Genetics, Robotics, Law Punishment

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JusQuid s ezione s cientif ica
Comitato scientifico
Paolo Benciolini, Lorenza Carlassare, Marcello M. Fracanzani, Manuela Mantovani, Francesco
Moschetti, Elisabetta Palermo Fabris, Paolo Patrono, Silvio Riondato, Rino Rumiati, Daniele
Rodriguez, John A. E. Vervaele, Paolo Zatti
Direttore responsabile
Silvio Riondato
t E. Pavanello, La responsabilità penale delle persone giuridiche di diritto pubblico, 2012

(e-book).
t S. Riondato (a cura di), Dallo Stato Costituzionale Democratico di Diritto allo Stato di
Polizia? Attualità del "Problema penale". Nel trentesimo dall'Ultima Lezione di Giuseppe
Bettiol, 2012.
t L. Pasculli, Le misure di prevenzione del terrorismo e dei traffici criminosi internazionali,
2012.
t S. Riondato, R. Alagna (a cura di), Diritto penale della Repubblica di Turchia. Criminal
Law of the Republic of Turkey, 2012.
t R. Borsari, Reati contro la Pubblica Amministrazione e discrezionalità amministrativa. Dai
casi in materia di pubblici appalti, 2012.
t C. Sarra, D. Velo Dalbrenta (a cura di), Res iudicata. Figure della positività giuridica
nell’esperienza contemporanea, 2013.
t R. Alagna, S. Riondato (a cura di), Studi sulla riforma penale post-socialista. Studies on
the Criminal Law Reform in the Post-Soviet Countries, 2013.
t R. Borsari (a cura di), Profili critici del diritto penale tributario, 2013.
t R. Borsari, Diritto penale, creatività e co-disciplinarità. Banchi di prova dell’esperienza
giudiziale, 2013.
t S. Riondato, Cornici di «famiglia» nel diritto penale italiano, 2014.
t I.G. Antonini, La duplice natura della società pubblica: tra garanzia della concorrenza e
alternativa all’appalto, 2014.
t D. Provolo, S. Riondato, F. Yenisey (eds.), Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment, 2014.
The publication of this volume has been funded by the University of Padua, within the
Young Scholars Project (Progetto Giovani Studiosi) on “The impact of genetics on criminal
law: the protection of genetic identity and genetic privacy” hosted by the Department of
Public, International and Community Law of the same University
Prima edizione 2014, Padova University Press
Titolo originale Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment
© 2014 Padova University Press

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GENETICS, ROBOTICS, LAW, PUNISHMENT
edited by
Debora Provolo - Silvio Riondato - Feridun Yenisey

To the beloved memory of

Joachim Reinhardt Vogel
Table of Contents
Debora Provolo
Presentation of the research p. 13
PART I
HUMAN GENETICS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES BETWEEN
LAW AND SCIENCE
Carlos María Romeo Casabona

Genetics and biotechnology: an overview of criminal law in a global legal p. 17
perspective
Mario Zatti
Are we truly free? p. 43
Siamo veramente liberi? p. 69
Carlo Casonato, Marta Tomasi

Genetics and constitutional rights: perspectives and criticalities p. 93
Genetica e diritti costituzionali: prospettive e profili problematici p. 111
Emrah Nikerel
Small DNA, big wonder: an overview of DNA sequencing technologies p. 127
Gülay Bulut
Law and genetics p. 137
Stefano Canestrari
“Bio-penal law” and issues of beginning of human life p. 145
“Biodiritto penale” e questioni di inizio vita p. 159
Adelmo Manna
The prohibition of medically assisted fertilization of heterologous character and
the so-called criminal paternalism p. 171
Lorenzo Pasculli
Genetics, robotics and crime prevention p. 187
Debora Provolo
Protection of personal data and penal instruments to contrast the new forms of
genetic discrimination p. 205
Protezione dei dati personali e strumenti penalistici di contrasto alle nuove forme di
discriminazione su base genetica p. 229
Feridun Yenisey
Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal law and criminal procedure p. 253
Natalya Krylova, Gleb Bogush

Genetics: general overview of Russian criminal law p. 261
Zsolt Szomora
The protection of human genome by means of criminal law in Hungary and
related issues on the punishability of incest p. 269
Leonardo Mazza
The new frontiers of criminal law p. 277
Le nuove frontiere del diritto penale p. 281
PART II
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS, NEUROSCIENCES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Andrea Manfrinati, Rino Rumiati

Morality and immorality: a neuroscientific perspective p. 287
Giuseppe Sartori, Cristina Scarpazza, Pietro Pietrini

The neuroscience of acquired pedophilia: neuroimaging and forensic consideration p. 293
Francesca Zanuso
In search of Mister Hyde. A few reflections on forensic genetics and the penal
rationalism p. 313
Alla ricerca di Mister Hyde. Alcune considerazioni sulla genetica forense e sul
razionalismo penale p. 325
Roberto E. Kostoris
Genetics, neurosciences and criminal trial: short sparse considerations p. 337
Genetica, neuroscienze e processo penale: brevi considerazioni sparse p. 343
Riccardo Borsari
Neurosciences, genetics and criminal law. Rhapsodic reflections p. 347
Neuroscienze, genetica e diritto penale. Considerazioni rapsodiche p. 359
Deborah W. Denno
Genetics: overview of United States criminal law p. 369
Óscar Morales García

Genetics. Applications within the Spanish law and criminal proceedings p. 411
PART III
HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, ROBOTICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Francesco Salerno
International protection and limits to the right to self-determination for the bio-
technological strengthening of one’s own person p. 437
Tutela internazionale e limiti del diritto all’autodeterminazione per il potenziamento
bio-tecnologico della propria persona p. 459
Maria Beatrice Magro

Biorobotics, robotics and criminal law p. 477
Biorobotica, robotica e diritto penale p. 499
Paolo Moro
Biorobotics and fundamental rights. Issues and limits of artificial intelligence p. 517
Biorobotica e diritti fondamentali. Problemi e limiti dell’intelligenza artificiale p. 533
Amedeo Santosuosso
If the agent is not necessarily a human being. Some legal thoughts p. 545
Eric Hilgendorf
Modern technology and legal compliance p. 563
Ugur Tumerdem
Telerobotic surgery: a look back at the dawn of a new era p. 577
Silvio Riondato
Robotics and criminal law (robots, hybrids, chimeras and “technological animals”) p. 589
Robotica e diritto penale (robots, ibridi, chimere e “animali tecnologici”) p. 599
Presentation of the research
Debora Provolo
The research Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment springs from the Young Scholars
Project (Progetto Giovani Studiosi) entitled “The impact of genetics on criminal law: the
protection of genetic identity and genetic privacy” which I got funded by the University
of Padua.
The contributions collected here are the outcome of a fertile path of common
reflection that involved, with an inter-disciplinary and comparative approach,
authoritative scholars of different scientific extraction, to whom goes the most
vivid appreciation. Fundamental moments of this research, rich of precious stimuli,
have been two international conferences, “Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment”,
from September, 30th to October, 1st 2013 (University of Padua, both branches
of Padua and Treviso), which I organised and co-directed together with professor
Silvio Riondato, and “Genetics, Robotics and Criminal Law”, on April, 18th 2014
(Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Istanbul), organised and directed by professor Feridun
Yenisey, the proceedings and contributions of which are also collected in this volume.
Special thanks to Lorenzo Pasculli for the masterly work of translation.
The Authors dedicate the research published here to the memory of the dear
friend and colleague Joachim Reinhardt Vogel, professor of criminal law at the
Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich, who, on August, 17th 2013 in Venice,
has been taken away from the love of his dear ones and from the friendship and
respect of us all.
The papers offer an overview on several and complex aspects of “impact” that
genetics and robotics have on law, and on criminal law, in particular. It is therefore
an apparatus that aims at inter-disciplinarity both within the legal field and out of it.
Indeed, the subject lends itself to be dealt with from different perspectives, capable
of reciprocal interaction, especially from that of biology and medical science, that of
the various technologies, that of philosophy, that of law.
From a strictly legal point of view, the suggestions are many. The problems
related to genetics and robotics interest, to keep within the main fields, international
and European law, constitutional law, private law, criminal law, civil and criminal
procedure, administrative law.
14 Presentation of research
Genetics and robotics are characterised by strong developmental dynamics,

in which reaching extraordinary achievements goes together with the constant
proceeding towards ever more advanced results. These two sectors are unavoidably
destined to fuel both ethical-philosophical reflection and the debate on the legal
implications of the most recent scientific achievements. The hopes with which the
many, potential and effective, benefits connected to the “genetic revolution” and to
the new technologies of biorobotics are welcomed are accompanied by the strong
worries for the prejudicial effects for the fundamental rights of the human being and
the future generations.
A thorough reflection on the role of law in the regulation of science and on the
adequacy of the “traditional” legal instruments (and especially of criminal law) is
demanded in order to face the new forms of aggressions to the rights of the person,
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to protect “new” fundamental rights
emerging as a consequence of scientific and technological developments, or to catch
new modalities of harm, and also to assess the validity of classic penal institutes.
For instance, we need to discuss the influence of the most recent achievements of
neurosciences on imputability. Thus, a “vital organ” of criminal law is interested:
culpability.
However, it is an impervious ground, not only for the underlying bioethical
implications, but also because of the possibility of intervening on the individual
genetic inheritance – by manipulating it, by altering it, even by performing man-
machine hybridisations –, as well as the possibility of “reading” its characters – by
establishing the presence of genetic variations responsible of present pathologies or of
pathologies which might appear in the future, or of a predisposition of the individual
to engage in certain behaviours – forces lawyers to confront the complexity and the
uncertainties of biomedicine and of the most modern technologies.
The above-sketched multiform framework is reflected in the variety of the writings
collected here. These range from medically assisted procreation to behavioural
genetics and neurosciences, to forensic genetics, to the penal protection of genetic
data also in the light of new computer technologies, to artificial intelligence, to the
biotechnological strengthening of the person, to discrimination based on genetics.
The asset offered by the plentiful contributions of many illustrious scholars
coming from different Countries is precious. Some of them dedicated most of their
studies precisely to the subjects of this research. This provides us with interesting cues
for reflection in a comparative perspective. Given the interdisciplinary vocation of
this meeting, authoritative scholars of extra-legal fields explain the strictly scientific
aspects of the relevant topics. Thus, all this turns into a profitable occasion to
stimulate the critical reflection on a central theme for contemporary criminal law.
Part I
Human genetics and new technologies between law and science
Genetics and biotechnology: an overview of criminal law in a global legal perspective1
Carlos María Romeo Casabona
Table of contents: 1. Criminal policy in relation to genetics and biotechnology. – 1.1.

Preventive Criminal Law or merely symbolic Criminal Law on genetics and biotechnology.
– 1.2. Is the punishment of future-oriented crimes a symptom of a merely symbolic
Criminal Law? – 1.3. Criminal Law on biotechnology, going beyond its symbolic value.
– 1.4. Reasonably satisfying the preventive role of Criminal Law in relation to human
biotechnology. – 2. Relaxing the principle of maximum certainty in defining offences. The
influence of International Law on the configuration of “biotechnological” crimes. – 2.1.
The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning. – 2.2. The legal regulatory framework
established by the Council of Europe on the in vitro embryo. – 3. Adapting the description
of criminal action techniques and penal sanctions as a preventive way or mechanism for a
merely symbolic Criminal Law. – 3.1. The identification or configuration of legal goods
that are worthy of protection by Criminal Law. – 3.2. Delimitation of the material object of
the offence. 3.3. Selection of actions or omissions deserving punishment. – 3.4. Selecting
the offence’s technical structure. – 3.5. The specific description of the criminal action or
omission. – 3.6. Unlawfulness. – 3.7. Fixing legal penalties: proportionality and suitability. –
3.8. Special Criminal Law versus common penal code.
1. Criminal policy in relation to genetics and biotechnology2

1.1. Preventive Criminal Law or merely symbolic Criminal Law on genetics and
biotechnology
The convenience and even the efficacy of Criminal Law as a resource to fight
1
The departure point of this work is another which was first published at the “Revue Internationale de
Droit Pénal”, nr. 82, 2011, p. 83 ff.
2
Abbreviations: AIDP: International Association of Criminal Law. AP: “Actualidad Penal”. CHRB:
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. ECHR: European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights. PC,
PCs; Penal Code, Penal Codes. NFP: “Nuevo Foro Penal” journal. RIDP: “Revue Internationale de
Droit Pénal”. LawHuGenRev “Law and the Human Genome Review/Revista de Derecho y Genoma
Humano”. ZRP: Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik.
18 Genetics and biotechnology
against socially undesirable conduct that may arise from biotechnology has been put
into question. This discussion needs to be viewed from within another wider debate
as to whether Criminal Law is a legitimate means of intervening against the new
dangers and risks linked to more complex activities within society3. These include
economic and financial activities controlled by secret criminal organisations that make
it impossible to identify the individuals responsible; industrial and biotechnological
activities, with their supposedly unpredictable risks to human health and life and
the environment; the growth of new information and communication technologies
related crimes, etc.
The perception exists that it is difficult to outline concrete or comprehensible
legal goods or values (“legal goods”) in relation to many of these activities. Instead,
the profile of these goods or values is more vague or imprecise, especially if they are
of a collective nature (“fuzzy legal goods”). It is further perceived that the intention
is only to prevent acts involving mere or undetermined risk and not injury to legal
goods, thereby distancing Criminal Law from the harm principle, that is, Criminal
Law should be reserved for actions and omissions that produce or are capable of
producing damage to legal goods. There is also a belief that in this way Criminal Law
has merely become a punitive means of managing general risks and, thus, would
function in this arena as more of a form of “Administrative Law”4, since these duties
are actually such that belong to a true Administrative Law. All of this has led to the
rejection of Criminal Law as a suitable instrument for preventing the new risks that
post-modern societies face. It is argued that if Criminal Law proceeds in this manner,
it will lose its preventive effect and the confidence of society in its role. It will become
relegated to a mere symbolic task and with this, relinquish its authenticity5.
Within discussions on decriminalisation, there is an insistence by a number of
authors that the paths that need to be taken within the abovementioned sectors
(and consequently within human genetics and biotechnology) are very different.
They include social, formal and informal controls of a very diverse nature with legal
3
Criminal Law has been condemned as inoperable in relation to the new manifestations of crime. It
has been suggested that Criminal Law should be maintained as a “nucleus”, with proposals for a “third
approach” which would guarantee fewer civil rights and have less serious legal consequences. This is
known as the “Frankfurt School”. See, W. Hassemer, Kennzeichen und Krisen des modernes Strafrechts,
in “ZRP”, 1992, p. 378 ff; also, Perspektiven einer neuen Kriminalpolitik, in “Strafen in Rechtsstaat”,
Baden-Baden, 2000, p. 271; F. Herzog, Gesellschaftliche Unsicherheit und strafrechtliche Daseinvorsorge,
Heidelberg, 1991; C. Prittwitz, Strafrecht und Risiko. Untersuchungen zur Krise von Strafrecht und
Kriminalpolitik in der Risikogesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1993; also some chapters from the book
published by the Institute for Criminal Sciences of Frankfurt, La insostenible situación del Derecho
Penal, Granada, Ed. Comares, 2000.
4
J.M. Silva Sánchez, La expansión del Derecho penal. Aspectos de la política criminal en las sociedades
postindustriales, 2nd ed., Madrid, Civitas, 2001, p. 123.
5
In relation to current debate, see in detail L. Arroyo Zapatero, U. Neumann, A. Nieto Martín
(Coords.), Crítica y justificación del Derecho Penal en el cambio de siglo, Ediciones de la Universidad
Castilla-La Mancha, Cuenca, 2003.
C. M. Romeo Casabona 19
recourse fundamentally linked to Administrative Law. In taking this approach, only a

little room would remain, for the most resistant aspects of Criminal Law, or perhaps
no room for Criminal Law at all.
The convenience and even the efficacy of Criminal Law as a resource to fight
against socially undesirable conducts that may arise from genetics and biotechnology
has been put into question. This discussion needs to be viewed from within another
wider debate as to whether postmodern Criminal Law is a legitimate means of
intervening against the new dangers and risks linked to more complex activities
within society.
The following sections will discuss whether there might be a way that the points
mentioned above could be incorporated into Criminal Law in order to prevent
certain activities linked specifically to genetics and biotechnology. From there, I will
discuss protective legal instruments and the legal recourse offered, or that should be
offered, by the legal system. At the same time, I will summarise newly constituted
legal goods in relation to human genetic engineering and biotechnology, giving
several examples taken from Comparative and International Law.
1.2. Is the punishment of future-oriented crimes a symptom of a merely symbolic

Criminal Law?
Evaluating the suitability of Criminal Law (those worthy and in need of
punishment) as a method of intervening in the sphere of human genetics and
biotechnology and, above all, whether it can effectively take a preventive role, is
not limited to the difficulties that this sphere shares with other activities within the
post-industrial era. An example of these difficulties is identifying the legal goods that
could be affected as precisely as possible. Neither does the problem solely revolve
around producing a practicable description of the punishable conduct that would
need to be incorporated into the corresponding criminal offence and the suitability
of traditional fault attribution procedures, for use in these new spheres. In the context
of biotechnology, there is a further specific problem, which is not irrelevant to other
fields, as I will explain in the following considerations.
Numerous ways of genetic manipulation (genetic engineering) described in
scientific literature are considered possible from a hypothetical perspective. However,
they are still not technically feasible, which raises the question as to whether this
preventive role of Criminal, Law should extend to include the manifestation of these
crimes. This peculiarity could form the basis of a possible objection to the intervention
of Criminal Law in this sphere: creating “future-oriented criminal offences” (i. e.,
reproductive human cloning). It would be inappropriate to anticipate the seriousness
of these offences since this would involve creating criminal acts which, at the time
of promulgating the law, technically cannot be committed. How can preventing
the undertaking of an activity that cannot be undertaken per se, raise objection? Is
this not the clearest example of the inefficacy of Criminal Law, where it provides
a substitute response to a problem that could perhaps arise in the future (e.g. to
reassure society in the face of frightening biotechnological scenarios)?
In view of the above, the controversial question, therefore, is whether Criminal
Law will not be reduced to merely fulfilling a symbolic role rather a preventive one6.
Furthermore, whether in this way, it will become ineffective and result in loss of
confidence among citizens regarding its protective role and leading to its loss of
legitimacy. It has been pointed out that if «symbolic legislation, with its stigmatisation
of the corresponding action, and the relevance of the good that is in question, also
constitutes an especially clear manifestation of a Criminal Law with an ‘educative’ or
‘social-ethical’ connotation... the provisions having exclusively symbolic roles can be
considered illegitimate, and should be eradicated from the legal system», since this
symbolic element lacks the preventive function needed to make it legitimate7.
A further matter of criticism has been the recourse to criminal punishments for
these acts assuming its inefficacy in the foreseeable scenario (included here as an
argument) that if these acts are committed, generally speaking they are not going to
be discovered. As a consequence, they cannot be legally pursued, since the potential
perpetrators belong to the scientific community and the crimes are likely to remain
hidden within the secretiveness of their laboratories.
1.3. Criminal Law on biotechnology, going beyond its symbolic value

In the first place, it must be accepted that Criminal Law always involves symbolic
content and scope, through its expression of the social rejection and disapproval
of the forms of conduct included in the law that crimes entail. Furthermore, the
educational and social-ethical role of Criminal Law mentioned above that forms
part of its symbolic effect does not seem to me objectionable8. On the contrary, this
is an effect that exudes from criminal legislation itself, as part of its evaluative facet
(positive, in relation to legal goods that are being protected, negative in relation to
6
Cf. J.L. Díez Ripollés, El derecho penal simbólico y los efectos de la pena, in “AP”, 2001, p.16 ff, who
condemns this characteristic in relation to cloning crimes; J. García González, Límites penales a los
últimos avances de la ingeniería genética aplicada al ser humano, Edersa, Madrid, 2001, p. 228 ff, where a
certain amount of scepticism is shown regarding the suitability of the criminal approach; D.M. Luzón
Peña, Función simbólica del Derecho Penal y delitos relativos a la manipulación genética, in C.M. Romeo
Casabona (Ed.), Genética y Derecho Penal. Previsiones en el Código Penal español de 1995, Cátedra
Interuniversitaria Fundación BBVA – Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho y Genoma Humano,
Universidad de Deusto y Universidad del País Vasco – Ed. Comares, Bilbao – Granada, 2001, p. 49 ff
(he considers that this effect is unavoidable in these crimes).
7
In relation to this, J.M. Silva Sánchez, Aproximación al Derecho Penal contemporáneo, Barcelona,
J.M. Bosch, 1992, p. 306.
8
Remember the objections given above in this regard that were raised by J.M. Silva Sánchez,
Aproximación al Derecho Penal contemporáneo, p. 306.
acts that may threaten these goods because they have been labelled as criminal). It
does not lose or abandon its primary preventive aim as a result of this, since it is still
a procedure or mechanism for promoting actions that respect legal goods. For that
reason, it is not distanced from the role of Criminal Law, which is still essentially
understood to be the protection of legal goods9.
Certainly this should not be the sole or principal role of Criminal Law, so that
lawmaker feels it has accomplished its task by simply configuring and introducing in
PC new crimes, in spite of being conscious of the inoperable and ineffective aspects
of the Criminal Law. Their main task is to anticipate the most serious attacks on legal
goods that have important social value, even if they appear to have been relegated
to secondary importance. This is the case with crimes involving an “abstract danger”
-or dangerous action related crimes-, where the protection of the goods is the reason
of the law (ratio legis), but where for the act to constitute a criminal offence, there
is no requirement for the injury or endangerment of such goods10. As Hassemer
has correctly pointed out, the real question is not whether Criminal Law should or
should not have symbolic effects, but up to what point these effects are acceptable11.
«‘Symbolic’ in a critical sense is therefore a Criminal Law where latent functions
predominate to those that are manifest. It may be expected that through this norm
and its application, objectives other than those provided for therein also may be
achieved»12. In other words, we will only find ourselves facing symbolic effects
that ought to be rejected, when other effects that the legislator has not consciously
confessed to, or advised of, other than preventive effects for the protection of legal
goods from certain attacks, are dominant in the intervention of Criminal Law.
Consequently, the question is whether in the biotechnological sphere it is possible
to construct new criminal offences through which Criminal Law can reasonably
satisfy its preventive role, without other “symbolic” aspects or interests becoming
predominantly overriding or controlling. Of course, it is essential to differentiate
two plains in order to obtain acceptable answers to the above question. Firstly, by
studying proposals for legislative reform (de lege ferenda perspective) in view of
criminal policy that has been previously adopted in relation to biotechnology, the
question of whether it is really possible to achieve the manifest function of protecting
legal goods should be resolved. This would entail identifying these legal goods and
the conduct that is apt to injure them. Secondly, the conclusions drawn from these
studies should be compared with the real legislative representations of these crimes
9
J. Cerezo Mir, Curso de Derecho Penal Español, Parte General, I, Tecnos, Madrid, 5th ed., 1996, p.
13 ff (15); C. Roxin, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, I, 3. Aufl., München, C. H. Beck, 1997, p. 19 ff.
10
C. Roxin, Strafrecht, cit., p. 19.
11
In this respect W. Hassemer, Derecho penal simbólico y protección de bienes jurídicos (trad. Larrauri),
in “NFP”, No. 51, 1991, p. 17 ff (p. 23 and 24).
12
W. Hassemer, Derecho penal simbólico y protección de bienes jurídicos, cit., p. 24.
offered by comparative Law. This would allow us to check whether any scepticism
existing in relation to the efficacy of Criminal Law in biotechnology is actually
due to the defective approach of the lawmaker (de lege lata perspective). To these
ends, important aspects for achieving a correct legal description of offences are also
presented below. My own proposals relating to guidelines on the intervention of
Criminal Law and the design of legal goods will be dealt with in later sections.
1.4. Reasonably satisfying the preventive role of Criminal Law in relation to human
biotechnology
In principle and without creating any motive for objection, it can be assumed
that the symbolic facet of Criminal Law increases considerably with the introduction
of crimes such as some of those related to human biotechnology. Also, it may be said
that the novelty of this to Criminal Law lies precisely in that these crimes relate to
acts that in some cases are still not feasible, but which the legislator has identified
as being especially serious in the future. In this respect, Mantovani correctly states
that the jurist needs not only to rationalise the present, but also to programme the
future. This is because the accelerated progression of biomedicine always tends to
transform “hypothetic future scenarios” into the “future” and the “future” into the
“present”13. If this diagnosis is true in relation to human Biomedicine, Genetics and
Biotechnology, it would justify deliberating recourse to legal instruments, including
criminal instruments. Here, the problem lies in knowing how to anticipate which
of those scientific events considered to be feasible are going to evolve into present
reality in the short-middle term, and therefore, from which the state of scientific
advancement of Criminal Law should begin its intervention.
Criminal Law will not be limited to having symbolic effects on biotechnology
once actions considered to be especially serious and dangerous to key legal goods are
criminalised, since it does not lack relatively and reasonably important preventive
significance14. Furthermore, if the potential for these acts to become practicable
in the future is reasonably high this must constitute an inalienable minimum for
punitive intervention to become legitimate15. Therefore, in essence the possibility
and validity of creating “future-oriented crimes” cannot be discarded. This statement
13
F. Mantovani, Manipolazioni Genetiche, in Digesto, vol. VII, Penale, 40 ed., Torino, UTET, 1993,
p. 6.
14
D.M. Luzón Peña, Función simbólica del derecho penal y delitos relativos a la manipulación genética,
2001, p. 49 ff.
15
In this respect, S. Romeo Malanda, Intervenciones genéticas sobre el ser humano y Derecho penal,
Cátedra Interuniversitaria Fundación BBVA – Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho y Genoma
Humano, Universidad de Deusto y Universidad del País Vasco – Ed. Comares, Bilbao – Granada,
2006, p. 221 ff., for whom the intervention of Criminal Law in biotechnology (in certain cases, since
he also assumes the principles of subsidiarity and of minimum criminalisation) is necessary in order for
it to become modernised.
is compatible with the observation that due to the nature of these techniques, a
more modest or limited role corresponds to Criminal Law in this sector16. This is
especially true in comparison with the roles of preventive control that correspond to
other social agents, in particular through Administrative Law, without forgetting the
multidimensional use to which the precautionary principle may be put17.
In relation to this, it should be remembered that the International Association of
Penal Law (IAPL) came to its conclusion on the convenience of introducing crimes
in relation to reproductive genetic manipulation and cloning at its Vienna Congress
in 198818. This occurred at a time when not even the scientific community believed
that the technique, which several years later led to the birth of Dolly, a cloned sheep
(transferring the nucleus of a somatic cell to a previously enucleated ovule), could be
applied to mammals. Regarding other more traditional crimes that are never or very
rarely committed (as is the case for instance with crimes against the exterior security
of the State, which could hypothetically be committed), there is no doubt as to the
important preventive role played by Criminal Law.
My earlier comment about some lawyers who argued on the relative impunity
of the authors of these crimes due to the competent authorities’ inability to detect
and pursue them, betrays a lack of knowledge as to how scientists from this sector
behave. These scientific researchers are under pressure to reveal their achievements
to the public in order to avoid other scientists doing so before them. Their results
could decide whether they achieve notoriety, recognition, prestige and the possibility
of obtaining support and funding in order to be able to continue with their research.
Although it is possible that the earlier stages of research projects remain unknown
(e.g. manipulating at the laboratory gametes or even human embryos obtained in
vitro), it is unlikely that the results will be forever, or perhaps even for very long,
buried in obscurity. This is because the results provide the most undeniable proof of
the scientific “success” that has been achieved.
In conclusion, there is a warning issued here by Criminal Law that from this
moment forward research, or more accurately put, certain biotechnological
applications that are the fruit of research, are prohibited from continuing in a specific
direction or having certain aims. If this warning is not heeded, it will signify a need
for the general criminalisation of research in this sector. Here, Criminal Law finds its
appropriate framework - or legitimacy to be more exact - within the legal system as a
whole and in particular, among non-criminal regulatory dispositions that specifically
16
C. Roxin, Strafrecht, “AT”, I, cit., p. 22.
17
See C.M. Romeo Casabona, Aportaciones del principio de precaución al Derecho Penal, in Modernas
tendencias en la Ciencia del Derecho Penal y en la Criminología, Universidad Nacional de Educación
a Distancia, Madrid, 2001, p. 77 and ff.; C.M. Romeo Casabona (Ed.), El principio de precaución,
Cátedra Interuniversitaria Fundación BBVA – Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho y Genoma
Humano y Editorial Comares, Bilbao –Granada, 2004.
18
See AIDP, Droit Pénal et techniques biomédicales modernes, in “RIDP”, 1988, p. 1327 ff.
regulate research19. This intimidating prospect is compatible with the objectives of

general positive prevention. It generates confidence within the population regarding
the consequences that will be faced by particular lines of research that have certain
implications for human beings, and those involving experimentation on humans or
future human beings through their creation in vitro.
Human reproductive cloning is, or at least appears to be, a clear example of effective
prevention. Criminal prohibition and general institutional and social rejection of
this technique have meant that anyone stating that they are in a technical position
to undertake cloning of human beings, or even claiming that they have already
successfully used these techniques, hide the actual crimes that they are attempting to
carry out or claiming to have committed. Furthermore, they always state that their
activities are being undertaken in a territory where they are immune to any kind
of prosecution (for the time being and in view of the major technical difficulties
involved in human cloning, those proclaiming themselves authors of this infraction
would be more likely committing the crime of fraud, with gullible benefactors or
even clients constituting their victims).
From a global perspective and in view of the crimes introduced by the legislators
of the most exemplary countries, it does not appear that the requirements derived
of the minimum criminalisation have been infringed upon, at least not to any great
extent. In any case, comparative law provides examples that show a reprehensible
lack of rigour by lawmakers. These examples not only reflect a complete lack of
background or scientific knowledge regarding the acts that have become object of
criminal prosecution, but at the same time a lack of basic legislative technique due to
having dispensed with the most elemental rules required by this technique.
On occasion the limit derived from the principle of minimum criminalisation
has been patently exceeded: in Germany20, Italy21 and France22, where criminal
infractions related to these matters and serious penalties have been introduced into
their laws23. The enormous comprehensive scope bound by the defective transcription
of some criminal offences is not still included in this evaluation. For instance, with
19
This is the case in Spanish Law, art. 20 of the Constitution, and Laws 14/2006 of 26 May, on Assisted
Reproduction Techniques, and 14/2007 of 3 July, on Biomedical Research.
20
Embryonenschutzgesetz, 13 December, 1990.
21
Legge 19 febbraio 2004 n. 40, Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita.
22
Law 2004-800, of 6 August, 2004. This Law has been modified by Law n. 2011-814, 7 July 2011,
relative à la Bioéthique. The focus on this has been changed: from a temporary exception to the
prohibition to research with embryos in vitro to a permission to do it when some legal requirements are
met (see art 41 of the Code de la santé publique).
23
In Brazil the situation has undergone a remarkable change with the abolition of the Law of 1995, and
the promulgation of the Law of 2005. It now exists uncertainty as to whether they have exceeded the
principle of minimum criminalisation regarding the punishments envisaged: Lei núm. 11.105, de 24 de
março de 2005, que establece normas de segurança e mecanismos de fiscalizaçao de atividades que envolvam
organismos geneticamente modificados e seus derivados, art. 26.
crimes relating to genetic manipulation in the strict sense of the Spanish PC, or
reproductive cloning in the Peruvian PC, which I will deal with later. On the other
hand, the same criminal policy objectives that have presumably led lawmakers from
many countries to introduce these crimes, must have driven them to incorporate as
crimes some acts that are still considered to be administrative infractions or which
materially are not unlawful. This issue will also be discussed in the following section.
2. Relaxing the principle of maximum certainty in defining offences. The influence of

International Law on the configuration of “biotechnological” crimes
If we have now arrived at the conclusion that preventive Criminal Law is
compatible with the punishment of some acts related to genetic interventions
involving human beings, which are going to be difficult to repress and which could
even result in criminalising acts that are still not feasible but which will probably
become so in the future. The definitive answer for or against the existence of these
crimes will depend on the evaluation of how the legislator expresses them in legal
texts. With this observation, I wish to briefly consider legislative criminalisation
techniques. This matter remains scarcely observed by the legislator24.
Focusing on this objective, it is interesting first to mention the pernicious influence
that can, on occasion, be wielded by International Law. I refer in particular to the
influence of legal instruments that promulgate or impose the prohibition of some
acts linked to biotechnology, but which fail to rigorously observe the need to provide
concrete specification of the prohibited acts. This is known in Criminal Law as the
principle of maximum certainty, as a part of the rule of law principle. However, it
is important to remember that, given the strict validity of the rule of law principle
in criminal matters (principle of legality), it is the exclusive responsibility of the
legislator (the legislator of the States) to correctly define offences for crimes that are
to be incorporated into a domestic Criminal Law. Usually this will be based on the
provisions of the international legal instrument, which is used for reference in each
case. It should also be remembered that such an international instrument could have
strictly criminal or a more general content. If the latter is the case, it logically follows
that the description of the acts that are to be prohibited may be more generic and less
precise. Furthermore, it could be binding on the States party to a given instrument
(e.g. a treaty or convention) or simply be indicative (e.g. a declaration). Given the
great productivity of International Law in relation to biomedical sciences and human
biotechnology in particular, I plan to offer two examples to aid comprehension of the
24
This issue is dealt with from different perspectives and involving different interests by J.L. Dièz
Ripollés, La racionalidad de las leyes penales, Madrid, Trotta, 2003; I. Navarro Frías, Mandato de
determinación y tipicidad penal, Granada, Ed. Comares, 2010; F.G. Sànchez Lázaro, Política criminal
y técnica legislativa, Granada, Ed. Comares, 2007.
reflections I have included here.

Since the nineties, International Law has been paying progressively more frequent
and more detailed attention to the varied and novel aspects relating to human rights
and the continual development of biomedical sciences. In this respect, I should
remind the reader once again of the importance of the proposals adopted by the
IAPL in 1988, on possible interventions of Criminal Law in the sphere of human
biomedical sciences and biotechnology.
Up to now, in order to achieve approval of appropriate international legal
instruments, there has been a need to reach an agreement on certain points regarding
the scope of their contents, aspects of the human rights involved that should to be
emphasised and the limits, whether permanent or temporary, to which these rights
should be respected in scientific activities and clinical or other kinds of applications.
As a consequence, in matters relating to human biotechnology, State lawmakers
can take inspiration from the recommendations, restrictions or prohibitions
established in International Law. We have examples of international legal provisions
regulating certain matters within this sector, such as human reproductive and non-
reproductive cloning, and the creation and use of human embryos for purposes other
than human reproduction, which demonstrate the vagueness, ambiguity and on
occasion inaccuracy with which the acts being prohibited are described, or in respect
to which, strict conditions are being imposed (limitations). Even though attention
should be paid on that I am referring to international legal instruments that are not
strictly criminal legal instruments, I must stress the influence that these instruments
could have on State lawmakers. They could contribute to creating a lack of precision
in descriptions of the facts established in crimes relating to these matters, which
would defy the especially rigorous requirement for legal security in criminal matters,
although it is the task of State lawmakers to avoid propagating these defects in any
case.
2.1. The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning

The example of human reproductive cloning is one, practically the only one,
where all of the parties involved, in particular the scientific community, agreed that it
should be rejected. Notwithstanding this unusual unanimity, which some considered
suspect, international institutions have also endorsed this rejection. Examples include
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
of 1997 (art. 11) and the Additional Protocol of the Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe concerning cloning in 1998, discussed
later. Within the supranational scope of the European Constitution (EU), the total
prohibition of human reproductive cloning has likewise been envisaged. Furthermore,
numerous States have approved legal provisions with the same objective and on some
occasions they have even considered cloning to be a criminal offence.

It is likely that this favourable climate led the authorities of the United Nations to
rightly take the initiative to approve a Convention aimed to a universal prohibition
of cloning human beings (“reproductive cloning”). However, in the course of its
drafting, delegates of some States argued that the scope of the future Convention
should be amplified to encompass all kinds of human cloning. This would also entail
the prohibition of what is known as “therapeutic cloning”, which refers to cloning
for research purposes not for human reproduction. This created a transition from
attempting to regulate a matter on which there already existed wide consensus,
towards including another topic, which to date remains the subject of intense debate:
scientists, experts in human and social science, lawmakers and public opinion were
and are still greatly divided and take opposing standpoints on this matter.
As a consequence of amplifying the initial objectives, the creation of this United
Nations instrument on human cloning underwent a tortuous process before it was
finally approved as a Declaration by the UN General Assembly, on 8 March, 2005.
The document was effectively approved as a Declaration after having renounced
the status of Convention, and everything that this change of model of legislative
instrument entailed from a legal perspective. The approval was preceded by various
unsuccessful attempts (since when previous attempts were made at introducing any
form of human cloning into the document, great opposition was raised), which led
to having to postpone its approval on several occasions.
The voting distribution when it was submitted to the vote that led to its approval
is pertinent in itself: there were 84 votes in favour of its approval, 34 against and 37
abstentions, as well as the absence of 37 member States delegates. From our point
of view, this voting was a clear reflection of insufficient consensus to move forward
and force approval on a point of such importance. For this reason, it would have
been wise to continue with the negotiation efforts to achieve a consensus. The most
appropriate solution would certainly have been to limit the document to the explicit
prohibition of reproductive human cloning and to have allowed, for the moment,
the states to take internal legal measures in relation to the other forms of cloning, in
accordance with their own criteria.
The terms of prohibition are expressed in the Declaration in the following way:
«b) Member States are called upon to prohibit all forms of human cloning
inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection
of human life;
c) Member States are further called upon to adopt the measures necessary to
prohibit the application of genetic engineering techniques that may be
contrary to human dignity».
If the first criticism of this declaration is that it was unable to achieve the desirable
wide consensus among the states, the second observation is that in spite of a desire
to close every door to any kind of human cloning, the approved text was far from
achieving this goal. Taking an interpretative approach to the legal regulations, it can
be observed that the prohibition of any kind of cloning will only apply “inasmuch”
(“dans la mesure qu’il serait” in French) as it is incompatible with human dignity and
the protection of human life. This means accepting, at least theoretically, that the
hypothetical existence of a scenario where no incompatibility with human dignity
and the protection of human life exists remains open. Remains the nuclear issue on
how to determine what that scenario might be and under what circumstances there
would be no prohibition. In any case, this margin for interpretation reveals the lack
of precision on this point in the wording of the legal text. This is an instance of the
vagueness that we rejected earlier due to the negative influence that it could have on
State lawmakers.
Finally, in relation to the obligations that this Declaration could entail for the
states, it should be remembered that a declaration is not as strictly binding as a treaty
(or convention) and does not generate the same obligations as the latter, as seen
earlier. However, the principles of the Declaration will guide the activities of the
State lawmakers.
In conclusion, the United Nations probably missed its opportunity to achieve the
unanimous approval of a legal instrument that would have increased its prestige and
desirable leadership in the sphere of human rights related to biomedical sciences. On
the contrary, based on the confrontation between certain states to the extent that
some wanted to impose a certain general position on human cloning onto others
(regarding the said position no declaration was envisaged), added to the foreseeable
lack of effect of the approved Declaration, it seems there has been a failure to
augment the credibility and unifying capability that such an important Institution
should possess in this sector.
2.2. The legal regulatory framework established by the Council of Europe on the in
vitro embryo
The Council of Europe has vocalised its position on amplifying protection of the
in vitro embryo on many occasions, notwithstanding the modifications it has made
over time. In any case, the 1997 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(CHRB)25 reflects a substantial turn in relation to the legal treatment of human
life, in particular the in vitro embryo. It is the first time that International Law on
treaties has established an explicit legal framework on this matter, meaning it has
binding force on the States that are party to it. However, as frequently occurs in
International Law, its provisions relating to the in vitro embryo and specifically to
scientific research into it, are perhaps too ambiguous to enable them to be employed
25
Presented for signature in the City of Oviedo (Spain) 4 April, 1997. At present it is in force in nearly
thirty European States, and it is also open for signature by other non-European states.
literally by State lawmakers for criminal matters.

The CHRB26 does not declare whether the embryo enjoys the legal status of
a person or the possession of rights. Neither does it mention whether prenatal
life can be considered to be a human being for the purposes of the Convention,
e.g. when it alludes to this in article 1. It is usually considered that these sorts of
difficult or controversial issues have been left for the States that are party to decide
in their own legislation27. Notwithstanding this interpretative conclusion, which
appears to be correct, it can also be held that, based on the various precepts of the
CHRB that affect the embryo in some way, as well as the Additional Protocol on
the prevention of human cloning28, a set of governing norms and principles can be
deduced which form a legal status of or for the embryo in vitro. The Convention
could not be indifferent to the possibility of using embryos for research with the aim
of advancing knowledge of the biological processes linked to the commencement of
human life, fertility, the human genome itself and, over time, to treat the illnesses
of other individuals (regenerative medicine via the cultivation and development of
embryonic stem cells).
This matter provoked some of the widest controversy during the preparation of
the Convention, which led to some intermediate versions of this precept to simply
opt for its elimination, leaving its regulation (the approval of a specific protocol
on the status of the embryo) for the future. This was an attempt to avoid creating
an insurmountable obstacle that would prevent the definitive adoption of the
Convention. For this motive, a more or less open solution involving a compromise was
chosen, having failed to achieve wide consensus on the subject within the European
sphere. It was one of the matters that evoked the largest number of discrepancies
and probably the main reason why some of the key European States have still not
subscribed to or ratified the Convention (the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom and Russia have not subscribed, and it is still pending ratification
by Italy29, although the respective positions of these countries are based on different
grounds). As regards Spain, with the incorporation of the CHRB to the domestic
legal system30 has established a legal framework on this matter which, in spite of its
26
Cf. in relation to this, see the Convention Explanatory Report, par. nº 18, see specifically the terms
“everyone” and “toute personne”, which the Convention employs in its official languages.
27
This is expressly stated in the Explanatory Report, par. nº 19. However, it also indicates a general
acceptance that human dignity and the identity of the human species should be respected from the
commencement of life.
28
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning
Human Beings, Paris, 12 January, 1998.
29
France has ratified it on 13th December 2011, and Spain on 1st September 1999. Both and Italy
signed the Convention in Oviedo, the 4th April 1997.
30
It went into force in Spain on 1 January, 2000, and the Protocol with regard to the prohibition of
human cloning was also ratified, going into force on March 1st, 2000.
lack of precision, cannot be exceeded by the Spanish legislator31.

The CHRB establishes the following on experimentation with human in vitro
embryos:
1. Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it shall ensure adequate
protection of the embryo.
2. The creation of human embryos for research purposes is prohibited (art. 18).
It is not easy to determine the scope of this important provision. Although it
should not be forgotten that it is the first precept in International Law that
regulates a protection of in vitro embryos, it should also be recognised that
it is difficult to determine what these guarantees for the suitable protection
of embryos might be. The doubt about what might be considered, according
to the Convention, the suitable guarantee framework for an embryo that is
going to be submitted to research or experimentation remains unresolved.
For this reason, there should also be insistence in the international sphere
that an appropriate legal statute on the preimplantation embryo (in vitro or
in utero) is consolidated, putting an end to the present ambiguity and lack of
definition.
At this moment it is necessary to refer to the Additional Protocol of the CHRB
regarding the prohibition of cloning human beings, since it completes the legal
sphere on the protection of the in vitro embryo envisaged in the aforementioned
art. 18:
1. Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to
another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited. 2. For the
purpose of this article, the term human being “genetically identical” to
another human being means a human being sharing with another the same
nuclear gene set (art. 1).
Independent of the scope of this prohibition, specifically as to whether it
encompasses non-reproductive cloning (also known as “therapeutic” cloning), the
main doubt that has arisen from this precept is determining the significance of
“human being”. That is to say, whether “to create a human being genetically identical
to another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited” refers only to a being
that has been born or to one that has been conceived but not born. In reality, this
question goes beyond the Protocol. As I indicated earlier, the CHRB takes a general
perspective, mentioning the human being but without explaining what should be
understood by this term32. This is what was understood by the Netherlands when it
31
For a more detailed discussion of this subject see C.M. Romeo Casabona, The status of the
Extracorporeal Embryo in Spanish Law, in Interdisziplinäres Verbundprojekt der Status des Extrakorporalen
Embryos. International-Interdisziplinäres Expertenkolloquium, Freiburg in Breisgau, 14-16 October,
2004.
32
This is expressly mentioned in the Explanatory Report of the Protocol: «6. (…) it was decided to
ratified this Protocol on cloning: a note of clarification is included in this instrument

explaining that human being is understood by the Kingdom of the Netherlands as
referring to a human being that has been born.
Based on the above reflections, a sufficiently defined, broad view of the basis
of the CHRB’s legal treatment of the in vitro embryo may be inferred. Following
in the footsteps of the CHRB and the ECHR, interpreting the latter upon the
declaration of its jurisdictional decisions, noted the new Convention also alludes to
taking a defined position on the legal situation of prenatal human life, in particular,
the in vitro embryo. Here again, the question as to whether prenatal life is or is
not a person, or what significance should be attached to “human being”, has been
consciously left open. It is left to the States that are party to the Convention to make
their own decisions regarding criminal policy within their respective legal systems.
Consequently, it cannot be held that the CHRB expressly recognises that prenatal
life is considered to be a human being, but neither does it oppose States (being
members of the Convention) that qualify this prenatal life as such, and consequently
protect it by domestic law.
It is less complicated to deduce the position of the CHRB in relation to certain
specific situations that may affect the in vitro embryo. Here, it can be clearly
deduced that the in vitro embryo is protected in relation to these situations. With
the intention of establishing an evaluative scale going from the most restrictive to the
most permissive level33, and using as a reference the highest, lowest or non-existent
grade of acts that can affect the embryo, below is a summarised list of instructions or
principles that can be extracted from the CHRB and its Additional Protocol on the
prohibition of the cloning of human beings34:
1. Any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to
another human being, whether living or dead, is prohibited, that is to say,
creating in vitro embryonic clones for reproductive purposes (art. 1 of the
leave it to domestic law to define the scope of the expression “human being” for the purposes of the
application of the present Protocol».
33
The vast majority of these criteria were proposed in my own previous work. See C.M. Romeo
Casabona, La investigación y la terapia con células madre embrionarias: hacia un marco jurídico europeo,
in “LL”, nº 5467, 2002, pp. 1-6; the same in “Iter Criminis. Revista de Ciencias Penales” (Mexico),
nº 2, 2002, pp. 101-124; Embryonic stem cell research and therapy: the need for a common European
legal framework, in “Bioethics”, 16 (6), 2002, pp. 557-567; La recherche et la thérapie avec des cellules
souches embryonnaires. Quel est le cadre juridique pour l’Europe?, in “RGDM”, nº 9, 2003, pp. 151-166;
Investigação e terapia com células-mãe embrionárias. Qual regulamento jurídico para europa?, in M. de
F. Freire De Sá & B. T. De Oliveira Naves (Coords.), Bioética, Biodireito e o novo Código Civil de
2002, Ed. Del Rey, Belo Horizonte, 2004, pp. 125-154; Informe a la Ministra de Sanidad y Consumo:
La cuestión jurídica de la obtención de células troncales embrionarias humanas con fines de investigación
biomédica. Consideraciones de política legislativa (published in “LawHuGenRev”), nº 24, 2006, p. 75
ff.). Based on the criteria incorporated into this work, an attempt is made to broaden the overall vision
to include other aspects that were then secondary to the main objective being pursued.
34
Note that only activities that could be permitted or prohibited according to the CHRB are described
below, not their technical feasibility or scientific interest.
Protocol on Cloning).
2. The creation of in vitro human embryos for research purposes is prohibited,
whatever technique is used to produce them (art. 18.2).
3. It is necessarily deduced from the Convention, although not expressly
mentioned, that the creation of in vitro human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes is also prohibited, whatever technique is used for their
creation (arts. 2 and 18.2).
4. The creation of in vitro embryos for procreative projects seeking to modify
the genome of any of their corresponding genetic descendants is prohibited
(art. 13).
5. The use of medically assisted procreation techniques in order to choose the
sex of the embryo is not permitted, except when it is undertaken to avoid the
transmission of serious hereditary sex-related disease (art. 14).
6. States party to the Convention are expressly permitted to authorise research
on in vitro embryos, as long as they have not been specifically created for
this purpose and as long as the law guarantees adequate protection of the
embryo (art. 18.1). These are specifically frozen surplus in vitro embryos
from medically assisted reproductive techniques.
7. Any intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be
undertaken for preventive, diagnostic (preimplantation diagnosis) or
therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to introduce any modification
in the genome that would be inherited by any genetic descendants (art. 13).
8. Interventions in embryos in vitro for preventive, diagnostic (preimplantation
diagnosis) or therapeutic reasons may be undertaken (arts. 12 and 13).
9. It is necessarily deduced that, in view of present technical resources for
assisted human reproduction, domestic legislation may envisage the
possibility that surplus embryos are produced as an after effect. That is to
say, it refers to embryos that cannot be destined for their initial purpose of
human reproduction (art. 18.1)35.
10. From the above evaluative conclusion, it can also be deduced that in view of
current technical resources for assisted human reproduction, the legislation
of the States party to the Convention may permit that more embryos than are
needed for a single transfer into a woman may be generated for reproductive
purposes, and that those that are not used during the first attempt may
be cryopreserved for subsequent reproductive requirements (successive
repetitions of attempts to impregnate the woman if previous attempts have
failed) (art. 18.1).
35
From the general evaluation that the CHRB makes of the in vitro embryo, it may also be deduced
that the deliberate creation of embryos is not acceptable when there it is expected that a large number of
them will not be able to be destined for reproduction, that is to say, that they will become superfluous.
11. The creation of human embryos with direct therapeutic purposes for a person
is permitted, since it is not expressly prohibited (arts. 2 and 18.2).
12. Obtaining embryonic clones for direct therapeutic purposes for a person or
for research purposes, such as deriving stem cells, is permitted since it is not
expressly prohibited by the Protocol (arts. 2 and 18.2 of the CHRB and art.
1 of the Protocol which prohibits cloning of human beings).
13. Obtaining stem cells (pluripotent, multipotent and even totipotent cells)
which will be functionally similar, using cellular reprogramming techniques
for research purposes is permitted, since it is not expressly prohibited (art. 2,
18.2 and 1 of the Protocol).
14. The use of supernumerary or surplus human embryos or their cells for
direct therapeutic purposes for people is permitted, since it is not expressly
prohibited (art. 18.1).
15. The creation of human embryos for reproductive purposes using assisted
human reproduction techniques that do not involve cloning is permitted
(art. 18.1 and art. 1 of the Protocol).
3. Adapting the description of criminal action techniques and penal sanctions as a

preventive way or mechanism for a merely symbolic Criminal Law
In spite of the difficulties presented by new crimes in the biotechnologies sector,
the legislator cannot give up proceeding with the utmost scrupulousness. Precisely,
the spectacular impact and alarm raised in public opinion regarding the mere
announcement of some actions regarding biotechnology have in some occasions
caused the legislator to act immediately and precipitately, sometimes without even
knowing or understanding what it must prohibit and sanction, without perceiving or
even asking itself what might be the legal interest, which has to be looked after, and
being content with just appeasing the community (symbolic effect of Criminal Law
in its most strict acceptance).
The effectiveness of preventive measures regarding these crimes, their political-
legal justification and the fact that they may or may not be disregarded due to their
merely symbolic effect will ultimately depend on whether or not legislative technical
premises have been properly managed for description and punishment of these kinds
of offences36. Some reflections and proposals regarding this issue are noted below.
36
Regarding this issue, see C.M. Romeo Casabona, Los genes y sus leyes. El Derecho ante el genoma
humano, Cátedra Interuniversitaria BBVA Fundación BBVA - Diputación Foral de Bizkaia de Derecho
y Genoma Humano, Universidad de Deusto y Universidad del País Vasco – Ed. Comares, Bilbao –
Granada, 2002, p. 227 ff; J. García González, Límites penales a los últimos avances de la ingeniería
genética, cit., p. 189 ff; A. Jorge Barreiro, Los delitos relativos a la manipulación genética en sentido
estricto, en C.M. Romeo Casabona (Ed.), Genética y Derecho Penal. Previsiones en el CP español de
3.1. The identification or configuration of legal goods that are worthy of protection by
Criminal Law
The legal good or goods to be protected, as a criminal-policy response, must
have been clearly identified beforehand. This task is essential because it constitutes
the only method of establishing what is to be protected and the timely definition of
the criminal action must be carried out for this purpose at the time of describing
the conduct that lawmakers want to be prohibited: only when it appears clearly
configured, it is possible to predict what actions may include material content of risk
that may be harmful to a legal good. Specificity or lack of vagueness is necessary for
proper «substantive due process» or legality. It may be sustained without exaggeration,
that the configuration of legal goods, which are sufficiently specific and perfected
such as the embodiment of social values in a determined historic moment, is one of
the primary challenges currently faced by Criminal Law. The success or failure of this
goal will determine, in a large measure, the success or failure of Law as a regulatory
instrument for biotechnology and its protector, if applicable.
At the same time, we must identify the individual or the supra-individual
titleholders of these legal goods.
A consequence of the legal good determination will be the identification of other
crimes that share the protection provided for this legal good or those which are
related. Similarly, in a parallel way, it is necessary to have a systematic classification
of the new crime, which must be grouped with those crimes that share that identity
or proximity of protected legal goods, without prejudice to what will be said later on
regarding the advantage or not of including any or all of these crimes into a special
legislation. Even in the case that it is not possible to find a certain similarity in these
characteristics, the ownership of the legal good may be used as a complementary
criterion for entering it in the legal text.
A defective classification of the crimes, grouped under the same title, even though
different legal goods can be identified, may be found in the Spanish PC of 1995:
next to the genetic integrity (art. 159, on genetic manipulation) we find the security
of the State against the manufacturing of biological weapons by means of genetic
engineering (art. 160), to the procreative freedom regarding the crime of using non
consensual assisted reproduction techniques (art. 162). For example, an example in
the far past was the Schema di Delega Legislativa of 1992 for a new PC in Italy did
not seem sensible either when it hat previewed a Title under the heading “Crimes
against human dignity”, which included genetic manipulation crimes, since apart
from the fact that very heterogeneous crimes were grouped from a different way of
understanding the different affected legal goods. In this way, human dignity as an
1995, cit., p. 63 ff.

autonomous legal good displays or may display an excessive vagueness and amplitude
contrary to the principle of maxium certainty37.
3.2. Delimitation of the material object of the offence

The material object of the action will also be set for the purpose of a better
delimitation of the different modes that the action subject to be punished as a crime
may include.
The material object of the action is not well defined in the crime relative to
genetic manipulation in the Spanish PC38. What human genes are included? That
is, regarding what human genes will the definition of the criminal action fall upon?
Who do these genes belong to?39
The question regarding what should be understood as “embryo” in German Law
regarding the Protection of embryos40, is also of such a nature. The question that
rises is whether this definition can be considered, including the so called therapeutic
cloning, since it does not require sexual reproduction; in other words, the fusion of
male and female gametes in a laboratory and even though, the product of the cloning
is classified by this law as an embryo (paragraph 6).
Also the meaning of embryo in the Italian current Law is broader than from a
scientific approach, but also here the binding concept is determined by the legal
understanding of such different entities, as embryos, clones, hybrids, etc.41.
3.3. Selection of actions or omissions deserving punishment

Likewise, the actions or omissions that have a greater potential for damaging those
legal goods must be selected. In fact, the unawareness that usually accompanies the
facts regarding biotechnologies, may generate confusion regarding the characteristics
and potential of these facts with greater ease. This, in turn, which may result in an
exaggeration of the importance of the harmful effects of some actions, or that the
intrinsic danger of others, is undervalued. Moreover, this causes the real possibility
37
This problem has been partially solved through the Law 2004 n. 40, but it poses other very complex
questions.
38
According to art. 159.1 Spanish PC: «Those that manipulate human genes in a way that alters the
genotype for a purpose other than the elimination of or reduction of defects or serious illnesses will be
punished…»
39
See on these concerns, J.L. La Cuesta Arzamendi, The so called ‘genetic manipulation’ offences in the
new Spanish Criminal Code of 1995, “LawHuGenRev”, No. 5, 1996, p. 60 f.
40
Embryonenschutzgesetz, paragr. 8: «In this Law, embryo is defined as the human fertilised ovum
capable of developing from the moment of the nuclear fusion so the multipotent cells taken from the
embryo may develop into a person as long as the rest of required conditions are present». This definition
may have been modified (at least expanded upon) by the Stammzellegesetz, paragr. 3.4: «An embryo is
any multipotent human cell with the ability of dividing itself and developing into a person, as long as
the required conditions are present».
41
See Italian Law 2004 n. 40, Chapter VI, art. 13.
that certain facts are technically practicable in the near future are not properly
assessed.
On the other hand, the risk that the description of the specifically defined criminal
conduct and its modes may be coming too close to a determined technical procedure
must be prevented, because it may leave out others that may be incorporated in the
future. This produces a difficult balance with legal security (principle of maximum
certainty). An opposing procedure, but one that may produce similar ineffective
results, is to opt for an extreme casuistic and tedious regulation, which would be
equally reproachable. This is what occurs in Japanese Criminal Law on the matter42.
In fact, in some cases we see that certain technical advances can compromise
the validity of the definition of the objective (external) part of the criminal conduct
description or essential, material and elemental definition (these words should be
deleted). This is the case with the creation of definitions relating to (these words
should be deleted) embryos, where creation uses the nuclear transfer technique
for non reproductive purposes (because if this was the purpose of the author of
the fact, the technique or conduct should be transferred to the crime of creating
human beings by cloning). In fact, the Spanish and Mexican State PCs indicate
that a crime exists when human ova are fertilized for purposes other than human
procreation (arts. 161.1 and 154.II, respectively). In that regard, it is arguable that
a cloned embryo obtained using the aforementioned nuclear transfer technique can
be considered as the fertilization of an ovum; a practice that in its own sense requires
that a spermatozoid enter an ovum, and fertilize it (in summary; while the cloning
is a form of asexual reproduction since two gametes, one male and one female do
not participate, the word fertilization could refer to sexual reproduction also when
performed in a labour). It is true that in any case, the aim of the protection of
the regulation consists in preventing human embryos from being created for non
reproductive purposes (e.g., for research or industrial purposes), but the doubt created
by whether or not the written law encompasses any procedure for creating human
embryos, including cloning, this is not consistent with the requirements regarding
the rule of law principle. Another example is constituted by the definition of an
embryo in the aforementioned German law of 1990; since a possible difference with
the possibility of obtaining a clone through nuclear transfer in this law is perceived,
which was discovered prior to the promulgation of said law.
42
It seems as though the Japanese legislator has opted for these tedious technical definitions and maybe
for an excessive dependence on concepts and scientific techniques. Law dated 30 November, 2000,
relative to the regulation regarding human cloning techniques and other similar techniques (art. 2,
including legal definitions).
3.4. Selecting the offence’s technical structure

The next step is established by the timely technique for defining the criminal
offence option in relation with the action, whose commission is deemed to require
preventing and with the degree of punitive intervention more or less advanced. This
analysis will drive lawmakers to chose whether the offence is structured as a “result
crime” (resulting in injuries or damage) or, to the contrary, as a simple or mere
activity crime, with no connection to a damage result - abstract endangerment or
dangerousness crimes.
As is known, the appeal for one or another structure of the criminal conduct will
be determined by criminal-policy considerations based on the advancement of the
Criminal Law intervention as well as for structural reasons. For example, when the
proof of a casual relationship with a damage result is highly problematic. This last
reason might make more adequate abstract endangerment crimes or the configuration
of crimes of omission (purely of omission or of commission by omission) in relation
with biotechnologies and other activities, about which there is little knowledge
regarding their different causal processes, since the casualty issue is ruled out.
However, from a prevention point of view, these crimes are not objectionable, since
they are susceptible of remaining focused on protection, albeit, it is true that this is
less evident with regard to abstract endangerment of legal goods types of crimes. The
problem may then consist in the combining of this political-criminal decision with
the configuration of legal goods that are excessively vague and indefinite.
The defining of crimes as mere procedural infractions and therefore remotely
damaging to legal goods can be seen in the French PC.
The previous Brazilian penal legislation43, also displayed an improper point of
view on the protected legal good and, consequently, on the description of proscribed
conduct and defined results. It included results that were already part of crimes such
as homicide, abortion and injuries, which could hardly be derived from the actions
that have been criminally defined (v. art. 13, I, II and III). In general, these failures
were reviewed and corrected by the new Law of 2005.
In the subjective (internal) part of the crime definition structure we must decide
whether, not only intentional but also negligent actions are punished, in accordance
with the exceptional punishment of negligence principle. Regarding the definition
of criminal conduct that inflicts harm or damage, we must assess whether it should
include any unjust subjective element, since it has an ambivalent effect. In fact,
including this in the crime definition limits the scope of the punishable conduct. If
it is included, the concurrence in the specific case must be added to the rest of the
crime definition requirements and, therefore, its proof. But this will not be easy. On
43
Law No. 8974 of 1995, regarding the use of genetic engineering techniques, replaced by Law 11.105
of 2005.
the other hand, a crime of this kind usually does not require the objective presence
of a determined result to which the intention of the active subject is directed, but
proving the crime does not require to prove that a given harm result was effectively
caused.
3.5. The specific description of the criminal action or omission

We must check whether the constructed definition is understandable to the
potential target audience: the prohibited or mandated conduct must be clear. This
is precisely one of the defects that are more frequently found in crimes related with
genetics and biotechnologies.
For example, lack of clarity or inaccurately delimiting an assumed fact from a
technical point of view can be found in the Spanish PC (art. 159.1, aforementioned;
art. 161.2: «The same punishment [prison term of one to five years and specific
barring from public or professional employment or office for a period of six to ten
years] will be applied to the creation of identical human beings by means of cloning
or other procedures focused on race selection»). Here, it is not clear whether the law
includes one conduct or two alternatives. The Colombian PC of 2000 (art. 132,
used very similar terminology as that in the Spanish crime of art. 159 and, therefore,
suffers from the same problems, in spite of having included a clarifying clause.
However, in art. 133, regarding reproductive cloning, this Colombian law clears
the highlighted ambiguities, regarding the equivalent crime in the Spanish PC. The
defective wording of the Spanish PC art. 159 was also included in the Mexican PC
of 2002 (art. 154.I), and in the Peruvian PC (art. 324): «Any person that makes use
of any genetic manipulation technique for the purpose of cloning human beings will
be punished with incarceration for a period of no less than six and not greater than
eight years and barring in accordance with article 36, sections 4 and 8».44 The later
denotes a lack of knowledge on the part of lawmakers of current cloning procedures;
since basically none of the current techniques strictly requires any form of genetic
manipulation.
In matters of a certain technical nature it is common to use a legislative technique
known as “incomplete criminal provisions” (“normas penales en blanco” in Spanish
law, a Criminal Law that defines a penalty for a criminal offence that is in turn
completely or partially defined in another law). This consists in the referring of
criminal precept to a non-penal Law (e.g. an Administrative Law) to complete
the description of the defined action, i.e., of the prohibited action. In general,
and as required by the principle of legality, it is usually deemed necessary that the
corresponding legal offence contain the description of the core of the prohibited
action. On the other hand non-Criminal Law to which the criminal law is referred
44
Introduced by Law no. 27636 of 2002.
will provide elements that are complementary to the defined conduct (action or
omission). These references may be explicit or implicit of a specific law. In any case,
the law referred to must be easily identified by the interpreter of the law (the judge).
In this regard, it is not compatible with the principle of legality, because the definition
of the prohibited conduct does not follow the maximum certainty requirements nor
the clarity of implicit referral to another law, the amplitude involved in carrying out
«genetic engineering procedures for illegal purposes» (art. 154.III, second section of
the Mexican PC), without determining what these may be, or without referring to a
law that defines which are legal and which are illegal. If the no-penal referral law did
not exist (as seems to occur in Mexico), it would be empty and the crime would not
be never applicable.
3.6. Unlawfulness
The cases that may exceptionally be authorized - in other words, situations that
are considered legal must be clearly defined by the law. Normally, the legal scope will
be established by a no-penal law, although it may also be established by the criminal
precept itself. When the Criminal Law refers to a no-penal law, the destination law
must be easily identifiable and the legal scope of the referral must be well delimited.
Sometimes, the Criminal Law allows a penal offence for lawful exceptions, that
may be described in an administrative law. In the human biotechnology sector, it
may occur that no legal margin for lawfulness is left for the offence defined. This
means that the definition of the criminal offence will already bear its complete
unlawfulness. This is the case, for example, of human reproductive cloning, which
does not currently include any exceptions for a lawful reproductive cloning.
In the scope of unlawfulness we find some examples of comparative law, where a
given law has no clarity issues regarding the prohibited norm and aspects of the given
conduct, in specific circumstances may be allowed, - be considered legal through a
justification of the offence. Yet, we find in some of these laws a contradiction on the
part of lawmakers, who, by searching for legal ins and outs that, in the end, mocks
the main goal of the prohibition. A specific example of this is found in the possibility
of using in vitro embryos for scientific research which are surplus from assisted
reproductive techniques. Some countries have opted for a rigorous prohibition, even
under threat of prosecution, as is the case of Germany45 for example. However, the
German legislator has authorized by law the importing and use of embryonic stem
cells under certain circumstances46. The paradox in this lies in the fact that research
with embryos left over from in vitro fertilisations from German health centres is
not permitted, but research is permitted if «left-over» embryos have been imported
45
Embryonenschutzgesetz, paragr. 7.
46
Law dated 28 June, 2002, Stammzellegesetz, paragr. 13 in relation to paragr. 4 and 5.
from foreign centres outside Germany. In 2004 France established a moratorium

regarding the legal prescription which prohibited at that time carrying out research
with embryos left over from in vitro fertilisations47. France had done that in a way
that also seemed to be paradoxical: the legal good was protected or not protected,
depending on temporary criteria - not because of the considered social value in
itself. These paradoxes have occured because lawmakers of both countries aimed
to simultaneously provide two different and contradictory answers directed at
different target audiences (trying to achieve the “squaring of the circle” in the legal
sense). Thus, to society the law was designed to put them at ease regarding the legal
protection granted to the in vitro embryo, and to the scientific community, the law
was designed to open the doors to research, in order to not place it at a disadvantage
in relation to researchers from other countries and to prevent them from going to
other countries that have more permissive laws.
3.7. Fixing legal penalties: proportionality and suitability

The penalties and the possible secure preventive measures –whatever the nature of
the latter- or, if applicable, other accessory consequences must be precisely evaluated
by lawmakers. This must be done, while in all cases maintaining the principle of
proportionality. To accomplish this, attention should be paid to the issues delimited
in the previous paragraphs of this contribution: specifically, the legal good that is
intended to be protected ; the greater or lesser dangerousness or harmful of the
conduct that is intended to be prohibited; and the configuration of the crime as a
harm result or as mere endangerment activity; and the nature of the fact regarding the
condition of the active subject of the crime (professional, authority or government
employee). In summary, lawmakers must consider the greater or lesser seriousness of
the disvalue of the action and the result, the last one if required by law. Additionally,
it must weigh the level of dominating punitive repression present in the whole
reference PC.
Disproportionate sentences are present in several pieces of penal legislation,
such as the French PC, where the sentences may reach twenty and thirty years of
imprisonment, even life in prison48. Another example is found in the Japanese law49,
which includes severe sentences for crimes related to overstepping the boundaries
regarding assisted reproductive techniques, cloning, chimeras or hybrids. On the
other hand, we must recognize that the indirect criminal-policy objective is to
protect the preimplantational human embryo without entering into contradictory
47
The Decree dated 6 February, 2006 established a moratorium of five years. As it was said before the
legal situation en changed since Law of 2011.
48
The most severe sentences refer to specific eugenic practices and reproductive cloning (arts. 214-1ff.
of the PC).
49
Act 30 November 2000, in which prison up to ten years or a fine have been established (art. 16).
assessments regarding the protection of preimplantational and gestational human

life, and the permitted exception mentioned in the previous section, as has been
reported on occasion in the German doctrine. Even more serious is the criminal
sanction included in the Italian law for human reproductive cloning by nuclear
transfer: ten to twenty years in prison and a fine ranging from six hundred thousand
to one million euros as well as being barred from practicing medicine for life (art.
12.7)50.
3.8. Special Criminal Law versus common penal code

After having made the decisions discussed above, lawmakers must adopt still
another. This decision, in reality and in time, will be positioned first, even though
from a logical point of view, it is dependent on the others. The purpose for the
lawmaker is to decide whether the new crimes should be incorporated into the PC or
into a special Criminal Law. One aspect that may be of help in making this decision
is if the activity is already regulated in a regulative type law, which establishes the
requirements, conditions and limits to which the activity is subjected. A point to
reflect upon relates to which procedure is the most ideal. This refers to the question of
whether the criminal definition is strongly dependent on the non criminal regulation
of the activity and, in particular, when it includes highly technical contents. If these
circumstances are present, it will be advisable to include these crimes into a special
law, as was done in Germany with the Embryo Protection Law of 1990.
It does not seem like the goals of general prevention through punishment
regarding these crimes will be negatively affected, just because the offence is listed
outside the PC. This seems so, because even though these crimes are usually drafted
without referencing certain personal conditions, which the subject of the crime must
meet. In other words, these are special crimes, meaning that the law establishes what
is the necessary personal profile of the perpetrator for him to be punished and that
this criterion is correct. In fact, the target audience for the law is usually very small
and coincides with the target audience for the non-penal regulations of the law51.
In comparative law we find examples of both of these legislative approaches: either
in the PC (e.g. Colombia, Spain, France, Mexico, Peru), or in a special Criminal Law
(e.g. Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan, Italy, United Kingdom).
50
“Norme in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita”, Law 10 February, 2004, n. 40. Cfr. Also
art. 13.
51
Also in favour of the special Criminal Law process is S. Romeo Malanda, Intervenciones genéticas
sobre el ser humano y Derecho penal, cit., p. 260, who remembers that it will always be easier to modify
the law than the PC (in both cases by organic law, although in the first it would suffice if it were the
criminal part of the law).
Are we truly free?
Mario Zatti
Table of contents: 1. Soul, freedom and truth. – 2. Truth and provability. – 3. Ego’s
freedom and physics. – 4. A step under some shadow of metaphysics: evolution as creation
and non-created pain.
1. Soul, freedom and truth

Neuroscientists face with some difficulty the problem of conscience-brain
relationships, which in fact has been defined by D. J. Chalmers1 and is generally
known as the “hard problem” of neuroscience; philosophers too consider conscience
as a hard problem, due to the hindrance of evocating doubtful immaterial phenomena.
Theories apparently well consolidated, which believed to have identified three brain’s
regions as specific of self-awareness, which is central to human consciousness (insula,
anterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortices), are now falling. It has been recently
demonstrated that human self-awareness is correlated with neurological processes
involving diffuse cerebral webs and not specific limited regions2. Another problem
must be taken into consideration, the complex type of causality between neural
functions and conscious processes, these being emergent as “top down” influences in
a sort of circular causality, owing to the reciprocity of the relations. According to R.
Wurzman and J. Giordano3 the hard problem exists because an explication is searched
only considering an efficient cause of events and only in the sense of the mechanisms
1
D.J. Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of Consciousness, in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kazniak, A.C.
Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996, p. 5.
2
C.L. Philippi, J.S. Feinstein, S.S Khalsa, A. Damasio et al., Preserved Self-Awareness Following
Extensive Bilateral Brain Damage to the Insula, Anterior Cingulate, and Medial Prefrontal Cortices, in
“PloS ONE”, 2012, 7(8), e38413. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038413.
3
R. Wurzman, J. Giordano, Mind, matter, neuroscience and physics, in “NeuroQuantology”, 2009,
7, pp. 368-81.
44 Are we truly free?
through which consciousness could arise from the processes of the neural substrate.
In this matter, the efficient mechanism is inextricable from formal and final causes:
every type of cause is involved, in a convergence and reciprocity which imply that the
designation of the events as causes or effects may be ambiguous.
In spite of the above complexity, particularly in view of the circularity of causal
actions, let us attempt some exploration of the theme of the possibility of free choices
by the system.
It is well known that conscious activity is connected to biochemical and electrical
manifestations of cerebral function. Such function is not subject to determinism:
the variations of activity of neurons combined with the secretion and the bond
to receptors of the neurotransmitters show that cerebral functions take place far
from thermodynamic equilibrium, and in such conditions entropy production can
entail a not deterministic character of the cerebral function corresponding to self-
determination. Quantum indeterminacy and nonlinear chaotic dynamics account
for the extreme sensibility and the instability of the entire cerebral hardware, i.e.,
the necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the exercise of freedom by human
beings.
The action of turning to the right or to the left in the case of a flying mosquito has
a physical cause: for instance, the stimulus of a light radiation mechanically followed
by the transmission of a series of signals and consequential movements. In the case of
man, similar phenomena can be observed, movements caused by stimuli activating a
sensorial receptor which travelling along sensorial neurons and synaptic connexions
carries the information to the central neural system; herein action potentials are
generated and, following efferent neurons, eventually stimulate effector organs, for
example some muscular movement, without any intervention of voluntary acts.
Simple spinal arc (short) reflexes don’t imply encephalic involvement.
In the above mentioned cases the energy that at the beginning promotes the
action is supplied by a physical agent. But let us consider the case of an autonomous
choice of the will: where does the energy come from to induce action potentials of
cerebral neurons and synaptic networks?
If volition acts on synaptic events, the power of choice between to do or not to
do, for instance to choose between two states corresponding to two desires of equal
force, requires that the act of will can result in a compression of the entropy of the
synaptic states, due to the furnishing of information, reducing uncertainty.
The information amount (I) must be generally inversely proportional to the
probability (p) of an event, therefore
I = f 1/p
M. Zatti 45
The minimal amount of information is needed when a choice is made between

two simultaneous options of equal probability: this is the binary digit, the unit of
information called bit
1 = f 1/1/2
The function f is therefore log2
1 = log 2
2
L. Szilard published (1929) a study entitled: “On the reduction of entropy in a

thermodynamic system caused by an intelligent being”, giving examples of application
of Maxwell’s idea (Maxwell demon): procedures of reduction of entropy by means
of a memory. Owing to the mathematical relation between physical entropy and
uncertainty or informational entropy, the reduction of entropy of synaptic states,
caused by a mental choice acting within the competence of physical laws, always will
represent removal of uncertainty, that is information supply, necessarily supported
by an energetic cost paid by the system4.
The problem of free choice has to do with the possibility that a system possessing
indeterminacy or fundamental instability, such as the neural network, may be
oriented in such a way that, after the choice has been made, it may find itself in
one of its 2n possible states, inasmuch as this compression (reduction of entropy)
correspond to the act of free will. Every time a reduction of entropy of the synaptic
state, operated by a mental choice, takes place, it will necessarily be accompanied (as
the laws of thermodynamics dictate) by heat exchanges with the environment or by
equivalent variations of the entropy of a memory. If the system is material, in fact,
it has to expend energy to effect the instability orientation (reduction of entropy),
which should correspond to the act of free will. That is to say, the system should
want to expend energy, and this free act would be prior to and different from the
instability orientation: this decision in turn requires energy dissipation which in turn
requires an act of will…; one would have to resort to infinity.
4
In a cylinder containing one molecule of gas and divided into two halves by a partition/piston, if
a demon determines which side the molecule is on, he could obtain work without any expenditure
of energy. If the force of the molecule colliding with the piston is kBT/L (kB Bolzmann constant, T
absolute temperature, L distance between the piston and the extremity of the cylinder), the work of the
molecule to double L is kBTloge 2. But to make afresh such space in demon’s memory, the minimal
energy needed (at room temperature), being in question 1 bit of information to be removed, must
be just kBTloge 2 =10-27KWh in the appropriate units. Not even a demon, if physical laws are not
violated, could operate net reductions of entropy. L. Brillouin, Scientific Uncertainty and Information,
New York, Academic Press, 1964. R. Landauer, Dissipation and Noise Immunity in Computation and
Communication, in “Nature”, 1988, 335, pp. 779-84. A. Bérut et al., Experimental verification of
Landauer’s principle linking information and thermodynamics, in “Nature”, 2012, 483, pp. 187-89.
This could only be avoided if a system does not require physical means in the act
of choosing: what is needed is an uncaused causality, an immaterial intelligence that
any exclusively physical system (in which for every bit of information transferred
a corresponding amount of energy must be dissipated) does not possess. Or man
is not free. K.R. Popper and J.C. Eccles5 explain that an immaterial causality does
not violate any physical law because it acts upon what, in the realm of quantum
mechanics, is indeterminate.
According to E. Boncinelli6 one’s self can be willing, but it is no other than the
brain. I believe he/she should differ since, remaining on the field of physical efficient
causes, a free responsible act cannot obtain. At least if we don’t want to look upon
some biochemical reaction as free and responsible. It also seems that the scientific
reasoning has to stop here, acquainted with the necessity of metaphysics.
What has been discussed so far means that:
- the brain shall be endowed with a certain measure of indeterminacy, necessary
to be suitable to give hospitality to free will;
- this is not sufficient however, because an immaterial form must be in act.
C. Darwin7 wrote that, although great, the difference between the human mind
and that of highest animals is one of degree and not of quality. This is half a truth:
the brain in fact, as far as the immaterial self is not involved, performs functions of
receptivity, association, memory, stimulation, that in man and in animals take place
without qualitative differences.
In view of the above considerations, even without an exhaustive philosophical
discussion, we may infer that a free action must have an immaterial principle, some
complement of a mere physical causation (mechanical, rational, computational,
algorithmic). Today’s physics gives an incomplete comprehension of causality in the
real world since it does not take into consideration human volition, which is clearly
causally efficient8. On this matter philosophy offers a number of different perspectives9.
An interesting idea has been put forward by A. N. Whitehead10 - analogously to those
5
K.R. Popper, J.C. Eccles, L’io e il suo cervello.Dialoghi aperti tra Popper e Eccles (1977), Roma,
Armando, 2001.
6
E. Boncinelli, Quel che resta dell’anima, Milano, Rizzoli, 2012, p. 137.
7
C. Darwin, L’origine dell’uomo (1871), Milano, Ermanno Bruciati & C., 1913, p. 89.
8
G.F.R. Ellis, Physics and the Real World, Metanexus Institute, “Science and Religion: Global
Perspectives”, 2005, Philadelphia, PA, USA, www.metanexus.net; Id., Physics, complexity and causality,
in “Nature”, 2005, 435, pp. 743-45.
9
S. Gibb, E.G. Lowe, R.D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford Univ. Press,
2013. E. Berti, M. Ivaldo, G. Mura, V. Possenti (eds.), L’Anima, Milano, Mondadori, 2004.
10
A.N. Whitehead, quoted by R. Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1997, p. 158.
M. Zatti 47
of P. Teilhard de Chardin11, and of the theologian J. Ratzinger (1985)12 who defined

matter as “prehistory of spirit” – according to whom something psychic pertains to
all nature, but a high level psychical emergence (“reflexive thought” of Theilhard)
is conditioned to the evolution of special complexes of occasions: in particular, the
power of actualizing potentialities modifying quantum mechanical linear dynamics
may be pervading all the nature, although non-negligible only in systems with high
psychical excellence.
We must in fact take into account a fundamental condition for freedom: the
presence of chance, albeit a limited one, which seems to give form to a sort of
“freedom” of nature. The human freedom requires an all important immaterial
subject; and that of nature? On the matter of fact, we shall also take into consideration
some philosophical and theological aspects.
Considering a creative choice by an omnipotent Divinity, it appears to have
been doubly limiting with respect to the full omnipotence because 1) it introduces
free beings capable of good and evil and 2) permits in nature a degree of casualty
bearing contingence, and limits to the action of fixed mathematical laws and to
the Laplacian identification of causality and determinism. Introducing stochasticity
at a fundamental level (the inherent statistic character of atomic-subatomic events)
implicates that “…every individual quantum event may be genuinely unpredictable”,
although, P. Davies says13, a collection of such events conforms with the statistical
predictions of quantum mechanics. Statistical laws are in fact deterministic while
concerning a collection of objects.
As far as Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason14 is concerned, P. Davies argues
that if some space exists in nature for genuine, inherent stochasticity, there the
outcome of any particular throw of the die is undetermined by anything. “Imagine
an electron colliding with an atom. Quantum mechanics tells us that there is, say,
equal probability that the electron will deflect to the left as to the right. […] If
the electron actually deflects to the left, there will be no reason whatever why it
has done so…”. This sentence finds a philosophical resonance in the D. Antiseri’s
remarks15 about “the insufficient defence” which could be rationally brought to the
principle. However it is not possible to deliver up the principle of sufficient reason
without relinquishing reason tout court, neither on the basis of Davies’s explanation,
11
P. Teilhard de Chardin, Il fenomeno umano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1968; Id. quoted in: O. Rabut,
Incontro con Teilhard de Chardin, Milano, Borla, 1958, p. 28.
12
J. Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI, Progetto di Dio (1985), Marcianum Press, 2012, p. 133. According
to M. Heller (The New Physics and a New Theology, Templeton Prize, 2008) it does not seem correct
to believe that in the human knowledge science and theology (or philosophy) could be independent,
though recognizing their different epistemological registers.
13
P. Davies, The Mind of God, London, Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp. 192-93.
14
G.W. Leibniz, Scritti filosofici, Torino, UTET, 1967.
15
D. Antiseri, Gloria o miseria della metafisica cattolica italiana?, Roma, Armando, 1987, p. 31.
nor if the principle should be considered as an axiom, which is a reasonable truth

even if presupposed to rational systems. As an axiom it was regarded by Spinoza.
Anyhow it must be a truth concerning all events (essendi, fiendi) in accordance with
one of the definitions given by Leibniz: “Nothing happens without a reason”. The
discussion brings us to ask: where does chance come from? In fact it must exist, as
an accidental cause, notwithstanding the easiness of believing that in reality it does
not exist, being the result of our ignorance or inadequate accuracy of observations of
processes and initial conditions. There is, however, a second answer, as I. Ekeland16
observes, which consists in saying that chance is the result of independent causal
sets. “This answer seemed idiotic to me when I was a child, and it seems even more
idiotic now, inasmuch as there are no independent casual sets in the universe…”.
This opinion implies a deterministic view of the universe in which the meeting of
causal sets cannot be, by definition, such a thing as a fortuitous case, even if it might
appear so. At the root of any real physical contingency, of the creativity of evolution,
or of the existence of free, sentient beings, there must be a certain framework of a
lack of necessitating causal constrictions: there would be nothing truly fortuitous,
or new, if this root of intrinsic indeterminacy were lacking. It does exist, al least in
the submicroscopic quantum world, as well as in the bifurcation points of chaotic
systems, whose nonlinear dynamics are amplifiers even of only minimal accidental
variations.
Some claim the acausality (absolute chance) of events of the submicroscopic
quantum world. It is fairly obvious that we are talking about a minority. They have to
regard as acceptable the hypothesis of events arising from nothing. Yet they have some
arguments to support their claim. In the subatomic world the interactions (forces)
between particles are transferred by other particles: if motions can exist only as a result
of the actions of external forces on the particles, one of these would not be able to
move without the action (cause) of a force, but, on the other hand, the force cannot
exist if there are no moving particles to transfer it: either everything is immobile, or
there are uncaused spontaneous motions17. Some limits to physical causality, in view
of the elementary material indeterminacy, must be considered, and the concept of
indeterministic causality has been proposed, as we shall see. Nevertheless, it is always
difficult to justify this ambiguous concept, as it is in general to admit the existence
of truly contingent causes, without coherently reaching the point of accepting some
framework of objective physical acausality in nature governed by laws, so much so,
indeed, that most of the examples regarding chance, from the creditor who meets at
the market-place his debtor (Aristotle, Ph II 5) to the tinman whose hammer falls
16
I. Ekeland, La matematizzazione del caso, in E. Noël (ed.), Aggiornamenti sull’idea del caso, Torino,
Bollati Boringhieri, 1992, p. 171.
17
S. Gao, The Basis of Indeterminism, in “Phil. Sci. Archive”, 2001, <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/
documents>; A possible quantum basis of panpsychism, in “Neuroquantology”, 2003, 1, pp. 4-9.
M. Zatti 49
just when doctor Dupont is passing (Monod, Le hazard et la nécessité), have always
been related to human acts, implying the existence of a psychic cause at the origin of
the contingent causal set to which a fortuitous event is due.
It may be suggestive to compare the macroscopic unpredictability due to
causal sets of psychic origin, as in the examples of the type recalled here above,
with that of the submicroscopic world where it may also be possible to postulate
a psychic cause - instead of a lack of causes - of fortuitous events. The logical basis
of indeterminism is provided by the demonstration that the motion of elementary
particles is discontinuous, random and spontaneous: self-movement is in fact a typical
immanent property of animated beings. And going back to what was said about the
powers of the soul and its gradual emergence (causal powers other than physical
power), the same could be said also for the inherent root of indeterminacy, which
could then be the same of freedom, and may remind us of Teilhard’s great insight18:
“We are logically forced to assume in rudimentary form the existence of some sort
of psychic form in every corpuscle…”. The concept is still actual: a recent article on
NeuroQuantology has an expressive title: Neural Correlate of Cosciousness in a Single
Electron…19. Viewing the matter in this aspect does not put away the principle of
sufficient reason.
These ideas should not be considered as expression of propensity to mysticism
or as getting off the lines of the scientific reasoning. It may be enough to remember
the title of a book of P. Davies and J. Brown20: The ghost in the atom. N. Bohr, one of
the fathers of quantum physics, wrote that anybody who is not shocked by quantum
theory does not understand it. In the quantum world a particle is a wave, and a wave
is a particle. The famous Schrödinger’s cat can be in a superposition of states, both
dead and alive, depending on an earlier random event21. In the notorious doubleslit
experiment a photon acts either like a particle or like a wave, but not both. But also
one photon can pass through both slits at once and interfere with itself. A subtle
connexion can exist between two particles (“entanglement”) whereby a measurement
operated on one of them causes on the other, even at a distance of light-years, an
instantaneous condition not any longer characterized by indetermination. Physicists
have even created quantum links between photons that don’t exist at the same time22.
These and similar aspects explain how scientists have spoken of “metaphysics of
18
P. Teilhard de Chardin, Il fenomeno umano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1968.
19
V.Y. Argonov, Neural Correlate of Consciousness in a Single Electron: Radical Answer to “Quantum
Theories of Consciousness”, in “NeuroQuantology”, 2012, 10, pp. 276-85.
20
P.C.W. Davies, J.R. Brown, The ghost in the atom, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986.
21
J. Gribbin, In search of Schrödinger’s cat, London, Corgi Books, 1985.
22
A. Cho, Physicists Create Quantum Link Between Photons That Don’t Exist at the Same Time, in
“Science NOW”, 22 May 2013. Megidish E., H. Eisenberg et al., in “Physical Rev. Letters” (in
press).
quantum theory”23, although there are incontestable experimental confirmation of it.

B. D’Espagnat24, considering that a quantum measurement of an object can
give a multiplicity of possible results, so that the original quantum state must be
considered indetermined resulting therefore impossible any definite scientific
description of reality as it really is, spoke of “veiled reality” that science will not be
able to know exhaustively. Asked whether this could bear to some sort of mysticism
he said in reply that science is not all. In a philosophical prospect, it is not difficult
to see in the veiled reality an analogy with the noumenon of the kantian Critique
of Pure Reason. According to E. Husserl (Logische Uuntersuchungen) “…with regard
to their matter, objects remain fully not determinate, being determined only by the
form of their connections”. Husserl’s notion of ‘object’ seems to correspond to that
of ‘particular’ of analytical metaphysics or to that of ‘individual’ of logic, and the
notion of ‘law which regulates a connexion’ to that of ‘property of a relation’25. The
concept of a particular and not universal property having existence of its own has
lead to introduce a new name for it: ‘trope’. According with this ontology, things are
nothing but bundles of properties. What does really exist is represented by properties
and relations. This is an old problem. What physical reality can have the fundamental
particles of matter26? The problem is not whether they do exist, but what are they
made of. If they are really fundamental, what matter could they be made of?
On a more technical plane the theory of hidden variables postulates that the
wave-function represent an objectively real field, in a state of rapid casual fluctuation
deriving from a deeper subquantum level, much in the same way as the fluctuations
of the Brownian motion of a droplet of liquid derive from the underlying atomic
level. The behaviour of the field appears to be indetermined, but the precise dynamics
of the fluctuations is caused by a hypothetical “implicate order”, which may also
be understood as the primary reality of the substance of consciousness27. Bohm’s
theory, often quoted and seldom partaken, has been also recently submitted to a
rather radical criticism as far as mental/material interrelations are concerned28. Bohm
affirmed: “Quantum physics sees mind and matter as implicated…”; and already N.
Cusano29 used the latin word “implicatio” putting forward a rather similar idea some
centuries ago, also denying the possibility of knowing the “quidditas” of things.
In conclusion, the existence of chance as we have outlined it can be traced to an
23
H. Krips, The metaphysics of quantum theory, Oxford, Clarendon press, 1987.
24
B. D’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, Princeton Univ. Press, 2006.
25
C. Masolo, A. Oltramani et al., La prospettiva dell’ontologia applicata, in “Rivista di estetica”, 2003,
22, pp. 170-83.
26
M. Kuhlmann, What Is Real?, in “Sci. American”, 2013, 309(2), pp. 32-9.
27
D. Bohm, Universo Mente Materia, Como, Red, 1996.
28
R. Maleeh, P. Amani, Bohm’s Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter Revisited, in:
NeuroQuantology 2012, 10, pp. 150-63.
29
N. Cusano, La dotta ignoranza (1440), Roma, Città Nuova, 1998.
M. Zatti 51
intrinsic indeterminacy of matter, for which two hypotheses can be propounded:

1. that at the elementary level the relationships correspond to an indeterministic
physical causality, as was first claimed by Sommerfield, de Broglie and Born, which
requires the separation of the notion of causality from that of determinism30, and
the use of the concept of “probabilistic causality”, perhaps better interpreted as
deterministic cause of probabilities31;
2. that a psychic causal power operates at the elementary level, in the single
particles of the quantum world, already present albeit without any claim of awareness,
capable of blindly influence quantum events inducing random effects.
Chance as we know it in physics and by common sense must in any event be
referred to a fundamental, though very limited framework of physical acausality. It is,
in any case, important to note that the inherent stochasticity of quantum mechanics,
a condition of total randomness, – the equity of the quantum game of dice – is itself
a fairly restrictive law of nature.
As for the accusation of vitalism that could be brought against some of the
possibilities described, it may be useful to consult the article entitled Quantum
Vitalism by S.H. Hameroff32:
“…functional descriptions fail to capture an essential self-organizing “unitary oneness”
present in living systems. To nineteenth-century biologists this quality was ascribed to a
“life force”, “élan vital”, or “energy field”. Then, as molecular and cell biology began to
reveal the biochemical and physical processes involved in cellular activities, the apparent
need for a life force waned, and “vitalists” or “animists” were vilified. In modern reduc-
tionist science the notion of life force or energy or information field has remained almost
taboo. However a new wrinkle has recently appeared. Whereas nineteenth-century vita-
lism was based completely on forces outside the realm of science, a “vitalist” perpective
has emerged in which life derives by direct extension from the most fundamental level of
reality. In “quantum vitalism”, life is intimately linked to self-organizing processes at the
most basic level of the universe”.
The appearance of life is therefore programmed in the elementary particles of the
universe, and this implies a set of laws using chance and putting it into effect in the
only possible way, comprising an immaterial psychic field. In the course of evolution
this field accompanies matter up to complexity and freedom. In this hypothesis it is
worth noting that evil and pain would be due directly or indirectly to psychic causes,
both at the level of the blind calamity produced in the action of a rudimentary
psyche and at the higher level of the free action of consciousness.
Be that as it may, we must realize that when we appeal to chance in nature we
cannot escape identifying it with a framework of physical acausality. Within which
30
M. Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949.
31
F. Weinert, Quantum mechanics: The Physicist turns Philosopher. Conference Proceedings of 100 Years
of Quantum Theory, Madrid, 2000, http://www.staff.brad.ac.uK/fweinert.
32
S.H. Hameroff, Quantum Vitalism, in “Advances”, 1997, 13, pp. 13-22.
we happen to find creativity, novelty, and freedom; and, along with these, calamity.
In an assay published in 1967 the theologian K. Rahner33 had this to say about
the presence of spirituality in matter in the course of evolution:
“If effectively the process of becoming is really one of self-transcendence which, depen-
ding on the circumstances, can go so far as to yield a new essence […] and if matter
and spirit are not simply disparate entities, but matter is somehow a frozen spirit (“fri-
gorifié”), the only meaning of which is to make the spirit proper possible, and if, lastly,
created spirituality always remains spirituality in matter up to its absolute realization,
then the evolution of matter into spirit is not an unrealizable concept, provided only that
the concept of evolution is understood in the sense of this essential self-transcendence
subject to the dynamism of the absolute being”.
This opinion, which is shared by others, open up a vast horizon in natural
philosophy, which today addresses the study of evolutionary processes, including
biological and psychological ones, with new conceptual instruments, such as the
theories of complex systems, self-organization and emergent properties. Animated
beings distinguish themselves particularly in that they are capable of autonomous
activity (self-movement) and, in the case of human beings, in their consciousness,
power of abstraction, of constructing forms and grasping universals, in their freedom
to choose and causing effects which cannot be explained solely on the basis of
neuronal behaviour.
The emergent properties in the course of cosmic evolution, particularly life and
consciousness, as such (i.e. qua emergent) would appear to come from nothing.
When Rahner talks about the evolution of matter toward spirit and indicates the
way it comes about, i.e. “self-transcendence”, what he means is that the emergence
does not come from nothing, but comes into being as a form contained potentially
in things and actuated in adequate causal conditions. This, as well as other forms, is
known philosophically as degrees of being. These include the human soul as the only
full ontological emergence of the “image and likeness” (Gen 1, 26), the last rung of a
ladder whereby the psychic potentials of nature gradually manifest themselves. This
line of thought is shared and clearly expressed by the theologian J. Ratzinger in his
Carinthian lessons [1985]34:
“…spirit is not added to matter as something extraneous […]; rather its coming forth
denotes that a movement which makes use of an outrider arrives to destination. Finally
we should say that the creation of spirit is just what, less than anything other, could be
represented as an handicraft of God, who should have begun hereabouts, suddenly, to
bustle in the world”.
Within such perspective, different from that of thomistic philosophy, it is easier,
33
K. Rahner, Science, évolution et pensée chrétienne, Paris, Desclée De Bouwer, 1967, p. 111.
34
J. Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI, Progetto di Dio, cit., p. 134.
M. Zatti 53
notwithstanding the difference, to comprehend the anthropological view of spirit

and matter as constitutive principles of one being, that is, one substance35. One can
then admit that soul is an emergent property potentially present since the beginning
of cosmic evolution but one which36
“…is actuated, triggered as J. Searl puts it, only in the presence of certain conditions,
i.e. of a certain level of organization […] that is to say, a real leap forward in ontological
level – well, in this case it is possible that such an event may occur several times in the
course of evolution, at different levels and also with different outcomes, with a gradual
growth of its own powers and its own independence from the material substrate […];
this therefore paves the way for a truly non-reductionist explanation of unconscious life,
as well as of those intentional behaviours we may well encounter, albeit in attenuated
form, in species other than our own […].
If the very laws of nature oblige us to admit the existence of phenomena that they can-
not explain, and consequently to postulate that they are grounded in a different, non
material type of reality, it would be simply contradictory to claim that the related causal
powers cannot be attributed to them for the reason – or rather the tautological argument
– that they cannot be explained in materials terms”.
Dealing with these arguments, it is difficult to understand the attitude of V.
Mancuso when, in his book L’anima e il suo destino37, certainly in a pleasing literally
manner, he affirms for example that “…the body is energy under the aspect of
matter, the soul is energy in a free state” or that “an elephant has a bigger amount of
energy than a man [because of its body mass] but man’s energy is higher, that is, can
do more work, thanks its better order”. And he wrights on the newspaper Il Foglio
(10-2-2008):
“Science is necessary to speak of soul… [and] on this ground I got to found the concept
of soul as surplus of energy, free energy with respect to the mass. For a live being …the
soul[A] results from the total energy, taking away the energy like mass: E – M = A. In the
case of a stone, on the contrary, E – M = 0”.
In my opinion, the Author has lost his way. Free energy is scientifically defined
as that which is utilizable, for instance heat developing in a chemical reaction: two
molecules of HI (2HI), compound made of hydrogen (H) and iodine (I), have a free
energy higher than that of the sum of one of hydrogen (H2) and one of iodine (I2),
separated in the reaction which takes place yielding 610 calories per mole in standard
conditions, without any change of mass between the reagents and the products.
Therefore the inorganic chemical compound HI, with its surplus of free energy,
according with Mancuso’s rule, should be an animated living being. In any case as
a biochemist I should not be very happy if my soul could be measured in calories.
Why the conscious free choice, which our Ego is able of, could not be made by
35
C. Fabro, F. Ocariz, in: Le ragioni del Tomismo, Milano, Ares, 1979, pp. 50, 96.
36
P. Musso, Filosofia del Caos, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1977, p. 174-75.
37
V. Mancuso, L’anima e il suo destino, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2007, pp. 97, 105.
an exclusively material agent, whether part of deterministic or of indeterministic

systems? Beside the thermodynamic problem, as we said above, in the first case it
is unimaginable that a rigid causal set might give free scope to anything outside its
own laws, and in fact those who identify psychical and cerebral states, F. Crick for
example38, are often inclined to consider as an illusion, in spite of its immediate
evidence, the interior sensation of freedom; in the second case, our choices couldn’t
be but the result of quantum events carried out with casual arbitrariness, since
indetermination implies constant fluctuations, also in the absence of any measuring
operation. Not even by means of the dynamics of non-linear systems (chaos),
notoriously active in the brain, this one could do autonomously a choice and cling to
it, because of the typical instability of chaotic dynamics. The indeterministic aspects
of matter, which are also present in neurons, are just those that justify the possibility
of a causal action of the soul on the brain without violating the laws of physics39.
J. Eccles described the quantum uncertainty demonstrable in the junctions
between neurons (synapses) in which the stimulus passes from one neuron to another
via the release of biochemical quanta of neurotransmitters. These are contained in
vesicles whose membrane can fuse, as a result of the actions produced by the nerve
stimulus, with that of the junction (presynaptic membrane) causing the emptying
of the vesicle and the emission of the neurotransmitter. The mass of the vesicle, in
fact, is not such as to exceed the limits of Heisenberg uncertainty equation and
therefore could be affected by the magnitude of the effect produced by a quantum
mechanics probability wave. Hameroff and Penrose suggested that consciousness
might be related to a quantum wave function collapsing in structures in the brain’s
neurons called microtubules40. According to Penrose, Swinburn and others, if the
only source of indeterminacy in the physical world were that of quantum states, this
would be enough to guarantee scope for non-computability, the possibility unrelated
to algorithmic processes allowing the exercise of human intelligence and freedom.
This basically echoes the attempts made by the ancients Epicurus and Lucretius
to describe an indeterminacy of the atomic motions (clinamen) as a justification of
free will.
About this matter there are many different philosophical opinions, from hard
determinism incompatible with the existence of free will, to compatibilism or
semicompatibilism, to the impossibilism with regard to moral responsibility, until to
38
F. Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul, London, Simon e Shuster, 1994.
39
J.C. Eccles, A unitary hypothesis of mind-brain interaction in the cerebral cortex. Proc. Royal Soc.
London B 240, pp. 433-51; F. Beck, J.C. Eccles, Quantum Processes in the Brain: A Scientific Basis for
Consciousness, in N. Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness, Amsterdam, J. Benjamins, 2003, pp.
141-66; S. Hameroff, R. Penrose, Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules:
a model for consciousness, in “J. Consciousness Studies”, 1996, 3, pp. 36-53.
40
S. Hameroff, R. Penrose, Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A
model for consciousness, in “Mathematics and Computers in Simulation”, 40, 1996, pp. 453-480.
M. Zatti 55
supporters of the preservation of the public illusion of free will, in order to contribute
to the maintenance of public morality41. There is also, on the other side, the so-
called libertarianism, variously and sometimes vaguely defined. The very extensive
researches can find some synthesis in the work of L. Doyle42.
The human psyche is much more than a computer. It was to K. Gödel’s credit that
he explained as early as 1931 his “incompleteness theorems”, accepted since then by
all logicians43. The first theorem states that for logics higher than that of first order
predicate calculus, in every logico-mathematical system which is coherent there are
propositions that cannot be demonstrated within the system, but that we can see
to be true. The consequence was to take note in the mathematical spheres of the
difference of the concepts of demonstrability and truth; and of the impossibility of
deriving all truths with mechanical procedures.
For any rational system founded on axioms and rules of logical inference, and
coherent, there are infinite truths which are not demonstrable within the system
(and this has been proved). Therefore the set of demonstrable propositions is not
coincident with that of true propositions. “Gödel seems to give back to the human
mind, fit for abstraction and hence able to get out of the system, a status quite
different from that of any machine, unable to be self-conscious”44.
A detailed exposition of the theorems cannot be done here: the demonstration
requires the prior analysis of 46 propositions and 5 preparatory theorems. Let us try
to grasp some knowledge by intuition.
1. Among the infinite truths not belonging to whatever consistent axiomatic
system A, one of these truths is represented by the statement G which, within A, is
demonstrably equivalent to the following assertion: “G is not a theorem of A”.
Since the set of axioms is effectively given, the correctness of any proof can be
verified by arithmetical methods. So if, contrarily to the above truth, we say “G is
a theorem of A”, there should be a proof GG of our assertion such as to be able to
prove in A that “GG is a proof of G”, thereby proving in A that “G is a theorem of
A” which means proving the opposite of G in A. Therefore, if A is consistent, G is
not a theorem of A. But this is what G asserts, so G is true. Consequently, there are
true propositions which are not demonstrable.
2. It has been said in A that “if A is consistent, G is not a theorem of A”. This
proposition contains the theorem “A is consistent” and the theorem “G is not a
theorem of A”, i.e. in this proposition G should be just what it states not to be.
But then the entire proposition, and particularly the first part (the theorem “A is
41
S. Smilansky, Free will and illusion, Oxford University Press, 2000.
42
R. Doyle, Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy, Information philosopher 2011.
43
K. Gödel, Collected Works, S. Feferman Ed., New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1986, I, pp. 145-95.
44
F. Bertelè, A. Olmi, A. Salucci, A. Strumia, Scienza, analogia, astrazione, Padova, Il Poligrafo,
1999, pp. 251-65.
consistent”) cannot belong to A, if A is consistent; namely, if the system is consistent,

it cannot prove its consistency.
It has been shown that the first theorem is valid for all consistent formal systems,
which are therefore incomplete, that is to say, there are formulas that are not
demonstrable in them and that we, standing out of the system, can see as truths: our
intellect is not confined within the limits of the rational system.
Gödel’s theorem must apply to cybernetic machines, since it is quality, essence
of their own, to consist of concrete installation of a formal system. Therefore, for a
machine (computer) able to manage arithmetic, and coherent, there will always be a
formula which cannot be demonstrated in the machine-system but which we can see
to be true. In other words, no machine will ever be an adequate and complete model
of the human soul, whose essence is different45.
The importance of Gödel’s theorems and of others which followed on the
argument may be defined as epochal. According to G. Chaitin46, Gödel discovered
just the tip of the iceberg of mathematical incompleteness, which concerns an
infinite number of theorems that are true but cannot be demonstrated by any finite
system of axioms. Certain mathematical facts are true without any logical reason,
being impossible to find a theory explaining why they are true: they are irreducible
not only from a computational point of view, they are logically irreducible, and can
be used solely as axioms. A theory is useful if it represent an algorithmic compression
of data: comprehension is compression, which in many cases is unrealizable because
one is in front of an irreducible complexity. The example which can demonstrate
these limits of logical knowledge is the number that Chaitin has called “omega” and
indicates the probability of halting of a computer program chosen by chance among
all other possible programs. It is a number which does possess a definite value but
one that will never be calculated because the number is irreducible.
These theorems have definitively proved that for any logical system there are
infinite truths that are not demonstrable in it; but the human intellect sees them just
as truths. It is also evident that the truth does not let itself be denied47:
“… truth does exist necessarily, is indefectible, cannot be denied without re-proposing
in the negation itself ”.
And it proves itself as “indubitable truth of doubt”, as Augustine said (De vera
religione 39, 73):
“Anyone who understands to be in doubt sees something that is sure (his doubt), which
he is certain of: therefore he is certain of truth”.
45
J.R. Lucas, Minds, Machines and Gödel, in “Philosophy”, 1961, XXXVI, pp. 112-27.
46
G. Chaitin, The Limits of Reason, in “Sci. American”, 2006, 294/3, pp. 54-61.
47
A. Poppi, La Verità, La Scuola, 1984, p. 95.
M. Zatti 57
Much of the above discussion is synthesized by Augustine (De Libero Arbitrio II,
12, 34) in a few words:
“…we judge our knowledge by means of truth, but we cannot pass judgement on truth
itself. […] Do not get out of yourself, […] it is inside man that truth abides”.
In fact, in our inward world we can also find beauty, good, morals… And we see
that good is truth, which makes us free. According to J. Maritain48
“…human intelligence, although being a reason that manages its concepts, observant of
logical rules (and this depends on its carnal condition) is also an intellect, that is a power
able to see in the intelligible order as the eye does […] in the tangible one. The intellect
knows the prime principles of any demonstration just through such an insight”.
G. Berlucchi49 in the essay Mente e Cervello develops interesting considerations.
He uses the term “mind” to indicate a cerebral function, and “soul” to denote a
supposed “immaterial essence” (which should be left to metaphysical discussions). In
the conclusions he recalls the new ways of intending the active role of conscience and
will “in the control of cerebral operations, breaking the apparent causal closure of
physical world”. Mental states are seen as emergent properties of cerebral processes,
and that in their turn exert an inverse causality on cerebral matter (top-down, as is
typical of complex systems).
If we conform to these indications and terminology, and to what has been said in
the preceding pages about causality in the physical world, we shall put the boundary
line of the dualism truth/demonstration at the level and as expression of that soul/mind.
Thus we speak of emergent dualism: intellect and reason, freedom and mechanicism,
truth and demonstration, soul and mind; but one intended as the composition of the
substantial unity of informed matter constitutive of man. On this subject, G.F. Basti50
appropriately quotes a passage of Thomas Aquinas where a qualitative distinction
is lucidly made between cognitive operations. In fact, although apparently all of
them are alike peculiar to the body-soul compound, they are not: for example, the
intellective act which leads to an abstract conception absolutely lacking in physical
models cannot be but spiritual. This is why we say that soul is also a subsistent form,
in possession of autonomous being, because it accomplishes operations independent
of the body. “The thesis of the subsistence of the human soul, together with the thesis
of the intellective soul as the only substantial form of the body, is conclusive in the
construction of an anthropology…”51.
What do we intend while speaking of intellect, or in other words, which relation
48
J. Maritain, Il contadino della Garonna, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1973, p. 166.
49
G. Berlucchi, Mente e Cervello, in V. Andreoli, F. Buzzi (eds.), L’anima e la mente, Cinisello
Balsamo, San Paolo, 2012, pp. 137-47.
50
G.F. Basti, Filosofia dell’uomo, Bologna, ESD, 1995, p. 351.
51
A. Ghisalberti, L’anima da Aristotele a Tommaso D’Aquino, in V. Andreoli, F. Buzzi (eds.),
L’anima e la mente, cit., pp. 35-36.
does exist between knowledge of truth and possession of freedom? To have freedom,
syntax is not enough, what is needed is semantics which makes the difference between
the human intelligence and that of animals and artificial intelligence. Animals
lack the concept of logical connexion, and so cannot distinguish induction from
deduction, nor can they understand why some sentences are proofs of others (though
they can make use of acts of logical succession and therefore operate deductively in
point of fact); moreover, lacking the concepts of true and untrue, they cannot refuse
an argument raising an objection to the previous statements52. Leibniz (Monadology
29) wrote:
“It is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguish us from animals,
[…] letting us know ourselves and God”.
So there is a difference between the knowledge of man and animals, difference
which expresses an ontological emergence whereby what is meant as ‘soul’ cannot
be reduced to the meaning of ‘mind’ or ‘brain’. But even between emergentists
there are strong differences. J.R. Searl53 stated that consciousness is an emergent
property of brain in the sense, for instance, in which solidity is a property of water
molecules when they are frozen. But, if solidity is a property which may be taken
back to the behaviour of molecules, consciousness may be attributed to cerebral
states. This is certainly not an ontological emergence, and in fact Searle asserts that
cognitive phenomena are simply caused by neurophysiological processes of the brain;
which however cannot exhaust all the non-reducible emergent reality54. Sperry’s
emergentism is more radical, considering mental properties as “configurational and
olistic”, different from the neural events of which they are composed but upon which
they exercise a regulative control: mental events are causes rather than correlates.
To have freedom, either the form of knowledge ( ) and the related
substantial substratum must be distinct respectively from the logic ( ) and
from the computer.
“Man is objectively somebody and in this consists what distinguishes, in the visible
world, him/her from the other beings, which are always something”55. The difference
can’t be but self-possession that qualifies the person, hence the human soul. But
there are still discordant ways of understanding what soul is56. A psychiatrist deeply
resolute in his “scientific atheism”, P. Debray-Ritzen57, once wrote of his soul:
“…a computer with its fifteen billion transistors and its umpteen billions of connections,
52
R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 210.
53
J.R. Searl, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1992.
54
R.W. Sperry, Mental Phaenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function, in G.G. Globus, G.
Maxwell, I. Savodnik (eds.), Consciousness and the Brain, New York, Plenum Press, 1976, p. 163.
55
K. Wojtyla, Amore e responsabilità, Casale Monferrato, Marietti, 1980, c.I.
56
E. Berti, M. Ivaldo, G. Mura, V. Possenti (eds.), L’Anima, Milano, Mondadori, 2004.
57
P. Debray-Ritzen, L’ateismo scientifico: uno psichiatra, in C. Chabanis, Dio esiste? No, rispondono…,
Milano, Mondadori, 1974, p. 127.
M. Zatti 59
in which a unique intellectual and emotional personality has formed…; the assembly of
all this on a single tool…is my soul.”
2. Truth and provability

