mentioned legislation, shall be justified and evaluated by the internal expert Units.
1.2 1.2.1
Normative references European normative references At this moment applicable European Normative References related to the specification does not exist.
1.2.2
Normative references of ISO, IEC and national organizations Norme CEI 64.2 "Impianti elettrici in luoghi a rischio di incendio o esplosione"
1.2.3
Normative references of other organizations API RP 500 B "Recommended practice for classification of areas for electrical installation at drilling rigs and production facilities on land and on marine fixed and mobile platforms" "Design and installation of pressure relieving systems in refineries" (Part 1 Design, Part 2 Installation) "Guide for pressure relieving and depressuring systems" "General Recommendations for Spacing"
API RP 520
API RP 521
Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI)
1.2.4
Legislation In areas different from Italy the legislation of the involved country shall to be considered. D.M. 31.7.1934 "Approvazione delle norme di sicurezza per la lavorazione, l'immagazzinamento, l'impiego e la vendita di olii minerali e per il trasporto degli olii stessi"
Ministero Interno "Caricamento e svuotamento nelle raffinerie Circolare dell'11.5.1954, n. 70 e nei depositi di olii minerali, dei veicoli a cisterna ed a botte senza l'attuazione del ciclo chiuso"
Ministero Interno Circolare del 9.7.1954 n.21137/4105
Criteri di sicurezza per l'installazione e . l'esercizio di centrali di compressione di gas metano"
Ministero Interno Circolare del 22.12.1962, n. 132 D.P.R. 19.3.1956, n. 303
Serbatoi di grande capacit (integrazione del DM 31.7.1934)
"Norme generali per l'igiene del lavoro" "Protezione dei lavoratori contro i rischi derivanti da esposizione ad agenti chimici, fisici, biologici durante il lavoro" "Norme di polizia delle miniere e delle cave" "Progetto di regolamento generale di prevenzione incendi" "Stabilimenti di lavorazione, depositi di olii minerali. Misure di sicurezza"
D.P.R. 9.4.1959, n. 128 Ministero Interno Circolare del 1965 Ministero Interno Circolare del 15.1.1976, n.10.03049/XV.H.24 D.M. 24.11.1984
"Norme di sicurezza antincendio per il trasporto, la distribuzione, l'accumulo e l'utilizzazione del gas naturale con densit non superiore a 0,8" "Norme di sicurezza depositi GPL di capacit non superiore a 5 m 3" "Attuazione delle direttive CEE n 80/779, 82/884, 84/360 e 85/203 concernenti norme in materia di qualit dell'aria, relativamente a specifici agenti inquinanti e di inquinamento prodotto dagli impianti industriali, ai sensi dell'art. 15 della legge 16 aprile 1987 n 183" "Linee guida per il contenimento delle emissioni inquinanti degli impianti industriali e la fissazione dei valori minimi di emissione" "Protezione dei lavoratori contro i rischi derivanti da esposizione ad agenti chimici, fisici, biologici durante il lavoro"
D.M. 31.3.1984 e D.M. 20.7.1993 D.P.R. 24.5.1988, n 203
D.M. 12.7.1990
D.L. 15.8.1991, n. 277
D.Lgs 19.9.1994, n. 626
"Attuazione delle direttive CEE 89/391, 89/654, 89/655, 89/656, 90/269, 90/270, 90/394 e 90/679 riguardante il miglioramento della sicurezza e della salute dei lavoratori sul luogo di lavoro "Approvazione della regola tecnica di prevenzione incendi per la progettazione, la costruzione, l'installazione e l'esercizio dei depositi di GPL in serbatoi fissi di capacit complessiva superiore a 5 m 3 e/o in recipienti mobili di capacit complessiva superiore a 5000 kg" "Regolamento di polizia mineraria"
D.M. 13.10.1994
DPGR n.7 Regione Sicilia
1.2.5
Internal normative references 06744.VAR.ELE.SPC Classificazione luoghi onshore con pericolo di esplosione e scelta impianti elettrici di sicurezza e materiali Specifica generale per condotte interrate
07486.PLI.MEC.PRG
1.2.6
References /Ref. 1/: L.Lusardi, A.Robertson, Wellheads and Separators Areas Risk Analysis, Mila Field Development, Snamprogetti Spc. 01-ZC-E70458, 1984 F.P.Lees, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries ediz. 1983 G.L.Wells, Safety in process plant design ediz. 1980 B.J. Wiekema - TNO / Institute of Envir onmental and Energy Technology, 1980 E.P.A. - Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis NIOSH - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Chemical Hazards
/Ref. 2/: /Ref. 3/: /Ref. 4/:
/Ref. 5/:
/Ref. 6/:
2. 2.1
FUNCTIONAL NORMATIVE REQUIREMENT Definitions The following definitions are valid in this document: Classified area: Space of determined dimensions classified taking into consideration both the chemical properties, physical conditions and quantity of the contained dangerous substances processed or stored and the environmental characteristics, which can influence the dispersion or accumulation of the dangerous substances. The term classified area, generally used by AGIP, corresponds to dangerous zone or AD area by CEI. Plant area: Zone delimited by internal roads or enclosures, devoted to lodge only one or more plant units similar for pressure level, type of fluid, etc. Dangerous area: Space of undetermined extent where there is a dangerous atmosphere, so as defined by CEI 64-2 rules. The term dangerous area, generally used by AGIP, correspond to dangerous place by CEI. Water barrier: Screen of water spray obtained with suitable nozzles in order to reduce quickly the concentration of the flammable gas under the E.L.L. (Explosivity Lower Limit) Burning ray: Burning gas jet coming from pressurised containers. Active defence: Device operating directly on the event in order to reduce the consequences (i.e. fire fighting system). Passive defence: Device or design contrivance devoted to cancel or reduce the effects of an event on the areas or on installation areas close to the event place (i.e. fire breaker wall or safety distance).
Safety distance: This specification generally considers as safety spacing the distances between: enclosure and hazardous equipment installed into the Unit; various hazardous equipment installed into the Unit; hazardous equipment and infrastructures installed into the Unit; hazardous equipment installed into the Unit and outer infrastruct ures .
The main Italian legislation about distances is: - D.M. 31-7-1934 (paragraphs 38 56), for mineral oils installations; - D.M. 13-10-1994 (paragraphs 4.1 4.5), for LPG tanks. The definitions recalled by the above mentioned laws dont agree each other; as an explanation each definition is listed with suitable annotations. - protection spacing: The D.M. 31-7-1934 doesnt mention that but defines the distances between tanks/ warehouses/ decantation rooms and inner buildings to be respected. The D.M. 13-10-1994 defines them as distances which determine, inside the tank, a respect zone (see it). - respect spacing: The D.M. 31-7-1934 mention them as distances between tanks/ warehouses/ decantation rooms and outer buildings, railways, tramways, bridges, monuments. The D.M. 13-10-1994 doesnt adopt this term but defines them as outer safety distances (see it). - outer safety distance: The D.M. 31-7-1934 doesnt adopt this term but defines it as respect distance. The D.M. 13-10-1994 define it as distance between dangerous elements of the tank and outer buildings (divided as buildings in general and buildings with a big people concentration), railways and tramways. - inner safety distance: The D.M. 31-7-1934 doesnt mention that but defines the mutual distances between tanks and tanks, tanks and decantation zones, decantation zones and decantation zones. The D.M. 13-10-1994 define it as mutual distance between dangerous elements of the tank (tanks, decantation zone, movable storage tanks, pumps, compressors, etc.).
- protection zone: The D.M. 31-7-1934 mention that as a minimum distances between tanks/ hazardous enclosed spaces and enclosure. The D.M. 13-10-1994 doesnt report distances from dangerous elements of the tank to the enclosure. - respect zone: The D.M. 31-7-1934 doesnt mention that (see protection spacing) but defines the distances between tanks/ warehouses/ decantation rooms and inner buildings to be respected. The D.M. 13-10-1994 defines that as a zone in which ignition sources, utilities building of the tank, (offices, laboratories, workshops, warehouses, services), roads open to traffic and projection of air-ways, must not exist. Confined explosion: Ignition in bulk of a cloud of flammable gas with explosion into an area confined by walls and ceiling with a whole open area less than 40% of the total walls area. Unconfined explosion: Ignition in bulk of a cloud of flammable gas with explosion outdoors. IDLH - Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health Limit of concentration to which a man can be exposed for half an hour without any irreversible consequences for health or any impairment of escape possibility. (Ref. NIOSH - National Institute for Occupational Safety). LOC - Level of concern Concentration in air of a hazardous substance to which, for a relatively short exposure time, injuries for health can be expected (Ref. EPA - Environmental Protection Agency and ISPESL 1 Supplement of n1/1993). Preventive measure: Measure or device able to prevent ignition into an area involved by the presence of explosive mixture as a consequence of releases from anomalous events reasonably expected. Reasonably expected: It is an event that, according to known incidental events (well-known data), can be considered frequent enough to found on it the dimensioning of active and passive defences. For this reason it is not generally the most serious event, since the serious event is also rare or not very frequent, so it is not a valid design reference.
2.2
Operative environment The design of oil and gas treatment units must take account of environmental conditions of the installation place, defined by the design specification. All the environmental factors, that can influence the system reliability, shall be to consider: minimum and maximum temperature; wind velocity and direction; snowfalls; presence of polluting and corrosive substances; earthquakes; mechanical stress and vibrations due to normal operation; direct or indirect fulmination; electromagnetic influences.
2.2
Functional requirements The General Plot Plan shall be to realise in accordance with the criteria hereinafter stated. Once the General Plot Plan is defined, for process and utilities areas shall be to respect the safety distances stated in subchapter 2.4 of this specification. The General Plot Plan shall be to define in order to maintain the separation among the process equipment and from process equipment and manned areas (or areas that can be manned for emergency). Defining the General Plot Plan the possibility of a next enlargement shall be to consider, in order that the future process areas do not determine an unacceptable reduction of the safety distances. The layout of the areas into the Unit shall be defined so as to exploit main direction of the winds in order to reduce the possibility that gas or smoke release for fire occurrence can involve manned areas and main escape ways.
The volume at /Ref.2/ (F.P. Lees: Loss Prevention in the Process Industries) suggests not to exceed the dimensions 100 x 200 m, in order to make emergency entrance and escape easy. The criteria that have determined such layout are stated in the following paragraphs. Units have been divided into the following groups: - Process and utilities Units - Safety main Units - Critical plant Units
2.3.1