A computer is an instrument capable of performing operations in terms of
demonstration, and the problem of mind/brain or spirit/matter can be approximated
only if we clarify the relationship between truth and demonstration, that we shall
try to examine through what the soul itself expresses, i.e., natural language, in which
they are actually found in a non-pacific coexistence.
The conflict is classically expressed by “the antinomy of the liar”, a well-known
paradox representing an obstacle to the definition of truth in natural languages.
Imagine58 a book of many pages, each containing only one sentence. On page 1 we
read: “The sentence written on page 2 is true”; on page 2 we read: “The sentence
written on page 3 is true”; and so on, up to the last page of the book where we read:
“The sentence printed on page 1 is false.” Assume that the sentence of page 1 is
indeed false: confronting what it says of the following sentence and all the ensuing
ones, we must conclude that the sentence printed on page 1 is true in so far as it
arrives at confirming the statement of its own falsity, namely it is both true and
false. Assuming on the contrary that the sentence of page 1 is true, the conclusion
is the same. A number of logical antinomies are known, inducing contradictions.
We must take note of a common condition and cause of them: it is the acritical
superimposition of the concept of truth upon a system of declarative sentences,
which pertain to provability.
He who doesn’t recognize this point will expect to exhaust truth in the provability,
so as to proceed in the certainty of exact science, but excluding a priori from his
knowledge infinite truths (Gödel); those who acknowledge that a system in which
antinomies appear denounces a symptom of disease (Tarski) will not found their
knowledge on methodological bases that reveal contradictions, but will go deep into
the question with scientific rigour.
The exposition which follows traces back to Tarski (1969).
If we analyse the characteristic elements of language that are the real source of
the antinomy of the liar, a fundamental aspect of common language strikes us: its
universal, all-inclusive character. In particular it is possible to ascertain that, for each
sentence of the common language, it is possible to formulate in the same language
another sentence which declares that the first one is true or false. Such universal
languages involving logical antinomies are neither necessary nor suitable for the aims
58
A. Tarski, Il concetto di verità nei linguaggi formalizzati, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1963; Id., Verità e
dimostrazione, in “Le Scienze”, 1969, 12, p. 20; Id. in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: papers from
1923 to 1938, J. Corcoran (ed.), Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983.
of science. For example, in chemistry certain particular objects are studied (atoms,
molecules, etc.) and not others: the vocabulary of the theory is meagre, the language
suitable for the treatment of this subject is therefore a restricted one. The conditions
imposed on the language in order to secure its coherence are: that the vocabulary
must be completely determined; that precise formal syntactic rules are used; that
this limited language is kept distinct from that in which the notion of truth is used,
its definition is formulated, its implications are discussed. The latter will be called
“metalanguage” and the former “object language”; the metalanguage must be richer
than the object language, since it shall contain all the set of sentences of the object
language, that have to be available for the definitions of truth. The exclusion of the
definition of truth from the object language or, in other words, the distinction of
the notion of truth from the system of provable sentences, results to be a radical
condition to avoid antinomies, that is, for a correct foundation of logic. Important
deductions can be done.
Let us take for example as an object language that of arithmetic. The vocabulary
is very limited, including variables, numbers, symbols for relations and operations on
numbers, some logical terms and simple rules. The metalanguage will be that in which
the theory for the study of arithmetical language is formulated (meta-arithmetic),
and it will contain the definitions of truth and of provability. We can therefore define
in the metalanguage the set of provable sentences of the arithmetical language, that
is the set of its sentences which satisfy the definition of formal proof. It will also
possible to arrange all provable sentences in order of complexity, and number them.
So it will also be possible to describe the relations between the numbers assigned to
the sentences by means of arithmetical operations and relations, that is in the object
language itself: since the set of numbers corresponding to provable sentences can
be describe in arithmetical terms, it might be said the definition of provability is
translatable from the metalanguage into the object language.
No such translation can be obtained for the definition of truth, otherwise the
logical antinomies would reappear, because the object language would turn out
again universal. All this means that the set of provable sentences and the set of true
sentences do not coincide, since one of them does not enjoy all the properties of
the other (to show that two data sets are not coincident it is enough to indicate one
property of one of them not shared by the other). All the axioms of arithmetic being
true and all rules unfailing, all the provable sentences must be true; in view of the
non-coincidence of the two sets there must be true sentences that are not provable.
Just as Gödel said.
It is well known that a computer is constructed in such a way as to operate with
certain axioms and formalized logical rules, thus obtaining any number of proved
sentences. We can define these sentences as true if we place our trust in the axioms
and rules of logic, and would be tempted to consider the logical sum of the provable
M. Zatti 61
sentences as the definition of truth of the computer. Here, however, we run up

against the problem of antinomies. The word “truth” and any discussion of it must
be excluded from object language if we wish to keep it free of antinomy. Thus the
notion of truth must be distinct from the system of provable sentences, and therefore
distinct from the computer.
The soul, according to Debray quoted before, and many others, is a kind of
computer, a “tool”; but it embraces in its language, besides logical expressions, also
semantics and truth which are metalogical. We must therefore be aware of what is
clearly present in our universal language: a dualistic expression.
An essential point is this: any logico-mathematical system requires a non-logical
foundation of axioms. W. Stegmüller59 states that it is impossible to disprove the
essential intuitions without having just presupposed them. We can’t help establishing
our conceptual intuition that permits to catch the relation between abstract concepts,
a type of eidetic evidence.
Evidence warranted by our capacity of intuition of essences60. Similar opinions
are expressed by R. Penrose61: “ability to divine or intue truth from falsity” and also
“aesthetic criteria”; and by many others.
Some people claim that the paradox of the liar (Epimenide’s paradox) owes its
absurdity to the fact that it is an operation of self-reference. As S. Galvan says, “…
against a certain reasoning aiming at some demonstration of senselessness of Gödel’s
theorem because of its self-reference, hence circularity, [we must make clear that]
the formula is certainly self-referential but not senseless as it isn’t circular.” D.
Hofstadter62, on the other hand, furnishes the demonstration of the reproduction
of Epimenides’s paradox in the Typographical Theory of Numbers, as operated by
Tarski, whereby we have a version of the paradox which, at this level, becomes not
an affirmation about itself but a sentence about numbers which is true only if it is
false. A possible explanation offered by Hofstadter himself, namely the hypothesis
that the antinomy could derive from an inconsistency between cerebral functions,
would discredit rationality and make useless our arguing; and the Author himself
obviously confirms that:
“when in a logical system even only one contradiction is allowed, then, from the princi-
ple ex falso quodlibet, whatever may be deduced within that system”63.
The metalogical notion of truth becomes instead a reliable guidance for the
rationality in the dualistic hypothesis, since in this case the reason rests eventually
on absolute truth. After all, Hofstadter’s hypothesis is but another way of saying that
59
W. Stegmüller, Metaphysik, Skepsis, Wissenschaft, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, Springer, 1969.
60
S. Galvan, Introduzione ai teoremi di incompletezza, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992, pp. 191 ss.
61
R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, Oxford Univ. Press, 1989, pp. 110, 412, 421.
62
D. R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, New York, Basic Books, 1979, pp. 449-50.
63
D.R. Hofstadter, D.C. Dennet, L’io della mente, Milano, Adelphi, 1985.
the burden of truth cannot be given to the rational thinking without having to pay
the penalty of paradoxes.
It may be interesting to note how, generally, self-reference can introduce a paradox:
when the reference is made through the semantic content of the proposition itself.
These paradoxes depend ultimately on the conflict between two radically different
modes used in language to consider the identity of a being, namely, on the one hand
identity defined by means of spatio-temporal (or logico-formal) localization, for a
concrete entity; and, on the other, identity independent of any related space-time
domain and possessing a semantic nature, for an abstract entity such as, for instance, a
quality. Entities of the former type are necessarily designated by means of substantives,
while those of the second type, corresponding to qualities, may be designated by
means of adjectives (e.g. true). This being so, the operation of identification on a
semantic basis is alien to the computer and to calculating thought, for which self-
reference through the semantic content is thus prohibited. In other words, qualities,
perceived in their semantic identity, have to be kept distinct (metalanguage) from
the language and operations of quantitative logic (object language) and spatial
identification, and therefore distinct (dualism) from the subject of action to which
the latter operations pertain. This dualism is the reason for the difference that exists
between truth and proof and, in general, between perception of quality, essence and
form, on the one hand, and res extensa, on the other.
The advocates of artificial intelligence very often neglect the dual aspect that we
have dwelt upon here at some length, identifying all intelligence with logic. On
the basis of what has been said, this can only be a blind alley, up which people go
when they are unwilling to accept the dualistic solution. The materialistic axiom on
the ground of which all knowledge must form part of physical sciences, thus does
not allow to rely on its certainty. K. Popper and many others have condemned any
dialectic metaphysics in which, tough within some limits, the use of contradiction
is permitted. He who declares that “…one can live in contradictions being happy”
should show a consequent behaviour; on the contrary, when the occasion occurs, he
will do no such thing as to throw himself into a well, convinced, as Aristotle said,
that to fall down is not at all the same thing as not to fall.
When Debray, quoted above, says “…my soul is unique because the chromosomes
which contributed to the formation of my body contained an absolutely original
message”, what he is saying is right, but incomplete. Aristotle had already established
that living beings are composed of matter and information (as confirmed by the data
of modern biology to which Debray refers) and had reached the conclusion that from
this point of view there can be no subsistence of the soul outside informed matter.
Aristotle, however, also recognized the existence of the , i.e. of the intellect
capable of exercising contemplative cognition, which “appears to be a different type
of soul […] susceptible of being separated, like the eternal, from the corruptible.”
M. Zatti 63
The perception of “that which is with regard to essence” is therefore proper to the
, able of the cognition corresponding to semantic identification, which, not
being a form of discursive-propositional thought, can get in touch with the timeless
(Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 413a).
One absurd consequence of identifying the soul with the computer, and of the
failure to distinguish between truth and proof, is reported by S. Sutherland64 in a
commentary on a book by D. McKay65. The latter, distinguishing between hardware
and software in the brain, suggests that one possible solution to the problem of
the resurrection might consist in the incorporation of the program operating in the
brain of each individual in something other than the human body. Furthermore, he
ventilates the hypothesis of constructing computers as intelligent as the individuals
of the human species and which, Sutherland observes, could therefore be legitimate
candidates for the Kingdom of Heaven. The software of calculating thought is
characterized by incompleteness and does not see infinite truths; freedom, creativity
and truth abide elsewhere, since it is evident that, if human actions would be simply
connected to strict mathematical inferences and to rationality, they should be always
foreseen.
We should try to explain such points to those who state arbitrary limits to
their own knowledge, for instance defining themselves “Atheistic and Agnostic
Rationalists”, without taking great account of how many times they put their faith
in so many axioms, not subject to proof. Supposing that God’s existence be not a
possible subject of investigation with rational method, the agnostic attitude seems to
be correctly defined “rationalism” from a logical point of view. The position of the
atheists is different so far as they presuppose that something not subject to proof is
non-existent. It is rather difficult to understand why all of them go together.
But a question can be asked, perhaps an impertinent one: is their method the
only well-grounded one to get a complete knowledge of the existent reality? Clearly,
what is in question is the method. If it were the very method to be followed to get
knowledge, then we should use such a method, of which the field is under discussion,
also to determine the field of the method itself. He who declares to be an atheistic
rationalist shall grant to fall in a circular argumentation; or to do an act of faith.
Man has been defined along centuries as “rational animal”: for example by
Plato, Aristotle (though considering the intellectual intuition as a higher function),
Plotinus, Cicero, Sallustius, Augustine (rational substance made of soul and body),
Boetius (rationalis naturae individua substantia), Aquinas (intellectus et ratio),
Scotus, Occam, Descartes (res cogitans), Hobbes (mechanism with rational soul),
Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel… (incomplete list).
64
S. Sutherland, Science and Faith in Mind, in “Nature”, 1981, 290, p. 167.
65
D.M. McKay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967.
But the definition is inadequate: man is not only a rational animal, he is an

animal able (sometimes) to recognize the limits of his own reason.
3. Ego’s freedom and physics

The human being, partaking to some extent of divine perfection, can exercise a
causality which is “image and likeness” of the creating power: causality, within proper
limits, free, delivered from determinism. Can this binding assertion be proved,
independently of the interior experience of freedom which some people regard rather
as an illusion? It is interesting to consider the problem following the reasoning of C.
Borghi66, a peculiar point of view presented answer the following question: “What
meaning has for a robot the word ‘freedom’?
“… in every instant of its evolution in conformity with the laws determining its ope-
rations, any physical object must ‘choose’, between infinite evolutive possibilities, the
one and only way which corresponds to the maximum increase of entropy (principle of
least action, or Hamilton’s principle, or Fermat’s principle, or geodetic principle). The
number of evolutional possibilities among which the choice is made is the power of a
denumerable infinity that, in the language of Cantor’s number theory, is the transfinite
number aleph-zero. Any evolutive process subject to physical determinism involves, as
a characteristic feature, a number aleph-zero of possible developments at every instant.
Now, if we ask whether indeterministic evolutive processes exist, a way to answer will
be to find out whether processes exist of which the number of choices at any moment is
inevitably bigger than aleph-zero”.
Let us suppose, Borghi goes on reasoning, that an Ego with his own capability
of choosing causes is superimposed on the observed phenomenon. If the Ego will
choose one of the directions willed by determinism then he will be able to divert it
into a number of directions which is again infinite and denumerable. This means
that the Ego who operates the choice of causes has at his disposal a number of
directions of evolution which is aleph-zero at the power aleph-zero, that is aleph-one
directions: and this isn’t any longer determinism.
“All this is said – Borghi concludes – to show that it is possible to give a definition of
‘freedom’ which can be represented in non contradictory terms univocally recognizable
even by a robot, i.e. in terms of power of multiplicity of choices”.
The capability of choosing causes (the choice of the reasons of choice of causes),
the power to resist desires, the “countersuggestibility” of R. Swinburn and the “logical
indeterminacy” of D.M. McKay, are all displays of human self-determination, of
libertas a necessitate.
The matter is synthesized by Borghi as follows.
66
C. Borghi, Se volessimo vederci chiaro. Note per una possibile teoria delle scienze, Milano, Jaca Book,
1976, p. 102.
M. Zatti 65
“If human behaviour would be deterministic, it should be perfectly possible to organize

an engineering of history that should be a sociology through which the becoming of
human societies and cultures would be predictable. In other words, if one could know
all the “sociological potentials”, of which the gradients define hypothetical “sociological
forces” as well as physical potentials determine with their gradients the physical forces,
then the dynamic of human societies would not be different from that of a machine,
managed just by determinism. Suppose a society of which we know all the sociological
potentials and on which we can therefore set up a scientific project of sociological evo-
lution. Clearly such a project should require that the society’s population be kept in the
dark about the project itself since, if people become acquainted with it, there would be
the possibility and even a great probability of a complete failure of the project. In other
words, we find again in this hypothesis the substantial difference of multiplicity of free
choices with respect to the multiplicity of those subject to determinism”.
The same might be told of one and only human being, rather than a society,
though for the latter it is easier the pretence of observation and prediction by means
of statistics, and so easier the possible arbitrary negation of free will.
4. A step under some shadow of metaphysics: evolution as creation and non-created pain
Is evolution a creative process or simply revelation of the implicit? May we speak
of Évolution Créatrice without romantic references to the “élan vital” and without any
confusion with creationistic infantilism?
Available data allow to define the entire cosmic process, starting from the big-
bang, as a history of complexification, so as to warrant a sentence of C. Tresmontant67:
“The world is a process in which information increases.” At least in the planets
of the terrestrial type, one may speak not so much of an increase but rather of a
transformation of information: putting together atoms to make molecules, molecules
to construct supramolecular structures, and so forth, means dissipation of energetic
information (Ie, potential electronic energy), to get structural construction while Ie
is continuously supplied by the influx of radiant energy into the biosphere. The result
is a continuous increase of structural information (Ith, thermic energy contained
in structural bonds), whilst the increase in complexity also requires dissipation of
configurational information (Ic) into variety and aperiodicity; Ic increases however
as an effect of the systems of replication and selection. On the whole, the second law
of thermodynamics keeps valid (∆ Ie + ∆ Ic + ∆ Ith ≤ 0) whereby there is no increase
of information. In the case of the order through fluctuation of systems far from
equilibrium, the possible reduction of entropy is actually information acquisition
as complexity, which however must correspond to thermodynamic equivalent
dissipation.
67
C. Tresmontant, L’esistenza di Dio oggi, Modena, Edizioni Paoline, 1971; Id., Il problema
dell’anima, Roma, Edizioni Paoline, 1972.
But, the question is, the theory of quantitative information is not suitable to the
problem, because it can’t appraise meaning and quality (see par. 2). Mozart’s music
has not a greater thermodynamic stability than some casual noise, nor will it be
possible to translate into the terms of information (bit) the beauty of the content of
a message.
If however to the word information we attribute the meaning of presence of
form, of essence, which define the degrees of being in the philosophical acceptation
of information of matter, then the evolutive process can be fully appreciated in
its continuous progressive creative action, evident in the origin of life, of animal
knowledge, of human intelligence, reason whereby K. Popper speaks of true miracles,
that is, impossibility to give an explanation68. Popper from his point of view is right,
in the sense that a rational comprehension of the creative evolution (presence of a
field of forms) would demand to put a metaphysical hypothesis, which he refuses.
In fact, since the entire empiric is really becoming, this is a coming of more of
being, opposed to Parmenides’s principle which excludes any real becoming because
being cannot come from nothing. Unless the source of being is metaphysical.
However, a genuine evolutionist is also, in the correct sense, a creationist. In fact, a
reductionistic or physicalistic view of evolution is such in so far as it often inclines
to deny the gradation of being as a concept which ultimately requires a metaphysics.
If the latter is instead considered in the contemplation of nature, although with
due epistemological distinction, then it will not even be necessary to do a separate
reasoning for the appearance of man: if the maximum degree of all becoming is the
human spirituality, a tensing towards formal attractors is proper of all the stages
of evolution. It is thus supported by the laws of thermodynamics to which is due
the dissipation, structuring and complexification permitted by the conditions at the
border between order and chaos, etcetera; but this is not enough, what is needed is
also the permanence of structures and dynamics constructed, in a series of states of
relative stability, in one word forms predisposed (archetypes and attractors) along the
course of possible and probable transformations. J. Maritain69 wrote:
“Everything which exists has its own nature or essence, but the existential position of
things is not implicit in their nature […]. Existing reality is thus composed of nature and
the unexpected (chance); for this reason, it makes sense over time and therefore, with this
enduring quality, constitutes history (irreversible). History needs these two elements: a
world of pure natures would not move in time; there is no history for Platonic archet-
ypes; a world consisting purely of the unpredictable would have no orientation; there is
no history for a thermodynamic equilibrium”.
The thermodynamics and the field of forms and attractors represent in physical
68
K. Popper, Società aperta, universo aperto, Roma, Borla, 1984, pp. 102-09, 133.
69
J. Maritain, quoted by L. Valdré, Filosofia e storia della scienza, in E. Garulli (ed.), Filosofia e
scienze della natura, Milano, Massimo, 1983.
M. Zatti 67
analysis the equivalents of the efficient cause and the final cause of philosophical
language, in which it is therefore possible to describe the evolution as creation that
little by little puts into existence the essences, or develops the causal reasons pre-
created (“administratio”, “prima conditio”). The concept of forma finis materiae and
the very real “attraction of archetypes” (R. Thom70) in the course of evolutionary
processes repropose the problem of the essence as potency with respect to being.
An essence as “potentia essendi” is somehow pre-existent. A reductionist, well aware
of what represent the degrees of being, that are degrees of characterization and
limitation (“Abgrenzung”, “Begrenzung” – J. Seifert71) of the perfection of being due
to the potency (essence), refuses to admit them all reducing the mind to the brain,
the brain to the plays of electrical potentials and chemical mediators, and so on; i.e.,
getting rid of any really creative aspect of evolution (and any aspect really free of
human acts).
The progress of knowledge has realized, although among trials and errors, that
nature expresses themes, having found within it forms which are there: when Kepler
was analyzing the planetary orbits of the Copernican system, he discovered just the
same curves that Apollonius of Perga had studied because of their mathematical
beauty more than two centuries B.C.; and A. Einstein found in the space of general
relativity the forms of the Riemannian geometry, the beautiful non-Euclidean theory
of curved surfaces of the German mathematician B. Riemann (about 1850)72.
The progress of evolution has also found, trough trials and errors, the field of
forms, the guiding attractors. Finding the forms can be defined creative since, as A.
Manzoni73 said so well, “…to invent is nothing else but to find”.
The bestowal of being, that is creation, takes place through the forms. To detract
the quality of being, namely the influence of forms, means pain, misfortune. The
latter are therefore incompleteness and shortcoming, which are in the creation
without being created. And, speaking in general, we deal not so much with the
metaphysical limits of perfection and “privatio boni” (Leibniz, Essais de Thèodicèe…
1710), but rather with the “corruptio boni” (Augustine, Confessions, VII, 12), and
possibly with the ontic of the Nothingness (das Nichtige) of K. Barth74, all of which
aren’t derived from divine will, but from the non-intervention to give free scope to
nature. In these conditions man can do good and evil, and undergo misfortune;
because reality is composed not only of “nature” but of “unexpected” too, not only
of algorithm but also of uncertainty. The only metaphysical evil does not imply lack
70
R. Thom, Stabilità strutturale e morfogenesi, Torino, Einaudi, 1980.
71
J. Seifert, Essere e Persona, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1989.
72
S. Chandrasekhar, Truth and Beauty, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987.
73
A. Manzoni, Opere morali e filosofiche, A. Chiari, F. Ghisalberti (eds.), Milano, Casa Manzoni,
1963, p. 700.
74
K. Barth, Dio e il Niente, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2000.
of due perfections; it is the scope for life and freedom that involves, necessarily, such
lack, i.e. incompleteness, indeterminacy.
The human condition is a peculiar one: indeterminacy, physico-mathematical
incompleteness of chaos and logico-mathematical incompleteness of Gödel’s
theorem, which, on the other side, are necessary conditions to exercise freedom75.
Thus, as we have seen, knowledge requires not only reason but also intellect, logos
and myth, “denken” and “dikten”: if man doesn’t have the humbleness to recognize
the limits of his own reason, he will not exhaust truth, nor, therefore, be really free.
Man can profit by his freedom to do good and evil just thanks to indeterminacy
and incompleteness in nature, that is to say to cosmic pain. Some sort of deep bond
between sin and pain had been already perceived by intuition by the most ancient
myths of human history.
75
M. Zatti, Il dolore nel creato: un disegno intelligente?, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2013.
Siamo veramente liberi?
Mario Zatti
Sommario: 1. Anima, libertà e verità. – 2. Verità e dimostrazione. – 3. La libertà dell’Io e la fisica. – 4.

Un passo all’ombra della metafisica. L’evoluzione come creazione e il dolore non creato.
1. Anima, libertà e verità

I neuroscienziati affrontano con difficoltà il problema dei rapporti coscienza-cervello,
tant’è che esso è stato definito da D. J. Chalmers1 ed è oggi conosciuto come “hard problem”
delle neuroscienze; i filosofi tendono pure a considerare la coscienza come hard problem, per
la difficoltà di evocare fenomeni presumibilmente non materiali. Sono anche cadute teorie
apparentemente consolidate che avevano creduto di poter identificare tre specifiche regioni
del cervello come sedi dell’auto-consapevolezza: la corteccia insulare, del cingolo anteriore,
prefrontale media. Ma recentemente si è avuta la dimostrazione che la capacità, prettamente
umana, dell’auto-conoscenza ha un correlato processo neurologico che coinvolge sistemi di
reti cerebrali diffuse e non di specifiche regioni circoscritte2. Fa problema anche il tipo com-
plesso di causalità esistente tra funzioni neurali e processi consci, i quali ultimi emergono
come influenze “top-down” (dall’alto al basso) in una sorta di causalità circolare, data la reci-
procità delle relazioni. Secondo R. Wurzman e J. Giordano3 esiste un hard problem perché si
ricerca una spiegazione considerando la sola causa efficiente degli eventi e solo nel senso dei
meccanismi attraverso i quali la coscienza potrebbe sorgere dai processi del substrato neurale.
1
D.J. Chalmers, Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness, in S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak,
A.C. Scott (a cura di), Toward a Science of Consciousness, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1996, p. 5.
Suggerisco in particolare la lettura del libro di M. De Caro, G. Sartori, A. Lavazza, Siamo davvero
liberi?, Codice Edizioni, 2010, dal titolo simile al presente saggio e ad un capitolo del mio Il dolore (nel)
creato, EDB, 1994.
2
C.L. Philippi, J.S. Feinstein, S.S. Khalsa, A. Damasio et al., Preserved Self-Awareness Following
Extensive Bilateral Brain Damage to the Insula, Anterior Cingulate, and Medial Prefrontal Cortices, in
“PLoS ONE 2012”, 7(8), e38413. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038413.
3
R. Wurzman, J. Giordano, Mind, matter, neuroscience and physics, in “NeuroQuantology”, 2009,
7, pp. 368-81.
70 Siamo veramente liberi?
In questa materia il meccanismo efficiente è inestricabile dalla causa formale e finale: ogni
tipo di causa è coinvolto, in una “convergenza” e reciprocità tali per cui la designazione di
eventi come cause ed effetti risulta ambigua.
Nonostante l’estrema difficoltà per i suddetti aspetti complessi e particolarmente per la
circolarità delle azioni causali, vorrei tentare un’incursione rapida sul tema della possibilità di
scelte libere da parte del sistema. È ben noto che l’attività cosciente è connessa a manifestazio-
ni biochimiche ed elettriche della funzione cerebrale. Tale funzione non implica soggezione
al determinismo: le variazioni di attività dei neuroni combinate con la secrezione e il legame
recettoriale dei neurotrasmettitori nelle sinapsi dimostrano che le funzioni cerebrali sono
fenomeni che hanno luogo lontano dalla condizione di equilibrio termodinamico, e in tali
circostanze la produzione di entropia può comportare un carattere non deterministico per la
funzione cerebrale corrispondente all’autodeterminazione. L’indeterminazione quantistica e
le dinamiche non lineari caotiche giustificano la notevole sensibilità e instabilità di tutto lo
hardware cerebrale, condizione necessaria (ma non sufficiente) perché l’uomo possa esercitare
la sua libertà.
L’azione di svoltare verso destra o verso sinistra nel caso di una zanzara in volo ha una
causa fisica: per esempio può essere determinata dallo stimolo di una radiazione luminosa, cui
segue meccanicamente una trasmissione in serie di segnali e azioni motorie.
Nell’uomo vi sono fenomeni simili, cioè atti motori conseguenti a stimoli che attivano
un recettore sensoriale da cui parte un potenziale d’azione che attraverso neuroni sensoriali
e connessioni sinaptiche porta l’informazione al sistema nervoso centrale; da qui si generano
potenziali d’azione nei neuroni efferenti e infine la stimolazione degli organi effettori: per
esempio un atto motorio senza un intervento della volontà. Semplici riflessi ad arco breve
(spinali) non provocano coinvolgimenti encefalici.
Nei casi del tipo degli esempi citati, l’energia che inizialmente promuove l’azione è ap-
portata da uno stimolo fisico. Ma poniamo il caso di una scelta autonoma della volontà: da
dove viene l’energia necessaria a indurre potenziali d’azione dei neuroni cerebrali, delle reti
sinaptiche?
Se gli atti di volizione agiscono sugli eventi sinaptici, il potere di scelta tra fare e non fare,
per esempio di scegliere tra due stati corrispondenti a due desideri di ugual forza, implica che
l’azione della volontà risulti in una compressione dell’entropia degli stati sinaptici (apporto
d’informazione, riduzione dell’incertezza).
La quantità d’informazione (I) dev’essere in generale tanto maggiore quanto minore è la
probabilità (p) di un evento, per cui si ha:
I = f 1/p
L’informazione minima si avrà quando si debba esercitare una scelta tra due eventi pos-
sibili di uguale probabilità: sarà questa l’unità nota come “bit”:
1= f 1/½
La funzione f è dunque il log2. Avremo pertanto che 1 bit è:

M. Zatti 71
1=log2 2
L. Szilard pubblicava nel 1929 uno studio dal titolo: “Sulla riduzione dell’entropia di un
sistema termodinamico causata da un essere intelligente”, prospettando degli esempi di applica-
zione dell’idea di Maxwell (“il demonietto di Maxwell”)4, cioè procedure di riduzione dell’en-
tropia per mezzo di una memoria. Stante la relazione matematica tra entropia fisica, e incer-
tezza o entropia informazionale, la riduzione di entropia degli stati sinaptici, causata da una
scelta mentale operante nell’ambito delle leggi fisiche, ogni volta che abbia luogo rappresenterà
rimozione d’incertezza ossia apporto d’informazione e sarà necessariamente accompagnata da
un costo energetico pagato dal sistema.
Il problema della libera scelta riguarda la possibilità che un sistema avente una indeter-
minazione o instabilità fondamentale, come quello delle reti neurali, possa essere orientato
in modo che, con la scelta, esso possa trovarsi in un solo stato dei suoi 2n stati possibili, tale
rimozione di entropia informazionale essendo corrispondente all’atto del libero volere. Ab-
biamo però detto che, vigendo nel sistema leggi fisiche, si deve attuare una spesa di energia
per produrre l’orientamento nell’incertezza; cioè il sistema dovrebbe anzitutto voler dissipare
energia, con un atto decisionale diverso dall’orientamento dell’instabilità e ad esso necessa-
riamente precedente. Ma questo voler dissipare energia è un atto decisionale che a sua volta
richiede una spesa di energia che a sua volta richiede un atto decisionale…: ne viene un
ricorso all’infinito; la scelta è impossibile.
Si può evitarlo se si dispone di un sistema che non richieda mezzi fisici nell’atto di sce-
gliere: occorre una causalità non causata, dunque creativa; un’intelligenza immateriale che
la macchina termodinamica, nella quale per ogni bit di entropia informazionale cancellata
dev’essere simultaneamente dissipata un’energia di kBT loge 2, non ha.
L’uomo è libero in quanto non macchina, o non è libero.
K.R. Popper e J.C. Eccles5 sostengono che la causalità immateriale non viola alcuna legge
fisica perché interviene su ciò che nell’ambito della meccanica quantistica è indeterminato.
Afferma E. Boncinelli6:
4
Nel classico caso del cilindro contenente una sola molecola di gas e diviso a metà da un pistone, se
un demonietto prende nota di quale metà del cilindro è occupata dalla molecola, potrebbe ottenere
del lavoro senza avere speso energia. Se la forza che la molecola può esercitare sul pistone è kBT/L
(dove L è la distanza tra pistone ed estremità del cilindro, T è la temperatura assoluta e kB la costante
di Boltzmann), si può calcolare che il lavoro che la molecola può fare, spingendo il pistone fino a
raddoppiare L, è kBT loge 2. Ma per rimuovere l’informazione, che il demonietto aveva acquisito, su qual
era la metà del cilindro occupata dalla molecola (in modo da ripristinare la memoria), l’energia minima
necessaria (a temperatura ambiente) trattandosi di 1 bit è ancora, nelle unità di misura appropriate,
kBT loge 2 = 10-27 KWh. Si conclude che neppure un demonietto, se sottostà alla giurisdizione delle
leggi fisiche, può mai operare effettive riduzioni nette di entropia. L. Brillouin, Scientific Uncertainty
and Information, New York, Academic Press, 1964. R. Landauer, Dissipation and Noise Immunity in
Computation and Communication, in “Nature”, 1988, 335, pp. 779-84. A. Bérut et al., Experimental
verification of Landauer’s principle linking information and thermodynamics, in “Nature”, 2012, 483, pp.
187-89.
5
K.R. Popper, J.C. Eccles, L’io e il suo cervello. Dialoghi aperti tra Popper e Eccles (1977), Roma,
Armando, 2001.
6
E. Boncinelli, Quel che resta dell’anima, Milano, Rizzoli, 2012, p. 137.
“Questo Sé […] può volere, […] ma non c’è nulla che ci dica in che cosa esso differisce […] dal
nostro cervello” (corsivo mio).
Sembra che deva differire perché, se si resta sul piano delle cause efficienti fisiche, l’atto
libero responsabile non vi rientra. E questo già per definizione, a meno di voler considerare
libera e responsabile qualche reazione biochimica.
Sembra anche che il discorso scientifico deva qui arrestarsi, consapevole della necessità di
una metafisica. Quanto è stato fin qui esposto significa pertanto che:
- il cervello dev’essere dotato di una certa misura di indeterminazione, necessaria per
l’esercizio della libera volontà;
- questo è necessario ma non sufficiente perché dev’essere in atto una forma immateriale
per agire con libertà. Scriveva Darwin7 che “…per quanto grande sia la differenza che passa
fra la mente dell’uomo e quella degli animali più elevati, è differenza di grado e non di qua-
lità”. Questa affermazione è una mezza verità: il cervello, nella misura in cui l’io immateriale
non interviene, esercita funzioni di ricezione, associazione, memorizzazione, stimolazione che
nell’animale e nell’uomo si svolgono senza differenze qualitative.
Sulla base di considerazioni di filosofia naturale, anche senza l’apporto di una riflessione
filosofica più ampia, sembra doversi concludere che l’azione libera deve avere un principio
immateriale, qualcosa che va al di là della mera causalità fisica (meccanica, razionale, com-
putazionale, algoritmica). La fisica di oggi offre una comprensione incompleta della causalità
nel mondo reale d’ogni giorno, perché essa non considera la volizione umana, che è con ogni
evidenza causalmente efficace8.
La filosofia a questo proposito offre uno spettro di prospettive vastissimo9. È interessante
l’idea di A. N. Whitehead10 – che dal punto di vista filosofico ha qualche affinità con quelle di
P. Teilhard de Chardin11, e del teologo Joseph Ratzinger che nelle lezioni carinziane del 1985
parla di “materia come preistoria dello spirito”12 – secondo cui qualcosa di psichico è proprio
di tutta la natura, ma uno psichismo di alto livello (pensiero riflesso, direbbe Teilhard) è
condizionato all’evoluzione di speciali complessi di occasioni: la capacità per un sistema di
attualizzare potenzialità (modificare le dinamiche lineari della quantomeccanica) è pervaden-
te in natura anche se non negligibile solo in sistemi con alta esplicazione dello psichismo.
Siamo dunque davanti ad una prospettiva per cui condizione per la libertà è una limitata
presenza del caso, che sembra configurare una sorta di “libertà” della natura. La libertà del
soggetto umano richiede una causa immateriale; e quella della natura?
Vi sono qui riflessi filosofici e teologici su cui occorre riflettere.
7
C. Darwin, L’origine dell’uomo (1871), Milano, Ermanno Bruciati & C., 1913, p. 89.
8
G.F.R. Ellis, Physics and the Real World, Metanexus Institute, “Science and Religion: Global
Perspectives”, 2005, Philadelphia, PA, USA, www.metanexus.net; Id., Physics, complexity and causality,
in “Nature”, 2005, 435, pp. 743-45.
9
S. Gibb, E.G. Lowe, R.D. Ingthorsson (a cura di), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford Univ.
Press, 2013. E. Berti, M. Ivaldo, G. Mura, V. Possenti (a cura di), L’Anima, Milano, Mondadori,
2004.
10
A.N. Whitehead, citato da R. Penrose, The Large, the Small and the Human Mind, Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1997, p. 158.
11
P. Teilhard de Chardin, Il fenomeno umano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1968; Id. citato in O. Rabut,
Incontro con Teilhard de Chardin, Milano, Borla, 1958, p. 28.
12
J. Ratzinger – Benedetto XVI, Progetto di Dio (1985), Marcianum Press, 2012, p. 133.
M. Zatti 73
La scelta creativa di un Dio onnnipotente si dimostra doppiamente autolimitante in

relazione all’originaria onnipotenza perché: 1) contempla l’esistenza di soggetti liberi capaci
di fare il bene e il male e 2) permette nella natura una misura di casualità che introduce con-
tingenza e impredicibilità, limiti all’azione delle leggi matematiche fisse, e all’identificazione
Laplaciana di causalità e determinismo.
L’introduzione di stocasticità a un livello fondamentale (il carattere intrinsecamente sta-
tistico degli eventi atomici) implica che “…ogni individuale evento quantistico può essere
genuinamente impredicibile” sebbene, nota P. Davies13, una collezione di tali eventi si con-
formi alle predizioni statistiche della teoria. Bisogna sottolineare che le leggi statistiche sono
deterministiche in quanto riguardanti collettivi di oggetti.
Quanto al famoso principio leibniziano di ragione sufficiente14, può essere utile riportare
il giudizio dello stesso P. Davies, il quale fa notare che, se c’è in natura un ambito di genuina,
inerente stocasticità, lì ogni risultato di un lancio di dadi è genuinamente non-determinato
da alcunché. Se ha luogo “…una collisione di un elettrone contro un atomo, la quantomec-
canica dice che c’è uguale probabilità che l’elettrone defletta verso sinistra o verso destra”.
Se l’elettrone deflette verso sinistra, non vi è alcuna ragione fisica per cui esso abbia fatto
così anziché deflettere verso destra. L’affermazione di Davies potrebbe trovare una risonanza
filosofica notevole nelle osservazioni di D. Antiseri15 sulle “difese insufficienti del principio di
ragione sufficiente”. Al quale tuttavia non si può rinunciare, né sulla base delle considerazioni
esposte da Davies sulla fisica quantistica, e neppure se il principio dovesse considerarsi tra gli
assiomi, verità ragionevoli anche se presupposte ai sistemi razionali. Come assioma lo consi-
derò Spinoza; e per quanto ci interessa qui, è una verità che riguarda eventi (essendi, fiendi)
secondo una delle definizioni che ne ha dato Leibniz: “niente accade senza una ragione”.
La domanda allora è: da dove viene il caso? La risposta più semplice consiste nel negare
che esista, adducendo la nostra incapacità di fare accurate previsioni a causa di ignoranza, e
inadeguatezza del livello di osservazione delle condizioni iniziali (molti sistemi presentano
estrema sensibilità alle condizioni iniziali). Un’altra risposta, come osserva I. Ekeland16,
“…consiste nel dire che il caso è il risultato dell’incontro di serie causali indipendenti. Questa
risposta mi sembrava già idiota quand’ero un bambino, e mi sembra ancora più idiota ora, dato
che non ci sono serie causali indipendenti nell’universo”.
Se il sistema isolato che è l’universo viene visto come deterministico, infatti, l’incontro
di serie causali nell’ambito delle leggi naturali non può mai essere un caso fortuito, anche do-
vesse apparire tale. Alla radice di ogni reale contingenza fisica, della creatività dell’evoluzione,
dell’esistenza di esseri viventi e liberi, dev’esserci una certa intelaiatura dove possano mancare
condizioni causali necessitanti: non ci sarebbe niente di veramente fortuito, o nuovo, se non
ci fosse questa radice di indeterminatezza intrinseca alla materia, cioè una causalità indeter-
ministica. Ma si considera anche la possibile acausalità (caso assoluto) degli eventi nel mondo
submicroscopico dei quanti, per quegli eventi che apparentemente sorgono dal nulla. Qui c’è
13
P. Davies, The Mind of God, London, Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp. 65-69, 91-92, 192, 230.
14
G.W. Leibniz, Scritti filosofici, Torino, UTET, 1967.
15
D. Antiseri, Gloria o miseria della metafisica cattolica italiana?, Roma, Armando, 1987, p. 31.
16
I. Ekeland, La matematizzazione del caso, E. Noël (a cura di), Aggiornamenti sull’idea del caso,
Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1992, p. 171.
un grosso problema, che tuttavia cercherò di sintetizzare in poche righe.

Nel mondo subatomico le interazioni (forze) tra particelle sono trasferite da altre diverse
particelle: se i moti possono esistere solo come risultato di azioni di forze esterne alla particel-
la, ma queste forze non possono esistere senza appropriate particelle a loro volta in movimen-
to, o tutto resta immobile o ci sono moti “spontanei” non causati17.
Nondimeno, è sempre difficile giustificare l’ambiguo concetto di causalità fisica indeter-
ministica come lo è, in generale, ammettere l’esistenza di cause veramente contingenti senza
coerentemente aggiungere l’accettazione di una qualche forma di oggettiva limitazione della
causalità fisica nell’ambito della natura governata da leggi, tanto che gli esempi riguardanti
eventi che accadono per caso, dal creditore che incontra al mercato il suo debitore (Aristotele
Ph II 5) allo stagnino che lascia cadere il martello quando passa il dott. Dupont (Monod Il
Caso e la Necessità), sono meglio spiegati con riferimenti ad atti umani, implicando l’esistenza
di una causa psichica all’origine degli eventi veramente fortuiti (caso essenziale).
Può essere suggestivo comparare l’impredicibilità macroscopica dovuta a causalità di ori-
gine psichica con quella del mondo submicroscopico dove anche è possibile, e preferibile,
postulare una causa psichica invece di una mancanza di causa. La base logica di un tale
tipo di indeterminismo è fornita dalla nozione sulle caratteristiche dei moti delle particelle
elementari: i loro moti sono discontinui, casuali e spontanei: il sè movère è infatti tipica pro-
prietà immanente degli esseri animati. Riandando a quanto è stato detto sui poteri dell’anima
(poteri causali diversi da quelli fisici) questo potrebbe valere anche per l’intrinseca radice
dell’indeterminatezza, che allora diviene la stessa della libertà, e fa ricordare la grande visione
del mondo di P. Teilhard de Chardin18: “Siamo logicamente portati a presumere l’esistenza
di qualche sia pur rudimentale forma psichica in ogni corpuscolo…”. Il discorso è sempre
attuale: un recente articolo su NeuroQuantology titola “Correlati neurali della coscienza nel
singolo elettrone…”19. Sotto questi aspetti il principio di ragione sufficiente non viene messo
in discussione.
Non si deve credere che queste idee siano proprie di particolari inclinazioni al misticismo
e del tutto estranee al discorso scientifico. Basti ricordare che un libro sulla fisica dei quanti20,
Autore P. Davies con J. Brown, ha per titolo “The ghost in the atom” (dove la parola inglese
ghost significa spirito, anima, fantasma). Possiamo solo sfiorare il problema. N. Bohr, uno
dei padri fondatori della quantomeccanica, scrisse: “Chiunque non sia scosso (shocked) dalla
teoria quantistica non l’ha capita”. Nel mondo dei quanti una particella è un’onda, e un’onda
è una particella; e il famoso gatto di Schrödinger può trovarsi in una sovrapposizione di stati,
vivo e morto, e quindi né vivo né morto21. Un fotone può passare simultaneamente per due
diverse fessure. Vi può essere una sottile connessione (“entanglement”) tra particelle per cui la
misurazione condotta su una di esse provoca sull’altra, che può essere anche a distanza di anni
luce, l’istantaneo fissarsi di una condizione non più caratterizzata da indeterminazione. È
17
S. Gao, The Basis of Indeterminism, in “Phil. Sci. Archive”, 2001, <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/
documents>; Id., A possible quantum basis of panpsychism, in “Neuroquantology”, 2003, 1, pp. 4-9.
18
P. Teilhard de Chardin, Il fenomeno umano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1968.
19
V. Y. Argonov, Neural Correlate of Consciousness in a Single Electron: Radical Answer to “Quantum
Theories of Consciousness”, in “NeuroQuantology”, 2012, 10, pp. 276-85.
20
P.C.W. Davies, J.R Brown, The ghost in the atom, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986.
21
J. Gribbin, In search of Schrödinger’s cat, London, Corgi Books, 1985.
M. Zatti 75
stato recentemente dimostrato addirittura che possono essere prodotti stati quantici connessi
di due fotoni che non esistono nello stesso tempo: l’esperimento dimostra che non si può
considerare questi fenomeni come proprietà fisiche tangibili, e che gli eventi quantici sono
piuttosto fuori dalle nostre nozioni di spazio e tempo22.
Aspetti come questi spiegano che si sia anche parlato di “metafisica della teoria
quantistica”23 teoria che peraltro ha avuto conferme sperimentali scientificamente inappunta-
bili. B. D’Espagnat24, considerando che nella quantomeccanica la misurazione di un oggetto
può dare una molteplicità di possibili esiti, cosicché lo stato quantico originale deve essere
riguardato come indefinito, e risultando così impossibile una precisa descrizione scientifica
della realtà come essa è realmente, ne parlava come di “realtà velata”, che la scienza non può
conoscere compiutamente. Interrogato se ciò non comporti una sorta di misticismo rispon-
deva che “la scienza non è tutto”. Sul piano filosofico, non è difficile vedere nella “realtà
velata” di d’Espagnat l’analogia con il “noumeno” della kantiana Critica del giudizio. Secondo
E. Husserl (Logische Untersuchungen) “Quanto alla loro materia gli oggetti rimangono piena-
mente indeterminati” essendo essi determinati solo “dalla forma delle loro connessioni”. “La
nozione di ‘oggetto’ di Husserl sembra corrispondere a quella di ‘particolare’ della metafisica
analitica o a quella di ‘individuo’ della logica, mentre la nozione di ‘legge che regola una con-
nessione’ a quella di ‘proprieta di una relazione’”25. Il concetto delle proprietà come particola-
ri e non universali e come aventi esistenza propria, ha indotto a introdurre un nuovo termine
per definirle: ‘tropi’. In questa ontologia le cose non sono altro che fastelli di proprietà. Ciò
che veramente esiste è rappresentato da proprietà e relazioni. È un vecchio problema. Quale
potrebbe essere la realtà fisica delle particelle fondamentali della materia26? Il problema non
è se ci siano, ma cosa siano, perché se veramente fondamentali possono essere a loro volta
costituite di ciò che definiamo materia?
Su un piano più tecnico si potrebbe menzionare la teoria che invoca variabili nascoste e
postula che la funzione d’onda dovrebbe essere considerata come un campo oggettivamente
reale, in uno stato di rapida fluttuazione casuale che deriverebbe da un più profondo livello
subquantico, in modo simile alle fluttuazioni del moto Browniano di una goccia di liquido,
che derivano dal sottostante livello atomico. Il comportamento del campo appare indetermi-
nato, ma la precisa dinamica delle fluttuazioni è causata da un ipotetico “ordine implicato”,
che può anche essere inteso come la realtà primaria della sostanza della coscienza27. La teoria
di Bohm, spesso citata e raramente condivisa, è stata sottoposta anche recentemente a critiche
piuttosto radicali per quanto attiene alla relazione mente/materia28. Affermava Bohm: “La
fisica quantistica vede mente e materia come implicate […]”; e già Niccolò Cusano usava la
parola “implicatio” proponendo un’idea in certo modo simile parecchi secoli fa e negando la
22
A. Cho, Physicists Create Quantum Link Between Photons That Don’t Exist at the Same Time, in:
Science NOW 22 May 2013. E. Megidish, H. Eisenberg et al., in “Physical Rev. Letters” (in stampa).
23
H. Krips, The metaphysics of quantum theory, Oxford, Clarendon press, 1987.
24
B. D’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, Princeton Univ. Press, 2006.
25
C. Masolo, A. Oltramani et al., La prospettiva dell’ontologia applicata, in “Rivista di estetica”, 2003,
22, pp. 170-83.
26
M. Kuhlmann, What Is Real?, in “Sci. American”, 2013, 309(2), pp. 32-9.
27
D. Bohm, Universo Mente Materia, Como, Red, 1996.
28
R. Maleeh, P. Amani, Bohm’s Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter Revisited, in
“NeuroQuantology”, 2012, 10, pp. 150-63.
possibilità di conoscere la “quidditas” delle cose29.

Comunque sia, l’esistenza del caso come l’abbiamo prima delineato può essere riferita ad
un’intrinseca indeterminatezza della materia per la quale sono proponibili due ipotesi:
1. che al livello elementare esista una causalità fisica indeterministica, come proposta da
Sommerfeld, de Broglie e Born, che richiede la separazione della nozione di causalità da
quella di determinismo30 e l’uso del concetto di causalità probabilistica, interpretabile
piuttosto come causa deterministica di probabilità31;
2. che un potere causale psichico operi al livello elementare, dove già sarebbe presente, seb-
bene senza alcun titolo di consapevolezza, e capace di causare ciecamente effetti casuali.
In entrambe le ipotesi il caso, per come lo conosciamo nella fisica e per il senso comune,
dev’essere riferito a una fondamentale, sebbene limitata, cornice di acausalità fisica. È in ogni
modo importante sottolineare che l’inerente stocasticità della quantomeccanica, una condi-
zione che P. Davies ha definito “l’imparzialità del giuoco quantistico dei dadi”, è essa stessa
una piuttosto restrittiva legge di natura.
Quanto alla possibile accusa di vitalismo che potrebbe essere portata verso alcune delle
ipotesi descritte, può essere utile l’opinione espressa, nell’articolo intitolato Quantum Vitali-
sm, da S. Hameroff32:
“...le descrizioni funzionali non riescono a captare un’essenziale “unicità unitaria” autoorganizzante
presente nei sistemi viventi. I biologi del diciannovesimo secolo ascrissero questa qualità a una
“forza vitale”, “élan vital”, o “campo d’energia”. Poi, via via che la biologia molecolare e cellulare
cominciarono a rivelare i processi biochimici e fisici implicati nelle attività cellulari, l’apparente
necessità di una forza vitale svanì, e i “vitalisti” (o animisti) furono vilipesi. Nella scienza moderna
riduzionistica le nozioni di forza vitale, campi d’energia o d’informazione divennero dei tabù. Tut-
tavia recentemente le cose hanno preso una nuova piega. Mentre il vitalismo del diciannovesimo
secolo era basato su forze comunque estranee alla scienza, è emersa una prospettiva vitalista nella
quale la vita deriva per diretta estensione dal più fondamentale livello della realtà. Nel “vitalismo
quantistico” la vita è intimamente legata ai processi di autoorganizazione dal più fondamentale
momento dell’universo”.
La comparsa della vita sarebbe quindi programmata nelle basi elementari dell’universo, e
questo implica un insieme di leggi che usano il caso messo in azione nel solo modo possibile,
comprendendo un campo immateriale, psichico. Nel corso dell’evoluzione questo campo
raggiunge la complessità e infine la libertà.
In questa ipotesi è notevole il fatto che tutto il male sarebbe dovuto, direttamente o
indirettamente, a cause psichiche, sia al livello delle calamità cieche prodotte nell’azione di
una più o meno rudimentale psiche, sia al più alto livello della libera azione della coscienza.
In ogni caso dobbiamo renderci conto che quando ci appelliamo al caso in natura, non
possiamo evitare di identificarlo con una nota di acausalità fisica. Entro la quale soltanto
possiamo trovare creatività, novità, libertà e, insieme a queste, calamità.
In un’opera del 1967, parlando di scienza e fede, il grande teologo Karl Rahner così si
29
N. Cusano, La dotta ignoranza (1440), Roma, Città Nuova, 1998.
30
M. Born, Filosofia naturale della causalità e del caso, Torino, Boringhieri, 1962.
31
F. Weinert, Quantum mechanics: The Physicist turns Philosopher. Conference Proceedings of 100 Years
of Quantum Theory, Madrid, 2000, <http://www.staff.brad.ac.uK/fweinert>.
32
S.H. Hameroff, Quantum Vitalism, in “Advances”, 1997, 13, pp. 13-22.
M. Zatti 77
esprimeva sulla comparsa dell’anima nel corso dell’evoluzione33:

“Se in effetti il divenire è realmente un’autotrascendenza che può, a seconda delle circostanze, per-
venire a una nuova essenza […] e se materia e spirito non sono semplicemente dei dati disparati,
ma se la materia è in qualche modo uno spirito congelato, il cui solo significato è rendere possibile
lo spirito propriamente detto, e se infine la spiritualità creata resta sempre spiritualità nella materia
fino alla sua realizzazione assoluta, allora una evoluzione della materia verso lo spirito non è un
concetto irrealizzabile, a patto soltanto che il concetto di evoluzione sia inteso nel senso di questa
autotrascendenza essenziale sottomessa al dinamismo dell’essere assoluto”.
Questa opinione, condivisa da altri, apre un vasto orizzonte nella filosofia naturale, che
oggi affronta lo studio dei processi evolutivi, anche biologici e psicologici, con nuovi stru-
menti concettuali, quali le teorie dei sistemi complessi.
Le proprietà realmente emergenti (“genuine emergence”) sono dunque quelle che non
possono essere spiegate, dedotte o calcolate dalle proprietà dei costituenti. Corrispondono
infatti a diversi gradi dell’essere, messi in atto attraverso le forme.
Gli esseri animati si distinguono particolarmente in quanto capaci di attività autodina-
mica e nel caso degli esseri umani per la coscienza, la conoscenza dell’universale, la libertà
di scegliere e causare effetti non spiegabili unicamente sulla base del comportamento dei
neuroni. Le proprietà emergenti nel corso dell’evoluzione cosmica, in particolare della vita e
della coscienza, in quanto emergenti, sembrerebbero venire dal nulla. Quando Rahner parla
di evoluzione della materia verso lo spirito e ne indica il modo, autotrascendenza, vuole
significare che l’emergenza non viene dal nulla ma come produzione di forma contenuta in
potenza nelle cose e messa in atto nelle adeguate condizioni causali. L’anima umana è l’unica
piena emergenza ontologica dell’immagine e somiglianza, ultimo gradino di una scala nella
quale gradualmente le potenzialità psichiche della natura si rivelano.
Ad un determinato grado di organizzazione, quella proprietà emergente che chiamiamo
anima si innesca e, una volta così creata, vive di vita propria. Non è necessario pensare che
essa sia qualcosa che si aggiunge dall’esterno, come, sulla stessa linea di Rahner e ancora più
esplicitamente, è detto dal teologo J. Ratzinger34 nelle sue lezioni carinziane del 1985 pubbli-
cate in italiano nel 2012 (!):
“…lo spirito non si aggiunge alla materia come qualcosa di estraneo […]; l’apparire dello spirito
significa piuttosto […] che un movimento che fa da battistrada arriva al traguardo a lui assegnato.
Infine si dovrebbe dire che proprio la creazione dello spirito è ciò che meno di tutto ci si può raf-
figurare come un agire artigianale di Dio, il quale avrebbe qui iniziato, improvvisamente, a darsi
da fare nel mondo”.
In tale prospettiva, diversa da quella tomistica, diviene tuttavia più facile comprendere
la visione antropologica nella quale spirito e materia non sono due sostanze ma due principi
costitutivi di un unico ente, di un’unica sostanza35.
Si può allora ammettere che l’anima sia una proprietà emergente, cioè potenzialmente
presente fin dall’inizio dell’evoluzione cosmica, ma36
33
K. Rahner, Science, évolution et pensée chrétienne, Paris, Desclée De Bouwer, 1967, p. 111.
34
J. Ratzinger - Benedetto XVI, Progetto di Dio, cit., p. 134.
35
C. Fabro, F. Ocariz, in Le ragioni del Tomismo, Milano, Ares, 1979, pp. 50, 96.
36
P. Musso, Filosofia del Caos, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1977, pp. 174-75.
“…che si attua, si innesca, come dice Searle, solo in presenza di certe condizioni, cioè di un certo
livello di organizzazione […]; cioè si verifica un vero salto di livello ontologico – ebbene, in questo
caso è possibile che tale evento si verifichi più volte nel corso dell’evoluzione, a livelli differenti e
con esiti pure differenti, con una crescita graduale dei propri poteri […]: e perciò si apre la strada
ad una spiegazione realmente non riduzionista della vita non cosciente, nonché di quei comporta-
menti intenzionali che eventualmente dovessimo riscontrare, sia pure in forma attenuata, in specie
diverse dalla nostra […].
Se […] sono le stesse leggi naturali a costringerci ad ammettere l’esistenza di fenomeni che esse
non possono spiegare, e di conseguenza a postulare a loro fondamento un diverso tipo di realtà
non materiale, sarebbe poi semplicemente contraddittorio sostenere che ad essa non si devono
attribuire i relativi poteri causali per la ragione – o meglio, per la tautologia – che essi non possono
essere spiegati in termini materiali”.
Nell’ambito di questi argomenti è difficile capire la posizione di V. Mancuso quando nel
libro L’anima e il suo destino37, pur letterariamente affascinante e con momenti di discussione
filosofico-teologica interessanti, afferma per esempio che “…il corpo è energia sotto forma
di materia, l’anima è energia allo stato libero” o che “Un elefante ha una quantità di energia
maggiore rispetto all’uomo (così immagino a partire dalla massa di cui dispone), ma l’energia
dell’uomo è superiore, cioè può produrre più lavoro, grazie al suo essere più ordinata. La
capacità di produrre lavoro, com’è noto, è la definizione di energia”. E nella risposta a Civiltà
Cattolica, pubblicata su Il Foglio del 10-2-2008, scrive:
“La scienza è necessaria per parlare dell’anima… [e] su questa base io sono giunto a fondare il con-
cetto di anima come surplus di energia, come energia libera rispetto alla massa. Per un vivente…
l’anima risulta dal totale dell’energia, cui si sottrae l’energia come massa: E – M = A. Una pietra
invece dà: E – M = zero”.
Queste espressioni non mi risultano chiare. Il termine “energia libera” ha un significato
scientificamente preciso, e definisce quella forma di energia utilizzabile che si sviluppa per
esempio come calore in una reazione chimica: due molecole di HI, composto di idrogeno (H)
e iodio (I), hanno un’energia libera più alta di una di idrogeno + una di iodio nelle quali si
scindono, liberando 610 calorie per mola in condizioni standard, senza variazioni di massa tra
reagenti e prodotti della reazione. Dunque il composto HI (acido iodidrico, stretto parente
dell’acido muriatico), con il suo “surplus” di energia libera, secondo la regola di Mancuso
dovrebbe essere un vivente. In ogni caso, come biochimico, avere un’anima quantificabile in
calorie non mi torna molto.
Perché la libera scelta consapevole di cui è capace il nostro Io non potrebbe essere effet-
tuata da un ente esclusivamente materiale, sia esso parte di un sistema deterministico, o anche
indeterministico? Al di là degli aspetti termodinamici visti sopra, nel primo caso non si vede
come la catena delle cause di processi fisici potrebbe lasciare spazio alla libertà, e infatti coloro
che identificano gli stati psichici con stati cerebrali, come F. Crick per esempio38, tendono
a considerare la pur immediata evidenza interiore di libertà come un’illusione; nel secondo
caso le nostre scelte non potrebbero essere che il risultato di quegli eventi quantistici che si
realizzano nell’arbitrarietà casuale, perché l’indeterminazione implica costanti fluttuazioni
37
V. Mancuso, L’ anima e il suo destino, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2007, pp. 97, 105.
38
F. Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul, London, Simon e Shuster,
1994.
M. Zatti 79
anche quando non ha luogo alcuna operazione di misura.

Neppure attraverso le dinamiche di sistemi non lineari (caos), notoriamente presenti nel
cervello, questo potrebbe fare autonomamente delle scelte e attenervisi, a causa della tipica
instabilità delle dinamiche caotiche.
Su questo punto vi è un mosaico di posizioni che vanno dal determinismo duro incompa-
tibile con l’esistenza della libertà, al “compatibilismo” o a un “semicompatibilismo”, all’“im-
possibilismo” nei confronti della responsabilità morale, fino ai sostenitori dell’opportunità
di conservare la pubblica illusione della libera volontà come contributo al mantenimento
della pubblica moralità39. E anche, su opposto versante, il “libertarianismo”, variamente e
talora vagamente inteso. La vastissima letteratura trova una sintesi nel lavoro di R. Doyle40
comprendente un tentativo di superare i contrasti tra compatibilismo e incompatibilismo.
La psiche umana è molto più che un calcolatore. È merito del grande logico-matematico
Kurt Gödel l’aver dimostrato, molti decenni fa, i suoi teoremi d’incompletezza, accettati
fin da allora (anni ‘30) da tutta la comunità dei logici41. Il primo teorema stabilisce che, per
le logiche superiori a quella dei predicati del primo ordine, in qualunque sistema logico-
matematico coerente ci sono formule (proposizioni) che non possono essere dimostrate nel
sistema, ma che noi possiamo vedere che sono vere. La conseguenza fu la presa di coscienza
negli ambienti matematici della differenza dei concetti di dimostrabilità e di verità; e dell’im-
possibilità di derivare tutte le verità con procedimenti meccanici.
Per un qualsiasi sistema razionale fondato su assiomi e regole d’inferenza logica, e che sia
coerente, vi sono infinite verità non dimostrabili (e questo è stato dimostrato). L’insieme delle
proposizioni dimostrabili non coincide con quello delle proposizioni vere. “Gödel sembra
ridare alla mente umana, capace di astrazione e quindi di uscire dal sistema, uno status del
tutto differente da quello di qualsiasi macchina incapace di riflettere su sé stessa”42.
Un’esposizione dettagliata è al di sopra di quanto posso fare (la dimostrazione richiede la
previa analisi di 46 proposizioni e 5 teoremi preparatori), ma un’idea intuitiva si può captare.
Secondo il primo teorema d’incompletezza, per qualunque sistema assiomatico (A) che
sia consistente (coerente) ci sono infinite verità che non appartengono al sistema. Una di tali
verità è una proposizione (G) che sia dimostrata, entro A, equivalente alla seguente asserzio-
ne: “G non è un teorema di A”.
Infatti, se “G non è di A” fosse falsa, G sarebbe di A, dichiarando di non esserlo, quindi
A non sarebbe consistente. Ma allora se A è consistente “G non è di A” deve essere vera:
questa è dunque una verità e non appartiene al sistema, del quale risulta pertanto evidente
l’incompletezza.
Il secondo teorema è conseguente. Si è visto che può essere detto in A che “se A è con-
sistente, G non è di A”. Questa proposizione di A contiene il teorema “A è consistente” e il
teorema “G non è di A”. Cioè G in questa proposizione sarebbe proprio quello (un teorema
di A) che dichiara di non essere. Ma allora l’intera proposizione, e in particolare la prima
39
S. Smilansky, Free will and illusion, Oxford University Press, 2000.
40
R. Doyle, Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy, Information philosopher 2011.
41
K. Gödel, Collected Works, a cura di S. Feferman, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1986, I, pp.
145-95.
42
F. Bertelè, A. Olmi, A. Salucci, A. Strumia, Scienza, analogia, astrazione, Padova, Il Poligrafo,
1999, pp. 251-65.
parte (il teorema “A è consistente”) non può appartenere ad A, se A è consistente: cioè se il

sistema è consistente non può dimostrare la propria consistenza.
È stato dimostrato che il primo teorema vale per tutti i sistemi formali che siano coerenti,
che sono dunque incompleti, cioè contengono formule non dimostrabili che noi, stando fuori
del sistema, possiamo vedere che sono verità: il nostro “intelligere” non è confinato entro i
limiti del sistema razionale.
Il teorema di Gödel deve applicarsi alle macchine cibernetiche, perché è qualità, essenza
propria della macchina, l’essere concreta installazione di un sistema formale. Ne consegue
che, data una macchina (computer) capace di fare dell’aritmetica, e coerente, ci sarà sempre
una formula che nel sistema-macchina non può essere dimostrata ma che noi possiamo ve-
dere essere vera. Cioè, nessuna macchina potrà mai essere un adeguato e completo modello
della psiche umana, che è differente per essenza dalla macchina43.
L’importanza dei teoremi di Gödel e degli altri che seguirono si può definire epocale.
Secondo G. Chaitin44, Gödel aveva scoperto solo la punta dell’iceberg dell’incompletezza
logico-matematica, che riguarda un numero infinito di teoremi matematici veri i quali non
possono essere dimostrati da alcun sistema finito di assiomi. Certi fatti matematici sono veri
senza alcuna ragione logica, non potendo esistere alcuna teoria che spieghi perché sono veri:
essi non sono soltanto irriducibili da un punto di vista computazionale, sono logicamente
irriducibili, e possono essere solo usati come assiomi. Una teoria è utile se rappresenta una
compressione algoritmica dei dati: la comprensione è compressione, che in molti casi è irre-
alizzabile perché si è di fronte a una complessità irriducibile. L’esempio che può dimostrare
questi limiti della conoscenza logica è il numero che Chaitin ha chiamato “omega” e indica la
probabilità che, con un programma informatico scelto a caso dall’insieme di tutti i possibili
programmi, un computer prima o poi si fermi (alt di Alan Turing). È un numero che ha un
valore definito ma che non potrà mai essere calcolato, perché è incompressibile.
Questi teoremi hanno definitivamente provato che per qualunque sistema logico vi sono
infinite verità che non sono dimostrabili; ma l’intelletto umano vede che sono verità. È anche
evidente che essa non si lascia negare45:
“…la verità insomma esiste necessariamente, è indefettibile, non può mai essere negata senza che,
elencticamente, nella negazione stessa appaia nuovamente la sua riproposizione”.
E si conferma come “indubitabile verità del dubbio”. Scrive S. Agostino (De Vera Reli-
gione 39, 73):
“Chiunque comprende di essere in dubbio, vede una cosa sicura [il suo dubbio] della quale è certo:
dunque egli è certo del vero”.
La verità è più forte della dimostrazione. Come ancora diceva, con poche parole, S. Ago-
stino (De Libero Arbitrio, II, 12, 34):
“…noi giudichiamo la nostra conoscenza mediante la verità, ma non possiamo sottoporre a giudi-
zio la stessa verità. […] Non uscire da te, ritorna in te stesso, nell’interno dell’uomo abita la verità”.
43
J.R. Lucas, Minds, Machines and Gödel, in “Philosophy”, 1961, XXXVI, pp. 112-27.
44
G. Chaitin, The Limits of Reason, in “Sci. American”, 2006, 294/3, pp. 54-61.
45
A. Poppi, La Verità, La Scuola, 1984, p. 95.
M. Zatti 81
Così nel nostro mondo interiore noi troviamo anche la bellezza e il bene, l’arte e la mo-
rale; e vediamo che il bene è verità, che ci fa liberi.
Secondo J. Maritain46
“…l’intelligenza umana, benché sia una ragione che amministra i suoi concetti, ligia alla più stretta
logica (e questo le proviene dalla sua condizione carnale) è anche un intelletto, cioè una potenza
capace di vedere nell’ordine intelligibile come vede l’occhio, e con incomparabilmente maggiore
sicurezza di quanto veda l’occhio, nell’ordine sensibile. Non conosce forse l’intelletto i principi
primi di qualsiasi dimostrazione proprio attraverso una tale intuizione?”.
G. Berlucchi nel suo saggio Mente e Cervello47 fa delle considerazioni interessanti. Egli
usa il termine “mente” per indicare una funzione del cervello, e “anima” per denotare una
presunta “essenza immateriale” (che va lasciata alle discussioni metafisiche). Nelle sue conclu-
sioni richiama i nuovi modi di intendere il ruolo attivo di coscienza e volontà “nel controllo
del funzionamento cerebrale, rompendo l’apparente chiusura causale del mondo fisico”. Gli
stati mentali sono visti come proprietà emergenti dei processi cerebrali, e che a loro volta
esercitano una causalità inversa (top-down, cioè dall’alto al basso com’è tipico dei sistemi
complessi) sulla materia cerebrale.
Se ci atteniamo a queste indicazioni e a questa terminologia, e a quanto abbiamo detto
anche nelle pagine precedenti sulla causalità nel mondo fisico, dobbiamo porre il confine del
dualismo verità/dimostrazione al livello e come espressione di quello anima/mente.
Parliamo di dualismo emergente: dunque, di intelletto e ragione, di libertà e meccani-
cismo, di verità e dimostrazione, di anima e mente, ma lo intendiamo nella composizione
dell’unità sostanziale della materia informata che costituisce l’uomo.
A questo proposito G. F. Basti48 cita opportunamente un passo di Tommaso d’Aquino
dove molto lucidamente si distingue una differenza qualitativa tra le operazioni conoscitive,
nonostante sembrino tutte allo stesso modo proprie del composto anima-corpo, ma che vice-
versa non lo sono, come per esempio per la spiritualità dell’operazione intellettiva che porta ai
concetti astratti, assolutamente privi di modelli fisici. Per questo motivo diciamo che l’anima
è anche forma sussistente, possiede cioè un essere autonomo, perché compie delle operazioni
indipendentemente dal corpo. “La tesi della sussistenza dell’anima dell’uomo, coniugata alla
tesi dell’anima intellettiva come unica forma sostanziale del corpo, è decisiva nella costruzio-
ne di un’antropologia…”49.
Cosa s’intende quando si parla di intelletto, o in altri termini, quale rapporto esiste tra
conoscenza della verità e possesso di libertà? Per aversi libertà non basta la sintassi, occorre
la semantica, che differenzia l’intelligenza umana da quella degli animali e dall’intelligenza
artificiale.
Gli animali, mancando del concetto di connessione logica, non solo non sono in grado
di distinguere tra deduzione e induzione, ma non possono capire perché alcune proposizioni
46
J. Maritain, Il contadino della Garonna, Brescia, Morcelliana, 1973, p. 166.
47
G. Berlucchi, Mente e Cervello, in V. Andreoli, F. Buzzi (a cura di), L’anima e la mente, Cinisello
Balsamo, San Paolo, 2012, pp. 137-47.
48
G.F. Basti, Filosofia dell’uomo, Bologna, ESD, 1995, p. 351.
49
A. Ghisalberti, L’anima da Aristotele a Tommaso D’Aquino, in V. Andreoli, F. Buzzi (a cura di),
L’anima e la mente, cit., pp. 35-36.
siano prove di altre (anche se essi possono usare atti di successione logica e quindi operare
di fatto deduttivamente); né, mancando dei concetti di vero e di falso, possono rifiutare un
argomento obiettando alle relative premesse50. Osservava Leibniz (Monadology 29):
“è la conoscenza delle verità necessarie ed eterne che ci distingue dagli animali, […] permettendoci
la conoscenza di noi stessi e di Dio”.
C’è una differenza dunque tra la conoscenza umana e quella degli animali, differenza che
esprime un’emergenza ontologica per cui ciò che si intende dicendo anima non può essere
ridotto a ciò che si intende dicendo mente e cervello. Ma anche tra gli emergentisti vi sono
profonde differenze. J. R. Searle51 afferma che la coscienza è una proprietà di livello superiore
o emergente del cervello nel senso per esempio in cui la solidità è una proprietà delle molecole
dell’acqua quando sono nel ghiaccio. Ma a questo punto, se la solidità è una proprietà di un
oggetto che può essere ridotta al comportamento delle sue molecole, la coscienza deve potersi
ridurre a stati cerebrali. Certo non è questa un’emergenza ontologica, e difatti Searle sostiene
che i fenomeni cognitivi sono semplicemente causati dai processi neurofisiologici nel cervello,
il che può essere vero in parte ma non può esaurire tutta la realtà emergente non riducibile.
L’emergentismo di Sperry52 (1976) è più radicale, considerando le proprietà mentali
come “configurazionali e olistiche”, differenti rispetto agli eventi neurali dei quali sono com-
poste ma sui quali esercitano un controllo regolativo: gli eventi mentali sono cause piuttosto
che correlati.
Per aversi libertà, tanto il metodo di conoscenza ( ) quanto il relativo substrato
sostanziale, devono essere distinti rispettivamente dalla logica ( ) e dal calcolatore.
“L’uomo è oggettivamente qualcuno ed in questo consiste ciò che lo distingue dagli altri
esseri del mondo visibile che sono sempre qualche cosa”53. La differenza è dovuta all’anima
umana, all’autopossesso che qualifica la persona. Ma su cosa si intende per anima i pareri
sono discordanti54. Uno psichiatra molto deciso nel suo “ateismo scientifico”, P. Debray-
Ritzen55, considerava la sua anima
“…un calcolatore con miliardi di transistor e miliardi e miliardi di connessioni [nel quale] si è
formata una personalità intellettuale e affettiva unica…; il montaggio di tutto ciò su un unico
utensile, con un montaggio unico…è la mia anima”.
2. Verità e dimostrazione
Un calcolatore è uno strumento capace delle operazioni di dimostrazione. Quello che va
chiarito, più attentamente di quanto abbiamo fatto finora, è il rapporto tra dimostrazione e
50
R. Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 210.
51
J.R. Searl, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1992.
52
R.W. Sperry, Mental Phaenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function, in G.G. Globus, G.
Maxwell, I. Savodnik (a cura di), Consciousness and the Brain, New York, Plenum Press, 1976, p. 163.
53
K. Wojtyla, Amore e responsabilità, Casale Monferrato, 1980, c.I.
54
E. Berti, M. Ivaldo, G. Mura, V. Possenti (a cura di), L’Anima, cit.
55
P. Debray-Ritzen, L’ateismo scientifico: uno psichiatra, in C. Chabanis, Dio esiste? No, rispondono…,
Milano, Mondadori, 1974, p. 127.
M. Zatti 83
verità, e sarà utile esaminarlo attraverso ciò che ne esprime l’anima stessa, analizzare cioè il
linguaggio per quanto esse già vi si trovino in coesistenza non pacifica.
Il conflitto si esprime classicamente nelle antinomie logiche quali il “paradosso del men-
titore”, noto ostacolo a una definizione di verità nei linguaggi naturali.
Immaginiamo un libro di molte pagine, ognuna delle quali contiene una sola proposizio-
ne: a pagina 1 è scritto: “La proposizione stampata a pagina 2 è vera; a pagina 2 è scritto: “La
proposizione stampata a pagina 3 è vera”; e così via fino all’ultima pagina nella quale è scritto:
“La proposizione stampata a pagina 1 è falsa”.
Supponiamo che la proposizione di pagina 1 sia davvero falsa: confrontando quello che
essa esprime della proposizione seguente, e tutte le successive, si concluderà che la proposi-
zione 1 è vera in quanto giunge a confermare la dichiarazione della propria falsità, cioè è vera
e falsa contemporaneamente. Supponendo invece che la proposizione di pagina 1 sia vera, la
conclusione è la stessa: è vera in quanto giunge alla dichiarazione della propria falsità. Vi sono
molte altre espressioni di antinomie logiche, di cui si è qui riportato soltanto un esempio che
permette di constatare come la sovrapposizione acritica del concetto di verità a un sistema di
proposizioni dichiarative, che sono proprie delle dimostrazioni, possa condurre all’assurdo.
Chi non riconosce questo fatto pretenderà di esaurire la verità nella dimostrazione, con
ciò ritenendo di procedere nella sicurezza del metodo scientifico, ed escludendo a priori dalla
propria conoscenza infinite verità (Gödel); chi riconosce che un sistema nel quale compa-
iono antinomie denuncia un sintomo di malattia, non si accontenterà di fondare la propria
conoscenza su basi metodologiche che palesano contraddizioni, ma esigerà di approfondire
l’analisi con metodo critico (quindi con rigore scientifico). Lo faremo seguendo la forma di
esposizione che risale ad A. Tarski56.
Analizzando gli elementi caratteristici del linguaggio che sono la fonte reale dell’antino-
mia del mentitore, colpisce un aspetto fondamentale del linguaggio comune: il suo carattere
universale, onnicomprensivo. In particolare si può constatare che per ogni proposizione del
linguaggio comune, è possibile formarne nello stesso linguaggio un’altra la quale esprima che
la prima proposizione è vera o falsa. Tali linguaggi universali, con le antinomie logiche che
comportano, non sono né necessari né adatti per gli scopi della scienza. Per esempio nella chi-
mica si studiano certi oggetti particolari (atomi, molecole ecc.) e non altri: il linguaggio che
ben si adatta a tale trattazione è perciò un linguaggio ristretto con un vocabolario limitato.
Le condizioni imposte al linguaggio per assicurarne la coerenza sono: che il vocabolario
sia completamente determinato; che si usino regole sintattiche formali precise; che questo
linguaggio ristretto sia tenuto distinto da quello nel quale si usa la nozione di verità, se ne for-
mula la definizione, se ne discutono le implicazioni. Quest’ultimo verrà detto “metalinguag-
gio”, e il primo “linguaggio oggetto”; il metalinguaggio dev’essere più ricco del linguaggio
oggetto, perché deve contenere tutte le proposizioni del linguaggio oggetto dovendone di-
sporre per le definizioni di verità. Questa esclusione della definizione di verità dal linguaggio
oggetto, o in altri termini la distinzione tra la nozione di verità e il sistema delle proposizioni
dimostrabili, risulta essere condizione radicale per evitare le antinomie, ossia per una corretta
56
A. Tarski, Il concetto di verità nei linguaggi formalizzati, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1963; Id., Verità e
dimostrazione, in “Le Scienze”, 1969, 12, p. 20; Id. in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: papers from
1923 to 1938, a cura di J. Corcoran, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1983.
fondazione della logica. I risultati di questa premessa portano a importanti deduzioni.

Prendiamo per esempio come linguaggio oggetto quello dell’aritmetica. Il vocabolario
è molto limitato comprendendo variabili, numeri, simboli per le relazioni e operazioni sui
numeri, alcuni termini logici e semplici regole. Il metalinguaggio sarà quello nel quale viene
formulata la teoria (meta-aritmetica) per lo studio del linguaggio aritmetico, e conterrà la
definizione di verità e quella di dimostrabilità.
Si può quindi facilmente definire nel metalinguaggio l’insieme delle proposizioni dimo-
strabili del linguaggio aritmetico, cioè l’insieme delle proposizioni di questo che soddisfano
alla definizione di dimostrazione formale. Sarà anche possibile disporre tutte le proposizioni
dimostrabili in ordine progressivo di complessità, e numerarle. Ora, le relazioni tra i numeri
così assegnati alle proposizioni potranno (trattandosi di numeri) essere descritte mediante
operazioni e relazioni aritmetiche, cioè nello stesso linguaggio oggetto: poiché l’insieme dei
numeri corrispondenti alle proposizioni dimostrabili può essere dunque descritto nei termini
dell’aritmetica, si potrà dire che la definizione di dimostrabilità è traducibile dal metalinguag-
gio al linguaggio oggetto.
Analoga traduzione non sarà invece ammissibile per la definizione di verità, pena la ri-
comparsa delle antinomie logiche (infatti il linguaggio oggetto risulterebbe di nuovo uni-
versale). Ciò indica che l’insieme delle proposizioni dimostrabili non coincide con l’insieme
delle proposizioni vere, dato che l’uno non gode di tutte le proprietà dell’altro (per dimostrare
che due insiemi non coincidono è sufficiente indicare una proprietà di cui goda uno e non
l’altro: qui la proprietà è la possibilità di definizione nel linguaggio dell’aritmetica). Tenendo
presente che tutti gli assiomi dell’aritmetica sono veri e tutte le regole sono infallibili, tutte
le proposizioni dimostrabili devono essere vere. Stante la non coincidenza dei due insiemi, vi
saranno pertanto delle proposizioni vere che non sono dimostrabili. Come dice Gödel.
È ben noto che un calcolatore può essere costruito in modo che operi con certi assiomi
e regole formalizzate di logica, ricavando così qualsiasi numero di proposizioni dichiarative
dimostrate.
Noi possiamo definire vere queste proposizioni se abbiamo fede negli assiomi e nelle re-
gole logiche, e saremmo tentati di considerare la somma logica delle proposizioni dimostrabili
come la definizione di verità del calcolatore. Ma qui si incontra il problema delle antinomie
(e insieme l’aspetto apriori così caratteristico del concetto di verità). Come abbiamo visto,
in ogni linguaggio dobbiamo distinguere tra linguaggio oggetto e metalinguaggio. La parola
“verità” e ogni discussione su di essa va esclusa dal linguaggio oggetto; ne segue che esistono
proposizioni vere ma non dimostrabili. Così la nozione di verità deve essere distinta dal siste-
ma di tali proposizioni, dunque distinta rispetto al calcolatore.
L’anima secondo il citato Debray e molti altri è “un calcolatore”, un “utensile”; ma essa
nel suo linguaggio comprende, oltre alle espressioni logiche, anche semantica e verità che
sono metalogiche. Consapevoli di questo, dobbiamo prendere coscienza con piena chiarezza
di quanto è contenuto nel nostro linguaggio universale: in esso si ritrova l’espressione di un
dualismo, innegabile.
Per qualunque sistema logico-matematico è indispensabile una fondazione non logica di
assiomi.
M. Zatti 85
W. Stegmüller57 afferma che non si possono confutare le intuizioni essenziali senza pre-
supporle, in una argomentazione circolare autocontradditoria. Né si può fare a meno di una
forma di intuizione concettuale che consente di cogliere il rapporto tra concetti astratti, un
tipo di evidenza eidetica58. Evidenza garantita dalla nostra capacità di intuizione delle essenze.
Concetti simili sono espressi da R. Penrose59, “ability to divine or intue truth from falsity” e
insieme “aesthetic criteria”; e da moltissimi altri.
Si sostiene talvolta che l’antinomia del mentitore (paradosso di Epimenide) debba l’as-
surdità al fatto di essere un’operazione di autoriferimento. Come osserva S. Galvan, “…
contro certe argomentazioni che si propongono di dimostrare la insensatezza della formula
di Gödel facendo leva sulla sua struttura autoreferenziale e quindi circolare, [si deve dire che]
la formula è certamente costruita in modo autoreferenziale ma non è insensata perché non è
circolare”.
D. R. Hofstadter60 riporta chiaramente la dimostrazione della riproduzione del parados-
so nella “teoria topografica dei numeri”, quale operata da Tarski, e per cui si ha una versione
del paradosso che, a questo livello, diventa non un’affermazione su sé, ma un’affermazione sui
numeri che è vera se e soltanto se è falsa. Una possibile spiegazione, offerta poi dallo stesso
Hofstadter, cioè l’ipotesi che l’antinomia derivi da un’incompatibilità tra funzioni cerebrali,
avrebbe l’effetto di togliere credito alla razionalità e quindi di rendere inutile il nostro ragio-
nare; e l’Autore stesso in altra occasione ovviamente lo conferma:
“…quando in un sistema logico si permette anche una sola contraddizione, allora, per il princi-
pio – ex falso quodlibet –, da quel sistema si può dedurre qualunque conclusione si voglia” (D.R.
Hofstadter e D.C. Dennet)61.
La nozione metalogica di verità diviene invece garanzia di guida per la razionalità nell’i-
potesi dualista, che poggia infine sulla verità assoluta. In fondo quello di Hofstadter non è
che un altro modo per dire che della verità non si può fare carico al pensiero calcolante e al
cervello, pena dover ammettere l’inaffidabilità delle operazioni della conoscenza: per teoriz-
zare una razionalità ragionevole occorre ipotizzare un soggetto d’azione distinto, capace di
attingere il “ver primo” con sicurezza.
Il conflitto tra verità e dimostrazione e le antinomie sono espressioni di un ampio ambito
di incoerenza nel quale si deve fare chiarezza. L’autoriferimento infatti può produrre paradossi
se tale riferimento passa attraverso il contenuto semantico del discorso, e ciò vale anche per
il paradosso del mentitore. I paradossi dipendono dal conflitto tra due modi radicalmente
diversi usati nello stesso discorso per considerare l’identità di un essere: l’identità definita
mediante la localizzazione spazio-temporale o logico formale, da un lato; l’identità indipen-
dente da un connesso dominio di spazio-tempo, e di natura semantica, per un ente astratto
come ad esempio una qualità. Gli enti del primo tipo sono designati necessariamente con un
sostantivo; quelli del secondo tipo possono essere designati con aggettivi (per esempio: vero).
Orbene, l’operazione di identificazione su base semantica non pertiene al pensiero calcolante
57
W. Stegmüller, Metaphysik, Skepsis, Wissenschaft, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, Springer, 1969.
58
S. Galvan, Introduzione ai teoremi di incompletezza, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992, pp. 191 ss.
59
R. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, Oxford Univ. Press, 1989, pp. 110, 412, 421.
60
D.R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, New York, Basic Books, 1979, pp. 449-50.
61
D.R. Hofstadter, D.C. Dennet, L’io della mente, Milano, Adelphi, 1985.
(tanto meno al calcolatore).

In altri termini, le qualità percepite nella loro identità semantica vanno tenute distinte
(metalinguaggio) dal linguaggio e dalle operazioni della logica quantitativa (linguaggio ogget-
to) e della identificazione spaziale; quindi distinte (dualismo) per il soggetto cui le rispettive
operazioni competono. Questo dualismo è la ragione della differenza esistente tra intelligenza
umana e intelligenza artificiale e rispecchia la differenza tra verità e dimostrazione, e in genere
tra percezione di qualità ed essenza da un lato, e di res extensa dall’altro.
I cultori dell’intelligenza artificiale spesso trascurano il duplice aspetto (dimostrazione/
verità, ragione/intelletto) sul quale ci siamo soffermati, identificando l’intelligenza con la
logica. Per quanto si è detto, questo non può essere che un vicolo cieco, nel quale ci si inoltra
per non voler accettare la soluzione dualista.
L’assioma materialistico in base al quale tutto il conoscibile deve rientrare nelle scienze fi-
siche comporta così di non potersi accertare su nessuna base circa la razionalità della ragione,
dovendosene anzi radicalmente diffidare, per le dimostrate incompatibilità e antinomie. Ma
c’è gente a cui piace questa idea, si potrebbe dire, così ribaltando il commento rivolto ai dua-
listi da Hofstadter e Dennet. K. Popper e molti altri condannano le metafisiche dialettiche in
cui è ammesso in qualche misura l’uso della contraddizione. Chi afferma che “...si può vivere
nelle contraddizioni ed essere felici” dovrebbe comportarsi conseguentemente; mentre, come
afferma Aristotele, quando gli si presenta l’occasione si guarda bene dal precipitarsi nel pozzo,
convinto che il cadervi dentro non sia affatto uguale al non cadervi.
Quando Debray dice “…la mia anima è unica perché i cromosomi che hanno contri-
buito alla formazione del mio corpo contenevano un messaggio assolutamente originale”,
dice una cosa giusta ma incompleta. Anche Aristotele aveva stabilito che il vivente è una
composizione di materia e di un principio d’informazione (come confermano i dati della
biologia ai quali si rifà Debray) e aveva concluso che sotto questo aspetto per l’“anima” non
vi è sussistenza al di fuori della materia informata. Ma Aristotele aveva anche riconosciuto
l’esistenza del , l’intelletto capace di esercitare la conoscenza contemplativa, il quale “…
sembra che sia un tipo d’anima differente […] suscettibile di essere separato, come l’eterno,
dal corruttibile”. La percezione di “ciò che è rispetto all’essenza” è dunque propria del ,
capace della conoscenza che corrisponde all’identificazione semantica e che non essendo pen-
siero discorsivo-proposizionale può entrare in rapporto con l’eterno senza-tempo (Aristotele,
De Anima, II, 1, 413 a).
Una conseguenza assurda della identificazione dell’anima col calcolatore e della mancata
distinzione tra dimostrazione e verità è quella segnalata da S. Sutherland62 in un commento
ad un libro di D. McKay63. Questi, distinguendo tra hardware e software nel cervello, sugge-
risce che una soluzione al problema della risurrezione sarebbe l’incorporamento del program-
ma che funziona nel cervello di ciascun individuo in qualcosa di diverso dal corpo umano.
Inoltre ventila l’ipotesi della costruzione di calcolatori tanto intelligenti quanto gli individui
della specie umana e i quali sarebbero dunque, nota Sutherland, legittimi candidati al regno
dei cieli. Ma la dimostrazione che esistono verità non dimostrabili, che ogni uomo vede come
vere, per le quali un cervello umano (o artificiale) non può e non potrà mai dare conferma
62
S. Sutherland, Science and Faith in Mind, in “Nature”, 1981, 290, p. 167.
63
D.M. McKay, Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967.
M. Zatti 87
logica, significa che l’occhio del software non basta per vedere il regno dei cieli.
Il software della ragione calcolante è caratterizzato da incompletezza, e non vede infinite
verità; è altrove che abitano verità, creatività e libertà, perché è evidente che se le azioni uma-
ne fossero sempre connesse a rigorose inferenze matematiche e alla razionalità del pensiero
calcolante, sarebbero sempre prevedibili.
Bisognerebbe tentare di spiegarlo a quanti stabiliscono limiti arbitrari alla propria cono-
scenza, per esempio definendosi “atei e agnostici razionalisti”, senza tenere conto di quanti
atti di fede compiono nei confronti di tutti gli assiomi, per definizione indimostrabili.
Dato e non concesso che l’esistenza di Dio non sia possibile oggetto d’indagine con
metodo razionale, la posizione degli agnostici che si definiscono razionalisti sarebbe corretta
dal punto di vista logico. Quella degli atei è diversa perché evidentemente presuppongono
che ciò che non è razionalmente dimostrabile non esista. Non si capisce bene perché stiano
insieme.
Ma si può e si deve domandarsi se quel metodo (razionale) è l’unico che dia una com-
pleta conoscenza della realtà esistente. È una domanda sul metodo. Se esso è l’unico valido
per ottenere conoscenze, allora dobbiamo usare tale metodo, il cui campo d’azione è in que-
stione, anche per determinare il campo d’azione di questo stesso metodo. Chi si dichiara ateo
dovrà ammettere che non può evitare di cadere in un’argomentazione circolare; oppure che
fa un atto di fede.
L’uomo è stato definito per secoli “animale razionale”: per esempio da Platone, Aristote-
le (pur considerando come funzione superiore l’intuizione intellettuale), Plotino, Cicerone,
Sallustio, Agostino (“sostanza razionale che consta di anima e di corpo”), Boezio (“rationalis
naturae individua substantia”), Tommaso (distinguendo intellectus et ratio), Scoto, Occam,
Cartesio, Hobbes (“meccanismo tra i meccanismi” con anima razionale), Spinoza, Locke,
Leibniz, Kant, Hegel; e l’elenco non è completo. Ma la definizione non è adeguata: l’uomo
non è soltanto un animale razionale; è un animale capace (talvolta) di riconoscere i limiti
della propria ragione.
3. La libertà dell’Io e la fisica

L’uomo, partecipando in qualche misura alla perfezione divina, può esercitare una cau-
salità che è a immagine e somiglianza della causalità creatrice: è causalità libera, affrancata dal
determinismo. Può questa impegnativa affermazione essere provata anche indipendentemen-
te dall’esperienza interiore di libertà, che secondo alcuni potrebbe essere piuttosto un’illusio-
ne? Seguiamo il problema nell’esposizione che ne ha fatto C. Borghi64.
“Com’è noto – egli dice – in ogni istante della sua evoluzione secondo le leggi che ne determinano
le operazioni, ogni oggetto fisico deve operare una scelta tra infinite possibilità evolutive, sceglien-
do tra di esse quella, e quella sola, cui corrisponde un massimo di aumento dell’entropia (principio
di minima azione o principio di Hamilton, o principio di Fermat, o principio della geodetica). Il
numero di possibilità evolutive tra cui tale scelta è operata, nel linguaggio della teoria dei numeri
di Cantor, è la potenza di una infinità numerabile, ossia il numero transfinito aleph-zero. Ogni
64
C. Borghi, Se volessimo vederci chiaro. Note per una possibile teoria delle scienze, Milano, Jaca Book,
1976, p. 102.
processo evolutivo sottoposto al determinismo fisico implica in modo caratterizzante un numero

aleph-zero di scelte possibili ad ogni istante.
Ora, se ci poniamo la domanda “esistono processi evolutivi non deterministici?”, una maniera
di poter rispondere sarà scoprire se esistono processi evolutivi il cui numero di scelte, istante per
istante, sia inevitabilmente maggiore di aleph-zero.
Lo svolgersi di un processo può essere seguito sopra un diagramma in cui le ascisse sono il tempo
e le ordinate un qualche parametro che rappresenta il fenomeno in questione. Ad ogni istante,
per così dire, la natura pone il problema: quale sarà la posizione del punto seguente? Dal punto
in esame si espandono, in tutte le direzioni, tutte le possibili traiettorie che rappresentano tutti i
possibili sviluppi del fenomeno compatibili con l’insieme delle leggi fisiche. Il numero di queste
possibili linee di sviluppo è numerabile e infinito, cioè sarà il numero aleph-zero, secondo la no-
menclatura di Cantor. Tra queste possibili linee di sviluppo la natura sceglie quella cui corrisponde
il minimo valore d’incremento dell’azione hamiltoniana, e questo, come sappiamo, è determini-
smo fisico. Ora supponiamo che sul fenomeno in osservazione si sovrapponga un Ego con la sua
capacità di scelta delle cause. Questo vuol dire che l’Ego deve scegliere una delle direzioni volute
dal determinismo ma, una volta sceltala, la potrà sviare in un numero di direzioni che è ancora
infinito e numerabile, cioè l’ Ego ha a disposizione aleph zero possibilità di scelta per ognuna delle
direzioni scelte dal determinismo. In complesso vuol dire che l’Ego che opera la scelta delle cause
ha a disposizione un numero di direzioni di sviluppo che è aleph-zero alla potenza aleph-zero, ossia
aleph-uno direzioni. E questo non è più determinismo”.
Il potere di scegliere le cause (la scelta dei motivi della scelta delle cause), il potere di resi-
stere a un desiderio, e quella che Swinburne definisce “countersuggestibility” e McKay “logical
indeterminacy”, sono tutte manifestazioni dell’autodeterminazione umana, della “libertas a
necessitate”. Il problema è sintetizzato dal Borghi nel modo seguente:
“Se il comportamento umano fosse deterministico, sarebbe perfettamente possibile organizzare
una ingegneria della storia che sarebbe una sociologia per mezzo della quale il divenire delle società
e delle culture umane sarebbe prevedibile. In altre parole, se fosse possibile conoscere tutti i “po-
tenziali sociologici”, i cui gradienti definiscono ipotetiche “forze sociologiche”, allo stesso modo
in cui i potenziali fisici determinano con i loro gradienti le forze fisiche, allora la dinamica delle
società umane non sarebbe diversa dalla dinamica di una macchina, retta appunto dal determini-
smo. Supponiamo di avere una società della quale conosciamo in ipotesi tutti i potenziali socio-
logica e sulla quale quindi possiamo impiantare un progetto di evoluzione sociologica di carattere
scientifico. Appare evidente che tale progetto esigerebbe che la popolazione di quella società fosse
rigorosamente mantenuta all’oscuro del progetto stesso, perché se lo sapesse ci sarebbe la possibilità
e persino una grande probabilità di un totale insuccesso per il progetto in questione. In altre parole,
si riottene anche in questa ipotesi quella differenza sostanziale di molteplicità delle scelte libere, in
relazione alla molteplicità delle scelte evolutive dovute al determinismo”.
Lo stesso discorso si potrebbe fare per un solo soggetto anziché per un insieme umano,
una società; per la quale tuttavia forse è più facile la pretesa dell’osservazione e della predi-
zione mediante statistiche, e quindi della possibile negazione arbitraria di una reale libertà.
4. Un passo all’ombra della metafisica. L’evoluzione come creazione e il dolore non creato
L’evoluzione è creativa o è semplice rivelazione dell’implicito? Si può parlare di evolu-
zione creatrice anche senza romantici riferimenti all’“élan vital” e senza confusione con gli
M. Zatti 89
infantilismi creazionisti?
Oppure l’evoluzione è soltanto eduzione, trasformazione?
La datità disponibile permette di definire il processo cosmico, a partire dal big-bang,
come una storia di complessificazione, tanto da giustificare una definizione come quella di C.
Tresmontant65: “Il mondo è un processo durante il quale l’informazione aumenta”. Almeno
nei pianeti di tipo terrestre è più corretto parlare non di un aumento ma di una trasforma-
zione dell’informazione: mettere insieme atomi per fare molecole, molecole per fare strutture
sopra-molecolari, ecc., significa dissipazione di informazione energetica (Ie, energia potenzia-
le elettronica) attraverso la strutturazione; ed essendo Ie continuamente rifornita dall’influsso
nella biosfera di energia radiante, si ha un continuo aumento dell’informazione strutturale
(Ith, energia termica contenuta nei legami strutturali), mentre la complessificazione richiede
anche dissipazione di informazione configurazionale (Ic) nella varietà e aperiodicità; Ic au-
menta tuttavia nella biosfera per effetto dei sistemi di replicazione e di selezione. Nel com-
plesso, resta valida in tutti i processi la seconda legge della termodinamica espressa come
∆ Ie + ∆ Ic + ∆ Ith ≤ 0, per cui non si ha un aumento globale dell’informazione. Nei casi
dell’ordine da fluttuazione dei sistemi lontani dall’equilibrio la possibile riduzione di entro-
pia è in effetti acquisizione d’informazione come complessità, che però deve corrispondere a
equivalenti termodinamici della dissipazione.
Ma la teoria quantitativa dell’informazione non è adatta ad affrontare il problema perché
non può valutare il significato, la qualità (si ricordi quanto s’è detto su logica e semantica). La
musica di Mozart non ha maggiore stabilità termodinamica del rumore, né sarà mai possibile
tradurre nei termini dell’informazione in bit la bellezza del contenuto di un messaggio.
Se tuttavia alla parola informazione si attribuisce il significato di presenza di forme, di
essenze che definiscono i gradi dell’essere nell’ambito dell’accezione filosofica dell’informa-
zione della materia, allora il processo evolutivo può essere apprezzato nel suo significato. Che
è quello della progressiva azione creatrice continua, di fronte alla cui evidenza nell’origine
della vita, della conoscenza animale, dell’intelligenza umana, K. Popper66 parla di autentici
miracoli, cioè di impossibilità di una spiegazione. Popper dal suo punto di vista ha ragione nel
senso che la comprensione razionale dell’evoluzione creatrice esigerebbe di porre un’ipotesi
metafisica, che egli rifiuta. Infatti, dato che l’intero empirico è realmente in divenire, essendo
questo un venire del più dell’essere, è contradditorio rispetto al principio di Parmenide, se-
condo il quale, non potendosi ammettere che l’essere venga dal nulla, ogni divenire è escluso.
A meno che la fonte del più dell’essere non sia metafisica. Si è evoluzionisti se si è, nel senso
corretto, creazionisti. Infatti gli evoluzionisti riduzionisti o fisicalisti sono tali perché tendo-
no a negare i gradi dell’essere, ammettendo i quali non si può fare a meno di una metafisica.
E in questa chiave interpretativa non è necessario fare un discorso a parte per la comparsa
dell’uomo. Se il grado supremo di tutto il divenire è la spiritualità umana, una tensione ver-
so principi essenziali e formali è propria di tutte le tappe del processo evolutivo. Il quale è
sostenuto dalle leggi della termodinamica cui si deve la dissipazione verso la strutturazione e
la complessificazione permesse dalle condizioni al confine tra ordine e caos; ma questo non
65
C. Tresmontant, L’esistenza di Dio oggi, Modena, Edizioni Paoline, 1971; Id., Il problema
dell’anima, Roma, Edizioni Paoline, 1972.
66
K. Popper, Società aperta, universo aperto, Roma, Borla, 1984, pp. 102-09, 133.
basta, è anche necessaria la permanenza delle strutture e dinamiche costruite, in una serie di
stati di relativa stabilità, in una parola forme predisposte (archetipi e attrattori) lungo il corso
delle trasformazioni possibili e probabili. J. Maritain67 scriveva:
“Ogni cosa esistente ha la sua natura o essenza, ma la posizione esistenziale delle cose non è impli-
cita nella loro natura […]. La realtà esistente è così composta di natura e di imprevisto (caso); per
questa ragione ha un senso nel tempo e durando costituisce una storia (irreversibile). La storia ha
bisogno di questi due elementi: un mondo di pure nature non si muoverebbe nel tempo: non v’è
storia per gli archetipi platonici; un mondo di puro imprevisto non avrebbe orientamento: non v’è
storia per un equilibrio termodinamico”.
La termodinamica e il campo delle forme rappresentano sul piano dell’analisi fisica i
corrispettivi della causa efficiente e della causa finale del linguaggio filosofico, nel quale si può
descrivere dunque l’evoluzione come creazione che pone via via nell’esistenza le essenze, o
sviluppa le ragioni causali precreate (“administratio”, “prima conditio”). Il concetto di “forma
finis materiae” e la realissima “attrazione degli archetipi” nel corso dei processi evolutivi (R.
Thom68) ripropongono il problema delle essenze come potenza, rispetto all’essere. Esse come
“potentia essendi” in qualche modo pre-esistono. I riduzionisti sono ben consapevoli di ciò
che rappresentano i gradi dell’essere, cioè (J. Seifert69) i gradi di caratterizzazione e limitazio-
ne (“Abgrenzung” e “Begrenzung”) della perfezione dell’essere negli enti dovuta alla potenza
(essenza), tant’è che vorrebbero negarli riducendo la mente al cervello, il cervello al giuoco
dei potenziali elettrici e dei mediatori chimici, ecc.; cioè eliminando ogni aspetto realmente
creativo dell’evoluzione (e così anche ogni aspetto realmente libero dell’azione umana).
Il progresso della conoscenza ha compreso, sia pure attraverso tentativi ed errori, che
la natura esprime dei temi, perché vi ha trovato delle forme che sono là: quando Keplero
analizzava le orbite dei pianeti del sistema copernicano vi ritrovava le curve che Apollonio
di Perga aveva studiato secoli prima per la loro bellezza matematica, alla stessa maniera che
Einstein trovava nello spazio della relatività generale le forme della geometria di Riemann (S.
Chandrasekhar70).
Il progresso dell’evoluzione ha trovato anch’esso, attraverso tentativi ed errori, il campo
delle forme, gli archetipi attrattori. Questo trovare le forme può essere definito veramente
creativo perché, come dice tanto bene A. Manzoni71, “…l’inventare non è altro che un vero
trovare”.
Il dono e la partecipazione dell’essere nella creazione avvengono attraverso le forme. Il ve-
nir meno della qualità dell’essere, cioè dell’influenza delle forme, è dolore. Il dolore è quindi
incompletezza, mancanza; è nel creato, ma non è creato; è assenza, allontanamento dall’esse-
re. E, parlandone in generale, non è solo la “privatio boni” di Leibniz (Saggi di Teodicea 1710),
ma piuttosto la “corruptio boni” di S. Agostino (Confessioni, VII, 12) e, forse, l’ontica del
67
J. Maritain, citato da L. Valdré, Filosofia e storia della scienza, Filosofia e scienze della natura,
Milano, Massimo, 1983.
68
R. Thom, Stabilità strutturale e morfogenesi, Torino, Einaudi, 1980.
69
J. Seifert, Essere e Persona, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1989.
70
S. Chandrasekhar, Truth and Beauty, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987.
71
A. Manzoni, Opere morali e filosofiche, a cura di A. Chiari, F. Ghisalberti, Milano, Casa Manzoni,
1963, p. 700.
M. Zatti 91
Nichtige di K. Barth72, che derivano dal non volere divino, nello spazio dell’indeterminazione
dove l’uomo ha potuto fare il bene ma anche il male e ha subìto la sciagura; perché la realtà
non è composta soltanto di ”natura” ma anche di “imprevisto”, non soltanto di algoritmo
ma anche di incertezza. Il solo male metafisico non implica perdita delle perfezioni dovute; è
lo spazio per la libertà che la comporta. Questa è la condizione umana: l’indeterminazione,
l’incompletezza fisico-matematica del caos e quella logico-matematica del teorema di Gödel,
che sono d’altra parte le condizioni necessarie per la libertà73. Come abbiamo visto, esse im-
plicano che la conoscenza richieda non soltanto ragione ma anche intelletto, logos e mito,
“denken” e “dikten”: se l’uomo non ha l’umiltà di riconoscere i limiti della ragione, non può
esaurire la verità né, quindi, essere veramente libero.
72
K. Barth, Dio e il Niente, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2000.
73
M. Zatti, Il dolore nel creato: un disegno intelligente?, Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2013.
Genetics and constitutional rights: perspectives and criticalities1
Carlo Casonato, Marta Tomasi2
Table of contents: 1. Introduction. – 2. An intrusive bio-law. – 3. The risks of a space

void of law. – 4. The characters of the subject to be regulated. – 5. Law before a changing
and multiform subject. – 6. Law, life sciences and human sciences. – 7. The force of concrete
cases. – 8. Critical considerations of synthesis: a sustainable penal bio-law?
1. Introduction
Many are the issues and the problems that could be faced with regard to the
relation between genetics and constitutional law and rights. Here, we will limit
ourselves to deal with three aspects concerning: (i) the tendency to have a pervasive
law also in matters connected to life sciences; (ii) the need to set limitations to a
regulation that is however necessary, if only for constitutional reasons; (iii) the
suggestion of a law built and modulated on the basis of the specific characteristics of
life sciences. Upon these bases, we will conclude this paper with some questions that
in our opinion concern criminal law in a particularly critical way.
2. An intrusive bio-law
It is a widespread and shared opinion, both within legal scholarship and within
literature dealing with other areas of knowledge, that law in general, and in particular
in matters connected to man’s health and to life sciences, has often showed itself too
intrusive. Perceived as an «obsessive and formalistic system of general and abstract
norms, incapable of adapting to the multiple and unpredictable needs of concrete
1
Translation in English language by Lorenzo Pasculli.
2
In the common conception of the paper, paragraphs from 1 to 4 can be attributed to Carlo Casonato,
paragraphs from 5 to 7 to Marta Tomasi; paragraph 8 is to be attributed to both.
94 Genetics and constitutional rights
cases», the legal phenomenon came to impose «the respect of procedures that are
often bureaucratic and obsolete and eventually irrelevant for the patient’s interests»3.
Often reduced to the mere legislative component, law has thus been exclusively or
mainly intended as an obstacle to clinical research and for the exercise of the medical
practice itself.
Along this lines, Stefano Rodotà opens his book on «life and the rules» (La vita
e le regole) with the image of a «law-saturated society», questioning himself on the
possibility that law invades vital worlds and takes hold of «nude life». «Does this
mean that nothing can be alien to it, and society has to resign to be closed in the steel
cage of an omnipresent and pervasive legal dimension?» 4. A decade ago already, in
a work significantly entitled Limits, Roger B. Dworkin suggested an answer to such
questions, remembering how, particularly within the field of biology and medicine,
«[l]aw itself has limits that suggest deference and humility in considering whether
and how to use it [...]. Sound public policy requires evaluation of each legal tool to
ascertain which one(s) can deal best with which problems of biomedical advance and
to understand the limits of the ability of each legal tool and the entire legal system to
regulate biomedical developments»5.
Facing the risks engendered by an inopportune and eventually counterproductive
«legal interference», scholars unanimously acknowledge the need to set a number of
limits to regulation. They disagree, though, on the nature, the content, the amount
and the consistence of the limitations to be set.
3. The risks of a space void of law

The alternative to an inopportune intrusiveness cannot consist in banning law
from the field. A measured self-restraint aiming at acknowledging a balanced space
to the pair autonomy-responsibility of professionals involved in life sciences cannot
bring to an unconditioned withdrawal of law. Such a situation would endanger the
safeguard of individual rights and the necessary containment of power (of every
power), thus succumbing to the dominion of a science that would even self-regulate
in conditions – we might say – of sovereignty. Thus, following the two Authors we just
cited, «[t]o suggest that the law has no role to play in the area of biomedical advance
would be both stupid and unrealistic». A space void of law, also constitutional law,
would conceal the «peril of an unconditioned will of power»; will that is attested by
some recent cases, also out of the field of genetics.
3
F. D’Agostino, Diritto, in “L’Arco di Giano. Rivista di Medical Humanities”, 1, 1993, p. 51 (our
transl.).
4
S. Rodotà, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2006, p. 9 (our transl.).
5
R.B. Dworkin, Limits. The Role of the Law in Bioethical Decision Making, Bloomington and Indianapolis,
Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 2.
C. Casonato, M. Tomasi 95
The affair that led the Indian Supreme Court to decide, on April 1st, 2013, the
Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others has originated in 2006, when the Indian
patent office denies to the Swiss multinational the patent for a variant (based on
the beta crystal form) of a drug already commercialized since 1993 (the Imatinib
Mesylate, produced under the name of Gleevec or Glivec)6. The Indian Patent Act
1970, amended several times also after the adoption of the TRIPS agreements,
establishes that a product can be patented provided that, amongst others, it is new
and inventive. In particular, it has to be an «invention which has a feature that: (a)
entails technical advance over existing knowledge; or (b) has an economic significance
and (c) makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art» (Chapter I,
Section 2.1). Moreover, the act provides for a specific clause of absolute relevance that
excludes from patenting «the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance
which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance»
(Chapter II, Section 3d).
On such bases, the Court highlights how «in the patent application, there is
no claim of superiority of the beta crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate in regard
to the aforesaid three properties [(i) more beneficial flow properties; (ii) better
thermodynamic stability; and (iii) lower hygroscopicity than the alpha crystal form
of Imatinib Mesylate], or any other property, over the starting material Imatinib, or
even over Imatinib Mesylate in amorphous form or any form other than the alpha
crystal form» (p. 9).
Despite Novartis’ requests, and the fact that the recalled Section 3d of the second
Chapter of the act was inserted after the petition for grant of a patent, the Court
rejects the request for a patent extension.
For what more matters here, this case demonstrates how the absence of a legal
norm, as the lack of its implementation, would have determined the success of
Novartis’ strategy aimed at extending the duration of a patent beyond its initial expiry
date through the adoption of minor modifications of the product. Such a commercial
strategy, known as evergreening, would have prevented the commercialization of the
generic drug at far lower prices (the Novartis product costs 2.600 dollars per month,
whereas the generic drug does not cost more than 180), thus preventing, as a matter
of fact, some hundred thousands of patients, not only Indian, from using such a
medicine destined to the treatment of some tumours and some types of leukaemia.
With such a decision, more generally, the Court brought the patent logics to the
principle, entailed by the form of social State itself, according to which «medicine
and surgical and curative devices were to be made available to the public at the
cheapest price commensurate with giving reasonable compensation to the patentee»
(p. 33).
6
A reconstruction of the case and the links to the original materials can be found at www.biodiritto.org.
A second evidence of the will of some of the protagonists of clinical research to

break free from a normative framework protecting fundamental legal and ethical
principles can be found in the affair that saw the Italian research institute Mario
Negri opposed to GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). Within an experimental research project
on some innovative antibiotics carried out within the framework of the Innovative
Medicines Initiative (IMI) by a team made of universities and public research centres
as well as private pharmaceutical companies, GSK claimed a total control both of
the methodological aspects of the protocol, and of the aspects connected to the
transparency and the publication of the results. In the words of the director, Silvio
Garattini, and of researchers at the Mario Negri as reported in an article published in
September 2013 on the British Medical Journal, «GSK wanted to retain the right to
permit or refuse access to the patient outcome data and to give written approval for
any independent publication of the data generated by the public-private partnership.
That meant that we would have had to ask GSK’s permission to access the data from
our own trial and that GSK reserved the right to block publication of our analysis
of that data at any time after the study was completed»7. Despite the declaration
by GSK itself published on the New England Journal of Medicine in August 2013
concerning the commitment to make clinical data public8 and the IMI’s policy on
intellectual property according to which «[o]wnership of the foreground [results,
including data, know how, and information] belongs in the first instance to the
participant(s) who generated it», GSK insisted in its line aimed at reserve the right
to decide «who would ever see the raw data and for what purpose. No one would
have had the right to publish anything about the outcomes of the study without the
company’s written consent».
Facing the violation of the principles of transparency and accessibility of
the outcomes of any research, the Mario Negri Institute therefore declared the
renunciation to collaborate to a project that − it is worth noticing − disposes of 195
million Euros of funds coming, partly, from the European Commission: «[s]ecrecy
on clinical data implies undue exploitation of the rights of physicians and patients
involved in the studies. This is even more inappropriate when publicly funded or
independent non-profit institutions are contributing to the development of a drug
and patients are generously volunteering to participate. Secrecy definitely sounds
paradoxical when EU funds support the clinical research, as with IMI projects».
A third case demonstrating the strong temptations of uncontrolled power by some
non-marginal components of the world of clinical research and of the production
of drugs to the detriment of the rights of the persons involves Johnson & Johnson
7
S. Garattini, V. Bertelé, G. Bertolini, A failed attempt at collaboration, in “BMJ”, 2013; 347:
f5354.
8
P. Nisen, F. Rockhold, Access to patient-level data from GlaxoSmithKline clinical trials, in “N Engl J
Med.”, 2013, Aug 1; 369(5): 475-8.
(J&J) and, once again, Novartis.

According to the European Commission’s findings, in 2005 after the expiry of the
patent for Fentanyl (an analgesic much more effective than morphine, chiefly used
to soothe the pains of patient affected by cancer), the patentee, the pharmaceutical
company J&J, took agreements with Novartis in order to delay as much as possible
the introduction of the generic drug in the Dutch market. Such a «co-promotion
agreement» provided for strong incentives by a Dutch partner of J&J, Janssen-Cilag,
in favour of Sandoz, a Dutch subsidiary of Novartis; incentives that exceeded the
benefits that Sandoz could have realised by selling the generic drug in Holland. The
agreement terminated in December 2006, when a third pharmaceutical company
introduced the generic drug in the market.
Such a strategy drew the attention of the European Commission that, in
December 2013, found it a «pay-for-delay» behaviour in violation of the competition
rules: «Instead of competing, Janssen-Cilag and Sandoz agreed on cooperation so
as “not to have a depot generic on the market and in that way to keep the high
current price”. Janssen-Cilag did not consider any other existing potential partners
for the so-called “co-promotion agreement” but just focused on its close competitor
Sandoz. Sandoz engaged in very limited or no actual co-promotion activities». Thus,
the violation of art. 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
brought the Commission to impose a fine of 10.798.000 Euros on J&J and a fine
of 5.493.000 Euros on Novartis9. Apart from the technical aspects of the case, what
is striking in the perspective adopted here, is once again the will of maximize profits
by eluding elementary legal norms and ethical principles safeguarding fundamental
individual and collective rights. In the words of the responsible for competition and
Vice-President of the European Commission, Joaquín Alumnia, «J&J paid Novartis
to delay the entry of a generic painkiller. The two companies shockingly deprived
patients in the Netherlands, including people suffering from cancer, from access to a
cheaper version of this medicine»10.
The three mentioned cases, all dating back to 2013 and recalled here as mere
examples, can be compared to other less recent affairs happened, for instance, in the
United States, such as, amongst others, with specific regard to treatment of genetic
data and information, the famous Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., or Washington
University v. Catalona11.
9
Art. 101 of TFEU establishes that: «The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market (…)».
10
We are citing the European Commission’s press release of 10 December 2013 (http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm).
11
Respectively, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990); 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir.
These affairs, however, confirm the need for the existence and for a careful
application of a normative framework capable to equally balancing the different
interests at stake in the field of life sciences, averting the always latent expansion of
“the rule of the strongest”, which may also materialize in other forms of violence,
such as, for instance, those in which research is conducted in poor Countries where
there are no norms on the vigilance of ethical committee and on the respect of
the participant’s rights; in which researchers want to pass to the direct application
of their own activities on the sick without the control of scholarship and of the
competent bodies; up to the situations in which a single professional wants to operate
a treatment against the patient’s will.
All such problems shall be framed within the pair power-liberty that traditionally
involves and animates constitutional law and its logics. In this regard we might recall,
mutatis mutandis, one of the most effective syntheses of constitutionalism intended
as a movement of ideas and practices (that becomes prescriptive rules) dedicated to
the objective of limiting power and safeguarding personal rights. We are speaking
about art. 16 of the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1879, which
declares that «Toute Société dans laquelle la garantie des Droits n’est pas assurée, ni la
séparation des Pouvoirs déterminée, n’a point de Constitution».
In the light of the both positive and negative potential of life sciences, and of
genetics in particular, there is therefore the problem of indicating the properties
of a “well-dimensioned” law having characteristics that prevent its hypertrophy, by
ensuring its safeguard function. In general, we may recall the resort to the old label
of «diritto mite» («meek law»), recently revised, precisely with regard to some issues
concerning life sciences, as «diritto gentile» («kind law»)12.
Facing alternatives and often opposite conceptions concerning the contents, the
nature, the profundity that such a «good law» should assume, here we intend to
suggest a theoretical-practical hypothesis capable of orienting the construction of a
biolaw having virtuous characters thanks to the attention to the specificities of the
object to be regulated.
4. The characters of the subject to be regulated

Genetics, as any other life science and particularly as those aimed at life and
health of human beings, insists on a peculiar subject that complicates some of the
dynamics and legal categories usually utilised. (i) Dealing with genetics means, first
(Mo.) 2007). In general, see C. Casonato, Derechos de la persona y lógicas de la investigación clínica, in
“Teoría y Derecho. Revista de pensiamento jurídico”, 11/2012, p. 26 ff.
12
The first reference goes to G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite, Einaudi, 1992. The second indication
refers to Paoalo Zatti’s work, testified by the materials collected at http://undirittogentile.wordpress.
com/.
of all, dealing with a subject of which science incessantly highlights new aspects,
original knowledge and previously unexplored questions, renovated potentialities and
unknown risks. It is precisely the uninterrupted scientific discoveries and technological
applications that make a multiform and mutable subject of it, which may result
modified even from the moment in which it is regulated by law. (ii) Secondly, every
aspect connected to the genetic dimension typically involves the anthropological
conception and the deepest moral structure of each of us. And with it, the meaning of
delicate and dividing objects such as those of reductionism or genetic determinism,
as far as to call into question the survival of free will. Finding an agreement on
the relative regulation, setting rights and duties and founding the respective limits
is therefore an activity that, especially in certain contexts more inclined to the
reciprocal delegitimisation rather than to an authentic dialogue, such as the Italian
context, often consumes time and resources vainly. (iii) Thirdly, the concrete cases that
reality uncovers are characterised by particularly complex peculiarities having lots of
consequences, linked to contexts that are, in turn, specific themselves and hard to be
generalized, in which even a single detail may represent such an element to justify a
differentiated legal treatment.
For all of these reasons, life sciences and genetics in particular invoke disciplines
that cannot be maximalist but have to combine safeguards with flexibility, tending
to be open to the specific features of the subject to be regulated. Such normative
necessities should not be confused with indecision or weakness, but dictate that
the normative decision to be adopted is the product of a careful balance of often
opposite interests, which rarely can find full reception and in most cases are to be
accurately pondered with each other. In the following paragraphs, we will draw
upon comparative law some examples of legal institutes or regulations that – in
our opinion – may reflect the normative needs connected to the above-described
characters of the subject.
5. Law before a changing and multiform subject

As we foretold (sub i), the continuous progresses of technology and scientific
knowledge make of genetic a multiform and ever-changing subject of study that
puts law, its tendential stillness and non-permeability to external influences to the
test and requires an unusual promptness in elaborating solutions to new emerging
problems. Strictly connected to such a profile of criticality, a further relevant aspect
concerns the typical language of genetics that, in most cases, seems to express itself
in terms of probability rather than certainty, offering relevant but not univocal and
deterministic indications about the possibilities, for instance, to contract a particular
illness in an indefinite moment in the future.
The task that law has to face is to lay its ordering force upon a composite and
ambiguous reality, without neglecting scientific data or exposing itself to the risk of
creating a detachment between rule and facts; without getting rigid but avoiding to
loose sight of the levels of certainty and verifiability concretely acquired.
The complexity of individuating such a point of balance emerges from a
comparative analysis that highlights how legal orders have faced the challenges of
human genetics resorting to a variety of instruments, both binding and non-binding
in nature, and to a multiplicity of approaches that in part acknowledge and in part
reject the exceptional nature of genetic data compared to other health information13.
Within such a fragmented background, it seems that a unifying trait can be
individuated in the relevance attributed to the instrument of genetic counselling,
considered as a procedural instrument indispensable to manage the complexity of the
phenomenon and to grant a protection to rights considering the specific characters
of genetic information and of its knowability.
The interest of the international scientific community for genetic counselling
is well consolidated already14 and its inescapability is recognized in international,
supranational and national documents. For instance, it is required as a condition for
the legitimacy of genetic testing by art. 12 of the so-called Oviedo Convention15 and
by art. 8 of the respective additional Protocol of 2008 on genetic testing16, by art.
11 of the UNESCO International Declaration on Human Genetic Data17 and by the
Recommendation n. 9 of the 25 Recommendations on genetic testing adopted by
the European Union18.
13
Apart from the criticisms that can be addressed to an exceptionalist approach that individuates in
genetic information an unicum amongst health information – criticisms centred on the fact that such an
approach would suggest a “gene-centric” anthropological model, which simplifies extremely complex
mechanisms, far from being fully understood, and which, on the other hand, gives too much relevance
to components that contribute to the biological characterisation of the human being, although in a
non-deterministic and non-exclusive way – it is relevant to notice how many jurisdictions chose to
dedicate to genetic information specific normative provisions. Some examples can be represented by
the general Authorisation to the treatment of genetic data adopted by the Italian Data Protection
Authority (the most recent version, as it is well-known, dates back to December 2012), the German
Gendiagnostikgesetz (GenDG) (Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen, 31 July 2009), the
Austrian Gentechnikgesetz (GTG) (BGBl 510/1994, lastly amended by BGBl. I Nr. 13/2006), the Swiss
federal act on genetic exams on human beings (8 October 2004) or the specific provisions established
by the French Code de la santé publique (recently, ad hoc dispositions have been introduced by Loi n.
2011-814 of 7 July 2011).
14
F.C. Fraser, Genetic Consulting, in “American Journal of Human Genetics”, 26, (1974), pp. 639-
659.
15
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, adopted within the Council of Europe and opened
to ratification on April, 4th 1997 in Oviedo.
16
Strasbourg, 27 November 2008.
17
Unanimously adopted during the 32nd UNESCO General Conference on October 16th, 2003.
18
European Commission (Directorate-General for Research Information and Communication Unit),
25 Recommendations on the ethical, legal and social implications of genetic testing, 2004.
Genetic counselling shall, therefore, represent a point of connection between

the potentialities of technology and the care for and protection of the patient19, a
medium between the test and the person subjected to it; such a role of connection is
to be interpreted even more intensely in the actual context of genetic consumerism20,
characterised by an increasingly wide diffusion of the test, also in the virtual market,
and by a consequent withdrawal of controls and guarantees21.
In Italy, the importance of counselling, which should provide the «instruments for
the comprehension of genetic illness», had already been emphasised by the National
Committee for the Bioethical Orientations for Genetic Testing (Comitato Nazionale
di Bioetica negli Orientamenti Bioetici per i Test Genetici)22 and, more recently, by the
State-Regions agreement of July, 15th 2004 on Guidelines for the activities of medical
genetics23. In particular, the text of the agreement credits to genetic counselling,
qualified as «integrant part of a genetic testing», with the value of a complex process
of communication and provides for a possible participation of professional figures
different than the physician or the geneticist. The relevance of the counselling phase
is evident also due to the fact that the informed consent to the test is qualified as
the outcome of a process of communication that should «conclude a dialogue», in a
conception of counselling intended more as a complex act of communication than
a properly medical act24.
Such an approach has been, at least in part, reaffirmed by the Italian Data
Protection Authority (Garante per la protezione dei dati personali) that defines
counselling as a whole of «communication activities aimed at helping the individual
19
See the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee’s Report on genetic counselling (Paris, 15
December 1995): «Genetic counselling provides the link between genetic technologies, several of which
have been acquired through the Human Genome Project, and patient care».
20
S. Amato, Biogiurisprudenza. Dal mercato genetico al self-service normativo, Torino, 2006 and L.
Battaglia, La genetizzazione della medicina, in C. Modonesi, G. Tamino (eds.), Fast science. La
mercificazione della conoscenza scientifica e della comunicazione, Milano, 2008, pp. 203-220.
21
Similar worries are at the base of precautions such as that the Data Protection Authority introduced
in Italy, by excluding, in consideration of the «need to grant an appropriate genetic counselling», the
possibility to offer services of on-line medical reporting in case of genetic investigations [Linee guida in
tema di referti on-line of 19 November 2009 (G.U. n. 288 of 11 December 2009), our transl.].
22
Comitato Nazionale di Bioetica, Orientamenti bioetici per i test genetici. Sintesi e raccomandazioni (19
November 1999). At the fourth point of the document it is made clear that «within an adequate service
of genetic counselling, the potential users should be provided with the instruments to understand the
genetic disease: for instance, what does unifactorial or multifactorial disease mean; what is the meaning
of the possible results of the test; and also the possibility of false negatives and false positives, the
meaning of the probabilistic approach to diagnosis, the notions of predisposition to the disease and the
risk factor» (our transl.).
23
The agreement was elaborated, pursuant to art. 4 D. Lgs. del 28 August 1997, n. 281, between the
Ministry of Health, the Regions and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano.
24
On the topic see L . Palazzani (ed.), Gen-jus: la consulenza tra genetica e diritto, Roma, Studium,
2011; L. Palazzani, L. Nepi (eds.), Gen-ius. Consulenza genetica e normative europee, Roma, Studium,
2012; P. Sommaggio, La consulenza genetica: un ponte tra auto poiesi ed auto trascendimento, in “Tigor:
rivista di scienze della comunicazione”, A. II, 2010, n. 2 (July-December).
or the family struck by a genetic pathology to understand the medical information

that include diagnosis and the probable course of the disease, the available forms of
assistance, the contribution of heredity to the occurrence of the illness, the extant
risk of recurring both for oneself and for other relatives and the opportunity to make
them know, as well as all the existing options in coping with the risk of disease and
the impact that such a risk may have on procreation choices; in the performance of
genetic testing such a counselling also includes information on the meaning, the
limits, the reliability and the specificity of the test, as well as the implications of its
results»25. Further indications, laid down by point 5 of the Authorization, dedicated
to the Information notice, establish that the counselling should be offered before and
after the analysis.
Apart from the formulation adopted at a national level, for what matters most
here, it is the requirement that UNESCO individuated at an international level –
that is, that counselling is configured as non-directive and culturally adequate and
that it shall represent the best interest of the person involved26 – that highlights
the role that counselling has in realising the safeguard of individual rights through
a careful consideration of the specificities of the concrete case, of factual reality
and of the individual characters of the single subject put in relation with genetic
knowledge. In the same direction the cited art. 8 of the additional Protocol to the
Oviedo Convention on genetic testing that clarifies that the form and the scope of
counselling shall be established based on the implications of the results of the test
and on the meaning they may bear for the person or the members of his/her family27.
A reading of genetic counselling as an instrument of connection capable of
aligning the potentialities offered by scientific evolution and the effective protection
of rights could also allow to solve a profile of uncertainty that seems to emerge from
a first reading of the text of the Italian Authorization.
The importance of genetic counselling, which as we saw is highlighted by point
5, seems to be partially retracted by the letter of point 9, which provides that «the
outcomes of genetic testing and screening […] shall be communicated to the
interested person also in compliance with his declaration of will of knowing or not
knowing such events and, whereas necessary, with an appropriate genetic counselling»
(our transl.). Such a tempering could be read in a positive key, when one finds
25
The definition is among those listed at Point 1 of the general Authorization to the treatment of
genetic data n. 8/2013 (letter h).
26
UNESCO, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, cit., art. 11: «[g]enetic counselling
should be non-directive, culturally adapted and consistent with the best interest of the person
concerned».
27
Art. 8 entitled Information and genetic counseling: «[t]he form and extent of this genetic counselling
shall be defined according to the implications of the results of the test and their significance for the
person or the members of his or her family, including possible implications concerning procreation
choices».
in it the intention to exclude the need for counselling in every case in which the
outcome to be communicated to the patient corresponds to information that could
be obtained through medical exams of different nature. Such a reading would permit
to refuse an exceptionalist approach and to use genetic counselling wisely and to the
actual aim of protecting rights.
Genetic counselling, therefore, although variously configured in the several
cited normative instruments, when interpreted correctly, seems to qualify itself
as an instrument useful to ensure a full protection to the right of individual self-
determination and of a concretely free and informed choice. Moreover, it lets
individual action be placed in a perspective based on a correct consideration of the
level of development of science and technique and of the degree of certainty they
can afford.
In this way, genetic counselling is the manifestation of a law careful to the person’s
own characteristics, to his/her own understanding abilities, to the social and cultural
context in which his/her own personality develops and to the ethical-moral substrate
that orients his/her choices.
6. Law, life sciences and human sciences

The second order of considerations derives, as we saw (sub ii), from the fact that
many aspects of human genetics typically involve the deepest moral conception of
each of us and, with it, the meaning of also anthropologically delicate and dividing
concepts, such as, for instance, those of health and sickness, of nature and artifice, of
autonomy and hetero-determination, as far as to influence the boundaries between
cure and strengthening.
In particular, the most recent techniques, not yet brought to a definitive
consolidation, which go from the isolation of single genes to pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis, from the possibility to intervene on the sequence of nucleic acids
forming DNA and to modify it, producing effects on the phenotypical characteristics,
to synthetic biology, seem capable of touching the hearth of vital mechanisms of
humankind and, consequently, the characters that ontologically determine the
human being.
Facing such developments, it seems possible to find, within the legal phenomenon
globally conceived, a tendential convergence of opinions aimed at stigmatizing
potential abusive and distorted deployments of scientific progresses; such tendency,
at least partly historically determined, resulted into the enunciation of principles in
various documents providing for adequate safeguards in protection of rights, so to
avoid discriminations, reductionist attitudes and eugenic drifts.
Particularly clear and exemplary of this is art. 3, par. 2, of the Charter of fundamental
rights of the European Union28, which imposes «the prohibition of eugenic practices,
in particular those aiming at the selection of persons». The explanations relating to
the Charter clarify that such a statement is aimed at preventing «possible situations in
which selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns
for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts
deemed to be international crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court
adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998».
If we cast our eyes little beyond the expressions of principle, however, the
multiplicity of relevant practical behaviours are subjected to also diametrically
opposite theoretical frameworks and practical regulations.
In particular, starting from the scientific acquisitions that are concretely available at
the present moment, the problems concerning eugenic practices broadly considered29
emerge whenever one considers diagnostic techniques and the following selective
possibilities. In this case the declaration of principle seems to succumb before the
complexity of reality and its ability to influence the protection of individual rights. It
is well known, indeed, that some jurisdiction adopted norms explicitly introducing
the possibility of a selection of embryos based on certain genetic features. Thus, both
the Spanish and the British legal order, for instance, introduced rules admitting, in
specific circumstances qualified in a quite detailed fashion, the possibility to select an
embryo that results genetically compatible with a sick sibling.
In 2008, the UK Parliament admitted the legitimacy of techniques of analysis
aimed at a screening of embryos produced with in vitro procreation techniques
and at the consequent selection of those genetically compatible with a sick sibling
(“preimplantation tissue typing” – PTT). Resorting to such practices, though, has
been conditioned to a specific authorisation by a committee of the Human Fertility
and Embryology Authority (HFEA)30 having the duty to assess the existence of certain
requirements and specific factors such as the probability of success of the treatment,
the availability of alternative treatments and the possibility to collect cells and tissues
from other relatives or third donors31.
28
Entered into force on December 1st, 2009.
29
The term «eugenics» here is recalled as a general reference to practices of selection based on genetic
features. According to some Authors, however, one could properly speak of eugenics only with regard
to coercive public policies aimed at orienting individual behaviours (cf. A. Santosuosso, Diritto,
scienza e nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, pp. 189-190).
30
Such a role is envisaged by the new version of Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE) of
1990. Amongst the activities that can be authorised (Schedule 2) there is the testing on embryos «in
a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons whose gametes are used to bring
about the creation of the embryo (or of either of those persons) suffers from a serious medical condition
which could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue of any resulting
child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting child would be compatible with that of the
sibling» (1ZA, 1, lett. d).
31
Highly detailed indications are laid down by the Code of practice of HFEA that individuates a very
As a confirmation of the essential relevance to be attributed in such cases to

the specific characteristics of each situation, one may consider that, dating from
2009, as regards pre-implantation genetic diagnosis techniques generally considered,
the HFEA chose to adopt a condition-by-condition approach, individuating a list of
pathologies for which resorting to such techniques is generally authorised; on the
contrary, the authorisation to the application of PTT techniques still depends on the
assessment of the specificities of the concrete case.
In the same direction goes the Spanish act32 acknowledging the relevance of
pre-implantation genetic as an instrument useful to the «prevención de enfermedades
genéticas que en la actualidad carecen de tratamiento», also through the «posibilidad
de seleccionar preembriones para que, en determinados casos y bajo el debido control y
autorización administrativos, puedan servir de ayuda para salvar la vida del familiar
enfermo»33. To this end, the act envisages the possibility to perform pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis aimed at evaluating the histocompatibility with a sick third
subject, conditioned to the authorisation by the competent health authority and to
the favourable opinion by the Comisión Nacional de Reproducción Humana Asistida,
which shall assess the clinical, therapeutic and social characteristics, case by case34.
long list of requirements to which the centre competent for the authorisation shall adhere. Thus,
«10.22 When deciding whether to use preimplantation tissue typing, the centre should consider the
circumstances of each case individually, rather than the fact that the procedure is sought to provide
tissue to treat a particular condition. 10.23 When deciding on the appropriateness of preimplantation
tissue typing in a particular situation, the centre should consider the condition of the affected child,
including: a) the degree of suffering associated with their condition; b) the speed of degeneration in
progressive disorders; c) the extent of any intellectual impairment; d) their prognosis, considering all
treatment options available; e) the availability of alternative sources of tissue for treating them, now
and in the future, and; f) the availability of effective therapy for them, now and in the future. 10.24
The centre should also consider the possible consequences for any child who may be born as a result,
including: a) any possible risks associated with embryo biopsy; b) the likely long-term emotional and
psychological implications; c) whether they are likely to require intrusive surgery as a result of the
treatment of the affected child (and whether this is likely to be repeated), and d) any complications
or predispositions associated with the tissue type to be selected. 10.25 The centre should also consider
the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment, including: a) their previous reproductive
experience; b) their views and the affected child’s views of the condition; c) the likelihood of a successful
outcome, taking into account: i) their reproductive circumstances (ie, the number of embryos likely
to be available for testing in each treatment cycle, the number likely to be suitable for transfer,
whether carrier embryos may be transferred, and the likely number of cycles); ii) the likely outcome of
treatment for the affected child; d) the consequences of an unsuccessful outcome; e) the demands of
IVF/preimplantation testing treatment on them while caring for an affected child, and; f) the extent of
social support available».
32
Ley n. 14 of 26 May 2006, Sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida, pubblicato in “Boletín
Oficial del Estado”, 126 of 27 May 2006.
33
Such a possibility falls within the reasons that determined the adoption of the cited regulation (Ley
14/2006, Exposición de motivos, II).
34
Art. 12 of the act, after having listed the legitimate applications of pre-implantation genetic
diagnosis, establishes that «[l]a aplicación de técnicas de diagnóstico preimplantacional para cualquiera
otra finalidad no comprendida en el apartado anterior, o cuando se pretendan practicar en combinación con
Similarly, the difference between negative eugenics, which some regard with
favour insofar as aimed at reducing or eliminating certain genetic features deemed
to be detrimental or pathological, and the more discussed positive eugenic, aimed
at the promotion and the strengthening of features considered advantageous, blurs
before the heterogeneity and the complexity of the category of genetic information.
Selection based upon sex, for instance, considered as non-acceptable in general and
in principle35, finds application in some jurisdictions whereas connected to specific
medical reasons. The clearest example of regulation taking into account such a
hypothesis can be found, once again, in the British Human Fertility and Embryology
Act, which legitimizes the possibility of authorising testing on embryos aimed at
determining their sex, in cases presenting a qualified risk that the child might carry
or develop «(i) a gender-related serious physical or mental disability, (ii) a gender-
related serious illness, or (iii) any other gender-related36 serious medical condition»37.
Provisions as such, though, require an application that is rigorously founded on
an evaluation that keeps into account the already mentioned problematic aspects
of genetic data and, in particular, on their scarcely predictive nature. Particularly
problematic, from this point of view, appear to be such as news as those, recently
reported by the press, according to which Western Australia health authorities have
authorised a family genetically predisposed to the development of forms of autism to
select an embryo on the basis of sex because, according to some studies, males would
be four times more inclined to develop the disease than females38.
Furthermore, with regard to the possibilities that might emerge in the future
from gene therapy, a first aspect calling for some clarification concerns the difference
between somatic gene therapy and gene therapy that, on the contrary, would be able
to influence the germline. The difference between the two typologies of intervention
consists in the fact that, in the former case, the modification would produce effects
only for the individual subjected to therapy while, in the latter, the introduced
la determinación de los antígenos de histocompatibilidad de los preembriones in vitro con fines terapéuticos
para terceros, requerirá de la autorización expresa, caso a caso, de la autoridad sanitaria correspondiente,
previo informe favorable de la Comisión Nacional de Reproducción Humana Asistida, que deberá evaluar
las características clínicas, terapéuticas y sociales de cada caso».
35
On this, at least in the United Kingdom, there are opposite opinions on the imposition of
prohibitions of selection based on sex. Cf. S. Wilkinson, E. Garrard, Eugenics and the Ethics of
Selective Reproduction, Keele University, 2013.
36
Paragraph 3 clarifies the meaning of “gender related”: «[f]or the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(c),
a physical or mental disability, illness or other medical condition is gender-related if the Authority is
satisfied that: (a)it affects only one sex, or (b)it affects one sex significantly more than the other».
37
Human Fertility Embriology Act (HFE) 1990, Schedule 2, 1ZA, 1, lett. c).
38
The news, appeared on “The West Australian” (Baby sex checks for autism, 19 October 2013, at http://
au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/), has been reported by “Forbes” (Embryo sex selection to select against
autism?, 21 October 2013, at http://www.forbes.com) and by “BioNews” (IVF sex selection allowed in
Western Australia to reduce autism risk, 28 October 2013, http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_357600.
asp).
corrections would have consequences also for a possible offspring, as they would
influence also germ cells (spermatozoa and oocytes) or totipotent staminal cells (at
the early stages of embryo development)39.
The two different options have been looked at with different attitude from both the
bioethical point of view and the legal one. In particular, therapies on the somatic line
are tendentially accepted, compared as they are, to a certain extent, with experimental
substitutive therapies such as organ implantation and raise specific problems mainly
connected to the security and effectiveness of the techniques employed40.
Totally different is the attitude towards germline gene therapy that, being
founded on logics of non-consensuality, could be read as a violation of the principles
of self-determination and human dignity and it has therefore been addressed
with provisions entailing explicitly negative judgements. For instance, the Federal
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, with the intent of protecting the human
being «against the misuse of reproductive medicine and gene technology», forbids
«all forms of […] interference with the genetic material of human reproductive cells
and embryos» (art. 119). Similarly, the already cited Oviedo Convention sets forth
an express prohibition of intervening on human genome whenever «an intervention
seeking to modify the human genome» is introduced (art. 13).
All the cited examples, albeit heterogeneous in nature, converge in revealing
the moral and anthropological weight of the decisions to take and in highlighting
how the general and monolithic rejection of eugenic and deterministic tendencies,
acknowledged in principle, is wiped out whenever it confronts with the need for
operational rules unavoidably conditioned by the concreteness of cases and how legal
rules appear once more to abandon their claims for generality before the complexity
of reality.
7. The force of concrete cases

A final aspect (sub iii) that qualifies human genetics by distinguishing it, at least
in part, from the other sectors of life sciences and that conditions the legal approach
to this reality concerns the multiform category of genetic data and therefore to the
variability of the relevance of the information that the individual can obtain through
39
On this, in general, see J. Habermas, Il futuro della natura umana. I rischi di una genetica liberale,
Einaudi, 2002. In specific and partly critical terms, C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed eugenetica. Prime
considerazioni su un discorso giuridico altamente problematico, in “Humanitas”, n. 4, 2004.
40
As, since 1991, the Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, maintained, «somatic cells gene therapy, in
the adequate conditions and in compliance with rigid requirements not only legal, but also technical-
scientific in nature, but also with legal and ethical requirements, is totally acceptable from any point
of view, as it can be assimilated to a substitutive therapy or an implantation not of organs, or tissues or
cells, but of molecules». Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, Terapia Genica, 15 February 1991 (http://
www.palazzochigi.it/bioetica/pdf/1.pdf).
a genetic test; this is a category characterised by an high degree of heterogeneity due

not only to the different cognitive value of each DNA portion and to the plurality of
subjects that might be interested to it, but also to the variability of the informative
scope of each individual according to the different objectives that are meant to be
pursued through its employment41.
Seemingly, law shall take charge of this fragmentariness in order to ensure, in
every situation in which genetic information has some relevance, the protection of
the plurality of interests involved. In the medical-health field, for instance, in many
cases the need for a full consideration of the interests of third subjects, belonging to
the same biological group of those subjected to testing, has become more and more
pressing. The intra-family and inter-subjective relevance of genetic data has, thus,
been acknowledged by some legislators, through a valorisation of the procedural
dimension that is functional to an adjustment of the rule to the characteristics of the
concrete case.
In this sense, the French legislator chose to give account in the legal reasoning of
the informative value that genetic information might bear also with regard to a relative
of the person subjected to testing, by introducing, with art. 1131-1-2 of the Code de
la santé publique, some rules aimed at concretising a sort of obligation, procedurally
qualified, of communication to the relatives. According to the norm, the physician,
before subjecting an individual to genetic testing, shall inform him/her of the fact
that his/her silence might cause serious risks for the health of the members of his/her
family, whenever a serious genetic disease is diagnosed, while its consequences could
be subjected to preventive measures (including genetic counselling) or therapy. After
the informative moment, the physician, together with the person, individuates in
a written document, the modalities of information of his/her family members. On
the basis of this document, the person «est tenue» to trasmit the relevant information
to the members of his family (of whom it is possible to obtain «les coordonnèes»)
whenever «des mesures de prévention ou de soins» can be advised42. If the person does
not want to communicate directly with the relatives, it is the physician who shall
bring to their knowledge the existence of a medical information of family character
that might concern them and invite them to undergo genetic counselling, without
revealing either the name of the source-subject or the genetic anomaly detected or
even the risks connected to it. A complex normative solution that tends to balance,
considering the shared and merely predictive nature of genetic data, the right to
41
As someone correctly pointed out: «genetic, genomic and proteomic sequencing provide genetic
information, but not necessarily knowledge», M.L.Y. Chan, Beyond determinism and reductionism:
genetic science and the person, Adelaide, 2003, p. 126. In general, for Italy, see P. Veronesi, Il corpo e la
Costituzione. Concretezza dei «casi» e astrattezza della norma, Giuffrè, 2007.
42
The only exception is the case in which the person has manifested through a written paper the will
not to obtain a diagnosis: in this case the physician could contact the interested thirds.
privacy, on the one hand, with the rightful claims for health or prevention, on the
other hand.
Even in different fields, such as that of labour, rules that are exceedingly abstract
or deaf to the specificity of the cases which they apply to, show all their inadequacy.
In the cited context, strictly forbidding employers from accessing data can result
inappropriate in the case, for instance, in which a duty or a certain work environment
could harm an employee with certain genetic characteristics (always bearing in
mind the probabilistic character of the possible outcomes). The choice of the Italian
jurisdiction, enclosed within a regulation aimed at protecting privacy, excludes the
possibility for employers to use genetic data to «determine the professional attitude
of workers or of candidates for vacant jobs» (our transl.). In light of what we have
pointed out so far with regard to a «well-dimensioned» law, a solution based on
an anti-discriminatory approach could appear more functional, provided that it is
possible to assess, on a case-by-case basis, the opportunity to realise, also with the
worker’s consent, a «reasonable distinction» aimed at protecting the community or
the worker himself. Such an approach would allow at the same time to valorise the
potentialities emerging from the new scientific acquisitions, putting them in service
of the protection of rights, and to ensure a high degree of flexibility, although within
the limits of a sustainability rigorously founded on a criterion of reasonableness.
8. Critical considerations of synthesis: a sustainable penal bio-law?

The aspects dealt with here as mere examples demonstrate the possibility to
conceive, adopt and implement a law that faces the genetic subject respecting its
own characters. The elements that can be connected to its continuous progress, as
well as those due to the difficulty of regulating a subject that calls into play the
deepest dimensions of our being and conceiving ourselves as human and that invokes
a specific attention to the concreteness of single cases, seem to lead towards a law
having particularly problematic characters.
Given what we said, for instance, the «general and abstract» character of
legislation (necessary at least in the subjects covered by strict statutory legality) seems
to be attenuated before the need for considering each situation with a case-by-case
approach. And if sometimes it is a detail that makes the differences in dealing with
an event, how to ensure the necessary margin of certainty of the legal framework
without conceiving laws that dilate themselves beyond any limit or break in pieces in
the attempt to anticipate any possible present and future variation? How to ensure
the opportune flexibility in considering different personal behaviours without giving
up the tendential foreseeability of the respective consequences? How, in the end, to
combine equity and justice with interpretative-applicative margins that might reach
arbitrariness?
Of course, such questions emerge with particular vigour precisely in criminal law,
in which the constitutional principle of legality dictates, ex art. 25, the prohibition of
analogy and the correlative principles of non-retroactivity, determinacy, clarity and
precision; principles as such hardly seem to satisfy the normative needs emerging
from the characters of genetics.
Avoiding the risk of a legal-penal revision of genetic exceptionalism, hardly
consistent with the normative system as a whole, apparently we have to confirm the
need for reflecting over the characters of a law, also penal, which is increasingly called
to abandon some elements of presumed objectivity and precision (and, with them,
elements of only apparent equality or of false certainty) and to face logics that are
increasingly fuzzy in nature43; without neglecting the need to confront also common
law families on the field of formation, first of all at the university level, of lawyers,
other than on the education and selection of judges who, caring about experience at
least as much as logic, are able to manage in a sustainable form a legal phenomenon
that appears ever more hardly interpretable according to canons of certainty and
objectivity. Taking cues from the teaching of other sciences, a law capable to face
sudden and dynamic solicitations coming from outside, it is a law characterised by
an high cipher of resilience, capable to avoid frailness and weaknesses through the
elaboration of specific forms of adjustment to reality that do not bring to a total loss
of safeguarding potential.
43
On this, see, for instance, S. Baldin, Riflessioni sull’uso consapevole della logica fuzzy nelle classificazioni
fra epistemologia del diritto comparato e interdisciplinarietà (Reflections on the conscious use of fuzzy logic
in classifications between epistemology of comparative law and interdisciplinarity), in “Revista General de
Derecho Publico Comparado”, 10, 2012, pp. 1-20.
Genetica e diritti costituzionali: prospettive e profili problematici
Carlo Casonato, Marta Tomasi1
Sommario: 1. Introduzione. − 2. Un biodiritto invadente. – 3. I rischi di uno spazio vuoto di dirit-

to. – 4. Le caratteristiche dell’oggetto da regolare. – 5. Il diritto di fronte ad un oggetto cangiante e
multiforme. – 6. Diritto, scienze della vita e scienze dell’umano. – 7. La forza dei casi concreti. – 8.
Considerazioni critiche di sintesi: un bio-diritto penale sostenibile?
1. Introduzione
Sono molteplici i temi e le problematiche che potrebbero essere trattati in riferimento
al rapporto fra genetica e diritto e diritti costituzionali. In questa sede, intendiamo limitarci
ad affrontare tre profili riconducibili: (i) alla tendenza ad avere un diritto pervasivo anche
nelle materie legate alle scienze della vita; (ii) alla necessità di porre dei limiti ad una regola-
mentazione che comunque, per motivi anche solo di carattere spiccatamente costituzionale,
è necessario esista; (iii) alla proposta di un diritto che si costruisca e si moduli sulla base delle
caratteristiche specifiche delle scienze della vita. Su queste basi, concluderemo lo scritto con
alcuni interrogativi che ci paiono investire in modo particolarmente critico il diritto penale.
2. Un biodiritto invadente
È ormai opinione diffusa e condivisa, tanto all’interno della dottrina giuridica che della
letteratura che si occupa degli altri saperi, quella secondo cui il diritto in generale, e in parti-
colare nelle materie legate alla salute dell’uomo e alle scienze della vita, si sia spesso dimostra-
to troppo invadente. Percepito come «un ossessivo e formalistico sistema di norme generali e
astratte, incapaci di adattarsi alle molteplici e imprevedibili esigenze dei casi concreti», il feno-
meno giuridico è giunto ad imporre «il rispetto di procedure spesso burocratiche e antiquate,
1
Nella comune concezione dello scritto, i paragrafi da 1 a 4 sono riconducibili a Carlo Casonato, quelli
da 5 a 7 a Marta Tomasi; il paragrafo 8 è da attribuire ad entrambi.
112 Genetica e diritti costituzionali
e in definitiva irrilevanti per gli interessi del paziente»2. Spesso ridotto alla sola componente
legislativa, il diritto è quindi stato inteso esclusivamente o prevalentemente come un ostacolo
per la ricerca clinica e per la conduzione della stessa pratica medica.
Su questa linea, Stefano Rodotà apre il suo libro su La vita e le regole con l’immagine di
una «law-saturated society» interrogandosi sulla possibilità che il diritto invada i mondi vitali
e si impadronisca della «nuda vita». «Questo vuol dire che nulla può essergli estraneo, e la
società deve rassegnarsi ad essere chiusa nella gabbia d’acciaio di una onnipresente e pervasiva
dimensione giuridica?»3. Già una decina d’anni prima, Roger B. Dworkin in un’opera signi-
ficativamente intitolata Limits, proponeva una risposta a tali quesiti, ricordando come, par-
ticolarmente nell’ambito della biologia e della medicina, «[l]aw itself has limits that suggest
deference and humility in considering whether and how to use it [...]. Sound public policy
requires evaluation of each legal tool to ascertain which one(s) can deal best with which prob-
lems of biomedical advance and to understand the limits of the ability of each legal tool and
the entire legal system to regulate biomedical developments»4.
A fronte dei rischi generati da una inopportuna e in definitiva controproducente “inge-
renza giuridica”, la dottrina è quindi unanime nel riconoscere la necessità di porre una serie
di limiti alla regolazione. Quanto non è condiviso, peraltro, riguarda la natura, il contenuto,
lo spessore e la consistenza delle limitazioni da porre.
3. I rischi di uno spazio vuoto di diritto

L’alternativa rispetto ad una inopportuna invadenza non può consistere in un abbando-
no di campo da parte del diritto. Un misurato self-restraint teso a riconoscere un equilibrato
spazio al binomio autonomia-responsabilità da parte dei professionisti coinvolti nelle scienze
della vita non può condurre ad un ritrarsi incondizionato del diritto. Tale situazione mette-
rebbe a rischio la garanzia dei diritti individuali ed il necessario contenimento del potere (di
ogni potere), cedendo al dominio di una scienza che giungerebbe ad autoregolarsi in condi-
zioni – potremmo dire – di sovranità. Seguendo i due autori da ultimo citati, così, «[to] sug-
gest that the law has no role to play in the area of biomedical advance would be both stupid
and unrealistic». Uno spazio vuoto di diritto, anche costituzionale, celerebbe «l’insidia di una
volontà di potenza incontrollata»; volontà di cui alcuni casi recenti, anche al di fuori della
tematica genetica, testimoniano l’esistenza.
La vicenda che ha condotto il primo aprile 2013 la Corte Suprema indiana ad esprimersi
sul caso Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others ha origine nel 2006 quando l’ufficio brevetti
indiano nega alla multinazionale svizzera il brevetto per una variante (basata sulla forma beta-
cristallina) di un farmaco già commercializzato dal 1993 (l’Imatinib Mesylate, prodotto con il
nome Gleevec o Glivec)5. Il Patent Act indiano del 1970, emendato più volte anche a seguito
dell’adozione degli accordi TRIPS, dispone che la brevettabilità di un prodotto sia condizio-
2
F. D’Agostino, Diritto, in “L’Arco di Giano. Rivista di Medical Humanities”, 1, 1993, p. 51.
3
S. Rodotà, La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2006, p. 9.
4
R.B. Dworkin, Limits. The Role of the Law in Bioethical Decision Making, Bloomington and
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1996, p. 2.
5
Una ricostruzione del caso e i link ai materiali originali nel sito www.biodiritto.org.
nata, fra l’altro, alla sua novità e inventiva brevettuale. In particolare, si dovrà trattare di una
«invention which has a feature that: (a) entails technical advance over existing knowledge; or
(b) has an economic significance and (c) makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled
in the art» (Chapter I, Section 2.1). La legge dispone, inoltre, una clausola specifica di assoluta
rilevanza secondo cui si esclude dalla brevettabilità «the mere discovery of a new form of a
known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
substance» (Chapter II, Section 3d).
Su queste basi, la Corte rileva come «in the patent application, there is no claim of supe-
riority of the beta crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate in regard to the aforesaid three properties
[(i) more beneficial flow properties; (ii) better thermodynamic stability; and (iii) lower hygro-
scopicity than the alpha crystal form of Imatinib Mesylate], or any other property, over the
starting material Imatinib, or even over Imatinib Mesylate in amorphous form or any form
other than the alpha crystal form» (p. 9).
Nonostante le richieste di Novartis, e il fatto che la richiamata sezione 3d del secondo ca-
pitolo della legge fosse stata inserita successivamente alla richiesta di brevetto, la Corte rigetta
la richiesta di estensione del brevetto.
Per quanto più interessa in questa sede, tale caso dimostra come l’assenza di una norma
di legge, al pari di una sua non implementazione, avrebbe fatto prevalere la tattica di Novartis
tesa a estendere la durata di un brevetto oltre la sua iniziale scadenza attraverso l’adozione
di minori modifiche del prodotto. Tale strategia commerciale, conosciuta come evergreening,
avrebbe impedito la commercializzazione del farmaco generico a prezzi molto più ridotti (se
il prodotto Novartis costa 2.600 dollari al mese, il generico non supera i 180), impedendo di
fatto a centinaia di migliaia di pazienti, non solo indiani, l’utilizzo di un presidio destinato
al trattamento di alcuni tumori e di alcuni tipi di leucemie. Con questa decisione, in termi-
ni più generali, la Corte ha ricollegato le logiche brevettuali al principio, riconducibile alla
stessa forma di Stato sociale, secondo cui «medicine and surgical and curative devices were to
be made available to the public at the cheapest price commensurate with giving reasonable
compensation to the patentee» (p. 33).
Una seconda testimonianza della volontà di alcuni dei protagonisti della ricerca clinica di
liberarsi da una cornice normativa a garanzia di principi giuridici ed etici fondamentali può
desumersi dalla vicenda che ha visto l’istituto di ricerca italiano Mario Negri contrapporsi alla
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). All’interno di un progetto di ricerca sperimentale su alcuni antibio-
tici innovativi condotto all’interno della cornice della Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI)
da un team composto da università e centri di ricerca pubblici e compagnie farmaceutiche
private, GSK pretendeva un controllo totale tanto degli aspetti metodologici del protocollo,
quanto dei profili legati alla trasparenza ed alla pubblicazione dei risultati. Nelle parole del
direttore, Silvio Garattini, e dei ricercatori del Mario Negri come riportate in un articolo
pubblicato a settembre 2013 sul British Medical Journal, «GSK wanted to retain the right to
permit or refuse access to the patient outcome data and to give written approval for any inde-
pendent publication of the data generated by the public-private partnership. That meant that
we would have had to ask GSK’s permission to access the data from our own trial and that
GSK reserved the right to block publication of our analysis of that data at any time after the
study was completed»6. Nonostante la dichiarazione da parte della stessa GSK pubblicata sul
New England Journal of Medicine dell’agosto 2013 relativa all’impegno di rendere pubblici i
dati clinici7 e la policy dell’IMI in materia di proprietà intellettuale secondo cui «[ownership]
of the foreground [results, including data, know how, and information] belongs in the first
instance to the participant(s) who generated it», la GSK insisteva sulla sua linea tesa a riser-
varsi il diritto di decidere «who would ever see the raw data and for what purpose. No one
would have had the right to publish anything about the outcomes of the study without the
company’s written consent».
A fronte della violazione dei principi di trasparenza e di accessibilità dei risultati di ogni
ricerca, l’Istituto Mario Negri dichiarava quindi la rinuncia a collaborare ad un progetto che
− si badi − dispone di un finanziamento di 195 milioni di euro provenienti, in parte, dalla
Commissione Europea: «[s]ecrecy on clinical data implies undue exploitation of the rights
of physicians and patients involved in the studies. This is even more inappropriate when
publicly funded or independent non-profit institutions are contributing to the development
of a drug and patients are generously volunteering to participate. Secrecy definitely sounds
paradoxical when EU funds support the clinical research, as with IMI projects».
Un terzo caso a dimostrazione delle forti tentazioni di potere incontrollato da parte di
alcune componenti non marginali del mondo della ricerca clinica e della produzione di me-
dicinali a detrimento dei diritti delle persone vede coinvolta la Johnson & Johnson (J&J) e,
ancora una volta, la Novartis.
Secondo la ricostruzione della Commissione Europea, alla scadenza nel 2005 del brevet-
to del Fentanyl (un analgesico molto più efficace della morfina, utilizzato prevalentemente
per lenire i dolori dei pazienti affetti da cancro), la compagnia farmaceutica J&J, detentrice
del brevetto, si accordava con Novartis per ritardare il più possibile l’introduzione nel mercato
olandese, a prezzo notevolmente più basso, del farmaco generico. Tale “co-promotion agree-
ment” prevedeva forti incentivi da parte di una consociata olandese di J&J, la Janssen-Cilag,
a favore della Sandoz, controllata olandese di Novartis; incentivi che superavano i benefici
che Sandoz avrebbe potuto realizzare vendendo in Olanda il generico. L’accordo terminò nel
dicembre 2006, quando una terza compagnia farmaceutica si apprestava a introdurre in quel
mercato il farmaco generico.
Tale strategia attirò l’attenzione della Commissione Europea che nel dicembre 2013 rile-
vò una condotta “pay-for-delay” in violazione delle regole a tutela della concorrenza: «Instead
of competing, Janssen-Cilag and Sandoz agreed on cooperation so as “not to have a depot
generic on the market and in that way to keep the high current price”. Janssen-Cilag did not
consider any other existing potential partners for the so-called “co-promotion agreement” but
just focused on its close competitor Sandoz. Sandoz engaged in very limited or no actual co-
promotion activities». La violazione dell’art. 101 del Trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione
Europea condusse quindi la Commissione a comminare una multa di 10.798.000 euro per
J&J ed una di 5.493.000 per Novartis8. Al di là degli aspetti tecnici della vicenda, quanto
6
S. Garattini, V. Bertelé, G. Bertolini, A failed attempt at collaboration, in “BMJ”, 2013; 347:
f5354.
7
P. Nisen, F. Rockhold, Access to patient-level data from GlaxoSmithKline clinical trials, “N Engl J
Med.”, 2013, Aug 1; 369(5): 475-8.
8
L’art. 101 del TFUE dispone: «Sono incompatibili con il mercato interno e vietati tutti gli accordi
colpisce, nell’ottica in questa sede privilegiata, consiste ancora una volta nella volontà di
massimizzare il profitto eludendo elementari norme giuridiche e principi etici a garanzia di
fondamentali diritti individuali e collettivi. Nelle parole del responsabile per la concorrenza e
vice-presidente della Commissione Europea, Joaquín Alumnia, «J&J paid Novartis to delay
the entry of a generic pain killer. The two companies shockingly deprived patients in the
Netherlands, including people suffering from cancer, from access to a cheaper version of this
medicine»9.
I tre casi ricordati, emersi tutti nello stesso anno 2013 e qui riportati a titolo meramente
esemplificativo, potrebbero essere affiancati da altre vicende emerse in tempi meno recenti
ad esempio negli Stati Uniti: si pensi, in riferimento specifico al trattamento dei dati e delle
informazioni genetiche fra gli altri, ai noti Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., o a Washington University v.
Catalona10.
Tali vicende, in ogni caso, confermano la necessità dell’esistenza e della attenta applica-
zione di un quadro normativo che possa bilanciare in termini equilibrati i diversi interessi in
gioco nel settore delle scienze della vita, evitando la sempre latente espansione della “regola
del più forte”, che può concretizzarsi anche in altre forme di violenza fra cui, ad esempio,
quelle in cui la ricerca clinica è condotta in paesi poveri in cui non esistono norme in materia
di vigilanza di comitati etici e di rispetto dei diritti dei partecipanti; in cui i ricercatori vo-
gliono passare all’applicazione diretta delle proprie attività sui malati senza il controllo della
letteratura e degli organi preposti; fino alle situazioni in cui un singolo professionista vuole
procedere a un trattamento sanitario contro la volontà del malato.
Questi tutti sono problemi che vanno ricondotti al binomio potere-libertà che tradizio-
nalmente chiama in causa e anima il diritto costituzionale e le sue logiche. Potrebbe al ri-
guardo ricordarsi, mutatis mutandis, una delle sintesi più efficaci del costituzionalismo inteso
come movimento di idee e di pratiche (che diventano regole precettive) dedicato allo scopo di
limitare il potere e di garantire i diritti della persona. Ci riferiamo all’articolo 16 della Décla-
ration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen del 1879 in cui si dichiara come «Toute Société
dans laquelle la garantie des Droits n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des Pouvoirs déterminée,
n’a point de Constitution».
Pensando al potenziale sia positivo che negativo delle scienze della vita, e della genetica
in particolare, sorge quindi il problema di indicare le proprietà di un diritto “ben dimensio-
nato” le cui caratteristiche ne impediscano l’ipertrofia, assicurandone la funzione garantista.
In termini generali, si può evocare il ricorso alla ormai risalente qualifica di “diritto mite”,
tra imprese, tutte le decisioni di associazioni di imprese e tutte le pratiche concordate che possano
pregiudicare il commercio tra Stati membri e che abbiano per oggetto o per effetto di impedire,
restringere o falsare il gioco della concorrenza all’interno del mercato interno (…)».
9
Citiamo dal comunicato stampa della Commissione Europea del 10 dicembre 2013 (http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm).
10
Rispettivamente 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990); 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003); 490 F.3d 667 (8th
Cir.(Mo.) 2007). In termini generali, si permetta il rinvio a C. Casonato, Derechos de la persona y
lógicas de la investigación clínica, in “Teoría y Derecho. Revista de pensiamento jurídico”, 11/2012, p.
26 ss.
recentemente rivisitata, proprio in riferimento ad alcune tematiche relative alle scienze della
vita, in termini di “diritto gentile”11.
In presenza di alternative e spesso opposte concezioni in merito al contenuto, alla natura,
allo spessore che un tale “buon diritto” dovrebbe assumere, si intende qui di seguito proporre
una ipotesi teorico-applicativa in grado di orientare la costruzione di un biodiritto che assu-
ma le caratteristiche virtuose indicate grazie all’attenzione verso le specificità dell’oggetto da
regolare.
4. Le caratteristiche dell’oggetto da regolare

La genetica, come tutte le scienze della vita, e quelle finalizzate alla vita e alla salute degli
esseri umani in particolare, insiste infatti su un oggetto peculiare che complica alcune delle
dinamiche e delle categorie giuridiche usualmente utilizzate. (i) Occuparsi di genetica signi-
fica, in primo luogo, trattare un oggetto di cui incessantemente la scienza pone in luce profili
nuovi, conoscenze originali e interrogativi prima inesplorati, rinnovate potenzialità e inediti
rischi. Proprio le ininterrotte scoperte scientifiche e applicazioni tecnologiche ne fanno un og-
getto multiforme e mutevole, il quale può risultare modificato già nel momento in cui viene
disciplinato dal diritto. (ii) Ogni aspetto legato alla dimensione genetica, in secondo luogo,
coinvolge tipicamente la concezione antropologica e la struttura morale più profonda di ognu-
no. E con essa, il significato stesso di concetti delicati e divisivi come quelli di riduzionismo
o determinismo genetico, fino a mettere in discussione la sopravvivenza del libero arbitrio.
Trovare un accordo sulla relativa disciplina, indicare diritti e doveri e fondare i rispettivi limiti
è quindi attività che, soprattutto in determinati contesti inclini alla reciproca delegittimazio-
ne più che ad un autentico dialogo, come quello italiano, consuma spesso invano tempo e
risorse. (iii) I casi concreti che la realtà fa emergere, in terzo luogo, sono caratterizzati da pecu-
liarità particolarmente complesse e cariche di conseguenze, legate a contesti anch’essi specifici
e difficilmente generalizzabili, in cui anche un singolo dettaglio può costituire un elemento
tale da giustificare un trattamento giuridico differenziato.
Per tutte queste ragioni, le scienze della vita e la genetica in particolare invocano discipli-
ne che non possono essere massimaliste, ma devono combinare garanzia e flessibilità, tenden-
do all’apertura nei confronti delle proprietà specifiche dell’oggetto da regolare. Tali necessità
normative non vanno confuse con indecisione e debolezza ma impongono che la decisione
normativa adottata sia il frutto di un attento bilanciamento di interessi spesso contrapposti, i
quali raramente possono trovare accoglimento integrale e nella maggior parte dei casi devono
essere fra loro accuratamente ponderati. Nei paragrafi che seguono, trarremo dal diritto com-
parato alcuni esempi di istituti o di discipline giuridiche che – ci sembra – possano riflettere
le esigenze normative riconducibili alle caratteristiche dell’oggetto appena indicate.
11
Il primo riferimento è ovviamente all’opera di G. Zagrebelsky, Il diritto mite, Einaudi, 1992. La
seconda indicazione si rivolge all’opera di Paolo Zatti, testimoniata dai materiali raccolti nel sito http://
undirittogentile.wordpress.com/.
5. Il diritto di fronte ad un oggetto cangiante e multiforme

Come si è anticipato (sub i), i continui progressi della tecnologia e della conoscenza
scientifica fanno della genetica un oggetto di studio multiforme e sempre cangiante che met-
te alla prova il diritto, una sua tendenziale staticità e impermeabilità ad influenze esterne
e richiede un’inusitata prontezza nell’elaborare soluzioni a nuove problematiche emergenti.
Strettamente connesso a questo profilo di criticità, un ulteriore aspetto rilevante attiene il
linguaggio tipico della genetica che pare esprimersi, nella maggior parte dei casi, in termini
di probabilità piuttosto che di certezza, fornendo indicazioni, rilevanti ma non univoche e
deterministiche, circa le possibilità, ad esempio, di contrarre una determinata malattia in un
non definito momento nel futuro.
Il compito che il diritto si trova ad affrontare è quello di calare la propria forza ordinatrice
su una realtà composita e ambigua, senza trascurare il dato scientifico o esporsi al rischio di
creare uno scollamento fra regola e fatti; senza irrigidirsi ma evitando di perdere di vista i
livelli di certezza e verificabilità concretamente acquisiti.
La complessità dell’individuazione di tale punto di equilibrio emerge da una analisi com-
parata che evidenzia come gli ordinamenti abbiano affrontato le sfide della genetica umana
facendo ricorso a una pluralità di strumenti, di natura vincolante e non, e a una molteplicità
di approcci che in parte accolgono e in parte rigettano la natura eccezionale dei dati genetici
rispetto alle altre informazioni sanitarie12.
All’interno di questo panorama frammentato, un tratto unificante pare, però, potersi ri-
scontrare nella rilevanza attribuita allo strumento della consulenza genetica, considerata come
meccanismo procedurale indispensabile per gestire la complessità del fenomeno e garantire
una tutela dei diritti a fronte delle caratteristiche specifiche dell’informazione genetica e della
sua conoscibilità.
L’interesse della comunità scientifica internazionale nei confronti della consulenza gene-
tica è ormai ben consolidato13 e la sua imprescindibilità è riconosciuta in documenti interna-
zionali, sovranazionali e nazionali. Per citare alcuni esempi, essa è richiesta come condizione
di legittimità dei test genetici dall’art. 12 della cd. Convenzione di Oviedo14 e dall’art. 8 del
12
Al di là delle critiche che si possono rivolgere a un approccio eccezionalista che individua nelle
informazioni genetiche un unicum fra le informazioni sanitarie – critiche incentratesi sul fatto che
tale impostazione proporrebbe un modello antropologico “geneticentrico”, che semplifica meccanismi
estremamente complessi e lontani dal potersi dire compresi a pieno e che, per altro verso, attribuisce
eccessiva rilevanza a componenti che contribuiscono alla caratterizzazione biologica dell’essere umano,
in maniera però non deterministica e non esclusiva – è rilevante notare come molti ordinamenti
abbiano scelto di dedicare alle informazioni genetiche specifiche previsioni normative. Per citare alcuni
esempi si pensi all’Autorizzazione generale al trattamento dei dati genetici adottata dall’Autorità garante
per la privacy (la cui più recente versione, come noto, risale a dicembre 2012), alla Gendiagnostikgesetz
(GenDG) tedesca (Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen, del 31 luglio 2009), alla
Gentechnikgesetz (GTG) austriaca (BGBl 510/1994, modificata da ultimo con BGBl. I Nr. 13/2006),
alla Legge federale sugli esami genetici sull’essere umano della Svizzera (8 ottobre 2004) o alle previsioni
specifiche contenute nel Code de la santé publique francese (recentemente, disposizioni ad hoc sono state
introdotte con Loi n. 2011-814 del 7 luglio 2011).
13
F.C. Fraser, Genetic Consulting, in “American Journal of Human Genetics”, 26, (1974), pp. 639-
659.
14
Convenzione sui Diritti dell’Uomo e la Biomedicina, adottata in seno al Consiglio d’Europa e aperta
relativo Protocollo addizionale sui test genetici del 200815, dall’art.11 della International De-
claration on Human Genetic Data dell’UNESCO16 e dalla Raccomandazione numero 9 delle
25 Raccomandazioni sui test genetici predisposte dalla Commissione Europea17.
La consulenza genetica deve dunque rappresentare un punto di raccordo fra le potenzia-
lità della tecnologia e la cura e protezione del paziente18, un medium tra il test e la persona che
vi si sottopone; questo ruolo di collegamento deve essere interpretato con ancor maggior for-
za nell’odierno contesto del consumismo genetico19, caratterizzato da una diffusione sempre
più ampia dei test, anche sul mercato virtuale, e da un conseguente arretramento dei controlli
e delle garanzie20.
In Italia, l’importanza della consulenza, che dovrebbe fornire «gli strumenti per la com-
prensione della malattia genetica», era già stata evidenziata dal Comitato Nazionale di Bioetica
negli Orientamenti Bioetici per i Test Genetici21 e, più di recente, dall’Accordo Stato-Regioni
del 15 luglio 2004 recante Linee guida per le attività di genetica medica22. In particolare, il
testo dell’accordo riconosce alla consulenza genetica, qualificata come «parte integrante di un
test genetico», il valore di un complesso processo di comunicazione e prevede una eventuale
partecipazione di figure professionali diverse dal medico o dal genetista. La rilevanza della fase
della consulenza è resa evidente anche dal fatto che il consenso informato al test sia qualificato
come esito di un processo di comunicazione che deve «concludere un dialogo», affermandosi
così una concezione della consulenza intesa più come atto comunicativo complesso che come
atto propriamente medico23.
alla ratifica il 4 aprile 1997 a Oviedo.
15
Strasburgo, 27 novembre 2008.
16
Adottata all’unanimità nel corso della 32esima Conferenza Generale dell’UNESCO il 16 ottobre
2003.
17
Commissione Europea (Direzione Generale della Ricerca Unità Informazione e Comunicazione),
Venticinque raccomandazioni concernenti le implicazioni etiche, giuridiche e sociali dei test genetici,
2004.
18
Così l’International Bioethics Committee dell’UNESCO nel Report on genetic counselling (Parigi, 15
dicembre 1995): «Genetic counselling provides the link between genetic technologies, several of which
have been acquired through the Human Genome Project, and patient care».
19
S. Amato, Biogiurisprudenza. Dal mercato genetico al self-service normativo, Torino, 2006 e L.
Battaglia, La genetizzazione della medicina, in C. Modonesi, G. Tamino (a cura di), Fast science. La
mercificazione della conoscenza scientifica e della comunicazione, Milano, 2008, pp. 203-220.
20
Simili preoccupazioni stanno alla base di cautele come quella introdotta in Italia dal Garante per
la protezione dei dati personali che, considerata la «necessità di assicurare una consulenza genetica
appropriata», ha escluso che si possano offrire servizi di refertazione on-line nel caso di sottoposizione
a indagini genetiche [Linee guida in tema di referti on-line del 19 novembre 2009 (G.U. n. 288 dell’11
dicembre 2009)].
21
Comitato Nazionale di Bioetica, Orientamenti bioetici per i test genetici. Sintesi e raccomandazioni (19
novembre 1999). Al punto 4 del documento si chiarisce che «[a]ll’interno di un servizio di consulenza
genetica adeguato, si dovrebbero fornire ai potenziali fruitori gli strumenti per la comprensione della
malattia genetica: ad esempio, che cosa s’intende per malattia monofattoriale o multifattoriale; quale il
significato dei possibili risultati del test; e ancora, l’eventualità di risultati falsi negativi o falsi positivi,
il significato dell’approccio probabilistico alla diagnosi, i concetti di predisposizione alla malattia e di
fattore di rischio».
22
Elaborato ai sensi dell’art. 4 D. Lgs. del 28 agosto 1997, n. 281 tra il Ministero della Salute, le
Regioni e le province autonome di Trento e Bolzano.
23
Sul punto si vedano L. Palazzani (a cura di), Gen-jus: la consulenza tra genetica e diritto, Roma,
Questa impostazione è stata almeno in parte riaffermata dal Garante per la protezione
dei dati personali che definisce la consulenza come un insieme di «attività di comunicazione
volte ad aiutare l’individuo o la famiglia colpita da patologia genetica a comprendere le in-
formazioni mediche che includono la diagnosi e il probabile decorso della malattia, le forme
di assistenza disponibili, il contributo dell’ereditarietà al verificarsi della malattia, il rischio di
ricorrenza esistente per sé e per altri familiari e l’opportunità di portarne a conoscenza questi
ultimi, nonché tutte le opzioni esistenti nell’affrontare il rischio di malattia e l’impatto che
tale rischio può avere su scelte procreative; nell’esecuzione di test genetici tale consulenza
comprende inoltre informazioni sul significato, i limiti, l’attendibilità e la specificità del test
nonché le implicazioni dei risultati»24. Ulteriori indicazioni, contenute nel punto 5 dell’Auto-
rizzazione, dedicato all’Informativa, prevedono che la consulenza debba essere fornita prima
e dopo lo svolgimento dell’analisi.
Al di là della formulazione adottata a livello nazionale, per quanto in questa sede più
interessa, sono i requisiti individuati a livello internazionale dall’UNESCO – che richiede che
la consulenza si configuri come non-direttiva e culturalmente adeguata e che impone che essa
rappresenti il miglior interesse della persona coinvolta25 – a mettere in evidenza il ruolo che
tale strumento riveste nel realizzare la garanzia dei diritti dell’individuo mediante una attenta
considerazione delle specificità del caso concreto, della realtà fattuale e delle caratteristiche
individuali del singolo che è messo in relazione con la conoscenza di tipo genetico. Nella
stessa direzione il citato art. 8 del Protocollo addizionale alla Convenzione di Oviedo sui test
genetici che chiarisce che la forma e la portata della consulenza debbano essere stabilite in
base alle implicazioni dei risultati del test e al significato di cui essi possono essere portatori
per la persona o per i membri della sua famiglia26.
Una lettura della consulenza genetica come strumento di raccordo che sia in grado di
allineare le potenzialità messe a disposizione dall’evoluzione scientifica e l’effettiva tutela dei
diritti permetterebbe anche di risolvere un profilo di incertezza che pare emergere da una
prima lettura del testo dell’Autorizzazione italiana.
L’importanza della consulenza genetica, che come si è visto è messa in luce dal punto 5,
sembra essere parzialmente ritrattata dalla lettera del punto 9 a norma del quale «[g]li esiti di
test e di screening genetici […] devono essere comunicati al medesimo interessato anche nel
rispetto della sua dichiarazione di volontà di conoscere o meno tali eventi e, ove necessario,
con un’appropriata consulenza genetica». Tale temperamento potrebbe comunque essere letto
in chiave positiva se si rintraccia in esso l’intenzione di escludere l’esigenza di una consulenza
Studium, 2011; L. Palazzani, L. Nepi (a cura di), Gen-ius. Consulenza genetica e normative europee,
Roma, Studium, 2012; P. Sommaggio, La consulenza genetica: un ponte tra auto poiesi ed auto
trascendimento, in “Tigor: rivista di scienze della comunicazione”, A. II, 2010, n. 2 (luglio-dicembre).
24
La definizione è fra quelle elencate al Punto 1 dell’Autorizzazione generale al trattamento dei dati
genetici n. 8/2013 (lettera h).
25
UNESCO, International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, cit., articolo 11, a norma del quale
«[g]enetic counselling should be non-directive, culturally adapted and consistent with the best interest
of the person concerned».
26
Così l’art. 8 rubricato Information and genetic counseling, secondo il quale «[t]he form and extent
of this genetic counselling shall be defined according to the implications of the results of the test and
their significance for the person or the members of his or her family, including possible implications
concerning procreation choices».
in tutti i casi in cui il risultato da comunicare al paziente corrisponda alle informazioni che
si possono ottenere mediante esami medici di altra natura. Questa lettura permetterebbe di
rifiutare un approccio eccezionalista e di fare un uso della consulenza genetica accorto ed
effettivamente funzionale alla tutela dei diritti.
La consulenza genetica, dunque, seppur diversamente configurata nei diversi strumenti
normativi citati, se correttamente interpretata, pare qualificarsi come strumento utile a ga-
rantire una piena tutela del diritto all’autodeterminazione individuale e di una scelta concre-
tamente libera e informata. Inoltre, essa consente che l’agire individuale si collochi in una
prospettiva fondata su di una corretta considerazione del livello di sviluppo della scienza e
della tecnica e del grado di certezza che esse possono garantire.
In questo modo, la consulenza genetica è manifestazione di un diritto attento alla con-
siderazione delle caratteristiche proprie della persona, delle sue capacità di comprensione,
del contesto sociale e culturale all’interno del quale la sua personalità si svolge e del sostrato
etico-morale che ne orienta le scelte.
6. Diritto, scienze della vita e scienze dell’umano

Il secondo ordine di considerazioni deriva, come si è visto (sub ii), dal fatto che molti
profili della genetica umana tipicamente coinvolgono la concezione morale più profonda
di ognuno e, con essa, il significato di concetti anche antropologicamente delicati e divisivi
come, per portare alcuni esempi, quelli di salute e di malattia, di natura e di artificio, di
autonomia e di etero determinazione, sino ad incidere sui confini fra cura e potenziamento.
In particolare, le tecniche di più recente sviluppo, non ancora portate a definitivo con-
solidamento, che vanno dall’isolamento di singoli geni alla diagnosi genetica preimpianto,
dalla possibilità di intervenire sulla sequenza di acidi nucleici che compongono il DNA e di
modificarla, producendo effetti sulle caratteristiche fenotipiche, alla biologia sintetica, sem-
brano in grado di toccare il cuore dei meccanismi vitali della specie umana e, di conseguenza,
i caratteri ontologicamente determinanti l’essere umano.
A fronte di questi sviluppi pare potersi ravvisare, all’interno del fenomeno giuridico glo-
balmente inteso, una tendenziale consonanza di opinioni volte a stigmatizzare potenziali im-
pieghi abusivi e distorti dei progressi scientifici; tale tendenza, almeno in parte storicamente
determinata, è confluita nell’enunciazione di principi in diversi documenti che approntano
idonee garanzie volte alla tutela dei diritti, ad evitare discriminazioni, atteggiamenti riduzio-
nisti e derive eugenetiche.
Esemplificativo e particolarmente esplicito in questo senso è l’art. 3, co. 2 della Carta dei
diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea27, che impone il «divieto delle pratiche eugenetiche,
in particolare di quelle aventi come scopo la selezione delle persone». Il rapporto esplicativo
della Carta chiarisce che questa statuizione è volta a prevenire «possible situations in which
selection programmes are organised and implemented, involving campaigns for sterilisation,
forced pregnancy, compulsory ethnic marriage among others, all acts deemed to be interna-
tional crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in Rome on 17 July
1998».
27
Come noto divenuta vincolante il 1 dicembre 2009.
Se si spinge lo sguardo poco oltre le affermazioni di principio, tuttavia, la molteplicità

di condotte rilevanti in questo ambito è oggetto di impostazioni teoriche e regolamentazioni
pratiche anche diametralmente opposte.
In particolare, prendendo le mosse da quelle che sono le acquisizioni scientifiche al mo-
mento attuale concretamente disponibili, le problematiche relative alle pratiche eugenetiche
latamente intese28 emergono allorquando si prendano in considerazione le tecniche diagno-
stiche e le conseguenti possibilità selettive. In questo caso le dichiarazioni di principio sem-
brano cedere a fronte della complessità del reale e della sua capacità di incidere sulla tutela
dei diritti dei singoli. È noto, infatti, come alcuni ordinamenti abbiano adottato norme che
esplicitamente introducono la possibilità di una selezione di embrioni sulla base di deter-
minate caratteristiche genetiche. Così, tanto nell’ordinamento spagnolo, quanto in quello
britannico, ad esempio, sono state introdotte regole che ammettono, a fronte di specifiche
circostanze qualificate in maniera piuttosto dettagliata, la possibilità di selezionare un em-
brione che risulti geneticamente compatibile con un fratello malato.
Il Parlamento del Regno Unito, nel 2008, ha ammesso la legittimità di tecniche di analisi
volte a uno screening degli embrioni prodotti con le tecniche di fecondazione in vitro e alla
conseguente selezione di quelli geneticamente compatibili con un fratello malato (“preim-
plantation tissue typing” – PTT). Il ricorso a tali pratiche, tuttavia, è stato subordinato ad
una specifica autorizzazione da parte di un comitato della Human Fertility and Embryology
Authority (HFEA)29 che ha il compito di valutare la sussistenza di determinati presupposti e
specifici fattori quali la probabilità di successo del trattamento, la disponibilità di trattamenti
alternativi e la possibilità di reperire cellule e tessuti da altri familiari o donatori terzi30.
28
Il termine “eugenetica” è qui richiamato in generale in riferimento a pratiche di selezione sulla
base di caratteristiche genetiche. Secondo alcuni autori, peraltro, si potrebbe parlare in termini propri
di eugenetica unicamente a fronte di politiche pubbliche coattive volte a orientare i comportamenti
individuali (cfr. A. Santosuosso, Diritto, scienza e nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, pp. 189-
190).
29
Tale ruolo è previsto nella nuova versione dello Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE) del
1990. Fra le attività che possono essere autorizzate (Schedule 2) rientrano infatti i test sugli embrioni
«in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons whose gametes are used to
bring about the creation of the embryo (or of either of those persons) suffers from a serious medical
condition which could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue of
any resulting child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting child would be compatible with that
of the sibling» (1ZA, 1, lett. d).
30
Indicazioni molto dettagliate sono fornite nel Code of practice della HFEA che individua una
lunghissima lista di requisiti cui il centro competente all’emissione dell’autorizzazione deve attenersi.
Così, «10.22 When deciding whether to use preimplantation tissue typing, the centre should consider
the circumstances of each case individually, rather than the fact that the procedure is sought to provide
tissue to treat a particular condition. 10.23 When deciding on the appropriateness of preimplantation
tissue typing in a particular situation, the centre should consider the condition of the affected child,
including: a) the degree of suffering associated with their condition; b) the speed of degeneration in
progressive disorders; c) the extent of any intellectual impairment; d) their prognosis, considering all
treatment options available; e) the availability of alternative sources of tissue for treating them, now
and in the future, and; f) the availability of effective therapy for them, now and in the future. 10.24
The centre should also consider the possible consequences for any child who may be born as a result,
including: a) any possible risks associated with embryo biopsy; b) the likely long-term emotional and
psychological implications; c) whether they are likely to require intrusive surgery as a result of the
A conferma dell’essenziale rilevanza da attribuirsi in questi casi alle caratteristiche speci-

fiche delle singole situazioni, si consideri che, a partire dal 2009, per le tecniche di diagnosi
genetica preimpianto generalmente intese la HFEA ha scelto di fare ricorso ad un approccio
condition-by-condition, individuando una lista di patologie per le quali il ricorso a tali tecni-
che è generalmente autorizzato; diversamente, l’autorizzazione all’applicazione delle tecniche
di PTT rimane legata alla valutazione delle specificità del caso concreto.
Sulla stessa linea si colloca la legge spagnola31 che riconosce la rilevanza della diagnosi ge-
netica preimpianto come strumento utile alla «prevención de enfermedades genéticas que en
la actualidad carecen de tratamiento», anche mediante la «posibilidad de seleccionar preem-
briones para que, en determinados casos y bajo el debido control y autorización administra-
tivos, puedan servir de ayuda para salvar la vida del familiar enfermo»32. A tale scopo la legge
prevede la possibilità di svolgere una diagnosi genetica preimpianto al fine di una valutazione
di istocompatibilità con un soggetto terzo malato, subordinandola però ad un’autorizzazione
da parte dell’autorità sanitaria competente e a un parere favorevole della Comisión Nacional
de Reproducción Humana Asistida, che dovrà valutare le caratteristiche cliniche, terapeutiche
e sociali, caso per caso33.
Similmente la differenza fra eugenetica negativa, guardata da alcuni con atteggiamento
di favore perché volta a ridurre o eliminare determinate caratteristiche genetiche conside-
rate svantaggiose o patologiche, e la più discussa eugenetica positiva, volta alla promozione
e al rafforzamento di tratti considerati vantaggiosi, sfuma a fronte dell’eterogeneità e della
complessità della categoria delle informazioni genetiche. La selezione basata sul sesso, per
esempio, considerata come non accettabile in via generale e di principio34, trova invece appli-
cazione in alcuni ordinamenti se connessa a specifiche ragioni mediche. Il più palese esempio
treatment of the affected child (and whether this is likely to be repeated), and d) any complications
or predispositions associated with the tissue type to be selected. 10.25 The centre should also consider
the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment, including: a) their previous reproductive
experience; b) their views and the affected child’s views of the condition; c) the likelihood of a successful
outcome, taking into account: i) their reproductive circumstances (ie, the number of embryos likely
to be available for testing in each treatment cycle, the number likely to be suitable for transfer,
whether carrier embryos may be transferred, and the likely number of cycles); ii) the likely outcome
of treatment for the affected child;d) the consequences of an unsuccessful outcome; e) the demands of
IVF/preimplantation testing treatment on them while caring for an affected child, and; f) the extent of
social support available».
31
Ley n. 14 del 26 maggio 2006, Sobre técnicas de reproducción humana asistida, pubblicato in “Boletín
Oficial del Estado”, 126 del 27 maggio 2006.
32
Tale possibilità rientra fra le ragioni che hanno determinato l’adozione della normativa in esame (Ley
14/2006, Exposición de motivos, II).
33
Così l’art. 12 della legge, dopo aver elencato le applicazioni legittime della diagnosi genetica
preimpianto prevede che «[l]a aplicación de técnicas de diagnóstico preimplantacional para cualquiera
otra finalidad no comprendida en el apartado anterior, o cuando se pretendan practicar en combinación
con la determinación de los antígenos de histocompatibilidad de los preembriones in vitro con fines
terapéuticos para terceros, requerirá de la autorización expresa, caso a caso, de la autoridad sanitaria
correspondiente, previo informe favorable de la Comisión Nacional de Reproducción Humana Asistida,
que deberá evaluar las características clínicas, terapéuticas y sociales de cada caso».
34
Non mancano, anche su questo punto, voci che si oppongono, almeno nel Regno Unito,
all’imposizione di divieti di selezione sulla base del sesso. Cfr. S. Wilkinson, E. Garrard, Eugenics
and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction, Keele University, 2013.
di regolamentazione che prende in considerazione tale ipotesi è contenuta, anche in questo

caso, nello Human Fertility and Embryology Act britannico, che legittima la possibilità di
autorizzare lo svolgimento di test sugli embrioni, volto a stabilirne il sesso, nei casi in cui vi
sia un rischio qualificato che il bambino possa avere o sviluppare «(i) a gender-related serious
physical or mental disability, (ii) a gender-related serious illness, or (iii) any other gender-
related35 serious medical condition»36.
Simili previsioni, tuttavia, richiedono una applicazione rigorosamente fondata su una
valutazione che tenga in considerazione gli aspetti problematici dei dati genetici sui quali ci
si è già soffermati e, in particolare, sulla loro natura scarsamente predittiva. Particolarmente
problematiche, sotto questo punto di vista, paiono notizie come quella recentemente riporta-
ta dalla stampa, secondo la quale le autorità sanitarie dell’Australia occidentale avrebbero au-
torizzato una famiglia con una predisposizione genetica per lo sviluppo di forme di autismo a
selezionare un embrione sulla base del sesso poiché, secondo alcuni studi, i maschi sarebbero
quattro volte più propensi a sviluppare la malattia rispetto alle femmine37.
Ancora, con riferimento alle possibilità che potranno emergere in futuro dalla terapia
genica, un primo profilo che richiede chiarimento riguarda la differenza fra terapia genica im-
piegata nella linea somatica e quella che, diversamente, sarebbe in grado di incidere sulla linea
germinale. La differenza fra le due tipologie di intervento risiede nel fatto che, nel primo caso,
la modificazione produrrebbe effetti unicamente per l’individuo sottoposto a terapia mentre,
nel secondo, le correzioni introdotte produrrebbero conseguenze anche per una eventuale di-
scendenza, andando esse a incidere anche su cellule germinali (spermatozoi e ovociti) o cellule
staminali totipotenti (ai primissimi stadi di sviluppo embrionale) 38.
Le due diverse opzioni sono state guardate con atteggiamento differente tanto dal punto
di vista bioetico, quanto da quello giuridico. In particolare, le terapie sulla linea somatica
sono tendenzialmente accettate, equiparate in qualche misura a terapie sperimentali sostitu-
tive come i trapianti di organi, e sollevano problematiche specifiche principalmente connesse
alla sicurezza ed efficacia delle tecniche impiegate39.
35
Il paragrafo 3 chiarisce cosa si intenda per “gender related”: «[f]or the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)
(c), a physical or mental disability, illness or other medical condition is gender-related if the Authority
is satisfied that: (a)it affects only one sex, or (b)it affects one sex significantly more than the other».
36
Human Fertility Embriology Act (HFE) 1990, Schedule 2, 1ZA, 1, lett. c).
37
La notizia, comparsa su “The West Australian” (Baby sex checks for autism, 19 ottobre 2013, reperibile
in http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/), è stata riportata da “Forbes” (Embryo sex selection to select
against autism?, 21 ottobre 2013, reperibile in http://www.forbes.com) e da “BioNews” (IVF sex
selection allowed in Western Australia to reduce autism risk, 28 ottobre 2013, http://www.bionews.org.
uk/page_357600.asp).
38
Sul punto si veda, in generale, J. Habermas, Il futuro della natura umana. I rischi di una genetica
liberale, Einaudi, 2002. In termini specifici e parzialmente critici, C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed
eugenetica. Prime considerazioni su un discorso giuridico altamente problematico, in “Humanitas”, n. 4,
2004.
39
Come sostenuto sin dal 1991 dal Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, «la terapia genica di cellule
della linea somatica, in presenza di adatte condizioni e dopo aver ottemperato a rigidi requisiti di natura
non solo tecnico-scientifica, ma anche di ordine giuridico ed etico, è completamente accettabile da tutti
i punti di vista, essendo assimilabile ad una terapia sostitutiva o ad un trapianto non a livello di organo,
di tessuto o di cellule ma a livello molecolare». Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, Terapia Genica, 15
febbraio 1991 (http://www.palazzochigi.it/bioetica/pdf/1.pdf).
Completamente differente l’atteggiamento adottato in riferimento alla terapia genica

germinale che, fondandosi su una logica di non consensualità, potrebbe essere letta come una
violazione dei principi di autodeterminazione e dignità umana ed è conseguentemente stata
destinataria di previsioni contenenti giudizi esplicitamente negativi. Così, per esempio, la
Costituzione della Confederazione Svizzera che, nell’intento di tutelare l’essere umano «dagli
abusi della medicina riproduttiva e dell’ingegneria genetica», vieta «tutti [...] gli interventi
nel patrimonio genetico di cellule germinali e embrioni umani» (art. 119). Similmente la già
citata Convenzione di Oviedo prevede un espresso divieto di intervenire sul genoma umano
allorché si introduca una «qualsiasi modifica sul genoma dei discendenti» (art. 13).
Tutti gli esempi riportati, seppure di natura eterogenea, convergono nel far emergere lo
spessore morale e antropologico delle decisioni da adottare e nel mettere in evidenza come il
generale e monolitico rifiuto di tendenze eugenetiche e deterministe, accolto in via di prin-
cipio, si vada frantumando quando messo a confronto con la necessità di elaborare regole
operative inevitabilmente condizionate dalla concretezza dei casi e come le regole giuridiche
paiano ancora una volta piegare le proprie pretese di generalità a fronte della complessità del
reale.
7. La forza dei casi concreti

Un ultimo profilo (sub iii) che qualifica la genetica umana distinguendola, almeno in
parte, dalle altre branche delle scienze della vita e che condiziona l’approccio giuridico a que-
sta realtà è legato alla multiformità della categoria dei dati genetici e dunque alla variabilità
della rilevanza dell’informazione che l’individuo può ottenere mediante un test genetico; si
tratta di una categoria caratterizzata da un elevato grado di eterogeneità in ragione non solo
del differente valore conoscitivo di ogni porzione di DNA e della pluralità di soggetti che ad
esso possono essere interessati, ma anche della variabilità della portata informativa di ogni
singolo al variare delle finalità che mediante l’utilizzo di esso si intendano perseguire40.
Di questa frammentarietà il diritto pare doversi fare carico per garantire, in ogni situazio-
ne in cui emerga un profilo di rilevanza delle informazioni genetiche, la tutela della pluralità
di interessi coinvolti. In ambito medico sanitario, per esempio, si è fatta pressante, in molti
casi, l’esigenza di tenere in piena considerazione gli interessi di soggetti terzi, appartenenti
al medesimo gruppo biologico del soggetto sottopostosi a test. La rilevanza intrafamiliare e
intersoggettiva dei dati genetici è stata così riconosciuta da talune legislazioni, per mezzo di
una valorizzazione della dimensione procedurale che risulta funzionale ad un adattamento
della regola alle caratteristiche del caso concreto.
In questo senso, il legislatore francese ha scelto di dare conto nel ragionamento giuridi-
co della valenza informativa di cui l’informazione genetica può essere portatrice anche nei
confronti di un familiare del soggetto che si è sottoposto al test, introducendo, con l’art.
1131-1-2 del Code de la santé publique, alcune regole volte a concretizzare un obbligo, pro-
40
Come è stato efficacemente sostenuto: «genetic, genomic and proteomic sequencing provide genetic
information, but not necessarily knowledge», M.L.Y. Chan, Beyond determinism and reductionism:
genetic science and the person, Adelaide, 2003, p. 126. In termini generali, per l’Italia, si veda P.
Veronesi, Il corpo e la Costituzione. Concretezza dei «casi» e astrattezza della norma, Giuffrè, 2007.
ceduralmente qualificato, di comunicazione ai familiari. Secondo la norma, il medico, prima

di sottoporre un soggetto a un test genetico, è tenuto a informarlo del fatto che da un suo
eventuale silenzio potrebbero derivare seri rischi per la salute dei membri della sua famiglia,
qualora venisse diagnosticata una malattia genetica grave, le cui conseguenze potrebbero esse-
re oggetto di misure di prevenzione (compresa la consulenza genetica) o di cura. A seguito del
momento informativo, il medico individua insieme alla persona, in un documento scritto, le
modalità di informazione dei membri della famiglia. Sulla base di tale documento, la persona
«est tenue» a trasmettere le informazioni rilevanti ai membri della sua famiglia (dei quali
sia possibile ottenere «les coordonnèes») qualora «des mesures de prévention ou de soins»
possano essere loro proposte41. Se però la persona non volesse comunicare direttamente con i
familiari è previsto che sia il medico a portare alla loro conoscenza l’esistenza di un’informa-
zione medica di carattere familiare che potrebbe riguardarli e ad invitarli a sottoporsi a una
consulenza genetica, senza peraltro rivelare né il nome del soggetto-fonte, né l’anomalia ge-
netica evidenziata e neppure i rischi ad essa associati. Una soluzione normativa articolata che
tende a contemperare, per mezzo di una considerazione della natura condivisa e meramente
predittiva dei dati genetici, il diritto alla riservatezza da un lato e legittime pretese di salute o
prevenzione dall’altro.
Anche in ambiti diversi, come quello lavorativo, regole eccessivamente astratte o sorde
alle specificità dei casi sui quali si calano mostrano la propria inadeguatezza. Nel contesto ci-
tato, l’imposizione di rigorosi divieti di accesso ai dati per i datori di lavoro potrebbe provarsi
inappropriata nel caso in cui, per esempio, le mansioni da svolgere risultino incompatibili
con un determinato profilo genetico o nei casi in cui una mansione o un determinato am-
biente lavorativo possano nuocere a un impiegato con determinate caratteristiche genetiche
(sempre tenuto conto del carattere probabilistico delle risposte che si possono ottenere). La
scelta dell’ordinamento italiano, incardinata all’interno di una disciplina orientata alla tu-
tela della privacy, esclude la possibilità per i datori di lavoro di impiegare dati genetici per
«determinare l’attitudine professionale di lavoratori o di candidati all’instaurazione di un
rapporto di lavoro». Alla luce di quanto sin qui sostenuto in riferimento a un diritto “ben
dimensionato”, una soluzione basata su un approccio antidiscriminatorio potrebbe apparire
più funzionale, laddove si ammettesse la possibilità di valutare, sulla base del singolo caso, la
possibilità di realizzare, anche con il consenso del lavoratore, una “distinzione ragionevole”
finalizzata alla tutela collettiva o del lavoratore stesso. Un simile approccio consentirebbe al
contempo di valorizzare le potenzialità emergenti dalle nuove acquisizioni scientifiche, asser-
vendole alla tutela dei diritti, e di garantire un elevato grado di flessibilità, pur nei limiti di
una sostenibilità rigorosamente fondata su un criterio di ragionevolezza.
8. Considerazioni critiche di sintesi: un bio-diritto penale sostenibile?

I profili qui trattati a mero titolo esemplificativo dimostrano la possibilità di concepire,
adottare e implementare un diritto che tratti la materia genetica rispettandone le caratteristi-
41
L’unica eccezione è prevista per il caso in cui la persona abbia manifestato per iscritto la volontà di
non ottenere una diagnosi; in questa ipotesi sarà comunque possibile per il medico contattare i terzi
interessati.
che proprie. Gli elementi riconducibili al suo continuo progredire, così come quelli dovuti
alla difficoltà nel disciplinare una materia che chiama in causa le dimensioni più profonde
del nostro essere e concepirci umani e che invoca una specifica attenzione alla concretezza
dei singoli casi, paiono condurre peraltro verso un diritto dotato di caratteristiche particolar-
mente problematiche.
Per quanto detto, ad esempio, il carattere “generale e astratto” dello strumento legislativo
(necessario peraltro nelle materie coperte da riserva) pare doversi attenuare di fronte all’esi-
genza di considerare le fattispecie con un approccio caso per caso. E se talvolta è un dettaglio
a fare la differenza nel trattamento di un evento, come assicurare il necessario margine di
certezza dell’inquadramento giuridico senza concepire leggi che si dilatino a dismisura o si
frantumino nel tentativo di anticipare ogni possibile variante, presente e futura? Come poter
garantire l’opportuna flessibilità nel considerare le diverse condotte personali senza venire
meno alla tendenziale prevedibilità delle relative conseguenze? Come, in definitiva, combina-
re equità e giustizia con margini interpretativo-applicativi che potrebbero giungere ad essere
arbitrari?
Evidentemente, tali interrogativi emergono con particolare forza proprio sul versante
del diritto penale, in cui il principio costituzionale di legalità impone, ex art. 25, il divieto di
analogia e i corrispettivi principi di irretroattività, determinatezza e tassatività; principi che
paiono tutti mal conciliarsi con le esigenze normative emergenti dalle caratteristiche della
genetica.
Evitando il rischio di una rivisitazione giuridico-penale del genetic exceptionalism, difficil-
mente compatibile con il sistema normativo nel suo complesso, pare doversi confermare l’esi-
genza di riflettere sulle caratteristiche di un diritto, anche penale, chiamato sempre più spesso
ad abbandonare taluni elementi di presunta oggettività e precisione (e con esse di eguaglianza
solo apparente o di falsa-certezza) e ad affrontare logiche di natura sempre più fuzzy42; senza
trascurare la necessità di confrontarsi, anche con le famiglie di common law, sulla formazione,
in primo luogo universitaria, del giurista, oltre che sulla preparazione e sulla selezione di giu-
dici che, attenti all’experience almeno quanto alla logic, sappiano gestire in forma sostenibile
un fenomeno giuridico che appare sempre più difficilmente interpretabile secondo canoni
di certezza e oggettività. Prendendo spunto dagli insegnamenti di altre scienze, un diritto
capace di far fronte alle improvvise e dinamiche sollecitazioni provenienti dall’esterno è un
diritto caratterizzato da un elevata cifra di resilienza, in grado di evitare fragilità e debolezze
attraverso l’elaborazione di forme specifiche di adattamento al reale che non conducano ad
una perdita di potenziale garantista.
42
Su cui, ad esempio, S. Baldin, Riflessioni sull’uso consapevole della logica fuzzy nelle classificazioni fra
epistemologia del diritto comparato e interdisciplinarietà (Reflections on the conscious use of fuzzy logic in
classifications between epistemology of comparative law and interdisciplinarity), in “Revista General de
Derecho Publico Comparado”, 10, 2012, pp. 1-20.
Small DNA, big wonder: an overview of DNA sequencing technologies
Emrah Nikerel
Table of contents: Introduction. – “Reading DNA”, from 70s to today. – Next generation
sequencing. – Processes after reading DNA. – Errors in reading DNA and methods to recover.
– Visualizing the generated DNA reads, assembled Genomes. – Possibilities following NGS.
– Storing, cataloguing and accessing sequenced genomes. – Conclusions.
Introduction
Deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly known as DNA, is a macromolecule that
encodes the genetic instructions used in the development and functioning of all
known living matter1. Together with proteins and carbohydrates, DNA composes
the three major macromolecules essential for all forms of life. Most DNA molecules
consist of two biopolymer strands coiled around each other to form a double helix.
The DNA is composed of simpler units called nucleotides, of which there are four
types: guanine (G), adenine (A), thymine (T), or cytosine (C). Discovery of its
double helix structure in 1953 by Watson and Crick2 opened several avenues of
research related to its function, structure and more interestingly about its content,
termed as its sequence.
One of the main follow-ups of their discovery was the so-called, “central dogma
of molecular biology”, as an explanation of the flow of genetic information in living
matter. In its basics, the central dogma deals with the detailed transfer of sequence
information, and is often described as “DNA makes RNA and RNA makes protein”.
This dogma has a very important implication: since all information about anything
that runs in the cell is contained in the DNA, we have to look into DNA if we want
1
http://www.genome.gov.
2
J.D. Watson, F.H. Crick, Molecular structure of nucleic acids; a structure for deoxyribose nucleic acid,
in “Nature”, 171 (4356), 1953, pp. 737–738.
128 Small DNA, big wonder
to understand what goes on in the cell. Here, it’s very important to note that, the
information is not only limited by the physics of what goes on in the cell, but also
covers the very specific identification of the organisms that has that DNA.
Over the last 60 years, the central dogma has led to major research in reading
the content of DNA. A major such international effort is the Human Genome
Project which still is, interestingly, the world’s largest collaborative biological project
that ran from 1990, to 2003, with the goal of determining the whole nucleotide
sequences (more than three billion) which make up human DNA, and of physically
and functionally identifying and mapping all of the genes of the human genome.
The Human Genome Project drove a major technology push for developments in
obtaining genomics data (from here onwards termed as “reading DNA”) and has led
substantial changes both scientifically, in terms of basic questions related to the way
we understand biological systems, as well as applications related, in terms of how
this technology is being currently used. Such questions include, and not necessarily
limited to, “How much different is our DNA from the DNA of other organisms”, “Can
I find, genomics traits that are common among several species”, “how specific is a person’s
DNA”, “How can we read DNA in a cheap and effective way?”, and more on the
technology side, “Can we trust the high troughput DNA readings?” ormore on service
oriented interest as “Can we store, access, extract information from high throughput
DNA data?”.
This paper is centered around the above mentioned questions and aims to
present an easy-to-read introduction to the current state-of-the-technology in DNA
sequencing. As such, it is an overview lecture, rather than a purely scientific one. In
particular, I will introduce alternative technologies as Sanger Sequencing, microarrays
and Next-Generation DNA sequencing and the implications of the latter in currently
available genomic data, possible errors in this technology and ways to account for
this (coverage, phred scores, statistics) and lastly, I will list common bioinformatics
databases for further data mining. The reader is expected to have very preliminary
acquaintance to the basic concepts related to genomics, and is assumed to have access
to a “glossary” related to these basics, one particular example is available at DNA
initiative3.
“Reading DNA”, from 70s to today

Reading DNA was one of the “hard tasks” in molecular biology during 70s, but
has been revolutionized by the method pioneered by Frederick Sanger, and termed as
Sanger sequencing4. There are several excellent reviews on the basics and implications
3
http://www.dna.gov/glossary.
4
F. Sanger, S. Nicklen, A.R. Coulson, DNA sequencing with chain-terminating inhibitors, in
E. Nikerel 129
on this technology, but in its essence, the technology made the process of reading
DNA, possible and affordable. Using Sanger technology, DNA can be read nucleotide
by nucleotide, by special enzymes called dideoxynucleotides. The details of the process
are given in Figure 1, but briefly, the reading is performed during synthesis of a
template at multiple copies, each at different length.
Figure 1: basics of Sanger sequencing. The methodology is based on the “reading by synthesis”
principle. Starting from a template, the process consists of synthetizing the complementary of
the template (panel a). By using specialized enzymes, the DNA is synthesized at different lengths,
each detected by using specialized gels, allowing to reconstruct the whole sequence back (panel b)
Albeit being revolutionary at that time, Sanger technology turned to be time

consuming and expensive, with regard to per nucleotide cost and effort. Nearly a
decade later, microarray (both cDNA and oligonucleotide) technology has been
introduced to read DNA and has been proven to be extremely useful for large scale
DNA reading, i.e. reading several thousand gene products in one experiment, as
opposed to single DNA reading per experiment5, based on reading by hybridization
principle. Here, as opposed to the Sanger sequencing, there is already a DNA template
and we look whether our sample has that template or not. The challenge with the
microarray technology is that the experimenter is limited by what the template is:
the technology can only read what the microarray chip has been designed for, and as
such requires dedicated probe design, which in turn limits the broad usage of this.
Stated otherwise, discovery of new DNA or identification of foreign DNA was not
possible with microarray technology.
“Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences”, 74 (12), 1977, pp. 5463-5467.

5
M. Dufva, Introduction to microarray technology, in DNA Microarrays for Biomedical Research,
Humana Press, 2009, pp. 1-22.
Next generation sequencing

The advantage of microarray technology, that is large-scale DNA reading opened
new avenues with massive amount of data, but also brought its own challenges, e.g.
assessment of errors, coming from hybridization heterogeneity, sample treatment etc.
and limitations. Especially with the Human genome project, it was clear that there is
a need for new technologies that would:
t generate high volume of data,
t allow discovery and identification of DNA of unknown origin (new or
foreign)
t be unbiased towards any organism
t allow study of a mixture of DNA, coming from multiple sources (e.g. host &
pathogen DNA, population of DNA, etc.)
t be affordable (in price), so to be accessible by large body of users.
Next generation sequencing (NGS) came into the picture in particular with
the need from the Human Genome Project, aiming to determine all the 3 billion
nucleotides in human DNA. The project lasted 13 years, and scientists spent around
30 billion dollars, and provided massive and interesting data related to human
genome. More than that, it changed the way that we read DNA. Empowered by
the miniaturization possibilities, the idea behind NGS is the following: the DNA
is shredded into several small pieces (of about 100 nucleotides) by enzymatic or
physical shearing and the resulting “soup of DNA” is read via a method similar to
Sanger sequencing, that is, read by synthesis, but with massive parallelization this
time6.
The immediate challenge is then to reconstruct the original DNA from the
smaller reads. Historically, the idea behind the next generation sequencing is not
new. Formerly hierarchical shotgun sequencing aimed to perform the same, yet to a
(much) smaller part of the DNA of interest: get the whole DNA (109 bases), amplify
a small part (104 bps, by a technique called Polymerase Chain Reaction, PCR) and
shred that amplified part into smaller pieces (100 bp) and read all the shredded parts
(sequencing by synthesis). Then, first reconstruct the amplified part of the genome
from the shredded parts then by making use of the physical maps of the original
amplification (from 109 to 104), reconstruct the whole genome, a process called
“hierarchical shotgun sequencing”. With the availability of high capacity computers,
it was possible to extrapolate this process to the whole genome, the new process is
then called “whole –genome shotgun sequencing”. The details of this process are given
in Figure 2.
6
J. Shendure, H. Ji, Next-generation DNA sequencing, in “Nature biotechnology”, 26 (10), 2008, pp.
1135-1145.
E. Nikerel 131
Figure 2: Shotgun sequencing explained: hierarchical vs. whole-genome. In hierarchical shotgun

sequencing (left panel), the genome is first decomposed into smaller units, then shredded into
pieces and read, as opposed to whole genome (right panel) whereby the decomposition into
smaller units is not needed, due to the advances in computers, making reconstruction possible.
Processes after reading DNA

One key step in the above mentioned next-generation sequencing technology is
the so-called “assembly problem”: given the short DNA reads, (re)construct the original
DNA sequence or preferably entire genome, which later is shown to be equivalent
of the so called “shortest superstring problem”. Figure 3 illustrates the assembly
problem for a very small example dataset, whereby starting from an unordered DNA
readings and by incrementally adding matching reads, the aim is to get the consensus
sequence. Being originally a challenging task, thanks to the advances in computing
capabilities as well as availability of new assembly algorithms, dedicated software, the
assembly problem is now manageable, even for large genomes7.
Errors in reading DNA and methods to recover

Let it be from the biological variation, sample treatment process or even
instrumental limitations, one thing is for certain: every experimental process or all
measurements contain error. NGS technology is no exception in this and the DNA
7
J.R. Miller, S. Koren, G. Sutton, Assembly algorithms for next-generation sequencing data, in
“Genomics”, 95 (6), 2010, pp. 315-327.
reads contain error. There are several measures to take this error into account8: the
one I will focus is the so-called phred scores: If p is defined as the probability of
wrong calling a specific base, the Phredquality score is defined as: Q= 10log10p.
Phred quality scores have become widely accepted to characterize the quality of DNA
sequences, and can be used to compare the efficacy of different sequencing methods.
More importantly, Phred quality scores can be used for the automatic determination
of accurate, quality-based consensus sequences.
Figure 3: Workflow and details of the DNA assembly problem. Starting from an ordered list
that contains DNA readings (left panel), we select a sequence (center panel, top row) and find
one-by-one the matching sequences (center panel, lower rows). At the end of the assembly
process, we aim to reconstruct the so called “consensus sequence”, that would be the original
genome we aimed to sequence (right panel, consensus sequence is shown with red fonts).
Once we know how much error is made during reading, the next step would be
to compensate for this error. The current practice in NGS technology is simply to
read DNA again, and again and again, such that, one strand of DNA is read multiple
times. This average number of times that one nucleotide is read is called coverage. By
increasing the coverage, we decrease the effect of an erroneous read, as well as the
challenge in the assembly problem by making more and more overlapping DNA
parts at an overall price cost9.
8
J. Błażewicz, P. Formanowicz, M. Kasprzak, W. T. Markiewicz, J. W glarz, DNA sequencing
with positive and negative errors, in “Journal of Computational Biology”, 6 (1), 2009, pp. 113-123; O.
Zagordi, R. Klein, M. Däumer, N. Beerenwinkel, Error correction of next-generation sequencing data
and reliable estimation of HIV quasispecies, in “Nucleic acids research”, 38 (21), 2010, pp. 7400-7409.
9
J.C. Dohm, C. Lottaz, T. Borodina, H. Himmelbauer, Substantial biases in ultra-short read data
sets from high-throughput DNA sequencing, in “Nucleic acids research”, 36(16), 2008, e105-e105.
E. Nikerel 133
Visualizing the generated DNA reads, assembled Genomes

Typically, when the reading and assembling the DNA of interest is performed,
the next task is to visualize the DNA via special programs called genome browsers,
whereby we integrate and visualize several types of information related to the
genome of interest: individual reads, consensus sequence, reference genome (if any),
annotation, and comparison with other phylogenetically close genomes, an example
is described by Fiume et al.10, or Skinner et al.11.
Possibilities following NGS

The advent of the NGS technology as well as accompanying bioinformatics tools
revolutionized the way that we study DNA. The massive amount of generated data
also challenged scientists from diverse backgrounds, in terms of acquiring, processing,
storing, in general, managing this data. Owing to the advances in miniaturization
and parallelization, a decade after the introduction of this technology, it became
significantly cheaper and accessible in an unprecedented way: the cost of sequencing
one nucleotide decreased several orders of magnitude in a relatively very short time
period (Figure 4). Such progress is typically compared with the so called Moore’s law,
a measure on how quickly the computers become more powerful. It is clear by Figure
4 that, the rate at which NGS technology improves or becomes cheaper is much
faster than the growth of computational power, we witnessed in the past.
This simply meant, apart from the scientific highlights, one important thing:
reading any DNA became accessible to anybody.
Figure 4: Technology push exhibited as price drop over the years. The price is
compared to the Moore’s law, typical to illustrate the available computational power.
From this graph, it can be noted that the technology improvement, exhibited as price
drop in sequencing, is progressing at a rate faster that the progress of computers.
10
M. Fiume, V. Williams, A. Brook, M. Brudno, Savant: genome browser for high-throughput
sequencing data, in “Bioinformatics”, 26(16), 2010, pp. 1938-1944.
11
M.E. Skinner, A.V. Uzilov, L.D. Stein, C.J. Mungall, İ.H. Holmes, JBrowse: a next-generation
genome browser, in “Genome research”, 19(9), 2009, pp. 1630-1638.
One other aspect of the technology push relates to several available platforms
providing NGS. Without getting too much into the details, the next generation
sequencing technology also underwent a number of generations: 2nd, 3rd etc. These
vary by their read length, the size of the data that they can generate etc. There is
one take-home message from the technology side: things are getting smaller, more
flexible, and cheaper. All in all, the technology becomes accessible also by non-
scientists, especially when considering the case of sequencers at the size of a palm of
a hand12.
Storing, cataloguing and accessing sequenced genomes

As mentioned, the NGS technology has been initially coined, developed and
used for the Human Genome Project, which amounted to a very large “book”
composed of 3.2 billion letters! When this amount of information is obtained for
a group of people (say patients), or to a different organisms (e.g. wheat’s genome is
approximately 6 times larger), it becomes quickly apparent that ways to store, share,
search, all in all, manage the high resulting high volume of data are highly needed.
Several bioinformatics databases (typically public) are developed and focused on
this idea. Currently, there is handful of databases (a short list is given in Table I)
that specialize on specific sub-topics, of what resulted from – omic (a generic term
that is not limited by genomics but also includes metabolomics, transcriptomics,
proteomics, etc.) studies. Understandably, the amount of information available
within these databases tremendously increased over the last decade, in particular
with the massive datasets generated by NGS or similar technologies.
Nowadays, any person can reach these online databases, and query for genomic
information. Consider the “classical case” that there is a piece of DNA isolated from
a crime scene, say from blood sample. If you send this DNA to a sequencer, you will
get what the sequence was, but this itself is little useful if you cannot find the origin
of your DNA of interest. By querying the read DNA towards these databases, you
can align and find out the organism that it belongs to, the function in case there is
annotation and actually all information related to this piece of DNA. As of 2008,
there are 1011 base pairs submitted to National Center for Biotechnology Information
(NCBI) and the number is only increasing. The availability of such databases is
important not only for non-scientific audience for accessibility, but also for technical
oriented scientists, that would like to automatize common or repetitive tasks, parse
large files and generalize their specific finding over species. As such, bioinformatics
deals with ways to cope with large data sets and making sense of genomic-scale data.
12
Oxford Nanopore, https://www.nanoporetech.com/technology/the-minion-device-a-miniaturised-
sensing-system/the-minion-device-a-miniaturised-sensing-system.
E. Nikerel 135
Table 1: Common bioinformatics databases
Database name Web address Type of data

GenBank www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov nucleotide sequences
SWISS-PROT www.expasy.ch protein sequences
PDB www.rcsb.org/pdb/ protein structures
InterPro www.ebi.ac.uk/interpro/ protein domains
BRENDA www.brenda-enzymes.org/ enzyme properties
KEGG www.genome.ad.jp metabolic pathways
Conclusions
Looking at the development of the field in one or two decades back, genomics
has witnessed an impressive technology push. In this simple overview, I focused
on the following implications, some of them is beyond the very science, closer to
application:
t We can “read DNA” at great speed, low cost; generating genomics data is no
longer the bottleneck, understanding however still is.
t Knowing that all measurements contain error, we now have ways to assess
the credibility of the resulting data and experimental and computational
methods to compensate this error.
t To access the resulting information on DNA from several organisms, there
are a number of (public) databases; the availability of these tools makes “high
throughput science” possible.
The impact of the above mentioned technologies is foreseen on a number of
application fields including, but not limited to personalized medicine, or discovery
and use of genomic diversity. From a medical application perspective, the technology
being affordable, in the future, it will be standard to sequence human DNA, much
like a simple blood test of today. As a similar example, paternity tests will be much
more accurate than today and the genomic profile of each individual will shape if
not clearly determine his/her dietary requirements. From an industrial application
standpoint, exploiting the genomic diversity will be much easier: isolating DNA from
diverse environments, sequencing it and patenting the sequence will be standard
procedure. Alongside to this industrial use, the technology will also be used for
quality control: assessing for example the quality of the meat will be performed using
molecular technologies, e.g. whether the meat is from a specific animal (veal, pig or
horse). From a forensics point of view, this technology will deliver highly accurate
genomic data, with little preprocessing, even when the DNA in question comes
from a mixture of sources. In conclusion, the implications and several applications

of DNA reading technology are already in place for some and expected to dominate
tomorrow’s world.
Law and genetics
Gülay Bulut
Table of contents: Introduction. – What is genetics? – Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)

as a hereditary molecule. – Structure of DNA. – Functions of DNA. – What is a gene?
– Chromosome. – How do genetic diseases occur? – DNA mutations. – Polymorphism. –
What is genetic testing? – Law and genetics. – References.
Introduction
What is genetics?
Genetics is the sub-branch of biology which studies heredity and its variations in
organisms. Modern genetics, which studies the mechanism of inheritance, was born
with Mendel’s work in the middle of the 19th century. As a monk, Mendel observed
the proliferation of the peas in the garden of the church where he lived. These
observations provided the foundation of the genetics and still remain valid today.
Undoubtedly, following the basic physical traits (like green or yellow and round
or wrinkled beans) of peas and using mathematics when analyzing the biological
observations contributed Mendel’s success.
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as a hereditary molecule

Majority of living organisms have deoxyribonucleic acid as their genetic material.
In humans, this molecule, shortly described as DNA, can be found in the nucleus. An
individual’s DNA is the same in all his cells. Normal human DNA has approximately
3 billion bases and more than 99% of this is similar in all humans. Therefore, only
about 1% creates the differences between individuals (1-4).
138 Law and genetics
Structure of DNA
DNA is a double stranded, helical molecule. Each strand consists of consecutive
building blocks called nucleotides. Nucleotides are composed of three different
molecules, a phosphate group, a sugar group and a nitrogenous base (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Nucleotides are the building blocks of the DNA molecule. They are composed of a
phosphate group, a sugar group and a nitrogenous base.
The sugar and phosphate groups of the DNA are uniform and do not vary. On
the contrary, there are 4 types of nitrogenous bases: Adenine (A), Thymine (T),
Guanine(G) and Cytosine (C). Because of these differences in nitrogenous bases, all
individuals have different and unique DNA. DNA code or genetic code means the
sequence of the nitrogenous bases (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Short part of a DNA sequence
Nitrogenous bases make hydrogen bonds with each other. Sugar and phosphate
groups form the backbone of the double stranded DNA helix, while nitrogenous bases
keep two strands together by forming hydrogen bonds with the bases in the other
strand. In this spiral staircase like formation, sugar-phosphate backbone resembles
of handrail and nitrogenous bases resemble of steps. In the helical DNA molecule,
adenine forms 2 hydrogen bonds with the thymine and cytosine forms 3 hydrogen
bonds with the guanine on the complementary strand (Figure 3). Hydrogen bonds,
which keep approximately 3 billion bases together, give DNA a property of being
G. Bulut 139
one of the strongest and most stable molecules on earth. Thus DNA can be obtained
and analyzed even from fossils or decayed bodies (1-4).
Figure 3. Double helix of DNA.
Functions of DNA
There are two main function of DNA as a heredity molecule. First, DNA provides
the transmission of genetic information to the next generations by replicating itself
(Figure 4). This process is specially important in cell division because replication
allows the transmission of the same DNA as parental DNA to the daughter cells.
Figure 4. Replication of DNA.
Another important function of DNA is to ensure the protein synthesis by passing

the genetic information through messenger RNA molecules. Genetic information in
DNA is first transmitted to RNA (transcription) and then to the protein (translation).
This flow of genetic information is called ‘Central Dogma’ (1-4).
Figure 5. Flow of genetic information - Central Dogma.
What is a gene?
Genes are DNA sequences which encodes a functional product (RNA, polypeptide
or protein). Within a gene, the beginning and end the DNA sequences have been
determined. In the beginning of 2000’s with the completion of Human Genome
Project, it’s announced that in humans there are about 20,000-25,000 genes. Every
human has 2 copies of each gene. Sequences of these genes are almost similar in
most of the people except approximately 1% can vary between individuals. This little
variation determines the unique physical traits of a person.
Chromosome
DNA is wrapped around the histone proteins and packed in the nucleus (Figure
6). Thus DNA, which would reach approximately 2 meters in unpacked form, can fit
in a cell’s nucleus. This packed DNA and histone proteins are called a ‘chromosome’
during mitosis and ‘chromatin’ in non-dividing stages.
Figure 6. Structure of a chromosome.