Process and utilities Units Process and utilities Units considered by this specification are as follows; indications for their suitable location are stated in Annex 2: Unit 120: Unit 190: Unit 200: Unit 200: Unit 210: Unit 220: Unit 300: Unit 310: Unit 320: Unit 350: Unit 380: Unit 390: Unit 430: Chemical injection for well head and plant Launching and/or receiving traps Oil separation (Heaters) Oil separation (Separators/ Oil column stabilisation) Oil treatment Oil transport and storage (Oil removal pumps) Gas separation Gas dehydration (Gas dehydration columns) Liquid hydrocarbons recovery (Gasoline stabilisation column) Gas conditioning Glycol for gas dehydration (Reconditioning glycol column) Glycol for gas dehydration (Glycol sto rage tanks) Combustible gas oil.
Grouping the process or utilities units must be realised according to the following requirements: - reduce areas containing toxic or corrosive products; - bring the export pumps as close as possible to the relevant storage tanks; - maintain the (fractioning, absorption, etc.) column as close as possible to the relevant reboiler;
- put the compressors of acid or sweet gas into the same area for easiness of maintenance, taking into consideration the length of inlet and sending pipes of acid gas (for instance installing the compression unit close to the sweetening unit); - place the air heat exchangers as close as possible to the process areas connected to them and as far as possible from equipment with free burning flame (i.e. ovens, etc.). The evacuation and access paths to the process and utilities areas must have the following characteristics: - two accesses to the installation areas must always exist, one at least placed upwind. - stairs to the installation areas must be provided with handrail; sailor stairs are allowed as escape and access ways only to out-of-the-way zones seldom visited by personnel (i.e. for maintenance); - the access stairs must be placed on the side of plant or equipment more proofed against hazardous events, in order that the equipment itself can be a shield for the personnel going upstairs and downstairs.
2.3.2
Safety main Units Safety main Units considered by this specification are as follows; indications for their suitable location are stated in Annex 3: Unit 230: Unit 480: Unit 560: Unit 580: Unit 690: Unit 730: Flares and vents Electric power generation Oily waters treatment Gaseous effluents treatment Civil buildings Foam/water fire system
Main requirement for safety main Units is to be allowed to work during the foreseeable hazardous events, thus they must be protected against any consequence of those events.
The evacuation and access paths from the areas with safety fundamental Units must comply with the following requirements: - access to the Plant, adopted as the main escape way, must allow a fast access to the car parking; - the plant for the treatment of liquid effluents must be in the centre of the area which it is devoted to and not near to one of the external roads, in order to be far from the vehicles entries. 2.3.3 Critical plant Units Critical plant Units considered in this specification are the following; indications for their suitable location are stated in Annex 4; Unit 220: Unit 310: Unit 320: LNG Unit 330: Unit 330: Unit 330: Unit 360: Unit 370: Unit 400: Unit 410: Unit 420: Unit 460: Unit 910: Unit 920: Unit 970: Oil transport and storage (Oil storage tank) Gas dehydration (Instrumentation rooms with fiscal metering equipment) Liquid hydrocarbons recovery (Ethane removing / LPG storage) Gas deacidification (Gas deacidification column) Gas deacidification (H 2S absorber reconditioning column) Gas deacidification (Sulphur recovery) Gas compression Natural gas liquefaction (NGL) Cooling and refrigeration Heating Combustible gas Compressed air Electric energy main supply >1000 V Electric energy main supply <1000 V Control system
A plant unit is considered as critical when results: - high hazardous for design or process reasons (plant into a confined environment, with a high H 2S concentration, etc.); - an important unit for profitability reasons (high content of hydrocarbons, high investment cost, long supplying times); - sensible or exposed to the consequences of incide nts; - a fundamental service; - source of ignition.
Areas with critical plant units must be protected against hazardous events that can be foreseen and thus can not be placed downwind of plants which in anomalous situations can release flammable gas or vapours.
2.3.4
Process piping and vents Accordingly to the requirements of the layout defined in this specification, a particular attention shall be to pay when positioning the various plant equipment, in order to avoid the connecting piping is too much long. In particular, the length of highly pressurised piping, lines containing toxic products or liquefied gas and pipes of complex realisation (with inner passivation, outer insulation or tracing), shall be as short as possible. The vent manifolds must be protected against the foreseeable incidents, thus they shall not be installed neither on pumps or process compressors, nor into storage vessels.
2.3.5
Clearances The equipment and piping layout must be realised in order to minimise any hazard arising from collisions with heavy transports. One horizontal and vertical free area must be left around the equipment in order to allow the removal for maintenance, building and assembling. For these reasons, the pipes connecting plant areas must be parallel to access roads or zones. Along the shoulder of every road a free clearances of 1.5 m must be left, used as pedestrian crossing.
The following minimal clearances must be maintained: Equipment Pumps Compressors Columns Horizontal vessels Exchangers Heaters and Heat exchangers Main pipes stands (1) Secondary pipes stands (1) Underground pipes Horizontal clearance 1,5 m 3 m 1,5 m 2 m 1,5 m 3 m 4,5 3 1 m m m Vertical clearance 4 m 4 m --1,5 m 1 m 5 4 m m --(*)
(1) From /Ref.3/ Safety in process plant design (*)7 m on areas with crane admittance
2.3.6
Divisions Products performing in different ways to fire or requiring, in case of fire, specific extinguishing agents (i.e. flammable solids and liquids) are required to be separated. In particular, the gas treatment areas must be kept separate from oil treatment areas (i.e. by dividing the control vessels). The areas requiring the same type of fire protection must be as far as possible placed side by side.
2.3.7 2.3.7.1
Outer installations and radiation General The layout of the Plant areas must be such that the outwards consequences of a possible fire are minimised, by regarding the existing works. Into the following table are reported the maximum allowable exposure levels due to radiation from flares and vents for an accidental ignition in the different situations. The radiation values are referred to the maximum flowrate provided and in the worst conditions, including the value of the sun radiation.
People are considered equipped when wearing safety protection clothes. The escape ways are considered shielded if people can protect themselves behind walls or equipment when going away their work place.
2.3.7.2
Radiation values in an emergency and in lack of risk analysis The radiation levels to be adopted are defined in the following table and represent the maximum allowable values in emergency when a dedicated risk analysis isnt provided. The values reported are valid both into and out of the installation. Radiation values in an emergency and in lack of risk analysis 1 Condition of people into the installation area - Not equipped - Outdoor continuous emergency intervention 2 - Not equipped - Temporary presence in open area - Lack of shielded escape ways Condition of people out of the installation fence - General outdoor area with presence of people (i.e. squares, playing fields, open space public places) 1.5 - Outdoor area with temporary presence of people (i.e. cultivated lands) 3 - Equipped - Occasional presence in open area - Escape ways shielded
- Outdoor area where is not provided (i.e. motorways and railways)
Maximum radiation values, including the value of the sun radiation (kW/m2)
4.8
2.3.7.3
Radiation values in an emergency and in presence of risk analys is If a risk analysis has been realised and the probability occurrence has been verified within the acceptability limits, the radiation values stated in this table shall be used (radiation with considerable consequences)
Radiation values in an emergency and in presence of risk analysis
1 Condition of people into the installation area - Not equipped - Outdoor continuous emergency intervention
2 - Not equipped - Temporary presence in open area - Lack of shielded escape ways
3 - Equipped - Occasional presence in open area - Escape ways shielded
Condition of people out of the installation fence
- General outdoor area with presence of people (i.e. squares, playing fields, open space public places) 4.8
- Outdoor area with temporary presence of people (i.e. cultivated lands)
- Outdoor area where is not provided (i.e. motorways and railways)
Maximum radiation values, including the value of the sun radiation 2 (kW/m )
12
2.3.7.4
Radiation values in standard operating conditions For flares permanently burning and flares of thermodestroyer are not allowed radiation values higher than the following: Radiation values in standard operating conditions 1 Condition of people into the installation area - Not equipped - Outdoor continuous emergency intervention 2 - Not equipped - Temporary presence in open area - Lack of shielded escape ways Condition of people out of the installation fence - General outdoor area with presence of people (i.e. squares, playing fields, open space public places) 1.5 - Outdoor area with temporary presence of people (i.e. cultivated lands)
Maximum radiation values, including the value of the sun 2 radiation (kW/m )
4.8
2.3.8
Control systems Plants for liquid hydrocarbons treatment and storage tanks must be supplied with control vessels and piping and draining systems of the possible leaks. The dimensioning of the control vessels must consider the following requirements. - If the vessel is not drained, the volume must allow the control of the useful capacity of the tank or apparatus. Products as propane, contained into no cryogenic tanks, make exceptions: in these cases it is sufficient to consider a vessel capacity of 32% of the total volume of the tank. - The minimum distance between the upper part of the external sides of the control vessel of the storage tanks and the tank shell placed into the vessel must be equal to the tank height minus the sides height.
The height on the country side of the vessel walls must not exceed 4 m, in accordance with the requirements of Ministry of the Interior 22-12-1962 n132 (supplement of D.M. 31-7-1934). Derogations are provided for high capacity tanks, in particular cases, (the document reports as an example a 50000 m 3 tank). Meeting the requirement of this document, when the control vessel height reaches 4 m, the tank shell must be accessible from the upper part of the sides by a gangway of sheet-steel, without going down into the vessel; the upper part of the vessel must be connected with the gangway with at least two external stairs. - The slope of the drained control vessels must not allow a standing of possible flames under the tank (slope to be preferred: 2 0/00); the stairs to the vessels and possible fire fighting installations must not be in that part of the vessel where slopes join. The flammable liquids drainage must be completely separated from not hazardous drainage and the two systems must not have connections without shut off fittings. The dimensions of the system collecting the plant drainage (oily waters) must comply with the volume of the liquid drained in emergency, contained into the higher process equipment. The evaporation basin for LPG storage must be always present and placed at a distance so that a fire into the basin do not involve the tanks. The basin must be dimensioned in order to contain the possible LPG leakages. The basin shall be placed at a level allowing a leaks accumulation, into the control vessel, higher than the basin capacity. The width of the evaporation basin shall not exceed 2 m. The drainage systems of the basin shall be dimensioned in order to evacuate the highest quantity of water coming from the control vessel (cooling water of the tank or meteoric waters).