G. Bulut 141
A healthy human has 23 pairs of chromosomes in their somatic cells. 22 pairs of

those are autosomal chromosomes and same in both men and women. The 23rd pair
of chromosomes are sex chromosomes. Females have two X, whereas males have one
X and one Y chromosomes (Figure 7). Analysis of chromosomes by grouping them
according to their structures, is called ‘karyotyping’ (1-4).
Figure 7. Chromosome analysis of a normal female and a male (karyotyping).
How do genetic diseases occur?

Genetic diseases occur due to permanent changes in DNA sequences. These
changes are called mutations and can happen in one single nitrogenous base
in DNA or can contain a large segment of a chromosome. Genetic diseases and
hereditary diseases are different from each other. Genetic disorders include diseases
which occur due to a mistake in DNA sequence. On the other hand, in hereditary
diseases, mistakes in DNA sequences are transmitted to the next generations. Thus,
a hereditary disease is also a genetic disease but not all genetic diseases are hereditary.
DNA mutations
A single change in one of the nitrogenous base of DNA can cause a disease with
very severe clinical symptoms. For example, in sickle cell anemia, there is a single base
change within the DNA sequence and thus an adenine base has been replaced by a
thymine. This single nitrogenous base change affects the structure of hemoglobin
protein which is found in red blood cells and is responsible for oxygen transport
to the tissues. As a result, a significant reduction is observed in the oxygen carrying
capacity of hemoglobin. In cellular level, red blood cells, which are disk-shaped and
flexible in healthy individuals, have sickle shape and transform into a more fragile
state in sicle cell patients.
In diseases, where there is a mutation at the chromosomal level, total chromosome
number or structural changes in chromosomes are a matter of question. For example,

in Down Syndrome, individuals have three chromosome 21 instead of two (Figure
8). As a result, distinct clinical symptoms are observed (2,4).
Figure 8. Down Syndrome (47,XX, +21) - mutation on chromosomal level
Polymorphism
In DNA sequences, except mutations, there are some genetic changes which are
called polymorphisms and can be observed in more than 1% of the population.
Clinically, these variations are accepted as normal. Although they don’t have any
adverse effects on human health, they are likely to affect the risk factors during the
development of some diseases. In addition to that, they are responsible for the normal
differences between individuals (exp. eye and hair color, blood type etc.). DNA
sequences with high polymorphism are important in forensic cases with applications
like personal identification and paternity testing (4).
What is genetic testing?

Genetic tests are tests for determining the changes on DNA, chromosomes,
genes or proteins. Today approximately 1000 genetic tests are being used. These tests
have been implemented in prenatal diagnosis, newborn screening, identification
of carrier individuals and forensic applications. Over time, with the development
of scientific techniques and identification of diseases and their responsible DNA
sequence changes, number of genetic tests have increased, they have been technically
simplified and their prices have reduced.
G. Bulut 143
Law and genetics

There are multiple areas where law and genetics overlap. Undoubtedly, genetics
is the supportive field of science to solve the forensic cases. However, with the
developments in genetics, it requires support from law in areas like protecting genetic
information of individuals and ethics. In previous years, the association of law and
genetics is inevitable.
For example, due to mis-diagnosis during prenatal testing, the legitimate rights of
a mother who gives birth to a baby with a genetic anomaly has to be defined in the
framework of the law. Human gene mapping within the scope of Human Genome
Project also brings some ethical problems. First of all, personal genetic information
is individual’s privacy. For this reason, it has to be confidential, it should not be
available for public access and has to be protected from discrimination. United
Nations has made some legal regulations to protect the genetic rights of the member
countries. For example, in 2008 The United States Congress has accepted Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, which aims to prevent discrimination because
of individual’s genetic information (5).
Another important issue is the patenting of the genes. With the regulations in
this issue, in June 2013, Supreme Court of the United States has decided that human
genes are natural part of DNA sequences so, isolation of human genes in laboratories
is not an adequate justification to patent the genes (6). Thus, a significant reduction
has been observed in the prices of genetic tests.
Another controversial issue is whether an individual with a certain genetic
abnormality has a tendency to be a criminal or not. For example, more aggressive
and criminal behaviors have been observed in men who has two Y chromosomes
rather than one. In this specific issue which was discussed especially in 1960s, there
is no related substantial scientific data (7). However, according to one hypothesis,
exclusion of these individuals from society places them to a low socio-economical
level, which may later increase their risk of showing criminal behavior (8).
References
1. B. Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell, Garland Science, 2008.
2. G.M. Cooper, R.E. Hausman, The Cell: A Molecular Approach, Sinauer Associates,
2013.
3. T. Strachan, A. Read, Human Molecular Genetics, Garland Science, 2010.
4. Genetic Home Reference, US Library of Medicine, 2014, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
handbook.
5. Genetic Non-discrimination Act (GINA), Public Law 110 – 233, 122 Stat. 881,
H.R. 493, May 2008.
6. A. Liptak, Supreme Court Rules Human Genes May Not Be Patented, in “New York
Times”, 13 June 2013.
7. Criminal behaviour and the Y chromosome, in “Br. Med. J.”, January 14th, 1967,
1(5532), 64–65.
8. K. Stochholm et al., Criminality in men with Klinefelter’s syndrome and
XYY syndrome: a cohort study, in “BMJ Open” 2012; 2:e000650 doi:10.1136/
bmjopen-2011-000650.
“Bio-penal law” and issues of beginning of human life 1
Stefano Canestrari
Table of contents: 1. Introductory remarks. − 2. Issues of beginning of human life and

secularism of criminal law. − 3. The regulation of medically assisted procreation. − 4. The
protection of prenatal life.
1. Introductory remarks
The evolution of scientific knowledge increased considerably man’s life and health
expectancies. Just consider the notable results achieved by biomedicine, such as the
production of new drugs and vaccines; the arrangement of innovative diagnostic
instruments for genetic diseases and biotechnologies; medical and pharmaceutical
experimentation; preventive medicine; medically assisted procreation; prenatal
therapy of the foetus etc.
These are issues of great interest and topicality, as they touch some complex
questions concerning bioethics and “bio-law”, whereas such expressions indicate the
disciplines dealing with the ethical and legal problems connected to the scientific and
technical progress, especially in the biomedical area.
As it is known, the issues traditionally faced from such perspectives concern life,
health, procreation, death; and it becomes clear that they are fields of – at times
bitter – confrontation between remarkably different moral visions. Nevertheless,
such fields cannot be considered a “space free from law”, or rather sectors, that,
due to their prevailing and absorbing ethical, philosophical and religious dimension,
should be aprioristically exempted from legal regulation.
On the contrary: with growing intensity and frequency today there is much
1
146 “Bio-penal law” and issues of beginning of human life
debate about the opportunity, and even about the need, of a legal regulation of
bioethics relating to the beginning and the end of human life, including, not least,
the most appropriate punitive means to ensure its effectiveness.
Not surprisingly, the consequent scenario implies the difficult task to reconcile the
program of protection with some fundamental characters of modern criminal law,
first of all the “secularism” of punitive intervention. Also, we cannot waive the whole
body of guarantees typical of the penal intervention, amongst which is particularly
relevant the limitation of punishment only to the cases calling for the need of
protecting real legal goods that cannot otherwise be effectively protected. Despite
any possible intervention of criminal law in the bioethics of the beginning and the
end of human life, it is clear that it cannot abdicate the constitutional principles of
legality and harm and the criminal-political canons of subsidiarity and fragmentation
(«frammentarietà»), which maintain their decisive role in the implementation of the
program aimed at protecting the values of the human person.
The idea of the penal intervention as an extrema ratio confirms that the use of the
penal instrument is functional only to prevent facts that seriously endanger social co-
existence and not to sanction mere manifestations of immorality or of contrast with
ethical, religious or ideological values of a part of society.
Thus, once acknowledged that the embryo is a legal good deserving protection, it
still remains to be established whether, in the critical situations in which its protection
contrasts with other interests (just think about the health of the aspiring mother),
there are more effective instruments of control than criminal law; or whether an
extensive adoption of the latter (by criminalizing every harm to the embryo’s integrity)
would not concretely induce undesired effects (such as the increment of abortion
practices as a consequence of the prohibition of preimplantation genetic diagnosis2)
or even criminogenic effects (such as the increment of back-street abortions whereas
the voluntary termination of pregnancy is not permitted).
Misconducts offending principles or values that do not constitute actual legal
objects could not be criminalised either: thus, the hoary issue concerning the possible
penal protection of the embryo depends upon the fact that it is acknowledged with
the status of human being3, while – for instance – the possibility of such a protection
of male and female gametes shall be absolutely excluded, notwithstanding the moral
value attributed to the principle of generation of life4.
2
With regard to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, the novelties at a normative level and the most
recent case law and academic orientations will be illustrated infra, par. 3.
3
On the topic, from different points of view, E. Dolcini, Embrione, pre-embrione, ootide: nodi
interpretativi nella disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2004,
p. 459 ff.; L. Eusebi, Beni penalmente rilevanti e tecniche di procreazione, in L. Fioravanti (a cura di),
La tutela penale della persona. Nuove frontiere, difficili equilibri, Milano, 2001, p. 46.
4
Cf. S. Canestrari, Verso una disciplina penale delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita? Alla
ricerca del bene giuridico tra valori ideali e opzioni ideologiche, in L. Fioravanti (a cura di), La tutela
S. Canestrari 147
2. Issues of beginning of human life and secularism of criminal law

Amongst the fields in which the legal-penal relevance of the idea of secularism5
seems more immediate and undeniable, however, there are currently some contexts
intrinsically characterised by references to pre-comprehensive structures of ethical
nature and to “ontological” conceptions on man and on life (abortion, medically
assisted procreation, genetic manipulations). In such cases, the decisions of the
legal order concern fields of strong ethical connotation and situations depending
on general opinions concerning human life – especially in its beginning – rising
complicated issues, which can be only partially dealt with here.
It is important to start by saying that, while tackling such thorny issues, the legal
order makes a decision irrespectively, be it only that of “not deciding”. Indeed, an
“abstensionist” policy implies the legitimisation of a practice, at least in accordance
to the liberal principle which states that everything which is not forbidden is allowed.
Given for acknowledged that “secular” law is not synonym of value-free law –
also being value-free implies an option, that is the legitimatisation of practices – we
must make a clarification of fundamental importance. We must highlight that law,
inasmuch as “secular”, shall nevertheless feel the need for granting the highest level
of pluralism.
In such a perspective, for instance, the values of sexuality or procreation should
penale, cit., p. 61 ff.

5
On the issue of the secularism of criminal law see, recently, S. Canestrari, Laicità e diritto penale nelle
democrazie costituzionali, in E. Dolcini, C.E. Paliero (eds.), Studi in onore di G. Marinucci, Milano,
2006, 121 ff.; G. Losappio, Bioetica e diritto penale. Le disposizioni penali del Testo Unico nelle proposte
di legge sulle tecniche di procreazione assistita, in “Ind. pen.”, 1999, p. 610 ff.; M.B. Magro, Etica laica
e tutela della vita umana: riflessioni sul principio di laicità in diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”,
1994, passim; M. Romano, Principio di laicità dello Stato, religioni, norme penali, in “Riv. it., dir. proc.
pen.”, 2007, p. 493 ff.; S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni, Documento introduttivo, in S. Canestrari, L.
Stortoni (eds.), Valori e secolarizzazione nel diritto penale, Bologna, 2009, p. 7 ff.; S. Canestrari, F.
Faenza, Paternalismo penale e libertà individuale: incerti equilibri e nuove prospettive nella tutela della
persona, in A. Cadoppi (ed.), Laicità, valori e diritto penale. The moral limits of the Criminal Law. In
ricordo di Joel Feinberg, Milano, 2010, p. 167 ff.; D. Pulitanò, Problema penale e problemi della laicità,
in S. Canestrari-L. Stortoni (eds.), Valori, cit., p. 179 ff.; L. Ferrajoli, Stato laico ed etica laica.
Laicità e diritto penale, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni (eds.), Valori, cit., p. 121 ff.; G. Fiandaca,
Considerazioni intorno a bioetica e diritto penale, tra laicità e ‘post-secolarismo’, in “Riv. it. dir. proc.
pen.”, 2007, p. 546 ff.; Id., I temi eticamente sensibili tra ragione pubblica e ragione punitiva, in “Riv.
it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 1383 ff.; Id., Punire la semplice immoralità? Un vecchio interrogativo che
tende a riproporsi, in A. Cadoppi (ed.), Laicità, cit., p. 207 ff.; E. Dolcini, Laicità, ‘sana laicità’ e diritto
penale. La Chiesa cattolica maestra (anche) di laicità?, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 1017 ff.;
A. Cadoppi, Liberalismo, paternalismo e diritto penale, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni (eds.), Valori,
cit., 283 ff.; A. Cadoppi, Presentazione. Principio del danno (harm principle) e limiti del diritto penale,
in A. Cadoppi (ed.), Laicità, cit., VII ff.; G. Forti, Alla ricerca di un luogo per la laicità: il “potenziale
di verità” nelle democrazie liberali, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni (eds.), Valori, cit., p. 349 ff.; A.
Barbera, Il cammino della laicità, in S. Canestrari (ed.), Laicità e diritto, Bologna, 2007, p. 33 ff.;
L. Risicato, Dal “diritto di vivere” al “diritto di morire”. Riflessioni sul ruolo della laicità nell’esperienza
penalistica, Torino, 2008, passim.
not be touched by any legal sanctions. Therefore, we cannot agree with the total ban
of heterologous assisted insemination techniques– the violation of which implies the
application of severe afflictive sanctions (administrative in nature, but penal in their
“substance”) – oriented to affirm the ideal value of the naturality of procreation.
A pure secular conception should be oriented to identify and appreciate all the
actual interests at stake: without delegitimizing any of them a priori. Thus, again
with regard to the medically assisted procreation: the right to self-determination
of the mother (rectius, of both parents), as well as the respect of her psychophysical
integrity; the protection of the embryo and the rights of the future child (for instance,
to “enjoy” the double parental figure); the protection of human genome and, at the
same time, of the freedom of research.
Criminal law as an extrema ratio confirms that this is a selective appreciation,
oriented on the basis of rational criteria offered by the indications deriving from
constitutional principles.
With regard to the prospect of genetic manipulations, in good part reasonably
achievable in the future, the legitimacy of reproductive cloning of human being is
to be excluded, in the light of the most fundamental principles of respect of human
dignity6.
Furthermore, it is necessary to balance as many interests as possible, paying a
special attention to the protection of the interests of the weakest subjects: we think
that the key criterion to use is the one to which the widest legal protection should be
recognised to those who cannot protect themselves on their own.
In conclusion, a law correctly inspired by the idea of secularism shall assume
decisions oriented to grant in any case the liberty of the members of the community
and the symmetry of their reciprocal positions and relations, and try to compensate
the painful decisions, that sacrifice an interest, with other instruments offered by
social reality: thus, the necessary referral of the decision to interrupt the pregnancy in
certain circumstances to the woman’s free choice shall go together with the adoption
of (financial, human, professional, structural etc.) resources, allowing women to
choose freely while confronting with different possibilities7.
6
On this subject cf. J. Habermas, Il futuro della natura umana. I rischi di una genetica liberale, ed. by
L. Ceppa, Torino, 2001, p. 57 ff., p. 82 ff., whereas the Author observes that the attempt to determine
discretionarily another man in its natural constitution shall be prohibited.
7
On the questions raised by abortion cf., amongst criminal lawyers, M. Romano, F. Stella, Aborto e
legge penale. Riflessioni e proposte, Milano, 1975, p. 39 ff.; L. Eusebi, La tutela penale della vita prenatale,
in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1988, p. 1098 ff.; M. Zanchetti, La legge sull’interruzione della gravidanza,
Padova, 1992, p. 50 ff. More recently, C. Cassani, Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194. Norme per la tutela
sociale della maternità e sull’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza, in S. Canestrari (ed.), I reati contro
la vita e l’incolumità individuale, in I grandi temi, Treatise directed by A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, M.
Papa, I reati contro la persona, I, Torino, 2006, p. 154 ff.; C. Cassani, entry Aborto, in A. Cadoppi-S.
Canestrari, P. Veneziani (eds.), Codice penale commentato con dottrina e giurisprudenza, Piacenza,
2011, p. 2945 ff.
S. Canestrari 149
A final remark: a truly secular vision forces us to deem inconsistent any

conception masked under “labels” or preconstituted schemes. Recalling such labels
and schemes without any argumentation usually sounds as an excusatio non petita.
In such a perspective, there can be no secular law (“biolaw”) opposed to a catholic
law: law can only be a set of common rules aimed at social co-existence, which keep
into account, for instance, the prerogatives of the model of the non-disposability of
life and of the one of the quality of life; of the value-free liberal perspective of the
inviolability of individual choices and the ethical perspective of the protection of the
needs for justice, with special regard to the weakest, in order to select and crystallize
the minimum basis of aequitas according to approximate criteria, which take into
consideration as much as possible the social reality.
3. The regulation of medically assisted procreation

The Italian law on medically assisted procreation (law n. 40 of 19 February
2004,) aimed at satisfying two fundamental needs: protecting the woman’s health
and providing an adequate protection to the human embryo. To achieve both
objectives was not easy since opposed needs had to be balanced without adopting
mere compromise solutions based on expedients or fictions8.
8
On the current regulation see, from different perspectives, E. Dolcini, Embrione, cit., p. 440 ff.;
F. Mantovani, Procreazione medicalmente assistita e principio personalistico, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p.
326 ff.; G. Fiandaca, Scelte di tutela in materia di fecondazione assistita e democrazia laica, in “Leg.
pen”., 2005, p. 339 ff.; A. Manna, La tutela penale della vita in fieri, tra funzione promozionale e
protezione di beni giuridici, in “Leg. pen”., 2005, p. 245 ff.; L. Eusebi, La vita individuale precoce:
soltanto materiale biologico?, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 457 ff., S. Canestrari, Commento alla legge
40/2004, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2004, p. 416 ff.; L. Risicato, Lo statuto punitivo della procreazione
tra limiti perduranti ed esigenze di riforma, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2005, p. 674 ff.; E. Dolcini,
La legge sulla procreazione assistita: quali prospettive dopo il referendum del 2005?, in “Dir. pen. proc.”,
2006, p. 103 ff.; F. Consorte, La procreazione medicalmente assistita: legge 19.2.2004, n. 40, in S.
Canestrari (ed.), I reati contro la vita, cit., p. 215 ff.; E. Dolcini, Fecondazione assistita e diritto
penale, Milano, 2008; S. Canestrari, F. Faenza, Il principio di ragionevolezza nella regolamentazione
biogiuridica: la prospettiva del diritto penale, in “Criminalia”, 2008, p. 88 ff.; E. Dolcini, Responsabilità
del medico e reati in materia di procreazione assistita. Ambiguità e rigori della legge n. 40 del 2004, in
“Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 27 ff.; E. Dolcini, Embrioni nel numero “strettamente necessario”: il
bisturi della Corte Costituzionale sulla legge n. 40 del 2004, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 950 ff.;
C. Cassani, La diagnosi genetica preimpianto e la sua rilevanza penale, in “Ind. pen.”, 2009, p. 87 ff.;
C. Cassani, Artt. 12-14, in Procreazione medicalmente assistita. Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40. Norme
in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita, in M. Balestra, S. Canestrari, G.F. Ricci (eds.),
Leggi collegate, in M. Sesta (ed.), Codice della famiglia. Tomo II. Leggi collegate, Milano, 20092, p.
3716 ff.; E. Dolcini, La procreazione medicalmente assistita: profili penalistici, in S. Canestrari, G.
Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S. Rodotà, P. Zatti (eds.), Il governo del corpo. Tomo I, in Trattato di
biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Milano, 2011, p. 1537 ff.; E. Dolcini, La lunga marcia
della fecondazione assistita. La legge 40/2004 tra Corte Costituzionale, Corte EDU e giudice ordinario,
in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 428 ff.; A. Vallini, La diagnosi genetica preimpianto: da illecito
penale a questione deontologica. Eterogenesi dei fini di un legislatore irragionevole, in “Riv. it. med. leg.”,
The existing legislation recognises that the embryo is a value deserving protection,
as we can infer from our Constitution, from the decisions of the Constitutional
court, from the statutes in force, from international and European Institutions’
documents. Such an acknowledgement led to the introduction of many criminal
offenses, which may be distinguished in two groups. The first group includes offenses
presiding “widely” shared principles, expression of values that are strongly rooted
also within the present pluralistic societies. The second one consists of criminal
offenses that interfere, through intransigent limitations and prohibitions, with the
application of the main methods or procedures of medically assisted procreation, in
order to protect the human embryo’s integrity.
A first group of dispositions aims at forbidding behaviours that are inconsistent
with the recognition of the human nature of the embryo and that offend the legal
good of the un-repeatability of human genome. Amongst others:
a) Art. 12, co. 6, punishes with imprisonment from three months to two years
and with a fine from 600.000 Euros to 1.000.000 Euros whoever, in any
form, realises, organises or advertises the commercialisation of gametes or
embryos [«chiunque, in qualsiasi forma, realizza, organizza o pubblicizza la
commercializzazione di gameti o di embrioni»].
b) Art. 12, co. 7, punishes with imprisonment from ten to twenty years and with
a fine from 600.000 Euros to 1.000.000 Euros whoever realises a process
aimed at obtaining a human being descending from a single starting cell,
possibly identical in its genetic nuclear inheritance to another human being
dead or alive [«chiunque realizza un processo volto ad ottenere un essere umano
discendente da un’unica cellula di partenza, eventualmente identico quanto
al patrimonio genetico nucleare, ad un altro essere umano in vita o morto»].
The norm also establishes that the physician is punished with perpetual
interdiction from the exercise of the medical profession.
c) Art. 13, co. 1, forbids any experimentation on embryos whatsoever.
d) Art. 13, co. 2, allows clinical and experimental research on each human
embryo, provided that it pursues exclusively therapeutic and diagnostic
2011, p. 1405 ff.; C. Cassani, La diagnosi genetica preimpianto: profili penali e risvolti applicativi, in G.
Balbi, A. Esposito (eds.), Laicità, valori e diritto penale. Atti del Convegno. Santa Maria Capua Vetere,
6 febbraio 2009, Torino, 2011, p. 79 ff.; F. Consorte, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40. Norme in materia di
procreazione medicalmente assistita, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, P. Veneziani (eds.), Codice penale
commentato, cit., p. 2981 ff.; F. Consorte, La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita (L.
19-2-2004, n. 40) § 1 - La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita, in I delitti contro la vita e
l’incolumità personale, in Trattato di diritto penale diretto da A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A. Manna,
M. Papa, Parte speciale, Vol. VII, Torino, 2011, p. 623 ff.; A. Vallini, Illecito concepimento e valore
del concepito. Statuto punitivo della procreazione, principi, prassi, Torino, 2012, passim; G. Fiandaca, E.
Musco, Diritto penale. Parte speciale, vol. II, tomo I, I delitti contro la persona, Bologna, 20134, p. 51
ff.; E. Dolcini, Legge sulla procreazione assistita e laicità dello Stato: da sempre, un rapporto difficile, in
“Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 27 novembre 2013, p. 1 ff.
S. Canestrari 151
purposes aimed at the protection of the health and at the development of the
embryo itself and whereas no other methodology is available.
e) Art. 13, co. 3, lett. a) establishes a particularly harsh punishment for whoever
produces human embryos for research or experimental purposes or however
for different aims than those set forth by the present law [«embrioni umani a
fine di ricerca o di sperimentazione o comunque a fini diversi da quello previsto
dalla presente legge»] (the punishment of imprisonment from two to six years
and of the fine from 50.000 Euros to 150.000 Euros are aggravated up to a
third).
f ) Art. 13, co. 3, moreover, punishes any form of selection for eugenic purposes
of embryos and gametes or interventions aimed at altering the genetic
inheritance of the embryo or of the gamete or at predetermining its genetic
characters by means of techniques of selection, of manipulation or however
through any artificial process, except for the interventions with diagnostic
and therapeutic purposes set forth at the second comma of the present
article [lett. b): «ogni forma di selezione a scopo eugenetico degli embrioni e dei
gameti ovvero interventi che attraverso tecniche di selezione, di manipolazione o
comunque tramite procedimenti artificiali, siano diretti ad alterare il patrimonio
genetico dell’embrione o del gamete ovvero a predeterminarne le caratteristiche
genetiche, ad eccezione degli interventi aventi finalità diagnostiche e terapeutiche,
di cui al comma 2 del presente articolo»]; interventions of cloning by nuclear
transfer or of premature scission of the embryo or of ectogenesis both with
procreative and research purposes [lett. c): «interventi di clonazione mediante
trasferimento di nucleo o di scissione precoce dell’embrione o di ectogenesi sia
a fini procreativi sia di ricerca»]; and the insemination of a human gamete
with a gamete of a different species as well as the production of hybrids
and chimeras [lett. d): «fecondazione di un gamete umano con un gamete di
specie diversa e la produzione di ibridi o di chimere»], and the punishment of
imprisonment from two to six years and the fine from 50.000 to 150.000
Euros is aggravated up to a third.
With the second group of dispositions, the legislator intends to solve the delicate
question of supernumerary embryos.
a) The first comma of art. 14 forbids the suppression of embryos and the practice
of cryopreservation of embryos.
b) As a consequence, the second comma of art. 14 establishes that, taken into
account the technical-scientific evolution and the provisions of art.7, comma
3, the techniques of production of embryos shall not create an amount of
embryos exceeding the number strictly necessary to a single and simultaneous
implant, and however not exceeding the number of three embryos [«le tecniche
di produzione degli embrioni, tenuto conto dell’evoluzione tecnico-scientifica
e di quanto previsto dall’art. 7, comma 3, non devono creare un numero di

embrioni superiore a quello strettamente necessario ad un unico e contemporaneo
impianto, comunque non superiore a tre»]; the threatened penalty is very harsh:
imprisonment up to three years and a fine from 50.000 to 150.000 Euros.
As we are about to see, the Constitutional Court has declared the partial
unconstitutionality of the commas 2 and 3 of art. 14.
c) The same art. 14, at comma 4, prohibits the embryo reduction of multiple
pregnancies, except for the cases provided for by law 22 May 1978, n. 194
[«riduzione embrionaria di gravidanze plurime, salvo nei casi previsti dalla legge
22 maggio 1978, n. 194»].
The intransigent prohibitions introduced by this second group of criminal offenses
are set for the only purpose of protecting the embryo. The prior-ranking good of
the woman’s health lacks an adequate protection, since the legislator obligates the
physician to adopt methodologies different than those the medical science deems
optimal in order to remedy the status of infertility, with the effect of making the
treatment less safe and of diminishing the percentages of success. On the one hand,
in fact, this will increase the phenomenon of multiple pregnancies, which exposes
the woman to serious dangers of complications and the future child to an higher
risk of perinatal mortality caused by immaturity (in regard to the problem of the
lawfulness of the embryo reduction of a multiple pregnancy following an intervention
of medically assisted procreation, see the decree of 5 June 2004 and the ordinance of
29 June 2004 of the Court of Cagliari); on the other hand, most cases will require
more cycles of treatment in order to achieve the current percentage of pregnancies.
In particular, the peremptory prohibition of «any form of selection for eugenic
purpose of embryos and gametes» established by art. 13, comma 3, lett. b), seems
to thwart the recourse to preimplantation genetic diagnosis also in couples with
fertility problems carrying genetic diseases, that are transmissible to the conceptus.
The preimplantation diagnosis may be performed only when it pursues therapeutic
purposes aimed at the protection of the health, at the development of the embryo
and in case no other methodology is available [«volte alla tutela della salute e allo
sviluppo dell’embrione stesso, e qualora non siano disponibili metodologie alternative»
(art. 13, comma 2)]9. The guidelines concerning procedures and techniques of
medically assisted procreation («Linee guida contenenti le indicazioni delle procedure
e delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita»), later enacted by the Ministry
of Health with Ministerial Decree of 21 July 2004, specified (sub art. 13) that any
investigation concerning the state of health of embryos created in vitro, according
to article 14, comma 5, shall be observational in nature [«ogni indagine relativa
allo stato di salute degli embrioni creati in vitro, ai sensi dell’articolo 14, comma 5,
9
In this regard, see S. Canestrari, Commento, cit., p. 416; E. Dolcini, Responsabilità, cit., 2009, p. 31.
S. Canestrari 153
dovrà essere di tipo osservazionale»] and that whenever the investigation highlights
serious irreversible anomalies in the development of an embryo, the physician who
is responsible of the Institution, according to article 14, comma 5, shall inform the
couple. Whenever, in this case, the transfer of the embryo, which is not coercible,
should not be performed, the in vitro culture of the same embryo shall be maintained
until its own extinction [«qualora dall’indagine vengano evidenziate gravi anomalie
irreversibili dello sviluppo di un embrione, il medico responsabile della struttura ne
informa la coppia ai sensi dell’art. 14, co. 5. Ove in tal caso il trasferimento dell’embrione,
non coercibile, non risulti attuato, la coltura in vitro del medesimo deve essere mantenuta
fino al suo estinguersi»]. Moreover, with reference to art. 14, comma 3, of the law
the guidelines establish that whenever the transfer of the embryos into the uterus is
not possible due to force majeure concerning the woman’s state of health that were
unpredictable during the insemination and whenever the transfer is not performed,
every non-transferred embryo shall be cryo-preserved while waiting for the implant,
which shall take place as soon as possible [«qualora il trasferimento nell’utero degli
embrioni non risulti possibile per cause di forza maggiore relative allo stato di salute della
donna non prevedibili al momento della fecondazione e, comunque, un trasferimento
non risulti attuato, ciascun embrione non trasferito dovrà essere crioconservato in attesa
dell’impianto che dovrà avvenire prima possibile»].
The new guidelines concerning medically assisted procreation adopted by the
Ministry of Health with Ministerial Decree 11 April 2008 returned on the topic.
After having confirmed the prohibition of preimplantation diagnosis with eugenic
purpose (sub art. 13), the new guidelines establish that whenever the transfer of
embryos into the uterus is not possible for reasons of force majeure concerning
the woman’s health that were not foreseeable at the moment of the insemination
and, however, a transfer is not performed, every non-transferred embryo shall be
cryo-preserved while waiting for the implantation, which shall take place as soon
as possible. Any embryo that is not transferred into the uterus shall be frozen at the
expenses of the centre of medically assisted procreation while waiting for the future
implantation [«qualora il trasferimento nell’utero degli embrioni non risulti possibile per
cause di forza maggiore relative allo stato di salute della donna non prevedibili al momento
della fecondazione e, comunque, un trasferimento non risulti attuato, ciascun embrione
non trasferito dovrà essere crioconservato in attesa dell’impianto che dovrà avvenire prima
possibile. Qualsiasi embrione che non sia trasferito in utero verrà congelato con onere a
carico del centro di procreazione medicalmente assistita in attesa del futuro impianto»].
There are many cases of couples, who are healthy carriers of genetic diseases
(especially beta-thalassaemia), petitioning Courts (according to art. 700 of the
civil procedure code) for the right to a preimplantation diagnosis and to obtain
the transfer of healthy embryos only. Indeed, under art. 14, comma 2, of law
40/2004, imposing the concurrent transfer of all the embryos produced, different
medical centres refused to proceed with the transfer of the only embryos proven
to be healthy by the preimplantation diagnosis. The Court of Catania (ordinance
3 May 2004, in “DFP”, 2005, 75) dismissed the petition of the spouses and the
challenge of unconstitutionality of art. 14, comma 2 of the law, stating that the
disposition does not violate fundamental human rights but protects life, balancing
all the values involved (artt. 2, 3 e 32 Cost.). A later decision concerning analogous
cases took a different direction: indeed, the Court of Cagliari (ord. 16 July 2005, in
“Foro it.”, 2005, I, 2876) recognised the right to obtain preimplantation diagnosis
of the already developed embryo and challenged the constitutionality of art. 13 of
law 19 February 2004, n. 4 with regard to articles 2, 3 and 32 of the Constitution
(the Constitutional Court, with ord. 369/2006, declared manifestly inadmissible
the issue of constitutionality given the «evident contradiction» of challenging the
constitutionality of a specific disposition that could be inferred also from other
articles of the same law that have not been challenged and from the whole legislative
text in the light of the criteria that inspired it). The Court of Cagliari (decision 22
September 2007, in “Foro it.”, 2007, I, 3245), after having ascertained the right of
the woman to obtain preimplantation diagnosis, condemned the hospital and the
physician to perform the diagnosis on the embryo to be transferred in the uterus,
in order to verify the state of health of the same embryo. In this case, the judge
established that «law n. 40 of 2004 forbids the selection of embryos for eugenic
purposes, as the law on abortion does not allow the interruption of pregnancy to
eugenic purposes, whereas the state of health of the foetus is not relevant in itself,
but as the cause of a pathologic state of the pregnant woman; however, as law n.
194/78 [on abortion] allows the interruption of pregnancy to protect the pregnant
woman’s health, likewise the woman can legitimately refuse the implantation of the
embryo that has been produced in vitro whenever the knowledge of the existence of
serious genetic or chromosome diseases in the embryo itself determined in her such
a disease that the implantation could be of serious harm for her physical or psychic
health. Indeed, this would not be a case of eugenic practice, definitely forbidden by
article 13, but a case of impossibility to proceed to the implantation for a «serious
and documented reason of force majeure concerning the woman’s health state that
was not foreseeable at the moment of the insemination» [«grave e documentata causa
di forza maggiore relativa allo stato di salute della donna non prevedibile al momento
della fecondazione»], which, according to article 14, comma 3, expressly legitimises
the cryo-preservation of the embryo (if and) until the impediment ceases. Finally,
the Court of Florence (ord. 17 December 2007, in “Foro it.”, 2008, I, 627) upheld
the claim under art. 700 of the civil procedure code and recognised the right of the
petitioners to transfer and implant the created embryos that do not present in a full-
blown form the genetic pathology carried by the parents.
S. Canestrari 155
Challenges of unconstitutionality, as highlighted by scholars10, have been also

raised by the Tar (administrative Court) of Lazio (sent., sec. III quater, 21 gennaio
2008, n. 398, in “Foro it.”, 2008, III, 207), which annulled the criticised guidelines
dispositions approved with ministerial decree 21 July 2004 and maintained the
unconstitutionality of art. 14, co. 2 and 3, of the law, with regard to artt. 3 and 32
Const., whereas, as to the procedure of medically assisted procreation, it allows the
formation of a limited number of embryos (up to three) to be implanted at the same
time and forbids the cryo-preservation of embryos outside the cases set forth by the
same article; by the Court of Florence (ord. 12 July 2008), with regard to art. 14, co
1 and 2, of law n. 40/2004, for being inconsistent with artt. 3 and 32, co. 1 and 2,
Const. and to art. 6, co. 3, last part, of law n. 40/2004, for being inconsistent with
art. 32, co. 2, Const., whereas they prohibit the cryo-preservation of supernumerary
embryos, the necessary creation of up to three embryos and the obligation of a
single and contemporary transfer of no more than three embryos and whereas they
establish that the woman’s consent to the transfer of the created embryos in the
uterus is irrevocable; by the Court of Florence (ord. 26 August 2008) with regard to
art. 14, co. 4, of law n. 40/2004, for being inconsistent with artt. 2, 3, 13 and 32 of
the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court, dealing with the questions, declared the
unconstitutionality of art. 14, co. 2 and 3, of law 40/2004 (sent. 8 May 2009, n. 151),
limited to the words «single and contemporary implant, and however not exceeding
the number of three embryos» and whereas it does not establish that the transfer of
the embryos, which needs to be carried out as soon as possible in compliance with
the same norm, shall be performed without any detriment for the woman’s health.
The Court maintained that the provision of the creation of no more than three
embryos, lacking any consideration on the subjective conditions of the woman
subjected to the procedure of medically assisted procreation, contrasts with art. 3
Const., in the light of both principles of reasonableness and of equality, since the
legislator treats different situations in the same way; but also with art. 32 Const.,
due to the prejudice for the woman’s health and possibly, as seen, of the foetus that is
connected to it («la previsione della creazione di un numero di embrioni non superiore a
tre, in assenza di ogni considerazione delle condizioni soggettive della donna che di volta
in volta si sottopone alla procedura di procreazione medicalmente assistita, si pone, in
definitiva, in contrasto con l’art. 3 Cost., riguardato sotto il duplice profilo del principio
di ragionevolezza e di quello di uguaglianza, in quanto il legislatore riserva il medesimo
trattamento a situazioni dissimili; nonché con l’art. 32 Cost., per il pregiudizio alla
salute della donna, ed eventualmente, come si è visto, del feto ad esso connesso»).
10
See S. Canestrari, F. Faenza, Il principio di ragionevolezza, cit., p. 88 ff.; L. Risicato, Lo statuto,
cit., p. 676 ff.
The unconstitutionality of art. 14, co. 2, also entails a derogation to the general
principle of prohibition of cryo-preservation, as required by art. 14, co. 1, as it
establishes the necessity to resort to the freezing technique of embryos that have
been produced but not transferred by medical choice.
Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Courts of the merits (cf.
Trib. Bologna, Sec. I, ord. 16 June 2009 – 17 June 2009, Judge Dr. Borgo, inedita;
Trib. Bologna, Sec. I, ord. 29 June 2009, in DeJure; Trib. Cagliari, ord. 9 November
2012, n. 5925, in “Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 10 December 2012; Trib. Roma, ord.
23 September 2013, in http://www.giurcost.org) have further affirmed the penal
lawfulness of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, also admitting the possibility to
obtain, by means of the techniques of assisted insemination, a number of embryos in
proportion with the physical conditions of the couple, compliant with the medical
assessment on the quantification of the strictly necessary number, ex art. 14, co. 2
(see Trib. Bologna, Sec. I, ord. 16 June 2009 – 17 June 2009, Judge Dr. Borgo, cit.;
Trib. Bologna, Sec. I, ord. 29 June 2009, cit.).
Fertile couples carrying genetic diseases that can be transmitted to the children
are excluded from the application of law 40/2004.
A recent and isolated decision (Trib. Salerno, ord. 9 January 2010, in “Fam.
dir.”, 2010, 476 ff.) upheld a petition aimed at acceding to preimplantation genetic
diagnosis, with a following selection of the healthy embryos, in favour of a fertile
couple carrying a genetic disease, basing its decision on a constitutionally oriented
interpretation of art. 13, co. 1, in the light of the parents’ right to be informed on the
state of health of the embryos ex art. 14, co. 4.
Such an aspect has been lately considered by a decision of the European Court
of Human Rights, which stated that the prohibition, established by Italian law,
of the assisted insemination of fertile couples carrying genetic diseases with the
aim of submitting to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, contrasts with the right
to the respect of a person’s own private and family life ex art. 8 ECHR, whereas
the «interference» of State law in the exercise of such a right is disproportionate,
with regard to the incoherence of the possibility, provided for by law 194/1978, of
therapeutic abortion when the foetus, once the pregnancy has started, is affected
by the disease carried by the couple (European Court of Human Rights, Sec. II, 28
August 2012, n. 54270/2010, Costa and Pavan vs. Italia)11.
The Court of Rome, upon application ex art. 700 of the civil procedure code
by the same petitioners, after having disapplied art. 4 of law 40/2004, enforced the
11
See E. Dolcini, Legge, cit., p. 8 ff.; A. Vallini, Diagnosi preimpianto: respinta la richiesta di rinvio
alla Gran Camera CEDU avanzata dal governo italiano nel caso Costa e Pavan contro Italia, in “Dir. pen.
contemporaneo”, 18 febbraio 2013, p. 1 ff.; Id., Ardita la rotta o incerta la geografia? La disapplicazione
della legge 40/2004 “in esecuzione” di un giudicato della Corte EDU in tema di diagnosi preimpianto, in
“Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 16 dicembre 2013, p. 1 ff.
S. Canestrari 157
decision of the European Court, according to art. 46 ECHR, recognising the right
of the couple to have access to assisted insemination to submit to preimplantation
genetic diagnosis the obtained embryos (Trib. Roma, ord. 23 September 2013, in
http://www.giurcost.org).
4. The protection of prenatal life

Due to the progress of medical techniques in the field of care and management
of the person at the beginning of human life, the power of disposing of the
conceived child and the danger of harmful interventions in the prenatal phase has
increased12. Indeed, the foetus now turns out to be more exposed and vulnerable
and the affirmation of new rights and interests of the conceived child increases the
complexity of the conflict with the mother and with the physician (gynaecologist
and obstetrician). At the present state, the activity of the physician may represent a
new threat to the integrity and health of the foetus, which, as a proper patient, has
the right to be cured according to the best science and technique available. Current
prenatal medicine started the process of making the foetus an autonomous subject,
revealing the mechanisms of its development and highlighting its distinct subjectivity
and its specific needs for protection.
Facing the new and multiple phenomenologies of risk, the scanty regulation
offered by law 194/1978 in protection of prenatal life appears to be insufficient.
Indeed, the criminal offence of negligent abortion of the foetus does not cover the
range of the potential forms of aggression of the foetus by the physician performing
the activities of prenatal diagnosis and surgery.
It must be pointed out that the emerging needs for (penal) protection of prenatal
life concern the specific context of the wilful pregnancy13, as the protection of the
embryo within the techniques of medically assisted procreation (that is to say, the
protection of the in vitro embryo) falls under the specific regulation of the techniques
of medically assisted procreation, while the protection of the future son within the
interruption of pregnancy by the woman is entrusted to law 194/1978.
In the prenatal phase the offences of injury and manslaughter do not apply, not
even when the harmful typical event is realised after the birth, and the punishability
of behaviours causing a mere harm to the physical integrity of the future child is
12
On the topic see K. Summerer, Le nuove frontiere della tutela penale della vita prenatale, in “Riv. it.
dir. proc. pen.”, 2003, p. 1245 ff.; L. Eusebi, La tutela penale, cit., p. 1053 ff.; F. Mantovani, Il c.d.
diritto del feto a nascere sano (problemi medico-legali della diagnosi e trattamento del feto in utero), in “Riv.
it. med. leg.”, 1980, p. 237 ff. Amongst the Spanish scholars, see C.M. Romeo Casabona, El derecho y
la bioetica ante los limites de la vida humana, Madrid, 1994, p. 400.
13
For such an orientation see K. Summerer, Libertà della donna e tutela del nascituro. Il conflitto
materno-fetale nella prospettiva del diritto penale, in S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S.
Rodotà, P. Zatti (eds.), Il governo del corpo, cit., p. 1623 ff., especially p. 1647 ff.
excluded. Moreover, the positioning of the foetus in the body of the mother poses
delicate questions on the determination of the requirements of lawfulness of the
medical treatment, in particular with regard to the requirement of the informed
consent and the general balance of the relevant interests.
The need for an extension of the protection of the person, in the light of the
evolution of medical science and prenatal technology, as well as of the new sensibility
for prenatal life, prompts us to ask ourselves some questions on the modalities and the
limitations of a legislative intervention in such a sector. Comparative reflection may
bring to the elaboration of effective strategies of intervention and to reach a delicate
balance between opposite values and interests. The attention falls on the solution
adopted in the Spanish jurisdiction by the protection of the physical integrity of the
foetus provided for by the Codigo penal of 1995 (artt. 157 and 158), on the penal
dispositions protecting the foetus of some North-American legal orders, on the case
law of common law Countries concerning the physician’s liability for the injuries
caused to the foetus.
“Biodiritto penale” e questioni di inizio vita
Stefano Canestrari
Sommario: 1. Considerazioni introduttive. − 2. Questioni di inizio vita e laicità del diritto penale. − 3.
La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita. − 4. La tutela penale della vita prenatale.
1. Considerazioni introduttive
L’evoluzione delle conoscenze scientifiche ha aumentato in modo sensibile le aspettative
di vita e di salute dell’uomo. Basti pensare ai notevoli risultati già raggiunti dalla biomedicina,
quali la produzione di nuovi farmaci e vaccini; la predisposizione di strumenti diagnostici in-
novativi per le malattie genetiche e biotecnologie; la sperimentazione medica e quella farma-
cologica; la medicina preventiva; la procreazione medicalmente assistita; la terapia prenatale
del feto, ecc.
Si tratta di questioni di grande interesse e attualità, poiché toccano alcune complesse
tematiche di bioetica e “biodiritto”, intendendo con tali ultime espressioni le discipline che
affrontano la riflessione etica e giuridica sui problemi legati al progresso della scienza e della
tecnica soprattutto nell’area bio-medica.
Come noto, i temi tradizionalmente affrontati da tali angolazioni riguardano la vita, la
salute, la procreazione, la morte; e si comprende che essi siano terreno di confronto – talvolta
aspro – tra visioni morali sensibilmente diverse. Nondimeno, tali ambiti non possono consi-
derarsi uno “spazio libero dal diritto”, ossia settori, che proprio per la prevalente e assorbente
dimensione etica, filosofica e religiosa, debbano aprioristicamente rimanere esenti da regola-
mentazione giuridica.
È ben vero il contrario: con sempre maggiore insistenza si parla oggi dell’opportunità
e finanche della necessità di una regolamentazione giuridica della bioetica di inizio e di fine
vita, che si estenda al corredo punitivo più idoneo a presidiarne l’effettività.
Naturalmente lo scenario che per questa via si dischiude impone il difficile compito
di conciliare il programma di tutela con alcuni caratteri fondamentali del moderno diritto
penale, primo tra tutti la “laicità” dell’intervento punitivo. Parimenti irrinunciabile risulta il
complesso dei principi di garanzia caratteristici dell’intervento penalistico, tra cui spicca la
160 “Biodiritto penale” e questioni di inizio vita
delimitazione della punizione ai soli casi in cui sussiste la necessità di salvaguardare autentici
beni giuridici non altrimenti ed efficacemente tutelabili. Anche ove si ammetta l’intervento
del diritto penale nella bioetica di inizio e di fine vita, è chiaro che esso non può abdicare
ai principi costituzionali di legalità e di offensività e ai canoni politico-criminali della sus-
sidiarietà e della frammentarietà, che mantengono il loro ruolo decisivo nell’attuazione del
programma di tutela dei valori della persona umana.
L’idea dell’intervento penale come extrema ratio conferma che l’utilizzo dello strumento
penale è funzionale soltanto alla prevenzione di fatti che mettono gravemente a repentaglio
la coesistenza sociale e non per sanzionare mere manifestazioni di immoralità o di contrasto
con valori etici, religiosi o ideologici di una parte della società.
Così, preso atto che l’embrione costituisce bene giuridico meritevole di tutela, resta co-
munque da stabilire se, nelle situazioni critiche in cui la sua salvaguardia confligge con altri
interessi (si pensi alla salute della aspirante madre), non vi siano strumenti di controllo più
efficaci di quello penale; o se l’adozione a tappeto di quest’ultimo (con incriminazione di
ogni forma di offesa all’integrità dell’embrione) non induca concretamente effetti indesiderati
(come l’aumento delle pratiche abortive quale conseguenza del divieto della diagnosi genetica
preimpianto1) o addirittura criminogeni (come l’incremento delle pratiche abortive “clande-
stine” laddove non è consentita l’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza).
Non si potranno altresì incriminare neppure condotte lesive di principi o valori che non
costituiscano reali oggettività giuridiche: la annosa questione della possibile tutela penale
dell’embrione dipende così dal fatto che ad esso si riconosca o meno lo statuto di essere
umano2, mentre deve assolutamente essere esclusa – ad esempio – la eventualità di una simile
tutela per i gameti maschili e femminili, a prescindere dalla valenza morale attribuita al prin-
cipio della generazione della vita3.
2. Questioni di inizio vita e laicità del diritto penale

Tra i settori in cui più immediata e diretta sembra emergere la rilevanza giuridico-penale
dell’idea di laicità4, spiccano attualmente i contesti intrinsecamente caratterizzati dal riferi-
1
Con riferimento alla diagnosi genetica preimpianto, le novità a livello normativo e i più recenti
orientamenti giurisprudenziali e dottrinali saranno illustrati infra, par. 3.
2
Sul tema, da diversi angoli visuali, E. Dolcini, Embrione, pre-embrione, ootide: nodi interpretativi
nella disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2004, p. 459 ss.;
L. Eusebi, Beni penalmente rilevanti e tecniche di procreazione, in L. Fioravanti (a cura di), La tutela
penale della persona. Nuove frontiere, difficili equilibri, Milano, 2001, p. 46.
3
Cfr. S. Canestrari, Verso una disciplina penale delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita?
Alla ricerca del bene giuridico tra valori ideali e opzioni ideologiche, in L. Fioravanti (a cura di), La tutela
penale, cit., p. 61 ss.
4
Sul tema della laicità del diritto penale, v., di recente, S. Canestrari, Laicità e diritto penale nelle
democrazie costituzionali, in E. Dolcini, C.E. Paliero (a cura di), Studi in onore di G. Marinucci,
Milano, 2006, p. 121 ss.; G. Losappio, Bioetica e diritto penale. Le disposizioni penali del Testo Unico
nelle proposte di legge sulle tecniche di procreazione assistita, in “Ind. pen.”, 1999, p. 610 ss.; M.B.
Magro, Etica laica e tutela della vita umana: riflessioni sul principio di laicità in diritto penale, in “Riv.
it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1994, passim; M. Romano, Principio di laicità dello Stato, religioni, norme penali, in
“Riv. it., dir. proc. pen.”, 2007, p. 493 ss.; S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni, Documento introduttivo, in S.
S. Canestrari 161
mento ad assetti precomprensivi di stampo etico e a concezioni “ontologiche” sull’uomo e

sulla vita (aborto, procreazione medicalmente assistita, manipolazioni genetiche). Le decisio-
ni dell’ordinamento giuridico riguardano in questo caso ambiti a forte caratterizzazione etica
e situazioni dipendenti da visioni generali nei confronti della vita umana – in particolare del
suo inizio – sollevando tematiche complesse, che in questa sede possono essere affrontate
soltanto in parte.
Il presupposto da cui si deve muovere è che di fronte a tali tormentate questioni l’ordina-
mento prende comunque una decisione, fosse pure quella di “non decidere”. Ed invero, una
politica “astensionistica” implica la legittimazione di una prassi, quantomeno sulla base del
principio liberale per cui tutto ciò che non è espressamente vietato deve considerarsi lecito.
Preso atto che diritto “laico” non è sinonimo di diritto avalutativo – anche la avulatatività
comporta un’opzione, in quanto legittimazione di prassi – si deve effettuare una puntualizza-
zione di fondamentale importanza. Occorre sottolineare che il diritto, in quanto “laico”, deve
comunque avvertire l’esigenza di garantire al massimo il pluralismo.
In questa prospettiva, ad esempio, non si deve presidiare con sanzioni giuridiche il valore
della sessualità o quello della procreazione. Dunque non può essere condivisa la scelta di pre-
vedere un divieto assoluto delle tecniche eterologhe di fecondazione assistita – la cui violazio-
ne comporta l’applicazione di aspre sanzioni afflittive (di natura amministrativa, ma “sostan-
zialmente” penale) – orientato ad affermare il valore ideale della naturalità della procreazione.
Una concezione autenticamente laica deve orientarsi alla individuazione e all’apprez-
zamento di tutti gli interessi reali in gioco: senza delegittimarne aprioristicamente nessuno.
Così, con riguardo ancora alla procreazione medicalmente assistita: il diritto di autodetermi-
nazione della madre (rectius, di entrambi i genitori), nonché il rispetto della sua integrità psi-
cofisica; la tutela dell’embrione e i diritti del nascituro (ad es., a “godere” della doppia figura
genitoriale); la tutela del genoma umano e, al contempo, della libertà di ricerca.
Il diritto penale come extrema ratio conferma che si tratta comunque di un apprezzamen-
to selettivo, ossia orientato sulla base di criteri razionali offerti dalle indicazioni ricavabili dai
principi costituzionali.
Canestrari, L. Stortoni (a cura di), Valori e secolarizzazione nel diritto penale, Bologna, 2009, p. 7 ss.;
S. Canestrari, F. Faenza, Paternalismo penale e libertà individuale: incerti equilibri e nuove prospettive
nella tutela della persona, in A. Cadoppi (a cura di), Laicità, valori e diritto penale. The moral limits of
the Criminal Law. In ricordo di Joel Feinberg, Milano, 2010, p. 167 ss.; D. Pulitanò, Problema penale e
problemi della laicità, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni (a cura di), Valori, cit., p. 179 ss.; L. Ferrajoli,
Stato laico ed etica laica. Laicità e diritto penale, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni (a cura di), Valori, cit.,
p. 121 ss.; G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni intorno a bioetica e diritto penale, tra laicità e ‘post-secolarismo’,
in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen”., 2007, p. 546 ss.; Id., I temi eticamente sensibili tra ragione pubblica e ragione
punitiva, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 1383 ss.; Id., Punire la semplice immoralità? Un vecchio
interrogativo che tende a riproporsi, in A. Cadoppi (a cura di), Laicità, cit., p. 207 ss.; E. Dolcini,
Laicità, ‘sana laicità’ e diritto penale. La Chiesa cattolica maestra (anche) di laicità?, in “Riv. it. dir. proc.
pen.”, 2009, p. 1017 ss.; A. Cadoppi, Liberalismo, paternalismo e diritto penale, in S. Canestrari,
L. Stortoni (a cura di), Valori, cit., 283 ss.; A. Cadoppi, Presentazione. Principio del danno (harm
principle) e limiti del diritto penale, in A. Cadoppi (a cura di), Laicità, cit., VII ss.; G. Forti, Alla ricerca
di un luogo per la laicità: il “potenziale di verità” nelle democrazie liberali, in S. Canestrari, L. Stortoni
(a cura di), Valori, cit., p. 349 ss.; A. Barbera, Il cammino della laicità, in S. Canestrari (a cura di),
Laicità e diritto, Bologna, 2007, p. 33 ss.; L. Risicato, Dal “diritto di vivere” al “diritto di morire”.
Riflessioni sul ruolo della laicità nell’esperienza penalistica, Torino, 2008, passim.
In riferimento alle prospettive, in gran parte futuribili, delle manipolazioni genetiche, va

esclusa, sul piano dei più fondamentali principi di rispetto della dignità umana, la liceità della
clonazione riproduttiva degli esseri umani5.
È necessario inoltre operare un contemperamento del maggiore numero di interessi pos-
sibili, con peculiare attenzione alla protezione degli interessi dei soggetti più deboli: ritenia-
mo che debba valere il criterio generale per cui la tutela giuridica più ampia va apprezzata per
chi non è in grado di proteggersi da sé.
In conclusione, un diritto correttamente ispirato all’idea della laicità deve assumere de-
cisioni orientate a garantire comunque la libertà dei consociati e la simmetria delle loro reci-
proche posizioni e relazioni. E cercare di compensare le decisioni dolorose che sacrificano un
interesse con altri strumenti offerti dalla realtà sociale: così, la necessaria rimessione alla libera
scelta della donna della decisione di interrompere in determinate circostanze la gravidan-
za deve essere affiancata dall’approntamento di risorse (economiche, umane, professionali,
strutturali, ecc.) che permettano alla donna una scelta realmente libera di fronte a diverse
possibilità6.
Un’ultima osservazione: una visione realmente laica impone di ritenere inconsistente
qualsiasi concezione che si schermi dietro a “etichette” o schemi precostituiti, il cui richiamo
privo di argomentazione suona di solito come una excusatio non petita. In questa prospettiva,
non ci può essere un diritto (“biodiritto”) laico contrapposto ad uno cattolico: il diritto può
essere soltanto un insieme di regole comuni finalizzate alla coesistenza sociale, che tengano
seriamente conto, ad esempio, delle prerogative del modello della indisponibilità della vita e
di quello della qualità della vita; della prospettiva liberale avalutativa dell’intangibilità delle
scelte individuali e di quella etica della salvaguardia delle esigenze di giustizia soprattutto a
favore dei più deboli, per selezionare e cristallizzare la base minima di aequitas secondo ap-
prossimazioni il più possibile adeguate alla realtà sociale.
3. La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita

La legge in materia di procreazione medicalmente assistita (legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.
40) doveva soddisfare due esigenze di fondamentale importanza: garantire compiutamente la
salute della donna e fornire un’adeguata protezione all’embrione umano. Il raggiungimento
di entrambi gli obiettivi non era agevole; si doveva cercare di contemperare istanze contrap-
5
In argomento cfr. J. Habermas, Il futuro della natura umana. I rischi di una genetica liberale, a cura
di L. Ceppa, Torino, 2001, p. 57 ss., p. 82 ss., laddove osserva che deve essere vietato il tentativo di
determinare a propria discrezione un altro uomo nella sua costituzione naturale.
6
Sulle questioni sollevate dall’aborto cfr., tra i penalisti, M. Romano, F. Stella, Aborto e legge penale.
Riflessioni e proposte, Milano, 1975, p. 39 ss.; L. Eusebi, La tutela penale della vita prenatale, in “Riv. it.
dir. proc. pen.”, 1988, p. 1098 ss.; M. Zanchetti, La legge sull’interruzione della gravidanza, Padova,
1992, p. 50 ss. Più di recente, C. Cassani, Legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194. Norme per la tutela sociale
della maternità e sull’interruzione volontaria della gravidanza, in S. Canestrari (a cura di), I reati contro
la vita e l’incolumità individuale, in I grandi temi, Trattato diretto da A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, M.
Papa, I reati contro la persona, I, Torino, 2006, p. 154 ss.; C. Cassani, voce Aborto, in A. Cadoppi,
S. Canestrari, P. Veneziani (a cura di), Codice penale commentato con dottrina e giurisprudenza,
Piacenza, 2011, p. 2945 ss.
S. Canestrari 163
poste, senza adottare soluzioni meramente compromissorie fondate su espedienti o finzioni7.

L’attuale disciplina legislativa riconosce che l’embrione è un valore meritevole di tutela,
come si desume dalla nostra Costituzione, dalla giurisprudenza costituzionale, dalle leggi
vigenti, dai documenti internazionali e delle Istituzioni Europee. Tale consapevolezza ha con-
dotto all’introduzione di numerose figure di reato, che possono essere suddivise in due grup-
pi. Il primo comprende fattispecie incriminatrici poste a presidio di principi “ampiamente”
condivisi, espressione di valori fortemente radicati anche nel contesto delle attuali società plu-
ralistiche. Il secondo è composto da illeciti penali che, allo scopo di salvaguardare l’integrità
dell’embrione umano, interferiscono mediante vincoli e divieti intransigenti nell’applicazio-
ne delle principali metodiche o procedure di procreazione medicalmente assistita.
7
Sulla attuale disciplina si veda, da prospettive diverse, E. Dolcini, Embrione, cit., p. 440 ss.; F.
Mantovani, Procreazione medicalmente assistita e principio personalistico, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 326
ss.; G. Fiandaca, Scelte di tutela in materia di fecondazione assistita e democrazia laica, in “Leg. pen.”,
2005, p. 339 ss.; A. Manna, La tutela penale della vita in fieri, tra funzione promozionale e protezione
di beni giuridici, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 245 ss.; L. Eusebi, La vita individuale precoce: soltanto
materiale biologico?, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 457 ss., S. Canestrari, Commento alla legge 40/2004,
in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2004, p. 416 ss.; L. Risicato, Lo statuto punitivo della procreazione tra limiti
perduranti ed esigenze di riforma, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2005, p. 674 ss.; E. Dolcini, La legge sulla
procreazione assistita: quali prospettive dopo il referendum del 2005?, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2006, p. 103
ss.; F. Consorte, La procreazione medicalmente assistita: legge 19.2.2004, n. 40, in S. Canestrari (a
cura di), I reati contro la vita, cit., p. 215 ss.; E. Dolcini, Fecondazione assistita e diritto penale, Milano,
2008; S. Canestrari, F. Faenza, Il principio di ragionevolezza nella regolamentazione biogiuridica: la
prospettiva del diritto penale, in “Criminalia”, 2008, p. 88 ss.; E. Dolcini, Responsabilità del medico e
reati in materia di procreazione assistita. Ambiguità e rigori della legge n. 40 del 2004, in “Riv. it. dir.
proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 27 ss.; E. Dolcini, Embrioni nel numero “strettamente necessario”: il bisturi della
Corte Costituzionale sulla legge n. 40 del 2004, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 950 ss.; C. Cassani,
La diagnosi genetica preimpianto e la sua rilevanza penale, in “Ind. pen.”, 2009, p. 7 ss.; C. Cassani,
Artt. 12-14, in Procreazione medicalmente assistita. Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40. Norme in materia
di procreazione medicalmente assistita, in M. Balestra, S. Canestrari, G.F. Ricci (a cura di), Leggi
collegate, in M. Sesta (a cura di), Codice della famiglia. Tomo II. Leggi collegate, Milano, 20092, p.
3716 ss.; E. Dolcini, La procreazione medicalmente assistita: profili penalistici, in S. Canestrari, G.
Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S. Rodotà, P. Zatti (a cura di), Il governo del corpo. Tomo I, in Trattato
di biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Milano, 2011, p. 1537 ss.; E. Dolcini, La lunga marcia
della fecondazione assistita. La legge 40/2004 tra Corte Costituzionale, Corte EDU e giudice ordinario, in
“Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 428 ss.; A. Vallini, La diagnosi genetica preimpianto: da illecito penale
a questione deontologica. Eterogenesi dei fini di un legislatore irragionevole, in “Riv. it. med. leg.”, 2011,
p. 1405 ss.; C. Cassani, La diagnosi genetica preimpianto: profili penali e risvolti applicativi, in G. Balbi,
A. Esposito (a cura di), Laicità, valori e diritto penale. Atti del Convegno. Santa Maria Capua Vetere,
6 febbraio 2009, Torino, 2011, p. 79 ss.; F. Consorte, L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40. Norme in materia
di procreazione medicalmente assistita, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, P. Veneziani (a cura di), Codice
penale commentato, cit., p. 2981 ss.; F. Consorte, La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita
(L. 19-2-2004, n. 40) § 1 - La disciplina della procreazione medicalmente assistita, in I delitti contro la
vita e l’incolumità personale, in Trattato di diritto penale diretto da A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari, A.
Manna, M. Papa, Parte speciale, VII, Torino, 2011, p. 623 ss.; A. Vallini, Illecito concepimento e valore
del concepito. Statuto punitivo della procreazione, principi, prassi, Torino, 2012, passim; G. Fiandaca,
E. Musco, Diritto penale. Parte speciale, II, tomo I, I delitti contro la persona, Bologna, 20135, p. 51 ss.;
E. Dolcini, Legge sulla procreazione assistita e laicità dello Stato: da sempre, un rapporto difficile, in “Dir.
pen. contemporaneo”, 27 novembre 2013, p. 1 ss.
Un primo gruppo di disposizioni mira a vietare condotte che non sono compatibili con
il riconoscimento della natura umana dell’embrione e che offendono il bene giuridico dell’ir-
ripetibilità del genoma umano. Tra le altre:
a) L’art. 12, comma 6, punisce con la reclusione da tre mesi a due anni e con la multa
da 600.000 a un milione di euro «chiunque, in qualsiasi forma, realizza, organizza o
pubblicizza la commercializzazione di gameti o di embrioni».
b) L’art. 12, co. 7, punisce «chiunque realizza un processo volto ad ottenere un essere
umano discendente da un’unica cellula di partenza, eventualmente identico quanto
al patrimonio genetico nucleare, ad un altro essere umano in vita o morto» con la
reclusione da dieci a venti anni e con la multa da 600.000 a un milione di euro. La
norma prevede, altresì, che il medico sia punito con l’interdizione perpetua dall’e-
sercizio della professione.
c) L’art. 13, co. 1, vieta qualsiasi sperimentazione sugli embrioni.
d) L’art. 13, co. 2, consente la ricerca clinica e sperimentale su ciascun embrione uma-
no soltanto a condizione che si perseguano finalità esclusivamente terapeutiche e
diagnostiche ad essa collegate volte alla tutela della salute e allo sviluppo dell’em-
brione stesso, e qualora non siano disponibili metodologie alternative.
e) L’art. 13, co. 3, lett. a) commina una pena di particolare rigore nei confronti di chi
produce «embrioni umani a fine di ricerca o di sperimentazione o comunque a fini
diversi da quello previsto dalla presente legge» (è aumentata fino a un terzo la pena
della reclusione da due a sei anni e della multa da 50.000 a 150.000 euro).
f ) L’art. 13, co. 3, sanziona inoltre «ogni forma di selezione a scopo eugenetico de-
gli embrioni e dei gameti ovvero interventi che attraverso tecniche di selezione, di
manipolazione o comunque tramite procedimenti artificiali, siano diretti ad altera-
re il patrimonio genetico dell’embrione o del gamete ovvero a predeterminarne le
caratteristiche genetiche, ad eccezione degli interventi aventi finalità diagnostiche e
terapeutiche, di cui al comma 2 del presente articolo» (lett. b); «interventi di clo-
nazione mediante trasferimento di nucleo o di scissione precoce dell’embrione o di
ectogenesi sia a fini procreativi sia di ricerca» (lett. c) e la «fecondazione di un gamete
umano con un gamete di specie diversa e la produzione di ibridi o di chimere» (lett.
d), e la pena della reclusione da due a sei anni e della multa da 50.000 a 150.000
euro è aumentata fino a un terzo.
Con il secondo gruppo di disposizioni, il legislatore intende risolvere la delicata questio-
ne degli embrioni soprannumerari.
a) Il primo comma dell’art. 14 prevede il divieto di soppressione degli embrioni e della
pratica della crioconservazione degli stessi.
b) Di conseguenza, il secondo comma dell’art. 14 stabilisce che «le tecniche di produ-
zione degli embrioni, tenuto conto dell’evoluzione tecnico-scientifica e di quanto
previsto dall’art. 7, comma 3, non devono creare un numero di embrioni superiore
a quello strettamente necessario ad un unico e contemporaneo impianto, comunque
non superiore a tre», prevedendo la sanzione – di notevole asprezza – della reclu-
sione fino a tre anni e della multa da 50.000 a 150.000 euro. Come vedremo tra
poco, la Corte costituzionale ha dichiarato la parziale illegittimità costituzionale dei
commi 2 e 3 dell’art. 14.
S. Canestrari 165
c) Lo stesso art. 14 prevede al comma 4 il divieto di «riduzione embrionaria di gravi-

danze plurime, salvo nei casi previsti dalla legge 22 maggio 1978, n. 194».
I divieti intransigenti introdotti da questo secondo gruppo di fattispecie incriminatrici
sono posti esclusivamente per salvaguardare l’embrione. Al bene (di rango superiore) della
salute della donna non viene offerta una tutela adeguata, in quanto il legislatore impone al
sanitario l’obbligo di adottare metodologie diverse da quelle che la scienza medica ritiene
ottimali per rimediare allo stato di infertilità, con l’effetto di rendere meno sicuro il tratta-
mento e di diminuirne le percentuali di successo. Da un lato, infatti, aumenterà il fenomeno
delle gravidanze multiple, che espone la donna a seri pericoli di complicanze e il nascituro
a un maggior rischio di mortalità perinatale per immaturità (sul problema della liceità della
riduzione embrionaria di gravidanza multipla conseguente ad un intervento di procreazione
medicalmente assistita, si è pronunciato il Tribunale di Cagliari con decreto 5.06.2004 e con
ordinanza 29.06.2004); dall’altro, nella maggior parte dei casi sarà necessario procedere a più
cicli di trattamento per ottenere le attuali percentuali di gravidanze.
In particolare, il divieto perentorio di «ogni forma di selezione a scopo eugenetico degli
embrioni e dei gameti», previsto dall’art. 13, co. 3, lett. b), sembrerebbe vanificare il ricorso
alla diagnosi genetica preimpianto anche nei confronti di coppie portatrici di malattie ge-
netiche, trasmissibili al concepito, con problemi di fertilità. Invero, la diagnosi preimpianto
può essere effettuata esclusivamente nei casi in cui si perseguono finalità terapeutiche «volte
alla tutela della salute e allo sviluppo dell’embrione stesso, e qualora non siano disponibili
metodologie alternative» (art. 13, comma 2)8. Nell’ambito delle «Linee guida contenenti le
indicazioni delle procedure e delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita», emanate
successivamente dal Ministro della Salute con D.M. 21 luglio 2004, si precisava peraltro (sub
art. 13) che «ogni indagine relativa allo stato di salute degli embrioni creati in vitro, ai sensi
dell’articolo 14, comma 5, dovrà essere di tipo osservazionale» e che «qualora dall’indagine
vengano evidenziate gravi anomalie irreversibili dello sviluppo di un embrione, il medico
responsabile della struttura ne informa la coppia ai sensi dell’art. 14, co. 5. Ove in tal caso il
trasferimento dell’embrione, non coercibile, non risulti attuato, la coltura in vitro del mede-
simo deve essere mantenuta fino al suo estinguersi». Inoltre, con riferimento all’art. 14, co.
3 della legge, si stabilisce che «qualora il trasferimento nell’utero degli embrioni non risulti
possibile per cause di forza maggiore relative allo stato di salute della donna non prevedibili
al momento della fecondazione e, comunque, un trasferimento non risulti attuato, ciascun
embrione non trasferito dovrà essere crioconservato in attesa dell’impianto che dovrà avvenire
prima possibile».
Sul punto sono ritornate le nuove Linee guida in materia di procreazione medicalmente
assistita emanate dal Ministro della Salute con D.M. 11 aprile 2008, in cui, ribadito il divieto
di diagnosi preimpianto a finalità eugenetica (sub art. 13), si stabilisce che «qualora il trasferi-
mento nell’utero degli embrioni non risulti possibile per cause di forza maggiore relative allo
stato di salute della donna non prevedibili al momento della fecondazione e, comunque, un
trasferimento non risulti attuato, ciascun embrione non trasferito dovrà essere crioconservato
in attesa dell’impianto che dovrà avvenire prima possibile. Qualsiasi embrione che non sia
trasferito in utero verrà congelato con onere a carico del centro di procreazione medicalmente
8
In merito, v. S. Canestrari, Commento, cit., p. 416; E. Dolcini, Responsabilità, cit., p. 31.
assistita in attesa del futuro impianto».

Numerosi sono i casi di coppie portatrici sane di malattie genetiche (soprattutto beta-
talassemia) che, di fronte al rifiuto di un centro medico di procedere al trasferimento dei soli
embrioni risultati sani all’esito della diagnosi preimpianto – rifiuto fondato sull’art. 14, co.
2, della legge 40/2004, che impone il contemporaneo trasferimento di tutti gli embrioni
prodotti – si sono rivolte al Tribunale (ai sensi dell’art. 700 c.p.c.) al fine di vedere ricono-
sciuto il diritto di procedere alla diagnosi preimpianto e di ottenere il trasferimento dei soli
embrioni sani. Si ricorda il caso del Tribunale di Catania (ord. 3 maggio 2004, in “DFP”,
2005, 75), che ha respinto la richiesta dei coniugi e dichiarato infondata la questione di
legittimità dell’art. 14, co. 2, della legge, affermando che la disposizione non viola i diritti
fondamentali della persona, ma tutela la vita, contemperando tutti i valori coinvolti (artt. 2, 3
e 32 Cost.). Un diverso indirizzo è stato seguito da alcune pronunce successive relative a casi
analoghi: il Tribunale di Cagliari (ord. 16 luglio 2005, in “Foro it.”, 2005, I, 2876) ha infatti
riconosciuto il diritto ad ottenere la diagnosi preimpianto dell’embrione già formato ed ha
sollevato questione di legittimità costituzionale dell’art. 13 della legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.
40 in riferimento agli artt. 2, 3 e 32 Cost. (questione dichiarata manifestamente inammissi-
bile da Corte cost., ord. 369/2006, considerata la “evidente contraddizione” in cui è incorso
il Tribunale nel sollevare una questione volta alla dichiarazione di illegittimità costituzionale
di una specifica disposizione che sarebbe desumibile anche da altri articoli della stessa legge,
non impugnati, nonché dall’interpretazione dell’intero testo legislativo alla luce dei suoi cri-
teri ispiratori). Il Tribunale di Cagliari (sent. 22 settembre 2007, in “Foro it.”, 2007, I, 3245),
accertato il diritto della donna di ottenere la diagnosi preimpianto, ha condannato l’Azienda
ospedaliera e il medico ad eseguire l’accertamento diagnostico sull’embrione destinato ad
essere trasferito nell’utero, al fine di poter accertare lo stato di salute dell’embrione stesso. In
questo caso, il giudice ha stabilito che «allo stesso modo in cui per la legge sull’aborto non è
consentita l’interruzione della gravidanza a fini eugenetici, rilevando lo stato di salute del feto
non di per sé ma solo quale causa del verificarsi di uno stato patologico della gestante, allo
stesso modo nella legge n. 40 del 2004 è vietata la selezione degli embrioni a scopo eugeneti-
co; ma negli stessi termini in cui è consentita dalla legge n. 194/78 l’interruzione della gravi-
danza per la tutela della salute della gestante, allo stesso modo la donna potrà legittimamente
rifiutare l’impianto dell’embrione prodotto in vitro allorquando la conoscenza dell’esistenza
di gravi malattie genetiche o cromosomiche nell’embrione medesimo abbiano determinato in
lei una patologia tale per cui procedere ugualmente all’impianto sarebbe di grave nocumento
per la sua salute fisica o psichica. In questo caso, infatti, non si tratterebbe di pratica euge-
netica, certamente vietata ai sensi dell’art. 13, ma di impossibilità di procedere all’impianto
per “grave e documentata causa di forza maggiore relativa allo stato di salute della donna non
prevedibile al momento della fecondazione” che ai sensi dell’art. 14 terzo comma legittima
espressamente la crioconservazione dell’embrione sino a quando (e se) l’impedimento all’im-
pianto venga meno». Infine, il Tribunale di Firenze (ord. 17 dicembre 2007, in “Foro it.”,
2008, I, 627) ha accolto il ricorso ex art. 700 c.p.c. e riconosciuto il diritto dei ricorrenti a
trasferire e impiantare gli embrioni creati che non presentano in forma conclamata la patolo-
gia genetica di cui sono portatori i genitori.
S. Canestrari 167
Questioni di legittimità costituzionale, già evidenziate dalla dottrina9 sono state solleva-
te altresì dal Tar Lazio (sent., sez. III quater, 21 gennaio 2008, n. 398, in “Foro it.”, 2008,
III, 207), che ha annullato le criticate disposizioni delle linee guida, approvate con d.m. 21
luglio 2004, e rilevato la incostituzionalità dell’art. 14, co. 2 e 3, della legge, in riferimento
agli artt. 3 e 32 Cost., nella parte in cui prevede, ai fini dell’applicazione della procedura
della procreazione medicalmente assistita, la formazione di un numero limitato di embrioni,
fino ad un massimo di tre, da impiantare contestualmente, e vieta la crioconservazione di
embrioni al di fuori delle ipotesi ivi previste; dal Tribunale di Firenze (ord. 12 luglio 2008)
rispetto all’art. 14, co. 1 e 2, della legge n. 40/2004, per contrasto, quanto ai commi primo e
secondo dell’art. 14 cit., con gli artt. 3 e 32, co. 1 e 2, Cost. e dell’art. 6, co. 3, ultima parte,
della legge n. 40/2004, per contrasto con l’art. 32, co. 2, Cost., nella parte in cui impongono
il divieto di crioconservazione degli embrioni soprannumerari, la necessarietà della creazione
di massimo tre embrioni, nonché l’obbligo di un unico e contemporaneo trasferimento di
embrioni comunque non superiori a tre, e laddove prevedono la irrevocabilità del consenso
da parte della donna al trasferimento in utero degli embrioni creati; dal Tribunale di Firenze
(ord. 26 agosto 2008) rispetto all’art. 14, co. 4, della legge n. 40 del 2004, per contrasto con
gli artt. 2, 3, 13 e 32 della Costituzione.
La Corte costituzionale, investita delle questioni, ha dichiarato l’illegittimità dell’art. 14,
commi 2 e 3, della legge 40/2004 (sent. 8 maggio 2009, n. 151), limitatamente alle parole
«ad un unico e contemporaneo impianto, comunque non superiore a tre» e nella parte in cui
non prevede che il trasferimento degli embrioni, da realizzare non appena possibile, come
previsto in tale norma, debba essere effettuato senza pregiudizio della salute della donna.
La Corte ha ritenuto che «la previsione della creazione di un numero di embrioni non
superiore a tre, in assenza di ogni considerazione delle condizioni soggettive della donna che
di volta in volta si sottopone alla procedura di procreazione medicalmente assistita, si pone,
in definitiva, in contrasto con l’art. 3 Cost., riguardato sotto il duplice profilo del principio
di ragionevolezza e di quello di uguaglianza, in quanto il legislatore riserva il medesimo trat-
tamento a situazioni dissimili; nonché con l’art. 32 Cost., per il pregiudizio alla salute della
donna, ed eventualmente, come si è visto, del feto ad esso connesso».
L’illegittimità dell’art. 14, co. 2, comporta altresì una deroga al principio generale di di-
vieto di crioconservazione di cui al comma 1 dell’art. 14, posto che si determina la necessità
del ricorso alla tecnica di congelamento con riguardo agli embrioni prodotti ma non trasferiti
per scelta medica.
In seguito alla sentenza della Corte Costituzionale, la giurisprudenza di merito (v. Trib.
Bologna, sez. I, ord. 16 giugno 2009 - 17 giugno 2009, Giudice Dott.ssa Borgo, inedita;
Trib. Bologna, sez. I, ord. 29 giugno 2009, in DeJure; Trib. Cagliari, ord. 9 novembre 2012,
n. 5925, in “Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 10 dicembre 2012; Trib. Roma, ord. 23 settembre
2013, in http://www.giurcost.org) si è ulteriormente espressa nel senso della liceità penale
della diagnosi genetica preimpianto, consentendo altresì che dalle tecniche di fecondazione
assistita si possa ottenere un numero di embrioni commisurato alle condizioni fisiche della
coppia, nel rispetto della valutazione medica in merito alla quantificazione del «numero ...
9
Si vedano S. Canestrari, F. Faenza, Il principio di ragionevolezza, cit., p. 88 ss.; L. Risicato, Lo
statuto, cit., p. 676 ss.
strettamente necessario», ex art. 14, co. 2 (v. Trib. Bologna, sez. I, ord. 16 giugno 2009 - 17
giugno 2009, Giudice Dott.ssa Borgo, cit.; Trib. Bologna, sez. I, ord. 29 giugno 2009, cit.).
Restano escluse dall’applicazione della legge 40/2004, ai sensi dell’art. 4, le coppie fertili
portatrici di malattie genetiche trasmissibili ai figli.
Una recente e isolata pronuncia (Trib. Salerno, ord. 9 gennaio 2010, in “Fam. dir.”,
2010, 476 ss.), invece, ha accolto un ricorso finalizzato ad accedere alla diagnosi genetica
preimpianto, con successiva selezione degli embrioni sani, in favore di una coppia fertile, por-
tatrice di una malattia genetica, sulla base di un’interpretazione costituzionalmente orientata
dell’art. 13, co. 1, alla luce del diritto dei genitori di essere informati sullo stato di salute degli
embrioni ex art. 14, co. 5.
Tale profilo è stato successivamente oggetto di una sentenza della Corte Europea dei
Diritti dell’Uomo, che ha affermato che il divieto, previsto dalla legge italiana, di accedere
alla fecondazione assistita da parte di coppie fertili portatrici di malattie genetiche al fine di
sottoporsi alla diagnosi genetica preimpianto, è in contrasto con il «diritto al rispetto della
propria vita privata e familiare» ex art. 8 CEDU, in quanto la “ingerenza” della legge statale
nell’esercizio di tale diritto è sproporzionata, in ragione dell’incoerenza della possibilità, pre-
vista dalla legge 194/1978, di ricorrere all’aborto terapeutico, nel caso in cui, a gravidanza
iniziata, il feto sia affetto dalla malattia di cui la coppia è portatrice (Corte Europea dei Diritti
dell’Uomo, sez. II, 28 agosto 2012, n. 54270/2010, Costa e Pavan c. Italia)10.
Il Tribunale di Roma, adito dai medesimi ricorrenti ex art. 700 c.p.c., ha dato esecuzione
alla pronuncia della Corte Europea ai sensi dell’art. 46 CEDU, previa disapplicazione dell’art.
4 l. 40/2004, riconoscendo alla coppia il diritto di accedere alla fecondazione assistita per
sottoporre a diagnosi genetica preimpianto gli embrioni eventualmente ottenuti (Trib. Roma,
ord. 23 settembre 2013, in http://www.giurcost.org).
4. La tutela penale della vita prenatale

Con l’avanzamento delle tecniche mediche nell’ambito della cura e gestione della per-
sona all’inizio della vita umana cresce il potere di disposizione sul concepito e il pericolo di
interventi lesivi in fase prenatale11. Il feto, infatti, risulta maggiormente esposto e vulnerabile
e l’affermazione dei nuovi diritti e interessi del concepito incrementa la complessità del con-
flitto con la madre e con il medico (ginecologo o ostetrico). Allo stato attuale, l’attività del
medico può costituire una nuova minaccia per l’integrità e la salute del feto, che, quale vero e
proprio paziente, ha il diritto di essere curato secondo la miglior scienza e tecnica disponibile.
10
In dottrina v. E. Dolcini, Legge, cit., p. 8 ss.; A. Vallini, Diagnosi preimpianto: respinta la richiesta
di rinvio alla Gran Camera CEDU avanzata dal governo italiano nel caso Costa e Pavan contro Italia,
in “Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 18 febbraio 2013, p. 1 ss.; Id., Ardita la rotta o incerta la geografia? La
disapplicazione della legge 40/2004 “in esecuzione” di un giudicato della Corte EDU in tema di diagnosi
preimpianto, in “Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 16 dicembre 2013, p. 1 ss.
11
In argomento, v. K. Summerer, Le nuove frontiere della tutela penale della vita prenatale, in “Riv. it.
dir. proc. pen.”, 2003, p. 1245 ss.; L. Eusebi, La tutela penale, cit., p. 1053 ss.; F. Mantovani, Il c.d.
diritto del feto a nascere sano (problemi medico-legali della diagnosi e trattamento del feto in utero), in “Riv.
it. med. leg.”, 1980, p. 237 ss. Nella letteratura spagnola, v. C.M. Romeo Casabona, El derecho y la
bioetica ante los limites de la vida humana, Madrid, 1994, p. 400.
S. Canestrari 169
La moderna medicina prenatale ha avviato il processo di autonomizzazione del feto, rivelando

i meccanismi del suo sviluppo ed evidenziando la sua distinta soggettività e le sue specifiche
esigenze di tutela.
A fronte delle nuove e molteplici fenomenologie di rischio, la scarna disciplina predi-
sposta dalla legge 194/1978 a tutela della vita prenatale non può che apparire insufficiente.
La previsione della fattispecie di aborto colposo del feto non copre, infatti, la gamma delle
potenziali forme di aggressione del feto da parte del medico nello svolgimento delle attività
di diagnosi e chirurgia prenatale.
Va sottolineato che le emergenti esigenze di tutela (penale) della vita prenatale riguarda-
no lo specifico contesto della gravidanza voluta12, posto che la tutela dell’embrione nell’am-
bito delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita (ovvero la tutela dell’embrione in
vitro) rientra nella disciplina specifica delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita,
mentre la tutela del nascituro nell’ambito della interruzione della gravidanza da parte della
donna è affidata alla legge 194/1978.
In fase prenatale non solo non trovano applicazione le fattispecie di lesioni e di omicidio,
neppure nell’ipotesi in cui l’evento lesivo tipico si manifesti successivamente alla nascita, ma è
esclusa persino la punibilità di condotte che comportino una mera lesione dell’integrità fisica
del nascituro. Inoltre, la collocazione del feto nel corpo della madre pone delicati interrogativi
in ordine alla determinazione dei presupposti di liceità del trattamento medico, in particolare
con riferimento al requisito del consenso informato e del complessivo bilanciamento degli
interessi in gioco.
L’esigenza di un’estensione della tutela della persona, alla luce dell’evoluzione della me-
dicina e della tecnologia prenatale, nonché della nuova sensibilità nei confronti della vita
prenatale, induce ad interrogarsi sulle modalità e sui limiti di un intervento legislativo in
questo settore. La riflessione comparatistica può condurre all’elaborazione di efficaci strategie
di intervento ed al raggiungimento di un delicato equilibrio tra valori e interessi contrap-
posti. L’attenzione è rivolta alla soluzione adottata nell’ordinamento spagnolo attraverso la
tutela dell’integrità fisica del feto predisposta dal Codigo penal del 1995 (artt. 157 e 158),
alle disposizioni penali previste in alcuni ordinamenti nordamericani a tutela del feto, agli
orientamenti giurisprudenziali dei Paesi di common law in tema di responsabilità del medico
per le lesioni cagionate al feto.
12
Per questa impostazione, v. K. Summerer, Libertà della donna e tutela del nascituro. Il conflitto
materno-fetale nella prospettiva del diritto penale, in S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S.
Rodotà, P. Zatti (a cura di), Il governo del corpo, cit., p. 1623 ss., in partic. p. 1647 ss.
The prohibition of medically assisted fertilization of heterologous

character and the so-called criminal paternalism1
Adelmo Manna
Table of contents: 1. Characteristics of heterologous fertilization and the legal nature of

the sanction system. – 2. Searching the protected legal right. – 3. The legitimacy of the law
n. 40 can not be of religious nature. − 4. Critique of the alleged legal rights in contrast with
the principle of secularism. − 5. The Law no. 40 as an expression of the so-called “criminal
paternalism”. – 6. The criminal paternalism in the light of the principle of secularism and of
a liberal criminal law. – 7. The case-law and the first statements of the European Court of
Human Rights. – 8. Statement of the Constitutional Court on the prohibition of implanting
more than three embryos in the woman’s body. − 9. The case-law aiming to pass over the
prohibition of pre-implanting diagnosis. – 10. The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights that would legitimize the choices of the Italian legislator. –
11. The “defensive” attitude of the Constitutional Court. – 12. New warrants referred to the
Constitutional Court. – 13. The “Gospel” of a jurist: the Constitutional Charter.
1. Characteristics of heterologous fertilization and the legal nature of the sanction system
As far as the relationship between law and bioethics is concerned, heterologous
fertilization must be pointed out for the importance of the topic and its possible
consequences, as regulated by the law no. 40 of 2004 “rules on medically assisted
procreation”2. Medically assisted procreation of heterologous character involving
1
Revised and corrected text with the addition of the notes of the Report of the International meeting
Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment, held in Padua and Treviso, September 30 – October 1, 2013. This
paper was in advanced phase of publication when the Italian Constitutional Court, with the decision
n. 162 of June, 10th 2014, declared the inconstitutionality of article 4, co. 3, and article 9, co. 1 and 3
– limitedly to the words «in violation of the prohibition of article 4, co. 3» («in violazione del divieto di
cui all’articolo 4, comma 3») – and article 12, co. 1, of law n. 40 of 2004, which forbade and sanctioned
the realization of interventions of heterologous fertilization.
2
For a frame work of the previous legislation before the introduction of the law. n. 40 S. Canestrari,
172 The prohibition of medically assisted fertilization of heterologous character
transfer of sperm or oocytes is particularly significant. This method is punished,

in some circumstances with criminal sanctions, for example in case of so-called
“rented uterus”, i.e. surrogate mothers. This prohibition does not exist, however, in
other jurisdictions, such as the British one, in which the “supply” of an uterus is not
punished if it occurs free of charge (since it can be considered an act of individual
and social solidarity) while it can be punished if it is a subject of commercialization.
In Italy medically assisted procreation of heterologous nature is always punishable,
unlike, for example, in Austria where the law on embryos allows medically assisted
procreation of heterologous character “in vivo” while it prohibits the one “in vitro”3.
The penalties provided for by Italian Law are particularly afflictive administrative
sanctions. In fact they are nominally defined administrative sanctions but they can
be considered substantially criminal ones also according to the criteria of ECHR in
defining the notion of “criminal matter”. Stefano Canestrari rightly defined this type
of penalty a “Label Fraud”4, due to the high amount of the sanction that hides, in
fact, a real criminal sanction5. This consideration could , for the reasons which will
be developed below, refer to unconstitutionality of the prohibition of heterologous
fertilization, art. 4, paragraph 3, the part in which it is punished with a fine amounting
from 300,000 to 600,000 Euros6. In addition to these penalties, however, also a
disqualification is provided for , actually suspension from professional health care
practice from one to three years. Furthermore, in the case of surrogacy, art. 12, par. 6
provides for imprisonment from three months to two years of the woman who rents
her uterus. This is also the case of the physician who carries out such a heterologous
fertilization, while the parents whose infertility must be medically ascertained, are
not punished because they are considered a sort of “vulnerable” persons.
Guarantees of individuals get weaker through the above-mentioned “Label
Fraud”7 since the use of the administrative sanctions causes a negative impact in
terms of guarantees, because administrative offenses are not under the jurisdiction
of criminal courts and, for example, the conditional suspension, not applied in
Verso una disciplina penale delle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita? Alla ricerca del bene
giuridico tra valori ideali e opzioni ideologiche, in “Ind. Pen.”, 2000, p. 1091 ff.; Id., Bioetica e diritto
penale, Torino, Giappichelli, 2012, p. 3 ff.
3
With regards to Austrian law on assisted procreation (Federal law June 4th, 1992 no. 275 on medically
assisted procreation – Fortpflanzungsmeizinsgesetz, FMwedG) and in particular on the dispositions
of the law regarding heterologous procreation, see E. Dolcini, Fecondazione assistita e diritto penale,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2008, p. 82 f.; M. Maiwald, Problemi di bioetica nel diritto tedesco, in G. Marini (a
cura di), Bioetica e diritto penale, Torino, Giappichelli, 2002, p. 3 ff.
4
S. Canestrari, Commento alla legge 40/2004, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2004, II, p. 416 ff.
5
S. Canestrari, Bioetica e diritto penale, cit., p. 29 ff.
6
A. Manna, La tutela penale della vita in fieri, tra funzione promozionale e protezione di beni giuridici,
in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 345 ff.
7
On the exceeding extent of these administrative sanctions overpassing the limits of reasonableness
see R. Bartoli, La totale irrazionalità di un divieto assoluto. Considerazioni a margine del divieto di
procreazione medicalmente assistita, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 90 ff.
A. Manna 173
administrative sanction, cannot be obtained.
2. Searching the protected legal right

In order to test the legitimacy of such a prohibition, it is necessary to identify
the protected interest8, i.e. what should justify a total ban of medically assisted
fertilization of heterologous nature.
In doing so, one prefers to consider the question in a “negative” way, that is a
comparison is made between medically assisted fertilization of heterologous character
and other types of more “advanced” methods, for example a widow fertilized with
the seed of her dead husband or single women and homosexual couples.
In these latter cases it is possible to trace a legal right violated including the right
of a unborn child to be born in a family with two parental figures of opposite sex,
because according to pedagogical science a baby born in a family with two parental
figures of opposite sex does not, in fact, suffer traumas. This legal rights, which, at least
in my opinion, is the only one with a dignity and a concreteness of its’ own, however,
is neither harmed nor endangered by the heterologous fertilization. That being the
case, it is difficult to understand why heterologous artificial fertilization should be
punished, also because jurisprudence interested in this matter has properly made
the comparison with the civil institute for adoption (currently even of international
importance) between the differences of biological and foster parents, but not for this
reason adoption can be considered from criminal point of view.
3. The legitimacy of the law n. 40 can not be of religious nature

An authoritative part of doctrine outlines, however, other legal rights considered
able to legitimate the prohibition in question. In this regard it is useful to report the
position expressed by Luciano Eusebi and Ferrando Mantovani. For Luciano Eusebi
this ban would protect the “dignity of human procreation”9. More specifically,
reproduction should only take place with a “real” relationship between the bodies of
a man and a woman and not artificially because this would be in conflict with the
“dignity of human procreation”.
Such a concept cannot, however, at least in my opinion, be related to the dignity
of a legal right (in the terms of criminal law)10, because on closer inspections behind
8
On the legitimating role of the legal right, see A. Merli, Introduzione alla teoria generale del bene
giuridico, ESI, Napoli, 2006.
9
L. Eusebi, La vita individuale precoce: soltanto materiale biologico?, in “Leg. Pen.”, 2005, p. 357 ff.
10
G. Fiandaca, I temi eticamente sensibili tra ragione pubblica e ragione punitiva, in “Riv. it. dir.
proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 1383 ff.; Id., Punire la semplice immoralità? Un vecchio interrogativo che tende a
riproporsi, in A. Cadoppi, (a cura di), Laicità, valori e diritto penale. The Moral Limits of the Criminal
this eventual legal right is hiding an approach to a particular ethical-religious belief.

It is, therefore, not a legal right as defined in secular and secularized criminal law11.
Ferrando Mantovani has a similar hermeneutic prejudice, even if a different
argument, when he refers to the “dignity of women” and the “dignity of the baby”,
who would be, in fact, the legal objects harmed by this type of fertilization12. The
concept of dignity, however, is vague and indeterminate, able to legitimate any form
of protection, but in this way the legal right may lose one of its’ main functions,
namely the critical-selective one13. These legal rights are called “vague” or “wandering”
in the sense that they do not have real boundaries and, above all, they are used in this
field again to “hide” certain ethical and religious beliefs. On this matter one can only
agree with Giovanni Fiandaca, who, in an important essay dating back to 200514,
after the entry into force of the law in question, rightly labeled such legal rights as
utterly elusive.
4. Critique of the alleged legal rights in contrast with the principle of secularism
In the absence of concrete and limited interests (rectius beni) the consequence
is that the prohibition of medically assisted fertilization of heterologous character
appears to be the result of a certain ethical and religious influence, since this law
has embraced both a precise scientific conception and an equally specific ethical-
religious conception rejecting the others. This, as far as ethically delicate matters
are concerned, is neither in compliance with the democratic principle (in ethically
sensitive matters the majority is not enough), nor with the principle of secularism15.
Law. In ricordo di Joel Feinberg, Giuffrè, Milano, 2010, p. 207 ff.
11
M. Donini, ‘Danno’ e ‘offesa’ nella c.d. tutela penale dei sentimenti. Note su morale e sicurezza come
beni giuridici, a margine della categoria dell’”offense” di Joel Feinberg, in A. Cadoppi, (ed.), Laicità, valori
e diritto penale, cit., p. 41 ff.
12
F. Mantovani, Procreazione medicalmente assistita e principio personalistico, in “Leg. Pen.”, 2005, p.
326 ff.
13
F. Angioni, Contenuto e funzioni del concetto di bene giuridico, Milano, Giuffrè, 1983.
14
G. Fiandaca, Scelte di tutela in materia di fecondazione assistita e democrazia laica, in “Leg. Pen.”,
2005, p. 339 ff.
15
On the issue of secularism and on its complicated historic, political, philosophical, cultural, social
and legal implications see A. Ceretti, L. Garlati (eds.), Laicità e Stato di diritto, Milano, Giuffrè,
2007; M. La Torre, M. Lalatta Costerbosa, A. Scerbo (eds.), Questioni di vita o di morte. Etica
pratica, bioetica e filosofia del diritto, Torino, Giappichelli, 2007; G. Boniolo (eds.), Laicità. Una
geografia delle nostre radici, Torino, Einaudi, 2006; E. Dieni, A. Ferrari, V. Pacillo (eds.), Symbolon/
Diabolon. Simboli, religioni, diritti nell’Europa multiculturale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005; V. Ferrone,
D. Roche, L’Illuminismo nella cultura contemporanea, Bari, Laterza, 2002; G. Giorello, Di nessuna
chiesa. La libertà del laico, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2005; J. Habermas, Tra scienza e fede, Bari,
Laterza, 2006; E. Lecaldano, Un’etica senza Dio, Bari, Laterza, 2006; J. Rawls, Liberalismo politico,
Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1994; M. Mori (ed.), Scarpelli, Bioetica laica, Milano, Baldini e
Castoldi, 1998; J. Stuart Mill, La libertà, 1859, in La libertà, l’utilitarismo, l’asservimento delle donne,
Milano, Rizzoli, 1999; Id., Saggi sulla religione, 1874, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1972; C.A. Viano, Laici
A. Manna 175
The subject of secularism, therefore, touches precisely upon the position that the
State has to take with regard to one or more religious or moral confessions.
A liberal democratic state, above all in criminal matters, can only take on a feature
of secularism, i.e. of “impartiality16”, with regards to all existing religious and moral
doctrines. In the liberal jurisdictions the coexistence with pluralism goes through two
models of integration, an ethical one and a politic one. If a liberal democratic state
cannot pretend consensus on values according to which a neutral position would
be recommendable, it can, however pretend consensus on the procedures regarding
legitimate legal productions and legitimate exercise of power17.
5. The Law no. 40 as an expression of the so-called “criminal paternalism”

In a situation where no concrete harmed interest or at least jeopardized one can
be traced the norm is, from criminal point of view, void of legitimacy18. On the
contrary in artificial fertilization of homosexual couples, of single women or widows
fecundated with the seed of their dead husbands further licit causes are required also
in my opinion. Let’s think, for example, about the fertilization of a widow, that is
prohibited. In the terms of reform one should ask if it makes any sense to punish
a widow who has been inseminated with the semen of her deceased husband if it
can be considered just an extreme act of love towards the husband and a way for
her to preserve his memory and continue the ideal relationship with him through
in ginocchio, Bari, Laterza, 2006. On the role of laity as a fundamental principle of modern criminal
law see, although sometimes with radically heterogeneous approaches, S. Canestrari, Laicità e diritto
penale nelle democrazie costituzionali, in Studi in onore di G. Marinucci, I, Milano, Giuffrè, 2006, p.
139 ff.; E. Dolcini, Embrione, pre-embrione, ootide: nodi interpretativi nella disciplina della procreazione
medicalmente assistita (L. 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40), in “Riv. it. dir. pen. proc.”, 2004, p. 440 ff.; L.
Eusebi, Laicità e dignità umana nel diritto penale (pena, elementi del reato, biogiuridica), in Scritti per F.
Stella, I, Napoli, ESI, 2007, p. 163 ff.; G. Fiandaca, Scelte di tutela in materia di fecondazione assistita
e democrazia laica, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 339 ff.; Id., Laicità del diritto penale e secolarizzazione dei
beni tutelati, in Studi in memoria di P. Nuvolone, I, Milano, Giuffrè, 1991, p. 167 ff.; B. Magro, Etica
laica e tutela della vita umana: riflessioni sul principio di laicità in diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir. pen.
proc.”, 1994, p. 1382 ff.; S. Moccia, Carpzov e Grozio. Dalla concezione teocratica alla concezione laica
del diritto penale, Napoli, ESI, 1979; D. Pulitanò, Laicità e diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir. pen. proc.”,
2006, p. 55 ff.; M. Romano, Principio di laicità dello Stato, religioni, norme penali, in “Riv. it. dir. pen.
proc.”, 2007, p. 493 ff.; Id., Secolarizzazione, diritto penale moderno e sistema dei reati, in “Riv. it. dir.
pen. proc.”, 1981, p. 477 ff.; P. Siracusano, I delitti in materia di religione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1983; F.
Stella, Laicità dello Stato: fede e diritto penale, in G. Marinucci, E. Dolcini (eds.), Diritto penale in
trasformazione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1985, p. 310; C. Visconti, La tutela penale della religione nell’età post-
secolare e il ruolo della Corte costituzionale, in “Riv. it. dir. pen. proc.”, 2005, p. 1029 ff.
16
R. Dworkin, Harmless Wrongdoing, in A. Cadoppi (ed.), Laicità, cit., p. 189 ff.
17
J. Habermas, L’inclusione dell’altro. Studi di teoria politica, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1998, 106; J. Rawls,
Liberalismo politico, cit., p. 206, footnote 32; p. 303.
18
M. Romano, La legittimazione delle norme penali: ancora su limiti e validità della teoria del bene
giuridico, in “Criminalia”, 2011, p. 33 ff.
their son. Such a hypothesis could therefore be included in the criterion of “not
pretending” in the sense of not being able to demand a different type of behaviour,
in compliance with law19, because the motion of affects here, of course, prevail. The
same criterion can also be applied to homosexual couples: in this case, criticizing the
absolute prohibition of law no. 40 – as supported20 by the geneticist Flamigni, in due
course, a medical committee could be established. This committee could analyze a
case by case whether homosexual couples, or single women are able to continue the
pregnancy and, afterwards, above all, to educate in the best way their child. Criminal
law could be applied only in case of violation of any negative judgment21.
On this point, of course, different opinions can be supported. What, however,
appears at this point without doubt, is the consequent de-legitimacy of the absolute
prohibition of heteologous fertilization present in the law no. 40. This because, unlike
the case recently examined , no legal right , neither jeopardized nor harmed seems
to be present. Consequently in the absence of what could justify the intervention of
criminal law, punitive one, “paracriminal” (or whichever classification one prefers),
it is clear that the law no. 40 is an expression of the so-called criminal paternalism22.
6. The criminal paternalism in the light of the principle of secularism and of a liberal
criminal law
What is, however, criminal paternalism? It is an expression dating back to a
great nineteenth-century philosopher, John Stuart Mill, whose ideas were taken,
reaffirmed and systematized by a great American jurist, Joel Feinberg23, who justifies
the intervention of criminal law on the strength of two fundamental principles: the
principle of “harm to others” and the principle of “offense”. The latter is less serious
than “harm to others” because offense means causing disgust, disregards and, in any
case, harassment to persons24. According to this approach, the main task of criminal
19
G. Fornasari, Il principio di inesigibilità nel diritto penale, Padova, CEDAM, 1990; please also note
A. Manna, L’art. 384 c.p. e la “famiglia di fatto”: ancora un ingiustificato ‘ diniego di giustizia” da parte
della Corte Costituzionale?, in “Giur. Cost.”, 1996, p. 90 ff.
20
A. Manna, La tutela penale, cit., p. 345 ff.
21
Amplius: M. Romano, Repressione della condotta antisindacale, Milano, Giuffrè, 1975, p. 110 ff.
22
On this point see the essays of A. Cadoppi, Paternalismo e diritto penale: cenni introduttivi, L.
Cornacchia, Placing Care. Spunti in tema di paternalismo penale, D. Micheletti, Il paternalismo
penale giudiziario e le insidie della Bad Samaritan Jurisprudence, S. Tordini Cagli, Il paternalismo
legislativo, published in il punto su … Paternalismo legislativo e paternalismo giudiziario, in “Criminalia”,
2011, pp. 223 – 340.
23
J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I: Harm to Others, Oxford U.P., Oxford,
1984; cui adde L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Bari, Laterza, 1989, chs.
IV-VIII.
24
On these topics, see the last essay of S. Tordini Cagli, Principio di autodeterminazione e consenso
dell’avente diritto, Bologna, BUP, 2008, p. 101 ff.; A. Cadoppi, Presentazione. Principio del danno e
A. Manna 177
law is to protect certain legal rights from eventual offenses, which, according to
Feinberg, have criminal relevance only in case of harm to others25 or , at most, an
offense to others.
Nonetheless, in this perspective, many of the cases referred to in our jurisdiction
are lacking legitimacy. Just consider, for example, drug cultivation for personal
use, since the drug addict, in this case, causes harm to himself, but not to others26.
Now let’s think of the crime of illegal entry into the territory of a State (art. 10
immigrations law) or the offense of non-compliance with the order of expulsion (art,
14, para. 5b, immigrations law). In these cases action in which no harm is caused
to others but only to legal rights, often too elusive, easily attributable to general
expression of law and order is punished27.
In particular, the principle of harm to other, taken literally, is therefore selective
in defining the area of criminally relevant offense, since it is not always easy to
recognnize which incrimination produces harm to others.
In fact, in his work, Feinberg reduces the range of the principle of harm to
others, admitting precisely the legitimacy of incrimination that even if they do not
harm others, they are, however, offending, harassing and damaging the sensibility of
others. This is, I suppose, just “public morals” (principle of offense)28.
In this attenuated vision of paternalism, i.e. weakened forms of moral protection
by the State, however, the protection of the morals could turn out to be legitimate
since prostitution, begging and wandering in certain societies might be considered
contrary to morality29.
Such conclusions must be presently rejected, since they risk to continue to
legitimate offenses concerning feelings30, and in any case, legal rights of very little
importance31. All this, without considering that all those offences which punished
limiti del diritto penale, in Id. (ed.), Laicità, cit., VII ff.
25
J. Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. I: Harm to Others, Oxford U.P., Oxford,
1984; L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione. Teoria del garantismo penale, Bari, Laterza, 1989, chs. IV-VIII.
26
C. Ruga Riva, Il lavavetri, la donna col burqa e il Sindaco. Prove atecniche di “diritto penale municipale”,
in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2008, p. 133 ff.
27
F. Viganó, L. Masera, Inottemperanza dello straniero all’ordine di allontanamento e “direttiva
rimpatri” UE: scenari prossimi venturi per il giudice penale italiano, in “Cass. Pen.”, 2010, p. 1711 ff.
28
For a critique , on this point, regarding the way of thinking of Feinberg, v. M. Donini, “Danno” e
“offesa” nella c.d. tutela penale dei sentimenti. Note su morale e sicurezza come beni giuridici, a margine
della categoria dell’“offence” di Joel Feinberg, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen”, 2008, p. 1546 ff.; G. Fiandaca,
Diritto penale, tipi di morale e tipi di democrazia, in G. Fiandaca, G. Francolini, Sulla legittimazione,
cit., p. 153 ff.
29
For a deepened analysis, for example, of the offende pursuant to the code of Ticino, see A. Manna,
Di alcune trasgressioni nel codice penale ticinese del 1873 e dei rapporti fra diritto penale e morale, in
Aa.Vv., Codice penale per il Cantone del Ticino, Padova, 2011, CCXIII.
30
Contrary to such a possibility is G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni intorno a bioetica e diritto penale, tra
laicità e post-secolarismo, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2007, p. 554.
31
See A. Manna, Beni della personalità e limiti della protezione penale, Padova, 1989, p. 86.
either a status, or worse, lifestyles can only conflict, even before the principle of
offensiveness and of guilt, with the principle of secularism of jurisdiction, according
to which a liberal-democratic state has to take a neutral position with respect to all
ethical and religious concepts of the jurisdiction32.
As J. Rawls establishes, the only way to ensure peaceful coexistence in modern and
multicultural societies is that of creating a “cross section consensus” on democratic
principles, leaving, nonetheless, citizens free to profess, practice and believe in their
values33. Therefore I consider only the principle of harm to others really useful, that
is the real Harm to others, which in fact is the only distinguishing criterion, both
for its heuristic validity and for its possibility of being justifiable, between what has
criminal relevance and what can only justify less intensive forms of protection34, such
as, in particular, administrative offense.
Using that latter criterion of the prohibition of medically assisted fertilization of
heterologous character, it can be verified that taking into account the principle of
harm to others, the illegality of the prohibitions of heterologous fertilization becomes
evident. In truth, it would be possible, in theory, also without any specific reference
to the principle of harm to others, since our dogmatic categories contemplate in any
case the principle of offensiveness35. At least as a hermeneutic criterion, and not only
as a constitutional one, even if in a reduced version adopted by the Constitutional
Court in the sense of reasonableness36, it can hardly lead to uphold the legitimacy
of the prohibition of heterologous fertilization, because of the lack of any form of
offence of protected right37. Furthermore, if a child is born to parents of different
sex, as far as offence is concerned, no problems of any kind can raise in relation to
offence. Thus, in this perspective, thanks to the prohibition of medically assisted
fertilization of heterologous character criminal law inevitably assumes a paternalistic
function38. In other words, there is the risk of imposing a certain ethical-religious idea
about fertilization. This does not only contrast with the well-established principles of
criminal law, but it also seems to be closely dependent on a particular “world view”
32
G. Salcuni, Multiculturalismo e forme di democrazia, in L. Stortoni, S. Tordini Cagli (eds.),
Cultura, culture e diritto penale, Bologna, BUP, 2013, p. 112 ff.
33
J. Rawls, Liberalismo politico, cit., p. 34 ff.; p. 206 ff.
34
See one more time A. Manna, Di alcune trasgressioni, cit., CCXXIV.
35
M. Donini, Danno e offesa, cit., p. 57 ff.
36
Constitutional Court, no. 333 of 1991, in “Foro it.”, 1991, I, 2628, with a note of G. Fiandaca, La
nuova legge anti-droga tra sospetti di incostituzionalità e discrezionalità legislativa.; on these aspects, see
V. Manes, Il principio di offensività nel diritto penale. Canone di politica criminale, criterio ermeneutico,
parametro di ragionevolezza, Torino, Giappichelli, 2005, p. 25 ff.
37
E. Dolcini, La lunga marcia della fecondazione assistita: la legge 40/2004 tra Corte costituzionale, Corte
EDU e giudice ordinario, in Aa.Vv., Studi in onore di Mario Romano, Jovene, Napoli, 2011, p. 1475 ff.
38
G. Di Cosimo, Quando il legislatore predilige un punto di vista etico/religioso: il caso del divieto
di donazione dei gameti, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1381941442DI%20
COSIMO%202013a.pdf.
A. Manna 179
in which, however, not all citizens identify themselves, above all in modern “liquid”
society39. In fact, the first project in this field dating back to the sixties of the last
century , the one presented by Mr. Gonella, who was also Minister of Justice and one
of the most important leaders of the Christian Democrats, not surprisingly, equated
assisted heterologous fertilization even with adultery.
This, however, does not belong only to the “history of the criminal law”, because
even recently the ex- undersecretary for Health, Mrs. Roccella was of the same
opinion: she justified the ban of medically assisted fertilization of heterologous
character considering it a sort of genetic betrayal40.
7. The case-law and the first statements of the European Court of Human Rights
Case law has, however, shown a reaction to the provisions of the law no. 40,
which is not, however, so drastic as far as the heterologous fertilization is concerned.
When legislation intervenes in relation to ethical (and therefore politically) sensitive
matters, it is not easy to quickly eliminate the prohibitions41. There has been,
however, some issues deferred to the Constitutional Court; the idea that the ban of
medically assisted fertilization of heterologous character is against the Constitution,
was considered a not manifestly unfounded matter42. In the meantime, the European
Court of Human Rights judged a conflict between the Austrian law that only allows
“in vivo” fertilization and not “in vitro”, with articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, in light
of right of privacy, in the sense that the state in this way enters the sphere of family life
of citizen, and the principle of non-discrimination43. In particular, the Court holds
39
Taken for granted quote to Z. Bauman, Modernità Liquida, Bari, Laterza, 2006.
40
E. Roccella, Eterologa è tradimento genetico, 7 ottobre 2010, www.adnkronos.it.; on this combination
of morals and law, in critical sense, see E. Dolcini, Laicità, “sana laicità” e diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir.
proc. pen.”, 2009, 1017; L. Risicato, “Dal diritto di vivere” al “diritto di morire”. Riflessioni sul ruolo
della laicità nell’esperienza penalistica, Torino, Giappichelli, 2008, p. 41 ff.
41
The boundary between political discretion and technical control is rather ephemeral in similar cases,
see G. Fiandaca, Sui «giudizi di fatto» nel sindacato di costituzionalità in materia penale, tra limiti ai
poteri e limiti ai saperi, in Aa.Vv., Studi in onore di Mario Romano, Napoli, Jovene, 2011, p. 265 ff.; D.
Pulitanò, Giudizi di fatto nel controllo di costituzionalità di norme penali, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”,
2008, p. 1004 ff.
42
Court of Catania, October 21, 2010 Judge Distefano, in penalecontemporaneo.it, January, 14,
2011, with a note of E. Dolcini, Fecondazione eterologa: ancora un’ordinanza di rimessione alla Corte
costituzionale; Court of Milan, I civ., December, 28, 2010, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/
upload/ordinanza%20Milano_procreazione%20ass..pdf; court of Florence, September, 6, 2010, in
http://www.altalex.com/index.php?idnot=12123.
43
ECHR 1. Sec., April 1, 2010, S.H. and others C/ Austria, n. 57813/00, in http://www.echr.coe.int/
Pages/home.aspx?p=home. A. Catalano, Ragionevolezza del divieto di procreazione assistita eterologa, tra
ordinamento italiano e CEDU, in www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it, July, 2, 2010; V. Pellizzone,
Fecondazione eterologa e Corte europea: riflessioni in tema di interpretazione convenzionalmente conforme e
obbligo del giudice di sollevare la questione di legittimità costituzionale, ivi, July, 2, 2010.
up that legal order that allows the artificial procreation respects the right of a couple
to conceive a child, in accordance with the art. No. 8 of ECHR. Therefore bans of
access to some techniques of artificial procreation (fertilization “in vitro” with seed
of a third person, fertilizations through oocyte donation) are discriminatory, since
they pose a sterile couple in differentiated position compared with the other ones, in
accordance with the provisions of art. 14 ECHR, if not justified by an objective and
reasonable purpose and observance of the principle of proportionality between the
means used and objectives pursued.
8. Statement of the Constitutional Court on the prohibition of implanting more than

three embryos in the woman’s body
In this perspective it must be considered that an ablative intervention of the
Constitutional Court declared that it is against the Constitution to graft in the
woman’s body, with regard to homologous artificial fertilization, a maximum of three
embryos44. This decision is justified because the law on medically assisted procreation
violates the art. 3 of the Constitution, from two points of view, that of the principle
of reasonableness and that of equality, where it provides a production of no more
than three embryos at a time, to be planted at the same time and where the transfer
of the embryos to be implemented as soon as possible is provided, without prejudice
to the health of the woman. From this it follows, also, that the “grafting” can lead
to considerable suffering of the woman. This is the reason why it was declared
illegal also in contrast with art. 32 of the Constitution45. The unconstitutionality
of the art. 14, par. 2, is limited to the words “to a unique, contemporary grafting,
not exceeding three”, leaving untouched the principle that embryos should not be
created in number exceeding what is necessary, excluding, however, the requirement
for a unique and contemporary grafting and the maximum number of embryos to be
implanted: this also introduces an exception to the general principle of the prohibition
of cryopreservatios referred to in par. 1 of that article 14, with the consequent result
44
Const. Court, sentence of May, 8 , no. 151, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen”, 2009, n. 928, with a note
of E. Dolcini, Embrioni nel numero “strettamente necessario”: il bisturi della Corte costituzionale sulla
legge n. 40 del 2004, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 963 ff.; G. Di Genio, Il primato della
scienza sul diritto (ma non su i diritti) nella fecondazione assistita, in http://www.forumcostituzionale.
it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/giurisprudenza/2009/0003_nota_74_2009_carboni.
pdf.; L. Trucco, Procreazione assistita: la Consulta, questa volta, decide di (almeno in parte) decidere,
in http://www.giurcost.org/; D. Chinni, La procreazione medicalmente assistita tra “detto” e “non
detto”. Brevi riflessioni sul processo costituzionale alla legge n. 40/2004, in http://www.giurcost.org/;
S. Agosta, Dalla Consulta finalmente una prima risposta alle più vistose contraddizioni della disciplina
sulla fecondazione artificiale, in http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_
forum/giurisprudenza/2009/0003_nota_74_2009_carboni.pdf.
45
On this issue, see C. Cassani, La diagnosi genetica preimpiano: profili penali e risvolti applicativi, in
G. Balbi, A. Esposito (a cura di), Laicità, valori e diritto penale, Torino, Giappichelli, 2011, p. 79 ff.
A. Manna 181
of the need of the freezing technique of the embryos produced but not implanted
because of medical reasons involving the declaration of unconstitutionality also of
the par. 3 of art. 14.
9. The case-law aiming to pass over the prohibition of pre-implanting diagnosis

The development of case-law is based on the above-mentioned statement of the
Constitutional Court: the Court of Bologna, in 200946, and the Court of Salerno,
in 201047, stated on the basis of a constitutionally-oriented interpretation of the
law 19 February 2004, no. 40, even after the declaration of unconstitutionality of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of art. 14 of the Act, made by Constitutional Court on April 18,
2009, n. 151, that the genetic diagnosis shall be admitted before implantations of
the embryo48. So that, to protect the right of self-determination in the reproductive
choices of a married couple, both carriers of a serious genetically transmissible
disease, pursuant to art. 700 of the Code a medical center must fulfill a contract
for professional services consisting in the medically assisted procreation techniques
based on scientific practices, pre-implantation diagnosis of embryos to be produced
and the transfer into the uterus of the woman of embryos that do not outline any
genetic malformation. This solution is necessary also to respect the principle of
equality, art, 3 of the Constitution, since a different treatment of the abortion law
occurred, where instead pre-implantation diagnosis is allowed. Also, by not allowing
to check whether in the embryo that was implanted in a woman’s body there were
genetic diseases there was the risk to put in danger the right to health of the unborn
child, who was in danger of being born with genetic diseases49. It was also important
to give the possibility to the woman, after having discovered the genetic disease of
the fetus, to abort if she wanted.
10. The judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights that
would legitimize the choices of the Italian legislator
One must, however, report the decision of a contrary opinion, compared to that
of the first degree of the Grand Chamber of the European court of Human Rights,
46
Court of Bologna, decree June 29, 2009, in “Famiglia e diritto”, 2009, p. 1854 ff.
47
Court of Salerno, warrant January 9, 2010, in “Guida al dir.”, 2010, fasc. 9, p. 62 ff. On some
ambiguities present in the warrant of the Court of Salerno regarding the concept of infertility, see
E. Dolcini, La procreazione medicalmente assistita: profili penalistici, in S. Rodotà, P. Zatti (eds.),
Trattato di biodiritto, Il governo del corpo, Miano, Giuffrè, 2011, t. II, p. 1576.
48
See also Court of Cagliari November 9, 2012 no. 5925, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/
upload/1354806458ordinanza%20Tribunale%20Cagliari.pdf
49
E. Dolcini, La lunga marcia della fecondazione assistita, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2011, p. 429 ff.
which, with particular regard to art. 8 stated that non infringement of the so − called
domestic privacy occurs, at least in terms considered in the first instance, in the
case of the prohibition of assisted fertilization of heterologous character in vitro by
Austrian law50. The prohibition of heterologous artificial insemination (i.e. gametes
from a donor), according to Austrian legislation – concerning in vitro fertilization
with oocytes donations and that of sperm (but not in vivo with sperm donor, or
artificial insemination) – even if constituting an interference with the right to
respect for private and family life of parents, concerns a controversial and ethically
sensitive matter for which normative discipline gives to the State wide margin of
appreciation and it is the result of an acceptable balance between the rights of the
intended parent and those of third parties and the society. In particular, the Grand
Chamber considered the art. 8 ECHR in its negative dimension (that is as a source
of abstention obligations in a State) in order to assess whether the prohibition
under Austrian law on the subject of heterologous fertilization constituted a lawful,
necessary and proportionate interference according to art. 8 § 2 ECHR, compared
with the right to respect for private and family life enshrined in that provision (§88).
The Court stated that one must evaluate whether there were sufficient reasons for the
adoption of such a limiting regulation of heterologous fertilization and whether the
interference with the right to respect for private and family life could be considered
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by the Austrian legislature (§91). In this
regards, the Grand Chamber, while recognizing the existence within member states
of the Council of Europe of a clear trend towards the recognition of the possibility of
accepting the donation of gametes for the purposes of in vitro fertilization, however,
did not reconnect to it a decisive impact on the margin of appreciation of member
States in the field of medically assisted procreation. It pointed out that this trend
does not represent a consolidated guide line at European level, but rather “an aspect”
of the law that is not yet established and which cannot be evaluated as such to limit
the discretion of the national legislature (§96).
11. The “defensive” attitude of the Constitutional Court

This situation has provoked an unexpected decision, since the only one of its
kind, by the Italian Constitutional Court, because the Court referred the matter
50
ECHR, Grand Chamber, sent. 3.11.2011, Pres. Costa, ric. n. 57813/00, S.H. c. Austria, in “Foro it.”,
2012, 5, 4, p. 209 with a note of E. Nicosia. For a first comment of that sentence see E. Beduschi, A.
Colella, La Corte EDU salva (per ora) la legislazione austriaca in materia di procreazione medicalmente
assistita, in penalecontemporaneo.it, November 7, 2011. Critical analisys of the decision of the court of
Strasbourg see M. D’amico, B. Liberali (eds.), La legge n. 40 del 2004 ancora a giudizio. La parola alla
Corte costituzionale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2012, p. 269.
A. Manna 183
back to the referring courts for further consideration51. All this suggests that the
Constitutional Court wanted to affirm the obligation to take into account the
approach adopted by the Grand Chamber, so implicitly asking the lower courts to
argue otherwise on raised issues. In this perspective, the Court recalls that the judge
is obliged to a conforming interpretation of national laws, in the lights of the law of
the ECHR, whenever this is allowed by law. Only where the contrast between the
national standards and the norms of the ECHR cannot be overcome by means of
interpretation, the Court is obliged to raise the issue of constitutionality for violation
of art. 117, par. 1 of Const.52. So that, the national courts will consider the articles 8
and 14 of the ECHR as interpreted by the Grand Chamber of the European Court
and verify whether or not there is an alleged contrast and if it, eventually, can be
solved through interpretation.
12. New warrants referred to the Constitutional Court

The Courts of Milan53, Catania54 and Florence55, with other three orders, one
51
Const. Court., ord. May 22, 2012, n. 150, dep. June 7 2012, in http://www.giurcost.org/
decisioni/2012/0150o-12.html. For an examination of the reflects of law case of Strasbourg on Italy see
E. Dolcini, Il punto sulla procreazione assistita: in particolare il problema della fecondazione eterologa, in
“Il Corriere del merito”, 2013, p. 8 ff.
52
G. Salcuni, L’europeizzazione del diritto penale: problemi e prospettive, Milano, Giuffrè, 2011, p. 373
ff.
53
Court of Milan, 1. Civil Sect., hearing March 29, 2013 (dep. April 9, 2013), Pres. Bichi, Est.
Dorigo, in http://www.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/SoleOnLine5/_Oggetti_Correlati/Documenti/
Norme%20e%20Tributi/2013/04/tribunale-milano-fecondazione.pdf?uuid=1fed6df2-9d43-11e2-
8310-7be55e1e589c. Cf. the comment of A. Verri, Il Tribunale di Milano rimette nuovamente alla
Corte costituzionale la questione concernente la legittimità costituzionale della fecondazione eterologa,
in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-/-/-/2227-il_tribunale_di_milano_rimette_
nuovamente_alla_corte_costituzionale_la_questione_concernente_la_legittimit___costituzionale_
della_fecondazione_eterologa/; E. Malfatti, Ancora una questione di costituzionalità sul divieto di
fecondazione eterologa, tra incertezze generate dalla Corte costituzionale (ord. n. 150/2012) ed esigenze
del “seguito” alle pronunce di Strasburgo, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/area/3-/24-/-/2252-
ancora_una_questione_di_costituzionalit___sul_divieto_di_fecondazione_eterologa__tra_incertezze_
generate_dalla_corte_costituzionale__ord__n__150_2012___ed_esigenze_del____seguito____alle_
pronunce_di_strasburgo/.
54
Court of Catania, 1. Sect. April 13, 2013, Pres. Morgia, Est. Sabatino, in http://www.
penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1366820711Fecondazione%20eterologa_Ordinanza%20
rimessione%20Catania.pdf. Cf. also the comment of V. Tigano, Il divieto della fecondazione eterologa
di nuovo al vaglio della Consulta: l’ordinanza di rimessione del Tribunale di Catania, in http://www.
penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-/-/-/2247-il_divieto_della_fecondazione_eterologa_di_nuovo_al_
vaglio_della_consulta__l_ordinanza_di_rimessione_del_tribunale_di_catania/.
55
Court of Florence, March 29, 2013, Judge Paparo, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/
upload/1368192960ordinanza%20rim%20firenze%20ap%202013.pdf, comment of A. Verri, Anche
il Tribunale di Firenze, dopo quelli di Milano e Catania, rimette alla Corte costituzionale la questione di
legittimità costituzionale della fecondazione eterologa, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/-
/-/-/2244-anche_il_tribunale_di_firenze__dopo_quelli_di_milano_e_catania__rimette_alla_corte_
dated March 29, 2013, the other April 13, 2013 and the last March 29, 2013, again
raised the question to the Constitutional Court. Only the Court of Milan, referring to
art. 117, para. 1, which imposes the State to comply with EU rules and principles of
international law, considers that the question of the prohibition must be appreciated
in light of the scientific and social progress, so that such a parameter, weak and vague,
may allow the judgment of Constitutional Court to take into account, in addition to
supranational parameters, also the model of society obtainable by the Constitution
and, in particular, by articles 2,3,19,21 and 32. Indeed the European Court of
Human Rights (judgment dated November 3, 2011, no. 57813 SH and others,
Austria) provides, however, that the choice of the contracting State to authorize the
type of heterologous artificial insemination and, only exceptionally, fertilization with
sperm donation, is justified as long as it reflects the state of medical science and the
degree of existing consensus in society at that time56.
The courts of Catania and Florence consider again the questions not manifestly
not-founded and relevant, but only on the basis of national parameters, such as
articles 2 (inviolable rights of man), 3 (principle of equality), 29, 31 (the right to
family, which also means, of course, the rights to procreate children)57, and finally
the art. 32 (such as the right to health) because infertility is considered a disease and
the prohibition of heterologous fertilization means stopping therapy of a disease like
that of infertility58. The decision by the Constitutional Court, this time I hope “more
courageous”, however is expected for 2014 (see before, note nr. 1).
13. The “Gospel” of a jurist: the Constitutional Charter

One can in this view also consider two other constitutional provisions to
assume that the law contrasts with the principle of secularism. As to the nature of
the relationship between secularism and criminal law, according to a recent thesis,
secularism is only a character of criminal law, i.e. a line of criminal policy that should
be followed, but not an obligation for the legislature59.
On the contrary, I believe that secularism is a principle and not a character60,
costituzionale_la_questione_di_legittimit___costituzionale_della_fecondazione_eterologa/.
56
M. Murgo, La legge n. 40 e la CEDU, in “Nuova Giur. Civ.”, 2012, 3, 1, p. 224.
57
E. Dolcini, Stretto d’assedio il divieto di fecondazione assistita di tipo eterologo, in www.
penalecontemporaneo.it, February 14, 2011.
58
R. Bartoli, La totale irrazionalità di un divieto assoluto, cit., p. 96 ff.; E. Dolcini, Strasburgo –
Firenze – Roma: il divieto di fecondazione eterologa si avvia al capolinea?, in www.penalecontemporaneo.
it, October 21, 2010.
59
R. Bartoli, La totale irrazionalità di un divieto assoluto, cit., p. 96 ff.; E. Dolcini, Strasburgo –
Firenze – Roma: il divieto di fecondazione eterologa si avvia al capolinea?, cit.
60
For secularism as a principle see M. Donini, Il volto attuale dell’illecito penale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004,
p. 30 ff.; B. Magro, Etica laica e tutela della vita umana: riflessioni sul principio di laicità in diritto penale,
A. Manna 185
since it can be estimated from a set of constitutional rules that impose the State to
assume a neutral position with respect to religion and morality.
More specifically, as the Constitutional Court itself teaches61, secularism is a
principle of supreme law in our constitutional system, obtainable by art. 3 of the
Constitution, which guarantees the equality of citizens before the law without
distinction of religion, art, 21 of the Constitution, which gives everyone the right to
openly express their thoughts and art. 8, para, 1 and 19 of the Constitution, as far as
equality and freedom of all religious denominations are concerned62. The principle of
secularism also connects to the principle of harm, where pursuant to art. 25, par 2 of
the Constitution, it is expressly forbidden to punish individuals for the commission
of a harmless fact, i.e. without harm to a legal right, at least in the meaning that I
have described above.
The State cannot, in fact, enact positive moral judgments on conduct falling into
the lawfulness, or make negative moral judgments if the conduct is illegal.
Offences must be evaluated negatively, but only from a legal point of view, i.e.
when they produce social harm63.
The contrast with the principle of freedom is therefore due to the fact that
the law no. 40 is an expression of “criminal paternalism” and, as a result, causes,
paradoxically, a criminogenic effect, because it involves so-called “tourism of rights”
(in France, Greece, Spain, California)64. Couples can go abroad because Italy is one
of the few countries where there is still a complete prohibition of assisted fertilization
of heterologous character65. This practice is discriminatory because these “trips” are
expensive and therefore discriminatory in relation to social position66. Furthermore,
in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.” , 1994, p.1392 ff.; G. Salcuni, Art. 402, in A. Cadoppi, S. Canestrari,
A. Manna, M. Papa, Trattato di diritto penale, Parte Speciale, III, Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 873 ff.
61
Const. Court, April 12, 1989, n. 203, in “Giur. cost.”, 1989, pp. 890 ss., with a note of Masselli;
Const. Court., October 8, 1996, n. 334, ibid., 1996, pp. 2919 ss., with notes of S. Mangiameli e G.
Di Cosimo.
62
In addition, articles 2 e 13 Const., that guarantee liberty and autonomy of personal choices according
to E. Dolcini, Il divieto di fecondazione assistita “eterologa”...in attesa di giudizio, in “Dir. pen. proc.”,
2011, p. 353 ff. and, quivi, p. 356 ff.
63
M. Donini, Il volto attuale, cit., p. 31 ff.
64
On criminal aspects of so-called trips of rights see E. Dolcini, Responsabilità del medico e reati in
materia di procreazione assistita. Ambiguità e rigori della legge italiana n. 40 del 2004, in “Riv. it. dir.
proc. pen.”, 2009, p. 47 ff.; M. Maiwald, op. cit., p. 10 ff.
65
For a wide framework of European legislature see E. Dolcini, Il punto sulla fecondazione assistita
“eterologa”, in E. Mori (ed.), C. Flamigni, Medicina, impegno civile, bioetica, letteratura, Firenze,
Le lettere, 2013, p. 130 ff. In particular the author observes how, besides Italy, only Lithuania and
Turkey consider an absolute ban of heterologous assisted procreation with donation of female and male
gametes, both in insemination in vivo and in vitro.
66
G.D. Dodaro, Uguaglianza e diritto penale, Milano, Giuffrè, 2012, p. 112 ff.; A. Manna, La tutela
penale della vita in fieri, cit., p. 345 ff.; E. Boario, Bioetica e diritto penale, in G. Marini (ed.), Bioetica,
cit., p. 107 ff.
the most important problem lies in the fact that this prohibition “in Italian way”67
may lead poorest families, as was the case at the time of abortion, that is illegal
abortions – but still willing to have children, to use unscrupulous doctors who work
on a “parallel” market of fertility”, with obvious risks for the health of the woman
and the unborn child, especially from the hygiene-health point of view.
Finally, concluding my considerations, I want to recall a great catholic jurist,
Federico Stella68, recently passed away, who in his famous essay “Secularism and
faith” argued that even for a catholic jurist the “table of values” cannot be found in
the Gospel and the Scripture, but only in the Constitution.
67
Critical of proihibition politics, even if from different point of view, see D. Pulitano’, Paternalismo
e diritto penale, in Aa.Vv., Studi in onore di Mario Romano, cit., p. 479; M. Romano, Danno a sé stessi,
paternalismo legale e limiti del diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2008, p. 984 ff.
68
F. Stella, Laicità dello Stato, fede e diritto penale, in G. Marinucci, E. Dolcini (eds.), Diritto penale
in trasformazione, Milano, Giuffrè,1985, p. 309 ff.
Genetics, robotics and crime prevention
Lorenzo Pasculli
Table of contents: 1. Introduction and definitions. – 1.1. Crime prevention. – 1.2.

Genetics. – 1.3. Robotics. – 2. The employment of genetics in crime prevention. – 2.1.
Human behavioural genetics and criminal trial (special prevention). – 2.2. The collection
and retention of DNA materials – 3. The employment of robotics in crime prevention. –
3.1. Surveillance. – 3.2. Formation, education and information. – 3.3. Police guarding and
patrolling. – 3.4. Use of force. – 4. Genetics, robotics, crime prevention and human rights.
– 4.1. Genetics, robotics and individual dangerousness. – 5. Conclusive remarks.
1. Introduction and definitions

Amongst the many fields of law affected by genetics and robotics there is also
crime prevention.
I will consider here some of the current and the possible future employments
of genetics and robotics in crime prevention and some of the issues they raise with
special regard to the protection of fundamental individual rights and freedoms.
1.1. Crime prevention

First of all, it is necessary to clarify what I mean by «crime prevention», since it is
a concept of almost unending elasticity1.
«Crime prevention» may be intended either as an end or as a means2. In this
paper with the expression «crime prevention» I will refer to the means of elimination
or reduction of the causes of crime (and therefore of the risk of crime). In such a
1
A. Crawford, Crime, Prevention & Community Safety. Politics, Policies & Practices, London,
Longman, 1998, p. 7.
2
Cf., amplius, L. Pasculli, Dangerous Prevention. A General Theory of the Negative Measures of Global
Crime Prevention, Padova, forthcoming.
188 Genetics, robotics and crime prevention
wide conception I include both the so-called positive and negative models of crime
prevention:
1) the positive model consists of measures that expand, promote, improve the
individual legal sphere (for instance: educational programmes, developmental
crime prevention, psychological and social support, restorative justice, community
policing, situational prevention etc.)
2) the negative model, instead, consists of measures compressing the individual
legal sphere, and especially individual liberty, generally through the direct or indirect
use of force (for instance: preventive detention; confiscation of property; asset freeze;
civil and criminal forfeiture; repatriation of immigrants etc.)3.
Due to its negative contents, the negative model poses several threats to
fundamental rights and liberties, especially when negative measures are applied to
merely «dangerous» subjects, before they commit any crime (pre-crime or praeter
delictum measures).
1.2. Genetics
Genetics is the study of heredity in general and of genes in particular. Genetics
forms one of the central pillars of biology and overlaps with many other areas such
as agriculture, medicine, and biotechnology4.
While classical genetics – which remains the foundation for all other areas
in genetics – is concerned primarily with the method by which genetic traits are
transmitted in plants and animals, genetics covers several areas of study, such as
cytogenetics (the microscopic study of chromosomes), microbial genetics (the study of
microorganisms), molecular genetics (the study of the molecular structure of DNA),
genomics (the study of the structure, function, and evolutionary comparison of
whole genomes), population genetics (the study of genes in populations of animals,
plants, and microbes), behaviour genetics (the study of the influence of heredity on
behaviour), etc.
As we will see, the two most relevant areas of genetics in crime prevention are
behavioural genetics and genomics (which dominates also genetics research in general
and which is also a useful way to explore the genetic factors involved in complex
human traits such as behaviour).
3
For a first outline on the several models of crime prevention, also in comparative and supranational/
international perspective, see L. Pasculli, Le misure di prevenzione del terrorismo e dei traffici criminosi
internazionali, Padova, Padova University Press, 2012, also for further references.
4
Entry «Genetics», in Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica
Inc., 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/228936/genetics> (30 November 2013).
L. Pasculli 189
1.3. Robotics
A robot is any automatically operated machine that replaces human effort,
though it may not resemble human beings in appearance or perform functions in a
humanlike manner5. By extension, robotics is the engineering discipline dealing with
the design, construction, and operation of robots. Many aspects of robotics involve
artificial intelligence; robots may be equipped with the equivalent of human senses
such as vision, touch, and the ability to sense temperature. Some are even capable
of simple decision-making, and current robotics research is geared toward devising
robots with a degree of self-sufficiency that will permit mobility and decision-
making in an unstructured environment6. Today’s industrial robots generally do not
resemble human beings, although many advances are being accomplished toward
that direction (recently, the 11th July 2013, the U.S. company Boston Dynamics
revealed an experimental version of Atlas, the «Agile Anthropomorphic Robot»)7. A
robot in human form is called an android.
Robots may be manned, that is to say, transporting or operated by men, or
unmanned, that is, machines capable to perform their actions without the direct
human intervention. Such a distinction is not coincident with the distinction
between autonomous and non-autonomous robots:
a) autonomous robots are systems capable of operating (therefore, performing
functions, actions and tasks) in the real-world environment without a form
of external control for extended periods of time8;
b) non-autonomous robots are machines that cannot autonomously survive or
perform useful tasks in the real world for extended periods, except in highly
structured, stable and non-disturbed situations9.
2. The employment of genetics in crime prevention

Genetics may be used in crime prevention basically in two ways:
1. to establish whether a person is genetically predisposed to crime or antisocial
behaviours (that is, to assess his dangerousness).
2. to collect and retain DNA samples of individuals in special databases or banks
5
Entry «Robot», in Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica
Inc., 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/505818/robot> (8 September 2013).
6
Entry «Robotics», in Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica
Inc., 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1384950/robotics> (8 September 2013).
7
More info on the Boston Dynamics Website <http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_Atlas.html>
(12 April 2014) and on <http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/humanoids/video-boston-
dynamics-atlas-robot-revealed> (12 April 2014).
8
G.A. Bekey, Autonomous Robots: From Biological Inspiration to Implementation and Control, Cambridge
(MA), MIT Press, 2005, p. 1.
9
Id., ibid., p. 2.
in order to compare them with those found on the scenes of crimes, so to

detect the authors of crimes.
2.1. Human behavioural genetics and criminal trial (special prevention)

The finding of genetic predisposition to crime is entrusted to the area of human
behavioural genetics and it serves purposes of special prevention.
Genetic evidence of a predisposition to crime might be used to demonstrate the
dangerousness of a person and to determine whether the person should be subjected
to particular pre-crime or post-crime measures. Moreover, genetic determination
to crime may be considered a ground to exclude (or reduce) personal criminal
responsibility as well as a mitigating factor.
A concrete example of the use of genetics to measure individual criminal
responsibility is offered by American and Italian case law.
During the last two decades, U.S. courts have been variously considering
behavioural genetics evidence in more than eighty criminal cases, starting from
the case of Stephen Mobley10. The overall impact of such cases and the trends they
demonstrate have been thoroughly analysed by Deborah Denno’s «longitudinal»
studies11, which conclude that generally U.S. courts «accept behavioral genetics
evidence in the majority of cases in which defense attorneys attempt to offer it»12.
In Italy two particular cases, in which two different courts maintained the
defendants’ partial mental insanity («vizio parziale di mente»)13 also due to genetic
alterations, are worth being mentioned: the decision n. 5 of 18 September 2009 of
the Assize Court of Appeal of Trieste14 and the decision of 25 May 2011 of the judge
for the preliminary investigations of Como in the Albertani case15.
10
Mobley v. State, 426 S.E.2d 150, 151 (Ga. 1993); Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. 1995);
Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 1998).
11
D. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results
of a Longitudinal Study, in “Michigan St. L. Rev.”, 2011, pp. 967-1047; Id., Revisiting the Legal Link
Between Genetics and Crime, “Law & Contemp. Probs.”, 68, 2006 pp. 209-57; Id., Behavioral Genetics
Evidence in Criminal Cases: 1994-2007, in N. A. Farahany (ed.), The Impact of Behavioral Sciences in
Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 317-54, 465-98.
12
D. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration, cit., p. 1028.
13
The Italian penal code distinguishes total insanity («vizio totale di mente») from partial insanity (or
«semi-infirmity»). The former excludes mental competence (that is the capability of understanding
and willing) and, therefore, imputability: the offender will not be punished at all. The latter simply
diminishes mental competence and therefore does not exclude imputability, but punishment is
mitigated (articles 85, 88 and 89 of the penal code).
14
Corte d’Assise d’Appello di Trieste, n. 5 of 18 September 2009, in “Riv. pen.”, 2010, p. 70 ff., with
a comment by A. Forza, Le neuroscienze entrano nel processo penale.
15
G.i.p. Como, 20 September 2011, in “Guida al diritto”, 30 agosto 2011, con nota di P. Maciocchi,
Gip di Como: le neuroscienze entrano e vincono in tribunale. See also F. Casasole, Neuroscienze,
genetica comportamentale e processo penale, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2012, p. 110 ff. and M.T. Collica, Il
L. Pasculli 191
Without repeating here what others have already told (with much more detail), I
just want to point out three common features of the decisions of the Courts of both
Countries:
1. both American and Italian courts are oriented to admit the use of genetic
evidence in criminal trial;
2. so far, both American and Italian courts used it in favour of the defendant,
generally considering the genetic predisposition to crime as a mitigating
factor16;
3. so far, both American and Italian courts have considered genetic factors not
as isolated criteria to assess the personality of the defendant, but as one of
the many variables influencing human behaviour (such as environmental and
developmental factors).
So far…
2.2. The collection and retention of DNA materials

The collection and retention of DNA samples and profiles is entrusted to the
area of genomics and, other than having investigative purposes, it has also general
preventive effects.
The fact that State authorities retain the DNA profile of an individual may deter
him from committing any crimes, for fearing that he might be easily individuated as
the author of the crime if the DNA traces found on the crime scene should match
his stored DNA profile.
An example of such practice is given by the legislation of the United Kingdom,
which was the first country to use a DNA dragnet and to develop a national DNA
database17.
Until recently, U.K. law consented the indefinite retention of DNA material from
anybody arrested, whether innocent or convicted. The system had a statutory basis in
section 64 (1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) – as amended
by the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (CJPA) and the Criminal Justice Act 2003
(CJA)18 – which provides for powers for the taking, retention and use of fingerprints
and samples, and the retention and use of DNA profiles. Particularly, according to
section 64 of PACE (as amended by CJA), when investigating on a crime, the police
riconoscimento del ruolo delle neuroscienze nel giudizio di imputabilità, in “Dir. pen. contemporaneo”, 15
February 2012, in <http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/1-/62-/-/1264-il_riconoscimento_
del_ruolo_delle_neuroscienze_nel_giudizio_di_imputabilit_/> (10 April 2014).
16
Cf. also D. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration, cit., p. 1027 ff.
17
N. Beniquez, We Have Your DNA, Come Out with Your Hands Up! The Three D’s of DNA: A Fourth
Amendment Analysis of the Trilemma, in “T.M. Cooley J. Prac. & Clinical L.” 13, 2010-2011, p. 540.
18
Further amendments were introduced by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and the
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
may collect and store in the National DNA Database (NDNAD) DNA samples
from people arrested for any recordable offence (that is, from mere suspects).
Later, such system expanded under what has been described as regulatory «light
touch»: no statutory guidance for decisions about the retention of samples, no readily
accessible mechanism whereby individuals can challenge the decision to retain their
records (other than judicial review) and no independent oversight by a designated
regulatory body19. Police ended up with indefinitely retaining the DNA profile
obtained from such samples even if the individual was never charged or even if the
person was later acquitted of any crime.
UK courts denied that such retention constituted an interference with privacy
rights (and especially with the rights set by article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights). This was clearly stated by the Divisional Court and by the House of
Lords in the S. and Marper case20. It was the European Court of Justice that affirmed,
in the same case, that such a regulations violated the individual right to private life21.
The European Court found that «the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the
powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons
suspected but not convicted of offences» (our emphasis), as applied in the S and
Marper case, «fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private
interests» and that the United Kingdom has overstepped any acceptable margin of
appreciation in this regard. Accordingly, the Court maintained that the retention at
issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect
for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society22.
Following the European Court’s decision, the Unite Kingdom enacted the
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, in the aim of striking a new balance between
protecting the privacy and human rights of the public, and protecting them from
crime by keeping the right people on the DNA and fingerprint databases. According
to such Act the DNA samples shall be in any case destroyed after six months from
being taken. Nevertheless, the DNA profiles obtained from such samples may still be
retained according to different regimes. If later the arrested suspect is convicted, his
DNA profile can be retained indefinitely (except for minor offences committed by
minors). If the arrested suspect is not convicted, his DNA profiles may be retained
for up to five years, under particular conditions.
In any case, the Act allows speculative searches of DNA profiles against crimes
stored on the databases, to check if they match to any crime on the database. Once a
speculative search has been completed, the profile and fingerprints are deleted.
19
S. Beattie, S and Marper v UK: privacy, DNA and crime prevention, in “Eur. Hum. Rights L. Rev.”,
2009, pp. 229-230.
20
S and Marper [2002] “EWHC” 478; [2002] “Po. L.R.” 273; S and Marper [2004] “UKHL” 39;
[2004] 1 “W.L.R.” 2196.
21
E.Ct.H.R., S and Marper v. United Kingdom (App. Nos 30562/04 & 30566/04), judgment of 4
December 2008.
22
E.Ct.H.R., S and Marper v. United Kingdom, cit., p.125.
L. Pasculli 193
3. The employment of robotics in crime prevention

Many countries already use robots for different preventive purposes. Although
the employment of robotics in crime prevention is far more variegated than that of
genetics, it often passes unnoticed to the eyes of the lawyer, as it is still relegated to
the field of mere praxis, lacking specific legal regulations.
3.1. Surveillance
Surveillance is one of the most typical means of crime prevention. It can be used
either as a generic measure, to watch over the activities of the general population in
certain areas, or within the application of individual measures, to watch particular
dangerous or suspect individuals23. Surveillance may be useful either to prevent the
immediate commission of a crime (allowing an early intervention of police forces,
as soon as they perceive through their surveillance ongoing criminal activities) and
to serve as a general deterrent for the remote commission of a crime (knowing that
some areas are under surveillance, people avoid to perpetrate any offence fearing they
would be discovered).
Robot machines allow for several kinds of surveillance and in the most disparate
conditions, such as air surveillance, ground surveillance, climbing surveillance.
As for air surveillance, for instance, Noel Sharkey of the University of Sheffield
reported that the police in Liverpool and Glasgow acquired German made hicam
microdrones for surveillance operations and that the Staffordshire police deployed
one at the 2007 V music festival24. Another example of flying robot suitable for air
surveillance is the DelFly dragonfly-shaped flying surveillance drone developed by
the Delf University of Technology, Netherlands25.
As for ground surveillance, a most significant example is given by small robots,
generally equipped with cameras, sensors and alarms, used to patrol the grounds in
23
On the distinction between generic and individual preventive measures see L. Pasculli, Dangerous
Prevention, forthcoming. See also G. Canepa, Aspetti criminologici delle misure di prevenzione con
particolare riguardo alla legge 27 dicembre 1956, n. 1423, in Le misure di prevenzione, Atti del Convegno
«Enrico De Nicola» (Alghero, 26-28 aprile 1974), Milano, Giuffrè, 1975, p. 109 ff.
24
N. Sharkey, 2084: Big Robot is watching you. Report on the future of robots for policing, surveillance and
security, 2008, in <http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/people/N.Sharkey/> (9 September 2013).
25
J.V. Caetano, J. Verboom, C.C. de Visser, G.C.H.E. de Croon, B.D.W. Remes, C. de Wagter,
M. Mulder, Near-Hover Flapping Wing MAV Aerodynamic Modelling - a linear model approach,
in “Int’l J. Micro Air Vehicles”, 5, 4, 2013; G.C.H.E., de Croon, M.A. Groen, C. De Wagter,
B.D.W. Remes, R. Ruijsink, B.W. van Oudheusden, Design, Aerodynamics, and Autonomy of the
DelFly, in “Bioinspiration and Biomimetics”, 7 (2), 2012; G.C.H.E., de Croon, K.M.E. de Clerq,
R. Ruijsink, B. Remes, C. de Wagter, Design, aerodynamics, and vision-based control of the DelFly, in
“Int. J. Micro Air Vehicles”, 1(2), 2009, p. 71 ff.; K.M.E. de Clerq, R. de Kat, B. Remes, B.W. van
Oudheusden, H. Bijl, Aerodynamic Experiments on DelFly II: Unsteady Lift Enhancement, in “Int. J.
Micro Air Vehicles”, 1(4), 2009, p. 255 ff. For more info and references see <http://www.delfly.nl>
(11 April 2014).
various situations. Two robots of this kind are OFRO, meant for outdoor surveillance,
and MOSRO, meant for indoor surveillance, both produced by Mega Italia S.p.a.26.
OFRO was employed by the Seoul authorities to watch out for potential paedophiles
in school playgrounds and to provide surveillance at the Seoul World Cup in 2006
(China used two analogous robots, the Dragon Guard X3 portable robot developed by
Shanghai’s Grandar Robotics and the RAPTOR made by Beijing Universal Pioneering
Technology Co., Ltd., for surveillance purposes at the Beijing Olympics in 2008)27.
MOSRO is aimed at offering continuous surveillance in interior environments, such
as private houses, banks, offices and so on.
The recent developments in robotics also brought to the creation of climbing
robots that could be employed for the most disparate military or police operations.
One example is the RiSE robot developed by Boston Dynamics in conjunction with
researchers at University of Pennsylvania, Carnegie Mellon, UC Berkeley, Stanford,
and Lewis and Clark University and funded by DARPA28.
Curiously enough, the absence of regulations concerning the use of robotics for
surveillance purposes led to cases of prevention of police abuses by private citizens.
During the Occupy Wall Street manifestation in New York one of the protesters, Tim
Pool, purchased and used a Parrot AR drone (called «occucopter») to watch over
possible police abuses29.
3.2. Formation, education and information

Some of the most important (positive) measures of prevention are those aimed
at fostering the spontaneous adhesion of the general public and of possible offenders
to the values of society, as well as those aimed at developing an adequate awareness
of the risks of crime and the preventive remedies amongst possible victims (so-called
prevention of victimisation, also fostered by supranational and international law)30.
Robots may be well employed to such purposes.
Several Police Departments in the United States of America, such as, for instance,
the Crime Prevention Officers of the Gainesville Police Department (Florida)31,
26
F. Tarissi, Ecco i robots vigilantes, in “La Repubblica”, 12 March 2007, <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/
repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2007/03/12/ecco-robot-vigilantes.html> (11 April 2014).
27
N. Sharkey, 2084: Big Robot is watching you, cit.
28
A. Asbeck, S. Kim, M.R. Cutkosky, W.R. Provancher, M. Lanzetta, Scaling Hard Vertical
Surfaces with Compliant Microspine Arrays, in “Int. J. Robotics Research”, 25 (12), 2006, pp. 1165 ff.;
K. Autumn, A. Dittmore, D. Santos, M. Spenko, M. Cutkosky, Frictional adhesion: a new angle on
gecko attachment, in “J. Exp. Biol.”, 209, 2006, p. 3569 ff.
29
Cf. N. Sharkey, S. Knuckey, Occupy Wall Street’s «occucopter» – who’s watching whom?, in “The
Guardian”, 21 December 2011, in <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/
dec/21/occupy-wall-street-occucopter-tim-pool> (9 September 2013).
30
Cf. L. Pasculli, Le misure di prevenzione del terrorismo e dei traffici criminosi internazionali, cit., pp.
110-119 and 190.
31
See the official Website of the Gainesville Police Department <https://www.gainesvillepd.org/index.
L. Pasculli 195
incorporate the use of robots to divulgate among young students crime prevention
information in schools, in order to help make crime prevention more memorable.
Another example of robot use for educational and informational purposes is
the R Bot 001, a police robot developed by Moscow State Technical University and
factually experimented in the Russian city of Perm. R Bot 001 can record offences
against the law using its five cameras, and also urge citizens to legality, for instance by
reciting local statutes or by inviting drinkers to take their alcohol indoors. Moreover
the robot has a panic button for passersby to call the police32.
3.3. Police guarding and patrolling

Of course, the possibility of combining surveillance skills with information skills
suggested the creation of more complex robots capable of providing certain services
typical of policemen on patrol.
Other than the Russian R Bot 001, an example of robot «policemen» is the robot
experimented in China by the Changping District of Beijing police, meant to be
used where cameras cannot be installed and where incidents happen frequently. It is
a humanoid robot equipped with four video cameras: three in the head and a pinhole
camera in its chest. By pressing a red button on the robot’s stomach citizens will be
automatically connected with police headquarters and speak directly to an officer
using a microphone installed on the robot’s chest33.
Robots made their way also as prisons guards. A prison in Pohang, South Korea,
is running a field trial of roving and autonomous robotic prison guards (called
«Robo-Guards») developed by the Asian Forum for Corrections in concert with the
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute and manufacturer SMEC34.
Such robot guards are equipped with 3D depth cameras, a two-way wireless
communication system, and software programmed to recognize certain human
behaviours and a cycloptic eye aimed at identifying troubles while patrolling the
corridors of the prison block. The robot is designed to conduct self-directed patrols,
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47:crime-prevention&catid=40:information&Item
id=58> (11 April 2014).
32
A.F.P., Un robot policier en patrouille dans les rues de Perm en Russie, in “Libération”, 30 June 2007,
in <http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2007/06/30/-_97358> (9 September 2013); see also N. Sharkey,
2084: Big Robot is watching you, cit.
33
34
See A. Knapp, South Korean Prison To Feature Robot Guards, in “Forbes”, 27 November 2011,
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2011/11/27/south-korean-prison-to-feature-robot-guards/>
(12 April 2014); C. Palis, Robo-Guard: Robot Prison Guard Is The First Of Its Kind, in “Huffington
Post”, 16 April 2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/robo-guard-prison-south-
korea_n_1428736.html> (12 April 2014); L. Kim, Meet South Korea’s New Robotic Prison Guards, in
“www.digitaltrends.com”, 21 April 2012, <http://www.digitaltrends.com/international/meet-south-
koreas-new-robotic-prison-guards/> (12 April 2014); BBC News – Technology, 25 November 2011,
in <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-15893772> (8 September 2013).
guided by navigation tags located along corridor ceilings, but is supervised by a human
guard and can be controlled via iPad. The pattern recognition algorithms focus on
«risky behaviour»35 that signals trouble and can alert controllers, so that in case of
emergency (e.g., suicide attempt, assault, arson…) correctional officers may respond.
In less serious situations, two-way cameras and microphones allow the human guards
at the control centre to communicate directly with restive prisoners, so to prevent
any disorder. At the moment, this «Robo-guard» does not incorporate any features
that would involve physical interaction with prisoners (alleviating the reservations of
inmates, apparently concerned with the possibility of being roughly handled by the
machines). Nevertheless, according to the press, although still unrealised, the idea of
incorporating a functionality capable of conducting body searches is already in the
mind of the robot’s designers36.
Patrolling robots are also used in Nevada, where the U.S. National Nuclear
Security Administration employed a robot machine called MDARS («Mobile
Detection Assessment Response System») to patrol its radioactive waste facility37.
3.4. Use of force

Robots are also employed in crime prevention activities to exercise physical force
against things or against persons (coercion), so to prevent harm and injuries to human
agents (generally policemen or soldiers, but also citizens and possible crime victims).
An example of robots using force against things in police operations are the robots
employed by police and SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics) teams for the most
disparate dangerous tasks such as breaking down doors, approaching hostage takers,
searching buildings, smashing windows and taking mobile phones to barricaded
suspects38. Amongst such robots there are, for instance, the ANDROS Remotec, a
machine originally intended for bomb disposal, used by police and military forces all
over the world, and the Dragon Runner, a lightweight, back-packable, multi-terrain
robot capable of detecting a variety of devices without putting the operator in harm’s
way, which helps bomb disposal experts find and deactivate improvised explosive
devices. Dragon Runner also has the ability to dig around suspicious objects with
a manipulator arm, pick them up and move them, place small charges to disrupt
suspect devices, send video footage back to the operator at a safe distance thereby
enabling troops to assess a situation prior to moving forward or entering a structure,
potentially safeguarding lives. Further enhancements, including the incorporation of
35
A. Knapp, South Korean Prison To Feature Robot Guards, cit.
36
L. Kim, Meet South Korea’s New Robotic Prison Guards, cit.
37
L. Benedictus, Robot soldiers patrol America’s radioactive waste dump, in “The Guardian”, 24 October
2010, in <http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/oct/24/nasa-robots-on-patrol> (8 September
2013).
38
L. Pasculli 197
wire-cutters, have been implemented. Dragon Runner was used by British troops in
Afghanistan39.
The mechanical force of robots may be also employed against human persons.
In 2007 the American iRobot corporation teamed up with Taser Inc., a stun-gun
manufacturer, to arm track-wheeled robots for the police and the Pentagon. Such
robots (called PackBot) incorporate Taser X26 guns, non-lethal electroshock weapons
using electrical current to disrupt voluntary control of muscles causing neuromuscular
incapacitation. South Korea uses armed sentry robots to protect its borders40:
SGR-A1, a gun-toting sentry robot, developed five years ago by Samsung Techwin Co.
for the South Korean government is a fixed robot using pattern recognition software
to spot humans and a machine gun if needed. The South Korean defence company
DoDAAM is developing robotic gun turrets for export which can be programmed
to open fire automatically41. Similar robots are also used in Israel, where G-NIUS
Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) Ltd., an equally shared company of Israel Aerospace
Industries (IAI) and Elbit Systems Ltd., developed Guardium, an unmanned security
vehicle capable remotely controlled by a command centre, equipped with cameras,
night-vision, sensors and suitable to be armed with machine-guns or less-lethal
weaponry42.
Conclusively, robots may be used as means of both positive and negative
prevention. Of course, it is the latter that gives rise to most problems, especially with
regard to the possible compressions or intrusions on fundamental human rights by
robot devices. At the present moment, the most worrisome developments in the
employment of robotics for negative prevention are represented by the use of drones
as weapons or robot soldiers in war.
One might be tempted to consider such developments useful and legitimate, as
they might save human lives by replacing human soldiers with robots in the most
critical missions, but the issues at stake are many and disquieting. First of all, robots,
like humans (and inasmuch as programmed or controlled by humans), are fallible,
so they can commit mistakes (e.g. killing a civilian or a friend target, instead of
an enemy) and when such mistakes involve the use of lethal weapons they cannot
be considered light-heartedly. Secondly, the employment of robots may entail the
increase of violence in war, as robots have not the human feelings of prudence,
compassion, justice and common sense that can spare many lives and, generally,
bring some humanity in theatres of war. Finally, it is well known that a recent trend
39
More information can be found on the British Army’s official Internet website <https://www.army.
mod.uk/equipment/23256.aspx> (8 September 2013).
40
L. Kim, Meet South Korea’s New Robotic Prison Guards, cit.
41
BBC News – Technology, 25 November 2011, cit.
42
Cf. N. Sharkey, 2084: Big Robot is watching you, cit.; A. Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and
Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, Ashgate, Farnham 2009, p. 72; L. Benedictus, Robot soldiers patrol,
cit.
in crime prevention is resorting to emergency or war measures to prevent («fight»)

exceptional forms of criminality, often very close to acts of war (such as terrorism). It
cannot be excluded that such trend might expand as to include the employment of
military armed robots to preventatively protect society from «extraordinary» criminal
aggressions also in normal (non-emergency) times. We also know that the use of
emergency measures for normal situations carries the risk of the normalisation of
such measures, that is, the definitive settlement in the legal order of exceptional
measures (as such, derogating the principles and safeguards normally protecting
human rights) as ordinary means to prevent crime43. Thus, balances of interests
stroke for the peculiar context and reasons of war end up with being unreasonably
(and unjustifiably) applied also in perfectly normal circumstances, which call for
totally different tradeoffs. If this is the trend, then I would not be surprised if some
day soon someone suggested the use of military drones or deadly armed robots in
ordinary police activities.
Moreover, some recent developments in robotics make it possible to predict that
robots could be used, possibly together with genetic techniques, to assess individual
dangerousness. There exist already robots that are capable to recognize behavioural
patterns, such as the Pohang «Robo-Guards» or the South Korean SGR-A1 sentry
robot, and also voice tone and facial expression, such as the so called «conversational
robots» like Robita and, especially, Robisuke and its less publicised evolution Schema,
all developed by Waseda University’s Kobayashi Lab of Perceptual Computing in
Japan, respectively in 1999, 2003 and 2009. Robisuke, in particular, has gaze direction
recognition, head gesture recognition, and facial expression recognition44. Now, it is
43
On the so-called normalization of emergency see, amongst others, O. Gross, F. Ní Aoláin, Law
in Times of Crisis. Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
(MA) 2006; O. Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, in
“Yale L.J.”, 112, 2003, p. 1011 ff.; K.L. Scheppele, North American emergencies: The use of emergency
powers in Canada and the United States, in “Int’l J. Const. L.”, 4, 2006, p. 213 ss. With specific regard
to criminal law, see M. Pelissero, Il diritto penale politico tra esigenze di normalizzazione ed istanze
deflattive. Il contributo di Mario Romano alla riforma, in M. Bertolino, L. Eusebi, G. Forti, (a cura
di), Studi on. Mario Romano, I, Napoli, Jovene, 2011, p. 453 ff.; S. Moccia, La perenne emergenza,
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli 1997; A. Bernardi, Ombre e luci della politica criminale italiana
nell’era delle perenne emergenza, in “Annali dell’Università di Ferrara – Scienze Giuridiche”, XVII,
2003, p. 17 ff. On the normalization of emergency in (negative) crime prevention (and also for further
references) see L. Pasculli, Le misure di prevenzione, cit., pp. 96, 124 ff., 200-201, 260-261.
44
For some of the developments of the research staff at the Kobayashi Laboratory on such robot
features see S. Fujie, Y. Matsuyama, H. Taniyama, T. Kobayashi, Conversation robot participating in
and activating a group communication, in Interspeech 2009, proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference
of the International Speech Communication Association (Brighton, U.K., 6-10 September, 2009),
2009, p. 264 ff.; K. Hoshiai, S. Fujie, T. Kobayashi, Upper-body Contour Extraction Using Face
and Body Shape Variance Information, in proceedings of The 3rd Pacific-Rim Symposium on Image and
Video Technology (PSIVT2009, Tokyo, 13-16 January 2009), 2009, p. 862 ff.; S. Fujie, Y. Ejiri, Y.
Matsusaka, H. Kikuchi, T. Kobayashi, Recognition of para-linguistic information and its application
to spoken dialogue system, in proceedings of IEEE ASRU 2003 (Automatic Speech Recognition and
L. Pasculli 199
not difficult to imagine that the further evolution of such robots could be their
employment to infer personal dangerousness from human attitudes or expressions,
perhaps based on catalogues of expressions such as those elaborated by Paul Ekman45.
There is no need to say that if someday such abilities will be combined in the
same robot with the ability to autonomously use deadly weapons against those that
the AI algorithms of the robot recognise as suspect or dangerous, the result will
be most disturbing, especially considered the above mentioned lack of any human
feeling in robots. In any case, as the employment of robots increases, soon some solid
regulation will be needed.
4. Genetics, robotics, crime prevention and human rights

Crime prevention is but a means of protection against the most harmful
aggression to the most significant interests and goods of the human person, both
as an individual and as a member of a social formation. If crime prevention aims
at protecting the human person, then the condition for its legitimacy is that crime
prevention itself does not turn into an arbitrary violation of the human person.
Any preventive measure entailing irrational (inasmuch as determined by fear or
by the sense of insecurity rather then by rational assessments or because of their
indemonstrable effectiveness) or unreasonable (inasmuch as based on unacceptable
balances of interests) sacrifices of rights and liberties of the human person would be
unjust46 and, therefore, illegitimate.
Understanding Workshop, St. Thomas, U.S., 30 November-3 December 2003), 2003, p. 231 ff.;
Y. Matsusaka, T. Tojo, T. Kobayashi, Conversation Robot Participating in Group Conversation, in
“IEICE Trans. on Information and Systems”, vol. E86-D, n.1, 2003, p. 26 ff. Other references in
the official Internet Website of the Kobayashi Laboratory of Waseda University: <http://www.pcl.
cs.waseda.ac.jp/> (8 September 2013).
45
P. Ekman, Emotions Revealed. Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and
Emotional Life, Holt, New York, 20072; P. Ekman, W.V. Friesen, Unmasking the Face: A Guide to
Recognizing Emotions from Facial Clues (1975), Cambridge (MA), Malor Books, 2003; P. Ekman,
Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research in Review, New York, Academic Press, 1973,
drawing on C. Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), anniversary ed.,
with an introduction, afterword and commentaries by Paul Ekman and an essay on the history of the
illustrations by Phillip Prodger, London, Harper, 2009.
46
For a conception of man as a reasonable and rational animal see G. Bettiol, Sistema e valori nel
diritto penale, in “Jus”, 1940, now in Id., Scritti giuridici, I, Padova, CEDAM, 1966, p. 498 (for
further notes and references: S. Riondato, Un diritto penale detto «ragionevole». Raccontando Giuseppe
Bettiol, Padova, CEDAM, 2005, pp. 1 ff.). Cf. also J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia
University Press, 1993, p. 50 ff.; Id., A Theory of Justice (1971), rev. ed., Cambridge (MA), Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, passim; Id., Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy,
Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 54 ff. (also referring to T. Hobbes, Leviathan,
London, Andrew Crooke, 1651).
The minimum threshold of legitimacy of any genetic and robotic measure

of crime prevention shall be its compliance with the safeguard of fundamental
individual rights and liberties typical the rule of law and protected by international
human rights law. Many rights and principles are at stake, such as the right to liberty
and security, the right to respect for private and family life, right to health and the
prohibition of any discrimination.
4.1. Genetics, robotics and individual dangerousness

In this regard, one of the most interesting problems is the trust that some might
place on the capacity of genetics and robotics to detect individual dangerousness,
which in many jurisdictions is the ground for the application of the most disparate
– also restrictive and incapacitating – preventive measures.
Human behaviour is a complex phenomenon. Genetics may have a role in
influencing human behaviour, but many scholars recognize that:
1. other variables, such as environmental factors, seem to have even a more
significant effect on human behaviour than genes;
2. being genetically predisposed to crime does not necessarily mean to be
determined to crime47. Predisposition could at the best individuate the mere
possibility that an individual engages in criminal activities (that is a generic
risk of crime) rather than the probability of which individual dangerousness
consists.
This conclusion seems to be well known to Italian and American courts, which
consider genetic information together with many other factors to assess individual
responsibility and dangerousness. Given the difficulty determining the weight of
each of these factors, the self-constraint of Italian and American courts in limiting
the use of genetics only when favourable to the defendant is worth appreciation.
Nevertheless, the absence of a specific legal regulation of these issues cannot prevent
that the courts start using genetics also to prove criminal responsibility and individual
dangerousness.
The introduction of some legal constraint is, therefore, needed. Law should
intervene to set the limits of the possible use of genetics for penal and crime
preventive purposes, according to the in dubio pro reo principle. Such limits shall
be individuated in the margins of uncertainty of genetics: where the results of
genetic analysis cannot lead to certain conclusions they should not be used against a
defendant (whereas, on the contrary, they could be well use in favour of a defendant
even if they are uncertain). More generally, the proved impact of genetic factors on
the causation of criminal behaviours shall be considered as a key feature of a system
47
On these two propositions cf. the «points of (near) consensus» listed by O.D. Jones, Behavioral
Genetics and Crime, in Context, in “Law & Contemp. Probs.”, 68, 2006, pp. 86-88.
L. Pasculli 201
of positive measures aimed at improving the whole life conditions of an individual so

to attract him to legality, while subtracting him from crime.
As for robotics, one of the most worrisome scenario is the development of robots
capable to perform autonomous actions (which may also be harmful for human
beings), autonomous evaluations and to take autonomous decisions, that is, to think
and act against man without the control of man. Being the human person the very
foundation of crime prevention, it would not be admissible that a robot device could
assess individual dangerousness and decide whether and in what measure to restrict
human liberty or to harm or incapacitate a human being for preventive purposes.
As a reasonable and rational animal, man (even the most dangerous man) deserves
to be dealt with only by other reasonable and rational animals, according to the
principles of rationality and reasonableness and to that sense of justice typical of
humanity48. Besides, that is why criminal law jurisprudence has been moving so
many steps towards humanisation in the last centuries49. Entrusting robots with the
administration of preventive functions and measures that, like punishment, entail
the compression of fundamental right would represent a serious regression: a de-
humanisation of criminal law and crime prevention.
In particular, the robot assessment of individual dangerousness would necessarily
imply the codification of a sort of catalogue of indicators of dangerousness, which
the machine should be programmed to detect and to react to. Such a codification
would be unavoidably based on statistics and therefore would not be able to ensure
that degree of certainty that is necessary to lawfully compress individual liberty or
physical integrity. Without the control of the man there could always be the case of
false positives. For instance, how could a robot policeman programmed to detect
and react to facial expressions understand if the aggressive expression on the face of a
suspect is real or fake or playful? How can a robot soldier programmed to kill soldiers
wearing enemy uniforms distinguish real enemies from infiltrated friendly soldiers
in disguise? How can a sentinel robot programmed to shoot at those who trespass
the boundaries of a country recognise and spare a children who is just chasing his
balloon in the foreign territory?
Given such risks, robots shall never be employed to autonomously determine any
harm or restriction to the individual legal sphere, without proper human control.
On the contrary, a healthy and interesting development of robotics shall consist
in their use for positive measures, to perform tasks that the human being could never
48
On the conception of man as a reasonable and rational animal see G. Bettiol, Sistema e valori nel
diritto penale, cit.
49
G. Bettiol, Sull’umanizzazione del diritto penale, in “Riv. it. dir. pen.”, 1949, p. 1 ff., now in
Id., Scritti giuridici, II, cit., p. 746 ff. (on Bettiol’s opinions see G. Marinucci, Giuseppe Bettiol e
la crisi del diritto penale negli anni Trenta, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2008, p. 929 ff.). Cf. also G.
Delitala, Il rispetto della persona umana nell’esecuzione della pena, in “Iustitia”, 1956, p. 316 ff. and
M.A. Cattaneo, Pena, diritto e dignità umana, Torino, Giappichelli, 1990.
perform (e.g. aerial surveillance), to prevent harm to police forces, to criminals and
to victims (e.g. bomb disposal robots), to carry materials too heavy for men (e.g.
Big Dog and LS3 robots, developed by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency - DARPA – and Boston Dynamics) 50 and also for informative, educational,
therapeutic purposes.
Thus, genetics and robotics reflect once again the old question of the means of
crime prevention. Against the insistent (almost obsessive) suggestions that the only
way to «fight» a criminality that (especially in our global era) is getting more and
more «exceptional» are negative measures, I insist in suggesting that positive measures
are still the most efficient and legitimate way to prevent crime51. The resources,
technologies and products of globalisation – amongst which robotics and genetics –
would be better invested in the development of instruments to support and enhance
the personality of the human being, rather than in the multiplication of weapons
and measures that compress, incapacitate, neutralise, eliminate this personality in
an escalation of violence and (preventive) repression52 which ultimately is more
criminogenic than preventive – especially on the global scale and over the long term53.
5. Conclusive remarks
I conclude with two propositions.
First, if crime prevention is the protection of the human being, then the human
being shall be, therefore, the only and ultimate paradigm around which any robot
or genetic measure shall be construed. The human person shall remain the value
to protect, while genetics and robotics are mere instruments of protection. This also
means that genetics should not pretend to alter human nature, as robotics should
not pretend to replace it.
50
For more information on BigDog see the official Boston Dynamics Internet Website <http://www.
bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html> (8 September 2013). For details on the locomotion system
of such robots see D.E. Koditschek, R.J. Full, M. Buehler, A Principled Approach to the Bio-inspired
Design of Legged Locomotion Systems, in proceedings of the SPIE (Defense and Security Symposium),
5422, Unmanned Ground Vehicle Technology VI, 2004, p. 86 ff.; D.E. Koditschek, R.J. Full, M.
Buehler, Mechanical Aspects of Legged Locomotion Control, in “Arthropod Struct. Dev.”, 33, 2004, p.
251 ff.
51
Cf., for instance, F. Bricola, Forme di tutela «ante-delictum» e profili costituzionali della prevenzione,
in Le misure di prevenzione, Proceedings of the «Enrico De Nicola» Conference (Alghero, 26-28 April
1974), Milano, Giuffrè, 1975, p. 37 ff. (especially p. 74) and G. Canepa, Aspetti criminologici delle
misure di prevenzione con particolare riguardo alla legge 27 dicembre 1956, n. 1423, ibid., p. 109 ff.
(especially p. 118).
52
On the concept of «preventive repression» («repressione preventiva») see L. Pasculli, Le misure di
prevenzione, cit., pp. 42-43.
53
Cf. Z. Bauman, Liquid Fear, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 96; Id., Modus vivendi. Inferno e
utopia del mondo liquido, transl. by S. D’Amico, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008, pp. 1-7.
L. Pasculli 203
Secondly, crime prevention should go beyond mere protection of the human

personality (negative measures), as it should consist, more profitably, in the promotion
of such personality (positive measures). The introduction and development of positive
measures is, therefore, to be encouraged, especially in view of the rapid evolutions
of genetics and robotics, so to prevent any possible securitarian misuse or abuse of
the future developments of robot and genetic research and technologies. This is also
a very good way to start improving our law in view of acknowledging not only its
function of mere protection, but also (and especially) a more positive promotional
function (as Norberto Bobbio would define it)54 for the human person.
54
N. Bobbio, Sulla funzione promozionale del diritto, in “Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ.”, 23, 1969, p. 1312,
now as Id., La funzione promozionale del diritto, in Id., Dalla struttura alla funzione. Nuovi studi di
teoria del diritto, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, 1977, p. 13. N. Bobbio, The Promotion of Action in
the Modern State, in G. Hughes (ed.), Law, Reason and Justice. Essays in Legal Philosophy, New York,
New York University Press, 1969, p. 189.
Protection of personal data and penal instruments to contrast the new forms of
genetic discrimination1
Debora Provolo
Table of contents: 1. Genetic privacy and protection of personal identity. – 2. Treatment

of genetic data and risk of discrimination or stigmatization. – 3. The protection of genetic
data in the Privacy Code. – 4. Genetic data and biobanks. – 5. Towards a penal protection
against genetic discrimination?
1. Genetic privacy and protection of personal identity

The capability to “read” the human genetic heritage and to give a meaning to the
information derivable from it requires to take into account a peculiar aspect of the
protection of genetic identity – different from the one concerning protection against
possible manipulations, alterations or hybridizations2 – that is the one connected to
the protection of genetic data and, together with them, of interests pertaining to the
fundamental human sphere, first and foremost privacy3, regarded as inclusive, in a
1
2
About genetic identity as a subject of protection under criminal law see the contributions of R.
Borsari, Profili Penali della terapia genica, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P.
Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, edited by S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S.
Rodotà, P. Zatti, Milano, Giuffrè, 2011, p. 531 ff. and of E. Mezzetti, La tutela penale dell’identità
genetica, ibid., p. 309 ff.
3
The origin of the juridical concept of privacy, in its primogenial meaning – markedly individualistic
and strictly connected to the concept of private property – as the «right to be let alone», generally traces
back to the well-known essay of S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, in “Harvard Law
Review”, 1890, p. 193 ff. For an accurate analysis of the birth of the legal concept of privacy, see P.
Patrono, entry Privacy e vita privata (dir. pen), in Enc. dir., XXXV, Milano, Giuffrè, 1986, p. 557
ff., to which we refer also for a first bibliography on the topic; for an overview on the birth of the right
to privacy with reference to the link between technological progress, social needs and the necessary
evolution of common law, see U. Pagallo, La tutela della privacy negli Stati Uniti d’America e in
Europa. Modelli giuridic a confronto, Milano, Giuffrè, 2008, p. 3 ff.
206 Protection of personal data
broad sense, both of the right to be let alone (intended as “diritto alla riservatezza”)
and of the right to the protection of personal data4.
The relation between genetics and privacy is highly problematic. This depends
on the fundamental characteristics of genetic data, as very personal information
connected to the identity and health condition of the individual, having the
peculiarity to catch the human subject in his/her own uniqueness and, at the same
time, to relate him/her with other individuals who belong to the same genetic
lineage5. A similar conformation clearly can influence the concept of privacy, both
in its meaning as a right to defend the individual’s own private sphere from outer
invasions, since the peculiar character of genetic data consists precisely in their
being “shared” with other individuals, and in its meaning as a power to control and
organise personal information, due to the difficulty to unconditionally forbid the
access to an individual’s “own” genetic information, in consideration of the fact that
this information is not “own” only to that individual6.
4
See R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili Penali, in S. Riondato (ed.), Diritto penale della
famiglia, vol. IV of Trattato di diritto di famiglia, directed by P. Zatti, Milano, Giuffrè, 2011, p. 1041.
The terms “privacy”, “privateness”, “private life”, are often used as synonyms, although they are not
superimposable concepts: on the topic see, for a first approach and with different hints, F. Bricola,
Prospettive e limiti della tutela penale della riservatezza, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1967, p. 1079 ff.;
S. Fiore, Riservatezza (diritto alla), in Enc. giur. Treccani, Roma, Ed. enc. it., 1999; S. Furfaro,
Riservatezza, in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. IV, Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 1062; A. Manna, Beni della
personalità e limiti della protezione penale. Le alternative di tutela, Padova, CEDAM, 1989, p. 260 ff.;
F.C. Palazzo, entry Persona (delitti contro la) in Enc. dir., vol. XXXIII, Milano, Giuffrè, 1983, p. 309
ff.; P. Zagnoni, Sulla tutela penale del diritto alla riservatezza, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1982, p. 977
ff. The core of the concept of «privacy» (in its dual essential content of a right to the exclusive knowing
of events concerning an individual’s own private life and as a right to control private personal data) can
be better defined with the expression «interest to the respect of private life», a wide concept that can
include a multiplicity of interests of the individual, such as the interest to discretion and secret, to a
domicile, to a formal honour, to a private tranquillity, to a correct utilization and collection of personal
data: P. Patrono, entry Privacy e vita privata (dir. pen.), cit., p. 561 ff.
5
As it already has been observed (C. M. Romeo Casabona, La tutela del genoma humano, in Trattato di
Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 249) the genome
is information «sobre cada individuo, sobre su familia biológica e sobre la especie a la que pertenece».
About the debate regarding the exact meaning of the notion of “genetic data”, depending on whether
the word “genetic” is referred to the source of the information (that is the genetic test) or to the
content and to the character of the information (therefore including in the meaning also information
on the genetic characteristics of the individual derivable from his/her family medical history, from
the observation of his/her behaviour or even from other information on his/her personal health),
see E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali. Profili di diritto comparato ed europeo, Padova,
CEDAM, 2008, p. 3; J.H. Gerards, General issues concerning genetic information, in J.H. Gerards,
A.W. Heringa, H.L. Janssen, Genetic discrimination and genetic privacy in a comparative perspective,
Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005, p. 11 ff.
6
On this topic see C. Romano, Il trattamento dei dati genetici nel diritto italiano, in C. Casonato, C.
Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto 2009, Padova, CEDAM,
2011, p. 182. About the need to supplement the traditional protection of the private life of the family
unit from external interferences with the needs of protection of the single member also in respect to
the other family members, in a more individualistic and wide perspective of family, see R. Borsari,
D. Provolo 207
The protection of genetic privacy7 is strictly connected to the protection of

genetic identity, given that genetic information represents an essential instrument
of personal identification and for the recognition of risk factors regarding the
individual, and whose awareness can considerably influence the individual’s choices
(first and foremost procreative choices and those concerning his/her own health)
and, consequently, the free development of his/her personality8.
Genetic features are one of the many elements forming the identity of a person.
The right to a personal identity – with a certain simplification and with the due
awareness that in the legal language the term “personal identity” can have different
meanings9 – can be defined as the right to be oneself, both with reference to the
respect of the choices concerning one’s own life plan, and with reference to the need
of an adequate exterior representation of one’s own personality10.
Genetic information depicts, due to its nature and its own characters, an
aspect of personal identity (the genetic profile) that is not only a mark of a
person’s identifiability, but concerns also, in a substantial dimension, the way the
individual depicts himself or herself and develops his/her own personality11, within
the general or particular social reality in which his/her personal identity evolved,
expressed itself and strengthened12. However, precisely because personal identity
goes beyond genetic identity, as it is not limited to it13, there is a clear need for the
Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1042 f., and also, more broadly about the concept of
family in criminal law, S. Riondato, Introduzione a «famiglia» nel diritto penale italiano, in Id. (ed.),
Diritto penale della famiglia, vol. IV of Trattato di diritto di famiglia, directed by P. Zatti, cit., p. 4 ff.
7
About the concept of genetic privacy see G. Laurie, Genetic privacy. A challenge to medico-legal norms,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
8
See S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995, p. 209 ff.
9
For a very first approach to the complex theme of the right to a personal identity, basically a creation
of scholars and courts, see G. Alpa, M. Bessone, L. Boneschi (eds.), Il diritto all’identità personale,
Padova, CEDAM, 1981; G. Pino, L’identità personale, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà,
P. Zatti, Vol. I, Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, edited by S. Rodotà, M. Tallacchini, Milano,
Giuffrè, 2010, p. 297 ff.; Id., Il diritto all’identità personale. Interpretazione costituzionale e creatività
giurisprudenziale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003, passim; G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale,
in “Il diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”, 2007, p. 511 ff.; P. Zatti, Dimensioni ed aspetti
dell’identità nel diritto privato attuale, in “La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata”, 2007, II, p. 2
ff.; V. Zeno- Zencovich, Identità personale, in Dig. disc. priv., sez. civ., vol. IX, Torino, UTET, 1993,
p. 294 ff. Under a penal perspective see A. Manna, Beni della personalità e limiti della protezione penale.
Le alternative di tutela, Padova, CEDAM, 1989, p. 233 ff.
10
For this definition see G. Pino, L’identità personale, cit., p. 316.
11
In regard to the effects of genetic information on personal identity see S. Álvarez González,
Derechos fundamentales y protección de datos genéticos, Madrid, Dykinson, 2007, p. 63 ff.
12
E.C. Raffiotta, Appunti in materia di diritto all’identità personale, in “Forum di Quaderni
Costituzionali”, 2010, p. 8, in www.forumcostituzionale.it.
13
With regard to this topic see A. Manna, La tutela penale della vita in fieri, tra funzione promozionale
e protezione di beni giuridici, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 352, who, while affirming the impossibility to
equate in an absolute way the violation of the uniqueness of the genetic heritage of the embryo with a
harm to the personal identity of the individual, observes that «the inherently relational nature of the
dignitary statute of the person implies in fact that the genetic heritage represents only one (between
exact external representation of “what someone is” to take place through the use
of the whole information regarding the person instead of being limited to the only
evalutation of genetic data. Therefore, the right to an identity presupposes an integral
representation of the person14, which implies the right of the individual to not have
the representation of his personal identity reduced to his genetic profile only.
Then, the importance of the control over the definition of identity comes to
light, regarding which the «informational privacy»15 is instrumental, as precondition
for a free development of individual autonomy, immune to possible stigmatizations
and improper influences16. In this sense stands the law on protection of personal
data (legisl. decree 30 June 2003, n. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati
personali), which ensures a particular protection to genetic data17. Besides, this very
regulation contains (like the previous law n. 675/1996) an explicit reference to the
necessary protection of personal identity (art. 218), which leads back to the field of
fundamental rights, together with privacy and the right to the protection of personal
data19.
Overall, privacy and protection of personal data are functional to the capability of
the individual to determine his/her «individual compasses» («compasso individuale»)20,
as far as they allow him/her, on the one hand, to choose whether to keep given
characteristics of his/her own identity private and, on the other hand, to control
that personal information available to others is correct and complete and represents
a truthful depiction of his/her identity. Therefore, the regulation of (genetic) privacy
has to be considered not under the limitative perspective of controlling outbound
information, but under the wider perspective of monitoring the modalities of
many others) of the constitutive elements of the personal identity of the human being (as shown
by the natural phenomenon of identical twins, who develop different, sometimes even antithetical,
personalities although they have the same genetic heritage)» (our transl.).
14
G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 522 ff.
15
See G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy, cit., p. 6, who combines the concept of «informational privacy»
(«state in which personal information about an individual is in a state of non-access from others») and
the one of «spatial privacy» («state of non-access to the individual’s physical or psychological self») into
the broader notion of privacy as a «state of separateness from others».
16
About the relation between personal identity and privacy in a strict sense (interpreted as «riservatezza»,
as the right that specific information do not circulate unlawfully), see v. G. Pino, L’identità personale,
cit., p. 316 ff.
17
About this see below.
18
Art. 2 legisl. decree n. 196/2003: «1. The present Consolidated Act, hereinafter called “code”, guarantees
that the treatment of personal data is carried out respecting fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as the
dignity of the person concerned, with particular attention to privacy, personal identity and to the right to
protection of personal data» (our transl.).
19
On this topic see G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 521 f.
20
This incisive expression, which describes the idea that the line encompassing one’s own individuality
is drawn by the individual himself, who understands it and has any authority on it, has been coined by
A. Santosuosso, Diritto, scienza, nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, p. 68, footnote 2.
D. Provolo 209
definition of the identity21.

Moreover, within this context, there is the topical and urgent problem connected
to the modern configuration of the link between the body and the information that
can be extracted from it. The human body has undergone (and keeps undergoing)
deep transformations, it has lost its unity, being fragmented in parts or products
that form it (organs, blood, tissues, cells, gametes, DNA), that can circulate and
can be used autonomously for varied purposes; lastly, it has been the subject of a
process of dematerialisation which led to a contrast between «electronic body» and
«physical body»22. Moreover, this complex framework has to face the massive use of
increasingly modern technologies (first and foremost, the computer ones) aimed at
implementing techniques of collection of information and elaboration of individual
profiles23, which entail the risk of a «fragmentation of the ego» in a multiplicity of
databases, which give a merely partial and uncontextualised, and therefore potentially
detrimental, vision of the individual and of his/her identity24. The individual may
even be completely unaware of such fragmentation and this draws the attention on
a very significant topic that we can but briefly mention here: the raised vulnerability
of the individual to possible identity thefts that, in consideration of the peculiarity
of the reproduced or falsified data, can be particularly serious and definitive. While
one can actually replace a credit card or a password that has been stolen, one cannot
replace genetic material (the same can be said also for the different types of biometric
data, such as fingerprints, the analysis of fingers’ images, iris recognition, retinal
scan, hand geometry, ear shape recognition, vocal recognition and so on)25, as it
is impossible to cut the bond between the individual and genetic information26.
21
Along these lines G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 525.
22
S. Rodotà, Trasformazioni del corpo, in “Politica del diritto”, 2006, p. 3 ff. About the complex theme
of the relation between body and person, with regard to the concepts of identity and belonging, see P.
Zatti, Principi e forme del “governo del corpo”, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P.
Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 99 ff.
23
F. Mucciarelli, in Informatica e tutela penale della riservatezza, in L. Picotti (ed.), Il diritto penale
dell’informatica nell’epoca di internet, Padova, CEDAM, 2004, p. 179, observes that, in the absence
of an ability to elaborate informational data, most information collected would be «empty, silent
data, lacking of an actual harmful power endangering the protected interest: computers and software
transform white pebbles disseminated at every step in a continuous path, in a safe and often indelible
track, which guides the observer inside the fence of our private sphere, drawing its features in an
alarmingly accurate way» (our transl.).
24
See G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 522; S. Rodotà, Tecnopolitica. La
democrazia e le nuove tecnologie della comunicazione, Roma, Laterza, 2004, p. 148.
25
For an introduction to the topic see S. Girotto, Il trattamento dei dati biometrici, in Trattato di
Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 1237 ff.
26
See E.E. Joh, DNA Theft: recognizing the crime of nonconsensual genetic collection and testing, in
“Boston University Law Review”, Vol. 91, 2011, p. 665 ff. About this topic see also S. Rodotà,
Trasformazioni del corpo, cit., p. 15 ff., who points out that, in the event of a theft of biometric data (for
the Author, comprehensive also of the DNA), we are facing a «complete falsification of the identity»,
therefore the only way to avoid unlawful utilizations by others is stopping using the identification tool,
Moreover, the gravity of this situation is accentuated by the fact that genetic material
supplies an amount of information that goes beyond the mere identification of the
person and involves the biological group to which the subject belongs.
Therefore, the difficulty to control this «new» body, created outside its physical
unity, «decomposable, dispersible, manipulable, falsifiable»27, imposes to test
the suitability of the traditional penal instruments protecting the intimacy of the
existence, and to question ourselves about the need for new and more incisive
guarantees concerning the collection, the circulation and the use of genetic data.
2. Treatment of genetic data and risk of discrimination or stigmatization

The sharing of genetic data with other subjects, their stability over time and
their predictive predisposition distinguish them from the generality of personal
information28. The capability of genetic information to show not only the current
health condition of the individual, but also his/her predisposition to certain diseases,
entails undeniable advantages, for example in the field of predictive and personalized
medicine29, since the person concerned will be able to opt for specific therapies or to
change his or her lifestyle, behaving differently in order to avoid or reduce the risk of
occurrence of an illness to which he or she turned out to be predisposed.
However, at the same time, for a sort of paradox30, an improper circulation of these
data can put the individual in a condition of “frailty” that can negatively reverberate
over his/her public and private relations and hinder his/her social relationships, and
can give life to new forms of discrimination, based on genetics31. This can happen, for
with consequent total exclusion from all the systems that are based on it.
27
S. Rodotà, op. ult. cit., p. 22.
28
About this topic see, among others, L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati genetici, violazioni della privacy
e tutela dei diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, in “Il diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”,
2003, p. 689 ff.; P. Nicolás, Genetic Data and the Law. The Principles at stake, in C. Casonato, C.
Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto 2009, cit., p. 48 ff.;
C.M. Romeo Casabona, Los genes y sus leyes. El derecho ante el genoma humano, Bilbao-Granada, Ed.
Comares, 2002, p. 63 ff.; S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, cit., p. 207 ff.
29
For an overview on different angles (therapeutic, bioethical and juridical) of predictive medicine see
the contributions to the collective work edited by C. Bresciano, Genetica e medicina predittiva: verso
un nuovo modello di medicina?, Milano, Giuffrè, 2000.
30
The so-called “genetic paradox” is mentioned by M.T. Annecca, Test genetici e diritti della persona,
in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p.
406: the potential benefits deriving to the individual from being aware of a predisposition to specific
diseases go together with the risk, for the same individual, of exploitations or illicit utilization of that
genetic information, with special regard to the dangers for his/her dignity and fundamental rights, first
of all the right to privacy, with discriminatory effects on his/her social life.
31
About this topic see for now, also in a comparative perspective, C.M. Romeo Casabona, Genetic
Privacy and non-discrimination, in “Revista de derecho y genoma humano”, 2011, p. 141 ff.; P.
Torretta, Privacy e nuove forme di discriminazione rispetto alla circolazione delle informazioni genetiche:
sistemi giuridici di tutela a confronto, in “Rivista AIC”, 2010, p. 1 ff.; J.H. Gerards, A.W. Heringa,
D. Provolo 211
example, within the work, insurance and banking fields, where employers, insurance
companies or banks (for example, in granting loans) may discriminate employees
and clients on the basis of genetic data considered “anomalous”32 or, more broadly,
within the social fabric in which the subject is integrated, whenever the community
is informed that the subject has a genetic predisposition to a certain illness or to a
specific kind of behaviour, or that he or she has been registered into a biobank for
forensic purposes.
Attention has been widely drawn to the risk of a success of the dangerous tendency
to reduce the many identity profiles of an individual mainly (if not exclusively) to
his/her genetic makeup, taking into consideration as factual conditions what are
instead only hypothetical conditions33: in other terms, there may be the risk of a
tendency to treat the subject who has been diagnosed with a predisposition to a
certain behaviour or a specific illness as if the behaviour or the illness were already
ongoing, and this could happen even if in many cases the behaviour or the illness
might never arise, since the relation between the genotype and the phenotype – that
is between the genetic maturation and the actual display in the subject’s behaviour or
illness – is conditional, uncertain and anyway poorly understood34. Thus, this brings
to the establishment of what has been defined as a new, more sophisticated and
technologic, form of «Lombrosian predetermination», according to which specific
genetic features cannot but correspond to specific aspects of the life, the behaviour
and the fate of the man35. This “genetic fatalism”, prone to obtain from the (only)
reading of the individual’s DNA incontrovertible revelations on an inescapably
H.L. Janssen, Genetic discrimination and genetic privacy in a comparative perspective, cit., passim.
32
Genetic information could be used to damage the person concerned, who could, for example, not be
hired or could be paid less than another individual inasmuch as he/she is considered “subject at risk”,
or a life insurance could be denied to him or her, or he or she could even be someway penalized for
having adopted, being aware of his/her susceptibility to develop a certain disease, a lifestyle which has
facilitated its outbreak. About the use of genetic information in a working or insurance field and the
risks of discrimination connected see, also for the appropriate bibliographic references, M.T. Annecca,
Test genetici e diritti della persona, cit., p. 389 ff.; E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali, cit.,
p. 29 ff.; A Trojsi, Genetic Data and Labour Law, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.),
I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto 2009, cit., p. 71 ff.
33
C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica: una nuova frontiera dei diritti dell’uomo?, in Aa.Vv.,
I diritti fondamentali in Europa. XV. Colloquio biennale, Messina-Taormina, 31 May-2 June 2001,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2002, p. 643 f.
34
V. D. Nelkin, Bioetica e diritto, in C.M. Mazzoni (ed.), Una norma giuridica per la bioetica, Bologna,
Il Mulino, 1998, p. 154. About the predisposition of genetic data to have different meanings because
of their «cryptic nature», projected in time and beyond the person, see also A. Santosuosso, Genetica,
diritto e giustizia: un futuro già in atto, in A. Santosuosso, C. A. Redi, S. Garagna, M. Zuccotti
(eds.), I giudici davanti alla genetica, Pavia-Como, Ibis, 2002, p. 26.
35
In these terms C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica: una nuova frontiera dei diritti dell’uomo?,
cit., p. 644. From a penal perspective this recalls the threat of new forms of biological “determinism” or
“reductionism”, connected to the disruptive impact of genetics (and neurosciences) on penal regulations,
with particular regard to those concerning imputability and culpability. On this complex theme we
refer to the interesting contributions of this volume that deal with it from different perspectives.
predetermined future, without any space for interaction with other factors o with
the individual’s will,36 not only has detrimental consequences in the «outside world»,
in social relationships, but it also results into a strong influence on the existential
freedom of the person37.
In addition to the specific risks of discrimination that can arise in some sectors of
human action, such as insurances or employment, the danger connected to what has
been effectively defined as «the DNA mystique»38 is, more broadly, that of developing
a social organisation strongly characterized by genetic criteria of classification and
control39. This seems to be confirmed by the continuous increase of genetic data
banks40 and by the widespread policy of genetic screenings, enforced in several
countries, aimed at creating genetic filings not justified by therapeutic needs41, but
functional to forms of social control and exclusion policies42.
Within such a context, there is also the delicate issue concerning the possible
discriminatory consequences of employing the most recent achievements of
behavioural genetics in the criminal trial, and particularly, those concerning the
effects of a certain genetic profile on the human behaviour and on the individual’s
36
C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed eugenetica: prime considerazioni su un discorso giuridico altamente
problematico, in “Humanitas”, n. 4, 2004, p. 841 ff.
37
About this topic see S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, cit., p. 218, who raises the problem also with
regard to the “right to know” of the individual, meaning that in the case where there is not an absolute
and strict genetic predisposition to deal with, a full knowledge of one’s own genetic information can
distort the ways of interaction with the environment, and therefore the free development of personality.
About the topic of the right to informational self-determination connected to genetic data see L.
Chieffi, Analisi genetica e tutela del diritto alla riservatezza. Il bilanciamento tra il diritto di conoscere
e quello di ignorare le proprie informazioni biologiche, in Studi in onore di V. Atripaldi, Napoli, Jovene,
2010, p. 853 ff.
38
D. Nelkin, M.S. Lindee, The DNA Mystique. The gene as a cultural icon, New York, W.H. Freeman
and Company, 1995.
39
M. Croce, Genetica umana e diritto: problemi e prospettive, in U. Breccia, A. Pizzorusso (eds.), Atti
di disposizione del proprio corpo, Pisa, PLUS, 2007, p. 89.
40
One of the first (and most popular) large archives of genetic data created on a national basis is the
one established in Iceland in 1998, with the controversial foundation of the Health Sector Database,
a database aimed at collecting non only genetic but also health and genealogical information on the
Icelander population; its realization was entrusted to a private biopharmaceutical company (the deCode
Genetics), which afterwards went bankrupt. About the Icelander biobank and, in general, about the
juridical issues related to the creation and management of biobanks see A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi,
Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol.
II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 351 ff.
41
M. Croce, Genetica umana e diritto: problemi e prospettive, cit., p. 89.
42
For an illustrative purpose it is possible to mention the ideation, during the Bush Senior
administration, of the Violence Prevention Initiative programme, which provided for the realization of
a screening procedure on about one hundred thousand kids coming from areas with a high crime rate,
with the aim to identify «potential criminals» to put through programs of rehabilitative modification of
behaviour: «those who appeared likely to cause problems would then be sent to special day camps where
they would participate in remedial, behavioral modification programs to help them avoid their fate» (D.
Nelkin, M.S. Lindee, The DNA Mystique, cit., p. 159).
D. Provolo 213
personality. This complex topic is subject to deep reflections in other sections of this
volume, to which we refer; for the limited purposes of this paper, it is essential to
call attention to the risk that an excessive emphasis on genetic features, compared
with other factors, like environmental or family factors, which can equally encourage
a deviant or anti-social behaviour, can pave the way not only to the application of
negative preventive measures aimed at reducing or eliminating the risk of deviance
of subjects considered genetically predetermined to commit crimes43, but also, more
broadly, to insidious selective or socially-stigmatizing procedures based (not any
more on race or on morphological characteristics reminiscent of the Lombrosian
theories) but on specific genetic characters44.
Moreover, the peculiar characteristics of genetic data entail the risk of
discrimination becoming intergenerational, through an automatic “chain”-extension
of the prejudicial effects against a single individual also to his/her descendants45.
Furthermore, in consideration of the fact that some recent medical researches
have identified, within racial or ethnic groups, a higher probability of genetic
predisposition to certain illnesses (for example Africans and Afro-Americans show a
predisposition to a specific kind of anaemia, while it has been noticed that mutations
of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes connected to breast cancer prove to be more common
in women belonging to the group of Ashkenazi Jews), it is possible that members of
these communities – at times already disadvantaged and subjected to discrimination
– are discriminated without exception46, in a newborn form of ethnic-genetic
discrimination47. A similar result may occur, for instance, in the case of behavioural
genetics researches performed exclusively on groups of people belonging to ethnic-
geographical or racial minorities.
Borrowing an incisive image contained in an American paper on this issue, like
the «scarlet letter» of Hawthorne’s novel, the DNA associated with anti-social or
criminal behaviour or with the predisposition to a specific illness may become a
«scarlet gene» that marks the individual, his/her family and also the racial or ethnic
community to which he/she belongs48.
43
About the issues concerning the use of genetics in crime prevention see the contribution in this
volume by L. Pasculli, Genetics, robotics and crime prevention.
44
See extensively L. Chieffi, Le informazioni sul patrimonio genetico tra diritti del singolo e interessi
pubblici, in “Rivista AIC”, 2011, p. 5 ff.
45
On the point see C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed eugenetica, cit., p. 843 ff., who observes that, in
macro terms, there could be the risk to come to a society based upon a sort of “virtual disgenetics”,
where components are pre-selected on the basis of their supposed genetic pedigree.
46
D. Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, in “American Journal of Law &
Medicine”, vol. 29, 2003, p. 88 f.; J.L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination and the New Genetics, in
“Brooklyn Law Review”, vol. 66, 2001, p. 755.
47
C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica, cit., p. 647.
48
K. Rothenberg, A. Wang, The Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and
Ethnic Stigma, in “Law and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. 69, 2006, p. 344.
Furthermore, the need for a reflection on the adequacy of domestic (also)

penal regulations aimed at contrasting effectively any possible discrimination and
stigmatization on genetic bases is justified also by the solicitations coming from the
European and international normative framework49. In this context, we can observe
a gradual process of extension of the non-discrimination principle, which embraces
also discrimination based on genetic features of the individual50. One of the main
interventions is, thus, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the
Council of Europe (the so-called Oviedo Convention) of 199751, which, amongst
other things, sets the prohibition of any form of discrimination against a person based
on his or her genetic heritage (art. 11)52. Also the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union, other than confirming the right to respect for private life and
to the protection of personal data (arts. 7 and 8), forbids «any discrimination based…
on genetic features» (art. 21). In 1997 UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration
on the Human Genome and Human Rights: on the premise that humanity’s genetic
diversity is a value to protect, the Declaration recognises in the human genome the
factor that marks the fundamental unity among human beings, defining it as «the
heritage of humanity» (art.1), affirms that everyone has a right to respect for their
dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics and clarifies that
dignity makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics
and to respect their uniqueness and diversity (art. 2); in conclusion, it states that
the human genome cannot give rise to financial gains (art. 4) and states that «no one
shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to
infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human
dignity» (art. 6)53. At a later stage the UNESCO General Conference has also adopted
49
See C. Campiglio, Il principio di non discriminazione genetica nella recente prassi internazionale,
in “Diritti umani e diritto internazionale”, 2008, p. 513 ff. The author clarifies that the concept of
«stigmatization» differs from that of «discrimination», since the first one does not necessarily affect the
exercise of an individual right, being rather «a psychological attitude of hostility or discomfort towards
who is perceived as ‘different’ » (p. 529 f.).
50
For an overview on the sources of international biolaw (not only referring to genetics) see C.
Campiglio, L’internazionalizzazione delle fonti, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà, P.
Zatti, Vol. I, Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, edited by S. Rodotà and M. Tallacchini, cit., p. 609 ff.
51
E. Furlan (ed.), Bioetica e dignità umana. Interpretazioni a confronto a partire dalla Convenzione di
Oviedo, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2009.
52
With a specific regard to genetic tests, art. 12 of the Oviedo Convention states that «tests which are
predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for
a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health
purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject to appropriate genetic counselling».
53
See, among others, C. Borgoño, La protezione dei dati genetici nel biodiritto internazionale. Principi
biogiuridici fondamentali, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), I dati genetici nel
biodiritto, cit., p. 355 ff.; J.M. Siqueiros, G. Saruwatari, P.F. Oliva-Sánchez, Individualidad
genética y la Declaración Universal sobre el Genoma Humano y los Derechos Humanos, in “Revista de
Derecho y Genoma Humano”, 2012, p. 123 ff.
D. Provolo 215
the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003) and the Universal
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005)54.
In the light of the complex framework synthetically depicted, we may raise the
more general question whether the peculiarities of genetic information (which
distinguishes them from other sensitive information, including those concerning
health), taking also into consideration the discriminatory potentialities connected
to an illicit use of them, demand the arrangement of specific legislative instruments
of protection, on the basis of the so-called theory of genetic exceptionalism55, or, on
the contrary, the legal instruments already existing are adequate (even if possibly
requiring some “arrangements”).
3. The protection of genetic data in the Privacy Code