2.3.9
Escape ways For the escape ways the following requirements are valid: - no point of the closed enclosure must be more than 12 m away from an exit and no blind passage must be higher than 8 m /Ref.2/; - escape ways outdoors must be at least 0.7 m width /Ref.2/; - the doors along escape ways from rooms hazardous works an d materials must be at least 1.2 m width; - the doors along escape ways with hazardous works and materials different from the previous must be at least 0.9 m width.
2.3.10
Classification of areas with explosion hazard Areas classification shall be realised according to the specification 06744.VAR.ELE.SPC derived from CEI codes 64-2 and containing layouts and specific choices for the concerned plants of the Plant. Area classification depends on the quantity of dangerous products into the area and particularly on the exceeding of the values stated by the above mentioned specification. By adopting that code, the quantity of dangerous products into the area is always the total value of area whole plant and not of a single element of the plant.
2.4
Safety requirements for spacing This chapter is organised as follows: after the first two paragraphs reporting general requirements, a list of paragraphs is included according to the columns sequence of the tables of Annex 5. Each paragraphs adopts the same title of the column reporting the reference spacing and provides the following information: available normative references and/or computational models; national or regional normative references; consideration and reasons about choices operated; possible modifications or derogations offered to the designer.
2.4.1
Safety spacing The safety spacing, reported in Annex 5, are the minimum to be adopted on onshore installations. The tables, on the side of each spacing, state the relevant reference sources: Italian Legislation, Regional Legislation, Normative References of National Organizations or other Organizations, computational model, estrapolation from typical plant, etc. Spacing reported in these tables comes mostly from Normative references; when these can not be applied spacing come from calculation mentioned in the following paragraphs and in Annexes 6 11. In order to evaluate the quantity of the product discharged, according to CEI 64 - 2 codes, the intervention time of the shut-off valves is considered equal to 15 minutes (manual valve from a station constantly manned).
2.4.2 2.4.2.1 2.4.2.1.1
General requirements Spacing between hazardous equipment installed into the Plant Protection of equipment adjoining to that involved in leakage Legislation and decrees consider this element only regarding to LPG storage systems, to some equipment of mineral oils and gas-pipelines. When this element can not be defined by legislation or codes, it is mandatory to be estimate by computational models of Annexes 6 11.
According to the indications from CEI 64-2 codes, the possible leakage points to be considered are valve gaskets and stuffing, flanges, pumps operating flammable fluids (the equipment breakdown is not considered, not even partial, and pipes are nor considered as hazard centres: The diameter of the equivalent hole, to be used for computation of a reasonably believable leakage or to be used directly in the modelling shown in Annexes 6 11, is considered equal to: - 3.2 mm for RJ flanges (it corresponds to about 0.05 kg/s flowrates and valid for a pressure range 40 200 bar for gas only) /Ref.1/; - 15 mm for RF flanges and pump stuffing (it corresponds to about 0.5 kg/s flowrates for gas and 5 kg/s for oil; it is valid for pressures <40 bar) /Ref.2/;
2.4.2.1.2
Protection of plant area adjoining to that involved in leakage Legislation and decrees consider this element only regarding to pipes, gas compressors and well heads. For other flammable fluids, not covered by legislation or codes, the distance is determined by computational models of Annexes 6 11. The maximum permissible leakage and other reference data for calculation have been derived according to the following indications: - as a characteristic diameter has been adopted 10% of the highest connecting piping diameter /Ref.2/; - partial breakdown of storage tanks has been considered (roof sinking); For computing the vapours into the explosive field, in case of oil evaporative pool, one of the following assumptions (the most conservative one): a fixed vapours volume of 300 m3 (whose explosive part is 2%) /Ref.2/; 10% of the discharged volume. The ignition point has been considered at the leakage source.
2.4.2.2
Spacing between hazardous equipment installed into the Plant and the outer fittings The minimum requirement is to protect buildings and works out of the fence. Legislation and decrees consider in details this matter. When this element can not be defined by legislation or codes, it shall be evaluated each time by Risk Analysis computational models. These spaces are measured horizontally from the external perimeter of the equipment to the point closest to the outer fittings or fence, respectively; the railway and tramway tracks (excluded the connections inside the Plant) are considered outer fittings.
2.4.3
Fences The fence represents the boundary line between inner and outer elements of the Plant. The safety spacing from the fences are reported in Annex 5. The codes considered are: D.M. 31-7-1934; DPGR n7 Regione Sicilia; Ministry of the Interior - Circular 9-7-1954; Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI) - General Recommendations for Spacing.
2.4.4 2.4.4.1
Hydrocarbons storage tanks Liquid hydrocarbons storage tanks The safety spacing from the storage tanks are reported in Annex 5. The codes considered are: D.M. 31-7-1934; DPGR n7, Regione Sicilia; Ministry of the Interior - Circular 11-5-1954, n70; Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI) - General Recommendations for Spacing.
The spacing determined according to national normative references can be modified, by using computational models, only if the spacing determined in this last way are more conservative. The mutual spacing between tanks can be evaluated by using the pool fire model (see Annex 6) by supposing the burning tank have the roof sunk and the all liquid surface is involved in fire; the minimum spacing from the adjoining tank is determined by a limit radiation of 19 kW/m 2.
2.4.4.2
LPG storage tanks > 5 m 3 The safety spacing from the loading bays are reported in Annex 5. The normative reference adopted is D.M. 13-10-1994. The spacing determined according to national normative references can be modified, by using computational models, only if the spacing determined in this last way are more conservative.
2.4.5 2.4.4.1
Hydrocarbons loading bays from tankers Liquid hydrocarbons loading bays The distances from loading bays are regulated by the Circular of Ministry of Interior, 11-5-1954, n70: Caricamento e svuotamento, nelle raffinerie e nei depositi di olii minerali, dei veicoli a cisterna ed a botte senza lattuazione del ciclo chiuso. The spacing from loading bays to possible sources of ignition can be determined from the extension of the area classified according to CEI 64-2 codes. Some spacing for loading bays can be derived from normative references of national organizations such as General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI). The spacing determined according to national normative references can be modified, by using computational models, only if the spacing determined in this last way are more conservative.
2.4.5.2
LPG loading bays The safety spacing from the loading bays are reported in Annex 5. The normative reference adopted is D.M. 13-10-1994. The spacing determined according to national normative references can be modified, by using computational models, only if the spacing determined in this last way are more conservative.
2.4.6
Well heads The safety spacing from the loading bays are reported in Annex 5. The normative reference adopted is D.P.G.R. n7 - Regione Sicilia, Regolamento di polizia mineraria. The only normative references of national organizations concerning this argument are API RP 500 B.
2.4.7
Oil treatment plants The safety spacing from the Oil treatment plants are reported in Annex 5. Oil treatment plants include: oil treatment plants containing separators or stabilising columns and gas treatment plants (separation, dehydration and conditioning) containing oil quantity higher than 1 m 3. No normative references does exist. As a normative reference of national organizations General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI) has been adopted. In order to determine the safety spacing between process equipment of oil treatment plants, the pool fire model is adopted (see Annex 6) by introducing as an input an oil flowrate of 5 kg/s.
2.4.8
Gas treatment plants The safety spacing of gas treatment plants are reported in Annex 5. Gas treatment plants include: gas treatment plants containing separators, dehydration or deacidification columns containing gas quantity below 1 m 3. No normative references or decrees do exist, from which safety spacing for areas with gas treatment plants can be obtained. As a normative reference of national organizations General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI) has been adopted, in order to define some safety spacing. In order to determine the other safety spacing for gas treatment plants, computational models of gaseous jet fires in Annex 7 (for hazardous equipment spacing), or relating to unconfined gas cloud explosion in Annex 8 (for outer fittings spacing have been adopted too.
2.4.9
Compression stations The safety spacing from gas compression stations are reported in Annex 5 and are valid for gas turbine too, since they have the same risk level. An installation including a single gas compressor (and thus a single gas turbine) is considered a gas compression station too. The normative reference is Circular of Ministry of the Interior n.21137/4105 9-7-1954: Criteri di sicurezza per linstallazione e lesercizio di centrali di compressione di gas metano. Some spacing are determined by the requirements stated in D.M. 24-11-1984: Norme di icurezza antincendio per il trasporto, distribuzione, accumulo e utilizzazione di gas naturale con densit non superiore a 0.8. The safety spacing from the fittings out of the fence is affected by the permissible noise level according to DL 15-8-1991 n277. In some case, the safety spacing are deduced from DPGR n7, Regione Sicilia.
The safety spacing with equipment not covered by national and regional codes has been drawn from General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurers. Since national and regional codes dont cover the spacing between compressors and gas and oil treatment plants or between compressors and oil and gas pipelines, a technical proposal is considered (Progetto di Regolamento Generale di Prevenzione Incendi, 1965) which estimates spacing in accordance with the parametric model. The empirical relation is: R = 0.0865