The Italian legal system lacks a specific penal regulation of the protection of
the individual against genetic discrimination, while the only criminal provisions
regarding the repression of discriminatory conducts concern discrimination for
racial, ethnic, national or religious reasons56. Genetic discrimination is clearly a
54
See C. Campiglio, Il principio di non discriminazione genetica nella recente prassi internazionale, cit.,
p. 526 ff.
55
About the controversial theory of «genetic exceptionalism», elaborated especially by American legal
scholars, see, with different opinions, J.H. Gerards, General issues concerning genetic information, cit.,
p. 5 ff.; L.O. Gostin, J.G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic privacy and the law: an end to genetics exceptionalism, in
“Jurimetrics”, vol. 40, 1999, p. 21 ff.; D. Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?,
cit.; J.L. Hustead, J. Goldman, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra: Genetics
and Privacy, in “American Journal of Law and Medicine”, vol. 28, 2002, p. 285 ff.; S.M. Suter, The
Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, in “Washington
University Law Quarterly”, vol. 79, 2001, p. 669 ff. On this topic see also E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e
diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 25 ff., p. 197 ff.; Id., La circolazione dei dati genetici tra vecchi diritti e nuove
sfide, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), I dati genetici nel biodiritto, cit., p. 103 ff.;
V. Marzocco, S. Zullo, La genetica tra esigenze di giustizia e logica precauzionale. Ipotesi sul genetic
exceptionalism, ibid., p. 123 ff.
56
We refer to the crimes provided for by Art. 3 of L. n. 654/1975 which, in the text consequent to
the 1993 and 2006 reforms, punishes, amongst other things, those who promotes ideas based on racial
or ethnic superiority or hate, or commits or incites to commit discriminatory acts for racial, ethnic,
national or religious reasons, as well as those who, in any way, commits or incites to commit violence
or acts of provocation to violence for racial, ethnic or religious reasons. We cannot linger here on the
hermeneutic issues raised by this disposition: for a first approach see E.M. Ambrosetti, Beni giuridici
tutelati e struttura della fattispecie: aspetti problematici nella normativa penale contro la dicriminazione
razziale, in S. Riondato (ed.), proceedings of the symposium “Discriminazione razziale, xenofobia,
odio religioso. Diritti fondamentali e tutela penale” (Università degli Studi di Padova, 24 March
2006), Padova, CEDAM, 2006, p. 93 ff.; A. Caputo, Discriminazioni razziali e repressione penale,
in “Questione Giustizia”, 1997, p. 476 ff.; G.A. De Francesco, Commento all’art. 1 d.l. 26/4/1993
n. 122 conv. in l. 2/6/1993 n. 205, in “Leg. pen.”, 1994, p. 173 ff.; L. Fornari, Discriminazione
razziale, in F.C. Palazzo, C.E. Paliero (eds.), Commentario breve alle leggi penali complementari,
Padova, CEDAM, 2007, p. 1034 ff.; C.D. Leotta, Razzismo (dir. pen.), in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. IV,
Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 859 ff.; L. Picotti, Istigazione e propaganda della discriminazione razziale tra
different concept than racial or ethnic discrimination: the scientific debate on this
point is extremely complex (and it would require a much different research, beyond
the «energies» and the intent of this paper), however, although, as we saw, there
is a chance of individuating interactions between certain genetic factors and the
belonging to some racial or ethnic groups, the fact that race and ethnicity could be
considered as genetically determined is generally denied57.
It is worth considering, then, whether the regulations on the treatment58 of
genetic data, contained in the already mentioned Code of protection of personal
data (the so-called Privacy Code), can represent an appropriate instrument to prevent
and sanction a discriminatory use of genetic information. The problem of privacy
and the control over the flow of private information arises not only with regard to the
treatment of data in genetic testing (ever more diffused, also online), but also, more
broadly, with regard to genetics, genomics and pharmacogenomics research59, where
the scientific evolution and the new research methodologies employed give rise to
the need for use and exchange more and more personal information and biological
samples to be elaborated and analysed, often through computer technologies.
Genetic data have to be included, according to art. 4, par. 1, lett. b) and d) of the
Privacy Code, into the category of the so-called sensitive (or better, ultrasensitive)60
data, since they are personal data61 suitable to disclose, in particular, the state of
health of the individual62; however for such data, the Privacy Code in force, consistent
offesa dei diritti fondamentali della persona e libertà di manifestazione del pensiero, in S. Riondato (ed.),
proceedings of the symposium “Discriminazione razziale, xenofobia, odio religioso. Diritti fondamentali
e tutela penale”, cit., p. 117 ff.; S. Riondato, Diritto penale e reato culturale, tra globalizzazione e
multiculturalismo. Recenti novità legislative in tema di opinione, religione, discriminazione razziale,
mutilazione genitale femminile, personalità dello Stato, ibid., p. 81 ff.; L. Stortoni, Le nuove norme
contro l’intolleranza: legge o proclama?, in “Critica del diritto”, 1994, p. 14 ff. On this topic see also, for a
wider overview, D. Strazzari, Discriminazione razziale e diritto. Un’indagine comparata per un modello
“europeo” dell’antidiscriminazione, Padova, CEDAM, 2008; D. Tega (ed.), Le discriminazioni razziali
ed etniche. Profili giuridici di tutela, Roma, UNAR, 2011.
57
About this topic see V. Colonna, G. Barbujani, Quattro domande a cui la genetica può cercare di
rispondere, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), I dati genetici nel biodiritto, cit., p. 13
ff.; K. Rothenberg, A. Wang, The Scarlet Gene, cit., p. 347 ff.
58
According to art. 4, par. 1, lett. a), legisl. decree 196/2003, «treatment» means «any operation or
series of operation, also made without the aid of electronic devices, concerning the collection, registration,
organization, conservation, consultation, elaboration, modification, selection, extraction, comparison,
utilization, interconnection, block, communication, diffusion, cancellation and destruction of data, also if
not registered in a database» (our transl.).
59
See R. Lattanzi , Ricerca genetica e protezione dei dati personali, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by
S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 319 ff.
60
R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1054 ff.
61
Art. 4, par. 1, lett. b) of the Privacy Code defines «personal data» as «any information regarding
a physical person, identified or identifiable, also indirectly, through reference to any other information,
including an identification personal number» (our transl.).
62
L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela dei diritti fondamentali nel
processo penale, cit., p. 694. Due to the suitability of genetic data to be included in different categories
D. Provolo 217
with the previous legislation (l. 675/96), provides for a differentiated regulation63
compared with that concerning the more general category of sensitive data stated by
art. 26. This ad hoc regulation is contained in art. 90 of the Code, which states that
the treatment of genetic data, by anyone, is authorized only in the cases considered
by a specific authorization issued by the Data Protection Authority («Garante per la
protezione dei dati personali») having heard the opinion of the Minister of Health,
who, to this very end, seeks the advice of the Higher Council for Health Care64.
The measure taken by the Authority under art. 90 of the Code is therefore an
authorization which allows the treatment of genetic data within the limits and the
conditions provided in it and it can be both special (issued case-by-case) and general.
Thus, the solution chosen by the Italian legislator, eccentric within the whole
international scene, is to relinquish its own duties and prerogatives by deferring to
the Data Protection Authority the power-duty of regulating this matter65. Doubts
can arise from the extremely wide ‘mandate’ the legislator granted to the independent
administrative Authority with regards to the delicate matter of the protection of
sensitive data and, particularly, of genetic data66; however, transferring the power
to integrate legal provisions to more qualified authorities (such as, for example, the
Data Protection Authority) may seem appropriate, considering how difficult it is to
insert in a legislative text norms that demand an highly-specialised expertise and that
demand a particular flexibility in order to adjust themselves to constantly evolving
subjects, like that concerning genetic data.
The most recent general authorization of the Authority to the treatment of
genetic data has been issued on December 12th, 201367. Such an authorization
defines genetic data (regarded as «the result of genetic tests and/or any other information
of data (“personal”, “sensitive”, “regarding health” etc.) contemplated in the Code, the construction of
the legal status of genetic data requires a (not easy) recognition of the regulations concerning specifically
the several categories of data.
63
See, among others, G. Finocchiaro, Privacy e protezione dei dati personali. Disciplina e strumenti
operativi, Bologna, Zanichelli, 2012, p. 68, p. 224 ff.; M. Petrone, Trattamento dei dati genetici e tutela
della persona, in “Famiglia e diritto”, 2007, p. 853 ff.; C. Romano, Il trattamento dei dati genetici nel
diritto italiano, cit., p. 181 ff.
64
According to paragraph 2 of art. 90, the authorization of the Data Protection Authority «identifies
also the additional elements to include in the information note according to article 13, with particular regard
to the specification of the purposes pursued and to the results obtainable also in relation to the unexpected
news that can be known as a result of the data treatment and to the right to oppose the same treatment for
legitimate reasons» (our transl.).
65
R. Lattanzi, Ricerca genetica e protezione dei dati personali, cit., p. 338, who observes that, however,
this is an «emergency» solution, since the authorization cannot be extended to the regulation of further
and different profiles in respect to the protection of personal data.
66
On this topic see U. De Siervo, Tutela dei dati personali e riservatezza, in Aa.Vv., Diritti, nuove
tecnologie e trasformazioni sociali. Scritti in memoria di Paolo Barile, Padova, CEDAM, 2003, p. 304 ff.;
P. Torretta, op. cit., p. 27.
67
General authorization for the processing of genetic data n. 8/2013, published on G.U. n. 302 of
27.12.2013 and available on the website www.garanteprivacy.it.
that, regardless of its type, identifies an individual’s genotypic characteristics that can be
inherited within a related group of individuals») and, as a safeguard, limits the access
to them and their use. To be more precise, this authorization provides indications
on the subjects empowered to treat genetic data and about the purposes and
modalities of their treatment, the requirements of the information notice and of the
interested person’s consent, on the modalities of the preservation, communication
and dissemination of genetic data. In short, the general authorization to the
access to this category of personal data is released (in a generalised way) to certain
expressly specified subjects (such as medical workers, public or private health-care
bodies, medical genetics laboratories, research institutes or centres, psychologists,
lawyers, technical consultants and authorized private investigators, private or public
arbitration bodies): the authorization specifies the particular purposes for which
access is authorized to each of these categories of subjects. The treatment of genetic
data is permitted, upon consent, for health care purposes (with particular regard to
genetic diseases and to the protection of genetic identity of the interested subject or
of a third party belonging to his/her genetic heritage), and for scientific or statistical
research purposes aimed at the protection of the health of the interested subject or
third parties’ or community’s health in the medical, biomedical and epidemiological
sectors, to be performed with the subject’s consent. Moreover, the access to genetic
data is permitted when the treatment is indispensable to defense investigations or,
anyway, to claim or defend a right also of a third party before the judiciary68 (even
without the interested party’s consent, except when the treatment requires genetic
testing), and also to fulfil or to claim the fulfilment of specific obligations or to
perform specific tasks expressly established by the European legislation, by laws or
regulations concerning social security or work and public health and safety69. Lastly,
the use of genetic data is authorized to establish blood relationships for family re-
union of non-EU citizens, stateless and refugees (see legisl. decree 25 July 1998,
n. 286). The regulation of collection and use of genetic data require therefore the
informed consent of the interested subject, except for the expressly determined cases.
The above-mentioned authorization regulates also in a similar way the use of
biological samples (defined as «any sample of biological material from which an
individual’s genetic data can be extracted»)70.
68
In those cases the treatment is allowed on the condition that the right to be claimed or defended is
equal to that of the person concerned, or consists in a right of personality or in another fundamental
and inviolable right or freedom and that data are treated exclusively for those purposes and for the
amount of time strictly necessary to pursue them. However, the treatment must comply with the general
authorizations of the Data Protection Authority to the treatment of sensitive data by professionals and
private investigators.
69
In this case the treatment can take place also without the consent of the person concerned, within
the boundaries set by the general authorization of the Data Protection Authority to the treatment of
sensitive data in the employment context and with due regard to the provisions of the code of ethics
and behaviour referred to in article 111 of the Code.
70
(Our transl.). See G. Novelli, I. Pietrangeli, I campioni biologici, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed
D. Provolo 219
Just like expressly stated in the authorization, treatments of genetic data out
of the cases determined by the authorization, «including employers’ activities aimed
at establishing employees’ and/or job candidates’ professional eligibility, irrespective of
whether such activities are based on the subjects’ consent, and the activities carried out by
insurance companies»71, shall be considered illegal.
To ensure a correct treatment of personal, also genetic, data, the Privacy
Code provides for a complex sanctioning system72, consisting of both penal and
administrative sanctions73. The legislator, similarly to the previous law n. 675 of 1996,
chose to graduate, also from a qualitative point of view with respect to the kind of
sanction, the sanctioning reaction, with regard to the specific disvalue of the wrong
and according to the principle of subsidiarity of criminal law (last resort) and to the
principle of harm74. The few penal provisions (art. 167-171 of the Code) criminalize
the unlawful treatment of personal data, the false declarations and notifications to
the Authority, the failure to adopt security measures, the breach of the Authority’s
prescriptions and the violation of the prohibition to investigate on the employees’
opinions and of the prohibition to use audiovisual machineries or other equipments
aimed at remotely controlling employees’ activities.
Moreover, art. 170 punishes in particular the breach of the Authority’s prescriptions
concerning the authorization to the treatment of genetic data (provided for by the
mentioned art. 90)75. Such a disposition poses delicate issues, both with reference to
by S. Rodotà and P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 1027 ff.
71
(Our transl.). On this topic see C. Romano, op. cit., p. 186 f.
72
See, among others, A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento
dei dati personali, in “Il diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”, 2003, p. 727 ff.; Id., Privacy on
line: quali spazi per la tutela penale?, in “Dir. dell’internet”, 2005, p. 257; L. Picotti, Trattamento dei
dati genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela dei diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, cit., p. 698 ff.;
M.C. Bisacci, Tutela penale dei dati personali, in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. III, Torino, UTET, 2008,
p . 1741 ff.; A. Contaldo, L. Marotta, Depenalizzazione e nuove tutele dei dati personali anche alla
luce del codice della privacy (d.lg. 30 giugno 2003 n. 196), in “Giur. Merito”, 2004, p. 2640; V. Torre,
Modelli di tutela penale della privacy in internet, in “Dir. pen. e proc.”, 2004, p. 233 ff.
73
In the Code, the resort to administrative sanctions turns out to be quite limited, on the one hand,
because the violations that the legislator deems to be more harmful are backed by penal sanctions and,
on the other hand, because the reaction towards violations deemed to be less serious is entrusted to
restorative measures falling within the coercive powers of the Authority. With regard to the extent of
the sanction, R. Borsari (Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1052 f.) notes how the
administrative sanction is so strict that it hides its penal nature in a strict sense, like a «labeling fraud»
that allows to take away from penal guarantees the application of particularly afflictive sanctions.
74
So A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento dei dati
personali, cit., p. 733.
75
Art. 170: «Anyone who, being required to do so, does not abide to the measure adopted by the Authority
according to articles 26, paragraph 2, 90, 150, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 143, paragraph 1, letter c), shall be
punished with imprisonment of three months to two years» (our transl.). Therefore, such norm criminalizes
the mere breach of the measures of the Authority concerning authorizations to the treatment of
sensitive, or genetic, data and of data temporarily acquired following to a claim or a complaint of
the person concerned. Art. 170 follows the content of the corresponding offence stated in art. 37
the identification of a factual behaviour concretely punishable and of those who are
addressed by the criminal provision – as for this purpose it is necessary to refer to the
secondary legal source (the Authority’s decision) recalled by the disposition76 −, and
with reference to the connection with the more serious offence of unlawful treatment
of personal data77.
In general, the penal provisions of the Privacy Code are characterised by a mere
sanctionatory structure of the violations of some of the rules stated by non-penal
prescriptions set by the Code, in the sense that the criminal offences result from the
combination of the proper penal norms with the non-penal rules recalled by them78.
The description of the criminalized facts through the reference to other regulations
(often through normative elements which refer to other normative elements), together
with the complexity and the high technicality of the matter, undermines the full
intelligibility of the penal precept, required by the constitutional principle of clarity
and precision of criminal law79. Furthermore, there is the risk of a conflict between
these provisions and the principle of harm. Indeed, if through art. 170 the legislator
meant to strengthen, for evident general preventive purposes, the importance of the
Authority’s decisions, it may be observed that the entire system of penal protection
established by the Privacy Code is characterised by a similar tendency to back with
penal sanctions the correct functionality of the Authority, rather than protecting the
more meaningful legal interests of the individual (such as, the right to privacy and to
protection of personal data)80.
4. Genetic data and biobanks
of the previously in force law n. 675 of 1996, with the addition of a further offence concerning the
violation of the authorization adopted by the Authority according to art. 90 of the Code in reference
to the treatment of genetic data: as acknowledged in the Report to legisl. decree 196/2003 (p. 63),
the legislator decided to provide a penal sanction also for this circumstance because of the «particular
sensitivity of the matter disciplined».
76
A. Manna in Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento dei dati
personali, cit., p. 767, critically notes that the formulation of the norm clearly seems to be modeled on
the paradigm of art. 650 of the Italian penal code, with consequent doubts of constitutional legitimacy
with regard to the principle of legal clarity and precision of criminal law.
77
On this point see extensively L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela
dei diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, cit., p. 700 f.
78
processo penale, cit., p. 698.
79
On this point see R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1052.
80
A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento dei dati personali,
cit., p. 767. On this topic see also, in reference to the types of offences stated in law 675/1996, P.
Veneziani, I beni giuridici tutelati dalle norme penali in materia di riservatezza informatica e disciplina
dei dati personali, in L. Picotti (ed.), Il diritto penale dell’informatica nell’epoca di internet, cit., p. 183
ff., who notices that the framework of penal protection is only partially ascribable to the protection
of privacy, also preventive, and seems to be abundantly skewed in favor of the protection of mere
functions, in particular of control and intervention functions of the Authority.
D. Provolo 221
Within such a framework, there are also the legal issues related to the creation of the
so-called biobanks81. The collection, storage and systematization of human biological
materials and of the genetic information obtainable from them, are growing and there
are so many different types of biobanks that their cataloguing results utopian82: for
example, in relation to the material contained, it is possible to distinguish between
genomic or DNA banks (intended to collect mainly genetic data) and tissues and cells
banks, while, according to the purpose pursued, it is possible to distinguish biobanks
for research purposes or for medical purposes; biobanks for diagnostic purposes or
therapeutic purposes; biobanks employed with security purposes in crime prevention
and repression; biobanks aimed at organ transplantation; biobanks that contain the
products of neonatal screenings or stem cells, embryos, egg-cells and spermatozoa for
medically assisted procreation; biobanks of populations.
All these types of biobanks give rise to a number of juridical problems, like the
issues concerning the consent of the participants, their right to self-determination
and to an adequate information about the purposes of the bank and also, in parallel,
the protection of privacy and of the right to not know; the consequences over the
family members; the risk of discrimination and stigmatization of the participant
groups; the data sharing in the scientific community; the governance and control
of the biobank; the possible uses of data for forensic purposes; the patenting of the
results achieved, and so on. It becomes particularly evident the necessity to balance
the different interests involved, for example between the right to scientific research
and the rights of individuals (first and foremost, the right to privacy), or between the
right to privacy and the right to the community safety (with reference to the use of
genetic databases by the judiciary)83.
The regulations framework, entrusted to international, European and domestic
legal sources, is complex and not quite uniform. The Italian legal system, particularly,
is full of gaps84. The Italian legislator turned out to be practically dormant as to
81
On this topic see, among others, L. Caenazzo (ed.), Biobanche. Importanza, implicazioni e opportunità
per la società. Risvolti scientifici, etico-giuridici e sociologici, Padova, libreriauniversitaria.it edizioni, 2012;
C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (eds.), La disciplina delle biobanche a fini terapeutici e di
ricerca, Trento, Università degli Studi di Trento, 2012; C. Faralli, M. Galletti (eds.), Biobanche
e informazioni genetiche. Problemi etici e giuridici, Roma, ARACNE editrice, 2011; M. Macilotti,
Le biobanche: disciplina e diritti della persona, in Trattato di Biodiritto, directed by S. Rodotà and P.
Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, I, cit., p. 1195 ff.; G. Pascuzzi, U. Izzo, M. Macilotti (eds.),
Comparative Issues in the Governance of Research Biobanks. Property, Privacy, Intellectual Property and
the Role of Technology, Berlin - Heidelberg, Springer, 2013; A. Santosuosso, Diritto, scienza, nuove
tecnologie, cit., p. 147 ff.
82
See A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi, Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, cit., 356 ff.
83
On this point see A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi, Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, cit., p. 367.
84
For an overview on regulatory instruments on this matter see M. Tomasi, Il modello italiano di
regolamentazione giuridica delle biobanche: alla ricerca di una sintesi per una materia poliedrica, in L.
Caenazzo (ed.), Biobanche. Importanza, implicazioni e opportunità per la società. Risvolti scientifici,
etico-giuridici e sociologici, cit., p. 21 ff.; A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi, op. cit., p. 359 ff.
the specific regulation of biobanks; however, those who work in this field can find
important recommendations in some non-binding regulations (such as, for example,
the 2008 guidelines of the National Committee for biosafety, biotechnologies and
life sciences concerning the accreditation of biobanks and centres for biological
resources of human samples, established for research purposes)85. With regard to
biobanks with medical purpose and medical research purposes we can recall the
already mentioned authorization of the Data Protection Authority concerning the
treatment of genetic data that allows, under certain conditions, the use of biological
materials and of genetic information for research and statistical purposes aimed at
the protection of the health.
The only intervention of the Italian legislator in the matter of biobanks concerns
the forensic field. With law n. 85 of 30 June 200986, Italy adhered to the Prüm
Convention (signed in 2005 by seven countries members of the European Union),
which opened the doors to a EU system of collection, access and exchange of data
(such as noncoding DNA and fingerprints), with the aim to fight terrorism, cross-
border criminality and illegal immigration.
The use of genetic databases at judicial level represents an efficient aid in order to
identify perpetrators of crimes, offering remarkable advantages in terms of efficiency
and promptness of investigations and repression; their use, at the same time, gives
rise to serious questions regarding the balance between collective interest to safety
and individual rights, first and foremost the right to privacy87, and also, as of interest
here, concerning the possible risk of discrimination connected to the inclusion of a
subject in a DNA database.
85
Document available on the website www.governo.it/biotecnologie/documenti.html.
86
For a first approach, see V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del
DNA: bilanciamento tra diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, in
“Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2013, p. 1863 ff.; E. Galli, L’istituzione della banca dati nazionale del DNA
e del laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale del DNA. La delega al Governo per l’istituzione
dei ruoli tecnici del Corpo di polizia penitenziaria (l. 30 giugno 2009, n. 85), in D. Fondaroli (ed.),
Nuove strategie di polizia per una “società aperta”, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, p. 51 ff.; G. Gennari,
Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, in “Resp. civ. e prev.”, 2009, p.
2630 ff.; G. Leo, Il prelievo coattivo di materiale biologico nel processo penale e l’istituzione della Banca
dati nazionale del DNA, in “Riv. it. med. leg.”, 2011, p. 931 ff.; L. Marafioti, L. Luparia, Banca
dati del DNA e accertamento penale: commento alla legge di ratifica del Trattato di Prüm, istitutiva del
database genetico nazionale e recante modifiche al codice di procedura penale (l. 30 giugno 2009, n. 85),
Milano, Giuffrè, 2010; A. Scarcella (ed.), Prelievo del DNA e banca dati nazionale. Il processo penale
tra accertamento del fatto e cooperazione internazionale (legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85), Padova, CEDAM,
2009; P. Tonini, P. Felicioni, A. Scarcella, Banca dati nazionale del DNA e prelievo di materiale
biologico, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, suppl., 2009. Moreover, for a comparative perspective see C. Fanuele,
Dati genetici e procedimento penale, Padova, CEDAM, 2009.
87
On this point see A.M. Capitta, Conservazione dei DNA profiles e tutela europea dei diritti dell’uomo,
in “Archivio penale”, 2013, p. 4 ff.; L. Scaffardi, Le banche dati genetiche per fini giudiziari e i diritti
della persona alla ricerca di una legislazione europea armonizzata, in “Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da
Universidade da Coruña”, vol. 12, 2008, p. 845 ff.; E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali,
cit., p. 161 ff.
D. Provolo 223
The most innovative aspect of law n. 85 of 2009 is certainly the creation of the
national bank of DNA, aimed at identifying offenders (art. 5, par. 1). In the first
place, the database is dedicated to the collection of DNA profiles of those subjected
to biological sampling, according to art. 9 of the law: in practice, those subjected to
restrictions of personal freedom as a result of a final conviction or as precautionary
measure for serious crimes88. The database collects also DNA profiles related to
biological findings acquired throughout the course of criminal proceedings, DNA
profiles of missing persons and of those blood-related with them, of unidentified
corpses and remains of corpses. The database is also entrusted with the comparison
of DNA profiles for identification purposes (art. 7). It is, thus, clear that the database
does not manipulate biological material, nor it carries out analysis, nor it accesses to
the entire genetic heritage of the individuals who could be included in it89.
Law n. 85/2009 also established the central laboratory for the national DNA
database, which is entrusted with the «typification of the DNA profiles of the subjects
mentioned in article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2» and for the «conservation of biological
samples from which are typified the DNA profiles» (art. 8).
The DNA database is subject to the control of the Data Protection Authority, while
the National Committee for biosafety, biotechnologies and life sciences is required to
guarantee the observance of technical standards and rules for the functioning of the
central laboratory (art. 15).
As of interest here, it is convenient to emphasize that, in order to protect privacy,
the law sets the principle according to which the use of genetic data is allowed only
for purposes of identification of offenders: as a result, the use genetic data for different
purposes, such as, for instance, to ascertain the personality of an individual, his/
her genetic predisposition to anti-social behaviours or to investigate his/her family
relationships, is implicitly forbidden90. In line with this principle, the last paragraph
of art. 11 states that «analysis systems apply only to DNA sequences that do not allow
the identification of pathologies that could affect the interested subject»91. The anonymity
88
Particularly, art. 9 par. 1 states that «for the purposes of the addition of DNA profiles in the national
DNA database, the following persons are subjected to biological sampling:
a) those subjected to pretrial custody in prison or home confinement;
b) those arrested in flagrante delicto or subjected to provisional arrest as persons under investigation;
c) those imprisoned or confined upon final conviction for intentional crimes;
d) those subjected to alternative sentences upon final conviction, for intentional crimes;
e) those subjected to temporary or definitive custodial security measure » (our transl.).
Art. 9, par. 2, states that «the taking referred to in paragraph 1 can be done exclusively to the individuals
listed in paragraph 1 for intentional crimes for which discretionary arrest in flagrante delicto is allowed»
(our transl.) and moreover lists a series of crimes for which sample taking cannot be done.
89
See G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2631.
90
A.M. Capitta, Conservazione dei DNA profiles e tutela europea dei diritti dell’uomo, cit., p. 3; see also
C. Fanuele, op. cit., p. 317 ff.
91
(Our transl.). See V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del DNA:
bilanciamento tra diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit., p.
safeguard at art. 12, par. 1 of law n. 85/2009, which establishes that «DNA profiles
and the related samples shall not contain information that allow the direct identification
of the subject thereof» (our transl.), responds to the same needs for privacy protection.
Moreover, the legislator has precisely individuated those who can access to genetic
information (art. 12): as regards the database, the access is allowed to judicial police
and judicial authorities for personal identification purposes and for international
police cooperation only; the access to data recorded in the central laboratory is
allowed to the same subjects and for the same purposes, upon authorization of the
judicial authority. A duty of confidentiality falls on these subjects and art. 14 of law
n. 85/2009 punishes, unless the act constitutes a more serious offence, with 1 to 3
years of imprisonment the public functionary who communicates or uses data and
information in violation of the provisions of the same law or for purposes different
from those provided for by it92.
Within the protection of genetic data, a main problem concerns the modalities
and the terms of deletion of the DNA profiles from the database and of destruction
of the biological samples and, therefore, ultimately, the so-called «right to oblivion»,
intended as the right to not be recorded or classified and to obtain the removal
of data and samples whenever the purposes for which they were collected cease to
exist93. Art. 13 of the law states that the deletion of data and the destruction of
samples can happen only «upon final acquittal because no offence has been committed,
because the accused did not commit the offence, because the committed fact does not
constitute a criminal offence or because the law does not establishes such a fact as a
criminal offence»94. On the contrary, if the case is dismissed because the Prosecutor
drops the charges or because there is no case to answer, genetic profiles and biological
samples are respectively stored for a maximum time of forty and twenty years from
the last event that caused the filing or the sample taking. Therefore, with regard to
the preservation of data and samples, there is no difference in the treatment of the
convicted and of those who have not been convicted with a final sentence, or those
discharged for other reasons than those specified in the first paragraph of art. 13;
retaining the data of those who were not convicted for such a long time assumes
a preventive and repressive significance based on a probabilistic assessment of
1882: «the analysis can concern only the non-codified human genome segments, from which general
information about the individual cannot be collected, like the ones regarding ethnic groups, diseases
and sex» (our transl.).
92
Art. 14, comma 2, establishes a corresponding negligent offence punished with imprisonment up to
six months.
93
See V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del DNA: bilanciamento tra
diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit., p. 1890 f.
94
(Our transl.). Cancellation is also arranged following the identification of a cadaver as well as after
the finding of a missing person (art. 13, par. 2).
D. Provolo 225
individual dangerousness95. This situation gives rise to the problem of the compliance
of such regulations both with the presumption of innocence – which may apply to
non-convicted subjects (acquitted or discharged ) – and with the principle of non-
discrimination96.
Other than the discriminatory risks connected to an use of archived DNA for
purposes different from those stated by the law97 – risks that, as we saw, the provisions
contained in the law tend to prevent – the inclusion within the DNA database itself
may entail stigmatizing and detrimental effects, since it might contribute to spread
in the community a negative picture, capable to discredit and offer a potentially false
representation (whenever the reason of the insertion is groundless or later proves to
be mistaken) of the person to the eyes of the community98.
So far, the national DNA database has not been enforced yet. This poses also
another problem, related to the proliferation of unofficial forensic databases. Art. 17
of law n. 85 of 2009 establishes that DNA profiles extracted from evidences obtained
in criminal proceedings before the law came into force, shall be transferred by Police
forces to the national DNA database within a year from the date when the database
started working. Therefore, until implementing regulations will be enacted, there is
the risk of a spontaneous and uncontrolled creation of genetic databases for forensic
purposes, operating outside any safeguard and control99.
Finally, a last notation concerns the issue of the limits of the analysis of biological
samples aimed at the extraction of the identification profile. In this regard, law n. 85
of 2009 establishes that, as we saw, the analysis systems can apply exclusively to the
DNA sequences that do not allow the identification of pathologies that could affect
the interested subject (art. 11). However, as the European Data Protection Authority
observed in the opinion n. 2006/C116/2004 of 17 May 2006, this does not exclude,
also considering the constant evolution of biomedical sciences, that what is at a certain
time considered an innocuous DNA profile can at a later stage disclose way much
more information concerning the genetic features of the person, given the dynamic
nature of genetic information100. Moreover, the use of specific DNA markers or of
certain analysis techniques can amplify the risks of discrimination. For example,
a focused analysis of markers allows to identify, even if with a variable margin of
95
So, A.M. Capitta, op. cit., p. 28, footnote 107.
96
On this point see again A.M. Capitta, op. cit., p. 27 ff.
97
See C. Fanuele, Dati genetici e procedimento penale, cit., p. 325 ff.
98
So, G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2634.
99
The most well-known case is maybe the one concerning the database established at the RIS of Parma
(about which see also the prescriptions adopted by the Data Protection Authority on July, 19th 2007). It
concerned a computerized database, whose genetic profiles and samples were indiscriminately collected
without following any of the minimal safety measures stated by the Privacy Code: see G. Gennari,
Genetica forense e Codice della privacy: riflessioni su vecchie e nuove banche dati, in “Resp. civ. e prev.”,
2011, p. 1184 ff.
100
See G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2638.
reliability, the ethnic origin of the subject to whom the biological sample belongs,
with a consequent risk of increasing racial prejudices against offenders, while the
so-called sex test can lead to a fortuitous identification of chromosomal anomalies,
which can be used for discriminatory purposes. Or let’s think to the so-called familial
searching101, that makes virtually present, inside the database, subjects that are not
even legitimately included (the so-called «virtual suspects») and that cannot exercise
any guarantees or protection procedures that are reserved only to the subjects that
are officially recorded in the genetic database, with serious consequences also on the
privacy of the whole family102.
5. Towards a penal protection against genetic discrimination?

All the above considerations show that, apart from the acceptability of a genetic-
centred approach inspired by «genetic exceptionalism»103, one cannot but acknowledge
that if, due to their peculiarities (relation with health but not only with it, predictive
character, structural sharing with other subjects, stability over the time) and of their
potential, even discriminatory, employment, genetic information does not cause
completely new troubles, still it amplifies those connected to the utilization and
circulation of the generality of sensitive data (including health data)104. This fact
prompts to envisage a detachment of the concept of genetic privacy from the general
notion of privacy or a remodelling towards the centrality of everyone’s right to self-
determination on one’s own body, including both corporality and the information
derivable from it, backed, if necessary, with penal sanctions105.
Clearly, the extant penal regulation set in protection of genetic data (especially
art. 170 of the Privacy Code) turns out to be scarcely compliant with the principle
of legality (in particular, the principle of clarity and precision) and the principle
of harm. This leads us to question ourselves, first of all, about the need to rethink
the penal provisions aimed at protecting the fair treatment of genetic data, also in
perspective of making them more effective in contrasting possible discriminations
connected to the use of such data.
101
The familial searching is a technique of DNA analysis aimed at discovering partial correspondences,
instead of a full match, through the identification of a possible parental relationship between the person
investigated and individuals whose profile is stored in the database or that have offered a biological
sample during a mass screening: see V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale
del DNA: bilanciamento tra diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit.,
p. 1868 ff.
102
G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2639 f.
103
On this topic see, lastly, G. Gennari, US Supreme Court, Jeremy Bentham e il panopticon genetico,
in “Diritto penale contemporaneo”, n. 3, 2013, p. 152 ff.
104
See E. Stefanini, La circolazione dei dati genetici tra vecchi diritti e nuove sfide, cit., p. 117 ff.
105
So R. Borsari, Profili penali della terapia genica, cit., p. 558 ff.
D. Provolo 227
However, on a more general level, we need to ask ourselves whether a strengthening

of genetic privacy is the most suitable instrument to protect an individual against
genetic-based discrimination, or whether it would not rather be better to set an ad
hoc penal regulation capable to restrain conducts of genetic discrimination.
In this sense, a cue for further reflection can be deduced, for example, from the
French experience. France enforced penal provisions (art. 225-1 225-4 and art.
432-7 of the Code pénal)106 that expressly criminalize acts of discrimination based,
amongst other things, on the «caractéristiques génétiques» of the person107 consisting
in refusing to supply goods or services, in obstructing the regular management of an
economic activity, in refusing to hire or in sanctioning or firing a person or, even, in
subjecting the supply of goods or services, a job offer, an internship application or a
training period in a firm to discriminatory conditions108.
The choice to protect with criminal law the individual against acts of
discrimination based on genetic features entails the punctual identification of a legal
interest deserving protection109. It is therefore, necessary, in our opinion, to question
ourselves on the role that, in this context and in a strictly penal perspective, the
concept of «human dignity» can (or shall) acquire, as it is widely invoked precisely
with regard to the protection of genetic privacy110 and to the protection against
106
For a comment to the dispositions concerning discrimination contained in Section I (entitled “Des
discriminations”) of Chapitre V (coded as “Des atteintes à la dignité de la personne”) of Title II of Book II
of the penal code, see, amongst others, E. Dreyer, Droit pénal spécial, Paris, Ellipses, 2012, p. 323 ff.;
J. Pradel, M. Danti-Juan, Droit pénal spécial, Paris, Cujas, 2010, p. 255 ff.; M.L. Rassat, Droit pénal
spécial. Infractions du Code pénal, Paris, Dalloz, 2011, p. 616 ff.
107
Art. 225-1 states, in the first paragraph, that «constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre
les personnes physiques à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de famille, de leur grossesse, de
leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur lieu de résidence, de leur état de santé, de leur handicap,
de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation ou identité sexuelle, de leur âge, de
leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance,
vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée». Art. 432-7 punishes
discrimination as defined by art. 225-1 committed by an individual «dépositaire de l’autorité publique ou
chargée d’une mission de service public», during the execution of his duties, by denying a benefit stated by
the law or by obstructing the regular exercise of an economic activity.
108
It is interesting to notice that art. 225-3 establishes that the regulations setting discrimination
offences do not apply to a number of hypothesis, amongst which, as of interest here, the case of
«discriminations fondées sur l’état de santé, lorsqu’elles consistent en des opérations ayant pour objet la
prévention et la couverture du risque décès, des risques portant atteinte à l’intégrité physique de la personne
ou des risques d’incapacité de travail ou d’invalidité», provided that the discrimination is not based «sur
la prise en compte de tests génétiques prédictifs ayant pour objet une maladie qui n’est pas encore déclarée ou
une prédisposition génétique à une maladie».
109
About the set of problems concerning the identification of the legal interest deserving protection
with regard to the variety of rights ascribable to the notion of «human person» see G. De Francesco,
Una sfida da raccogliere: la codificazione delle fattispecie a tutela della persona, in L. Picotti. (supervised
by), Tutela penale della persona e nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2013, p. 3 ff.
110
About the capability of the notion (characterised by uncertain boundaries) of «human dignity»,
recalled by art. 3 of the Constitution, to expand the field of application of rights affirmed by other
constitutional norms (as the right to information or privacy) against the most aggressive applications
discriminations based on genetic features111.

It is, moreover, a concept that is affected by a sort of semantic ambiguity: the
most accurate penal theorists highlighted its vagueness and the risks of exploitation
to which it is exposed, as it is a strongly ethically-emotionally-connoted value, which
might be invoked to justify any kind of criminalization that is not based on the need
for protection of any more specific legal interest112.
Nevertheless, one of the fields where human dignity shows a «direct contact»
with the criminal offence, instead of acting as a «categorical synthesis» still undefined
in its own contents, is precisely that of harm to the equal human dignity of the
persons subjected to discriminatory practices, provided that these behaviours go as
far as denying the human being as a «value in itself», denying his/her identity and
his/her intrinsic qualities, typical of every human being, which do not bear any
kind of hierarchy or differentiation due to the different origin, belonging or personal
conditions113.
Granting penal protection to human dignity, also in the hypothesis of genetic
discrimination, would comply with the constitutional content of “equality” (art. 3
Cost.), according to which (also genetic) diversity cannot be interpreted as an aspect
to be corrected, but as a value that needs to be protected and cultivated, capable to
«produce identity» and, therefore, dignity in a dynamic sense114.
of biomedicine, see L. Chieffi, Le informazioni sul patrimonio genetico tra diritti del singolo e interessi
pubblici, cit, p. 4, who also observes that «in a similar direction, by imposing the “respect of human
person” nearby the protection of health (paragraphs 1 and 2 of art. 32), the Constitution agreed
to safeguard the individual also from behaviours that, even though they are not compromising his
physical integrity, however are capable to downgrade him to an object, a mere instrument or a source
of information useful only to others» (our transl.).
111
About the same topic see the recent A. Aparisi Miralles, El principio della dignidad humana como
fundamento de un bioderecho global, in “Cuadernos de bioética”, XXIV, 2013, p. 201 ff.
112
G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni intorno a bioetica e diritto penale, tra laicità e ‘post-secolarismo’, in “Riv.
it. dir. e proc. pen.”, 2007, p. 558 ff.
113
G. De Francesco, Una sfida da raccogliere: la codificazione delle fattispecie a tutela della persona, cit.,
p. 12 ff.
114
P. Torretta, Privacy e nuove forme di discriminazione rispetto alla circolazione delle informazioni
genetiche: sistemi giuridici di tutela a confronto, cit., p. 6.
Protezione dei dati personali e strumenti penalistici di contrasto alle nuove forme
di discriminazione su base genetica
Debora Provolo
Sommario: 1. Privacy genetica e tutela dell’identità personale. – 2. Trattamento dei dati genetici e
rischio di discriminazione o stigmatizzazione. – 3. La protezione dei dati genetici nel Codice della priva-
cy. – 4. Dati genetici e biobanche. – 5. Verso una tutela penale della persona contro la discriminazione
genetica?
1. Privacy genetica e tutela dell’identità personale

La capacità di “leggere” il patrimonio genetico umano e di dare un significato alle infor-
mazioni da esso ricavabili impone di prendere in considerazione un peculiare aspetto di tutela
dell’identità genetica - diverso da quello della protezione contro possibili manipolazioni, al-
terazioni o ibridazioni1 - ossia quello connesso alla protezione dei dati genetici e, con essi, di
interessi attinenti alla sfera fondamentale dell’individuo, in primis la privacy2, intesa, in senso
ampio, come comprensiva tanto del diritto alla riservatezza quanto del diritto alla protezione
dei propri dati personali3.
1
Sull’identità genetica come oggetto di tutela penale v. intanto i contributi di R. Borsari, Profili penali
della terapia genica, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del
corpo, Tomo I, a cura di S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C.M. Mazzoni, S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Milano,
Giuffrè, 2011, p. 531 ss. e di E. Mezzetti, La tutela penale dell’identità genetica, ivi, p. 309 ss.
2
L’origine del concetto giuridico di privacy, nella primigenia accezione - più marcatamente
individualistica e strettamente connessa al concetto di proprietà privata - di «right to be let alone», viene
comunemente fatto risalire al noto saggio di S. Warren, L. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, in “Harvard
Law Review”, 1890, p. 193 ss. Per un’attenta analisi sulla nascita della nozione giuridica di privacy, v.
P. Patrono, voce Privacy e vita privata (dir. pen.), in Enc. dir., XXXV, Milano, Giuffrè, 1986, p. 557
ss., cui si rinvia anche per una prima bibliografia sul tema; per un inquadramento della nascita del right
to privacy con riferimento al nesso tra progresso tecnologico, istanze sociali e necessaria evoluzione della
common law, v. U. Pagallo, La tutela della privacy negli Stati Uniti d’America e in Europa. Modelli
giuridici a confronto, Milano, Giuffrè, 2008, p. 3 ss.
3
V. R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, in S. Riondato (a cura di), Diritto penale
della famiglia, vol. IV del Trattato di diritto di famiglia, diretto da P. Zatti, Milano, Giuffrè, 2011, p.
230 Protezione dei dati personali
Il rapporto tra genetica e privacy si esprime in termini altamente problematici. Ciò di-
pende dalle caratteristiche strutturali dei dati genetici, in quanto informazioni personalissime
legate all’identità e allo stato di salute dell’individuo aventi la peculiarità di cogliere il soggetto
nella sua unicità ponendolo al contempo in relazione con altri individui appartenenti alla
medesima linea genetica4. Una simile conformazione non può, con tutta evidenza, non inci-
dere sul concetto stesso di privacy, tanto nella sua accezione di diritto di difendere la propria
sfera privata contro le invasioni dall’esterno, dal momento che carattere peculiare dei dati
genetici è quello di essere “condivisi” con altri soggetti, quanto nella sua accezione di potere
di controllare e gestire le informazioni personali, stante la difficoltà di porre divieti assoluti
all’accesso alle “proprie” informazioni genetiche in considerazione del fatto che esse non si
atteggiano soltanto come “proprie”5.
1041. I termini “riservatezza”, “privacy”, “privatezza”, “vita privata”, vengono di frequente impiegati
come sinonimi, benché non si tratti di concetti esattamente sovrapponibili: sul tema si vedano, per
un primo approccio e con diverse sfumature, F. Bricola, Prospettive e limiti della tutela penale della
riservatezza, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1967, p. 1079 ss.; S. Fiore, Riservatezza (diritto alla), in Enc.
giur. Treccani, Roma, Ed. enc. it., 1999; S. Furfaro, Riservatezza, in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. IV,
Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 1062; A. Manna, Beni della personalità e limiti della protezione penale. Le
alternative di tutela, Padova, CEDAM, 1989, p. 260 ss.; F.C. Palazzo, voce Persona (delitti contro la) in
Enc. dir., vol. XXXIII, Milano, Giuffrè, 1983, p. 309 ss.; P. Zagnoni, Sulla tutela penale del diritto alla
riservatezza, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1982, p. 977 ss. Il nucleo centrale del concetto di “privacy” (nel
suo duplice essenziale contenuto di diritto alla conoscenza esclusiva delle vicende concernenti la propria
vita privata e di diritto al controllo dei propri dati personali) deve comunque ritenersi più propriamente
espresso con la locuzione “interesse al rispetto della vita privata”, concetto ampio e suscettibile di
ricomprendere una pluralità di interessi facenti capo alla persona, quali l’interesse alla riservatezza e
al segreto privati, al domicilio, all’onore formale, alla privata tranquillità, alla corretta utilizzazione e
raccolta dei dati personali: così P. Patrono, voce Privacy e vita privata (dir. pen.), cit., p. 561 s.
4
Come autorevolmente osservato (C. M. Romeo Casabona, La tutela del genoma humano, in Trattato
di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 249) il
genoma è informazione «sobre cada individuo, sobre su familia biológica e sobre la especie a la que
pertenece». Sul dibattito in ordine all’esatto significato da attribuire alla nozione di “dato genetico”,
a seconda che si ritenga che il termine “genetico” si riferisca alla fonte da cui si ricava l’informazione
(ossia il test genetico) ovvero si riferisca al contenuto e al carattere dell’informazione (includendo così
nella nozione anche le informazioni sulle caratteristiche genetiche del soggetto ricavabili dalla sua storia
medica familiare, dall’osservazione del suo comportamento o, ancora, da altre informazioni sulla sua
salute personale), v. E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali. Profili di diritto comparato ed
europeo, Padova, CEDAM, 2008, p. 3; J.H. Gerards, General issues concerning genetic information,
in J.H. Gerards, A.W. Heringa, H.L. Janssen, Genetic discrimination and genetic privacy in a
comparative perspective, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2005, p. 11 ss.
5
Sul punto v. C. Romano, Il trattamento dei dati genetici nel diritto italiano, in C. Casonato, C.
Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto 2009, Padova,
CEDAM, 2011, p. 182. Sulla necessità di integrare la tradizionale tutela della vita privata del nucleo
familiare da ingerenze esterne con le esigenze di tutela del singolo componente anche rispetto ad altri
familiari, in una prospettiva più marcatamente individualistica e ampia della famiglia, v. R. Borsari,
Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1042 s., nonché, più ampiamente sulla nozione di
famiglia in diritto penale, S. Riondato, Introduzione a «famiglia» nel diritto penale italiano, in Id. (a
cura di), Diritto penale della famiglia, vol. IV del Trattato di diritto di famiglia, diretto da P. Zatti, cit.,
p. 4 ss.
D. Provolo 231
La tutela della privacy genetica6 è strettamente connessa alla tutela dell’identità genetica,
posto che l’informazione genetica è strumento essenziale per l’identificazione personale e
per l’individuazione dei fattori di rischio che riguardano la persona e la cui conoscenza può
incidere in maniera determinante sulle scelte del singolo (in primis quelle procreative e quelle
relative alla propria salute) e, conseguentemente, sul libero sviluppo della sua personalità7.
Le caratteristiche genetiche sono uno dei molteplici elementi che vanno a comporre
l’identità della persona. Il diritto all’identità personale può - con una certa semplificazione e
nella consapevolezza che nel linguaggio giuridico il termine “identità personale” è suscettibile
di assumere diversi significati8 - essere definito come il diritto ad essere se stessi, sia con riferi-
mento al rispetto delle scelte inerenti il proprio progetto di vita, sia con riguardo all’esigenza
che vi sia una corretta rappresentazione esteriore della propria personalità9.
L’informazione genetica, per la sua natura e per le caratteristiche che le sono proprie,
offre un aspetto dell’identità della persona (il profilo genetico, appunto) che non solo è con-
trassegno della sua identificabilità, ma riguarda altresì, in una dimensione più sostanziale, il
modo in cui l’individuo concepisce se stesso e costruisce la propria personalità10, nell’ambito
della realtà sociale, generale e particolare, in cui tale personalità è venuta svolgendosi, estrinse-
candosi e solidifìcandosi11. E tuttavia, proprio perché l’identità personale trascende l’identità
genetica, non si esaurisce in essa12, emerge la necessità che la corretta rappresentazione esterio-
re di “ciò che si è” avvenga attraverso il complesso delle informazioni che riguardano la persona
e non sia viceversa limitata alla sola valorizzazione dei dati genetici. Il diritto all’identità pre-
6
Sul concetto di privacy genetica v. G. Laurie, Genetic privacy. A challenge to medico-legal norms,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
7
V. S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995, p. 209 ss.
8
Per un primissimo approccio al complesso tema del diritto all’identità personale, di creazione
essenzialmente dottrinale e giurisprudenziale, v. G. Alpa, M. Bessone, L. Boneschi (a cura di), Il
diritto all’identità personale, Padova, CEDAM, 1981; G. Pino, L’identità personale, in Trattato di
Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Vol. I, Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, a cura di S. Rodotà e
M. Tallacchini, Milano, Giuffrè, 2010, p. 297 ss.; Id., Il diritto all’identità personale. Interpretazione
costituzionale e creatività giurisprudenziale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003, passim; G. Resta, Identità
personale e identità digitale, in “Il diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”, 2007, p. 511 ss.; P.
Zatti, Dimensioni ed aspetti dell’identità nel diritto privato attuale, in “La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile
Commentata”, 2007, II, p. 2 ss.; V. Zeno- Zencovich, Identità personale, in Dig. disc. priv., sez. civ.,
vol. IX, Torino, UTET, 1993, p. 294 ss. In prospettiva penalistica v. A. Manna, Beni della personalità
e limiti della protezione penale. Le alternative di tutela, Padova, CEDAM, 1989, p. 233 ss.
9
Per questa definizione v. G. Pino, L’identità personale, cit., p. 316.
10
In merito all’incidenza dell’informazione genetica sull’identità della persona v. S. Álvarez González,
Derechos fundamentales y protección de datos genéticos, Madrid, Dykinson, 2007, p. 63 ss.
11
E.C. Raffiotta, Appunti in materia di diritto all’identità personale, in “Forum di Quaderni
Costituzionali”, 2010, p. 8, in www.forumcostituzionale.it.
12
V. in proposito A. Manna, La tutela penale della vita in fieri, tra funzione promozionale e protezione
di beni giuridici, in “Leg. pen.”, 2005, p. 352, il quale, nell’affermare l’impossibilità di equiparare
in maniera assoluta la violazione dell’unicità del patrimonio genetico dell’embrione alla lesione
dell’identità personale del soggetto, rileva che «la natura intrinsecamente relazionale dello statuto
dignitario della persona implica invero che il patrimonio genetico rappresenti soltanto uno (tra molti
altri) degli elementi costitutivi dell’identità personale dell’uomo (come dimostra il fenomeno, esso sì
naturale, dei gemelli monozigoti, che benché dotati del medesimo patrimonio genetico, sviluppano
personalità distinte, e sovente persino antitetiche)».
suppone, dunque, una rappresentazione integrale della persona13, il che implica il diritto del
singolo a che la propria identità personale non venga ridotta al solo profilo genetico.
Emerge allora, correlativamente, l’importanza del controllo sulla definizione della pro-
pria identità, rispetto al quale la «informational privacy»14 è strumentale, in quanto precondi-
zione per il libero sviluppo dell’autonomia individuale, al riparo da possibili stigmatizzazioni
e indebiti condizionamenti15. In tal senso si colloca anche la normativa in materia di protezio-
ne dei dati personali (d.lgs. 30 giugno 2003, n. 196, Codice in materia di protezione dei dati
personali), la quale assicura una peculiare tutela ai dati genetici16. Del resto, proprio tale nor-
mativa contiene (come già la previgente l. n. 675/1996) un espresso richiamo alla necessaria
protezione dell’identità personale (art. 217), che riconduce nell’alveo dei diritti fondamentali,
unitamente alla riservatezza e al diritto alla protezione dei dati personali18.
Riservatezza e protezione dei dati personali sono, in definitiva, funzionali alla capacità
del soggetto di definire il proprio «compasso individuale»19, nella misura in cui gli consen-
tono, da un lato, di scegliere se mantenere private determinate caratteristiche della propria
identità e, dall’altro, di controllare che le informazioni personali di cui gli altri possono di-
sporre siano corrette e complete e costituiscano veritiera raffigurazione della sua identità. La
disciplina della (genetic) privacy va dunque considerata «non già nella prospettiva limitativa
del controllo sulle informazioni in uscita, bensì nella prospettiva più ampia della supervisione
sulle modalità di definizione della propria identità»20.
Emerge, peraltro, in questo contesto, il problema, attuale ed urgente, connesso al moder-
no atteggiarsi del legame tra corpo e informazioni che da esso possono essere ricavate. Il corpo
umano ha subito (e continua a subire) profonde trasformazioni, ha perso la propria unità
frammentandosi nelle parti o nei prodotti che lo compongono (siano esse organi, sangue, tes-
suti, cellule, gameti, DNA), suscettibili di circolare ed essere impiegati autonomamente per
le finalità più disparate; esso è stato oggetto, in ultimo, di un processo di dematerializzazione
che ha condotto alla contrapposizione tra «corpo «elettronico» e «corpo fisico»21. Questo
13
G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 522 ss.
14
V. G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy, cit., p. 6, che accomuna il concetto di «informational privacy» («state
in which personal information about an individual is in a state of non-access from others») e quello di
«spatial privacy» («state of non-access to the individual’s physical or psychological self») nella più ampia
nozione di privacy come «state of separateness from others».
15
Sul rapporto tra identità personale e privacy in senso stretto (intesa, cioè, come riservatezza, come
diritto a che certe informazioni non circolino indebitamente) v. G. Pino, L’identità personale, cit., p.
316 ss.
16
Su cui v. infra nel testo.
17
Art. 2 d.lgs. n. 196/2003: «1. Il presente testo unico, di seguito denominato “codice”, garantisce che il
trattamento dei dati personali si svolga nel rispetto dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali, nonché della
dignità dell’interessato, con particolare riferimento alla riservatezza, all’identità personale e al diritto alla
protezione dei dati personali».
18
Sul punto v. G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 521 ss.
19
L’efficace espressione, che descrive «l’idea che la linea che comprende l’individualità è tracciata
dall’individuo stesso che ne ha la comprensione e l’autorità», è di A. Santosuosso, Diritto, scienza,
nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, p. 68, nota 2.
20
Così G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 525.
21
S. Rodotà, Trasformazioni del corpo, in “Politica del diritto”, 2006, p. 3 ss. Sul complesso tema del
rapporto tra corpo e persona, in relazione ai concetti di identità e appartenenza, v. P. Zatti, Principi
D. Provolo 233
complesso quadro deve confrontarsi, inoltre, con il massiccio impiego di sempre più moderne
tecnologie (in primis quelle informatiche), volte ad implementare le tecniche di raccolta delle
informazioni e di elaborazione di profili individuali22, le quali comportano il rischio di una
«frammentazione dell’io» in una pluralità di banche dati, che restituiscono una visione solo
parziale e de-contestualizzata, e perciò potenzialmente pregiudizievole, dell’individuo e della
sua identità23. Di tale frammentazione il singolo può peraltro persino essere del tutto ignaro e
ciò attrae l’attenzione su un tema di estrema rilevanza che in questa sede non può che essere
soltanto accennato: quello della accresciuta vulnerabilità dell’individuo a fronte di possibili
furti di identità che, in considerazione delle peculiarità dei dati riprodotti o falsificati, assu-
mono caratteri di particolare gravità e definitività. Se, invero, è possibile sostituire la carta
di credito o la password che siano state rubate, così non è per il materiale genetico (ma lo
stesso può dirsi anche per i diversi tipi di dati biometrici, quali le impronte digitali, l’analisi
dell’immagine delle dita, il riconoscimento dell’iride, la scansione retinica, la geometria della
mano, il riconoscimento della forma dell’orecchio, il riconoscimento vocale, e così via)24 data
l’impossibilità di recidere il legame tra l’individuo e l’informazione genetica25. La gravità è
accentuata, inoltre, dal fatto che il materiale genetico fornisce un complesso di informazioni
che vanno ben al di là della mera identificazione della persona e che coinvolgono il gruppo
biologico cui appartiene il soggetto.
La difficoltà di preservare il controllo su questo «nuovo» corpo, creato al di fuori della
sua unità fisica, «scomponibile, disseminabile, manipolabile, falsificabile»26, impone allora
di saggiare l’adeguatezza dei tradizionali strumenti penalistici posti a tutela della intimità
dell’esistenza e di interrogarsi circa la necessità di predisporre nuove e più incisive garanzie in
materia di raccolta, circolazione e uso dei dati genetici.
2. Trattamento dei dati genetici e rischio di discriminazione o stigmatizzazione
e forme del “governo del corpo”, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il
Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 99 ss.
22
Rileva F. Mucciarelli, Informatica e tutela penale della riservatezza, in L. Picotti (a cura di), Il
diritto penale dell’informatica nell’epoca di internet, Padova, CEDAM, 2004, p. 179, che in assenza
della capacità di elaborazione dei dati informativi la maggior parte delle informazioni raccolte sarebbe
«un dato vuoto, muto, privo di una reale idoneità lesiva del bene protetto: sono il computer e i suoi
programmi a trasformare i sassolini bianchi disseminati ad ogni passo in un sentiero ininterrotto, in
una traccia sicura e spesso indelebile, che guida l’osservatore fin dentro il recinto della sfera privata di
ciascuno di noi, disegnandone i tratti in maniera allarmantemente precisa».
23
Cfr. G. Resta, Identità personale e identità digitale, cit., p. 522; S. Rodotà, Tecnopolitica. La
democrazia e le nuove tecnologie della comunicazione, Roma, Laterza, 2004, p. 148.
24
Per un’introduzione al tema v. S. Girotto, Il trattamento dei dati biometrici, in Trattato di Biodiritto,
diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 1237 ss.
25
V. E.E. Joh, DNA Theft: recognizing the crime of nonconsensual genetic collection and testing, in “Boston
University Law Review”, Vol. 91, 2011, p. 665 ss. Sul tema v. pure S. Rodotà, Trasformazioni del
corpo, cit., p. 15 ss., il quale osserva che, nel caso di furto di dati biometrici (tra cui l’A. include anche
il DNA), si è di fronte ad una «falsificazione totale dell’identità», sicché l’unico modo per evitare gli usi
illegittimi da parte di altri è non ricorrere più allo strumento identificativo, con conseguente esclusione
totale da tutti i sistemi che su di esso si basano.
26
S. Rodotà, op. ult. cit., p. 22.
La condivisione con altri soggetti, la stabilità nel tempo e l’attitudine predittiva dei dati
genetici valgono a differenziarli rispetto alla generalità delle informazioni personali27. La ca-
pacità delle informazioni relative al patrimonio genetico di disvelare non solo la condizione di
salute attuale dell’individuo, ma altresì la sua predisposizione verso talune malattie, comporta
evidenti vantaggi, per esempio a livello di medicina predittiva e individualizzata28, giacché il
soggetto interessato potrà decidere di sottoporsi a determinate cure o di modificare il proprio
stile di vita, adottando comportamenti volti ad evitare o limitare il rischio di insorgenza di
una malattia per la quale risulta essere predisposto.
Al contempo, tuttavia, per una sorta di paradosso29, la circolazione impropria di questi
dati è suscettibile di porre il singolo in una condizione di “fragilità”, che può riverberarsi ne-
gativamente sui suoi rapporti pubblici e privati ed ostacolarne le relazioni sociali, e può dare
vita a nuove forme di discriminazione, fondate appunto su base genetica30. Ciò può accadere,
ad es., in ambito lavorativo, assicurativo o bancario, laddove i datori di lavoro, le compagnie
assicurative o le banche (ad es. nella concessione di mutui) potrebbero discriminare lavoratori
e clienti sulla base di dati genetici ritenuti “anomali”31, o, più in generale, nel tessuto sociale
in cui il soggetto è inserito, ove sia reso noto alla comunità che tale soggetto risulta avere una
predisposizione genetica verso una certa malattia o un determinato tipo di comportamento,
27
Sul punto v., tra gli altri, L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela dei
diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, in “Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”, 2003, p. 689
ss.; P. Nicolás, Genetic Data and the Law. The Principles at Stake, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P.
Veronesi (a cura di), I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto 2009, cit., p. 48 ss.; C. M. Romeo
Casabona, Los genes y sus leyes. El derecho ante el genoma humano, Bilbao-Granada, Ed. Comares, 2002,
p. 63 ss.; S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, cit., p. 207 ss.
28
Per una panoramica sui diversi profili (terapeutici, bioetici e giuridici) della medicina predittiva v. i
contributi all’opera collettanea C. Bresciano (a cura di), Genetica e medicina predittiva: verso un nuovo
modello di medicina?, Milano, Giuffrè, 2000.
29
Al c.d. “paradosso genetico” fa riferimento M.T. Annecca, Test genetici e diritti della persona, in
Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà e P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p.
406: ai potenziali effetti benefici derivanti per il soggetto dalla conoscenza di predisposizioni verso
determinate malattie si accompagna il rischio, per il medesimo soggetto, di strumentalizzazioni o illecite
utilizzazioni di tali informazioni genetiche, in particolare per i pericoli connessi alla lesione della dignità
e di altri diritti fondamentali, in primis il diritto alla privacy, con conseguenze discriminatorie per la
vita di relazione.
30
Sul tema v. intanto, anche in prospettiva comparatistica, C.M. Romeo Casabona, Genetic Privacy
and non-discrimination, in “Revista de derecho y genoma humano”, 2011, p. 141 ss.; P. Torretta,
Privacy e nuove forme di discriminazione rispetto alla circolazione delle informazioni genetiche: sistemi
giuridici di tutela a confronto, in “Rivista AIC”, 2010, p. 1 ss.; J.H. Gerards, A.W. Heringa, H.L.
Janssen, Genetic discrimination and genetic privacy in a comparative perspective, cit., passim.
31
Le informazioni genetiche potrebbero essere utilizzate in danno del soggetto interessato, il quale
potrebbe, ad es., non essere assunto o essere pagato meno di un altro in quanto ritenuto “soggetto a
rischio”, o potrebbe vedersi rifiutata la polizza assicurativa o, ancora, potrebbe essere in qualche misura
penalizzato per aver adottato, nella consapevolezza della propria suscettibilità a sviluppare una certa
malattia, uno stile di vita che ne ha favorito l’insorgenza. Sull’impiego delle informazioni genetiche in
ambito lavorativo ed assicurativo e sui connessi rischi discriminatori si rinvia, anche per gli opportuni
riferimenti bibliografici, a M.T. Annecca, Test genetici e diritti della persona, cit., p. 389 ss.; E.
Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 29 ss.; A Trojsi, Genetic Data and Labour Law,
in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), I dati genetici nel biodiritto. Forum BioDiritto
2009, cit., p. 71 ss.
D. Provolo 235
oppure che risulta essere schedato in una biobanca a fini forensi.

Da più parti si è richiamata l’attenzione sul rischio che possa affermarsi la pericolosa
tendenza a ridurre i molteplici profili dell’identità dell’individuo prevalentemente (se non
esclusivamente) al suo corredo genetico, considerando come condizioni effettive quelle che
sono invece soltanto condizioni ipotetiche32: in altri termini, può esservi il pericolo che si ve-
rifichi la tendenza a trattare il soggetto cui è stata diagnosticata una predisposizione verso un
certo tipo di comportamento o ad una certa malattia come se il comportamento o la malattia
fossero già in atto, e ciò anche se in molti casi il comportamento o la malattia potrebbero
non manifestarsi mai, posto che la relazione tra il genotipo e il fenotipo – cioè tra la matura-
zione genetica e la effettiva manifestazione nel comportamento del soggetto o nella malattia
– è condizionale, incerta e comunque ancora scarsamente compresa33. Si afferma così quella
che è stata definita come «una nuova forma, più sofisticata e tecnologica, di “predetermina-
zione lombrosiana”, secondo cui a determinate caratteristiche genetiche non possono che
corrispondere determinati aspetti della vita, del comportamento e del destino dell’uomo»34.
Questo “fatalismo genetico”, tendente a trarre dalla (sola) lettura del DNA dell’individuo
incontrovertibili rivelazioni su un futuro ineluttabilmente predeterminato, senza che vi sia
spazio alcuno per l’interazione di altri fattori e per la volontà del singolo35, non solo ha
conseguenze pregiudizievoli “all’esterno”, nei rapporti sociali, ma si risolve altresì in un forte
condizionamento della libertà esistenziale della persona36.
Peraltro, oltre agli specifici rischi discriminatori che possono determinarsi in taluni set-
tori dell’agire umano, quale quello assicurativo o lavoristico, il pericolo connesso a quella che
è stata efficacemente definita come la «mistica del DNA»37 è, più in generale, quello di dare
32
C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica: una nuova frontiera dei diritti dell’uomo?, in Aa.Vv., I
diritti fondamentali in Europa. XV Colloquio biennale, Messina-Taormina, 31 maggio-2 giugno 2001,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2002, p. 643 s.
33
V. D. Nelkin, Bioetica e diritto, in C.M. Mazzoni (a cura di), Una norma giuridica per la bioetica,
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998, p. 154. Sull’attitudine dei dati genetici ad acquisire plurimi significati a
causa del loro «carattere criptico», proiettato nel tempo e oltre la persona, v. pure A. Santosuosso,
Genetica, diritto e giustizia: un futuro già in atto, in A. Santosuosso, C.A. Redi, S. Garagna, M.
Zuccotti (a cura di), I giudici davanti alla genetica, Pavia-Como, Ibis, 2002, p. 26.
34
In questi termini C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica: una nuova frontiera dei diritti
dell’uomo?, cit., p. 644. Nell’ottica del diritto penale ciò evoca lo spettro dell’affermarsi di nuove forme
di “determinismo” o “riduzionismo” biologico, legate al dirompente impatto della genetica (e delle
neuroscienze) sugli istituti penalistici, in particolare imputabilità e colpevolezza. Il tema è complesso
e su di esso si rinvia agli interessanti contributi che, da diverse prospettive, lo affrontano in questa
collettanea.
35
C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed eugenetica: prime considerazioni su un discorso giuridico altamente
problematico, in “Humanitas”, n. 4, 2004, p. 841 ss.
36
Sul punto v. S. Rodotà, Tecnologie e diritti, cit., p. 218, che pone il problema anche in relazione al
“diritto di sapere” del singolo, nel senso che laddove non vi sia una assoluta e rigida predisposizione
genetica con la quale misurarsi, una integrale conoscenza delle proprie informazioni genetiche può
distorcere le modalità di interazione con l’ambiente e, dunque, il libero sviluppo della personalità. Sul
tema del diritto all’autodeterminazione informativa in relazione ai dati genetici v. L. Chieffi, Analisi
genetica e tutela del diritto alla riservatezza. Il bilanciamento tra il diritto di conoscere e quello di ignorare
le proprie informazioni biologiche, in Studi in onore di V. Atripaldi, Napoli, Jovene, 2010, p. 853 ss.
37
D. Nelkin, M.S. Lindee, The DNA Mystique. The gene as a cultural icon, New York, W.H. Freeman
and Company, 1995.
vita ad un’organizzazione sociale fortemente connotata da criteri genetici di classificazione e

controllo38. Di ciò pare potersi trarre testimonianza dal continuo incremento delle banche
dati genetiche39 e dalla diffusa politica di screening genetici, attuata in numerosi Paesi, volta
alla realizzazione di schedature genetiche non giustificate da necessità terapeutiche40, bensì
strumentali a forme di controllo sociale e a politiche di esclusione41.
In questo contesto si inserisce altresì la delicata questione relativa ai possibili risvolti
discriminatori connessi all’impiego delle più recenti acquisizioni della genetica comporta-
mentale nel processo penale, e segnatamente, quelle relative all’incidenza di un certo profilo
genetico sul comportamento umano e sulla personalità dell’individuo. Il complesso argo-
mento è oggetto di approfondite riflessioni in altri contributi in questo volume, ai quali si
rinvia; ai limitati fini di questo scritto, preme soltanto richiamare l’attenzione sul rischio che
l’eccessiva enfatizzazione delle caratteristiche genetiche, rispetto ad altri fattori, quali quelli
di tipo ambientale o familiare, che possono parimenti aver contribuito al comportamento
deviante o antisociale dell’individuo, possa aprire la strada non solo all’applicazione di misure
di prevenzione negative volte a ridurre o elidere il pericolo di devianza di soggetti ritenuti ge-
neticamente predestinati alla commissione di reati42, ma altresì, più ampiamente, ad insidiose
pratiche selettive e di stigmatizzazione sociale fondate (non più sulla razza o su caratteristiche
morfologiche di lombrosiana memoria, bensì) sul possesso di determinati caratteri genetici43.
Le peculiari caratteristiche dei dati genetici comportano peraltro l’ulteriore rischio che la
discriminazione assuma carattere intergenerazionale, con l’automatica estensione “a catena”
degli effetti pregiudizievoli realizzatisi nei confronti del singolo individuo anche agli altri
componenti della sua discendenza44. Inoltre, in considerazione del fatto che talune ricerche
38
M. Croce, Genetica umana e diritto: problemi e prospettive, in U. Breccia, A. Pizzorusso (a cura di),
Atti di disposizione del proprio corpo, Pisa, PLUS, 2007, p. 89.
39
Uno dei primi (e più noti) grandi archivi di dati genetici realizzati su base nazionale è stato quello
creato in Islanda nel 1998, con la controversa istituzione dell’Health Sector Database, banca dati
destinata alla raccolta non solo di informazioni genetiche ma anche sanitarie e genealogiche dell’intera
popolazione islandese, la cui realizzazione è stata affidata ad una società biofarmaceutica privata (la
deCODE Genetics), peraltro successivamente fallita. Sulla biobanca islandese e, più in generale, sui
problemi giuridici connessi alla creazione e alla gestione delle biobanche v. A. Santosuosso, I. A.
Colussi, Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P. Zatti,
Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 351 ss.
40
M. Croce, Genetica umana e diritto: problemi e prospettive, cit., p. 89.
41
A titolo esemplificativo, può essere menzionata l’ideazione, avvenuta nel corso dell’amministrazione
Bush Senior, del programma Violence Prevention Initiative, che prevedeva l’attuazione di una procedura
di screening su circa centomila bambini provenienti da zone ad alto tasso di delinquenza, al fine di
identificare «criminali potenziali» da sottoporre a programmi di modificazione riabilitativa del
comportamento: «those who appeared likely to cause problems would then be sent to special day camps
where they would participate in remedial, behavioral modification programs to help them avoid their
fate» (D. Nelkin, M.S. Lindee, The DNA Mystique, cit., p. 159).
42
Sulle problematiche connesse all’impiego della genetica nella prevenzione del crimine v. il contributo
di L. Pasculli, Genetics, robotics and crime prevention, in questo volume.
43
V. ampiamente L. Chieffi, Le informazioni sul patrimonio genetico tra diritti del singolo e interessi
pubblici, in “Rivista AIC”, 2011, p. 5 ss.
44
Sul punto v. C. Casonato, Diritto, diritti ed eugenetica, cit., p. 843 ss., il quale rileva che, in termini
macro, potrebbe esservi il rischio di addivenire ad una società basata su una sorta di «disgenetica
virtuale», i cui componenti verrebbero pre-selezionati sulla base di un loro supposto pedigree genetico.
D. Provolo 237
mediche recenti hanno individuato, all’interno di gruppi razziali o etnici, una più elevata pro-
babilità di predisposizione genetica verso certe malattie (ad es. gli africani e gli afro-americani
mostrano una predisposizione ad un particolare tipo di anemia, mentre si è rilevato che muta-
zioni dei geni BRCA1 e BRCA2 associate al cancro al seno risultano essere più comuni presso
le donne appartenenti al gruppo degli ebrei ashkenaziti), emerge la possibilità che i membri di
tali comunità – talora già svantaggiati e oggetto di discriminazione – vengano indistintamen-
te discriminati45, configurandosi così una nuova forma di discriminazione etnico-genetica46.
Ad analogo risultato potrebbe addivenirsi, laddove si conducessero, ad esempio, ricerche di
genetica comportamentale ristrette a gruppi di persone appartenenti a minoranze etnico-ge-
ografiche o razziali.
Per riprendere allora un’efficace immagine contenuta in uno scritto statunitense sul
tema, come la «lettera scarlatta» del romanzo di Hawthorne, il DNA associato con il compor-
tamento antisociale o criminale o con la predisposizione verso una certa malattia può divenire
un «gene scarlatto» che marchia l’individuo, la sua famiglia ed anche la comunità razziale o
etnica cui egli appartiene47.
Peraltro la necessità di una riflessione sull’adeguatezza della disciplina (anche) penale
interna a contrastare efficacemente possibili discriminazioni o stigmatizzazioni su base ge-
netica si giustifica pure alla luce delle sollecitazioni che in tal senso provengono dal quadro
normativo internazionale ed europeo48. In tale contesto si è assistito invero ad un progressivo
processo di estensione del principio di non discriminazione, che abbraccia anche la discrimi-
nazione fondata sulle caratteristiche genetiche dell’individuo49. Tra gli interventi principali in
tal senso va senz’altro annoverata la Convenzione del Consiglio d’Europa sui diritti dell’uomo
e la biomedicina (c.d. Convenzione di Oviedo) del 199750, che sancisce, tra l’altro, il divieto
di ogni forma di discriminazione nei confronti di una persona sulla base del patrimonio gene-
tico della stessa (art. 11)51. Anche la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea, oltre
45
D. Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, in “American Journal of Law &
Medicine”, vol. 29, 2003, p. 88 s.; J.L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination and the New Genetics, in
“Brooklyn Law Review”, vol. 66, 2001, p. 755.
46
C. Casonato, La discriminazione genetica, cit., p. 647.
47
K. Rothenberg, A. Wang, The Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and
Ethnic Stigma, in “Law and Contemporary Problems”, Vol. 69, 2006, p. 344.
48
V. C. Campiglio, Il principio di non discriminazione genetica nella recente prassi internazionale, in
“Diritti umani e diritto internazionale”, 2008, p. 513 s. L’A. chiarisce che il concetto di «stigmatizzazione»
si differenza da quello di «discriminazione», giacché non necessariamente incide sull’esercizio di un
diritto individuale, sostanziandosi più che altro in «un atteggiamento psicologico di ostilità o disagio
nei confronti di chi viene percepito come ‘diverso’» (p. 529 s.).
49
Per un quadro delle fonti del biodiritto internazionale (non solo con riferimento alla genetica) si rinvia
a C. Campiglio, L’internazionalizzazione delle fonti, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà,
P. Zatti, Vol. I, Ambito e fonti del biodiritto, a cura di S. Rodotà e M. Tallacchini, cit., p. 609 ss.
50
E. Furlan (a cura di), Bioetica e dignità umana. Interpretazioni a confronto a partire dalla Convenzione
di Oviedo, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2009.
51
Con specifico riguardo ai tests genetici, l’art. 12 della Convenzione di Oviedo stabilisce che i «tests
which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as a carrier of a
gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be
performed only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject to
appropriate genetic counselling».
a confermare il diritto al rispetto della vita privata e alla protezione dei dati personali (artt.
7 e 8), vieta «qualsiasi discriminazione fondata, in particolare,…sulle caratteristiche genetiche»
(art. 21). Nel 1997 l’UNESCO ha adottato la Dichiarazione universale sul genoma umano
e i diritti dell’uomo: sul presupposto che la diversità genetica dell’umanità sia un valore da
tutelare, la Dichiarazione riconosce nel genoma umano il fattore che traccia la fondamentale
unità tra gli esseri umani, definendolo «the heritage of humanity» (art. 1), sancisce il diritto di
ciascuno al rispetto della propria dignità e dei propri diritti a prescindere dalle caratteristiche
genetiche e precisa che la dignità impone di non ridurre l’individuo ai suoi dati genetici e
di rispettarne l’unicità e la diversità (art. 2); infine, vieta di fare del genoma un oggetto di
profitto (art. 4) e stabilisce che «no one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic cha-
racteristics that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental
freedoms and human dignity» (art. 6)52. La Conferenza generale dell’UNESCO ha successiva-
mente approvato anche la Dichiarazione internazionale sui dati genetici umani (2003) e la
Dichiarazione universale sulla bioetica e i diritti umani (2005)53.
Alla luce del complesso quadro che si è sinteticamente delineato, si pone la più gene-
rale questione se le peculiarità delle informazioni genetiche (atte a differenziarle dalle altre
informazioni sensibili, incluse quelle sulla salute), anche in considerazione delle potenzialità
discriminatorie connesse ad una loro illecita utilizzazione, siano tali da richiedere la predispo-
sizione di strumenti normativi specifici di tutela, in ossequio alla teoria del c.d. eccezionalismo
genetico54, o se, al contrario, siano sufficienti (seppur eventualmente bisognosi di qualche
“aggiustamento”) gli strumenti giuridici già esistenti.
3. La protezione dei dati genetici nel Codice della privacy

Nell’ordinamento italiano manca una disciplina penale specifica in materia di protezio-
ne del singolo contro la discriminazione genetica, mentre le uniche disposizioni penali in
52
V., tra gli altri, C. Borgoño, La protezione dei dati genetici nel biodiritto internazionale. Principi
biogiuridici fondamentali, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), I dati genetici
nel biodiritto, cit., p. 355 ss.; J.M. Siqueiros, G. Saruwatari, P.F. Oliva-Sánchez, Individualidad
genética y la Declaración Universal sobre el Genoma Humano y los Derechos Humanos, in “Revista de
Derecho y Genoma Humano”, 2012, p. 123 ss.
53
V. C. Campiglio, Il principio di non discriminazione genetica nella recente prassi internazionale, cit.,
p. 526 ss.
54
Sulla controversa teoria del «genetic exceptionalism», la cui elaborazione si deve soprattutto alla
dottrina statunitense, v., con diversità di opinioni, di J.H. Gerards, General issues concerning genetic
information, cit., p. 5 ss.; L.O. Gostin, J. G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic privacy and the law: an end to
genetics exceptionalism, in “Jurimetrics”, vol. 40, 1999, p. 21 ss.; D. Hellman, What Makes Genetic
Discrimination Exceptional?, cit.; J.L. Hustead, J. Goldman, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts,
Challenges and Conundra: Genetics and Privacy, in “American Journal of Law and Medicine”, vol. 28,
2002, p. 285 ss.; S.M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, in “Washington University Law Quarterly”, vol. 79, 2001, p. 669 ss. In argomento
v. pure E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali, cit., p. 25 ss, p. 197 ss.; Id., La circolazione dei
dati genetici tra vecchi diritti e nuove sfide, in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), I
dati genetici nel biodiritto, cit., p. 103 ss.; V. Marzocco, S. Zullo, La genetica tra esigenze di giustizia
e logica precauzionale. Ipotesi sul genetic exceptionalism, ivi, p. 123 ss.
D. Provolo 239
materia di repressione di condotte discriminatorie riguardano la discriminazione per motivi

razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi55. La discriminazione su base genetica è, all’evidenza, con-
cetto diverso da quello di discriminazione razziale o etnica: il discorso scientifico sul punto è
estremamente complesso (e richiederebbe ben altra indagine rispetto alle “forze” e all’inten-
dimento del presente scritto), tuttavia, seppur è emersa, come si è visto, la possibilità di indi-
viduare interazioni tra fattori genetici e appartenenza a certi gruppi razziali o etnici, si nega
generalmente che razza ed etnia possano ritenersi categorie geneticamente determinate56.
Occorre allora interrogarsi se la disciplina concernente il trattamento57 dei dati genetici,
contenuta nel menzionato Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali (c.d. Codice del-
la privacy) possa comunque costituire un adeguato strumento per prevenire e sanzionare un
uso discriminatorio delle informazioni genetiche. Il problema della riservatezza e del control-
lo sul flusso delle proprie informazioni emerge non solo con riferimento al trattamento dei
dati nei tests genetici (sempre più diffusi, anche online), ma altresì con riguardo, più ampia-
mente, alla ricerca genetica, genomica e farmacogenomica58, laddove l’evoluzione scientifica
55
Si tratta delle fattispecie criminose previste dall’art. 3 della l. n. 654/1975, che, nel testo risultante
a seguito delle riforme del 1993 e del 2006, tra l’altro punisce chi propaganda idee fondate sulla
superiorità o sull’odio razziale o etnico, ovvero incita a commettere o commette atti di discriminazione
per motivi razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi, nonché chi, in qualsiasi modo, incita a commettere o
commette violenza o atti di provocazione alla violenza per motivi razziali, etnici, nazionali o religiosi.
Non è possibile in questa sede soffermarsi sulle questioni ermeneutiche sollevate da questa disposizione:
si rinvia pertanto, per un primo approccio, a E.M. Ambrosetti, Beni giuridici tutelati e struttura della
fattispecie: aspetti problematici nella normativa penale contro la discriminazione razziale, in S. Riondato
(a cura di), Atti del Seminario di studio “Discriminazione razziale, xenofobia, odio religioso. Diritti
fondamentali e tutela penale” (Università degli Studi di Padova, 24 marzo 2006), Padova, CEDAM,
2006, p. 93 ss.; A. Caputo, Discriminazioni razziali e repressione penale, in “Questione Giustizia”,
1997, p. 476 ss.; G.A. De Francesco, Commento all’art. 1 d.l. 26/4/1993 n. 122 conv. in l. 2/6/1993
n. 205, in “Leg. pen.”, 1994, p. 173 ss.; L. Fornari, Discriminazione razziale, in F.C. Palazzo, C.E.
Paliero (a cura di), Commentario breve alle leggi penali complementari, Padova, CEDAM, 2007, p. 1034
ss.; C.D. Leotta, Razzismo (dir. pen.), in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. IV, Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 859
ss.; L. Picotti, Istigazione e propaganda della discriminazione razziale tra offesa dei diritti fondamentali
della persona e libertà di manifestazione del pensiero, in S. Riondato (a cura di), Atti del Seminario
di studio “Discriminazione razziale, xenofobia, odio religioso. Diritti fondamentali e tutela penale”,
cit., p. 117 ss.; S. Riondato, Diritto penale e reato culturale, tra globalizzazione e multiculturalismo.
Recenti novità legislative in tema di opinione, religione, discriminazione razziale, mutilazione genitale
femminile, personalità dello Stato, ivi, p. 81 ss.; L. Stortoni, Le nuove norme contro l’intolleranza:
legge o proclama?, in “Critica del diritto”, 1994, p. 14 ss. Sul tema v. pure, in prospettiva più ampia,
D. Strazzari, Discriminazione razziale e diritto. Un’indagine comparata per un modello “europeo”
dell’antidiscriminazione, Padova, CEDAM, 2008; D. Tega (a cura di), Le discriminazioni razziali ed
etniche. Profili giuridici di tutela, Roma, UNAR, 2011.
56
Sul punto v. V. Colonna, G. Barbujani, Quattro domande a cui la genetica può cercare di rispondere,
in C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), I dati genetici nel biodiritto, cit., p. 13 ss.; K.
Rothenberg, A. Wang, The Scarlet Gene, cit., p. 347 ss.
57
Ai sensi dell’art. 4, co. 1°, lett. a), d.lgs. 196/2003, per «trattamento», deve intendersi «qualunque
operazione o complesso di operazioni, effettuati anche senza l’ausilio di strumenti elettronici, concernenti
la raccolta, la registrazione, l’organizzazione, la conservazione, la consultazione, l’elaborazione, la
modificazione, la selezione, l’estrazione, il raffronto, l’utilizzo, l’interconnessione, il blocco, la comunicazione,
la diffusione, la cancellazione e la distruzione di dati, anche se non registrati in una banca di dati».
58
V. R. Lattanzi , Ricerca genetica e protezione dei dati personali, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S.
Rodotà e P. Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 319 ss.
e le sempre nuove metodologie di ricerca impiegate fanno sorgere la necessità di disporre e

di scambiare sempre maggiori quantità di informazioni personali e di campioni biologici da
elaborare ed analizzare, spesso avvalendosi di tecnologie informatiche.
I dati genetici vanno inclusi, ai sensi dell’art. 4, co. 1, lett. b) e d) del Codice della pri-
vacy, tra i dati c.d. sensibili (o meglio ultrasensibili)59, in quanto dati personali60 idonei a
rivelare, in particolare, lo stato di salute dell’interessato61; per essi, tuttavia, il vigente Codice
della privacy, in linea con la precedente normativa (l. 675/96), prevede una disciplina dif-
ferenziata62 rispetto a quella dettata per la più generale categoria dei dati sensibili e prevista
dall’art. 26. La disciplina ad hoc è contenuta nell’art. 90 del Codice, il quale dispone che
il trattamento dei dati genetici, da parte di chiunque, è consentito nei soli casi previsti da
apposita autorizzazione rilasciata dal Garante per la protezione dei dati personali sentito il
Ministro della salute, che acquisisce, a tal fine, il parere del Consiglio superiore di sanità63.
Il provvedimento adottato dal Garante ai sensi dell’art. 90 del Codice è dunque un’au-
torizzazione che consente il trattamento dei dati genetici nei limiti e alle condizioni in essa
previsti e può essere sia speciale (rilasciata cioè caso per caso) che generale.
La soluzione del legislatore italiano, eccentrica rispetto all’intero panorama internazio-
nale, è stata dunque quella di spogliarsi dei compiti e delle prerogative che gli competo-
no, rimettendo all’autorità di protezione dei dati personali il potere – dovere di regolare
la materia64. Qualche perplessità può peraltro destare l’amplissima ‘delega’ che il legislatore
ha conferito all’Autorità amministrativa indipendente in merito alla delicata materia della
protezione dei dati sensibili e, in particolare, dei dati genetici65; tuttavia demandare il potere
di integrazione delle disposizioni legislative ad organi maggiormente qualificati (quale, ap-
punto, il Garante) può rivelarsi opportuno in considerazione della difficoltà di inserire in un
testo legislativo norme che richiedono una competenza di carattere altamente specialistico e,
59
R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1054 ss.
60
L’art. 4, co. 1, lett. b) Cod. privacy definisce «dato personale» «qualunque informazione relativa a
persona fisica, identificata o identificabile, anche indirettamente, mediante riferimento a qualsiasi altra
informazione, ivi compreso un numero di identificazione personale».
61
processo penale, cit., p. 694. Stante l’idoneità dei dati genetici a rientrare in diverse categorie di dati
(“personali”, “sensibili”, “inerenti alla salute” etc.) considerate dal Codice, la ricostruzione dello statuto
giuridico dei dati genetici richiede una (non facile) ricognizione delle regole di disciplina che riguardano
specificatamente le varie categorie di dati.
62
V., tra gli altri, G. Finocchiaro, Privacy e protezione dei dati personali. Disciplina e strumenti operativi,
Bologna, Zanichelli, 2012, p. 68, p. 224 ss.; M. Petrone, Trattamento dei dati genetici e tutela della
persona, in “Famiglia e diritto”, 2007, p. 853 ss.; C. Romano, Il trattamento dei dati genetici nel diritto
italiano, cit., p. 181 ss.
63
Ai sensi del 2° co. dell’art. 90, l’autorizzazione del Garante «individua anche gli ulteriori elementi da
includere nell’informativa ai sensi dell’articolo 13, con particolare riguardo alla specificazione delle finalità
perseguite e dei risultati conseguibili anche in relazione alle notizie inattese che possono essere conosciute per
effetto del trattamento dei dati e al diritto di opporsi al medesimo trattamento per motivi legittimi».
64
R. Lattanzi, Ricerca genetica e protezione dei dati personali, cit., p. 338, il quale rileva che si tratta
comunque di una soluzione «emergenziale», in quanto l’autorizzazione non può comunque estendersi
alla regolamentazione di profili ulteriori e diversi rispetto alla protezione dei dati personali.
65
Sul punto v. U. De Siervo, Tutela dei dati personali e riservatezza, in Aa.Vv., Diritti, nuove tecnologie
e trasformazioni sociali. Scritti in memoria di Paolo Barile, Padova, CEDAM, 2003, p. 304 ss.; P.
Torretta, op. cit., p. 27.
D. Provolo 241
che, con riferimento a materie in costante evoluzione, come quella relativa ai dati genetici,
richiedono una certa flessibilità.
La più recente autorizzazione generale al trattamento dei dati genetici del Garante è
stata emanata il 12 dicembre 201366. Essa fornisce una definizione di dato genetico (inteso
come «risultato di test genetici o ogni altra informazione che, indipendentemente dalla tipologia,
identifica le caratteristiche genotipiche di un individuo trasmissibili nell’ambito di un gruppo di
persone legate da vincoli di parentela») e ne limita l’accesso e l’impiego in funzione garantisti-
ca. Più precisamente, l’autorizzazione fornisce indicazioni sui soggetti legittimati a trattare i
dati genetici, sulle finalità per cui è autorizzato il trattamento, sulle modalità di trattamento,
sui requisiti dell’informativa e del consenso dell’interessato, sulle modalità di conservazione,
comunicazione e diffusione dei dati. In estrema sintesi, l’autorizzazione generale all’accesso
alla citata categoria di dati personali è rilasciata (in via generale, appunto), ad una serie di
soggetti espressamente indicati (tra cui, ad es., gli esercenti le professioni sanitarie, gli organi-
smi sanitari pubblici e privati, i laboratori di genetica medica, gli enti o agli istituti di ricerca,
gli psicologi, i difensori, i consulenti tecnici e investigatori privati autorizzati, gli organismi
di mediazione pubblici e privati): per ognuna di queste categorie sono precisate le specifiche
finalità limitatamente alle quali è possibile accedere ai dati. Il trattamento dei dati genetici è
ammesso, previo consenso, per finalità di tutela della salute (con particolare riferimento alle
patologie di natura genetica e alla tutela dell’identità genetica del soggetto interessato o di
un terzo appartenente alla sua stessa linea genetica) e a scopo di ricerca scientifica o statistica
finalizzata alla tutela della salute dell’interessato, di terzi o della collettività in campo medi-
co, biomedico ed epidemiologico, da svolgersi con il consenso dell’interessato. L’accesso ai
dati genetici è altresì ammesso quando il trattamento è indispensabile per lo svolgimento di
investigazioni difensive o, comunque, per far valere o difendere un diritto anche da parte di
un terzo in sede giudiziaria67 (anche senza il consenso dell’interessato eccetto il caso in cui il
trattamento presupponga lo svolgimento di tests genetici), nonché per adempiere o per esige-
re l’adempimento di specifici obblighi o per eseguire specifici compiti previsti espressamente
dalla normativa comunitaria, da leggi o da regolamenti in materia di previdenza e assistenza
o in materia di igiene e sicurezza del lavoro o della popolazione68. Infine, il ricorso ai dati ge-
netici è autorizzato per l’accertamento dei vincoli di consanguineità per il ricongiungimento
familiare di cittadini di Stati non appartenenti all’Unione europea, apolidi e rifugiati (v. d.lgs.
25 luglio 1998, n. 286). Le regole che presiedono alla raccolta e all’impiego di dati genetici
prescrivono dunque l’acquisizione del consenso informato del soggetto interessato, salvo i
casi espressamente indicati.
66
Autorizzazione generale al trattamento dei dati genetici n. 8/2013, pubblicata nella G.U. n. 302 del
27.12.2013 e reperibile sul sito www.garanteprivacy.it.
67
In tali casi il trattamento è ammesso a condizione il diritto da far valere o difendere sia di rango
pari a quello dell’interessato, ovvero consistente in un diritto della personalità o in un altro diritto o
libertà fondamentale e inviolabile e i dati siano trattati esclusivamente per tali finalità e per il periodo
strettamente necessario al loro perseguimento. Il trattamento deve essere comunque effettuato nel
rispetto delle autorizzazioni generali del Garante al trattamento dei dati sensibili da parte dei liberi
professionisti e da parte degli investigatori privati.
68
In questa ipotesi il trattamento può avvenire anche senza il consenso dell’interessato, nei limiti previsti
dall’autorizzazione generale del Garante al trattamento dei dati sensibili nei rapporti di lavoro e ferme
restando le disposizioni del codice di deontologia e di buona condotta di cui all’articolo 111 del Codice.
La citata autorizzazione regola altresì in maniera analoga l’utilizzo dei campioni biologici
(che definisce come «ogni campione di materiale biologico da cui possono essere estratti dati ge-
netici caratteristici di un individuo»)69.
Come espressamente dichiarato nell’autorizzazione, i trattamenti di dati genetici al di
fuori dei casi previsti dall’autorizzazione stessa sono da considerarsi illeciti «anche in riferi-
mento all’attività dei datori di lavoro volta a determinare l’attitudine professionale di lavoratori
o di candidati all’instaurazione di un rapporto di lavoro, anche se basata sul consenso dell’interes-
sato, nonché all’attività delle imprese di assicurazione»70.
A presidio del corretto trattamento dei dati personali, anche genetici, il Codice della
privacy prevede un apparato sanzionatorio complesso71, che si articola in sanzioni penali ed
amministrative72. Il legislatore, come già aveva fatto con la previgente l. n. 675 del 1996, ha
invero inteso graduare, anche sotto il profilo qualitativo del tipo di sanzione prevista, la rea-
zione sanzionatoria, in relazione al particolare disvalore del fatto illecito e in ossequio al prin-
cipio di sussidiarietà del precetto penale e di necessaria lesività della condotta incriminata73.
Le disposizioni penali (artt. 167-171 Codice), non numerose, individuano le condotte penal-
mente sanzionate nel trattamento illecito dei dati personali, nella falsità nelle dichiarazioni e
notificazioni al Garante, nell’omessa adozione di misure di sicurezza, nella inosservanza dei
provvedimenti assunti dal Garante e nella violazione del divieto di effettuare indagini sulle
opinioni del lavoratore e del divieto di uso di impianti audiovisivi e di altre apparecchiature
per finalità di controllo a distanza dell’attività dei lavoratori.
L’art. 170, in particolare, sanziona, tra l’altro, proprio l’inosservanza dei provvedimenti
del Garante relativi alle autorizzazioni al trattamento dei dati genetici (di cui al menzionato
art. 90)74. Si tratta peraltro di una disposizione che pone delicate questioni sia in ordine all’in-
69
G. Novelli, I. Pietrangeli, I campioni biologici, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà, P.
Zatti, Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 1027 ss.
70
Sul punto v. C. Romano, op. cit., p. 186 s.
71
V., tra gli altri, A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento
dei dati personali, in “Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”, 2003, p. 727 ss.; Id., Privacy on line:
quali spazi per la tutela penale?, in “Dir. dell’internet”, 2005, p. 257; L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati
genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela dei diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, cit., p. 698 ss.; M.C.
Bisacci, Tutela penale dei dati personali, in Dig. disc. pen., Agg., vol. III, Torino, UTET, 2008, p. 1741
ss.; A. Contaldo, L. Marotta, Depenalizzazione e nuove tutele dei dati personali anche alla luce del
codice della privacy (d.lg. 30 giugno 2003 n. 196), in “Giur. merito”, 2004, p. 2640; V. Torre, Modelli
di tutela penale della privacy in internet, in “Dir. pen. e proc.”, 2004, p. 233 ss.
72
Il ricorso alla sanzione amministrativa nel Codice risulta peraltro piuttosto limitato, perché, da un
lato, le violazioni che il legislatore ha ritenuto espressive di una maggior offensività sono presidiate
dalla sanzione penale e, dall’altro, la reazione verso le violazioni ritenute di più lieve disvalore è affidata
a misure ripristinatorie che rientrano nei poteri coercitivi propri del Garante. Con riguardo all’entità
della sanzione R. Borsari (Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1052 s.) rileva come la
severità della misura edittale delle sanzioni amministrative sia tale da celare la loro natura penale in senso
stretto, concretante una «truffa delle etichette» che consente di sottrarre alle garanzie giuspenalistiche
l’applicazione di sanzioni particolarmente afflittive.
73
Così A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento dei dati
personali, cit., p. 733.
74
Art. 170: «Chiunque, essendovi tenuto, non osserva il provvedimento adottato dal Garante ai sensi degli
articoli 26, comma 2, 90, 150, commi 1 e 2, e 143, comma 1, lettera c), è punito con la reclusione da tre
mesi a due anni». La norma in esame incrimina dunque la mera inosservanza dei provvedimenti del
Garante, relativi alle autorizzazioni al trattamento di dati sensibili, o genetici, e di quelli provvisori
D. Provolo 243
dividuazione della condotta materiale concretamente punibile e dei destinatari del precetto
penale - giacché a tal fine occorre riferirsi all’atto normativo secondario (il provvedimento del
Garante) cui la disposizione rinvia75 -, sia in ordine ai rapporti con la più grave fattispecie di
illecito trattamento dei dati personali76.
In generale, le disposizioni penali contenute nel Codice della privacy hanno una strut-
tura meramente sanzionatoria delle violazioni di alcuni dei precetti posti dalla disciplina
extrapenale contenuta nel Codice stesso, nel senso che le fattispecie incriminatrici risultano
dalla combinazione delle norme propriamente penali con quelle da esse richiamate77. La for-
mulazione delle fattispecie criminose mediante la tecnica del rinvio ad altre disposizioni di
legge (spesso descritte mediante elementi normativi che rinviano ad altri elementi normativi),
considerata anche la complessità e l’elevato tasso di tecnicismo della materia, va peraltro a
detrimento della piena intelligibilità del precetto penale, postulata dai principi costituzionali
di tassatività e determinatezza in materia penale78. Si profila, inoltre, un contrasto delle di-
sposizioni in questione con il principio di offensività. Invero, se con l’art. 170 il legislatore ha
inteso rafforzare, con evidenti finalità general-preventive, il valore delle decisioni dell’Autorità
garante, si può constatare che l’intero sistema di tutela penale approntato dal Codice della
privacy si caratterizza per una analoga tendenza a presidiare con la sanzione penale la corretta
funzionalità dell’Autorità Garante, più che beni giuridici ben più pregnanti facenti capo
all’individuo (quali il diritto alla riservatezza e alla protezione dei propri dati personali)79.
4. Dati genetici e biobanche

In questa cornice si inseriscono anche le problematiche giuridiche connesse alla creazione
delle c.d. biobanche80. La raccolta, lo stoccaggio e la sistematizzazione di materiali biologici
assunti a seguito di reclamo o ricorso dell’interessato. L’art. 170 ricalca integralmente il contenuto della
corrispondente fattispecie criminosa di cui all’art. 37 della previgente l. n. 675 del 1996, con l’aggiunta
però dell’ulteriore incriminazione dell’inosservanza dell’autorizzazione adottata dal Garante ai sensi
dell’art. 90 del Codice con riferimento al trattamento dei dati genetici: come si legge nella Relazione
al D.Lgs. 196/2003 (p. 63), il legislatore ha ritenuto di prevedere la sanzione penale anche per questa
ipotesi in ragione della «particolare delicatezza della materia disciplinata».
75
Osserva criticamente A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice
sul trattamento dei dati personali, cit., p. 767, che la formulazione della norma appare chiaramente
modellata sul paradigma di cui all’art. 650 c.p., con conseguenti dubbi di illegittimità costituzionale in
considerazione del vulnus al principio di determinatezza in materia penale.
76
Sul punto v. ampiamente L. Picotti, Trattamento dei dati genetici, violazioni della privacy e tutela dei
diritti fondamentali nel processo penale, cit., p. 700 s.
77
processo penale, cit., p. 698.
78
Sul punto v. R. Borsari, Relazioni familiari e privacy. Profili penali, cit., p. 1052.
79
A. Manna, Il quadro sanzionatorio penale ed amministrativo del codice sul trattamento dei dati personali,
cit., p. 767. In argomento v. pure, con riferimento alle fattispecie di cui alla previgente l. 675/1996, P.
Veneziani, I beni giuridici tutelati dalle norme penali in materia di riservatezza informatica e disciplina
dei dati personali, in L. Picotti (a cura di), Il diritto penale dell’informatica nell’epoca di internet, cit., p.
183 ss., il quale rileva come il quadro della tutela penale sia solo in parte riconducibile alla protezione,
anche anticipata, della privacy ed appaia ampiamente sbilanciato nel senso della salvaguardia delle mere
funzioni, in particolare delle funzioni di controllo e intervento che competono all’Autorità Garante.
80
Sul tema v., tra gli altri, L. Caenazzo (a cura di), Biobanche. Importanza, implicazioni e opportunità
umani e delle informazioni genetiche da essi ricavabili si vanno sempre più diffondendo e
diverse sono le tipologie di biobanche adottate, tali da rendere utopistica una loro catalo-
gazione81: ad es., in relazione al materiale contenuto, si individuano banche genomiche o
del DNA (destinate a raccogliere principalmente dati genetici) e banche di tessuti e cellule,
mentre, in base alla finalità perseguita, si distinguono biobanche impiegate a fini di ricerca o
in ambito sanitario; biobanche a scopo diagnostico o terapeutico; biobanche impiegate con
scopi di sicurezza per la prevenzione e repressione di reati; biobanche finalizzate al trapianto
di organi; banche contenenti i prodotti degli screening neonatali o cellule staminali, embrioni,
ovuli e spermatozoi per la procreazione assistita; biobanche di popolazioni.
Tutti questi tipi di biobanche sollevano una serie di problemi giuridici, quali le questio-
ni relative al consenso dei partecipanti, al loro diritto di autodeterminazione e all’adeguata
informazione sulla finalità della banca nonché, parallelamente, alla tutela della privacy e del
diritto a non sapere; alle ricadute sui membri della stessa famiglia; ai rischi di discriminazione
e stigmatizzazione dei gruppi partecipanti; al data sharing nella comunità scientifica; alla go-
vernance e al controllo sulla biobanca, ai possibili impieghi dei dati a scopo forense, alla bre-
vettabilità dei risultati raggiunti, e così via. Emerge, con tutta evidenza, la necessità di operare
un bilanciamento tra i diversi interessi in gioco, ad es. tra il diritto alla ricerca scientifica e i
diritti dei singoli (in primis la riservatezza), o tra il diritto alla privacy e quello alla sicurezza
della collettività (con riferimento all’utilizzo dei database genetici a livello giudiziario)82.
Il quadro di disciplina, affidato a fonti internazionali, europee e nazionali, è complesso
e poco organico, oltre che, con precipuo riferimento all’ordinamento italiano, lacunoso83. Il
legislatore italiano si è invero dimostrato perlopiù inerte in materia di regolamentazione spe-
cifica delle biobanche; importanti indicazioni per chi opera nel settore si rinvengono comun-
que in taluni atti privi di efficacia vincolante (quali ad es. le Linee Guida del 2008 emanate
dal Comitato nazionale per la biosicurezza, le biotecnologie e le scienze della vita e relative
all’accreditamento di biobanche e centri per le risorse biologiche di campioni umani, istitu-
iti a fini di ricerca)84. Con riguardo alle biobanche con finalità medica o di ricerca medica
può peraltro farsi riferimento alla già citata autorizzazione del Garante della privacy in tema
di trattamento dei dati genetici, che, come si è detto, permette, a determinate condizioni,
per la società. Risvolti scientifici, etico-giuridici e sociologici, Padova, libreriauniversitaria.it edizioni, 2012;
C. Casonato, C. Piciocchi, P. Veronesi (a cura di), La disciplina delle biobanche a fini terapeutici e di
ricerca, Trento, Università degli Studi di Trento, 2012; C. Faralli, M. Galletti (a cura di), Biobanche
e informazioni genetiche. Problemi etici e giuridici, Roma, ARACNE editrice, 2011; M. Macilotti, Le
biobanche: disciplina e diritti della persona, in Trattato di Biodiritto, diretto da S. Rodotà e P. Zatti,
Vol. II, Il Governo del corpo, Tomo I, cit., p. 1195 ss.; G. Pascuzzi, U. Izzo, M. Macilotti (a cura
di), Comparative Issues in the Governance of Research Biobanks. Property, Privacy, Intellectual Property
and the Role of Technology, Berlin - Heidelberg, Springer, 2013; A. Santosuosso, Diritto, scienza, nuove
tecnologie, cit., p. 147 ss.
81
V. A. Santosuosso, I. A.Colussi, Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, cit., 356 ss.
82
Sul punto A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi, Diritto e genetica delle popolazioni, cit., p. 367.
83
Per una panoramica degli strumenti normativi in materia, v. M. Tomasi, Il modello italiano di
regolamentazione giuridica delle biobanche: alla ricerca di una sintesi per una materia poliedrica, in L.
Caenazzo (a cura di), Biobanche. Importanza, implicazioni e opportunità per la società. Risvolti scientifici,
etico-giuridici e sociologici, cit., p. 21 ss.; A. Santosuosso, I.A. Colussi, op. cit., p. 359 ss.
84
Il documento è reperibile sul sito www.governo.it/biotecnologie/documenti.html.
D. Provolo 245
l’impiego dei materiali biologici e delle informazioni genetiche a fini di ricerca e statistica a
tutela della salute.
L’unico intervento diretto del legislatore italiano in materia di biobanche riguarda l’am-
bito forense ed è costituito dalla l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 200985, con cui l’Italia ha aderito al
Trattato di Prüm (firmato da sette Stati membri dell’Unione europea nel 2005), con il quale
si è aperta la strada ad un sistema comunitario di raccolta, accesso e scambio di dati (quali la
parte non codificante del DNA e le impronte digitali), allo scopo di contrastare il terrorismo,
la criminalità transfrontaliera e la migrazione illegale.
L’utilizzo dei database genetici a livello giudiziario costituisce valido ausilio ai fini dell’i-
dentificazione degli autori di reati, con notevoli vantaggi in termini di maggior efficienza e
rapidità delle indagini e di tempestività nell’azione repressiva; il loro impiego apre tuttavia, al
contempo, seri interrogativi in ordine al bilanciamento tra interesse collettivo alla sicurezza
e diritti individuali, tra cui in primis il diritto alla privacy86, nonché, per quanto interessa in
questa sede, in ordine ai possibili rischi di discriminazione connessi all’inclusione di un sog-
getto in un DNA database.
L’aspetto più innovativo della legge n. 85 del 2009 è senz’altro costituito dall’istituzione
della banca dati nazionale del DNA, finalizzata alla identificazione degli autori dei delitti
(art. 5, co. 1°). La banca dati è anzitutto deputata alla raccolta dei profili del DNA dei sog-
getti sottoposti a prelievo di campione biologico indicati nell’art. 9 della legge: si tratta, in
concreto, di persone sottoposte a misure restrittive della libertà personale a seguito di con-
danna definitiva o ad un provvedimento cautelare per reati di una certa gravità87. La banca
85
V., per un primo approccio, V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale
del DNA: bilanciamento tra diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, in
“Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 2013, p. 1863 ss.; E. Galli, L’istituzione della banca dati nazionale del DNA
e del laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale del DNA. La delega al Governo per l’istituzione dei
ruoli tecnici del Corpo di polizia penitenziaria (l. 30 giugno 2009, n. 85), in D. Fondaroli (a cura di),
Nuove strategie di polizia per una “società aperta”, Padova, CEDAM, 2011, p. 51 ss.; G. Gennari,
Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, in “Resp. civ. e prev.”, 2009, p.
2630 ss.; G. Leo, Il prelievo coattivo di materiale biologico nel processo penale e l’istituzione della Banca
dati nazionale del DNA, in “Riv. it. med. leg.”, 2011, p. 931 ss.; L. Marafioti, L. Luparia, Banca
dati del DNA e accertamento penale: commento alla legge di ratifica del Trattato di Prüm, istitutiva del
database genetico nazionale e recante modifiche al codice di procedura penale (l. 30 giugno 2009, n. 85),
Milano, Giuffrè, 2010; A. Scarcella (a cura di), Prelievo del DNA e banca dati nazionale. Il processo
penale tra accertamento del fatto e cooperazione internazionale (legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85), Padova,
CEDAM, 2009; P. Tonini, P. Felicioni, A. Scarcella, Banca dati nazionale del DNA e prelievo di
materiale biologico, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, suppl., 2009. V. inoltre, anche in prospettiva comparatistica,
C. Fanuele, Dati genetici e procedimento penale, Padova, CEDAM, 2009.
86
Sul punto v. A.M. Capitta, Conservazione dei DNA profiles e tutela europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in
“Archivio penale”, 2013, p. 4 ss.; L. Scaffardi, Le banche dati genetiche per fini giudiziari e i diritti
della persona alla ricerca di una legislazione europea armonizzata, in “Anuario da Facultade de Dereito da
Universidade da Coruña”, vol. 12, 2008, p. 845 ss.; E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali,
cit., p. 161 ss.
87
Più precisamente, l’art. 9, prevede, al comma 1°, che «ai fini dell’inserimento del profilo del DNA nella
banca dati nazionale del DNA, sono sottoposti a prelievo di campioni biologici:
a) i soggetti ai quali sia applicata la misura della custodia cautelare in carcere o quella degli arresti
domiciliari;
b) i soggetti arrestati in flagranza di reato o sottoposti a fermo di indiziato di delitto;
dati provvede inoltre alla raccolta dei profili del DNA relativi a reperti biologici acquisiti nel
corso di procedimenti penali, alla raccolta dei profili del DNA di persone scomparse o loro
consanguinei, di cadaveri e resti cadaverici non identificati, nonché al raffronto dei profili
del DNA a fini di identificazione (art. 7). Emerge dunque come la banca dati non manipoli
materiale biologico, non svolga analisi, né acceda all’intero patrimonio genetico dei soggetti
candidati all’inserimento88.
La l. n. 85/2009 ha istituito altresì il laboratorio centrale per la banca dati nazionale
del DNA, che provvede alla «tipizzazione del profilo del DNA dei soggetti di cui all’ articolo
9, commi 1 e 2» e alla «conservazione dei campioni biologici dai quali sono tipizzati i profili del
DNA» (art. 8).
La banca dati del DNA è sottoposta al controllo del Garante per la protezione dei dati
personali, mentre il Comitato nazionale per la biosicurezza, le biotecnologie e le scienze della
vita è tenuto a garantire l’osservanza dei criteri e delle norme tecniche per il funzionamento
del laboratorio centrale (art. 15).
Per quanto qui soprattutto interessa, è opportuno notare che a tutela della privacy si pone
il principio secondo cui l’impiego del dato genetico è consentito unicamente per il perse-
guimento della finalità di identificazione degli autori dei reati: emerge dunque un implicito
divieto di utilizzare il dato genetico a fini diversi, ad esempio per compiere accertamenti in
ordine alla personalità del soggetto, alla sua predisposizione genetica ad un comportamento
antisociale o per svolgere ricerche sulle relazioni familiari89. In linea con questo principio,
l’ultimo comma dell’art. 11 prevede che «i sistemi di analisi sono applicati esclusivamente alle
sequenze del DNA che non consentono la identificazione delle patologie da cui può essere affetto
l’interessato»90. Alle medesime esigenze di tutela del diritto alla riservatezza risponde la garan-
zia di anonimato posta dall’art. 12, co. 1, della l. n. 85/2009, secondo cui «i profili del DNA
e i relativi campioni non contengono le informazioni che consentono l’identificazione diretta
del soggetto cui sono riferiti».
Il legislatore ha inoltre precisamente individuato coloro che possono accedere alle infor-
mazioni genetiche (art. 12): per quanto riguarda la banca dati, l’accesso è consentito alla po-
lizia giudiziaria e all’autorità giudiziaria esclusivamente per fini di identificazione personale,
nonché per le finalità di collaborazione internazionale di polizia; l’accesso ai dati contenuti
c) i soggetti detenuti o internati a seguito di sentenza irrevocabile, per un delitto non colposo;
d) i soggetti nei confronti dei quali sia applicata una misura alternativa alla detenzione a seguito di sentenza
irrevocabile, per un delitto non colposo;
e) i soggetti ai quali sia applicata, in via provvisoria o definitiva, una misura di sicurezza detentiva».
Il 2° comma dell’art. 9 stabilisce che «il prelievo di cui al comma 1 può essere effettuato esclusivamente
se si procede nei confronti dei soggetti di cui al comma 1 per delitti, non colposi, per i quali è consentito
l’arresto facoltativo in flagranza», ed elenca altresì una serie di reati per i quali il prelievo non può essere
effettuato.
88
V. G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2631.
89
A.M. Capitta, Conservazione dei DNA profiles e tutela europea dei diritti dell’uomo, cit., p. 3; v. pure
C. Fanuele, op. cit., p. 317 ss.
90
V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del DNA: bilanciamento tra
diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit., p. 1882: «l’analisi può
riguardare solo i segmenti non codificanti del genoma umano, dai quali, cioè, non sarebbero desumibili
informazioni generali sul soggetto, come quelle su etnia, malattia o sesso».
D. Provolo 247
nel laboratorio centrale è consentito ai medesimi soggetti e per le medesime finalità, previa
autorizzazione dell’autorità giudiziaria. Su tali soggetti incombe un obbligo di segretezza e
l’art. 14 della l. n. 85/2009 punisce, salvo che il fatto costituisca più grave reato, con la reclu-
sione da uno a tre anni il pubblico ufficiale che comunica o fa uso di dati ed informazioni in
violazione delle disposizioni della legge stessa, o al di fuori dei fini da essa previsti91.
Un nodo problematico in termini di tutela dei dati genetici riguarda le modalità e i
tempi di cancellazione dei profili di DNA dalla banca dati e quelli di distruzione dei cam-
pioni biologici e, dunque, in definitiva, il c.d. «diritto all’oblio», inteso quale diritto a non
essere schedati o classificati e ad ottenere la rimozione di dati e campioni laddove vengano
meno le finalità per le quali gli stessi erano stati raccolti92. L’art. 13 della legge dispone che la
cancellazione dei dati e la distruzione dei campioni avvenga soltanto «a seguito di assoluzione
con sentenza definitiva perché il fatto non sussiste, perché l’imputato non lo ha commesso, perché
il fatto non costituisce reato o perché il fatto non è previsto dalla legge come reato»93. Al contrario,
in presenza di un provvedimento di archiviazione, ovvero di una sentenza di non luogo a
procedere o di non doversi procedere, i profili genetici e i campioni biologici vengono con-
servati, rispettivamente, per un termine massimo di quaranta anni e di venti anni, decorrente
dall’ultima circostanza che ne ha determinato l’inserimento o il prelievo. Difetta, dunque, la
previsione di un trattamento differenziato, quanto alla conservazione di dati e campioni, per
le persone condannate e per i soggetti non condannati in via non definitiva, ovvero in via
definitiva ma al di fuori delle formule assolutorie indicate nel 1° co. dell’art. 13; nei confronti
dei soggetti non condannati, la conservazione dei dati per tempi così lunghi assume una
valenza preventiva e repressiva, che si fonda, in definitiva, su un giudizio probabilistico di pe-
ricolosità94. Ciò pone un problema di compatibilità della disciplina sia con il principio della
presunzione di innocenza - il quale ben si può riferire ai soggetti non condannati (prosciolti
o archiviati) nei cui confronti si sia concluso l’accertamento penale -, sia con il principio di
non discriminazione95.
Al di là dei rischi discriminatori connessi ad un uso del DNA archiviato per fini diversi
da quelli previsti dalla legge96 - rischi che, come si è visto, le disposizioni contenute nella
legge tendono a prevenire -, l’inserimento nella banca dati del DNA può già di per sé avere
effetti pregiudizievoli, stigmatizzanti, giacché può contribuire a diffondere nella collettività
un’immagine negativa della persona, in grado di determinare discredito e potenziale falsa
rappresentazione (ove la ragione dell’inserimento non sia fondata o si riveli successivamente
erronea) agli occhi della collettività97.
Ad oggi, la banca dati nazionale del DNA non ha ancora trovato concreta attuazione.
Ciò pone, tra l’altro, un ulteriore problema legato al proliferare di banche dati forensi non
91
L’art. 14, 2° co. prevede la corrispondente ipotesi colposa, punita con la reclusione fino a sei mesi.
92
V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del DNA: bilanciamento tra diritti
individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit., p. 1890 s.
93
La cancellazione è disposta altresì a seguito di identificazione di cadavere o di resti cadaverici, nonché
del ritrovamento di persona scomparsa (art. 13, 2° co.).
94
Così A.M. Capitta, op. cit., p. 28, nota 107.
95
Sul punto v. ancora A.M. Capitta, op. cit., p. 27 ss.
96
V. C. Fanuele, Dati genetici e procedimento penale, cit., p. 325 s.
97
Così G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2634.
ufficiali. Invero, poiché l’art. 17 della l. n. 85 del 2009 prevede che i profili del DNA ricavati
da reperti acquisiti nel corso di procedimenti penali anteriormente alla data di entrata in vi-
gore della legge siano trasferiti dalle Forze di polizia alla banca dati nazionale del DNA entro
un anno dalla data della sua entrata in funzione, permane, fino a che non verranno emanati
i regolamenti di attuazione, il rischio di una creazione spontanea ed incontrollata di banche
dati genetiche ad uso forense, operanti anche al di fuori di qualsivoglia garanzia e controllo98.
Infine, un’ultima notazione riguarda la questione dei limiti di analisi del campione bio-
logico finalizzata alla estrazione del profilo identificativo. In proposito la legge n. 85 del 2009
prevede, come si è visto, che i sistemi di analisi possano essere applicati esclusivamente alle
sequenze del DNA che non consentono la identificazione delle patologie da cui può essere
affetto l’interessato (art. 11). Tuttavia, come osservato dal Garante Europeo della Protezio-
ne dei Dati nel parere n. 2006/C 116/2004 del 17 maggio 2006, ciò non esclude, anche
in considerazione della costante evoluzione delle scienze biomediche, che quel che è in un
dato momento è considerato un profilo di DNA innocuo possa successivamente rivelare
molte più informazioni riguardanti le caratteristiche genetiche della persona di quanto non
sia prevedibile, stante la natura dinamica delle informazioni genetiche99. Inoltre, l’impiego
di determinati markers del DNA o di talune tecniche di analisi può amplificare i rischi di
discriminazione. A titolo esemplificativo, l’analisi mirata di determinati marcatori consente
di identificare, pur con variabile margine di attendibilità, l’origine etnica del soggetto al quale
appartiene il campione biologico, con il conseguente pericolo di incrementare i pregiudizi
razziali sugli autori di reati, mentre il c.d. sex test può condurre all’identificazione casuale di
anomalie cromosomiche, la cui conoscenza può poi essere utilizzata a fini discriminatori.
Oppure si pensi all’impiego del c.d. familial searching100, che rende virtualmente presenti,
all’interno della banca dati, soggetti che non sono in essa legittimamente inclusi (c.d. «so-
spetti virtuali») e che non possono esercitare nessuna delle garanzie e procedure di tutela che
sono riservate soltanto a coloro che sono ufficialmente inseriti nel database genetico, con gravi
ricadute anche sulla privacy dell’intero gruppo familiare101.
5. Verso una tutela penale della persona contro la discriminazione genetica?

Da quanto sin qui pur sommariamente esposto è emerso che, al di là dell’accettabilità o
98
Il caso più noto è forse quello della banca dati istituita presso il RIS di Parma, sulla quale si è
pronunciata anche l’Autorità Garante con il provvedimento adottato il 19 luglio 2007. Si trattava di
una banca dati informatizzata, in cui i profili e campioni genetici venivano raccolti indiscriminatamente
e senza il rispetto delle misure minime di sicurezza previste dal Codice della privacy: sulla vicenda v. G.
Gennari, Genetica forense e Codice della privacy: riflessioni su vecchie e nuove banche dati, in “Resp. civ.
e prev.”, 2011, p. 1184 ss.
99
V. G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2638.
100
Il familial searching è una tecnica di analisi del DNA volta a rinvenire corrispondenze parziali, anziché
un full match, mediante l’individuazione di un possibile vincolo parentale tra l’indagato e soggetti il cui
profilo è presente in banca dati o che hanno offerto un campione biologico in occasione di uno screening
di massa: v. V. Marchese, L. Caenazzo, D. Rodriguez, Banca dati nazionale del DNA: bilanciamento
tra diritti individuali e sicurezza pubblica nella legge 30 giugno 2009, n. 85, cit., p. 1868 s.
101
G. Gennari, Bioinformazione e indagini penali: la l. n. 85 del 30 giugno 2009, cit., p. 2639 s.
D. Provolo 249
meno di un approccio genetico-centrico ispirato al «genetic exceptionalism»102, non si può co-

munque non riconoscere che le informazioni genetiche, per le loro peculiarità (attinenza alla
salute ma non solo, carattere predittivo, strutturale condivisione con altri soggetti, stabilità
nel tempo) e per le loro potenzialità di impiego, anche discriminatorio, se non creano proble-
mi del tutto nuovi, quantomeno amplificano quelli che di regola si connettono all’impiego ed
alla circolazione della generalità dei dati sensibili (inclusi quelli sulla salute)103. Ciò induce a
prospettare uno scostamento del concetto di privacy genetica rispetto alla nozione generale di
privacy o una rimodulazione nel senso della centralità del diritto all’autodeterminazione sulla
propria persona, inclusivo tanto della corporeità quanto delle informazioni da essa ricavabili,
corredato, se del caso, da sanzioni penali104.
Non sfugge peraltro come l’attuale disciplina penale posta a tutela dei dati genetici (e,
segnatamente, l’art. 170 del Codice della privacy) si riveli carente sotto il profilo del rispetto
dei principi di legalità (sub specie tassatività/determinatezza) e di offensività. Ciò induce anzi-
tutto ad interrogarsi circa la necessità di ripensare le disposizioni penali poste a protezione del
corretto trattamento dei dati genetici, anche nell’ottica di renderle maggiormente efficaci nel
contrastare i possibili risvolti discriminatori connessi all’uso di tali dati.
Su un piano più generale, tuttavia, occorre chiedersi se un rafforzamento della privacy ge-
netica sia lo strumento di intervento più idoneo per tutelare il singolo contro discriminazioni
fondate sulle sue caratteristiche genetiche, o se non sia invece auspicabile la predisposizione di
una disciplina penale ad hoc che reprima le condotte di discriminazione genetica.
Uno spunto di riflessione in tal senso può trarsi, ad esempio, da uno sguardo all’esperien-
za francese, ove sono previste disposizioni penali (artt. 225-1 − 225-4 e art. 432 -7 del Code
pénal)105 che espressamente puniscono la discriminazione fondata, tra l’altro, sulle «caractéri-
stiques génétiques» della persona106, che consista nel rifiutare la fornitura di un bene o di un
servizio, nell’ostacolare il normale esercizio di un’attività economica, nel rifiutare di assumere
o nel sanzionare o licenziare una persona, o, ancora, nel subordinare la fornitura di un bene
102
Sul punto v., da ultimo, G. Gennari, US Supreme Court, Jeremy Bentham e il panopticon genetico,
in “Diritto penale contemporaneo”, n. 3, 2013, p. 152 ss.
103
V. E. Stefanini, La circolazione dei dati genetici tra vecchi diritti e nuove sfide, cit., p. 117 ss.
104
Così R. Borsari, Profili penali della terapia genica, cit., p. 558 s.
105
Per un commento alle disposizioni in tema di discriminazione, contenute nella Section I (intitolata
“Des discriminations”) del Chapitre V (rubricato “Des atteintes à la dignité de la personne”) del Titolo II
del Libro II del codice penale, v., tra gli altri, E. Dreyer, Droit pénal spécial, Paris, Ellipses, 2012, p.
323 ss.; J. Pradel, M. Danti-Juan, Droit pénal spécial, Paris, Cujas, 2010, p. 255 ss.; M. L. Rassat,
Droit pénal spécial. Infractions du Code pénal, Paris, Dalloz, 2011, p. 616 ss.
106
L’Art. 225-1 stabilisce, al primo comma, che «constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée
entre les personnes physiques à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de famille, de leur
grossesse, de leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur lieu de résidence, de leur état de santé, de
leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation ou identité sexuelle,
de leur âge, de leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance ou de leur non-
appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion déterminée». L’Art.
432-7 punisce la discriminazione come definita dall’art. 225-1 posta in essere dal soggetto «dépositaire
de l’autorité publique ou chargée d’une mission de service public», nell’esercizio delle proprie funzioni, che
si sia concretata nel rifiuto del beneficio di diritto accordato dalla legge o in un ostacolo al normale
esercizio di una attività economica.
o di un servizio, un’offerta di impiego, una domanda di stage o un periodo di formazione in

impresa ad una condizione discriminatoria107.
La scelta di tutelare penalmente la persona contro atti di discriminazione fondata sulle
caratteristiche genetiche postula la precisa individuazione di un bene giuridico meritevole di
tutela108. Occorre allora interrogarsi, a mio avviso, sul ruolo che, in questo contesto, e sotto
un profilo strettamente penalistico, può (o deve) assumere il concetto di «dignità umana», la
cui valorizzazione viene da più parti invocata proprio con riguardo alla protezione della pri-
vacy genetica109 e alla tutela contro discriminazioni fondate sulle caratteristiche genetiche110.
Si tratta peraltro di concetto che risente di una certa ambiguità semantica: la dottrina pe-
nalistica più attenta ne ha invero messo in luce la genericità ed anche i rischi di strumentaliz-
zazione ai quali esso è esposto, trattandosi di un valore a forte connotazione etico-emozionale,
potenzialmente suscettibile di essere invocato per la giustificazione di ogni incriminazione
rispetto alla quale non si sia in grado di identificare quale oggetto di tutela un bene giuridico
più specifico111.
Tuttavia, uno degli ambiti in cui la dignità umana mostra un «contatto diretto» con
la fattispecie penale, anziché porsi come «sintesi categoriale» bisognosa di determinarsi nel
contenuto, è proprio nell’offesa alla pari dignità umana delle persone fatte oggetto di pratiche
discriminatorie, posto che tali condotte giungono a negare la persona umana come «valore
in sé», a negarne l’identità e le qualità intrinseche proprie di ogni essere umano, le quali non
tollerano alcuna forma di gerarchia o differenziazione in ragione della diversa origine od ap-
partenenza o condizioni personali112.
Accordare tutela penale alla dignità umana così intesa anche nelle ipotesi di discrimina-
107
E’ interessante notare che l’art. 225-3 sancisce l’inapplicabilità delle disposizioni che prevedono le
condotte discriminatorie in una serie di ipotesi, tra cui, per quanto qui interessa, il caso in cui si tratti
di «discriminations fondées sur l’état de santé, lorsqu’elles consistent en des opérations ayant pour objet la
prévention et la couverture du risque décès, des risques portant atteinte à l’intégrité physique de la personne
ou des risques d’incapacité de travail ou d’invalidité», a meno che, però, le discriminazioni non si fondino
«sur la prise en compte de tests génétiques prédictifs ayant pour objet une maladie qui n’est pas encore déclarée
ou une prédisposition génétique à une maladie».
108
Sulle problematiche relative all’individuazione del bene giuridico meritevole di tutela con riguardo
alla molteplicità di diritti riconducibili alla nozione di «persona umana» v. G. De Francesco, Una
sfida da raccogliere: la codificazione delle fattispecie a tutela della persona, in L. Picotti (a cura di), Tutela
penale della persona e nuove tecnologie, Padova, CEDAM, 2013, p. 3 ss.
109
Sulla capacità della nozione (pur di incerti contorni) di «dignità umana», richiamata dall’art. 3
Cost., di espandere il campo di applicazione dei diritti garantiti da altre norme costituzionali (come
il diritto all’informazione o alla riservatezza) contro le più aggressive applicazioni della biomedicina v.
L. Chieffi, Le informazioni sul patrimonio genetico tra diritti del singolo e interessi pubblici, cit., p. 4, il
quale rileva altresì che «in analoga direzione, nell’imporre il “rispetto della persona umana” accanto alla
tutela della sua salute (1° e 2° co. dell’art. 32), la Costituzione ha inteso preservare l’individuo anche
da quei comportamenti che, pur non pregiudicandone l’integrità fisica, siano tuttavia suscettibili di
degradarlo ad oggetto, a mero strumento ovvero a serbatoio di informazioni utili soltanto ad altri».
110
In argomento v., di recente, A. Aparisi Miralles, El principio della dignidad humana como
fundamento de un bioderecho global, in “Cuadernos de bioética”, XXIV, 2013, p. 201 ss.
111
G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni intorno a bioetica e diritto penale, tra laicità e ‘post-secolarismo’, in “Riv.
it. dir. e proc. pen.”, 2007, p. 558 ss.
112
G. De Francesco, Una sfida da raccogliere: la codificazione delle fattispecie a tutela della persona, cit.,
p. 12 ss.
D. Provolo 251
zione genetica sarebbe allora conforme al contenuto costituzionale di “eguaglianza” (art. 3

Cost.), in cui la diversità (anche genetica) si pone non come aspetto da correggere bensì come
valore da tutelare e coltivare, in quanto capace di «produrre identità» e, dunque, dignità, in
senso dinamico113.
113
P. Torretta, Privacy e nuove forme di discriminazione rispetto alla circolazione delle informazioni
genetiche: sistemi giuridici di tutela a confronto, cit., p. 6.
Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal law and criminal procedure
Feridun Yenisey
Table of contents: I. Legal framework. − II. Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal
code. − 1) Scientific experiment on human being. − 2) Experimentation on children. − 3)
Conducting a test on a patient for purposes of medical treatment. – III. Research involving
human biological material. − IV. Research involving human embryos. − V. Genetics related
regulations in Turkish criminal procedure: DNA evidence. − VI. Genetic information. − VII.
Protection of personal data.
I. Legal framework
Genetic research resulted many changes in many different fields of the law.
However, legal institutions react slowly to the scientific developments and change in
the law takes place later. New discoveries and implementations of earlier discoveries
related to the use of the genetic code, affected Turkish criminal law and criminal
procedure as well, but in a limited extend.
There are some sets of issues, arising from developments in genetics, such as
experiments on human beings for medical purposes, or the utilization of DNA
evidence or DNA identification in criminal procedure and storing genetic samples
which is related to the right on personal data and raises privacy concerns. These
points will be the focus of our short talk.
Article 17 of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to life and the
right to protect and develop his or her material and spiritual entity. The physical
integrity of the individual shall not be violated except in the case of medical necessity
and in cases prescribed by laws and shall not be subjected to scientific or medical
experiments without his or her consent.
Turkey has signed the Convention for the Protection of the Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on
254 Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal law and criminal procedure
Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and ratified it by Law dated 3.12.2003 - No.
5013. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of the Rights and Dignity
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings (1998) has also been ratified.
According Article 90 of the Constitution, international treaties have the legal
status of statutes and those concerning basic rights and freedoms, have priority in
relation national law. Therefore, The Convention for Human Rights and Biomedicine is
now an integral part of the Turkish legal system.
Other ratified international instruments related to our topic are the European
Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other
Scientific Purposes (1986) and the Protocol of Amendment to the European Convention
for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other Scientific
Purposes (2004).
II. Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal code

In the Turkish legal system, unauthorized experimentation and test on human
beings is forbidden under the threat of punishment (Art. 90 Turkish Penal Code:
TCK), but is permitted under two conditions. These conditions include the
authorization of the Ministry of Health and informed consent from the relevant
individual. Furthermore, the Regulation on Medical Research necessitates approval
from ethics committees.
1) Scientific experiment on human being

The sanction of illegal scientific experiment on human being is imprisonment
one to three years (Art. 90/1 TCK). The provisions pertaining to intentional injury
or intentional killing are additionally applicable if the victim is injured or dies due to
the scientific experiment (Art 90/5 TCK).
The Code defines the conditions of a permitted experiment on human beings in
detail (Art. 90/2 TCK). The first requirement is consent. Additional to consent, the
following conditions must be satisfied to avoid criminal responsibility:
a) authorization from the relevant council or body shall be received,
b) the experiment shall first be conducted in an experimental environment other
than the human body or on a sufficient number of animals,
c) the scientific data obtained through an experiment conducted in an
experimental environment other than human body, or on animals, should
necessitate the experiment then being performed on human beings in order
to attain its objectives,
d) the experiment should not foreseeably damage, or have a permanent effect
F. Yenisey 255
upon, human health,

e) no method should be employed that might result in the test subject suffering
to a degree unacceptable to human dignity,
f ) the objective of the experiment should outweigh any danger to the person’s
health or burden placed upon him,
g) the consent of the test subject should be in writing and based on sufficient
information about the content and consequences of the experiment, and
should not be dependent upon securing any gain.
2) Experimentation on children
Experimentation on children had been strictly forbidden by Turkish Criminal
Code when it had been enacted in 2004 (Art. 90/3 TCK). But before the Code
entered in force, it has been amended and experimentation on children is an
exception now, which may only be conducted under the following conditions in
addition to the conditions specified above:
a) the scientific data obtained through an experiment that has been conducted in
an experimental environment should necessitate the experiment then being
performed on a child, in order to attain its objectives,
b) written consent of the mother or father, or legal guardian, and the consent of
the child, where he has the capacity to give consent; and,
c) the presence of a child an illness expert from an authorized body which has the
capacity to give permission for the experiment.
Medical research involving minors can be conducted for the direct interest of
the minor. However, for research to be conducted on minors, the condition of the
benefit of the minor is not sufficient. Furthermore, permission of the parents is a
prerequisite for conducting medical research. In cases where the legal representative
does not consent, the urgency of the medical intervention shall be considered. If
medical research on minors arises from a medical emergency the intervention can be
performed with the decision of the court.
3) Conducting a test on a patient for purposes of medical treatment

Turkish Criminal Code makes a distinction between experimentation on human
beings and tests conducted upon a patient for purposes of treatment (Art. 90/4).
Treatment oriented non-consensual test on a patient is always punishable by
imprisonment up to one year (Art. 90/4, sentence 1).
However, where it is understood that existing methods of known treatment shall
not yield any positive result, conducting an experiment, while using known scientific
methods, upon a person who has consented to such, with the aim of treating such
person, shall not incur criminal responsibility.
The consent should be in writing and be based on sufficient information about

the content and consequences of the experiment, and the medical treatment should
be conducted by an expert physician in a hospital.
III. Research involving human biological material

Removing and using biological material from living persons, is regulated in
Turkish under certain conditions. The Law on Procurement, Preservation, Grafting
and Transplantation of Organs and Tissues governs the conditions of consent for the
removal of organs and tissue.
According to the Civil Code human biological material shall be removed, inoculated
and transplanted based on written consent. Therefore, the initial provision for the
removal of biological material from living persons is written consent. Accordingly,
the consent has to be obtained in the presence of two witnesses and without any
outside pressure. Secondly, the consent has to be informed consent. The donor must
be informed in detail on the potential threats that might arise, and the medical,
psychological, familial and social consequences and benefits for the recipient.
Scientific research can be conducted on bodies of the deceased that have previously
expressed consent for donating their body to be used for research purposes and the
bodies of individuals with no surviving family members.
Turkish Criminal Code sanctions the removal of organs and tissues from a living
another person using illegal methods by imprisonment of five to nine years (Art.
91/1 TCK); unlawful removal of organs or tissue from a deceased person with
imprisonment up to one year (Art. 91/2 TCK) and trading in organs and tissues by
imprisonment of five to nine years (Art. 91/3 TCK).
If the removal of organs and tissues results in the death of the victim, the offender
will also be punished according the provisions relating to intentional killing (Art.
91/8 TCK).
IV. Research involving human embryos

The Regulation on Centers for Medically Assisted Procreation published in 2001
includes provisions concerning research on human embryos. Moreover, as mentioned
above, the Convention on the Protection of the Rights and Dignity of the Human Being
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, which is part of Turkish law,
covers statements directly related to the issue.
The definition of embryo is not clearly made in Turkish law. However, the
Regulation on Centers for Medically Assisted Procreation defines an embryo as the
“fecund state of an egg”. This Regulation is related to the medical therapeutic
F. Yenisey 257
methods used for assisting procreation. The creation of embryos is allowed only for
procreation purposes. The use of embryos for other purposes is prohibited.
The Turkish law does not involve legislative instruments regarding cloning.
The relevant regulation can be found in the amendment to the Convention for the
Protection of the Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application
of Biology and Medicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, which has been
signed, but not ratified by Turkey as by September 2013.
V. Genetics related regulations in Turkish criminal procedure: DNA evidence

Obtaining DNA evidence is regulated in Turkish Criminal Procedure Code
(CMK). Material obtained through physical bodily examination and taking samples
of the suspect, accused or a third party, as described in Articles 75 and 76 CMK may
be subject to molecular-genetic tests.
Molecular-genetic tests shall only be conducted if it is necessary to determine if
those body samples are related to the suspect or to the victim, or to determine the
family connections. Molecular-genetic tests that are outside of the scope of these
aims are forbidden (Art. 78/1 CMK).
Permitted tests may also be conducted on other body parts, that had been found
and seized at the crime scene, and their owner’s identity is not known.
Molecular-genetic tests shall only be conducted upon a judge’s order. The ruling
shall also contain the name of the expert appointed to conduct the test (Art. 79/1
CMK).
Expert may be selected from the officially appointed experts or from the individuals
who are required to act as an expert or from officials who are not attached to the
investigating or prosecuting authorities, or from officials belonging to an objectively
separate structural branch of the investigating or prosecuting authority. These
individuals are obliged to take all suitable organizational and technical precautions in
order to prevent illegal conduct of molecular-genetic tests and so that unauthorized
third parties may not obtain knowledge about the outcomes. The items subject to
test shall be delivered to the experts without labeling them with the name, family
name, address and date of birth of the person from whom the items originate.
The outcome of the analysis on samples are considered as personal data and shall
not be used for another purpose; the individuals, who have access to the files, shall
not disclose the information to unauthorized persons (Art. 80 CMK). Violation of
this regulation will be punished under Art. 135 TCK.
As soon as the time limit for opposing the decision to drop the prosecution is
exhausted, the opposition has been overturned, the court gives a final judgment on
acquittal or a judgment is rendered on not punishing the accused and those judgments
are made final, the samples and information shall be destroyed immediately in the
presence of the public prosecutor, and this fact shall be documented and its document
shall be kept in the file. Violation of this regulation will be punished under Art. 138
TCK.
VI. Genetic information

Turkey has ratified the Convention for the Protection of the Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine. Articles 12, 13
and 14 of the Convention are concerned with genetics. This Convention is part of
Turkish law and its provisions cover tests of genetic diagnosis, intervention seeking
to modify the human genome, and choosing a future child’s sex.
The Regulation on the Centers for Diagnosis of Genetic Diseases was published in
1998 and governs the establishment of centers for diagnosis and medical treatment
of genetic diseases before the child is born. Article 17 of the Regulation states that
the sex of the child cannot be determined except where serious hereditary sex-related
disease is to be avoided. In Article 19 it is stated that the centers for genetic diagnosis
cannot execute a procedure unless informed consent of the applicant is obtained.
Concerning the protection of genetic information, it is stated that the results cannot
be declared to any third party without consent from the particular individual.
Genetic information is part of information covered in medical records and is
a personal data. Any person who illegally records personal data shall be punished
under Art. 135 TCK.
VII. Protection of personal data

Concerning the protection of personal data in Turkish law, Article 17 of the
Constitution governs the personal inviolability, material and spiritual entity of the
individual and Article 20 covers the privacy and protection of private life. The 2010
amendment to Article 20 by the law No. 5982 has created a new fundamental right
related to protection of personal data.
Governing provisions concerning the protection of personal rights are included
in the Turkish Civil Code. The Regulation on the Medical Deontology binds physicians
and dentists to secrecy concerning occupational execution. The Guideline for Good
Clinical Practice also states that the secrecy of private life shall be protected in research
on human beings. Accordingly, personal data concerning the state of individuals
and relevant medical information has to be kept confidential. The Regulation on the
Patients’ Rights also governs personal data. The Law on the Right to Information also
includes provisions on the issue.
F. Yenisey 259
Personal data includes any information relating to an identified or identifiable

natural person. The information may involve all of the properties of reference for
identification such as genetic information, name, address and civil status of the
individual. There are two types of personal data: personal data and sensitive personal
data. Sensitive personal data consist of data revealing political opinions, ethnic or
racial origin, religious or other beliefs, and data relating to state of health, private
and sexual life.
Turkish Criminal Code introduced rules concerning the protection of personal
data unlawfully. According to these rules, it is a crime to record, to disseminate or
to transfer personal data (Art. 135 TCK). It is also considered a crime to record
sensitive personal data such as the philosophical, political and religious opinions,
sexual lives and health status of the persons. Moreover, it is also stated as a crime in
the Code not to erase the personal data within the time limit envisaged by the law.
Genetics: general overview of Russian criminal law
Natalya Krylova, Gleb Bogush
Genetics has a long history in Russia, dating back to the beginning of 20th
century. In spite of termination for years under Stalin’s regime, the Russian genetics
has become today quite developed and internationally recognized science. The
development of medical genetics and gene therapy, the participation of Russia in the
biggest international biomedical project on the human genome gave rise to a number
of problems of moral, ethical and legal nature.
The Russian state research program “Human Genome” has declared five basic
principles of medical genetics and the introduction of the knowledge derived from
the fundamental principle of respect to human dignity: privacy, autonomy, justice,
equal access and quality. In 1999 the members of the project made a statement
of commitment to strictly abide themselves by the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, Russian legislation, to implement international legal norms and standards
regulating the gene therapy. The declaration provided for the general guidelines
for biomedical research involving human beings. In particular, it stated that the
interests and benefit of the individual should prevail over the interests of society,
science and any other interests. The intervention to the human genome, according
to the document, shall be allowed only for medical purposes and only provided that
such intervention is not aimed at changing the genes in the offspring. Further, the
genetic research may not serve as a basis for any form of discrimination or biological
evidence for superiority of any racial or ethnic group. Finally, the document refers
to the need to guarantee the confidentiality of genetic information relating to the
patients, the donors of biological materials and their families in order to prevent
unauthorized access to it1.
Despite the apparent success in developing the basic principles of bio - medical
research and application of gene therapy in Russia, the legal regulation in the area
of biomedicine is very far from perfection. The current domestic law in this area is
rather chaotic, not well systematized and has significant gaps and weaknesses. The
obvious shortage of legal regulation and criminal law protection in that field has its
1
V.S. Ovchinskiy, Kriminologia i biotekhnologii (Criminology and Biotechnologies), Moscow, 2005,
pp. 175-176.
262 Genetics: general overview of Russian criminal law
natural consequences in the absence of any available practice. The scant Russian legal
research in this area is consequently not based on reliable empirical data, but, at best,
on sociological surveys, and even more often on speculative assumptions. Much of
this topic is still terra incognita. The interaction between criminal law and genetics
should however be a new and very promising in the development of Russian criminal
law2.
The most international legal instruments on biomedical research, including in
the field of genetics, are non-binding for Russia. In particular, the Council of Europe
Convention on the protection of human rights and human dignity in relation to
the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine) of 1996 has not been ratified by the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is
impossible or Russia to accede either to the additional protocols to this Convention.
There have never been any official explanation of the reasons behind not ratifying
the convention. Quite the contrary, on a very high level, including the governmental
meetings and parliamentary hearings, some governmental officials stated their
willingness to accede the convention, adding rather vague remarks that Russian legal
system is just “not yet ready” to implement it.
At the national law level, the regulation is very general and lacks efficient
enforcement mechanisms. The Federal Law “On the fundamentals of health protection
of citizens of the Russian Federation” (“Fundamentals”), adopted in 2011, regulates
the issues of genetic research and therapy only at the level of general principles. It
bans a number of actions relating to the application of biomedical technologies.
However, the prohibition is not accompanied by appropriate responsibility for
specific violations. For example, the law prenatal sex selection for the exception when
there is a risk of sex-linked hereditable diseases (paragraph 4 of Art. 55). However
the law is silent on the sanctions of the violation of that prohibition, be it criminal,
administrative or civil. The same law provides for an absolute ban on the industrial
use of germ cells, reproductive organs and tissues of human embryos (paragraph 6
of Art. 55). This prohibition is well justified and in compliance with international
legal standards of biomedicine, but, again, no liability is attached to the prohibition.
Another federal law in this field – the law on the state regulation of genetic
engineering (1996). Its article 12 contains the reference to «the responsibility
according to the law of the Russian Federation» for the harm caused by illegal genetic
engineering. Such responsibility, unfortunately, is not provided in any of Russian
laws.
In May 2002 the State Duma passed a federal law “On the temporary ban of
human cloning”. The ban has been several times extended, the last time in 2010
2
See N.E. Krylova, Ugolovnoe pravo i bioetika: problemy, diskussii, poisk resheniy (Criminal Law and
Bioethics: Problems, Dicussions, Solutions), Moscow, 2005.
N. Krylova, G. Bogush 263
for indefinite period of time. The law proclaimed on «the responsibility for human
cloning according to the legislation of the Russian Federation». It is still, in 2013 not
clear, which liability may be applied in case of violation of the ban on the cloning
of human beings, there is no law regulating such responsibility and the issue is not
still resolved.
In general, Russian legislation in this area is very fragmentary and full of lacunas
that is absolutely inadequate to the latest achievements in the field of biomedicine in
general and medical genetics in particular. They are striking and require the legislator
to respond promptly and adequately.
The “legal vacuum” in the question of responsibility for the most dangerous
violations in the sphere of medical genetics in Russia is caused, among other factors,
by the fact that the legal standards themselves are still in the process of formation.
Many issues are a matter of controversy, cause an ambiguous attitude towards them,
and practical solutions often depend on the moral position of the doctor or the
researcher, as well as their personal views about what is good for the patient and
what are the means to achieve this good. A good illustration of these problem may be
perhaps the most developed area of legal regulation of the field - assisted procreation
technologies3.
Assisted procreation is widely applied in Russia, mostly as infertility treatment,
including the use of cryopreservation of germ cells and surrogacy. The use of assisted
procreation technologies are regulated by the recently adopted “Fundamentals” and
the regulations of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation , in particular,
the order of 30 August 2012 “On the procedure for the use of assisted reproductive
technologies and limitations thereof ”. Russian law provides for heterologous
fertilization only. According article 55 of the “Fundamentals”, a hetero couple,
married or not married, has a right to the use of assisted procreation technologies in
the presence of mutual informed consent to medical intervention. A single woman
also has the right to use the auxiliary reproductive technologies in the presence of her
informed consent to medical intervention.
The Russian legislation limits the number of the implanted embryos. According
to the Order of 2012, it is allowed to implant no more than two embryos, that
corresponds to the current practice of many states. In Russia, in certain cases, three
implanted embryos are allowed. This decision is made by the patient by means of
giving informed consent after providing full information by the attending physician
of the high risk of miscarriage, low survival rate and a high risk of disability of
the baby. Thus, the maximum number of embryos transplanted to woman is three.
Russian legislation does not provide for general right to refuse the implantation of the
3
See N.A. Sokolova, A.V. Mulenko, Novelly rossiyskogo zakonodatelstva o primenenii vspomogatelnykh
reproductivnykh tekhnologiy (The New Russian Law on the Application of Assisted Procreation Technologies),
in “Medicine Law”, (1) 2013.
embryos. However, such a waiver is possible in view of the fact that the implantation
of the embryo, as well as the use of assisted reproductive technologies in general,
require the patient’s written informed consent.
The cryopreservation of human embryos is also permitted in Russia. According
to the Order of the Ministry of Health (2012), it may be an option for “unused”
embryos, together with donation to another couple and destruction. The decision
is taken by the person to whom the embryos belong upon, written agreement
indicating the time of their storage (paragraph 25). Thus, the remaining embryo
after implantation procedure may be “utilized”, i.e. destroyed, can be transferred
to another couple. The possibility of destruction of embryos makes the process of
artificial insemination ethically dubious. Furthermore, Russian law allows reduction
of embryos for the prevention of complications during pregnancy, the birth and
neonatal perinatal period upon an informed written consent of the woman. The
number of embryos to be the reduction is determined by the woman with the advice
of the doctor. At risk of hereditary diseases linked to gender, such as hemophilia,
genetic diagnosis must be conducted prior to implantation.
Even in this area, however, there is no link between legal regulation and criminal
(or administrative) liability. The Russian criminal law does not provide for any
responsibility for eugenic selection of embryos, genetic manipulation aimed at
changing the genotype of embryos and carrying out experiments on human embryos.
As already noted, the use of gametes, tissues and organs of human embryos for
industrial purposes is prohibited. However, obtaining embryos solely for the purpose
of scientific research and experiments is not directly prohibited (for the exception of
human cloning) and therefore is not a criminal offence.
The research and the use of embryonic stem cells are not prohibited as such
in Russia. There are many Russian hospitals and medical centers using stem cells,
not only for cosmetic purposes, but also for treating serious cardio diseases, Down’s
syndrome etc. The Russian source for such studies is often abortive material, which
makes the experiments in this area ethically controversial, to say the least. Research
on embryonic stem cells and their use should not pose an ethical conflict in which
researchers have interest in getting a large number of embryonic tissues harvested by
increasing the number of abortions.
In 2003, Russia has created national stem cell bank and the hospitals, under
special licence, organize special cryobanks for the storage of embryos and germ cells.
At the same time, the transplantation of human embryonic stem cells is outside the
reach of any legal regulation: no federal law or other legal documents regulate this
issue. The federal law on the transplantation of organs and tissues (1992) contains
a special clause of its non-applicability to human bodies, their parts and tissues that
are relevant to the process of human reproduction, e.g. sperm, embryos or ovaries.
Administrative acts of the Ministry of Health regulate only in vitro fertilization
and embryo implantation in the treatment of human infertility. Again, no criminal

responsibility.
Probably the most developed area of legal regulation of procreative technologies
is that of surrogacy. “The fundamentals” (2011) define surrogacy is a bearing and
birth the child under a contract concluded between a surrogate mother (the woman
who carries the fetus after the transfer of the donor of the embryo) and potential
parents whose germ cells were used for fertilization, or a single woman who is unable
to bear and birth the child for medical reasons. According to the Russian legislation a
surrogate mother may be a woman, between 20 and 35 years old, having at least one
own healthy child and a medical certificate of good health and who gave voluntary
informed consent in writing. A married woman may be a surrogate mother only with
the written consent of her husband. The Russian criminal law however provides for
no responsibility for the violations of the rules on surrogacy.
Eugenics in Russia, as in many other countries, also has gained interest in recent
years. It can be explained not only by the apparent achievements of genetics, to the
extent it can modify or even “improve” human beings. At present, Russia is surviving
a critical socio-economic and demographic situation. For many years the mortality
rate in the country is higher than the birth rate, the population is getting older
each year. “Absolutely healthy” children are born very rarely. The level of hereditary
deceases has increased significantly. “Social deceases”, such as crime, alcoholism,
drug addiction, prostitution, etc. are also characterized by negative trends.
In this situation, there is a strong temptation to use eugenic measures, including
sterilization, for the improving the nation’s gene pool and also to prevent crime
and other asocial deviant behavior. Though such a use of eugenics is now just a
topic for academic debate, such proposals should be treated with a big caution. The
civilized state does not have a right to “adjust” the morality by forced sterilization.
“Breeding” people is contrary to fundamental human rights and unacceptable in
democratic society. Even the most serious offenders cannot be denied the right to a
private and family life and right to have children. Moreover, it is very easy to predict
inevitable abuses in this area, such as those that took place in Soviet psychiatry used
for punishing the dissidents4.
Eugenic “selection” itself is not a criminal offence in the Russian Federation
unless such practices make criminally relevant harm to the values, protected by the
criminal law (causing death or serious bodily harm).
As already noted, the human cloning is not a criminal offence, although a cloning
itself is prohibited since 2002. Therefore, the ban on cloning was only proclaimed. It
is important to note, that the law does not prohibit the cloning of organisms other
than human (plants, animals). No criminal or other responsibility exist for creating
4
N.E. Krylova, op. cit.
so-called chimeras.
Thus, Russian criminal law is still very far from the modern achievements of
genetics and does not provide for sufficient protection of legal interests in this
sphere. There are no special rules on criminal liability for unlawful genetic therapy
and genetic experiments, for causing physical and mental harm as a result of genetic
engineering, for discrimination on genetic grounds, for illegal eugenic selection, the
cloning of human beings, illegal use of embryonic stem cells, etc. Criminal liability
for some actions is only possible on the basis of general rules on “traditional” crimes.
So, if illegal genetic experiments or genetic therapy caused death or serious bodily
harm, criminal liability should arise from the norms of inflicting such harm (art.
105 (“murder”), 111 (“intentional serious bodily injury), etc.). Disclosure of the
information about the genetic characteristics of persons may be prosecuted under art.
137 of the Criminal Code (“violation of privacy”). Criminal liability may arise from
the articles on crimes against public health (art. 235-238 of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation). For example, the production and sale of products, or drugs
derived from genetic engineering, does not meet safety requirements, are punishable
under art. 238 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The creation of
“genetic weapons”, i.e. weapons of mass destruction produced by means of genetic
engineering methods and should result in criminal liability under Article 355 of the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation «development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition or sale of weapons of mass destruction». The prohibition of “genetic”
weapons is contained in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
their Destruction, ratified 1971 USSR and retains its legal force for the Russian
Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union.
As the rules of general part are concerned, the notion of “justified” (reasonable)
risk as a circumstance excluding criminal liability (art. 41 of the Criminal Code of
the Russian Federation) may be relevant to genetic experiments. Such a risk is that
following “socially useful purpose”, having taken all possible measures to prevent
adverse effects. The risk (for instance of genetic experiment) cannot be considered
“justified”, when it inevitably endanger “the life of many people, environmental
catastrophe or public calamity”.
At the same time, many serious violations in the sphere of genetics are still beyond
the reach of criminal law. In particular, illegal genetic manipulation at the molecular
and cellular levels, using modified RNA and DNA to create genetically modified
organisms (viruses, transgenic animals and plants, etc.). The further development of
medical genetics may cause new problems of ethical and legal nature. The increase
in the number of persons subjected to genetic screening, and, correspondingly, the
number persons, interested in the results of the DNA testing.
In sum, legal regulation in the sphere of genetics in Russia is unsatisfactory.
Russia may unfortunately serve as an example of the legal vacuum, that can have
negative consequences in the future. Among them is a real danger of using Russia’s
rich facilities as a safe heaven for criminal activity.
There is a strong need for international legal policy in this important field. It is
very important that Russia would adhere to international instruments in this field
and implementation of the best practices in Russian law. First of all, the criminal
law should provide for the provisions on criminal responsibility for serious violation
in this field, like discrimination on genetic grounds; intentional modification of the
human genotype for non-medical purposes; therapeutic and reproductive human
cloning; other genetic manipulation, leading to the loss of genetic identity; illegal
genetic manipulation at the molecular, cellular levels involving modified RNA and
DNA to create genetically modified organisms (viruses, microorganisms, transgenic
plants and transgenic animals and their cells); illegal testing of genetically modified
organisms.
The protection of human genome by means of criminal law in Hungary and

related issues on the punishability of incest
Zsolt Szomora
Table of contents: 1. The protection of human (and foetal) genome − The structure of
related legal sources and provisions. − 1.1. Statutory offences in the Criminal Code. − 1.2.
Background norms of the Criminal Code. − 1.3. The punishability of manipulative genetic
procedure and cloning. − 1.4. Rules on medically assisted procreation, cryopreservation of
gametes and embryos, research on embryos – and related criminal offences. − 2. Genetics and
the punishability of incest – legal concerns.
1. The protection of human (and foetal) genome - The structure of related legal sources
and provisions
1.1. Statutory offences in the Criminal Code
As for the structure of legal regulation on this matter, legal sources are to be
divided into two groups: statutory definitions of the Criminal Code and background
norms outside the Criminal Code, which norms are essential for the application
of the statutory definitions of criminal offences. Statutory offences aiming at the
protection of the human and foetal genome were first introduced in the Hungarian
Criminal Code1 in 19982. Before 1998, the protection by means of criminal law did
not exist.
1
At the time of the incorporation of these offences in 1998, the Criminal Code of 1978 (Act IV of
1978) was in effect (hereinafter referred to as CC). It has to be noted that, unlike the criminal law
of numerous Western European countries, the entire substantive criminal law is codified in a single
uniform act in Hungary. Concerning natural persons, no separate penal statues exist in the Hungarian
legal system, i.e. the only statute defining the elements of any criminal offences and providing the
sanctions is the single Criminal Code. In 2012, a new Criminal Code was enacted that has been in force
since 1 July 2013. The new CC did not affect the related rules in their main substance.
2
Act XXII of 1998 on the Amendment of the Criminal Code of 1978.
270 The protection of human genome by means of criminal law in Hungary
The Explanatory Notes of the Amending Act of 1998 to the Criminal Code3
refers to the fact that the recent development of medical biology and genetics not
only enables a significant broadening of the scope of healing and research but also
can lead to the danger of misuse of such practices. The legislature explicitly regards
the misuse of genetic practices as an artificial and inacceptable intervention into the
order of nature. Therefore, the Explanatory Notes state that the rules of the research
on human gametes and embryos as well as that of medically assisted procreation have
to be backed by penal sanctions. The legislature took the Biomedicine Convention of
the Council of Europe also into consideration4. Since 1998, the Hungarian Criminal
Code includes a separate Chapter under the title “Criminal offences against the order
of medical procedures and research” (Chapter XVI). The new Criminal Code of
2012 has not affected the provisions on these offences in their main substance, it is
therefore not necessary to differentiate between the Codes of 1978 and 2012 for the
goals of this paper. Hereinafter, the Articles of the CC 2012 will be referred to.
The statutory offences relevant to genetic identity are as follows5:
- Manipulative procedure on human genome (Art. 168 CC);
- Illicit use of human gametes (Art. 169. CC);
- Altering the gender of an unborn child (Art. 170 CC);
- Violation of the rules of experimental research on gametes and embryos (Art.
172-173 CC);
- Creating genetically identical human individuals (Art. 174 CC);
- Illicit use of human body (Art. 175 CC).
One remaining statutory offence laid down in this Chapter, which offence is
though not relevant to the protection of human genome:
- Violation of the rules of experimental research on human individuals (Art. 171
CC).
1.2. Background norms of the Criminal Code

Naturally, each of these statutory offences is laid down in a framework definition
in the Criminal Code, which definition refers back to the detailed special legal norms
on procedures on human gametes, embryos and genome. These legal provisions
3
The Explanatory Notes are attached to a Bill by the person who brings the Bill before the Parliament
in order to get it passed. In case of the 1998 Amending Act introducing the criminal offences discussed
in this paper, it was the Minister of Justice to prepare the Explanatory Notes.
4
It is remarkable that, despite the Biomedicine Convention having been ratified by the Hungarian
Parliament only in 2002, its provisions were already taken into consideration when the criminal
offences discussed here were introduced to the CC in 1998.
5
On a detailed analysis of these offences, see K. Karsai, Az egészségügyi beavatkozás és kutatás rendje
elleni bűncselekmények (Btk. XVI. Fejezet) [Criminal offences against the order of medical procedures and
research (Chapter XVI of CC)], in K. Karsai (ed.): Kommentár a Büntető Törvénykönyvhöz (Kommentár
a Büntető Törvénykönyvről szóló 2012. évi C. törvényhez), Budapest, 2013, pp. 338-351.
Z. Szomora 271
are included in a separate Chapter of the Act on the Health Care System6 and in
a Decree on medically assisted special procreation procedures, the disposal and
the cryopreservation of gametes and embryos (Decree of the Ministry of Welfare
30/1998)7. As already mentioned, the legislature also refers to the Biomedicine
Convention as the relevant international legal instrument. The consideration of these
background rules is essential for the correct interpretation of the statutory definitions
in the Criminal Code. In case procedures on human genome are carried out in
accordance with the provisions of these background norms, they do not constitute
any criminal offence, since these rules are regarded as explicit grounds of justification
precluding the punishability of such procedures8. Explicit grounds of justification
that are laid down outside the Criminal Code can be considered according to Art.
24 CC that generally declares conducts, which are allowed by (other) legal norms,
unpunished.
1.3. The punishability of manipulative genetic procedure and cloning

Looking at the provisions of the Hungarian Criminal Code, one can see
that any manipulative procedures on both human and foetal genome are punishable.
Already the commencement of a manipulative procedure constitutes a completed
offence9, which is the basic type of the offence. In case the procedure results in the
actual alteration of the genome, a qualified type of the offence is committed (Pars 1
and 2, Art. 168 CC).
The wording of the relevant statutory definition under § 168 CC does not
literally refer to the exceptions that constitute a ground of justification. As already
mentioned, they are laid down in the separate Act on the Health Care System. In
accordance with Art. 162 Health Care Act, such manipulative procedures are allowed
only if they aim at diagnosis, prevention or therapy. Concerning foetal genome,
manipulative procedures may be carried out only if they aim at diagnosing of
genetic diseases that have their basis on the gender of the foetus or if they aim at the
detection or healing of other genetic diseases (Arts 181 and 182 Health Care Act).
A general clause of proportionality is also included in these norms of justification:
the alteration of the genome must be limited to an absolutely necessary method and
extent. These provisions of the Health Care Act are in accordance with Chapter IV
of Biomedicine Convention.
6
Chapter IX of Act CLIV of 1997 [1997. évi CLIV. törvény az egészségügyről].
7
Decree of the Ministry of Welfare Nr. 30 of 1998 [30/1998. (VI. 24.) NM rendelet az emberi
reprodukcióra irányuló különleges eljárások végzésére vonatkozó, valamint az ivarsejtekkel és embriókkal
való rendelkezés és azok fagyasztva tárolására vonatkozó részletes szabályokról].
8
On the system of grounds of justification in Hungarian criminal law, see F. Nagy, A magyar büntetőjog
általános része [The General Part of Hungarian Criminal Law], Budapest, 2008, p. 140.
9
K. Karsai, op. cit., p. 338.
Under § 174 CC, human cloning is punishable. The prohibition of cloning

is an absolute one, both reproductive and therapeutic cloning are strictly forbidden;
no ground of justification exists.
1.4. Rules on medically assisted procreation, cryopreservation of gametes and embryos,

research on embryos – and related criminal offences
In Hungary, both homologous and heterologous insemination are permitted
(Art. 171 Act of Health Care). The above mentioned ministerial Decree Nr. 30 of
1998 on the detailed rules of assisted procreation limits the number of embryos to be
implanted to three pieces. There are four exceptional cases when four embryos may
be implanted into the mother’s uterus (Art. 2 par. 2):
- first, if one previous implantation was unsuccessful;
- second, if the mother receiving the embryo is older than 35 years of age;
- third, if the hormone examinations indicate an ovarian weakness;
- fourth, if no more embryos originating from the same persons are available for
cryopreservation.
The actual indication for implanting four embryos has to be recorded in the
documentation of the procreation procedure.
The ministerial Decree also lays down the detailed conditions of the cryconservation
of gametes and embryos. The indications for cryopreservation of embryos are as follows
(Annex IV of the Decree):
- the number of embryos is more than 3 or 4 and they are suitable for a next
possible implantation cycle; or
- the embryos are available but their implantation is actually contraindicated due
to any reasons; or
- the mother concerned is expecting chemo- or radiotherapy; or
- the embryos undergo pre-implantation diagnostic procedures before being
implanted.
Annex IV of the Decree also specifies the indications of the cryopreservation of
sperm for the purpose of homologous insemination. These indications are
- the expected chemo- or radiotherapy of the male partner;
- before medically indicated vasectomy or other operations leading to sterility;
- the erectile dysfunction of the male partner; or
- even social indications (such as a longer absence of the male partner).
As it can be seen from the just mentioned grounds for cryopreservation of
embryos, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis is permitted, but only for the purpose
of detecting diseases in connection with the gender of the unborn child or other
genetic diseases (cf. Art. 182 Health Care Act). The genome of the embryo can be
altered if it is necessary and suitable for the healing of the genetically based disease.
Z. Szomora 273
Consequently, a selection of the embryos after the pre-implantation diagnosis is also

permitted. Any other selection of the gametes or embryos for eugenic purposes or
any other interventions aimed at altering their genetic heritage is forbidden and
constitutes a criminal offence. Depending on the circumstances of the actual selection
or manipulative procedure, this criminal offence can be the altering the gender of an
unborn child (§ 170 CC), illicit use of human gametes (§ 169 CC) or the violation
of the rules of experimental research on gametes and embryos (Art. 172 CC).
In terms of experimental research with gametes and embryos, it has to be stressed
that no embryos may be created for the purposes of research. Consequently, embryos
can undergo research only if they have been created in the course of an assisted
procreation procedure. The research requires the approval of the persons concerned.
However, no approval is needed if the embryos are damaged. In both cases, also the
separation of embryonic stem cells and the research on them are permitted. Embryos
that have been created in an assisted procreation procedure may never be used for
creating more embryos or for creating embryos that have different genetic features
compared to the embryo created by conception except the already mentioned case
of diseases based on the gender of the unborn child. The cells of an embryo may be
separated from each other only for the detection of a probable disease of the unborn
child or the damage of the embryo (Arts 180 to 182 Act on Health Care). Any
violation of these rules constitutes one of the criminal offences listed above.
Fortunately, trading with gametes and embryos or the so-called procreative
tourism are not typical phenomena in Hungary, against which the legislature and
the authorities would have to combat. So, this topic does not raise special problems
in our country. The aforementioned criminal offences have left no trace in criminal
statistics and did not yet particularly arouse the interest of criminal layers10. I am
however sure that the interest of criminal law scholars will be aroused as soon as the
very first cases happen and are brought before the court.
2. Genetics and the punishability of incest – legal concerns

For the second part of this paper, a topic has been chosen that has a slightly bit
more relevance in the criminal law system of Hungary: the criminal offence of incest
and its relation to genetics. The offence of incest does not leave significant trace
in criminal statistics either. Usually, the number of registered incest cases does not
10
As an exception, one comprehensive paper can be metioned: G. Kovács, I. Németh, B. Gellér,
Az egészségügyi beavatkozás, az orvostudományi kutatás rendje és az egészségügyi önrendelkezés elleni
bűncselekmények I-II. [Criminal offences against medical procedures, the order of medical research and
against the health autonomy of individuals I and II], in “Büntetőjogi Kodifikáció”, 1/2005, pp. 7-24 and
2/2005, pp. 3-24.
exceed twenty per year11. It is still significantly more than the number of offences
related to the protection of genetic identity. The punishability of incest raises special
questions from the point-of-view of criminal law doctrine and from that of the
constitutional prohibition of discrimination.
In Hungary,
- all sexual activities among ascendants and descendants,
- as well as heterosexual vaginal intercourse and any homosexual activities of
siblings
were punishable.
In 1999, the statutory definition of incest (Art. 203 CC of 1978) was reviewed by
the Constitutional Court. The review had the following result: the punishability of
homosexual activities among siblings was abolished with reference to the prohibition
of discrimination12. In case of siblings, heterosexual activities other than vaginal
intercourse had been unpunished, while each kind of homosexual activity had been
forbidden by the Criminal Code 1978. This situation violated the constitutional
prohibition of discrimination, according to the opinion of the Constitutional
Court. In view of other incestuous relationships, the statutory definition remained
untouched. Incest
- by any kind of sexual activities between ascendants and descendants,
- as well as heterosexual vaginal intercourse of siblings
is still punishable (also in Art. 199 CC of 2012).
The Constitutional Court did not accept the complaints that aimed at a complete
annulment of the punishability. The Court brought forward the argument that the
protection of marriage, the family, the youth and the genetic health of progeny
represent reasonable grounds for the punishability of the remaining incestuous
activities in the statutory definition13. As we can see, the Hungarian Constitutional
Court referred to a complexity of legally protected interests and one of these interests
is the genetic health of children that could possibly be born from an incestuous
relationship. The fact that heterosexual vaginal intercourse is now the only punishable
sexual activity among siblings reinforces the impression that genetic protection is
supposed to be a distinguished interest to be protected among those I have just
11
1990: 20 (out of 1343 sexual offences); 1991: 9 (out of 1591 sexual offences); 1992: 16 (out of 1906
sexual offences); 1993: 17 (out of 2968 sexual offences); 1994: 27 (out of 1847 sexual offences); 1995:
14 (out of 1543 sexual offences); 1996: 12 (out of 2199 sexual offences); 1997: 15 (out of 1554 sexual
offences); 1998: 13 (out of 1519 sexual offences); 1999: 17 (out of 1642 sexual offences); 2000: 28 (out
of 1350 sexual offences); 2001: 7 (out 1382 sexual offences); 2002: 13 (out of 1307 sexual offences);
2003: 16 (out of 1265 sexual offences); 2004: 11 (out of 1298 sexual offences); 2005: 33 (out of 1365
sexual offences); 2006: 15 (out of 1247 sexual offences). Source: Official note of the Hungarian Central
Statistics Office upon request.
12
Dec. of the Constitutional Court: 20/1999. (VI.25.) AB hat.
13
20/1999. (VI.25.) AB hat. II.1.2.
Z. Szomora 275
mentioned.
I am not going to discuss the punishability of incest in general14. I am going to
focus on the argument of genetic protection and review the question of whether or
not the genetic health of progeny can be accepted as a legally protected interest in
criminal law. It is not Hungary the only country, in which the criminalization of
incest is based on the argument of genetic protection, amongst other arguments15.
The German Constitutional Court refers to possible genetic damages three times
in its 2008 decision on incest among siblings16. Some other countries can also be
mentioned where the courts or the legislature itself or legal literature uses the same
argument: Poland, Sweden, Romania and Chile for example17. It is not my task
to present and argue the results of the related medical, genetic researches and to
challenge the common knowledge that children of relatives can suffer from genetic-
based diseases with an increased probability18. In my opinion, the question of
whether or not the increased probability of genetic damages is an acceptable reason
for criminalization can be answered easily and clearly from the point of view of law.
In order to give the answer, a case that occurred in Great Britain shall first and
provocatively be described. Sharon and Nail Bernardi lost all seven of their children
to a rare genetic disease. The majority of the children did not live longer than a
couple of hours or days. It was their fourth child where the doctors and the couple
clearly got aware of the mother’s genetic disorder that is inherited dominantly and
leads to fatal disturbances in the central nervous system. Despite being aware of these
findings, the couple gave birth to three more children who died shortly after having
14
On a detailed, critical purposive analysis of the statutory definition of incest in the Hungarian
literature, see Zs. Szomora, A nemi bűncselekmények alapkérdései [Fundamental issues of sexual offences],
Budapest, 2009, pp. 224-244. See also M. Hollán, N. Kis: § 203. In: Az 1978. évi IV. törvény
kommentárja. Az 1978. évi IV. törvény kapcsolódó anyagaként. In: Hivatalos Jogszabálytár. Hatályos
Jogszabályok Hivatalos Gyűjteménye. Hivatalos Közlönykiadó. 2005/11. CD-formátum.
15
On the basis of the legislature’s working papers on the CC 1978, the Hungarian legislature regarded
the genetic argument only as a subsidiary aspect behind the dominance of the moral incest taboo that
was primarily referred to as the legal interest to be protected [cf. J. László (Ed.): Az 1978. évi IV.
törvény (Btk.) előkészítése (The preparation of the Criminal Code of 1978), vol. VIII, Budapest, 1989,
pp. 307-309]. Contrary to the legislature, the wording of the Constitutional Court’s 1999 decision
makes the impression that the Constitutional Court, in the course of and from the point of view of
the constitutional review of the statutory offence of incest, regarded the several relevant interests to be
protected as equal ones.
16
Regarding only the own argumentation of the German Constitutional Court, i.e. references
to genetic aspects by others involved in the proceedings of the Constitutional Court are here not
connumerated: BverfG, 2BvR 392/7 of 26 February 2008, marginal no. 41, 56, 61 (http://www.bverfg.
de/entscheidungen/rs20080226_2bvr039207.html).
17
Cf. Stellungnahme zu dem Fragenkatalog des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in dem Verfahren 2 BvR 392/07 zu
§ 173 Abs. 2 StGB – Beischlaf zwischen Geschwistern –. Fassung vom 19. November 2007, vorgelegt von H.-
J. Albrecht und U. Sieber, pp. 70-74 (http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20080226_2bvr039207.
html).
18
On a detailed overview on the results of medical research, see the expert opinion in Fn. 17, pp. 112-
117.
been born. After the death of the seventh child, the couple gave up their attempts to
give birth to healthy children19.
If we compare this case with incest cases, in which a major part of medical
findings allege an increased probability of the manifestation of recessive genetic
disorders, the clear conclusion can be made that no reasonable ground can be
found for the distinction of legal consequences in these two cases20. Impunity for
knowingly transmitted dominant diseases and punishability for a certain probability
of the manifestation of recessive disorders: this sort of distinction is an obvious
discrimination. The prohibition of discrimination can only apply concerning so-
called homogenous groups. If we talk about genetically inherited disorders, the
factor, on which the comparable groups can be built up, can only and exclusively be
the genome of the persons affected. As for the legal aspects, the presence or absence
of the genome disorders of the individuals affected can only and exclusively be taken
into consideration. In my view, no other circumstances can be relevant. In order to
prevent misunderstandings, I would like to emphasize that I under no circumstances
argue for punishing people who knowingly transmit genetic diseases. There are very
good reasons for which such life situations have to remain untouched by criminal
law and eugenic health should not be defined as a goal of penal sanctioning21. We
know these reasons very well from our history22.
Consequently, if one wants to substantiate the punishability of incest, one has
to do without the genetic factor and look for other protected interests that might
constitute a reasonable limit to the sexual freedom of relatives. This paper comes to
the conclusion that the protection of genetic health of progeny cannot be accepted
as a legally protected interest in the system of criminal law since it can under no
circumstances be relieved of its discriminatory nature.
19
The woman who lost all seven children (Robin Banerji, BBC World Service) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/magazine-19648992#story_continues_2).
20
Cf. H. Jung, Zur Strafbarkeit des Inzests, in H.-J. Kerner et al. (Eds), Kriminologie – Psychiatrie –
Strafrecht. Festschrift für Heinz Leferenz, Heidelberg, 1983, p. 315.
21
H. Tröndle, T. Fischer, Strafgesetzbuch und Nebengesetze, 53. Aufl. München, 2006, p. 1038.
22
F. Baumann, Die Blutschande und ihre rechtlichen Folgen, in “Schweizerische Juristenzeitung”,
21/1967, p. 323; M. Frommel: §§ 173-184f, in U. Kindhäuser et al. (Eds), Nomos Kommentar.
Strafgesetzbuch, Band 2. 2. Aufl., Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp. 3207-3208.
The new frontiers of criminal law1
Leonardo Mazza
During two intense days of congress we examined in an inter-disciplinary key

and with the intervention of several and illustrious scholars coming from various
Countries and having very different legal traditions the issues raised by genetics
and robotics in the legal field and in the field of criminal law, especially with the
connected implications of moral character, in an era in which deep socio-economical
transformations imply their direct and immediate repercussion on the custom and
on the judgments of value.
The complexity of the topics we dealt with in sectors having unceasing
developmental dynamics makes ever more difficult the reflection on the role that
law (and, in our case, substantive and procedural criminal law) has to play in the
regulation of scientific activity, on the same capability of known and experimented
legal instruments to adequately protect the single subjects from new forms of
aggression against the human person before a myth that has been long towering over
the heart of society: technology.
Facing the establishment of a different relation between the various fields of
experience and of the knowledge trying to regulate it, in the era of globalisation we
should ask ourselves whether and to what extent it is possible to take the responsibility
of binding decisions in the sectors of bio-ethics, of the fight against organised crime,
of the protection of health broadly conceived and of the well-being of the cives, in a
universe that seems to entrust to the functional effectiveness of its devices the answer
to every kind of every-day problem.
The rapid and sudden mutation produced in a short time by scientific discoveries
with their operational innovations caused technology to turn from an instrument of
the ends and values set by the reason into an exhaustive meter of life, to the extent
that it makes necessary to consider also the aspect of the consequences deriving
from it for the very dignity and happiness of the human person and to prospect the
possibility of tracing the features of an impalpable «neuro-ethics». This fully justifies
also the question on the function of morals not only as a practical exercise of personal
choices, but also, according to Ezio Riondato’s and Antonino Poppi’s opinion, as
1
278 The new frontiers of criminal law
a rational reflection and normative science of the strategic decisions of the single
subjects in the sociality of their own relations.
Also in the present time of civilisation and culture, marked by a sheer restlessness,
man cannot give up a serious and complete consideration of the ways and the ends
of life and of practice without abdicating his duty and his dignity.
We owe some philosophers of law operating in the second half of the Twentieth
Century the merit of having dealt among the first in Italy the problems posed by
the still ongoing technological transformation in highly industrialised societies
with the crisis of mentality and customs it necessarily involves and to which Mario
Losano, Sergio Cotta and Vittorio Frosini gave divergent solutions due to their
different attitude towards the ethical evaluation of such a phenomenon: the first
focused attention on the shift from natural language to that formalised by logic and
by programming, emphasising the role of cyberlaw and in general of the complexity
of computer machines; the Florentine disciple of Gioele Solari, taking up the
technologic challenge and charmed by the ptolemaic Great Syntax, inserted science
and its derivatives in the cognitive process of a generation tending to daydream
about a mythical reality of welfare, which is but an artifice and which is capable of
elaborating behavioural models illusoriliy responding to a radically renovated age;
the secular Sicilian, in the context of lively Sienese debates together with Letizia
Gianformaggio, Silvio Riondato and Peter Sloterdijk with his motto Du musst dein
Leben ändern, was concerned about always saving the privacy of the individuals from
the penetrating invasions of the most advanced cognitive instruments such as the
social communication networks, without giving up for this to constantly suggest
new adjectives to their experience.
In the new millennium such contributions are decisive for the study of genetics
and robotics, in order to understand the contrast between natural entities and non-
natural entities, and put the criminal lawyer, facing the eruption of new realities in a
renovated legal experiences, before the doubt concerning, in general, the endurance
of penal institutions which have been part of the lawyer’s cultural inheritance since
a long time. Think, for instance, to the capability of understanding and willing
(«capacità di intendere e di volere») and to the possible crisis (which renews itself
in time) of the postulate of the necessary connection between culpability and
imputability (with the relative judgement of value), or of the idea that intent and
negligence are exclusively to be attributed to subjects characterised by certain notes
of physio-psychological normality, without discussing the autonomy between the
judgement of imputability and the judgment of culpability.
The charm of neurosciences in their dialectic with substantive and procedural
criminal law is not limited to the identification of the biological roots of criminality
(with the related problems concerning the mechanisms of the formation of morals),
to the perils of the entrance of scientific evidence in the procedural mechanisms
L. Mazza 279
chosen by the legislator, but especially involves the use of such a knowledge by the
lawyer, who is not at all closed in a splendid isolation, as Musumeci wrongly believes
(and the present Conference organized by the University of Padua proves it), or in
a trench, so to assume an attitude of indifference, according to what Di Giovine
emphasises: the effort that the criminal lawyer is called to make consists in framing
new scientific realities within the substantive and procedural schemes and the legal
categories acquired by our legal inheritance (think about the indirect perpetration
of crime, as to the aspect of the responsibility of the robot as non-human agent), by
inserting them within such schemes and categories without necessarily having to
create unknown figures, also in order to avoid the belief that a legally subjectivized
nature engenders such a persuasive capability to modify the social perception of the
protected object, that is the affirmation of an intrinsic dignity of all that is alive, and
in order to prevent a present risk: the use of the undeniable progresses of cognitive
neurosciences and of molecular genetics might revive some forms of criminal law of
the offender («diritto penale d’autore»), thus ousting from the system the configuration
of a criminal law of the fact («diritto penale del fatto») that is mandated by our own
constitution itself.
Indeed, the well-known precepts of art. 25 Const. impose that our penal order
falls within the «criminal laws of the fact», with a strong refusal of any different
orientation that, in order to sanction the subject, privileges, instead, his/her being
or even his/her mere attitude towards the will expressed by the legislator, whose
intervention makes sense whereas correlated to the need for prohibiting a fact, for
forbidding it in compliance with the principle of culpability and in such terms
as to ensure the protection of a certain legal good and/or of a particular facet or
modalization, in accordance with the binding prescriptions deriving from the
combined provisions of articles 2, 3 and 25 of the fundamental Charter.
For sure, criminal law shall not assume forms contrasting with the use of the most
advanced technologies, but it is better not to be influenced by facile enthusiasms
aimed at depicting a new framework of the penal system in an evolutionist reading
(think, for instance, of the implications that some would draw from the analysis
of emotions – differentiated according to whether they are based on reasonable
judgements or not! – and empathy) and it is also necessary to prevent trials against
defendants that are impossible subjects of criminal law, such as robots, which still
remain means and can never be non-human agents.
A cautious attitude in this topic is also advised by the need for the new knowledge
to be properly “tested” in order to be possibly used within a process that shall define
itself “just”: it is necessary that scientific evidence always presents high credentials of
reliability, but reliability of neurosciences with all their several disciplines still suffers
from a certain “immaturity” unavoidably reflected not only on the investigation
on the influence of mental insanity on the ability of understanding and willing
280 The new frontiers of criminal law
and on the judgement of social dangerousness, but also on the whole structure of
imputability and of other fundamental institutes of the penal system, far beyond
merely cosmetic terminological modifications, different from the traditional ones,
but not always implying substantive diversity compared with the precedent ones.
Hence springs the invitation to meditate on some “intuitions” of the members of the
positive School and on the impossibility of acting differently, too soon and hastily
labelled by Ettore Dezza as “amenities”, and relegated with contempt by Paolo Grossi
to the shores of an “figurative and vulgar anti-legalism”, marked by an “subversive
conception of interpretation”. A further serene reflection, free from any ideological
prejudice, could instead bring to the conclusion that it is “never too late” to open
new frontiers.
Le nuove frontiere del diritto penale
Leonardo Mazza
Nel corso di due intense giornate congressuali sono stati esaminati in chiave interdiscipli-
nare, con l’intervento di numerosi ed illustri studiosi provenienti da vari Paesi con tradizioni
giuridiche assai diverse, le questioni che genetica e robotica sollevano nel campo del diritto e
di quello penale in particolare con le connesse implicazioni di carattere morale, in un conte-
sto epocale in cui profonde trasformazioni socio-economiche comportano una loro diretta ed
immediata ripercussione sul costume e sui giudizi di valore.
La complessità dei temi affrontati in settori contrassegnati da una incessante dinamica
evolutiva rende sempre più ardua la riflessione sul ruolo che deve svolgere il diritto (e nel caso
che ci occupa il diritto penale sostanziale e processuale) nella regolamentazione della attività
scientifica, sulla stessa capacità degli strumenti giuridici già conosciuti e sperimentati di tu-
telare adeguatamente i singoli soggetti da nuove forme di aggressione alla persona dinanzi ad
un mito che da tempo giganteggia nel cuore della società: la tecnologia.
Dinanzi all’instaurarsi di un diverso rapporto fra i vari campi dell’esperienza e dei saperi
che tentano di disciplinarla, è da chiedersi nell’era della globalizzazione se ed in quale misura
divenga possibile assumersi la responsabilità di decisioni vincolanti nei settori della bioetica,
della lotta alla criminalità organizzata, della salvaguardia della salute intesa in senso lato e del
benessere dei cives, in un universo che sembra affidare alla efficacia funzionale dei suoi dispo-
sitivi la risposta per risolvere ogni tipo di problema che prospetta la quotidianità.
Il rapido e repentino mutamento che le scoperte scientifiche con le relative innovazioni
applicative hanno prodotto in breve tempo ha fatto sì che proprio la tecnologia da stru-
mento in veste dei fini e dei valori stabiliti dalla ragione sia invece assurta al rango di metro
esaustivo della vita tanto da imporre di considerare anche il profilo delle conseguenze che ne
derivano per la stessa dignità e felicità della persona umana, e da prospettare la possibilità di
tratteggiare le sembianze di una impalpabile “neuroetica”. Il che, peraltro, giustifica a pieno
la domanda sulla funzione che deve svolgere la morale non solo quale esercizio pratico delle
scelte personali, ma pure, secondo la impostazione di Ezio Riondato ed Antonino Poppi,
come riflessione razionale e scienza normativa delle decisioni strategiche dei singoli soggetti
nella socialità dei loro rapporti.
Anche nel momento attuale di civiltà e di cultura, contrassegnato da una profonda in-
quietudine, l’uomo non può infatti rinunciare ad una seria e compiuta considerazione dei
modi e dei fini della vita e della prassi senza abdicare al suo compito ed alla sua dignità.
Si deve ad alcuni giusfilosofi operanti nella seconda metà del Novecento il merito di
aver affrontato tra i primi in Italia i problemi posti dalla trasformazione tecnologica tuttora
in atto nelle società ad alta industrializzazione con la crisi di mentalità e di costume che essa
282 Le nuove frontiere del diritto penale
necessariamente coinvolge ed ai quali Mario Losano, Sergio Cotta e Vittorio Frosini hanno
dato divergenti soluzioni in ragione del diverso modo del loro atteggiarsi nella valutazione
etica del fenomeno in discorso: il primo, esaltando il ruolo del ciberdiritto ed in genere della
complessità delle macchine informatiche, ha appuntato l’attenzione sul passaggio dal lessico
naturale a quello formalizzato della logica e della programmazione, l’allievo fiorentino di
Gioele Solari, raccogliendo la sfida tecnologica ed affascinato dalla Grande sintassi tolemaica,
inseriva la scienza e i suoi derivati nel processo cognitivo di una generazione che tende a fa-
voleggiare intorno ad una mitica realtà del benessere, tutta artificio ed in grado di elaborare
modelli comportamentali illusoriamente rispondenti ad una età radicalmente rinnovata, il
laico siciliano, nel contesto di vivaci dibattiti senesi unitamente a Letizia Gianformaggio, Sil-
vio Riondato e Peter Sloterdijk con il suo motto Du musst dein Leben ändern, si preoccupava
invece di salvare sempre la privatezza dei singoli dalle penetranti invasioni dei più avanzati
strumenti cognitivi come le reti di comunicazione sociale, senza per questo rinunciare a pro-
porre costantemente nuove aggettivazioni alla loro esperienza.
Ancora nel nuovo millennio questi contributi sono determinanti per lo studio dei settori
della genetica e della robotica, al fine di comprendere la contrapposizione fra entità naturali
ed entità non naturali, e pongono il penalista dinanzi al dubbio concernente in generale, di-
nanzi all’irrompere di nuove realtà in una rinnovata esperienza giuridica, la tenuta di istituti
penalistici acquisiti da tempo al patrimonio culturale del giurista. Si pensi, ad esempio, alla
capacità di intendere e di volere ed alla possibile crisi (rinnovantesi nel tempo) del postulato
del necessario collegamento tra colpevolezza ed imputabilità (con il relativo giudizio valoria-
le), ossia della idea dell’indefettibile riferirsi del dolo e della colpa esclusivamente a soggetti
caratterizzati da determinate note di normalità fisiopsichica, ferma restando l’autonomia tra
giudizio di imputabilità e giudizio di colpevolezza.
Il fascino delle neuroscienze nella loro dialettica con il diritto penale sostanziale e proces-
suale non si limita alla identificazione delle radici biologiche della criminalità (con i connessi
problemi relativi ai meccanismi preposti alla formazione della morale), alle insidie scaturenti
dall’ingresso della prova scientifica nei meccanismi del processo prescelti dal legislatore, ma
coinvolge soprattutto l’utilizzazione di tale sapere da parte del giurista, che non si chiude
affatto in uno splendido isolamento, come crede a torto la Musumeci (e lo dimostra a chiare
note il presente Convegno organizzato dall’Università degli Studi di Padova), od in una trin-
cea per assumere un atteggiamento di indifferenza, secondo quanto sottolinea la Di Giovine:
lo sforzo che il penalista deve compiere consiste nell’inquadrare nuove realtà scientifiche negli
schemi sostanziali e processuali e nelle categorie giuridiche acquisite al nostro patrimonio
giuridico (si pensi all’autoria mediata per quanto concerne il profilo della responsabilità del
robot come agente non umano), inserendole in essi senza dover necessariamente creare figure
non conosciute, anche per scansare da sé la credenza che da una natura giuridicamente sog-
gettivizzata scaturisca una capacità persuasiva tale da modificare la percezione sociale dell’og-
getto tutelato, vale a dire la affermazione di una intrinseca dignità di tutto ciò che è vivo e per
evitare un rischio incombente: l’utilizzo dei progressi innegabili delle neuroscienze cognitive
e della genetica molecolare potrebbero far rivivere forme di un diritto penale d’autore scal-
zando dal sistema la configurazione di un diritto penale del fatto quale deve essere il nostro
per stesso dettato costituzionale.
È, invero, affermazione imposta dai noti precetti contenuti nell’art. 25 Cost. quella che
L. Mazza 283
riporta l’ordinamento penale nell’ambito dei “diritti penali del fatto”, con deciso rifiuto di
un diverso indirizzo che privilegi, invece, ai fini della sanzionabilità del soggetto o l’essere di
costui od anche il suo mero atteggiamento nei confronti della volontà espressa dal legislatore,
il cui intervento ha un senso ove correlato all’esigenza di vietare un fatto, di proibirlo com-
patibilmente con il principio di colpevolezza ed in termini tali da assicurare la protezione di
un bene giuridico determinato e/o di una sua sfaccettatura o modalizzazione, nel rispetto,
dunque, delle prescrizioni vincolanti ricavabili dal combinato disposto degli artt. 2, 3 e 25
della Carta fondamentale.
Di certo, il diritto non deve assumere forme che contrastino l’uso delle tecnologie più
avanzate, ma è bene non farsi suggestionare da facili entusiasmi tesi a dipingere un nuovo
quadro del sistema penale in una lettura evoluzionistica (si pensi, ad esempio, alle implicazio-
ni che vorrebbero trarsi dalla analisi di emozioni – fra loro distinte a seconda che siano basate
su giudizi ragionevoli o non! – ed empatia) ed occorre altresì evitare che possano celebrarsi
processi i quali vedano sul banco degli imputati nuovi impossibili soggetti di diritto penale
come i robot che restano sempre e comunque mezzi e non mai agenti non umani.
Un atteggiamento prudente in materia è altresì consigliato dal rispetto della esigenza che
il nuovo sapere venga adeguatamente “testato” perché possa divenire fruibile nell’ambito di
un processo che deve definirsi “giusto”: è necessario, infatti, che la prova scientifica presenti
sempre una elevata credenziale di attendibilità, ma la affidabilità delle neuroscienze con le
diverse discipline ad esse afferenti denota ancora una certa “immaturità” che si riflette inevi-
tabilmente non solo in ordine alla indagine sulla incidenza del disturbo mentale sulla capacità
di intendere e di volere e sul giudizio di pericolosità sociale, sibbene anche sull’intero impian-
to della imputabilità e di altri istituti portanti del sistema penale, al di là di possibili modifi-
cazioni terminologiche di facciata, differenti da quelle tradizionali, che, però, non sottendono
sempre sostanziali diversità rispetto alle precedenti. Da qui scaturisce l’invito a meditare su
alcune “intuizioni” degli appartenenti alla Scuola positiva e sul non poter agire altrimenti,
troppo presto e frettolosamente bollate da Ettore Dezza come “amenità”, e relegate da Paolo
Grossi, con sprezzante livore, sulle sponde di un “antilegalismo icastico e sguaiato”, contras-
segnato da “una concezione eversiva della interpretazione”. Una ulteriore serena riflessione,
sgombra da qualsiasi pregiudizio ideologico, potrebbe invece far giungere alla conclusione
che non è mai “troppo tardi” per l’apertura di nuove frontiere.
Part II
Behavioral genetics, neurosciences and criminal responsibility
Morality and immorality: a neuroscientific perspective
Andrea Manfrinati, Rino Rumiati
For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate
ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral
philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since
the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive
psychology, brain sciences, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This
collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and the neuroscience of
morality is in its infancy, with the first brain imaging studies of moral development
undertaken only in 20011.
There are many issues addressed in the moral psychology: the neural bases of
moral emotions and moral judgments as well as comparison of normal adult moral
judgments with those made by children, and people with psychopathy, brain
damage, and autism2. In Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that «we evolved a moral
instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each child, designed to generate rapid
judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar
of action. […]. I argue that our moral faculty is equipped with a universal moral
grammar, a toolkit for building specific moral systems» (p. xvii)3. The idea is that
we were “designed” to discern Good from Evil. But often, things are different. It is
well established that in adults who have had normal development of social behavior,
damage to certain sectors of prefrontal cortex produces a severe impairment of
decision-making and disrupts social behavior, although the patients so affected
preserve intellectual abilities and maintain factual knowledge of social conventions
and moral rules4. The famous case of Phineas Gage is paradigmatic in this sense.
1
J.D. Greene, R.B. Sommerville, L.E. Nystrom, J.M. Darley, J.D. Cohen, An fMRI investigation
of emotional engagement in moral judgment, in “Science”, 293, 2001, pp. 2105-2108.
2
For a complete review of these topics see W. Sinnot-Armstrong, Moral Psychology, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2008.
3
M. Hauser, Moral Minds: How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, New York, Ecco
Press, 2006.
4
A. Damasio, Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain, New York, Grosset/Putnam,
1994; M. Koenigs, L. Young, R. Adolphs, D. Tranel, F. Cushman, M. Hauser, A. Damasio,
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements, in “Nature”, 446, 2007, pp. 908-
911; J. Moll, R. Oliveira-Souza, Moral judgments, emotions and the utilitarian brain, in “Trends in
Cognitive Sciences”, 11, 2008, pp. 319-321.
288 Morality and immorality: a neuroscientific perspective
There is a region of the human brain, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
whose damage consistently compromises both reasoning/decision-making, and
emotion/feeling, especially in the personal and social domain. In particular, moral
emotions play a central role in both implicit and explicit moral appraisal, being an
essential ingredient for human social cognition. The idea is that there is a significant
relationship between emotional experience and moral judgment5.
Patients with damage on the prefrontal cortex shown considerable similarity to
those of patients with psychopathy or sociopathy (Conduct Disorder or Antisocial
Personality Disorder, according to DSM-V nosology), another disorder characterized
by a pervasive disregard for social and moral standards, consistent irresponsibility
and a lack of remorse6. Psychopathy may be associated with dysfunction in prefrontal
regions, especially in persons without predisposing psychosocial risk factors. Since
there is a relationship between the prefrontal cortex and emotional processing, many
studies support the idea that the deficit in moral psychology seen among psychopaths
is due to the deficit in emotional processing7.
A growing number of theorists have begun to acknowledge that emotion
cannot truly be coherently subtracted from decision-making and moral judgment.
For example, according to Haidt’s social intuitionist account of moral judgment,
emotional intuitions play a crucial role in moral decision making8, while reasoning
processes merely rationalize judgments after the fact. Likewise, Moll and colleagues
rely on brain imaging research to argue that moral judgments are largely the product
of automatic emotional processes whereby emotional states assign moral values to
actions9; and Jesse Prinz has argued that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for
moral judgment10.
In the 2001, Joshua Greene and colleagues undertook the first brain imaging
study on moral judgment. The behavioral and neuroimaging results allowed Greene
to propose a dual process theory in which two different patterns of neural activity are
involved in moral judgment: a fast, unconscious, and effortless emotional system,
and a slow, conscious, and effortful cognitive system. In this view, the emotional
5
J. Haidt, The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment, in
“Psychological Review”, 108, 2001, pp. 813-834; J.D. Greene et al., op. cit., 2001; J.D. Greene, L.E.
Nystrom, A.D. Engell, J.M. Darley, J.D. Cohen, The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in
moral judgment, in “Neuron”, 44, 2004, pp. 389-400.
6
A. Roskies, Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from “acquired sociopathy”, in
“Philosophical Psychology”, 16, 2003, pp. 51-66.
7
M. Cima, F. Tonnaer, M.D. Hauser, Psychopaths know right from wrong but don’t care, in “Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience”, 5, 2010, pp. 59-67.
8
J. Haidt, op. cit., 2001.
9
J. Moll, R. Oliveira-Souza, P.J. Eslinger, I.E. Bramati, J. Mourão-Miranda, P.A. Andreiuolo,
L. Pessoa, The neural correlates of moral sensitivity: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation
of basic and moral emotions, in “The Journal of Neuroscience”, 22, 2002, pp. 2730-2736.
10
J. Prinz, The emotional construction of moral, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007.
A. Manfrinati, R. Rumiati 289
system refers to a class of processes that are valenced, quick, and automatic, though
not necessarily conscious. The cognitive system, in contrast, refers to controlled
processes that are important for reasoning, planning, manipulating information
in working memory, controlling impulses or, more generally, to higher executive
functions11. Traditional studies on moral judgment used resolutions of moral
dilemmas. Moral dilemmas, at the very least, involve conflicts between two or more
moral requirements. In this case, an agent regards herself as having moral reasons to
do each of two actions, but doing both actions is not possible12. The main features
of a moral dilemma are the following: a) the agent is required to do each of two (or
more) actions; b) the agent can do each of the actions; c) but the agent cannot do
both (or all) of the actions. The agent thus seems condemned to moral failure; no
matter what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to do something that she
ought to do).
Consider, for example the well-known Trolley Dilemma13: imagine that there are
five people tied up on a railroad track with a trolley car barreling towards them.
On an adjacent track, there is a single person. A bystander is able to push a switch
that will divert the trolley onto the alternate track, so that it kills the one person
instead of the other five. As a result, the one person dies, but the other five live. So
the question: was there anything wrong with the bystander’s action? The consensus
among philosophers, as well people who have been tested experimentally is that is
morally acceptable to save five lives at the expense of one in this case.
Next, consider the Footbridge Dilemma14: once again, five people are tied up on
a railroad track. But this time there are two bystanders, and one of them is a really
big guy, large enough to derail the trolley should he wind up in front of it. The
other bystander shoves the large guy in front of the trolley, to sacrifice one life for
the benefit of the other five. As a result, the large guy dies, but the trolley is derailed
and stops, and the other five people live. So the question: was there anything wrong
with the bystander action? Here the consensus is that it is not okay to save five lives
at the expense of one. The results of the Greene experiment revealed that when
participants considered the Footbridge Dilemma, they showed increased activity
in brain areas associated with emotion and social cognition and decreased activity
in areas associated with working memory and abstract reasoning than when they
considered Trolley Dilemma. On the contrary, the Trolley Dilemma elicited less
11
J.D. Greene et al., op. cit., 2001.
12
E.J. Lemmon, Moral dilemmas, in “The Philosophical Review”, 71, 1962, pp. 139-158; A.
MacIntyre, Moral dilemmas, in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research”, 50, 1990, pp. 367-
382; C. Bagnoli, Dilemmi morali, Genova, De Ferrari, 2006.
13
P. Foot, The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect, in “Oxford Review”, 5, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1967.
14
J.J. Thomson, Rights, restitution, and risk: Essays in moral theory (W. Parent Ed.), Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1986.
emotional activity and more activity in the cognitive areas of the brain, as compared
to the Footbridge Dilemma15.
One of the most interesting aspects of these studies is that the participants are
“normal” persons without brain damage or brain disorders. And the results are
intriguing because the same person that in the Trolley Dilemma accept the trade-
off 1 vs. 5 lives, is the same person who does not accept the same trade-off in the
Footbridge Dilemma; the same person that in the Trolley Dilemma behave according
to a Consequentialist point of view, is the same person that in the Footbridge
Dilemma behave according to a Deontological point of view; the same person that in
some situations seems “moral”, is the same person that in a different situation seems
“immoral”. But, what neuroscience tell us about these behaviors? Neuroscience tell
us that the person is the same but that the processing information and the brain
activations are completely different!
People’s moral judgments appear to be products of at least two different kinds of
psychological processes. First, brain imaging data suggest that there are prepotent
negative emotional responses that drive people to disapprove of the harmful actions
proposed in cases like the Footbridge Dilemma. These responses are characteristic
of Deontology, but not of Consequentialism. Second, further brain imaging results
suggest that “cognitive” psychological processes can compete with the aforementioned
emotional processes, driving people to approve of personally harmful moral
violations, primarily when there is a strong Consequentialist rationale for doing so16.
But, we should consider that emotional processes only guide Deontology and
that Consequentialism is only guided by cognitive processes? We think that the
answer is no. We do not think that the main question about moral judgments is if
moral judgments are the products of reason, or the products of emotions. We think
that the real question is how reason and emotion interact in order to provide moral
judgments.
Thus, we think that emotional processes play a relevant role in defining not
only Deontological but also Consequentialist perspectives. We have provided some
experimental results supporting this interpretation, and these results are based on the
characteristic structure of the moral dilemma17.
Specifically, considering that a moral dilemma is formally undecidable by
definition, an agent forced to choose between two possible resolutions, probably will
perceive both as highly conflicting and unpleasant, independently of which decision
15
J.D. Greene et al., op. cit., 2001.
16
J.D. Greene, The secret joke of Kant’s soul, in W. Sinnot-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychology. Vol.
3: The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, brain disorders, and development, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008, pp. 35-79.
17
A. Manfrinati, L. Lotto, M. Sarlo, D. Palomba, R. Rumiati, Moral dilemmas and moral principles:
When emotion and cognition unite, in “Cognition & Emotion”, 27, 2013, pp. 1276-1291.
A. Manfrinati, R. Rumiati 291
he will choose and independently of the trade-off between cost and benefit associated
with the two resolutions. The agent experiences the formal impossibility of resolving
the dilemma, and he recognizes that the two obligations are both right, but he is
forced to choose one while still considering the rejected alternative as valuable, thus
reaffirming the impossibility of resolving the dilemma. On the other hand, when
people choose a Consequentialist resolution they might consider the consequences
of an act as relevant in determining its morality, but they most likely feel that this
resolution could undermine their moral integrity, thus evoking an unpleasant
emotional feeling. If the consequentialist judgment engages controlled reasoning
processes to construct a set of practical principles for our moral behavior then the
whole process might have a high emotional cost that yields to a feeling of displeasure.
But not only moral norms are related to right or wrong human conduct. The
domain of law, as it is formulated and applied, poses another example that is of high
relevance to our social life. What happens at the neural level if subjects are engaged
in legal reasoning and judgment? Is there an overlap between brain activation
during legal and moral decision-making or are there different regions involved in
the legal condition? And does such neuroscientific knowledge imply anything for
our understanding of normative decision-making? The tension between moral and
legal norms is illustrated by debates in the scholarly literature, where the application
of legal rules is contrasted with the reliance on moral intuitions. The predominant
view conceives law ideally as purely rational, free from emotion and passion. In
the light of aforementioned scientific evidence emphasizing the role of emotion
and intuition in moral perception and judgment, it is pertinent to know whether
legal judgments are also subject to people’s emotions and intuitions. A recent study
has shown that several brain regions previously associated with moral cognition,
particularly the DMPFC (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex), the left STG (superior
temporal gyrus), and TPJ (temporoparietal junction) are also related to legal judgment
and that legal decisions are rather made by applying explicit rules than by relying
on intuitions, as indicated by stronger activation in the left DLPFC (dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex). Therefore, these results showed that there are neural similarities
between moral and legal judgments, suggesting a considerable overlap in cognitive
processing between both normative tasks. Furthermore, despite in the subjects’ rating
of emotional involvement, lawyers perceived themselves as significantly less involved
during normative judgment than non-lawyers people, these results are not confirmed
at the neural level. Then, the idea that that lawyers would pay more attention to
normatively salient features than other academics and in consequence would show
less activation related to processing of emotions is not confirmed18.
18
S. Schleim, T.M. Spranger, S. Erk, H. Walter, From moral to legal judgment: the influence of
normative context in lawyers and other academics, in “Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience”, 6,
2011, pp. 48-57.
In conclusion, it no longer makes sense to engage in debate over whether moral

judgment is accomplished exclusively by reason as opposed to emotion. Rather,
moral judgment is the product of complex interactions between emotional and
cognitive mechanisms. Furthermore, while some authors as Greene and Cohen have
argued that neuroimaging results related to normative issues will change the way we
think about law and morals19, we think that it is currently too early to draw any firm
normative conclusions from these experimental findings. We suggest that it is more
to learn about the way the brain processes normatively relevant information as can
be understood by focusing on morals alone. Both domains are instances of norms
related to right and wrong human conduct and as suggested by experimental results,
it matters in which light we see normative issues.
19
J.D. Greene, J. Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everyting, in “Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences”, 359, 2004, pp. 1775-1785.
The neuroscience of acquired pedophilia: neuroimaging and forensic

consideration
Giuseppe Sartori, Cristina Scarpazza, Pietro Pietrini
Table of contents: Introduction. – Brain alteration and behavioral changes. – Concepts

and definitions. – Aim of the present work. – Analysis of literature on the neural basis sexual
of arousal and pedophilia. – Case report. – Forensic considerations. – Forensic conclusions.
– Criticisms on the use of neuroscientific knowledge in the courtroom. – Neuroscientific
conclusions.
Introduction
“One must require from each one the duty which each one can perform” said
the King of the asteroid 325 to the Little Prince in Antoine de Saint-Exupery book.
What often happens, is that people take normal behaviors for granted, without
considering that there are some situations in which normal behavior is impossible
due to an alteration in brain structure/function. In those cases, the acting person
should not be considered responsible for his behavior. This has implications both
in a clinical and forensic setting. Indeed, forensic psychiatry applications are based
on the assumption that altered mental states lead to a higher propensity to commit
crimes. To ascribe a crime to the influence of a mental disorder is intrinsically linked
to a reduction of legal responsibility.
In the forensics setting, a fundamental logical step is to determine the defendant’
“state of mind” at the time he committed the crime. The expansion of neuroscientific
knowledge is welcomed as a rich resource by the community. Recently, it is being
increasingly looked at as a potential resource in the legal context1. The uncertainty
that judges face, and their need to take clear-cut decisions in complex cases, is
apparently helped by the advances of neurosciences, revealing fascinating and solid
1
V. Hughes, Science in court: head case, in “Nature”, 2010; 464(7287), pp. 340-2.
294 The neuroscience of acquired pedophilia
evidence about truths hidden to the naked eye2. The progress of neuroscientific
techniques has allowed us to better understand how damage to particular brain
structure might facilitate behavioral changes sometimes observed in criminals and,
therefore, may account for the alteration of the mental state of the defendant at the
time he committed the crime.
Worldwide, cases of murder have been evaluated with the help of neuroscientific
tools, in the hope that at least a “convergence” of clues may support decision3. The
idea is spreading that the numerous correlates that are being discovered for human
behavior, from lie4 to aggression5, may provide an objective explanation of the
behavior, able to reduce the responsibility that the individual can reasonably assume
for it. For instance, the Trieste and Como sentences have become famous worldwide6
because for the first time in Italy, the neurosciences techniques have been allowed
into the courtroom to be placed side by side with the psychological and psychiatric
assessment usually used in order to evaluate the defendant’s state of mind, and as a
consequence the criminal responsibility. This approach has been strongly and heavily
criticised by those who believe that the introduction of neuroscience into a legal
context could be a first step towards biological determinism, which would allow any
criminal to be able to assert: “ It was not me, it was my brain.” These criticisms, however,
are based on an image of neuroscience that does not correspond to the actual state of
the discipline. The forensic neuroscientists know that the neurosciences do not deny
the importance of cultural, educational and environmental, but rather emphasise
the fact that these sociocultural factors influence on behavior is constrained by the
specific biological structure within which they have to act. For example, a child who
was born with mental retardation will never reach a normal intelligence level, even
if he lived in a high socio-cultural environment, because his biological substrate (i.e.
the brain) do not allow it.
The purpose of this essay is to emphasize how neurosciences can help to discriminate
criminals who should be considered responsible for their own actions, i.e. have to be
convicted for their criminal behavior, from criminals who shouldn’t, i.e. need to be
treated with a medical perspective. Since the use of the most advanced neuroscience’
2
D.S. Weisberg, F.C. Keil, J. Goodstein, E. Rawson, J.R. Gray, The seductive allure of neuroscience
explanations, in “J. Cogn. Neurosci.”, 2008; 20(3), pp. 470-7.
3
V. Hughes, Science in court: head case, cit.; D. Rigoni, S. Pellegrini, V. Mariotti, A. Cozza, A.
Mechelli, S. D. Ferrara, P. Pietrini, G. Sartori, How neuroscience and behavioral genetics improve
psychiatric assessment: report on a violent murder case, in “Front. Behav. Neurosci.”, 2010; 4, p. 160.
4
Y. Yang, A. Raine, K.L. Narr, T. Lencz, L. LaCasse, P. Colletti, A.W. Toga, Localisation of
increased prefrontal white matter in pathological liars, in “Br. J. Psychiatry”, 2007;190, pp. 174-5.
5
B.K. Puri, S. J. Counsell, N. Saeed, M.G. Bustos, I.H. Treasaden, G.M. Bydder, Regional grey
matter volumetric changes in forensic schizophrenia patients: an MRI study comparing the brain structure of
patients who have seriously and violently offended with that of patients who have not, in “BMC Psychiatry”,
2008.
6
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091030/full/news.2009.1050.html.
G. Sartori, C. Scarpazza, P. Pietrini 295
techniques (electroencephalography, voxel-based morphometry analysis of the

structure of the brain-end, and “truth” machine, to name a few) is currently the
subject of heated discussions in the forensic setting, we decided to discuss a case in
which neuroscience were allowed into courtrooms without making use of these new
technologies, but only based on their own particular way of reasoning and logical
inference.
Brain alteration and behavioral changes

The concept that alteration of the brain could be causally linked to the onset of
abnormal behavior is not knew.
Guillaume Apollinaire used to write his girlfriend passionate letters nearly every
day before being wounded in the head, more precisely in the right temporal lobe,
during the World War I, in 1916. The wound is shown in Figure 1. As a result of
this, his personality and behavior changed dramatically and his affective relationship
were deeply modified as well. The most significant example being his rapid disinterest
for his fiancée. Moreover, he became irritable, anxious, grumpy and aggressive. A few
weeks after the brain injury, he went back to his literary writing. However, while his
lyricism did not decline, his general tone became darker, more defiant and nostalgic,
referring to “something lost”. On the contrary, no significant changes in cognitive
and executive ability was ever noted by Apollinaire’s contemporaries. The descriptions
provided to us by his contemporaries are unanimous in telling that after this injury
his personality changed drastically and its affective relationships were profoundly
altered. Irritability, susceptibility, emotional intolerance, affect flattening, anxiety,
and personality change coupled with spared cognitive functions perfectly fit with the
right temporal lobe dysfunction diagnosis7.
We mention briefly here Apollinaire’s case as an example, instead of the well
known Phineas Gage8, to clarify a really important concept in forensic neuroscience:
not all the alterations/lesions of brain structure lead to criminal behavior. Guillaume
Apollinaire, as well as Phineas Gage, suffered a severe brain injury after which they
showed obvious and dramatic changes of personality, but they do never went on to
commit crime.
7
J. Bogousslavsky, Guillaume Apollinaire, the lover assassinated, in J. Bogousslavsky, F. Boller
(eds.), Neurological Disorders in Famous Artists. Frontiers of Neurology and Neuroscience, 2005, 19, pp.
1-8.
8
L. F. Haas, Phineas Gage and the science of brain localisation, in “J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry”,
2001; 71(6), p. 761.
Concepts and definitions

Responsibility: Responsibility is defined as “the ability to foresee the consequences
of one’s own behavior and correct the same on the basis of this provision.” Therefore,
the responsibility presupposes a situation of freedom, in which the person can choose
which behavior to adopt. If that choice was not possible, even if it were able to
foresee the consequences of their actions, this person could not possibly adopt a
different behavior in light of his prediction.
In Italy, in 1993/1994 a violent serial killer (GS) suffocated and strangled six
women during extreme sex acts. He subsequently dismembered and concealed their
bodies. However, this man had suffered a severe head injury resulting in a bilateral
lesion of the frontal lobes, which are the brain region responsible for the impulses’
control and inhibition9. Despite the brutality of these murders, GS was initially
declared legally not responsible for the murders, because, due to the frontal lobe
lesions, he was unable to inhibit an uncontrollable impulse (sexual urge). However,
he was considered responsible for the dismemberment and concealment of the dead
bodies, which are premeditated acts, free from any impulse.
Anatomo-clinical correlation: This example introduces another concept of
fundamental importance: the so called “anatomical- clinical correlation.” The lesion
site, in this case the frontal lobes, which are the neural basis of inhibitory control
of impulses, suggested that MAYBE GS could not be considered responsible for
the criminal acts he committed during a uncontrollable impulse. The same brain
injury, however, cannot in any way justify those behaviors that are planned and
organized. The “anatomic- clinical correlation” principle refers to the correspondence
between altered brain areas and altered behavioral and neuropsychological symptoms
detected in an individual. In other words, the lesion must be consistent with the
“legally relevant” behavioral and neuropsychological symptoms.
The psycho-legal error: Stephen Morse, one of the leading critics of the use of
neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom, emphasizes what he called “psycho-
legal fundamental error.” This error is the belief that “causation, especially abnormal
causation, is per se an excusing condition”10. To detect a brain abnormality does not
automatically mean that that person cannot be considered responsible for his own
actions. Indeed, returning to GS clinical and forensic case, it was discovered that
GS practiced the same sexual activities also with his fiancée, but he never killed her.
This provides unequivocal evidence about the integrity of GS’s ability to interrupt
his sexual acts. The experts could reasonably conclude that the brain injury, although
objective and disabling, could not in any way be related to GS’s crimes. As a
9
F.T. Crews, C.A. Boettiger, Impulsivity, frontal lobes and risk for addiction, in “Pharmacol. Biochem.
Behav.” 2009; 93(3), pp. 237-47.
10
S.J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Sydrome and criminal responsability: a diagnostic note, in “Ohio State
Journal Criminal Law”, 2005, 3, p. 397.
consequence, he has been convicted for the murders.