3
GD/ S
where: R is the safety spacing in m G is the flowrate in kg/h of compressor or compressors, if more than one D is the danger index (for methane D = 15500) S is the equipment safety level S is equal to 500 when are present simultaneously: - effective equipment shut off capacity In case of leakage; - an adequate ventilation; - presence of flame sensors for an autom atic equipment shutdown. For other situations S = 100 shall be adopted. The safety spacing from treatment plants, oil and gas pipelines is thus: R = 0.27
G0.33
The safety spacing between compressors into a same area is drawn by applying the gaseous jet fire model.
2.4.10
Glycol heating and reconditioning units The safety spacing from glycol heaters and reconditioners are reported in Annex 5. Italian legislation does not provide explicitly safety spacing from this type of equipment; they can be deduced from those ones provided for the above mentioned equipment; in particular, DPGR n7 - Regione Sicilia Regolamento di polizia mineraria.
As a normative reference of national organizations General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI) and CEI 64-2 codes have been adopted, For gas heaters, the same models of gas treatment plants areas are used. For glycol reconditioning units, computational models of unconfined gas cloud explosion such as in Annex 9 (since they are not pressurised equipment) are considered. For oil heaters and diatermic oil systems, model relating to pool fires is considered, with a flowrate of 1 kg/s (see Annex 6).
2.4.11
Glycol storage tanks The safety spacing from glycol tanks are reported in Annex 5. The glycol tanks can be considered as tanks containing not less than 500 m 3 of atmospheric pressure gas (blanketing gas). The normative reference is then D.M. 24-11-1984: Norme di sicurezza antincendio per il trasporto, distribuzione, accumulo e utilizzazione di gas naturale con densit non superiore a 0.8. They are classified as tanks of 3^ category, according to this rules. No exceptions to the above mentioned spacing are allowed since neither other normative references of national organizations are available nor computational models can be applied to this case.
2.4.12
Basins for oily waters treatment The safety spacing from oily waters treatment basins are reported in Annex 5. Italian legislation does not provide safety spacing from these equipment. As a national normative references are adopted CEI 64-2 codes, which provide extension of classified area to drain wells and oily sewers. For oily waters basins, spacing are derived from the heavy vapours dispersion model (see Annex 10).
2.4.13
Oil/gas pipelines The safety spacing from oil/gas pipelines are reported in Annex 5. As regards the pipes, Italian legislation consider only spacing from outer structures. If pipes are close to the fences and so near roads and outer structures, the spacing is calculated in accordance with normative reference (D.M. 24-111984: Norme di sicurezza antincendio per il trasporto, distribuzione, accumulo e utilizzazione di gas naturale con densit non superiore a 0.8). As a normative reference of national organizations have been adopted General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI), which define the safety spacing for oil pipeline pumping stations. The spacing between gas pipelines and outer fittings is covered by a technical proposal (Progetto di Regolamento Generale di Prevenzione Incendi, 1965) which estimates spacing in accordance with the parametric model. The empirical relation is: R = 0.0865
3
GD/ S
where: R is the safety spacing in m G is the flowrate in kg/h of gas pipelines D is the danger index (for methane D = 15500) S is the safety level varying in relation to the ground permeability and the piping ventilation level. If the piping is not underground the highest value equal to 500 can be adopted. The safety spacing R from outer fittings is thus: R = 0.27
G0.33
2.4.14
Process safety valves The safety spacing from safety valves are reported in Annex 5. For safety valves, the API RP 520 and API RP 521 standard codes are adopted.
2.4.15 2.4.15.1
Gas flares and vents Dry gas flares The safety spacing from dry gas flares are reported in Annex 5. Flares receiving gas without gasoline droplets dragging are defined as dry gas flares. As a normative reference of national organizations have been adopted General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI), which define only the flares permanently burning. The relation (2) of Annex 8 is adopted in order to determine the spacing between high pressure flares (if existing). Into the enclosure limited by the minimum safety spacing (30 m) shall not be present any equipment; this spacing shall be to verify and if necessary increased according to the ground level radiation calculations.
2.4.15.2
Wet gas flares The safety spacing from wet gas flares are reported in Annex 5. Flares receiving gas with gasoline droplets entrainment are defined as wet gas flares. As a normative reference of national organizations have been adopted General Recommendations for Spacing of Industrial Risk Insurer (IRI), which define only the flares permanently burning. The relation (2) of Annex 8 is adopted in order to determine the spacing between high pressure flares (if existing). Into the enclosure limited by the minimum safety spacing (60 m) shall not be present any equipment; this spacing shall be to verify and if necessary increased according to the ground level radiation calculations. The safety spacing considers the gasoline droplets fallout too.
2.4.16
H2S process plants The safety spacing from H 2S process plants are reported in Annex 5. H2S process plants are those processing fluids with very high hydrogen sulphide concentration; into this fields are included the sulphur recover unit and the H2S adsorber reconditioning unit. No normative references of national organizations do exist about this matter. The safety spacing are thus determined by computational modelling such as the dispersion and following dilution of the hydrogen sulphide (see Annex 11) through which are determined the spacing from the emergency management areas, as control room, shut off valves and indoor areas where evacuation is not necessary (maximum concentration 100 ppm) and areas out of the plant (where concentration must not exceed 10 ppm).
2.5
Requirement of work health and environmental protection The safety spacing defined in Annex 5 must be verified together with the legislation requirements about work health (in particular DPR 19-3-1956 n303 and DL 15-8-1991 n277 about noise and vibration exposure) and environmental protection (in particular DPR 24-5-1988 n203 relating to DM 12-7-1990 about the air quality).
2.6
Ergonomics The safety spacing reported in Annex 5 must be verified with the ergonomics legislation requirements.
2.7
Requirements for Quality Management and Quality Assurance Eventual requirements for Quality Management and/or Quality Assurance are included in the applicable managerial specification enclosed to the offer request.
2.8
Documentation Plants layouts shall be realised in accordance with the specifications enclosed to the design documentation.
3 3.1 3.1.1
SUPPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS Enclosures and informative annexes Annexes Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 Annex 4 Annex 5 Annex 6 Annex 7 Annex 8 Plant general layout Better location - Process and utilities units Better location - Safety main units Better location - Critical plant units Safety spacing to be adopted Pool fire - Computational method Jet fire - Computational method Unconfined gas cloud explosion (pressurised) - Computational method gas cloud explosion (not pressurised) -
Annex 9 Unconfined Computational method Annex 10 Annex 11
Heavy vapours dispersion - Computational method Hydrogen sulphide dispersion - Computationa l method
Annex 1
Plant general layout
FLARE
MULTIFUNCTIONAL BUILDING OFFICES STORAGE TANKS PARKING CONTROL ROOM ACCESS WAY WATER TREATMENT INGRESSO COMPRESSORS GENERATORS
PROCESS
FIREFIGHTING
LOADING
PREVAILING WINDS
Annex 2
Better location - Process and utilities units
This annex reports in numerical order a series of card-files relating to the process and utilities Functional Units of a typical plant. The file-cards include: Title: Plant: Functional Plant Unit and relevant name Indications on equipment involved in the relevant positioning Better and/or alternative location according to other plants prevailing wind direction
Location: and
(Annex 2)
UNIT 120
: CHEMICAL INJECTION FOR WELL HEAD AND PLANT : Methane Oil Storage Tanks DOWNWIND OF THE GAS TREATMENT UNIT, INTO DEDICATED AREA -----
Plant Better location:
Alternative location:
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind)
UNIT 190 Plant Better location:
: LAUNCHING AND RECEIVING TRAPS : Launching and receiving traps UPWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF BUILDINGS AREA -----
Better location for loading bays
(Annex 2)
: OIL SEPARATION : Heaters UPWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF BUILDINGS AREA CROSSWIND CLOSE ARRIVALS UNIT
TO
THE
Area involved by waste gas: the smokes temperature must be < 540C into gas areas or < 250C into oil areas
:OIL SEPARATION : Separators/ Oil Stabilising Column DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT PLANTS(*) -----
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind) (*) the control basin of this Unit is to separate from the Heating Unit one (if adjacent)
(Annex 2)
: OIL TREATMENT : Separators/ Oil Stabilising Column DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT PLANTS(*) -----
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind) (*) the control basin of this Unit is to separate from the Heating Unit one (if adjacent)
: OIL TRANSPORT AND STORAGE : Oil Export Pumps UPWIND OF THE STORAGE TANKS DOWNWIND OF THE COMPRESSORS CROSSWIND CLOSE TO THE TANKS AREA
Area where hot liquids processing pumps must not be installed (>60C)
(Annex 2)
: GAS SEPARATION : Oil and Gas Heaters UPWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF BUILDINGS AREA CROSSWIND CLOSE ARRIVALS UNIT
TO
THE
: GAS DEHYDRATION : Gas Dehydration Columns UPWIND OF OIL TREATMENT UNITS UPWIND OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STORAGE -----
(Annex 2)
: LIQUID HYDROCARBONS RECOVERY : Gasoline Stabilising Column DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT PLANTS -----
: GAS CONDITIONING : Gas Conditioning Plant UPWIND OF OIL TREATMENT UNITS UPWIND OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STORAGE -----
(Annex 2)
: GLYCOL FOR GAS DEHYDRATION : Glycol Reconditioning Columns UPWIND OF PLANTS -----
UNIT 390 Plants Better location:
: GLYCOL FOR GAS DEHYDRATION : Glycol Storage Tanks UPWIND OF PLANTS -----
(Annex 2)
: COMBUSTIBLE GAS OIL : Gas Oil Tank and Pumps DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT UNITS DOWNWIND OF EQUIPMENT -----
Annex 3 -
Better location - Safety main units
: FLARES AND VENTS : Gaseous Effluents Treatment System DOWNWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF FLARES BARYCENTRIC AS TO THE PLANTS
Respect area (free from plants) around the 30 m radius flare for dry gas Plants and 60 m radius flare for gasoline gas Plants
: ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION : Electric Power Generator UPWIND OF PLANTS IN SAFE AREA(*) CROSSWIND, BY ADOPTING SAFETY SPACING FROM OTHER AREAS
(*)Avoid barycentric position as to

the plants. Do not place above electric rooms or transformers
(Annex 3)
: OILY WATERS TREATMENT : Liquid Effluents Treatment System IN DEDICATED AREA DOWNWIND OF PLANTS, MACHINERY AND BUILDINGS OUT OF THE AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND LPG/NLG UNITS -----
: GASEOUS EFFLUENTS TREATMENT : Thermodestroyer DOWNWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF FLARES BARYCENTRIC AS TO THE PLANTS
Respect area (free from plants) around the 30 m radius flare for dry gas Plants and 60 m radius flare for gasoline gas Plants
(Annex 3)
: CIVIL BUILDINGS : Multipurpose Building with or without Control Room UPWIND OF PLANTS IN SAFE AREA(*) CROSSWIND, BY ADOPTING SAFETY SPACING FROM OTHER AREAS
(*)Avoid barycentric position as to

the plants. Do not place above electric rooms or transformers
: FOAM/WATER FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM : Water Pumping Fire Fighting System UPWIND OF PLANTS IN SAFE AREA THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM MUST BE PLACED 30 m FROM THE PROVIDED FLAME UPWIND OF IT
Annex 4
Better location - Critical plant units
: OIL TRANSPORT AND STORAGE : Oil Storage Tanks DOWNWIND OF PLANTS, BUILDINGS AND MACHINERY, 60 m FROM GASEOUS EFFLUENTS UNIT -----
: GAS DEHYDRATION : Instrumentation room with fiscal metering equipment UPWIND OF OIL TREATMENT UNITS UPWIND OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STORAGE UNITS -----
(Annex 4)
: LIQUID HYDROCARBONS RECOVERY : LPG-LNG Hethane removing unit/Storage DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT UNITS, BUILDINGS AND MACHINERY OUT OF AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS(*) --------
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind) (*)For LPG/LNG storage, these criteria are valid only for evaporation basins
: GAS DEACIDIFICATION : Gas deacidification column BARYCENTRIC POSITION AS TO THE PLANTS OUT OF AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS 60 m FROM THE FENCE
Alternative location: to the barycentric position Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind)
(Annex 4)
: GAS DEACIDIFICATION : H2S Absorber Reconditioning Column BARYCENTRIC POSITION AS TO THE PLANTS OUT OF AR EA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS 60 m FROM THE FENCE
Alternative location: to the barycentric position
: GAS DEACIDIFICATION : Sulphur Recovery BARYCENTRIC POSITION AS TO THE PLANTS OUT OF AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS 60 m FROM THE FENCE
Alternative location: to the barycentric position
(Annex 4)
: GAS COMPRESSION : Gas compressors UPWIND OF OIL TREATMENT PLANTS AND LPG/LNG UNITS AS BARYCENTRIC AS POSSIBLE RELATING TO THE NOISE -----
: NATURAL GAS LIQUEFACTION : LPG-LNG Hethane removing unit/Storage DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT UNITS, BUILDINGS AND MACHINERY OUT OF AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS(*) --------
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind) (*)For LPG/LNG storage, these criteria are valid only for evaporation basins
(Annex 4)
: COOLING AND REFRIGERATION : Propane Cooling Cycle DOWNWIND OF GAS TREATMENT UNITS, BUILDINGS AND MACHINERY OUT OF AREA DOWNWIND OF STORAGE TANKS AND DRAINAGE TREATMENT UNITS(*) -----
Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind) (*)These criteria are valid only for evaporation basin
: HOT OIL : Free burning Heaters UPWIND OF PLANTS DOWNWIND OF BUILDINGS AREA CROSSWIND CLOSE TO ARRIVALS UNIT
(Annex 4)
COMBUSTIBLE GAS
: Combustible Gas System UPWIND OF OIL TREATMENT PLANTS UPWIND OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS STORAGE UNITS -----
: COMPRESSED AIR : Instrumentation Air System UPWIND OF PLANTS -----
(Annex 4)
UNIT 910 Plant Better location: : MAIN POWER SUPPLY >1000V : Electric cabin or substation UPWIND OF PLANTS, AT THE PLANT BOUNDARY, ACCORDING TO THE INNER AND OUTER CONNECTIONS CROSSWIND SAFE SPACED FROM PLANTS
: MAIN POWER SUPPLY <1000V : Electric cabin or substation UPWIND OF PLANTS, AT THE PLANT BOUNDARY, ACCORDING TO THE INNER AND OUTER CONNECTIONS CROSSWIND SAFE SPACED FROM PLANTS
(Annex4)
: CONTROL SYSTEM : UPWIND OF PLANTS, AT THE PLANT BOUNDARY, ACCORDING TO THE INNER AND OUTER CONNECTIONS CROSSWIND SAFE SPACED FROM PLANTS
Annex 5
Safety spacing to be adopted
Inside the chapter Safety requirements for spacing has been realised, for each of the following tables, a paragraph with the same title providing the following information: available normative references and/or computational models; national or regional normative references; considerations and reasons about choices operated; possible modifications or derogations offered to the designer.
The spacing reported in these tables represent obligations, requirements, guidance, interpretations and extrapolations coming from legislation, normative references, regulations and computational models considered absolutely, according their type, that is as independent documents. Some discontinuity of the relative spacing assessment shall be possible; these spacing shall be to verify and rearranged according to the layouts operated for each design. All the spacing into the tables are expressed in m.
LEGEND D G h H Q a.c. d.s. = = = = = = = main tank diameter (distance from the tank side) total flowrate in kg/h of the compressors s tation drilling/workover tower height tank height gas flowrate in m 3/g classified area according to CEI 64-2 code this safety distance is depending from the electric line voltage, and it must be calculated according to the reference normative (DM 13.10.1994) extrapolation from typical plant Italian legislation regional legislation (DPRG n7 Regione Sicilia) computational models interior normative reference normative references of national or ganizations or other foreign organizations no obligations protection zone according to Italian legislation about tanks
e.i. l.i. l.r. m.c. n.i. n.n
= = = = = =
n.v. = z.p. =
(Annex 5)
FENCES HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS z.p.non< H (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 15 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) h (l.i.) 50 (l.r.) 15 (e.i.) 15 (e.i.) 10 (l.i.) 30 (1) 10 (e.i.) 10 (e.i.) 30 (n.i.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 10 (l.i.) (2) 10 (l.i.) (2) n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. 3 (e.i.) 3 (l.i.) 3 (e.i.) 3 (e.i.) 3 (e.i.) 3 (e.i.)
FITTINGS INSIDE THE PLANT
FITTINGS OUTSIDE THE PLANT
(1) (2)
- reducible to 5 m if the fence is realised with a brick wall of thickness > 30 cm - it reduces to 5 m if the building is made of reinforced concrete of minimum thickness 15 cm, with beams covering or concrete slab and with upper vents area at least equal to 1/10 of the room plot area
(Annex 5)
LIQUID HYDROCARBONS . STORAGE TANKS HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS D (m.c.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (l.r.) 30 (n.n.) 20 (e.i.) 30 (l.r.) 30 (n.n.) D (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) (*) (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) (*) (l.i.) (*) (l.i.) (*) (l.i.) (*) (l.i.) (*) (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) iDi/2 (3) 40 (l.i.) 15 (l.i.) (4) 40 (l.i.) 40 (5) 40 (5) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) d.s. (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (l.i.) 60 (l.i.) LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3
(3) (4) (5) (*)
it reduces to 0.8 m if the tanks are underground it reduces to 7.5 m if the tanks are underground it reduces to a half if a water barrier is interposed to be defined each time according to the tank capaci ty
(Annex 5)
LIQ. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS 30 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) n.v. 40 (l.i.) 50 (l.r.) 60 (n.n.) 60 (n.n.) 60 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (a.c.) 30 (a.c.) 30 (a.c.) 30 (a.c.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (a.c.) LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS
HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT 40 (l.i.) 15 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 10 (l.i.) 50 (l.r.) 40 (5) 40 (5) 60 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) d.s. (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (l.i.) 60 (l.i.) 30 (l.i./l.r.) 30 (l.i./l.r.) 50 (l.r.) 50 (l.r.) n.v. 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (l.r.) 50 (l.r.) 15 (e.i.) 50 (l.r.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (l.i./l.r.) 30 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 50 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 30 (l.i.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.)
(5)
-- it reduces to a half if a water barrier is interposed
(Annex 5)
OIL TREATMENT PLANTS LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS 30 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 10 (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 15 (n.n.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.n.) 15 (e.i.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 60 (e.i.) 60 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 60 (e.i.) 60 (e.i.) GAS TREATMENT PLANTS 20 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 20 (m.c.) 3 (m.c.) 3(m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.n.) 3 (m.c.) 3 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (n.n.) 40 (m.c.) 40 (m.c.) 40 (m.c.) 40 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 40 (m.c.) 40 (m.c.) 100 (m.c.) 100 (m.c.) 100 (m.c.) COMPRESSION STATIONS TURBINES 30 (l.r.) 40 (l.i.) 60 (n.n.) 60 (n.n.) 30 (l.r.) 0.27 G 0,33 0.27 G 0,33 3 (m.c.) 30 (l.r.) 0.27 G 0,33 30 (n.n.) 0.27 G 0,33 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 0.27 G 0,33 10 (l.i.) 30 (l.r.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (v.e.) 30 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 100 (l.i.) 100 (l.i.) 100 (l.i.)
HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT
(Annex 5)
GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS 30 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (n.n.) 40 (l.i.) 50 (l.r.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (l.r.) n.v. 10 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 6 (m.c.) 6 (m.c.) n.v. 15 (n.n) 10 (m.c.) 10 (m.c.) 10 (m.c.) 10 (m.c.) 15 (n.n) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) 30 (n.n.) D (m.c.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (e.i.) 20( e.i.) 0.27 G 0,33 10 (e.i.) 7,5 (l.i.) 15 (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 7,5 (e.i.) 7,5 (e.i.) 10 (e.i.) 6 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 6 (e.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (l.i.) 20 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 50 (l.r.) 20 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 30 (n.n.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (m.c.) n.v. 15 (n.i.) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 15 (m.c.) 15 (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (e.i.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 20 (e.i.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 75 (m.c.) 75 (m.c.) GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS
(Annex 5)
OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 50 (l.i.) 100 (l.r.) 30 20 0.27 G 0,33 20 (e.i.) 20 (e.i.) 15 (n.i.) 1 - 2 -10 (6) 15 (n.n.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 10 (l.i.) 10 (l.i.) 20 (e.i.) 30 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 100 (n.i.) 100 (n.i.) 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 30 (e.i.) 40 (l.i.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) 15 (n.n.) PROCESS SAFETY VALVES
(6)
- the minimum distance to be adopted are : * 1 m between two underground gas pipelines * 2 m between two underground oil pipelines or a gas pipeline and a oil pipeline * 10 m between the shut-off valves of the gas and oil lines placed at the connection to the main manifolds, if above ground
(Annex 5)
DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES H2S PROCESS PLANTS n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. n.v. 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) n.v. n.v. n.v. 100 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 30 (m.c.) 100 (m.c.) 100 (m.c.)
HAZARDOUS EQUIPMENT LIQU. HYDROC. STORAGE TANKS LPG STORAGE TANKS > 5 m3 LIQU. HYDROC. LOADING BAYS LPG LOADING BAYS WELLS OIL TREATMENT PLANTS GAS TREATMENT PLANTS COMPRESSION STATIONS GLYCOL HEATING AND RECOND. GLYCOL TANKS OILY WATERS TREAT. BASINS OIL PIPELINES/GAS PIPELINES PROCESS SAFETY VALVES DRY GAS FLARES WET GAS FLARES PRESSURE REDUCER MEASUREMENT CABIN FREE FLAME EQUIPMENT GLYCOL PUMPS MANUAL SOV OFFICES, CONTROL ROOM FIRE FIGHTING PUMPS FIRE FIGHTING VALVES AERIAL POWER LINES CARRIAGE ROADS NON-CARRIAGE ROADS RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS PUBLIC PREMISES STATIONS 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 15 (n.n.) 10log(Q-2)/2 10log(Q-2)/2 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 30 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.n.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 15 (n.n.) 10log(Q-2)/2 10log(Q-2)/2 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.) 60 (n.i.)
Annex 6
Pool fire - Computational method
The relation for round base flame height computing is drawn from:
(1)
H = D 42 ( 0,06 / 1,27 9.8 D) 0,61
where: H is the flame height in metres D is the round base flame height 0,06 is the liquid hydrocarbons combustion rate in kg/(m 2 s) If the base flame were square shaped (i.e. into a duct or a control basin or an annulus of a floating roof tank), the following relations would be adopted: (2) Fr = 0,48 / D1
where: Fr is the discriminating factor for flame height determination D1 is the lower dimension of the flame base in meters. If Fr 0.25, the flame height is: (3) otherwise is: (4) H = 0,88 (Fr)-0,65 D1 H = 2,2 D1
For radiation computing, the following relations are used: (5) E = 130 e-0,12 D + 20 (1 - e-0,12 D)
where: E is the flame radiating flux in kW/m 2 (For flames with a diameter >20 m fixed value E = 130 kW/m 2 shall be to adopt). Radiation reaching the observer is: (6) q = FE
where: q is the radiation in kW/m 2 F is the view factor with the following values:
(Annex 6)
if the flame is round shaped, C is the distance in metres from the flame
centre to the observer and B is the flame radius: H/B H/B H/B H/B H/B H/B H/B H/B = = 0,1 0,5 2 2 2 2 2 2 C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B C/B = = = = = = = = 2 2 1 1,2 1,5 2 3 4 F = 0,028 F = 0,129 F = 0,580 F = 0,517 F = 0,392 F = 0,267 F = 0,141 F = 0,083
if the flame base is square shaped, C is the distance in metres from the flame
surface to the observer: H/C H/C H/C H/C H/C H/C H/C = = = = = = = 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 D/C D/C D/C D/C D/C D/C D/C = = = = = = = 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,05 0,2 0,1 0,05 F = 0,06 F = 0,027 F = 0,014 F = 0,007 F = 0,006 F = 0,003 F = 0,002
In order to evaluate the equilibrium radius of an unconfined pool fire, that is the flame radius relating to the steady phase when as much product leaks and burns, the following relation is considered: (7) 3 log R = 1,6 log Q + 0.89 (log = common logarithm)
where: R = pool equilibrium radius, in metres Q = leaking product flowrate, in kg/s When the flame radius is determined, radiation can be evaluated by (1) to (6) formulas. That is, with an oil leakage of 5 kg/s, R is 4.67 m, flame height is H = 15,3 m and radiating flux is E = 55.8 kW/m 2.
Annex 7
Jet fire - Computational method
For gas jet fires can be used some correlations for the flame spacing (it corresponds to a 1% of gas concentration by volume) according to the hole diameter. The correlations are: (1) X = 1,33 (d'/d) d
where: X is the distance in meters from the leakage point to the point where concentration is 1% (with an equipment pressure of 50 bar); (2) d'/d = 0,625 ln p + 0,0625
where: d is the hole diameter in cm d' is the jet diameter in cm p is the equipment pressure in bar.
Annex 8 Unconfined Computational method
gas
cloud
explosion
(pressurised)
The relation for the mass of flammable gas in a cloud arising from a pressurised gas leakage is the following/Ref.2/: (1) where: Q Ta d 7) To Q = 45400 Ta d 3 1067 / To1,5 is the mass in kg of flammable gas into the cloud ; is the ambient temperature in K is the jet diameter of the already expanded gas (meters) (see Annex is the gas temperature in K (generally 288 K)
The relation (1) is valid only for natural gas whose composition is defined by CEI 64.2 codes. Once determined the mass into the explosive zone, the hazard circumference shall be to evaluate, that is the distance where the consequences of a possible explosion are detected. The hazard circumference is from the following relation /Ref. 4/: (2) where: R K R = K (0.1 E ) 1/3 is the radius of the circumference limiting the hazard zone is a coefficient with value: - 0,03 if the hazard circumference is considered for the plants equipment; - 0,06 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fittings into the Plant; - 0,15 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fitting out of the Plant. is the energy content of the explosive part of the cloud whose value is 5 107 Q (in Joule) is the mass in kg of the flammable gas into the cloud
E Q
In order to obtain the extension of the explosive zone downwind of the leakage, the following correlation is considered: (3) log Q1 = 2 log L + 2 (log = common logarithm)
where: Q1 is the gas flowrate in m 3 / g L is the downwind spacing from the Explosivity Lower Limit (ELL) in atmosphere with a medium stability.
(Annex 8)
The values obtained by the application of this computational model and listed in table of Annex 5 have been determined by the following operative scheme which can help for verifying also real conditions substantially different from those assumed :
has been considered a pipe 120 mm in diameter and then a leakage from a
hole 12 mm in diameter (10% of the pipe diameter, as stated in 2.4.2.1.2) from the relation (2) of Annex 7 the jet diameter can be determined ( 3 cm at 50 bar pressure) from the relation(1) the explosive mass Q can be determined ( 6 kg) from the relation (2) the hazard radius can be calculated as the minimum distance for the installations equipment ( 20 m) from the relation (2) the hazard radius can be calculated as the minimum distance for the fittings into the Plant, usually offices and control room( 40 m) from the relation (2) the minimum distance towards the fittings out of the Plant can be calculated ( 100 m) the gas flowrate is evaluated ( 1 kg/s at 50 bar pressure) from the relation (3) the ELL is evaluated ( 30 m) which represents the minimum distance from heaters, reconditioners and free burning flame equipment.
Annex 9
Unconfined gas cloud Computational method
explosion
(not
pressurised)
The relation for the mass of flammable gas in a cloud arising from nonpressurised gas leakage is the following/Ref.2/: (1) Q = (12 / T a) V1.2 63 / (1 - 0.55 T a / To) 0.6
where: Q is the mass in kg of flammable gas into the cloud ; Ta is the ambient temperature in K V is the gas flowrate in m3/s To is the gas temperature in K The relation (1) is valid only for natural gas whose composition is defined by CEI 64.2 codes. Once determined the mass into the explosive zone, the hazard circumference shall be to evaluate, that is the distance where the consequences of a possible explosion are detected. The hazard circumference is from the following relation /Ref. 4/: (2) where: R K R = K (0.1 E ) 1/3 is the radius of the circumference limiting the hazard zone is a coefficient with value: - 0.03 if the hazard circumference is considered for the plants equipment; - 0.06 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fittings into the Plant; - 0.15 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fitting out of the Plant. is the energy content of the explosive part of the cloud whose value is 5 107 Q (in Joule) is the mass in kg of the flammable gas into the cloud
E Q
The values obtained by the application of this computational model and listed in table of Annex 5 have been determined by the following operative scheme which can help for verifying also real conditions substantially different from those assumed :
has been considered a pipe 120 mm in diameter and then a leakage from a hole 12 mm in diameter (10% of the pipe diameter, as stated in 2.4.2.1.2)
(Annex 9)
the gas flowrate is evaluated (0.17 kg/s) from the relation(1) the explosive mass Q can be determined (0.8 kg) from the relation (2) the hazard radius can be calculated as the minimum
distance for the installations equipment (6 m)

from the relation (2) the hazard radius can be calculated as the minimum
distance for the fittings into the Plant, usually offices and control room(10 m) from the relation (2) the minimum distance towards the fittings out of the Plant can be calculated too (25 m).
Annex 10
Heavy vapours dispersion - Computational method
The vapours quantity that can overflow from a basin containing oily products has been considered by Kletz /Ref.2/; it has been evaluated about 1 ton. It is necessary to evaluate the volume into the explosive field. Different criteria can be used: 10% of the volume released in 30 can be considered ( Bureau of Mines), or 2% of the total volume of released vapours ( Industrial Risk Insurers), or 7% of the total mass released ( TNO, "Report of the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters" published by General Directorate of Work of the Ministry of Social Affairs, 1979). Once determined the mass into the explosive zone, the hazard circumference shall be to evaluate, that is the distance where the consequences of a possible explosion are detected. The hazard circumference is from the following relation /Ref. 4/: (2) where: R K R = K (0.1 E ) 1/3 is the radius of the circumference limiting the hazard zone is a coefficient with value: - 0.03 if the hazard circumference is considered for the plants equipment; - 0.06 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fittings into the Plant; - 0.15 if the hazard circumference is considered for the fitting out of the Plant. is the energy content of the explosive part of the cloud whose value is 5 107 Q (in Joule) is the mass in kg of the flammable gas into the cloud
E Q
Annex 11
Hydrogen sulphide dispersion - Computational method
The maximum allowed concentration outside the plant is 10 ppm (LOC) /Ref. 5/. The reference gas leakage is 0,1 kg/s with 6% of hydrogen sulphide, which correspond to a hydrogen sulphide flowrate of 0,00866 m 3/s. The correlation between the hydrogen sulphide flowrate flowing from the leaks and the distance where is 10 ppm is the following:
(1)
log W = 1.899 log X - 0.76
where: W is the hydrogen sulphide flowrate (m 3/s) X is the distance from the leakage (km) (supposing the roughness coefficient as the typical value of a land defined as country). Into the enclosures for emergency management a 100 ppm concentration is allowed (IDLH) /Ref. 6/; the distance is determined according to the following: (2) log W = 1.8695 log X' - 5.398
where: W is the hydrogen sulphide flowrate (m 3/s) X is the distance from the leakage (km) The areas outside the plant and enclosures for emergency management are at 100 m e 30 m as a minimum distance from the leak., respectively.

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COMPANY SPECIFICATION

DESIGN LAYOUT AND SAFETY SPACING

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 2

Total sheets 71 May 1996 Emission

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20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 4

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 5

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 6

Industrial Risk Insurers (IRI)

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 7

Ministero Interno Circolare del 9.7.1954 n.21137/4105

Criteri di sicurezza per l'installazione e . l'esercizio di centrali di compressione di gas metano"

Ministero Interno Circolare del 22.12.1962, n. 132 D.P.R. 19.3.1956, n. 303

Serbatoi di grande capacit (integrazione del DM 31.7.1934)

D.M. 31.3.1984 e D.M. 20.7.1993 D.P.R. 24.5.1988, n 203

D.L. 15.8.1991, n. 277

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 8

D.Lgs 19.9.1994, n. 626

DPGR n.7 Regione Sicilia

/Ref. 2/: /Ref. 3/: /Ref. 4/:

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- Outdoor area where is not provided (i.e. motorways and railways)

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 19

Radiation values in an emergency and in presence of risk analysis

3 - Equipped - Occasional presence in open area - Escape ways shielded

Condition of people out of the installation fence

- Outdoor area with temporary presence of people (i.e. cultivated lands)

- Outdoor area where is not provided (i.e. motorways and railways)

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2.4.2 2.4.2.1 2.4.2.1.1

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Annex 9 Unconfined Computational method Annex 10 Annex 11

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Plant general layout

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Better location - Process and utilities units

20243.VON.SAF.SDS Rev.0 May 1996 Sheet 37

Plant Better location:

Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind)

UNIT 190 Plant Better location:

Position as to other Units: ( = prevailing wind)

Better location for loading bays