Free will: The concept of outstanding importance that we want to emphasize is
that not all brain injuries lead to an alteration in behavior which in turn results to
a diminished criminal responsibility of the individual. There is no equation “ brain
injury = lack of responsibility,” as critics of neuroscience have understood. Indeed,
when dealing with criminality and forensic responsibility, one should be able to ask
psycho-legal questions, namely, “Does this man have the ability to inhibit his action
if he wanted to?”. In this (GS) case the answer is “yes, he has this ability, he could
have acted differently”. The incontrovertible evidence for this, lies in the truth that
GS’s girlfriend had not been killed during extreme sex acts. Neuroscience in the
courtroom aims to document the possible existence of brain disease and to highlight
its possible causal relationship with the crime.
The criteria for responsibility are, and must be, behavioral, clinical and
neuropsychological. These criteria cannot be replaced by the empirically demonstrable
states of the brain. In other words, an individual could be considered not responsible
of his actions because neuroscientists are able to unequivocally demonstrate that
he was not able to inhibit his own impulses when he committed the crime. On the
contrary, an individual could NOT be considered not responsible for his actions
only on the basis of the presence of a brain damage in the frontal lobe. Even in
the presence of a perfect correlation between brain alterations and irresponsible
behavior, the brain changes are to be considered, in the forensic setting, nothing
more than mere evidence of behavioral states. If the defendant meets the clinical
and neuropsychological criteria that define him responsible for his acts, then the
defendant should be considered responsible, whatever any brain analysis highlights.
Batts wrote “Advances in neuroscience may lead to additional biological evidence
to the possible existence of mental defect due to an organic cause”11. First, the author
writes that neuroscience might help. He used the conditional tense. Neuroscience is
unlikely to be helpful in all cases. Moreover, the author said that neuroscience could
lead additional evidence. Neuroscience alone is useless within a forensic setting. It can
support behavioral evidence, provide objective data and may provide an explanation
for why the observed behaviors have occurred, but neuroscience alone cannot replace
the clinical evidence.
Aim of the present work

This work describes the recent case of a man charged with pedophilia. The man
has been found to suffer from a massive brain tumor, which directly caused his
11
S. Batts, Brain lesions and their implications in the criminal responsibility, in “Behavioral Sciences and
Law”, 2009, 27, pp. 261-272.
criminal behavior. We will broadly describe the clinical characteristics of the patient
and all the procedures carried out by neuroscientists to diagnose him. Moreover, we
will analyze the considerations and logical steps that allowed the clinician to causally
link the brain tumor to the pedophilic behaviors.
First, we need to define the difference between acquired and congenital disorders.
In neuropsychology, the term “acquired” denotes a symptom that is new and that
coincides with the onset of a disease of the nervous system. On the contrary, the term
“congenital” denotes a disorder with dismaturative characteristics that is present in
individuals who have never reached a normal level of maturity in a given skill or
function.
Regarding pedophilia, most individuals who are labeled pedophiles suffer from
a congenital psychiatric disorder. On the contrary, in the present case, the man, in
his sixties, declared that he had never experienced sexual interest in children until
one year before his arrest. This suggests that his pedophilia is just a symptom of an
underlying organic disease.
Analysis of literature on the neural basis of sexual arousal and pedophilia

Sexual arousal: Due to developments in neuroimaging techniques, our knowledge
about the underlying neurobiological processes of sexual experience has grown in
recent years. Four component seems to be central in a neurobehavioral model of sexual
arousal: a cognitive, motivational, emotional and automatic responses components
could be identified in literature12. The results show that the neurobiology underlying
human sexual and emotional behavior are multidimensional event consisting of
interrelated psysiological and psychological processes. The neural network responsible
for sexual arousal includes the orbitofrontal cortex, responsible for the catergorization
and evaluation of the sexual stimuli13; the insula and amygdale, responsible for the
hedonic quality of a stimulus, which describes the stimulus degree of pleasantness and
unpleasantness14; the caudal part of the left anterior cingulated cortex, responsible for
the motivational component15; and the hypothalamus, responsible for the sex driven
autonomic component, which includes effects on cardiovascular and respiratory
levels16.
12
J. Redoute, G. Stoleru, M.C. Gregoire, Brain processing of visual sexual stimuli in human males,
in “Human Brain Mapping”, 2000; 11(3), pp.162-77.
13
A. Ferretti, M. Caulo, C. Del Gratta, Dynamyc of male sexual arousal: distinct components of brain
activation revealed by fMRI, in “NeuroImage”, 2005; 26(4): 1086-96.
14
H. Mouras, S. Stoleru, J. Bittoun, Brain processing of visual sexual stimuli in healthy men: a
functional magnetic resonance imaging study, in “NeuroImage”, 2003; 20(2), pp. 855-69.
15
S. Karama, A.R. Lecours, J. M. Leroux, Areas of brain activation in male and female during viewing
of erotic film excerpts, in “Human Brain Mapping”, 2002; 16(1), pp. 1-13.
16
S. Karama, A.R. Lecours, J.M. Leroux, op. cit.
Neural basis of pedophilia: in view of the neural correlates of sexual processing

in healthy individuals, deficits in these in persons with congenital pedophilia can be
interpreted as a modified interaction between emotional and cognitive component of
sexual arousal. One region of particular interest in this context is the frontal cortex,
since several studies have already shown aberrant activation patterns in pedophilic
patients. The orbitofrontal cortex is frequently involved in cases of pedophilia17.
Another study18 also demonstrated abnormal activation patterns in this area and in
the amygdale, a brain structure associated with emotional evaluation. Interestingly, a
study by Schiltz et al.19, demonstrated anatomic-structural changes in male patients
with pedophilia. They observed volume reductions in frontal brain areas and the
amygdale in individual with pedophilia. Taken together, neural deficit particularly
involved pedophilia relates to brain structure involved in emotional (i.e. amygdale)
ad in sexual stimuli processing (i.e. frontal lobe).
Acquired pedophilia: An inappropriate sexual interest in children may results
from brain disease as well as from the sexual dysfunction disorder of pedophilia.
Pedophilia is a disorder characterized by a complex interaction of disturbances of
the emotional, cognitive and sexual experience. Although the current pathogenetic
theories support a neurobiological understanding of psychiatric disorders, the
brain correlates of pedophilia are still largely unknown. Table 1 reported available
study in which pedophilia has been observed in brain diseased patients. It is worth
noting that the majority of cases refer to patients suffering from a direct lesion in
the reported area (i.e. the area had been directly damaged by a tumor, as in Burns
and Swerdlow20, and Devinsky et al.21; or the area had been damaged surgically, as
in Mendez and Shapira22, case 7). In other cases, pedophilia occurred as a symptom
due to widespread cortical and/or subcortical atrophy in dementia23. Only two
early studies on this topic reported the onset of pedophilia due to compression of
otherwise normal brain regions24. This latter cases are of special interest in the field
17
C.L. Harenski, D.M. Thornon, K.A. Harenki, Increased frontotemporal activation during pain
observation in sexual sadism, in “Arch. Gen. Psychiatry”, 2012; 69(3), pp. 283-92.
18
H. Dressing, T. Obergriesser, H. Tost, Homosexual pedophilia and functional networks- an fMRI
case report and literature review, in “Fortschr. Neurol. Psychiatr.”, 2001; 69(11), pp. 539-44.
19
K. Schiltz, J. Witzel, G. Northoff, Brain pathology in pedophilic offenders: evidence of volume
reduction in the right amygdale and related diencephalic structures, in “Arch. Gen. Psychiatry”, 2007;
64(6), pp. 737-46.
20
J. M. Burns, R.H. Swerdlow, Right orbitofrontal tumor with pedophilia symptom and constructional
apraxia sign., in “Arch. Neurol.”, 2003; 60(3), pp. 437-40.
21
J. Devinsky, O. Sacks, O. Devinsky, Kluver-Bucy syndrome, hypersexuality, and the law, in
“Neurocase”, 2010; 16(2), pp. 140-5.
22
M. Mendez, J.S. Shapira, Pedophilic behavior from brain disease, in “J Sex Med.”, 2011; 8, pp.
1092-1100.
23
M. Mendez, J.S. Shapira, op. cit.
24
Q.R. Regestein, P. Reich, Pedophilia occurring after onset of cognitive impairment, in “J of nervous
and mental disease”, 1978; 166(11), pp. 794-798; B. Miller, J. L. Cummings, H. McIntyre, G.
of forensic neuroscience, as they allow the study of the causal link between brain
disease and symptoms onset and the possible reversibility of the symptomatology.
We described a 60-year old male who developed pedophilia late in his life, and whose
clinical profile is compatible with this interesting casuistry.
Case report
Summary: A 60 years old male pediatrician (D.M.) was charged for pedophilia
after being found to act pedophilic behavior in a primary school. D.M. denied a
previous attraction to children. He was unable to inhibit sexual urges and to estimate
the severity of his behavioral choice. During the neurological examination he
displayed signs of neurological diseases as well as symptoms of neuropsychological
dysfunction. Almost all symptoms were attributable to a frontal lobe suffering (e.g.
dishinibition, obsessive-compulsive behaviors, deficit in emotion attribution and in
moral reasoning) and compression of the optic chiasm (e.g. diplopia, tunnel vision).
D.M. and his wife reported that the emergence of these symptoms could be dated one
year before. This subjective report has been confirmed using the Autobiographical
Implicit Association test (aIAT)25, a behavioral tests based on reaction time. This test
confirm, in an objective way, that D.M. sexual interest in child arose one year before
he was charged for pedophilic behavior. Magnetic resonance imaging revealed the
presence of a big clivus chordoma (a rare slow-growing neoplasm arising from bone
in the skull base) that displaced the pituitary gland and compressed the orbitofrontal
cortex, the optic chiasm and the hypothalamus. The tumor is shown in Figure 2.
The pedophilic behavior and all neurological and neuropsychological dysfunctions
receded following tumor resection. Despite these findings, D.M. has been convicted
for pedophilia.
The facts: DM, a 60-year-old medical doctor, was a pediatrician working in
primary schools. He came to the attention of the court after having misused his
authority to sexually abuse children by touching their pubis, rubbing his penis against
their bodies, and in some cases attempting penetration. Moreover, DM produced a
huge amount of child pornography. His pedophilic behavior was discovered because
he left the door to his surgery open and a teacher saw him touching a child.
During the interrogation, teachers declared that DM’s attitude towards children
had changed in the last year. He began to show much more interest than usual in
children. DM denied ever being sexually attracted to children until one year before.
He declared that he was not aware of the risk he was taking, and that he had not
Ebers, M. Grode, Hypersexuality or altered sexual preference following brain injury, in “Medical Journal
of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry”, 1986; 49, pp. 867-873.
25
S. Agosta, G. Sartori, The autobiographical IAT: a review, in “Front Psychol.”, 2013; 4, pp. 519-
531.
realized the seriousness of the acts he was committing. His wife, who described him
as thrifty, loving and responsible, reported having noticed that her husband had not
been the same in the last year: he cried without any plausible reason, he was often
irritable and he developed an immoderate passion for photography, bringing his
camera everywhere.
Clinical and neuropsychological assessment: In his first visit with DM, an
expert witness of the defense (one of the authors of this essay) conducted clinical
and neurological evaluations. He then requested neuro-radiological tests because
his examination had revealed neurological signs and symptoms indicative of brain
dysfunction, i.e. diplopia (double vision), visual field restriction, unprovoked
outbursts of crying (spastic crying), tendon reflexes livelier in the right limb, and
a sudden onset of obsessive-compulsive behavior (passion for photography). The
MRI revealed the presence of a big tumor at the base of the skull (clivus chordoma).
A chordoma is a slow-growing malignant tumor which can invade the surrounding
bone, compressing, displacing and damaging the adjacent nervous and vascular
structures. The location and size of DM’s chordoma were such that the tumor
compressed the pituitary gland (which appeared to be dislocated from its natural
location), the hypothalamus, the pons and the white matter connections to the
frontal lobes. All these structures are part of the limbic system, which regulates
appetitive motivation (hunger, thirst, and sexual interest). Beyond the chordoma,
the optic chiasm was compressed by the dislocated pituitary gland, causing the onset
of diplopia and the reduction of the visual field. Therefore, the tumor location could
fully explain DM’s neurological symptoms.
During interviews with the experts, DM declared he had noticed the sudden
onset of a sexual interest in children about a year before his arrest, and he denied any
previous pedophilic behavior. He described his pedophilic behavior as an urge that
required immediate satisfaction. Moreover, he declared that he had not realized that
the he could get caught. Critically, he did not understand the gravity of what he was
doing. In clear contrast with this characterization, his relatives described him as a
respectful and responsible man.
The neuropsychological examination revealed that DM had an intelligence above
the norm. In contrast, he performed very poorly on tests used to evaluate frontal
lobe functionality. In particular, DM had the following difficulties: poor verbal
fluency based on phonemic access (ability to access and retrieve words by selecting
an appropriate search strategy based on phonemic access); literal interpretation of
idioms and metaphors, denoting a poor capacity for abstraction; poor performance
on the Trail Making Test, characterized by a difficulty in changing a behavior once it
had been initiated; poor performance on the Hayling test, highlighting a difficulty
in inhibiting automatic and impulsive responses.
Social cognition tests revealed DM’s difficulty in recognizing and attributing
emotions, particularly happiness and anger. He was also impaired in evaluating the
severity of social norm violations, but he was able to recognize which behaviors
could be considered appropriate in different contexts. Moreover, DM showed
disadvantageous decision making, as well as an inability to learn from his own
errors and to intuitively estimate the probability of an outcome given a certain
action. These findings, which could fully explain DM’s behavior, denote a selective
dysfunction of the orbital part of the frontal lobe26. In contrast, DM’s scores on
tests assessing logical reasoning and problem solving were within the normal range,
indicating proper functioning of the dorsolateral part of the frontal lobe27. DM’s
pattern of impairments makes him very similar to a patient described by Damasio,
who, after an injury to the orbital part of the frontal lobe, was quite able to identify
morally correct behaviors in hypothetical situations, but his own behavior tended
increasingly towards immediate gratification, even when he was aware that he was
acting in an unethical manner or that the long-term effects of his behavior would be
negative28.
In order to evaluate the truthfulness of DM’s declaration regarding the onset
of his pedophilia, the experts used an empirical technique based on reaction time
measurement, which allowed them to verify the presence of an autobiographical
memory that may not be accessible to the consciousness of the subject. This
technique is called aIAT (autobiographic Implicit Association Test, for a complete
discussion of the topic please read Agosta and Sartori29). This test relies on the
“compatibility effect”, i.e. is it easier (quicker) to respond to information stored in
memory compared to new information. The aIAT meets the criteria for scientific
evidence30. The aIAT has been used to investigate whether DM has always been
sexually attracted to children, or whether this sexual interest began in the previous
year, as he declared. The experts considered this test of particular importance for
demonstrating that the onset of attraction to children was contemporary with the
onset of the other neurological symptoms. If this was true, then the sexual deviancy
could be considered a clinical symptom due to tumor growth. For this purpose the
26
A. Bechara, H. Damasio, A. R. Damasio, Emotion, decison making and the orbitofrontal cortex,
in “Cerebral Cortex”, 2000, 10(3), pp. 295307; R.J. Blair, “A cognitive developmental approach to
mortality: investigating the psychopath, in “Cognition”, 1995; 57(1), 1-29; S.C. Herpertz, U. Werth,
G. Lukas, M. Qunaibi, A. Schuerkens, H.J. Kunert, R. Frees, M. Flesch, R. Mueller-Isberner,
M. Osterheider, H. Sass, Emotion in criminal offenders with psychopathy and borderline personality
disorder, in “Archives of General Psychiatry”, 2001; 58(8), pp. 737-45. M. Koenings, The role of
prefrontal cortex in psychopathy, in “Review in Neuroscience”, 2012; 23(3), 253:262.
27
D. Tranel, K. Manzel, S.W. Anderson, Is the prefrontal cortex important for fluid intelligence? A
neuropsychological study using Matrix Reasoning, in “Clin. Neuropsychol”, 2008; 22(2), pp. 242-61.
28
A. Bechara, H. Damasio, A.R. Damasio, Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal cortex, in
“Cerebral Cortex”, cit.
29
S. Agosta, G. Sartori, The autobiographical IAT: a review, in “Front Psychol.”, cit.
30
S . Agosta, G. Sartori, op. cit.
experts created sentences that describe two different versions of the same situation
(eg, “I have only recently felt sexually attracted to children” or “I’ve always been
sexually attracted to children”). DM’s task was to press a button as quickly as possible
to indicate whether the previous sentences were true or false. The aIAT revealed that
the memory trace in DM’s mind is compatible with his verbal account and his that
sexual attraction to children arose about a year before his arrest.
Forensic considerations
Is it possible now to analyze how the experts evaluated all the available information
and formed a judgment about DM’s state of mind at the time of the pedophilic acts.
Firstly, the timeline of the symptoms is of critical importance. Indeed, there
was a clear progression from a total absence of symptomatology to the more or
less contemporary onset of all the symptoms (neurological, neuropsychological,
personality changes), including the sexual interest in children. This temporal
specificity is consistent with DM’s statement and those of his wife and the teacher
who discovered him. In addition, the recent onset of DM’s pedophilia has also been
empirically confirmed using the aIAT, a behavioral test based on the analysis of
reaction times that is impossible to fake. Altogether, these data suggest that DM’s
sexual deviancy, which began about a year before his arrest, coincided with the
achievement of a critical mass of tumor volume in his brain. Indeed, at the time
of the MRI, the chordoma was compressing the hypothalamus, which is clearly
involved in guidance and sex drive31.
Secondly, the neuropsychological assessment detected numerous signs of
orbitofrontal dysfunction, such as deficits in foreseeing and understanding the effects
of certain behaviors; difficulties in decoding emotions and moral reasoning; emotional
fragility; a compulsive passion for photography; changes in personality (irritability,
intolerance to frustration) and a difficulty in inhibiting impulses. This constellation
of symptoms clearly localizes DM’s brain dysfunction to the frontal lobe. It is worth
noting that some of the above-cited impairments are particularly relevant to the
capacity for self-determination. Let’s consider, for example, the inability to decode
negative emotions. How could a person who is unable to decode negative emotions
understand the emotional signals coming from the victims of his aggression? Let’s
consider, now, the deficit in moral thinking. How does an individual incapable of
understanding moral violations evaluate the moral implications of his own actions so
that he may inhibit them before they are carried out? According to what DM said at
31
M. Brunetti, C. Babiloni, A. Ferretti, et al., Hypothalamus, sexual arousal and psychosexual
identity in human males: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, in “Eur. J. Neurosc.”, 2008; 27,
pp. 2292-2927.
the time of his arrest, he was not aware of the severity of his behavior.
On the one hand, the chordoma was compressing the hypothalamus, leading
to a sexual attraction to children; on the other hand, the chordoma was also
compressesing the orbitofrontal regions, causing deficits in moral judgment and
understanding others’ emotions, which prevented DM from understanding the
seriousness his behavior. Moreover, the orbitofrontal dysfunction also led to an
inability to inhibit impulses, which directly caused DM’s pedophilic behavior. The
anatomical-clinical correlation is astonishing. The tumor’s mass, location and size
are fully able to explain the entire symptomatology experienced by DM: altering
the functionality of both the hypothalamus and the orbitofrontal lobes gave rise to
the constellation of observed symptoms. All symptoms reported by DM are in fact
attributable to dysfunction of the hypothalamus, the frontal cortex, and the optic
chiasm and can therefore be unambiguously explained on the basis of the principle
of anatomic contiguity. It was the combination of an irresistible impulse (inability
to want) with an impaired ability to understand the reprehensible nature of his own
behavior (inability to understand) that composed DM’s inability to do otherwise
(free will) and, thus, DM’s lack of self-determination. Thus, is it possible to assert
that the brain tumor prevented DM from exercising free will at the time of the
pedophilic acts, and that, consequently, DM cannot be considered responsible for
his behavior.
However, the presence of brain abnormalities is not in itself sufficient to ensure
that an individual has a problem in cognitive functioning or behavioral inhibition.
Contemporary neuropsychology recognizes that brain abnormalities are simply risk
factors for the onset of a particular behavior. Thus, the theory of causation which
applies to the link between mental disorder and crime, is not the deterministic
causation which is implicitly assumed by most critics of the use of neuroscience
in competency assessments in criminal trials, but rather the so-called ‘INUS
causation’(Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient
conditions32. This model asserts that, in a set of causes (which include, in the case
of mental disorders, psychological, social, neural causes) an INUS cause indexes
that each subset of causes is sufficient but none in itself is necessary to cause the
outcome33; however, taken together, the causes are sufficient to cause the outcome.
The INUS cause is a probabilistic cause with different importance given to different
aspects of the causative set. Thus, the causal mechanism of criminal behavior must
be encoded according to the INUS criteria. DM’s disease, consequently, should be
considered an INUS condition of the observed behavior, i.e. the pedophilic behavior,
as none of the symptoms alone is necessary to cause the criminal behavior, but all
32
H. Anckarsäter, S. Radovic, C. Svennerlind, et al., Mental disorder is the cause of crime: the
cornerstone of forensic psychiatry, in “Int J Law & Psychiatry”, 2009; 32, pp. 342-347.
33
H. Anckarsäter et al., op. cit.
the symptoms together are sufficient to cause the same behavior. The probabilistic
causal model accounts for the link between the onset of DM’s chordoma and his
pedophilia coupled with a lack of impulse control. It is worth remembering that the
pedophilia was just one of the symptoms DM experienced that was attributable to
the expansion of the tumor. In addition to pedophilia, for example, there was the
onset of a deficit in moral reasoning, which abolished DM’s ability to identify the
pedophilic aggression as morally reprehensible, and an inability to inhibit impulses,
which led DM to act on every impulse he experienced. Another aspect that should
be etiologically related to DM’s criminal behavior is his impaired risk perception, as
documented in both the interrogation and the neuropsychological examination. The
propensity to engage in risky behaviors is a new feature of DM’s personality and is
in deep contrast with his premorbid personality. This accounts for certain irrational
behaviors, such as leaving the surgery door open while committing pedophilic acts.
Finally, DM also showed a new and excessive interest in photography. His wife
declared that he brought his camera everywhere, photographing anything. Thus, one
could reasonably consider his production of child pornography to be a manifestation
of an obsessive-compulsive disorder, also due to frontal lobe dysfunction.
Essential to the discussion of the causal relationship between DM’s neurological
condition and his impaired mental state is the restitutio a integrum that followed
surgical removal of the tumor, i.e. a total remission of all neurological, cognitive, and
behavioral symptoms, including pedophilia.
In conclusion:
- The experts concluded that DM’s severe neoplastic disease and the consequent
clinical manifestations were sufficient to say that DM was not responsible for
his criminal acts, because DM free will was diminished due to the frontal lobe
compression. Indeed, the whole spectrum of symptoms, and in particular the criminal
behavior, was causally attributable to the compressive effects of the tumor on the
surrounding brain regions. In addition, the spectrum of symptoms was indicative of
an altered state of mind that likely resulted in the criminal behavior.
- DM’s cognitive and behavioral symptomatology clearly demonstrated an
inability to understand (underlined by the inability to identify and evaluate
pedophilic behavior as morally reprehensible) and an inability to want (underlined
by the inability to inhibit his sexual urges).
What is the peculiarity of this case compared to cases of individuals with
congenital pedophilia? The congenital pedophiles, while suffering from a psychiatric
psychopathology, do not usually have impairments that make them unable to control
their sexual impulses and understand the negative social value of pedophilic behavior.
In most cases, individuals may experience sexual attraction to children, but they are
aware that acting on this attraction would be neither morally nor socially acceptable,
and, accordingly, they control their behavior so as not to commit criminal acts. If
one of these people, however, decides to act on the attraction, committing pedophilia
even though he would be perfectly capable of inhibiting that sexual impulse, then
that person is legally responsible for his own conduct.
Forensic conclusions
Incompetency or diminished responsibility, are considered to be proven if
evidence is given of a causal link between a pathological mental state and the criminal
behavior. We described a burden of symptoms that explains the pedophilic behavior.
According to the INSU (Insufficient but Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but
Sufficient conditions) concept widely adopted in forensic psychiatry34, no one of
these symptoms, alone, could account for D.M. pedophilic behavior, but all together
they are able to explain the emerging pedophilic behavior in D.M. For instance, the
abnormal sexual interest for children alone, would not be considered sufficient to
cause pedophilic behavior. However, if coupled with an impairment in impulsive
behavior control, and in understanding other’s emotion, it is able of giving rise to
this criminal behavior.
In addition, we provided an objective description of pedophilia as one within a
constellation of symptoms caused by the clivus chordoma to corroborate the idea that
D.M. was not malingering his disease. The tumor location could account for all the
observed symptoms. Since sexual arousal and preferences depend primarily on limbic
system structures including hypothalamus35, the hypothalamus hypofunctioning,
due to compression, offer a convincing explanation for the alteration of sexual
drives in D.M.36. Furthermore the orbitofrontal cortex functioning alteration could
account for the impaired levels of emotion recognition37, moral reasoning38 and
impulse inhibition39.
34
H. Anckarsäter et al., op. cit.
35
M. Brunetti, C. Babiloni, A. Ferretti, et al., hypothalamus, sexual arousal and psychosexual identity
in human males: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, in “Eur. J. Neurosc.”, cit.
36
M. Brunetti, C. Babiloni, A. Ferretti, et al., op. cit.; A.D. Baird, S. J. Wilson, P.F. Bladin,
et al., Neurological control of human sexual behavior: insight from lesion studies, in “J Neurol Neurosurg
Psychiatry”, 2007; 78, pp. 1042-1049; M.W. Walter, J. Witzel, C. Weibking, et al., Pedophilia is
linked to reduced activation in hypothalamus and lateral prefrontal cortex during erotic stimulation, in “Biol
Psychiatry”, 2007; 62, pp. 698-701.
37
D.H. Zald, C. Andreotti, Neuropsychological assessment of the orbital and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, in “Neuropsychologia”, 2010; 48(12), pp. 3377-91. R. Adophs, Recognizing emotion from facial
expressions: psychological and neurological mechanisms, in “Behav Cogn Neurosci Rev.”, 2002; 1(1), pp.
21-62.
38
M. Fumagalli, A. Priori, Functional and clinical neuroanatomy of morality, in “Brain”, 2012; 135,
pp. 2006-2021.
39
A. Bari, T.W. Robbins, Inhibition and impulsivity: behavioral and neural basis of response control,
in “Progr. Neurobiol”, 2013; 108: 44-79; G. Schoenbaum, M.R. Roesch, T.A. Stalnaker, et al.,
A new perspective on the role of the orbitofrontal cortez in adaptive behavior, in “Nat. Rev. Neurosci.”,
The restitutio ad integrum after neurosurgery decreed the causal link between
clivus chordoma and pedophilia. On presentation of these findings one can conclude
that D.M’s criminal behavior was the result of uncontrollable symptoms underlying
his mental disorder, thus D.M. has to be considered not responsible for his behavior.
The burden of symptoms does not allow to establishing a causal link between the
brain state and the criminal behavior, but rather between D.M.’s impaired mind and
his criminal behavior. However, we would like to emphasize that D.M.’s impaired
mental state is the result of an impaired brain. Our case highlight the complex medical-
legal issue regarding responsibility for behavior in the setting of neoplasm which
impair both hypothalamus and orbitofrontal cortex functioning. Hypothalamus is
critical for sexual behavior and the orbitofrontal cortex for impulsivity control. In
light of this mitigating factors, was he criminally responsible for his actions? In other
words: did his behavioral actions warrant imprisonment? We believe the answer is
no to both questions.
Criticisms on the use of neuroscientific knowledge in the courtroom

Critic 1: Behavioral assessment is sufficient while the neuroscientific evidence is
superfluous. This view was stated in Brown and Murphy40, who claim that neuroscience
add nothing to the overall accuracy of the assessment based on behavioral psychology
and descriptive psychopathology.
Response: This position misses a crucial point: the danger of malingering. The
patient could be faking, or exaggerating, symptoms: therefore, behavioral assessments
need to be integrated with objective evidence supporting the clinical observation. In
addition, the brain sciences do not aspire to becoming a substitute for the current
clinical criteria of patient classification. As we have already stated, the criteria for
responsibility are, and must be, behavioral, clinical and neuropsychological, and not
based on brain structural and functional alterations. The brain analysis is useful only
as a correlate of behavioral observation.
Critic 2: The presence of brain and genetic anomalies is not in itself evidence of
incompetency (psycho-legal error).
Response: The use of neuroscience as a means of evidence in the courtroom
does not presuppose the belief in the existence of a one-to-one correspondence
between brain states and behavior. It is a well-established fact in contemporary
neuropsychology that brain alterations are mere risk factors for the occurrence of
abnormal behaviors. As we have argued, this probabilistic causal link is best described
2009; 10(12), pp. 885-92. D.G. Dillon, D.A. Pizzagalli, Inhibition of action, thought and emotion: a
selective neurobiological review, in “Appl. Prev. Psychol.”, 2007; 12(3), pp. 99-114.
40
T. Brown, E. Murphy, Through a scanner darkly: functional neuroimaging as evidence of a criminal
defendant’s past mental states, in “Stanford Law Rev.”, 2010; 62(4), pp. 1119-208.
by the INUS causation model41.

Critic 3: Neuroscientific assessments are based on data that have been validated
only in group studies and not in single case studies: therefore, their actual value at
single-case level is not known.
Response: Medicine in general, including (but not limited to) neuroscience,
is about applying a general scientific principle to a particular case. All medical
assessments are based on an array of diverse sources of information, and are based on
careful weighting of all such information. Since the neuroscientists are well aware of
this problem, they are trying to at least estimate the probability to find false positive
results when trying to translate to the single-case the knowledge about the group
studies42.
Critic 4: The neuroscientific forensic assessment aims to find the neural correlate
of a neurological disorder.
Response: the neurological and psychiatric disorders are diagnosed on the basis of
observable symptoms, rather than neural correlates. This is true for psychiatric, as well
as neurological disorders. Let us consider, for example, a classic case in psychiatry:
schizophrenia. The condition is diagnosed based on a specific pattern of behavioral
symptoms such as hallucination, depersonalization, apathy, disorders of the
coherence of the speech; all these symptoms are usually originated from dysfunction
of a brain network that mainly includes the superior temporal gyri. However, the
presence of this brain dysfunction alone does not imply that the person suffers from
schizophrenia. The same logic applies to any neuropsychological disorder irrespective
of its etiology, neurological or psychiatric. In sum, behavioral disorders are defined
at the behavioral level and neuroscience only provides, in some case, an objective
evidence of the symptoms already observed.
Neuroscientific conclusions
Even if there are regions in the brain which appear to be responsible for specific
functions (for example, the orbitofrontal cortex for impulses inhibition and for
moral reasoning), the brain is also well known for the redundancy of its connections,
i.e. each regions in involved in more than one cognitive function and behavior, for
the interconnectivity between different regions and for its plasticity43. It has been
shown that the orbital region of the frontal lobe is involved in moral reasoning and
41
H. Anckarsäter, S. Radovic, C. Svennerlind, et al., Mental disorder is the cause of crime: the
cornerstone of forensic psychiatry, in “Int J Law & Psychiatry”, cit.
42
C. Scarpazza, G. Sartori, M.S. De Simone, A. Mechelli, When the single matter more than group:
very high false positive rates in single case voxel based morphometry, in “NeuroImage”, 2013; 70, pp.175-88.
43
B. Kolb, A. Muhammad, R. Gibb, Searching for factors underlying cerebral plasticity in the normal and
injured brain, in “J Commun Disord”, 2011;44(5), pp. 503-14.
in impulses inhibition, but there are patients reporting lesions in the orbitofrontal
cortices who do not have any deficit of moral reasoning or impulses inhibition. In
other words, even if a brain injury can influence behavior, there is no “moral region”
in the brain. This is the reason why it is not possible to adopt a deterministic reasoning
in forensic setting. Instead, it is indispensible to emphasize that the existence of
specific brain structures involved in the control of behavior could account for the
frequent observation that when these structures or their connection are damaged, the
patients are more likely to experience behavioral changes.
To date, the neurosciences are useful in courtroom because they offer the
possibility to provide objective evidences for the existence of an altered state of mind,
which, however, must be demonstrated by the standard clinical, psychiatric and /
or neuropsychological assessment. The neurosciences can provide another piece of
the puzzle to make the defendant mental state description more accurate and more
objective. To achieve this aim, the integration of neuroscientific knowledge in the
legal proceeding is mandatory, so that this latter one can benefit from the scientific
and logical reasoning.
In the case above described, the presence of a tumor which compresses the
areas involved in sexual orientation (hypothalamus) and inhibition of impulses
(orbitofrontal cortex) supports the hypothesis that the pedophilia arose as a symptoms
of a neurological disease. However, this consideration in only the conclusion of a
logical reasoning which was intended to explain the neurological, neuropsychological,
behavioral and social changes observed in the patients. All these symptoms together
suggest that the man’s control over his own behavior was weakened. In line with
our etiological hypothesis of a causal link between the tumor growth and behavioral
alteration, all the symptoms receded after the surgical removal of the chordoma.
Finally, we would like to conclude this essay as we started: using Antoine de
Saint- Exupery words. “One must require from each one the duty which each one
can perform”. As well as we cannot expect sophisticated reasoning from a child
with mental retardation, we cannot expect the ability to exert inhibition over his
sexual urges from DM. Indeed, in both cases the presence of an important biological
constraint prevents the brain from properly functioning, leading to an alteration in
mental status.
Patient
Localization of
Author_year (year, Etiology Mechanisms Sexual changes
lesion
gender)
Regestein and
56, R frontal Meningioma Compression P
Reich, 1978
Miller et al. L midbrain,
34, Glioma Compression P
1986 hypothalamus
Burns and 40, R orbitofrontal Tumor Invasive mass P

Swerdlow,
2003
Devinsky et al. R temporal Ganglio glioma Invasive mass
2010 51, (amygdala) (surgery removed) P
Mendez and 60, Frontotemporal Dementia Atrophy P
Shapira, 2011
67, Frontotemporal Dementia Atrophy P
76, Frontotemporal Dementia Atrophy P
82, Basal ganglia Dementia P
(pallidum)
59, Basal ganglia Parkinson’s Atrophy P
32, Basal ganglia Huntington Atrophy P
(caudate,
pallidum,
striatum)
59, Basal ganglia Pallidotomy to Surgery lesion P
(pallidum) cure Parkinson
67, R medial Hippocampal Atrophy P
temporal lobe slerosis.
Table 1. Available study reporting the onset of pedophilic behavior as a results of brain
disease. R=right; L=left. P=Pedophilia.
Figure 1. The figure depicted: A) Apollinaire’s helmet (adapted from Bogousslavsky, 2005);
B) Apollinaire during the recovery from the wound (download from the web); C) Apollinaire’s
brain region damaged by the wound.
Figure 2. The figure depicted D.M. magnetic resonance. The clivus chordoma, indicated by
the red arrow, is a rare slow-growing neoplasm thought to arise from cellular remnants of the
notochord. The clivus (latin for “slope”) is a part of the cranium, a shallow depression behind
the dorsum sellæ that slopes obliquely backward. In D.M. this tumor displaced the pituitary
gland and compressed the orbitofrontal cortex, the optic chiasm and the hypothalamus.
In search of Mister Hyde. A few reflections on forensic genetics and the penal
rationalism1
Francesca Zanuso
In this paper I will deal with a specific profile of forensic genetics, that concerning
the possibility of establishing the so-called disposition to crime.
The DNA composition is the genetic data presiding over our biologic identity and
from this point of view genetics is an excellent instrument to «trace back» a «personal
identity»2. I refer to an identity we know as being individual and unrepeatable
since the first assembling of male and female gametes, in the extraordinary human
adventure of procreation. DNA is unique and unparalleled and, therefore, researches
and investigations aimed, for instance, at individuating a particular subject to hold
him to account for his actions are more than welcome; it does not seem that any
particular doubts arise in this regard, other than those engendered by the proper
protection of the privacy of the so-called highly sensitive data.
In other words, whenever we decide to use the language of genetics we may
recognise a genetic identity that will not risk undue absolutizations, provided that
we keep in mind we used a peculiar scientific protocol to detect it3.
1
2
The various dimensions of identity and their legal relevance have been punctually illustrated by G.
Pino, Il diritto all’identità personale. Interpretazione costituzionale e creatività giurisprudenziale, Bologna,
Il Mulino, 2003, in E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali. Profili di diritto comparato e
europeo, Padova, Cedam, 2008 and, very recently, by S. Amato, F. Cristofari, S. Raciti (eds.),
Biometria. I codici a barre del corpo, Torino, Giappichelli, 2013.
3
Giuseppe Sermonti has accurately highlighted such a risk, which is based on the diffused but erroneous
belief that human nature could be entirely and solely represented through the decoding of DNA; cf.
G. Sermonti, Dimenticare Darwin, Milano, Rusconi, 1999. His remark is not superfluous at all, since
recently one of the most «mass media» figures of Italian science, Umberto Veronesi, has expressed
shocking convictions. According to the authoritative oncologist, DNA goes beyond the contingent:
«Our DNA does not die and keep living in our children and in all the generations to come. My
DNA, that is to say, all the physical and psychical characters, comes unaltered from human beings of
millennia ago. Immortality could simply be the fact that we transmit our DNA. It is a modern form
of metemsomatosis and of metempsychosis, that is, of reincarnation» (U. Veronesi, A. Elkann, Essere
laico, Milano, Bompiani, 2008, p. 74, our transl.). This apparent reference to the infinite, “depurated”
by metaphysics, has been conveniently criticised by F. D’Agostino, Parole di Bioetica, Torino,
Giappichelli, 2004, pp. 102-3. On this issue, see also Id. (ed.), Darwinismo e problemi di giustizia,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2008.
314 In search of Mister Hyde
All this does not seem to pose, indeed, particular legal-philosophical problems,
unless we presume that biologic identity reduces to itself every other dimension of
identity (such as the cultural, the familiar, the social ones and so on). It is, therefore,
indispensable not to fall into the error of genetic reductionism4, which may lead
us to erroneously conceive reality as a set of phenomenally significant data, which
can be manipulated and, therefore, dominated by human will5. This would be a
blunder: for several reasons, «reality» cannot be diminished to what may be an object
of the human thought. The most immediate of such reasons is the following: such
a presumed «reality» would miss the most important element, that is to say, that
subject who, by thinking, pretends to assume as an object whatever surrounds him6.
In other words, reality cannot be conceived as something to be limited to what
we may perceive in the space-time dimension: «beyond» this dimension there is all
that could never be assumed at the mercy of human will, because it is essentially what
contributes to form it7. Instead, it is to be acknowledged that subjective life manifests
itself as a constant, but elusive testimony of this phenomenal and ultra-phenomenal
dimension, of which it keeps the mystery.
These considerations, albeit approximately traced, show what is the real stake
facing the stimulating suggestions of forensic genetics8. The recurrent risk is
scientism9, which appears in the moment it assumes to be worth a peculiar application
4
We should remember that the Nobel prize Gerald Edelman, one of the fathers of neurosciences, wishes
neurosciences to accomplish Darwin’s program by making also the brain and the thought a product of
evolution and by depriving them of their metaphysical and mysterious air (cf. G.M. Edelman, Seconda
natura. Scienza del cervello e conoscenza umana, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2007); in this regard, cf. A.
Bianchi, Neuroscienze e diritto: spiegare di più per comprendere meglio, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G.
Sartori, (eds.) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, pp. XVIII-XIX.
5
In this regard cf. F. Zanuso, La consulenza genetica tra realtà e immaginazione, in L.Palazzani (ed.),
Gen-ius. La consulenza tra genetica e diritto, Roma, Studium, 2011, pp. 35-43.
6
On this topic cf. F. Cavalla, All’origine del diritto al tramonto della legge, Napoli, Jovene, 2011, pp.
6-8.
7
Mauro Ronco, who authored a really stimulating essay on the topic, criticises the necessarily
fragmentary conception of neurosciences that neglects the holistic dimension of the brain to examine
some of its parts as several objects; cf. M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, in “Archivio penale”, 3,
2011, p. 868. On the topic cf. also Id., Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, in “Iustitia”,
4/11, pp. 429-440.
8
It is due but pleasant for me to recognise an intellectual debt to Stefano Fuselli, recalling S. Fuselli,
Oltre i dualismi: un itinerario tra diritto, neuroscienze e filosofia, in “Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche”,
13/2013, pp. 61-141.
9
I cannot resist quoting such a provocative statement: «Astrologists, magicians, medicines,
mathematicians have always given their knowing contribution and oriented the decision of the judge on
the basis of the infallibility of their knowledge» (L. de Cataldo Neuburger, Scienza e processo penale:
linee guida per l’acquisizione della prova scientifica, Padova, Cedam, 2010, pag. XII-XIII, our transl.).
On the relations between science and law see the classic S. Jasanoff, La scienza davanti ai giudici,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2001, as well as S. Fuselli, Apparenze. Accertamento giudiziale e prova scientifica,
Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2008 and M.C. Tallacchini, Diritto e scienza, in Luoghi della Filosofia del
diritto. Idee strumenti mutamenti (ed. by B. Montanari), Torino, Giappichelli, 2012, pp. 145-169.
F. Zanuso 315
of genetic discoveries to the penal field: I refer to the pretension of inferring from
genetic makeup a higher or lower predisposition to deviance10. In this case it is not
simply said that, genetically, that individual is that unrepeatable subject, based on his
unrepeatable genetic sequence; on the contrary, it is presumed that, by virtue of that
unrepeatable genetic sequence, that subject shows a sort of weakness that inclines
him to crime or, at least, does not make it sufficiently resistant to the temptation of
establishing inter-subjective relations in a violent way. Genetics would not be used,
therefore, to call a subject to account for his actions; instead, it would be supposed
that genetics itself is able to offer a more or less exhaustive explanation of acting
itself11.
In other words, here is at stake the pretension of individuating a sort of «evil
gene» in order to defend ourselves12.
In the field of the philosophy of criminal law, this topic is particularly interesting
since it concerns the concept of free will, of responsibility, of blameworthiness
(«rimproverabilità»)13 and, therefore, it touches the heart of the traditional conception
of culpability as a nexus between action and will, the intention of the subject and the
meaning of penal sanction itself14. The risk of a rising etiologic determinism and of
10
In a remarkable essay, Messina writes that neurosciences are the most refined evolution of cognitive
psychology and that «neurosciences replace the quest for and the description of the most significant
and diffused cognitive illusions conditioning individual choices and behaviour in the perspective of
social psychology with a much more difficult and ambitious aim, that of becoming able to control and
predict mental processes through the knowledge of their physiological and biological correlatives» (G.
Messina, Le neuroscienze nel processo: profili problematici e orizzonti prospettici di un nuovo confronto fra
scienza e diritto, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen”, 1/2010, p. 347, our transl.). Even more critical is Lorusso,
as he writes of «fascinations coming from the hyper-evaluation of the technical-scientific knowledge
applied to criminal trial» (S. Lorusso, Il contributo degli esperti alla formazione del convincimento
giudiziale, in “Archivio penale”, 3/2011, p. 817, our transl.).
11
On the topic cf. P. Sommaggio, Umano post-umano. I rischi di un uso ideologico della genetica, in
“Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche”, 8/2008, cit., pp. 237 ff. See also the complete and well articulated
collective volume edited by L. Palazzani, Il diritto nelle neuroscienze: non siamo i nostri cervelli, Torino,
Giappichelli, 2013.
12
The expression is used by E. Musumeci, Cesare Lombroso e le neuroscienze: un parricidio mancato.
Devianza, libero arbitrio, imputabilità tra antiche chimere ed inediti scenari, Milano, FrancoAngeli,
2012, p. 102. On the naiveté of this presumption cf. S. Bauzon, De la disposition génétique au crime,
in L. Picotti, F. Zanuso (eds.), L’antropologia criminale di Cesare Lombroso: dall’Ottocento al dibattito
filosofico-penale contemporaneo, Napoli, ESI, 2011, pp. 61-67.
13
On this topic we may recall what Ronco conveniently stated: «Neurobiological science has not yet
proved experimentally, according to objective and verifiable criteria, neither the existence nor the
inexistence of the liberty of will. Nor could it possibly do that... since the problem can be solved only on
the metaphysical level, which considers man as a whole unit» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica,
cit., p. 856, our transl.). For a first approach to the relation between liberty and responsibility in the
legal field cf. B. Montanari, Libertà, responsabilità, legge, in Luoghi della Filosofia del diritto, cit., pp.
171-207.
14
In English-speaking Countries the issue is a central one since more than ten years now; as a mere
example see A. Evansburg, But your Honor, it’s in his genes. The case for genetic impairments as grounds
for a downward departure under the federal sentencing guidelines, in “American Criminal Law Review”,
a consequent «labelling» of deviance (labelling theory) is, in fact, always lurking and,
therefore, an open-minded reflection cannot be delayed any further15.
Such a reflection is unavoidable especially today, since nowadays our society is
tempted, even more than in the past, by a sort of genetic stigmatisation that should
allegedly (be able to) protect it from evil, by stopping an increasing social alarm.
Of course, many of these considerations are prompted by the news of the actual
application (of the results) of molecular genetics and of the so-called neurosciences
also in Italian courts, in decisions taken in different stages of litigation, in order to
better establish the culpability of the defendant. By way of example, I report two
judgements that caused a great sensation in the public opinion, due to the wide
popularisation offered by the media, as well as the reflections appeared in many
scientific journals: the decision of the «Corte di Assise di Appello di Trieste» (n. 5 of
18 September 2009) and the decision of the judge for the preliminary investigation
(«Giudice per le indagini preliminari»: GIP) of Como on the Albertani case (25 May
2011).
I cannot discuss here the merits of these decisions, as I am sure that other papers
in this book will well illustrate the conditions and consequences of these forensic
surveys.
What I wish to emphasise here is the risk of the scientistic degeneration of the
data used in these surveys ascertaining the genetic vulnerability to crime. Of course,
the danger is to interpret a scientific data, which is by its very nature hypothetical and
conventional and result of a peculiar reading of reality for operational purposes, as an
objective, neutral data, standing before our reason as an undoubted and indubitable
2001, pp. 1565-1566, M. Jones, Overcoming the myth of free will in criminal law: the true impact of
the genetic revolution, “Duke Law Journal”, 2002, pp. 1031-1035, D. Wasserman, Is there value in
identifying individual genetic predisposition to violence, in “Journal of law, Medecine and Ethics”, 2004,
pp. 24-33, O.R. Goodenough – K. Prehn, A neuroscientific approach to normative judgement in law
and justice, in Law and the brain, “Phil. Trans. R. Soc. London” B, 2004, 359, pp. 1709-26; S.J.
Morse, New neuroscience, old problems, in B. Garland (ed.), Neuroscience and the law: brain, mind, and
the scales of justice, Dana, New York, 2004, pp. 157-98; Id., Moral and legal responsabilty and the new
neuroscience, in J. Illes, Neuroethics: Defining the Issuesin Theory, Practice and Policy, Oxford University
Press, New York, 2006, pp. 33-50, M. Rajadhyaksha, Condemned by birth: the Implications of Genetics
for the Theories of Crime and Punishment, in “Socio-Legal Revue”, 85/2006, pp. 85-103.
15
In a recent essay, Larizza asks herself whether it is possible to prevent crime by imposing a preventive
treatment to those bearing anomalies without harming fundamental human rights (cf. S. Larizza, Sui
limiti posti dal sistema penale alle ricezione degli esiti conoscitivi della neuroimaging, in M.G. Ruberto, C.
Barbieri, Il futuro tra noi. Aspetti etici, giuridici e medico-legali della neuroetica, Milano, FrancoAngeli,
2011, p. 34). Then, she criticises the return of a naïve criminal aetiology (op. ult. cit., p. 35). In fact, one
can foresee the relapse in the deterministic logic; on the topic, just for a first orientation, cf. J. Greene,
J. Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything, in Law and the brain, cit., pp. 1775-
85 and, in Italy, in G. Gulotta, La responsabilità penale nell’era delle neuroscienza, in A. Bianchi,
Neuroscienze e diritto, cit., pag.8. Amongst Italian publications, see A. Forza, Neuroscienze e diritto,
“Rivista Penale”, 3/2009, pp. 247-255.
F. Zanuso 317
element, which one cannot but be aware and conscious of16. Knowing it would mean
individuating it as an object of one’s own knowledge; using it to protect society
would be necessary and unavoidable for legal, political but also ethical purposes.
In other words, the scientific discovery that a low-activity allele for the MAOA
(MAOA-L) gene inclines to aggressiveness in presence of provocations or displays
of social exclusion could engender two presumptions. According to the first one, a
person could be persuaded to think that such a fact offers the basis for a perfect (even
if just initial from a quantitative point of view!) understanding of the functioning
of the «criminal mind»; according to the second one, a person could be tempted
to think that such altered genetics not only represents a vulnerability to criminal
temptations, but also characterises «born to kill» subjects.
I do not use such an expression as a provocation just to wake up the reader’s
attention. I use it because it has been widely utilised by the Italian press after the
Albertani decision17.
It is out of doubt that both forensic scientists and legal scholars took into account
with the due prudence and wisdom what science seems to hand on a silver platter,
in order to discover one for all the appearance of crime… and to defend us from it! I
think of several interviews promptly released by the two men of science who signed
the survey recalled by the Trieste decision18 and of other scientific contributions
16
In this regard, it is worth emphasising the peculiarity of the neurosciences and neuroethics issues that
are related to our conscience, our sense of self, pretending to assume it as an object of the reflection.
On the topic, see what Salvatore Amato states: «Science cannot think to limit itself to describe…
but it is called to suggest (or demolish) a certain image of man and of the world that deeply affects
customs, by conditioning behavioural rules and social expectations» [S. Amato, Biopolitica, biodiritto
e biotecnologie, in L.Palazzani (ed.), Nuove biotecnologie, biodiritto e trasformazioni della soggettività,
Studium, Roma, 2007, cit., p. 27, our transl.]. On this topic see the interesting reflections by A.
Farano, Percorsi della responsabilità: le neuroscienze cambiano tutto o niente?, in “i-lex”, 18, 2013, pp.
189-200. The Author distinguishes between the concept of man as idem and as ipse, reprising it from
Ricoeur and Romano, and concludes her short essay stating that: «The discourse of neurosciences is
related to man conceived as idem, therefore to what in man does not change, his body, but also his
character, his genetic predispositions, whereas responsibility consists of identity conceived as ipseity, that
is, that permanence of self that keeps together in a coherent narrative framework past actions, of which
we recognise authors, and future actions, towards which we are committed. Therefore neuroscience
changes everything and nothing at all, provided it is returned to its descriptive function, thus preserving
a notion of responsibility rooted in ipseity» (op. ult. cit., p. 199, our transl.).
17
Just for instance, here are some titles appeared right after the Albertani decision: Cirimido, uccise
la sorella: alterati i suoi geni [«Cirimido, she killed her sister: her genes altered», our transl.], in “La
Provincia di Como”, 29.8.2011, Quella donna uccise per colpa dei geni [«That woman killed because of
her genes», our transl.], in “Corriere della Sera”, 30.8.2011, Born to kill: la colpa è nei geni [«Born to kill:
the culpability is in the genes», our transl.] (Insubria 30.8.2011), Italian court reduces murder sentence
based on neuroimaging data, in “Newsblog”, 1.9.2011 in www.natur.com), Nata per uccidere, è colpa dei
geni [«Born to kill, put the blame on the genes», our transl.] in “Giustizia giusta”, 1.9.2011.
18
In an interview for the online review “Brain Factor” Giuseppe Sartori observed: «The decision
recognises evidential efficacy to cognitive and molecular neurosciences, pointing out how the use
of such techniques increases the certainty of dealing with a real mental illness. That is to say, the
proof is stronger» (2/11/2009 www.brainfactor.it, our transl.). In other words, genetics would offer
about it19; I also remind some well-balanced contributions commenting the Como
decision from a penal point of view20.
This seems to be a way to avert the danger of falling into penal rationalism,
that is, into that sort of «moral sickness» nestled in the Western cultural history,
a considerable support to traditional neuro-psychiatric assessments by strengthening the assumed

objectivity of their conclusions. Nevertheless, this «objectivity» is not deemed to be immediately
evidential by Pietrini in an interview on the same website; the Scientist points out, in fact, that «in the
current state of knowledge no genetic variable has been put in causal relation with aggressive antisocial
behaviour, that is to say, there is no genetic variable that can absolutely determine the presence of a
certain behaviour» (17/11/2009 www.brainfactor.it, our transl.).
19
Mindful scientists may, therefore, acknowledge the presence of a statistically higher risk. Amongst
the many contributions in this regard see A. Lavazza, L. Sammicheli, Il delitto nel cervello. La mente
fra scienza e diritto, Torino, Codice edizioni, 2012, where the Authors point out with clarity and
decision the non causal nature of generic variables to which one may attribute the power of creating
a sort of genetic vulnerability cf. pp. 84-85. Two esteemed researchers expressed analogous views:
«Although [recent studies in brain-imaging] clearly suggest a neural basis for certain aggressive and
criminal behaviours, they must not be intended in a deterministic key. To admit the limits of brain
imaging is not to admit that the available results are meaningless, but only to recognize that further
research is in need» (P. Pietrini , V. Bambini, Homo ferox: the conribution of functional brain studies to
understanding the neural bases of aggressive and criminal behaviour, in “International Journal of Law and
Psychiatry”, 32, 2009, pp. 259-265) also published in Italian language in A. Bianchi, G. Gulotta, G.
Sartori (eds.), Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, pp.41-63. In a similar way, cf.
S. Pellegrini, Il ruolo dei fattori genetici nella modulazione del comportamento: le nuove acquisizioni della
biologia molecolare genetica, in A. Bianchi, G.Gullotta, G.Sartori, (eds.) Manuale di neuroscienze
forensi, cit., p. 79. An adequate consciousness characterises also those who state, with reference to the
data acquired: «The image deriving from them should not be interpreted as a photograph of what
happens in that particular moment, but as the fruit of a statistical elaboration of data, since the metabolic
activity of a tissue is strongly variable» (M.G. Ruberto, G.Ferrari, Neuroetica: una scienza nuova, in
M.G. Ruberto, C. Barbieri, Il futuro tra noi, cit., p. 81, our transl.). However, Sartori, writing with
Sammicheli, observes: «The peculiarity of neuroscientific evidence is in the higher demonstrability and
noticeability (at a biological level) of the state of pathological functioning of legally relevant mental
functions» [L. Sammicheli, G. Sartori, Neuroscienze giuridiche: i diversi livelli di interazione fra diritto
e neuroscienze, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G. Sartori (eds.) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, cit.,
p. 25, our transl.]. All this would be reassuring if the conclusions of such research and experiments
would not be articulated as follows: «Neurosciences have the objective of drawing a neuro-behavioural
geography of the criminal subject» (op. ult. cit., p. 28, our transl.).
20
See, for instance, M.T. Collica, Il riconoscimento del ruolo delle neuroscienze nel giudizio di
imputabilità, in “Diritto penale contemporaneo”, 1/2012, pp.1-26 and F. Casasole, Neuroscienze,
genetica comportamentale e processo penale, in “Diritto penale e processo”, 1/2012, pp. 110-117. Other
essential instruments for a comprehension of the penal reflections on this topic are offered by: A.
Forza, Neuroscienze e diritto, in “Rivista penale”, 3/2009, pp. 247-255; A. Colorio, Diritto e cervello:
verso le nuove frontiere del neurodiritto, in “I-Lex Scienze Giuridiche, Scienze Cognitive e Intelligenza
artificiale” (on-line review); 2010; M. De Caro, M. Marraffa, Libertà, responsabilità e retributivismo,
in “Sistemi intelligenti”, 2/2010, pp. 357-374; L. Capraro, V. Cuzzocrea, E. Picozza, D. Terracina
(eds.), Neurodiritto. Un’introduzione, Torino, Giappichelli, 2011, F. Macioce, Le neuroscienze. Vecchie
domande e nuove sfide per il diritto, in “Archivio giuridico Filippo Serafini”, 1/2012, pp. 25-59; A.
Nisco, Il confronto tra neuroscienze e diritto penale sulla libertà di volere, in “Diritto penale e processo”,
4/2012, pp. 499-508, F.G. Pizzetti, Neuroscienze forensi e diritti fondamentali: spunti costituzionali,
Torino, Giappichelli, 2012, A. Santosuosso, Neuroscienze e diritto: un quadro delle opportunità , in
“Rivista italiana di medicina legale”, 1/2012, pp. 83-103.
F. Zanuso 319
which reveals itself in the pretension of the reason to dispose of primal, certain and
evident premises (but actually subtracted from demonstration) from which derive
in a coherently cogent way punctual truths and indisputably valid legal norms21.
Moreover, often rationalism goes together with scientism, caused by a fall of
problematic tension, which leads to the absolutization of scientific results, forgetting
their hypothetical and conventional dimension22.
Within the penal field, historically such an error resulted in series of dangerous
assumptions such as that of distinguishing exhaustively the in-nocent man from
the ab-normal one, and consequently of protecting society from the latter one, thus
strengthening the dominating values and coming to a non-wanted but deep-rooted
State conception of penal law23.
As I said before, I think with well-founded reasons that scholars have not fallen
in such an error.
So what? Is everything all right? I fear not!
Indeed, if scientists and criminal lawyers have been «pouring oil on troubled
waters», albeit with different buckets, each one of different capacity, the media
bombarded the public opinion with boasting and resounding articles, engendering
the conviction that the application of genetics and neurosciences to criminal trial is
already realised, without any drawbacks.
But too often media disclose what the public expects from them, then a disquieting
question crept into my mind: why does the public want this?
I think we can answer by stating that the public opinion has been constantly
fascinated by every attempt to explain, through a presumably objective criterion, the
deviant’s personality, the genesis of crime in its origin and in its probable evolution.
An illustrious example of this fascination is given by the success of Lombroso’s
studies at the beginning of the last century. Back then, as it happens today, there
was the recurrent rationalistic illusion of defining and, therefore, confining evil in
21
On rationalism as moral sickness of Western modernity cf. F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione.
Oltre la concezione liberale dello stato: per una teoria radicale della pena, in F. Zanuso, S. Fuselli (eds.),
Ripensare la pena. Teorie e problemi nella riflessione moderna, Padova, Cedam, 2004, p. 30.
22
In this, the popular conviction is also supported by a naïve conception of empirical verifiability,
deemed able to exhaustively demonstrate the validity of the adopted hypotheses. Here the traditional
critical statement of two logical neo-positivists par excellence applies: «Hypotheses are proven with
empirical data, with the so-called facts; but we choose, analyse and interpret empirical data based on
the assumed principles» (M.R. Cohen, E. Nagel, Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, 1934,
p. 596, our transl.). In this regard, Mauro Ronco conveniently highlights that: «The new scientific
evidence, sometimes presented as objectively incontrovertible, is – even more than traditional evidence
– extremely subjective in its origin, in its elaboration and in its interpretation, as it depends more than
ever on the precision and integrity with which the expert observes the many and often contradictory
elements of fact, as well as on the methodological rigour and the objectivity with which he elaborates
and interprets them» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 858, our transl.).
23
F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., pp. 33-36.
a well determined category of subjects, the so-called abnormal24; such an illusion

goes together with the naïve assumption of clearly distinguishing the latter from
the community of the so-called innocents, of those who seem capable to integrate
themselves well in the social fabric25.
This social trend, cherished by dogmatic rationalism, arises from a fear that seems
to have a double nature and, therefore, has to be distinguished.
In the first place, the manifestation of Evil – for instance in the ferocity of a crime
– disquiets us. I would say that it disquiets equally the scholar and the ordinary man.
We are afraid of it, of course, because we fear for our own safety. But not only
for that! The fear goes together with a subtle anguish that «flows», unpleasant and
therefore contrasted, by the awareness of the possibility that the seed of evil may lie
in all of us, more or less deeply, in the flesh and in the spirit26.
A masterpiece of the Eighteenth century literature warns us about that. I think
of the tale by Robert Louis Stevenson, Dr. Jekyll and Mister Hyde and especially
of the underlying thesis of the writing, which wants to be an apology of human
nature. The moralist, the fierce guardian of his public image and of the bourgeois
respectability, transforms first intentionally and, then, progressively, blamelessly
and unconsciously into his opposite, in the hidden monster, filthy and repulsive,
in which all malevolence appears27. Yet, the scission of the twofold – mark well! at
first willingly and tenaciously programmed by the scientific knowledge of the homo
faber dr. Jekyll – is rooted in collective imagination since we fear Mister Hyde but
we are, alas, aware that every dr. Jekyll hosts, in a more or less durably hidden way, a
potential deviant. It is no coincidence that the monster’s name evokes what should
be kept hidden because obscure (to hide); besides, the scientist, the most respectable
and meritorious man for his times, bears in his name an assonance with the most
cruel of all crimes (to kill).
We cannot, therefore, be surprised by the fact that since ancient times man tried
to «exorcise» such an evil, of which we fear the connaturality, by confining it within
precise, definable and, thus, predictable schemes. In other words, we always tried to
protect ourselves from the evil that is outside of us, but which can also be inside us.
24
The issue is broadly dealt with in D. Velo Dalbrenta, La scienza inquieta. Saggio sull’antropologia
criminale di Cesare Lombroso, Padova, Cedam, 2004; by the same Author cf. also Id., Lombroso, in I.
Birocchi, E. Cortese, A. Mattone, M.N. Miletti (eds.), Dizionario Biografico dei Giuristi Italiani
(XII-XX secolo), II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2013, pp. 1189-1192.
25
Besides, the same scientists who deny the risk of a neuro-reductionist drift fall in dangerous slopes;
for instance, P. Pietrini, V. Bambini, Homo ferox: il contributo delle neuroscienze alla comprensione
dei comportamenti aggressivi e criminali, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G. Sartori, (eds.) Manuale di
neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, p. 54 name a paragraph «The criminal brain: morphological
and functional differences between criminal and normal individuals».
26
The alternative is not pleonastic but intentional, referred as it is to the various neuroscientific theses.
27
For a reconstruction of the tale by Stevenson and of its links with the then born psychoanalysis cf. M.
Trevi, Introduzione a R.L. Stevenson, Il dottor Jekyll e Mr. Hyde, Milano, Feltrinelli,1991, pp. 5-16.
F. Zanuso 321
In order to protect ourselves against it we must know it and, therefore, according

to the modern ways of thinking, make it an objective, and thus controllable, element:
besides the day before yesterday such an element was recognised in a particular
morphology, studied by physiognomics, yesterday it has been identified in the
presence of the occipital dimple or in a chromosome deformity28.
Today, the eternal temptation of «confining» evil, by defining it with an accurate
and verifiable description, is more alive than ever and it is mantled within the guise
of scientificity; to be precise, it uses the most à la page guises, that is to say, the ones
offered by neurosciences and molecular genetics. It counts on the chance to enter
in a painless way into the folds of the brain and to find there, in their regularity
and connection, the origin of the will29 or, better, of the deficit of the rising of the
prohibition preventing the will from manifesting in its too frequent anti-sociality30.
This results in the temptation to explain, thanks to the investigation on cerebral
neurones and to the genetic recording, the criminal propensity or, at least, the
incapacity to conform to social regularity31.
Actually, as I was saying, the most accurate literature maintains that certain
alterations of morphology and, therefore, of the functioning of the frontal region
and the structures it involves (which are presumably in charge with governing the
modulation of aggressive and anti-social behaviour) as well as the alterations of the
genetic composition may constitute not strictly necessitating, but surely strongly
prominent factors in determining with a good level of probability deviant criminal
behaviour32.
However, the public opinion, led by capable journalists, passes over the
dimension of probability, illusorily turning it into necessity33. This happens for a
28
On the topic cf. F. Zanuso, L’emergente attualità di Lombroso, in L. Picotti, F. Zanuso (a cura di),
L’antropologia criminale, cit., pp. 5-9. Di Giovine emphasizes how the idea that the mind is the brain
and that the conscience has biological nature reminds the rules of Darwinian evolutionism and evokes
«spectres» of biological reductionism recalling the Lombrosian era (cf. O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura
delle neuroscienze?, in “Archivio penale”, 3/2011, p. 838-840, our transl.).
29
For an example of these studies adhering to a deterministic and neuro-physiological vision of human
behaviour see D. Dennet, Freedom evolves, New York, Viking Press, 2003; for the effects in the
legal field cf. S. Morse, Addiction, Genetics and Criminale Responsibility, in “Law and Contemporary
Problems”, vol. 69, 2006, p. 165 ff.
30
In this regard see the studies contained in M. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain, New York, Dana Press,
2005.
31
It’s no accident that one of the main challenges of neuroethics is the reflection on the concept of
normality; cf. M.G. Ruberto, G. Ferrari, Neuroetica: una scienza nuova, cit., p. 114.
32
Similar theses, centred on the role of the so-called somatic marker can be found in the classic A.
Damasio, Descartes’Errors: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, 1994, italian translation in Adelphi,
Milano, 1995, pp. 245-6.
33
Someone speaks of «scourge of media exposition»: A. Bianchi, Psicodiagnostica forense: utilità e
limiti, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G. Sartori, (eds.) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, cit., p. 91 (our
transl.). Such a drift of the media has been immediately criticised; for instance, see the declarations in
E. Feresin, BadLighter sentence for murderer with bad genes, in “Naturenews” (30.10.2009).
further dimension of fear, which apparently affects really closely criminal policy34.
Today, far more than yesterday and the day before yesterday, we fear the diverse
that is in us but also that is close to us35. In our multi-racial and multi-cultural
society, the diverse troubles us. Especially, we fear that the diverse may turn into an
adverse.
There are of course psychological and sociological reasons that may explain such
a fear36. However, there is one radically cultural reason on which philosophy of law
has something important to say.
The Western world, fed with jacobinic spirit and careless of the dialectic lesson of
classicism, is inclined to think that the diverse is the adverse and that the adverse is
necessarily the alien, that is, he who is incomprehensible, the one with whom there
cannot be any sharing nor communication. The most prevalent mentality is afraid
of the diverse, the opposite, because it has been educated in a modern fashion to
«freeze» the conflicts, to deny their aspect constitutive of the ex-sistence37.
At the same time, multiculturalism proceeds in a relativist, tired, exhausted,
unconfident society, in which asking and answering does not seem to have sense any
more38.
How shall we found, then, the perspective of responsibility? How can we ask
somebody to answer for his behaviours? How can we ascertain the very responsibility
for a crime?
Of course, it is more appealing to think that there is a new, non-renounceable
discovery that shows a «sembiante del delitto» (an appearance or physiognomy of
crime)39, able to erect the boundary: here are the good ones, there the evil ones.
In other words, a society that cannot understand the diverse, especially when
it proves to be adverse, since it is not able to call anybody to be responsible, gladly
embraces the possibility to «confine» the evil, the danger in a well defined datum, for
instance in a defective allele.
Nevertheless, this trend is, allow me the pun, extremely dangerous, since it brings
34
On this functional relation between empirical sciences and criminal law cf. G. Forti, L’immane
concretezza, Metamorfosi del crimine e controllo penale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2000.
35
On this topic cf. F. Bilancia, F.M. Di Sciullo, F. Rimoli (eds.), Paura dell’Altro. Identità occidentale
e cittadinanza, Roma, Carocci, 2008.
36
On the issue cf. I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce? Criminologia, determinismo, neuroscienze,
Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2012.
37
On the topic cf. F . Zanuso, Conflitto e controllo sociale nel pensiero giuridico-politico della modernità,
Padova, Cleup, 1993, p. 19.
38
On the topic cf. the various essays dedicated to the issue of multiculturalism and its effects in the
legal field published in “Ragion Pratica” 1/2013; see especially F. Basile, Il diritto penale nelle società
multiculturali: i reati culturalmente motivati, in «Ragion Pratica» 1/2013, pp. 9-48, F. Santoni De Sio,
Responsabilità fondamentale e differenze culturali, in “Ragion Pratica” 1/2013, pp. 49-70, B. Pastore,
Reati culturalmente motivati e valutazione probatoria, in “Ragion Pratica” 1/2013, pp. 97-105.
39
On the issue cf. D. Velo Dal Brenta, La scienza inquieta, cit., p. 95 ff.
F. Zanuso 323
to a preventionist drift. In fact, if I can predict the perpetration of evil deeds, why
should not I prevent it40?
The never realised old positivist dream (in the end, everybody had to admit not
to have an indubitable criterion to uphold the inclination to crime before its own
manifestation in a criminal act41) today could be facilitated by apparently soft pillows!
How can we defend ourselves from this public opinion turmoil that might bring
to a result contrary to individual rights, whereas, for instance, the use of genetic
investigations should be requested not only in bonam partem, but also in malam
partem42? Not only, therefore, to punish more adequately, but, especially, to prevent
crime more effectively?
First of all, we can defend ourselves by firmly invoking the solid Patavinian
tradition that, connected to the teachings of Giuseppe Bettiol43 and nowadays of
Mauro Ronco44, Silvio Riondato45, Enrico Ambrosetti46 and their pupils, does not
cease to warn us against special-preventionist temptations and to remind us the
personalistic dimension of criminal law.
Moreover, a valuable protection can be offered by a further consciousness: that
of the acknowledgement of the bifacial nature of criminal law, which must protect
society from crime but, at the same time, cannot stop defending the criminal from
the arbitrary exercise of one’s pretended right47. To this end, the issue of the factual
finding of culpability and individual responsibility is fundamental to promote
a penalty that favours the reparation of the rift caused by crime and, especially,
the reconciliation of the social fabric, able to be responsible but also to call for
responsibility, in a constitutively dialogical dimension48.
40
On this topic cf. O. Di Giovine, La sanzione penale nella prospettiva delle neuroscienze, in “Riv. it.
dir. proc. pen.” 2/13, pp. 626-642.
41
Cf. F. Cavalla, La pena come problema. Il superamento della concezione razionalistica della difesa
sociale, Padova, Cedam, 1979, pp. 66-67.
42
Until now, it seems that neuroscientific evidence is used only to mitigate responsibility but one
should also fear it can be used in malam partem for preventive purposes; this way, the «so rightly
abhorred category of the diritto penale d’autore (criminal law of the author), thrown out of the door,
re-enters through the window» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 861, our transl.).
43
The whole production of the Maestro of Padua is worth being reminded, oriented as it is towards
the constant defence of retributivist personalism against any preventionist drift; cf. for instance G.
Bettiol, Scritti giuridici (1966-1980), Padova, Cedam, 1980.
44
Other than the references we have been citing so far, punctually concerning our topic, cf. M.
Ronco, Il problema della pena. Alcuni profili relativi allo sviluppo della riflessione sulla pena, Torino,
Giappichelli,1996.
45
See, amongst many others, S. Riondato, Un diritto penale detto ragionevole. Ricordando Giuseppe
Bettiol, Padova, Cedam, 2006.
46
The Author has dealt with the preventionist risk in his E. Ambrosetti, Recidiva e recidivismo, Padova,
Cedam,1997.
47
We recall here L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione: teoria del garantismo penale, Roma, Laterza, 1989, p.
507.
48
On the topic, see F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., passim, F. Zanuso, Giustizia riparativa e
In conclusion, it seems fundamental to ask ourselves how to use these extraordinary

discoveries49 and these valuable findings without provoking the wrath of Dionysus
(the god of diversity and of the elsewhere) and therefore our unconscious madness50,
effective metaphor of the dogmatic forgetfulness of the fact that what constitute us
in relation is diversity. How can we use them to rethink responsibility, as a significant
and constitutive dimension of sociality51, without falling in the jacobinic mistake of
assuming to be able to realise a community of equals, simply ignoring, expelling and
neutralising differences52? This is the challenge that lies ahead.
mediazione: un modello classico, in G. Mannozzi, F. Ruggieri (eds.), Pena, riparazione, riconciliazione,

Insubria Press, Como 2007, pp. 35-59, F. Reggio, Giustizia Dialogica. Luci e ombre della Restorative
Justice, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2010.
49
Bianchi maintains that neurosciences refer to such an innovative anthropology to impose a radical
rethinking of the conceptual architecture of legal knowledge (A. Bianchi, Neuroscienze e diritto, cit.,
p. XI). In a different orientation, Di Giovine writes: «Neurosciences, at least in the abstract, seem
to merely offer evidentiary support ad adiuvandum, leaving conceptual categories unchanged for the
rest… Scientific evidence, which was looked at with favour with regard to their entrance in the criminal
trial, due to their assumed simplifying capabilities, instead of obtaining more certainty, in some cases
revealed itself as a paradoxical factor of complication and destabilization of the evidence» (O. Di
Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, in “Archivio penale”, cit., pp. 841-843, our transl.).
50
On this issue, I recall the suggestive considerations on this myth by F. Cavalla, Alle origini, cit., pp.
99-102.
51
The suggestion of a cautious approach of neurosciences to the universe of law may be made «in view
of a construction of a penalty respectful of human dignity, included that of the culpable for serious
crimes» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 856, our transl.).
52
We are called to be penally responsible for what we have presumably committed, but the response
cannot be intended as an acceptation, a bending to social dictates, but instead as an availability to
acknowledge the reasons of sociality; cf. F. Zanuso, A ciascuno il suo. Da Immanuel Kant a Norval
Morris: oltre la visione moderna della retribuzione, Padova, Cedam, 2000, pp. 182-188. In order not
to fall in the mistake of penal rationalism we should not bend to granted predominant values, but
recognise the undeniable dimension of sociality; cf. F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., pp. 88-
100. Thus, punishment should consist in limitation of otherwise protected goods in order to promote
responsibility, which is the attitude to recognise in oneself the difference and the need for relation,
for community. That is why punishment in its concept is reparatory, not only because of its purpose,
but also in its modalities. It does not seem to me, therefore, that accepting such contributions of
neurosciences and forensic genetics necessarily mandates to «invent something different from the actual
criminal law» (S. Larizza, Sui limiti posti dal sistema penale, cit., p. 38, our transl.). Instead, it could be
convenient to remind the wisdom of the ancient; cf. F. Zanuso, Les promesses de la justice réparatrice
et la Sagesse du Tribunal de l’Héliée, in “Essais de Philosophie Pènale et de Criminologie”, vol. 8/2009,
Paris, ed. Dalloz, 2009, pp. 331-357.
Alla ricerca di Mister Hyde.

Alcune considerazioni sulla genetica forense e sul razionalismo penale
Francesca Zanuso
In questo mio intervento mi occuperò di un profilo puntuale della genetica forense,

quello che riguarda la possibilità di accertare la c.d. disposizione al crimine.
La composizione del DNA è il dato genetico che presiede alla nostra identità biologica
e sotto questo profilo la genetica è un fenomenale strumento per “rintracciare” una “identità
anagrafica”1. Mi riferisco ad una identità che sappiamo essere individuale ed irripetibile fin
dal primo comporsi dei gameti maschile e femminile in quella straordinaria avventura umana
che è la procreazione. Il DNA è unico e senza eguali e, pertanto, ben vengano ricerche ed
accertamenti volti a individuare un particolare soggetto per chiamarlo, ad esempio, a rispon-
dere del suo operato; non mi pare sorgano al riguardo particolari perplessità al di là di quelle
suscitate dalla opportuna tutela della riservatezza dei dati c.d. sensibilissimi.
In altre parole, laddove decidiamo di usare il linguaggio della genetica possiamo ravvisare
una identità genetica che non correrà il rischio di indebite assolutizzazioni a condizione di
ricordare che abbiamo utilizzato per individuarla un peculiare protocollo scientifico2.
Tutto questo non mi pare, appunto, ponga particolari problemi filosofico-giuridici a
meno di non presumere che l’identità biologica riduca a sé ogni altra dimensione dell’identità
(ad esempio quella culturale, familiare, sociale, etc.). È indispensabile, pertanto, non cedere
1
Le varie dimensioni dell’identità e la loro rilevanza giuridica sono illustrate con dovizia in G. Pino,
Il diritto all’identità personale. Interpretazione costituzionale e creatività giurisprudenziale, Bologna, Il
Mulino, 2003, in E. Stefanini, Dati genetici e diritti fondamentali. Profili di diritto comparato e europeo,
Padova, Cedam, 2008 e nel recentissimo S. Amato, F. Cristofari, S. Raciti (a cura di), Biometria. I
codici a barre del corpo, Torino, Giappichelli, 2013.
2
Giuseppe Sermonti ha accuratamente denunciato questo rischio, che si basa sulla diffusa quanto erronea
convinzione secondo la quale la natura umana sarebbe raffigurabile interamente ed esclusivamente
grazie all’avvenuta decifrazione del DNA; cfr. G. Sermonti, Dimenticare Darwin, Milano, Rusconi,
1999. Il suo richiamo non è certo superfluo poiché, di recente, uno dei più “mediatici” esponenti
della scienza italiana, Umberto Veronesi, ha espresso convinzioni a dir poco sconcertanti. Secondo
l’autorevole oncologo, ciò che va al di là del contingente è il DNA: «Il nostro DNA non muore e
continua a vivere nei nostri figli e in tutte le generazioni future. Il mio DNA, cioè tutti i caratteri fisici e
psichici, proviene intatto dagli umani di millenni fa. L’immortalità potrebbe semplicemente consistere
nel fatto che noi trasmettiamo il nostro DNA. È una forma moderna della metemsomatosi e della
metempsicosi, cioè della reincarnazione» (U. Veronesi, A. Elkann, Essere laico, Milano, Bompiani,
2008, p. 74). Questo apparente rinvio all’infinito, “depurato” dalla metafisica, è stato opportunamente
denunciato in F. D’Agostino, Parole di Bioetica, Torino, Giappichelli, 2004, pp. 102-3. Sul punto cfr.
altresì F. D’Agostino (a cura di), Darwinismo e problemi di giustizia, Milano, Giuffrè, 2008.
326 Alla ricerca di Mister Hyde
all’errore del riduzionismo genetico3, che ci porterebbe a pensare erroneamente la realtà come
ad un insieme di dati fenomenicamente apprezzabili, manipolabili e, perciò, dominabili dalla
volontà umana4. Si tratterebbe di un abbaglio: la “realtà” non può esser ridotta a quanto può
essere posto ad oggetto del pensiero umano per vari ordini di motivi di cui il più immediato
è il seguente: a questa “realtà” presunta sfuggirebbe proprio l’elemento più importante, ossia
quel soggetto che, pensando, pretende di porre ad oggetto quanto lo circonda5.
In altre parole, il reale non è da pensarsi come limitabile a quanto possiamo percepire
nella dimensione spazio-temporale; “al di là” della stessa vi è tutto quanto non potrà mai
essere preteso alla mercé della volontà umana, poiché è quanto concorre essenzialmente a co-
stituirla6. Piuttosto, è da riconoscersi che proprio la vita soggettiva si manifesta come costante
quanto inafferrabile testimonianza di questa dimensione fenomenica ed ultra-fenomenica, di
cui custodisce il mistero.
Queste considerazioni, pur approssimativamente accennate, mostrano qual è la concreta
posta in gioco di fronte alle stimolanti proposte della genetica forense7. Il rischio è quello
ricorrente dello scientismo8, che traluce nel momento in cui suppone di valere una peculiare
applicazione delle scoperte genetiche al campo del diritto penale: mi riferisco alla pretesa di
inferire dal corredo genetico una maggior o minor predisposizione alla devianza9. In questo
3
Da ricordarsi è che Gerald Edelman, premio Nobel e uno dei padri delle neuroscienze, auspica che
quest’ultime portino a compimento il programma di Darwin rendendo anche il cervello e il pensiero un
prodotto della evoluzione e togliendogli l’alone metafisico e misterioso (cfr. G.M. Edelman, Seconda
natura. Scienza del cervello e conoscenza umana, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2007); al riguardo, cfr. A.
Bianchi, Neuroscienze e diritto: spiegare di più per comprendere meglio, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G.
Sartori, (a cura di) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, pp. XVIII-XIX.
4
Al proposito cfr. F. Zanuso, La consulenza genetica tra realtà e immaginazione, in L. Palazzani (a cura
di), Gen-ius. La consulenza tra genetica e diritto, Roma, Studium, 2011, pp. 35-43.
5
Sul tema cfr. F. Cavalla, All’origine del diritto al tramonto della legge, Napoli, Jovine, 2011, pp. 6-8.
6
Mauro Ronco, autore di un saggio veramente stimolante sul tema, lamenta la concezione
necessariamente parcellizzata della neuroscienza che trascura la dimensione olistica del cervello per
esaminarne come tanti oggetti alcune parti; cfr. M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, in “Archivio
penale”, 3/2011, p. 868. Sul tema cfr. altresì Id., Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale,
in “Iustitia” 4/11, pp. 429-440.
7
È per me doveroso quanto gradito riconoscere un debito intellettuale al riguardo nei confronti di
Stefano Fuselli di cui segnalo S. Fuselli, Oltre i dualismi: un itinerario tra diritto, neuroscienze e filosofia,
in “Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche”, 13/2013, pp. 61-141.
8
Non posso rinunciare a riportare questa provocatoria affermazione: «Astrologi, maghi, medici,
matematici hanno sempre dato il loro contributo conoscitivo e orientato la decisione del giudice sul
presupposto dell’infallibilità del loro sapere» (L. de Cataldo Neuburger, Scienza e processo penale:
linee guida per l’acquisizione della prova scientifica, Padova, Cedam, 2010, p. XII-XIII). Sui rapporti fra
scienza e diritto rinvio all’ormai classico S. Jasanoff, La scienza davanti ai giudici, Milano, Giuffrè,
2001, a S. Fuselli, Apparenze. Accertamento giudiziale e prova scientifica, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2008 e
a M.C. Tallacchini, Diritto e scienza, in Luoghi della Filosofia del diritto. Idee strumenti mutamenti (a
cura di B. Montanari), Torino, Giappichelli, 2012, pp. 145-169.
9
In un bel saggio Messina afferma che le neuroscienze sono la più raffinata evoluzione della psicologia
cognitiva e che «alla ricerca e alla descrizione delle più significative e diffuse illusioni cognitive che
condizionano le scelte e il comportamento individuale secondo la prospettiva della psicologia sociale,
le neuroscienze sostituiscono un obiettivo ben più arduo ed ambizioso, quale quello di riuscire a
controllare e a prevedere i processi mentali attraverso la conoscenza dei loro correlativi fisiologici e
biologici» (G. Messina, Le neuroscienze nel processo: profili problematici e orizzonti prospettici di un nuovo
F. Zanuso 327
caso non ci si limita a dire che geneticamente quell’individuo è quell’irripetibile soggetto in

base alla sua irripetibile sequenza genetica; si presume, piuttosto, di poter affermare che, in
virtù di quella irripetibile sequenza genetica, quel soggetto manifesta una sorta di debolezza
che lo inclina al delitto o, almeno, non lo rende abbastanza resistente alla tentazione di im-
postare in modo violento le relazioni intersoggettive. Non si utilizzerebbe quindi la genetica
per chiamare a rispondere un soggetto delle sue azioni ma si ipotizzerebbe piuttosto che la
genetica stessa sia in grado di offrire una spiegazione più o meno esaustiva allo stesso agire10.
È qui in gioco, in altre parole, la pretesa di individuare una sorta di “gene del male” per
difendersene11.
Questo tema è particolarmente interessante per la filosofia del diritto penale poiché con-
cerne il concetto di libero arbitrio, di responsabilità, di rimproverabilità12 e, quindi, tocca
al cuore la concezione tradizionale della colpevolezza come nesso fra l’azione e la volontà e
l’intenzione dell’agente e il significato stesso della sanzione penale13. Il rischio di un risalente
determinismo etiologico e di una conseguente “etichettatura” della devianza (labelling theory)
confronto fra scienza e diritto, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen”, 1/2010, p. 347). Ancor più decisamente critico
risulta Lorusso nel momento in cui parla di «fascinazioni provenienti dall’ipervalutazione del sapere
tecnico-scientifico applicato al processo penale» (S. Lorusso, Il contributo degli esperti alla formazione
del convincimento giudiziale, in “Archivio penale”, 3/2011, p. 817).
10
Sul tema cfr. Cfr. P. Sommaggio, Umano post-umano. I rischi di un uso ideologico della genetica,
in “Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche”, 8/2008, cit., p. 237 ss. Completo e ben articolato è altresì il
collettaneo L. Palazzani ( a cura di), Il diritto nelle neuroscienze: non siamo i nostri cervelli, Torino,
Giappichelli, 2013.
11
La locuzione è utilizzata in E. Musumeci, Cesare Lombroso e le neuroscienze: un parricidio mancato.
Devianza, libero arbitrio, imputabilità tra antiche chimere ed inediti scenari, Milano, FrancoAngeli,
2012, p. 102. Sull’ingenuità di questa presunzione cfr. S. Bauzon, De la disposition génétique au crime,
in L. Picotti, F. Zanuso (a cura di), L’antropologia criminale di Cesare Lombroso: dall’Ottocento al
dibattito filosofico-penale contemporaneo, Napoli, ESI, 2011, pp. 61-67.
12
Sul tema volga quanto opportunamente precisa Ronco: «La scienza neurobiologica, a tutt’oggi, non
ha provato sperimentalmente, secondo criteri obbiettivabili e verificabili, né l’esistenza né l’inesistenza
della libertà del volere. Neppure potrebbe farlo… poiché il tema è risolvibile soltanto sul piano
metafisico che considera l’uomo come un tutto unitario» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit.,
p. 856). Per un primo orientamento sul rapporto fra la libertà e la responsabilità in ambito giuridico
cfr. B. Montanari, Libertà, responsabilità, legge, in Luoghi della Filosofia del diritto, cit., pp.171-207.
13
Nei paesi di lingua inglese il tema è centrale da più di un decennio; a mero titolo d’esempio cfr. A.
Evansburg, But your Honor, it’s in his genes. The case for genetic impairments as grounds for a downward
departure under the federal sentencing guidelines, in “American Criminal Law Review”, 2001, pp.1565-
1566; M. Jones, Overcoming the myth of free will in criminal law: the true impact of the genetic revolution,
“Duke Law Journal”, 2002, pp. 1031-1035; D. Wasserman, Is there value in identifying individual
genetic predisposition to violence, in “Journal of law, Medecine and Ethics”, 2004, pp. 24-33; O. R.
Goodenough, K. Prehn, A neuroscientific approach to normative judgement in law and justice, in Law
and the brain, “Phil. Trans. R. Soc. London” B, 2004, 359, pp. 1709-26; S. J. Morse, New neuroscience,
old problems, in B. Garland (ed.), Neuroscience and the law: brain, mind, and the scales of justice, Dana,
New York, 2004, pp. 157-98; Id., Moral and legal responsibility and the new neuroscience, in J. Illes,
Neuroethics: Defining the Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 2006,
pp. 33-50; M. Rajadhyaksha, Condemned by birth: the Implications of Genetics for the Theories of Crime
and Punishment, in “Socio-Legal Revue”, 85/2006, pp. 85-103.
è, in effetti, pur sempre in agguato e pertanto una riflessione spregiudicata è improcrastina-

bile14.
È irrinunciabile soprattutto oggi poiché la nostra società, ancor più che nel passato, è
tentata da una sorta di stigmatizzazione genetica che, confida, sarà in grado di porla al riparo
dal male, facendo cessare un incalzante allarme sociale.
Ovviamente, gran parte di queste considerazioni sono stimolate dalla notizia della av-
venuta applicazione anche nei tribunali italiani, in sentenze di vario grado, dei risultati della
genetica molecolare e delle c.d. neuroscienze ai fini di meglio valutare la colpevolezza dell’im-
putato. Mi riferisco, a titolo di esempio, a due sentenze che molto clamore hanno suscitato
nell’opinione pubblica, grazie alla ampia divulgazione compiuta dai mass media oltre che
alle riflessioni presenti in numerose riviste scientifiche: la sentenza della Corte di Assise di
Appello di Trieste ( n.5 del 18.09.2009) e la sentenza del GIP di Como sul caso Albertani
(25.5.2011).
Non posso per l’economia di questo scritto entrare nel merito, sicura che altri contributi
in questo volume ben illustreranno i presupposti e le conseguenze di queste perizie forensi.
Quello che qui mi preme evidenziare è il rischio della degenerazione scientistica dei dati
utilizzati per tali perizie che hanno accertato la vulnerabilità genetica al delitto. Ovviamente,
il pericolo è quello di intendere un dato scientifico, per sua natura ipotetico e convenzionale
e frutto di una peculiare lettura della realtà a fini operativi, come oggettivo, neutrale, presente
di fronte alla nostra ragione come un elemento indubbio e indubitabile di cui solo si può
prendere contezza, consapevolezza15. Conoscerlo sarebbe quindi individuarlo, rispecchiarlo
14
Larizza in un recente saggio si chiede se sia possibile prevenire il delitto, imponendo un trattamento
preventivo ai portatori di anomalie senza ledere i diritti fondamentali delle persone (cfr. S. Larizza, Sui
limiti posti dal sistema penale alle ricezione degli esiti conoscitivi della neuroimaging, in M.G. Ruberto, C.
Barbieri, Il futuro tra noi. Aspetti etici, giuridici e medico-legali della neuroetica, Milano, FrancoAngeli,
2011, p. 34). Denuncia quindi il riproporsi di una ingenua eziologia criminale (op. ult. cit., p. 35). In
effetti, la ricaduta nella logica deterministica del trattamento è prevedibile; sul tema cfr. a titolo di mero
orientamento J. Greene, J.Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything, in Law and
the brain, cit., pp. 1775-85 e, in ambito italiano, in G. Gulotta, La responsabilità penale nell’era delle
neuroscienza, in A. Bianchi, Neuroscienze e diritto, cit., p. 8. Tra le pubblicazioni italiane si segnala A.
Forza, Neuroscienze e diritto, “Rivista Penale”, 3/2009, pp. 247-255.
15
È opportuno sottolineare al riguardo la peculiarità dei temi trattati dalle neuroscienze e dalla neuro-
etica che hanno a che fare con la nostra coscienza, con il nostro senso di sé, pretendendo di porlo ad
oggetto della riflessione. Sul tema cfr. quanto afferma Salvatore Amato: «La scienza non può illudersi di
limitarsi a descrivere... ma si trova a proporre (o a demolire) una certa immagine dell’uomo e del mondo
che incide profondamente sui costumi, condizionando regole di comportamento e attese sociali» [S.
Amato, Biopolitica, biodiritto e biotecnologie, in L. Palazzani (a cura di), Nuove biotecnologie, biodiritto
e trasformazioni della soggettività, Roma, Studium, 2007, cit., p. 27]. Sul tema interessanti riflessioni
sono contenute in A. Farano, Percorsi della responsabilità: le neuroscienze cambiano tutto o niente? ,
in “i-lex”, 18, 2013, pp.189-200. La studiosa distingue fra concetto di uomo come idem e come ipse,
riprendendolo da Ricoeur e Romano, e conclude il suo breve saggio affermando: «Il discorso delle
neuroscienze afferisce all’uomo inteso come idem, dunque a ciò che nell’uomo non muta, il suo corpo,
ma anche la sua indole, le predisposizioni genetiche, laddove la responsabilità rileva dell’identità intesa
come ipseità, cioè quella permanenza di sé che tiene insieme in una cornice narrativa coerente le azioni
passate, di cui ci riconosciamo autori, e le azioni future verso le quali ci impegniamo. La neuroscienza
allora cambia tutto e niente, a patto di restituirla alla sua funzione descrittiva, preservando così una
nozione di responsabilità radicata nell’ipseità» (op. ult. cit., p. 199).
F. Zanuso 329
come oggetto del proprio sapere; servirsene a fini di tutela della società sarebbe necessario e
irrinunciabile a fini giuridici, politici ma anche etici.
In altre parole, la scoperta scientifica che un allele a bassa attività per il gene MAOA
(MAOA-L) renderebbe inclini all’aggressività in presenza di provocazioni o di manifestazioni
di esclusione sociale potrebbe generare due presunzioni. In base alla prima, si potrebbe essere
indotti a ritenere che questo dato fornisca la base per una perfetta (anche se magari iniziale
dal punto di vista quantitativo!) comprensione del funzionamento della “mente criminale”;
in base alla seconda, si potrebbe essere tentati di ritenere che tale genetica alterata non con-
figuri solo una vulnerabilità di fronte alla tentazione criminale ma caratterizzi soggetti “nati
per uccidere”.
Non uso questo termine a fini provocatori per risvegliare l’attenzione del lettore. Lo uti-
lizzo perché è stato ampiamente adoperato dalla stampa italiana dopo la sentenza Albertani16.
Infatti, non mi pare dubbio che sia gli scienziati forensi sia la dottrina penalistica abbia-
no preso con la dovuta prudenza e sapienza quanto la scienza sembra offrire su di un piatto
d’argento per scoprire una volta per tutte il sembiante del delitto… e difendercene! Penso a
numerose interviste tempestivamente rilasciate dai due scienziati che hanno firmato la peri-
zia richiamata dalla sentenza di Trieste17 e ad altri contributi scientifici su di essa apparsi18;
16
A titolo d’esempio segnalo un elenco di titoli apparsi in seguito alla sentenza Albertani: Cirimido,
uccise la sorella: alterati i suoi geni (“La Provincia di Como”, 29.8.2011), Quella donna uccise per colpa dei
geni (“Corriere della Sera”, 30.8.2011), Born to kill: la colpa è nei geni (“Insubria”, 30.8.2011), Italian
court reduces murder sentence based on neuroimaging data (“Newsblog”, 1.9.2011 in www.natur.com),
Nata per uccidere, è colpa dei geni (“Giustizia giusta”, 1.9.2011).
17
Giuseppe Sartori ha affermato in una intervista rilasciata alla rivista elettronica “Brain Factor”:
«La sentenza riconosce efficacia probatoria alle neuroscienze cognitive e molecolari segnalando come
l’utilizzo di queste tecniche aumenti la certezza che ci si trovi di fronte ad una vera infermità mentale.
La prova è cioè più forte» (2/11/2009 www.brainfactor.it). In altre parole, la genetica offrirebbe un
considerevole sostegno alle tradizionali valutazioni neuro-psichiatriche rafforzandone la pretesa
oggettività delle conclusioni. Tuttavia, questa “oggettività” non è ritenuta da Petrini, in una intervista
sullo stesso sito, immediatamente probante; lo scienziato puntualizza, infatti, che «allo stato attuale
delle conoscenze non esiste alcuna variante genetica che sia stata messa in relazione causale con il
comportamento aggressivo antisociale, cioè non esiste alcuna variante genetica che determini in maniera
assoluta la presenza di un certo comportamento» (17/11/2009 www.brainfactor.it).
18
Il consapevole scienziato può, quindi, riconoscere la mera presenza di un rischio statisticamente
maggiore. Fra i molti contributi al proposito segnalo A. Lavazza, L. Sammicheli, Il delitto nel cervello.
La mente fra scienza e diritto, Torino, Codice edizioni, 2012, nel quale gli studiosi puntualizzano con
chiarezza e decisione la natura non causativa delle varianti genetiche a cui può essere attribuito solo il
potere di creare una sorta di vulnerabilità genetica cfr. pp. 84-85. Analogamente si erano espressi due
apprezzati ricercatori: «I recenti studi di brain-imaging, anche se indicano chiaramente una base neurale
per certi comportamenti aggressivi, non devono essere intesi in chiave deterministica. Il limite delle
brain-imaging non è quello di ammettere che i risultati disponibili sono privi di significato, ma quello
che è necessario procedere ad ulteriori ricerche» (P. Pietrini, V. Bambini, Homo ferox: the contribution
of functional brain studies to understanding the neural bases of aggressive and criminal behaviour, in
“International Journal of Law and Psychiatry”, 32, 2009, pp. 259-265) pubblicato anche in italiano
in A. Bianchi, G. Gulotta, G. Sartori (a cura di), Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè,
2009, pp.41-63. Analogamente cfr. S. Pellegrini, Il ruolo dei fattori genetici nella modulazione del
comportamento: le nuove acquisizioni della biologia molecolare genetica, in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G.
Sartori, (a cura di) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, cit., p. 79. Adeguata consapevolezza caratterizza
anche chi afferma, riferendosi ai dati rilevati: «L’immagine che ne deriva non deve essere interpretata
segnalo altresì alcuni equilibrati contributi dedicati a commentare sotto il profilo penalistico
la sentenza di Como19.
In questo modo parrebbe scongiurato il pericolo della caduta nel razionalismo penale,
ossia in quella sorta di “malattia morale” annidata nella storia culturale dell’Occidente, che si
manifesta nella pretesa da parte della ragione di disporre di premesse prime, certe ed evidenti
(ma in realtà sottratte alla dimostrazione) da cui derivare in modo coerentemente cogente
verità puntuali e norme giuridiche indiscutibilmente valide20. Il razionalismo inoltre si ac-
compagna, di sovente, allo scientismo, causato da una caduta della tensione problematica,
che porta ad assolutizzare i risultati scientifici, dimenticandone la dimensione ipotetica e
convenzionale21.
come una fotografia di quello che avviene in quel determinato momento, bensì come il frutto di
una elaborazione statistica dei dati, perché l’attività metabolica di un tessuto è fortemente variabile»
(M. G. Ruberto, G. Ferrari, Neuroetica: una scienza nuova, in M. G. Ruberto, C. Barbieri, Il
futuro tra noi, cit., p. 81). Tuttavia Sartori, scrivendo con Sammicheli, afferma: «La peculiarità della
prova neuroscientifica.. sta nella maggiore dimostrabilità ed evidenziabilità (a livello biologico) dello
stato di patologico funzionamento di funzioni mentali giuridicamente rilevanti» [L. Sammicheli,
G. Sartori, Neuroscienze giuridiche: i diversi livelli di interazione fra diritto e neuroscienze, in A.
Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G. Sartori, (a cura di) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, cit., p. 25]. Tutto
questo rassicurerebbe se non si esponesse poi il fine delle ricerche e degli esperimenti: «Le neuroscienze
criminologiche hanno come obiettivo quello di disegnare una geografia neuro-comportamentale del
soggetto criminale» (op. ult. cit., p. 28).
19
Segnalo a titolo d’esempio M. T. Collica, Il riconoscimento del ruolo delle neuroscienze nel giudizio
di imputabilità, in “Diritto penale contemporaneo”, 1/2012, pp. 1-26 e F. Casasole, Neuroscienze,
genetica comportamentale e processo penale, in “Diritto penale e processo”, 1/2012, pp. 110-117. Altri
essenziali strumenti per una comprensione delle riflessioni penalistiche su questo tema sono: A. Forza,
Neuroscienze e diritto, in “Rivista penale”, 3/2009, pp. 247-255; A. Colorio, Diritto e cervello: verso le
nuove frontiere del neurodiritto, in “I-Lex Scienze Giuridiche, Scienze Cognitive e Intelligenza artificiale”
(on-line review), 2010; M. De Caro, M. Marraffa, Libertà, responsabilità e retributivismo, in “Sistemi
intelligenti”, 2/2010, pp. 357-374; L. Capraro, V. Cuzzocrea, E. Picozza, D. Terracina (a cura
di), Neurodiritto. Un’introduzione, Torino, Giappichelli Editore, 2011; F. Macioce, Le neuroscienze.
Vecchie domande e nuove sfide per il diritto, in “Archivio giuridico Filippo Serafini”, 1/2012, pp. 25-
59; A. Nisco, Il confronto tra neuroscienze e diritto penale sulla libertà di volere, in “Diritto penale
e processo”, 4/2012, pp. 499-508; F. G. Pizzetti, Neuroscienze forensi e diritti fondamentali: spunti
costituzionali, Torino, Giappichelli, 2012; A. Santosuosso, Neuroscienze e diritto: un quadro delle
opportunità, in “Rivista italiana di medicina legale”, 1/2012, pp. 83-103.
20
Sul razionalismo come malattia mortale della modernità occidentale cfr. F. Cavalla, La pena come
riparazione. Oltre la concezione liberale dello stato: per una teoria radicale della pena, in F. Zanuso, S.
Fuselli (a cura di), Ripensare la pena. Teorie e problemi nella riflessione moderna, Padova, Cedam, 2004,
p. 30.
21
In questo la convinzione popolare è suffragata anche da una ingenua concezione della verificabilità
empirica, ritenuta in grado di dimostrare esaustivamente la validità delle ipotesi adottate. Sul punto vale
la tradizionale affermazione critica di due neo-positivisti logici per eccellenza: «Le ipotesi si provano
facendo ricorso ai dati empirici, ai cosiddetti fatti; ma noi scegliamo, analizziamo ed interpretiamo
i dati empirici in base ai principi assunti» (M. R. Cohen, E. Nagel, Introducion to Logic and
Scientific Method, 1934, p. 596). Al riguardo opportunamente Mauro Ronco sottolinea: «La prova
scientifica, presentata talora come oggettivamente inoppugnabile, è, più ancora della prova tradizionale,
estremamente soggettiva nella sua origine, nella sua elaborazione e nella sua interpretazione, perché
dipende quant’altra mai dalla precisione e dalla completezza con cui il perito osserva gli innumerevoli
e spesso contraddittori elementi di fatto, nonché dal rigore metodologico e dall’oggettività con cui li
elabora e li interpreta» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 858).
F. Zanuso 331
In ambito penalistico, questo errore si è tradotto storicamente in una serie di pericolose

pretese quali quella di distinguere in modo esauriente l’uomo in-nocente dall’a-normale, di
proteggere di conseguenza la società da quest’ultimo, rafforzando così i valori dominanti e
giungendo ad una non voluta ma radicata concezione statualistica del diritto penale22.
Come dicevo, ritengo con fondate ragioni che la dottrina non sia caduta in questo errore.
E allora? Tutto a posto? Temo di no!
Infatti, se scienziati e penalisti hanno “gettato acqua sul fuoco”, pur con secchi diversi e
di diversa capienza, i mass media hanno bombardato l’opinione pubblica con articoli roboanti
e risonanti, generando la convinzione che l’applicazione della genetica e delle neuroscienze al
processo penale sia ormai cosa fatta, priva di risvolti negativi.
Ma troppo spesso i mass media rendono pubblico ciò che il pubblico si attende da loro
e allora un interrogativo inquietante si è insinuato in me: perché il pubblico vuole questo?
Mi pare si possa rispondere affermando che l’opinione pubblica è stata costantemente
affascinata da ogni tentativo di spiegare, ricorrendo ad un criterio presunto oggettivo, la per-
sonalità del deviante, la genesi del delitto nella sua origine e nella sua probabile evoluzione.
Pensiamo, a titolo di illustre esempio, al considerevole successo goduto all’inizio del secolo
scorso dagli studi del Lombroso. Allora, non diversamente da quanto oggi accade, si è ma-
nifestata la ricorrente illusione razionalistica di poter definire e, quindi, confinare il male in
una ben individuabile categoria di soggetti, i c.d. anormali23; questa illusione si accompagna
all’ingenua pretesa di distinguere nettamente questi ultimi dalla comunità dei c.d. innocenti,
di coloro che paiono atti a ben integrarsi nel tessuto sociale24.
Tale tendenza sociale, cullata dal razionalismo dogmatico, sorge dalla paura che mi pare
di duplice natura e, quindi, da distinguersi.
In primo luogo, il manifestarsi del Male, ad esempio nell’efferatezza di un delitto, ci
inquieta. Vorrei dire che inquieta parimenti lo studioso e l’uomo comune.
Ne siamo spaventati, ovviamente, poiché temiamo per la nostra stessa incolumità. Ma
non solo! Il timore è accompagnato da una sottile angoscia che “sgorga”, sgradita e per questo
contrastata, dalla coscienza della possibilità che il germe del male possa essere annidato in
tutti noi, più o meno profondamente, nella carne o nello spirito25.
Un capolavoro della letteratura ottocentesca ci è di monito. Mi riferisco al racconto di
Robert Louis Stevenson, Il dottor Jekyll e Mister Hyde e soprattutto alla tesi di fondo dello
scritto, che vuol essere un apologo della natura umana. Il moralista, il custode feroce della
sua immagine pubblica e della rispettabilità borghese, si trasforma prima intenzionalmente
e, poi, progressivamente, incolpevolmente e inconsapevolmente nel suo opposto, nel mostro
22
F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., pp. 33-36.
23
Il tema è ampiamente trattato in D. Velo Dalbrenta, La scienza inquieta. Saggio sull’antropologia
criminale di Cesare Lombroso, Cedam, Padova, 2004; dello stesso autore cfr. Id., Lombroso, in I.
Birocchi, E. Cortese, A. Mattone, M. N. Miletti (a cura di), Dizionario Biografico dei Giuristi
Italiani (XII-XX secolo), II, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2013, pp.1189-1192.
24
D’altro canto gli stessi scienziati che pur negano il rischio di una deriva neuro-riduzionistica indulgono
in qualche pericoloso cedimento; a titolo d’esempio intitolano un paragrafo “Il cervello criminale:
differenze morfologiche e funzionali tra soggetti sani e criminali” P. Pietrini, V. Bambini, Homo ferox:
il contributo delle neuroscienze alla comprensione dei comportamenti aggressivi e criminali, in A. Bianchi,
G. Gullotta, G. Sartori, (a cura di) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, Giuffrè, 2009, p. 54.
25
L’alternativa non è pleonastica ma intenzionale, riferita alle varie tesi neuro-scientifiche.
nascosto, laido e repellente in cui ogni malvagità si manifesta26. Eppure, la scissione del dop-
pio – notate bene! all’inizio volontariamente e tenacemente programmata dal sapere scien-
tifico dell’homo faber dottor Jekyll- si radica nell’immaginario collettivo poiché paventiamo
Mister Hyde ma siamo, purtroppo, consapevoli che in ogni dottor Jekyll alberga, in modo
più o meno durevolmente nascosto, un potenziale deviante. Non a caso, il mostro evoca nel
suo nome quanto deve essere nascosto poiché oscuro (to hide); dal suo canto, lo scienziato,
l’uomo più rispettabile e benemerito per i suoi tempi, porta nel suo nome una assonanza con
il più feroce dei crimini (to kill).
Non possiamo, dunque, esser sorpresi dal fatto che fin dall’antichità l’uomo abbia cer-
cato di “esorcizzare” questo male, di cui si teme la connaturalità, confinandolo all’interno di
schemi precisi, definibili e, quindi, prevedibili. In altre parole, abbiamo sempre cercato di
difenderci dal male che è fuori di noi, ma che può anche essere in noi.
Per difendercene dobbiamo conoscerlo e quindi, secondo la mentalità moderna, renderlo
un dato oggettivo e perciò controllabile: l’altro ieri questo dato era ravvisato in una particola-
re morfologia, studiata dalla fisiognomica, ieri è stato identificato nella presenza della fossetta
occipitale o di una difformità cromosomica27.
Oggi, l’eterna tentazione di “confinare” il male, definendolo con una accurata e verifica-
bile descrizione, è più viva che mai e si ammanta ancora una volta delle vesti della scientificità;
ricorre, per l’esattezza, alle vesti più à la page, ossia a quelle offerte dalle neuroscienze e dalla
genetica molecolare. Confida nella possibilità di entrare, in modo indolore nelle pieghe del
cervello e lì, nella loro regolarità e nella loro connessione, poter rintracciare l’origine della vo-
lontà28 o, meglio, del deficit del sorgere del divieto che impedisce alla volontà di manifestarsi
nella sua troppo frequente anti-socialità29. Ne deriva la tentazione di spiegare, grazie all’in-
dagine sui neuroni cerebrali e alla schedatura genetica, l’inclinazione al delitto o, almeno,
l’incapacità di conformarsi alla regolarità sociale30.
In verità, come già dicevo, la più attenta dottrina ritiene che alcune alterazioni della mor-
fologia e, quindi, del funzionamento della regione frontale e delle strutture da essa interessate
(che si presumono deputate a governare la modulazione del comportamento aggressivo e
anti-sociale) al pari delle alterazioni della composizione genetica possano costituire fattori
non strettamente necessitanti ma sicuramente fortemente preminenti nel determinare con
26
Per una ricostruzione della vicenda narrata da Stevenson e dei suoi legami con la nascente psicanalisi
cfr. M. Trevi, Introduzione a R. L. Stevenson, Il dottor Jekyll e Mr. Hyde, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1991,
pp. 5-16.
27
Sul tema cfr. F. Zanuso, L’emergente attualità di Lombroso, in L. Picotti, F. Zanuso (a cura di),
L’antropologia criminale, cit., pp. 5-9. La Di Giovine sottolinea come l’idea che la mente sia il cervello
e che la coscienza abbia natura biologica ricorda le regole dell’evoluzionismo darwiniano ed evoca
“spettri” di riduzionismo biologico che richiamano età lombrosiana” cfr. O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura
delle neuroscienze? , in “Archivio penale”, 3/2011, pp. 838-840.
28
A mero titolo d’esempio di questi studi che aderiscono ad una visione deterministica e neurofisiologica
dell’agire umano segnalo D. Dennet, L’evoluzione della libertà, Milano, Cortina, 2004; per le ricadute
in ambito giuridico cfr. S. Morse, Addiction, Genetics and Criminale Responsibility, in Aa.Vv., Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 69, 2006, p. 165 ss.
29
Al riguardo rinvio agli studi contenuti in M.Gazzaniga, La mente etica, Torino, Codice, 2006.
30
Non a caso una delle principali sfide della neuroetica è costituita dalla riflessione sul concetto di
normalità; cfr. M. G. Ruberto, G. Ferrari, Neuroetica: una scienza nuova, cit., p. 114.
F. Zanuso 333
buon tasso di probabilità il comportamento criminale deviante31.

Ma l’opinione pubblica sorvola, ben guidata da abili giornalisti, sulla dimensione della
probabilità trasformandola illusoriamente in necessità32. Questo accade per una ulteriore di-
mensione della paura, che mi pare interessi veramente da vicino la politica criminale33.
Oggi, ben più che ieri e l’altro ieri, temiamo il diverso che è in noi ma anche che è vicino
a noi34. Nella nostra società multirazziale e multiculturale, il diverso ci allarma. Soprattutto
paventiamo che il diverso si trasformi nell’avverso.
Vi sono ovviamente ragioni psicologiche e sociologiche che possono spiegare questo ti-
more35. Ma ve ne è una di carattere radicalmente culturale su cui la filosofia del diritto qual-
cosa di importante ha da dire.
L’Occidente, nutrito di spirito giacobino e incurante della lezione dialettica della classici-
tà, è indotto a pensare che il diverso sia l’avverso e che l’avverso sia necessariamente l’alieno,
ossia colui che è incomprensibile, colui con il quale non vi può essere né condivisione, né
comunicazione. La mentalità più diffusa teme il diverso, l’opposto poiché è stata moderna-
mente educata a “congelare” la conflittualità, a negarne l’aspetto costitutivo dell’ex-sistenza36.
Nel contempo, il multiculturalismo avanza in una società relativista, stanca, sfibrata,
sfiduciata, nella quale non pare più aver senso il chieder ragioni, il dare ragioni37.
Come fondare, allora, l’ottica della responsabilità? Come chiedere a qualcuno di rispon-
dere dei suoi gesti? Come accertare la stessa responsabilità di un crimine?
È ovviamente più allettante pensare che vi sia una nuova, irrinunciabile scoperta che
ci mostri un “sembiante del delitto”38, in grado di erigere il confine: di qua i buoni, di là i
malvagi.
In altre parole, una società che non può capire il diverso, soprattutto quando si mostra
avverso, poiché non sa chiamare a rispondere accoglie di buon grado la possibilità di “confi-
nare” il male, il pericolo in un ben definito dato, ad esempio in un allele difettoso.
31
Analoghe tesi, centrate però sul ruolo del c.d. marcatore somatico, sono contenute nell’ormai classico
A. Damasio, L’errore di Cartesio, Milano, Adelphi, 1995, pp. 245-6.
32
Si parla di “flagello dell’esposizione mediatica” in A. Bianchi, Psicodiagnostica forense: utilità e limiti,
in A. Bianchi, G. Gullotta, G. Sartori, (a cura di) Manuale di neuroscienze forensi, cit., p. 91.
Questa deriva dei mass-media è stata immediatamente denunciata; a mero titolo d’esempio posso
segnalare le dichiarazioni contenute in E. Feresin, BadLighter sentence for murderer with bad genes, in
“Naturenews” (30.10.2009).
33
Su questo funzionale rapporto fra scienze empiriche e diritto penale cfr. G. Forti, L’immane
concretezza, Metamorfosi del crimine e controllo penale, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2000.
34
Cfr. sul tema F. Bilancia, F.M. Di Sciullo, F. Rimoli (a cura di), Paura dell’Altro. Identità
occidentale e cittadinanza, Roma, Carocci, 2008.
35
Sul tema cfr. I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce? Criminologia, determinismo, neuroscienze,
Milano, Cortina, 2012.
36
Sul tema cfr. F. Zanuso, Conflitto e controllo sociale nel pensiero giuridico-politico della modernità,
Padova, Cleup, 1993, p. 19.
37
Cfr. sul tema i vari saggi dedicati al tema del multiculturalismo e delle sue ricadute in ambito
giuridico pubblicati in “Ragion Pratica” 1/2013; segnalo in particolare F. Basile, Il diritto penale nelle
società multiculturali: i reati culturalmente motivati, in “Ragion Pratica”, 1/2013, pp. 9-48; F. Santoni
De Sio, Responsabilità fondamentale e differenze culturali, in “Ragion Pratica”, 1/2013, pp. 49-70; B.
Pastore, Reati culturalmente motivati e valutazione probatoria, in “Ragion Pratica”, 1/2013, pp. 97-
105.
38
Sul tema cfr. D. Velo Dal Brenta, La scienza inquieta, cit., p. 95 ss.
Tuttavia, questa tendenza è, mi sia consentito il bisticcio di parole, estremamente perico-

losa, poiché porta ad una deriva prevenzionistica. In effetti, se posso prevedere il compimento
del male con una efficace mappatura genetica, perché non dovrei prevenirlo39?
Il vecchio sogno positivistico mai realizzatosi (alla fine tutti hanno dovuto ammettere di
non disporre di un criterio indubitabile per decretare l’inclinazione al delitto prima del suo
stesso manifestarsi in un atto criminale40) oggi potrebbe essere facilitato da apparenti morbidi
cuscini!
Come difendersi da tutto questo fermento dell’opinione pubblica che potrebbe portare
ad un esito anti-garantistico, laddove ad esempio venga richiesto che l’utilizzo delle indagini
genetiche non sia adoperato solo in bonam partem ma altresì in malam partem41? Non solo,
quindi, per punire più adeguatamente ma, soprattutto, per prevenire più efficacemente il
reato?
Ci si può difendere, innanzitutto, richiamandosi con fermezza alla solida tradizione pata-
vina che riallacciandosi al magistero di Giuseppe Bettiol42 ed ora di Mauro Ronco43, di Silvio
Riondato44, di Enrico Ambrosetti45 e dei loro allievi non cessa di metterci in guardia nei con-
fronti delle tentazioni special-prevenzionistiche e di ricordarci la dimensione personalistica
del diritto penale.
Inoltre, un valido presidio può essere offerto da una ulteriore consapevolezza: quella del
riconoscimento della natura bi-fronte del diritto penale che deve difendere la società dal reato
ma, contemporaneamente, non può rinunciare a difendere il reo dalla “ragione fattasi”46. A
tal fine, il tema dell’accertamento della colpevolezza e della responsabilità individuale risulta
fondamentale per promuovere una penalità che favorisca la riparazione della frattura creatasi
con il reato e, soprattutto, la riconciliazione del tessuto sociale, capace di rispondere ma altresì
di chiedere risposte, in una dimensione costitutivamente dialogica47.
39
Sul tema cfr. O. Di Giovine, La sanzione penale nella prospettiva delle neuroscienze, in “Riv. it. dir.
proc. pen.”, 2/2013, pp. 626-642.
40
Cfr. F. Cavalla, La pena come problema. Il superamento della concezione razionalistica della difesa
sociale, Padova, Cedam, 1979, pp. 66-67.
41
Fino ad oggi sembra che la prova neuroscientifica venga utilizzata solo in chiave mitigatrice della
responsabilità ma si deve temere anche un suo utilizzo in malam partem a fini preventivi; così facendo
“la tanto giustamente aborrita categoria del diritto penale di autore, cacciata dalla porta, rientrerebbe
dalla finestra” (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 861).
42
Del Maestro padovano sarebbe da ricordarsi l’intera produzione, orientata costantemente alla difesa
del personalismo retribuzionistico contro ogni deriva prevenzionistica; cfr. a titolo d’esempio G.
Bettiol, Scritti giuridici (1966-1980), Padova, Cedam, 1980.
43
Oltre agli scritti già ricordati, puntualmente concernenti il nostro tema, cfr. M. Ronco, Il problema
della pena. Alcuni profili relativi allo sviluppo della riflessione sulla pena, Torino, Giappichelli, 1996.
44
Segnalo fra i tanti S. Riondato, Un diritto penale detto ragionevole. Ricordando Giuseppe Bettiol,
Padova, Cedam, 2006.
45
Il rischio prevenzionistico è stato affrontato in E. Ambrosetti, Recidiva e recidivismo, Padova,
Cedam, 1997.
46
Il richiamo è a L. Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione: teoria del garantismo penale, Roma, Laterza, 1989, p.
507.
47
Sul tema rinvio a F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., passim, a F. Zanuso, Giustizia
riparativa e mediazione: un modello classico, in G. Mannozzi, F. Ruggieri (a cura di), Pena, riparazione,
riconciliazione, Como, Insubria Press, 2007, pp. 35-59; F. Reggio, Giustizia Dialogica. Luci e ombre
della Restorative Justice, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2010.
F. Zanuso 335
Concludendo, mi pare fondamentale chiedersi come utilizzare queste straordinarie sco-

perte48e questi pregevoli accertamenti senza provocare le ire di Dioniso (il dio della diversità,
dell’altrove) e quindi la nostra inconsapevole pazzia49, efficace metafora della dogmatica di-
menticanza che quanto ci costituisce in relazione è la diversità. Come utilizzarle per ripensare
la responsabilità, come significativa e costitutiva dimensione della socialità50, senza cadere
nell’errore giacobino di pretendere di realizzare una comunità di uguali, semplicemente igno-
rando, espellendo, neutralizzando le differenze51? Questa è la sfida che ci viene proposta.
48
Bianchi sostiene che le neuroscienze rinviano ad una antropologia così innovativa da imporre una
radicale ripensamento dell’architettura concettuale del sapere giuridico (A. Bianchi, Neuroscienze e
diritto, cit., p. XI). Di diverso orientamento è Di Giovine che scrive: «Le neuroscienze, per lo meno
in astratto, non sembrano fare altro che fornir riscontri probatori ad adiuvandum, lasciando per il
resto le categorie concettuali immutate… La prova scientifica, il cui ingresso nel procedimento penale
è stato inizialmente salutato con favore per le presunte capacità semplificatrici che ad essa venivano
attribuite, lungi dal conseguire una maggior certezza, si sia in alcuni casi rivelata un paradossale fattore
di complicazione e di precarizzazione della prova» (O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, in
“Archivio penale”, cit., pp. 841-843).
49
Sul tema rinvio alle suggestive considerazioni su questo mito contenute in F. Cavalla, Alle origini,
cit., pp. 99-102.
50
La proposta di un prudente accostamento delle neuroscienze all’universo del diritto può esser fatta «in
vista della costruzione di una penalità rispettosa della dignità umana, ivi compresa quella del colpevole
di gravi crimini» (M. Ronco, Sulla prova neuroscientifica, cit., p. 856).
51
Si è chiamati a rispondere penalmente per quanto si presume si sia compiuto ma la risposta non può
essere intesa come una accettazione, un piegarsi ai dettami sociali ma piuttosto come una disponibilità
a riconoscere le ragioni della socialità; cfr. F. Zanuso, A ciascuno il suo. Da Immanuel Kant a Norval
Morris: oltre la visione moderna della retribuzione, Padova, Cedam, 2000, pp. 182-188. Per non cadere
nell’errore del razionalismo penale non bisogna piegarsi a valori dominanti scontati ma riconoscere la
innegabile dimensione della socialità; cfr. F. Cavalla, La pena come riparazione, cit., pp. 88-100. Ecco
che la pena dovrà consistere in limitazioni di beni altrimenti tutelati al fine promuovere la responsabilità,
cioè l’attitudine a riconoscere in sé la differenza e il bisogno di relazione, di comunanza. Per questo la
pena nel suo concetto è riparatoria, non solo per la sua finalità ma anche nelle sue modalità. Non
mi pare pertanto che accettare questi apporti delle neuroscienze e della genetica forense implichi
necessariamente il dover “inventare qualcosa di diverso dall’attuale diritto penale”( S. Larizza, Sui
limiti posti dal sistema penale, cit., p. 38). Semmai è opportuno ricordare la saggezza degli antichi;
cfr. F. Zanuso, Les promesses de la justice réparatrice et la Sagesse du Tribunal de l’Héliée, in “Essais de
Philosophie Pènale et de Criminologie”, vol. 8/2009, Paris, ed. Dalloz, 2009, pp. 331-357.
Genetics, neurosciences and criminal trial: short sparse considerations1
Roberto E. Kostoris
1. Luckily I am a professor of criminal procedure and not a judge! Having to

decide through a concrete application of new sciences that are raising such insidious,
complex and partly unresolved problems, which in turn disclose such profound
questions that recall – as Francesca Zanuso said – the anguishes and doubts of our
own existence, is a task that – when carried out with conscience – really becomes
almost superhuman.
However, in order to try to find our own way in such delicate matters, criminal
procedural lawyers cannot but rely on a few general «indicators of direction», that
is, on a few basic principles of the legal order, although in the awareness that there
might be gray zones where the track gets more uncertain and solutions get more
debatable.
2. First of all, we must say that the topic places itself within the general framework
of the perennial conflict between authority and liberty that connotes the whole
dynamics of criminal trial. Genetics and neurosciences are in the service of the
authority, that is the State, as they concern the penal fact-finding in several ways.
Opposed to them is the private sphere of the individual, both under the aspect of the
protection of privacy and under the aspect of the protection of one’s own essence of
person, which is exposed to the aggressions of genetics and neurosciences; with the
risk of transforming the person into a «thing».
The very short time and space allow me to merely sketch a very general and
substantially assertive discourse, trying to individuate some fundamental points, but
especially suggesting some open problems.
3. Let us start from a few considerations on questions that appear to be more easily
framed. I refer to the issue – which is however extremely «sensitive» – of genetic data.
Here the problems focus, on the one hand, on the side of coercive biological
sample-taking for purposes of personal identification of investigation and evidence
in the criminal trial, and, on the other hand, on the side of the preservation and
1
338 Genetics, neurosciences and criminal trial
access to the DNA information: basically, questions concerning the «genetic data-
base».
With regard to coercive sample-taking, our code’s regulation as a whole appears
to be quite respectful of personal liberty (which is limited, let us not forget it, in a
modest part), of the protection of health and of personal dignity (which are also
interested, although in a marginal way), at least with regard to the findings collected
by the prosecutor or to performing a forensic survey; some doubt of constitutional
orthodoxy may concern the regulation of the taking of samples by judicial police
(art. 349 c.p.p.), since in this case the validation of a judge, as demanded by art. 13.2
Const. for each act interfering with personal liberty, is not required, as such sample-
taking is merely subjected to the prosecutor’s preventive authorisation, which may
even be issued in oral form.
Also largely unsolved is the problem of the protection of privacy with regard
to «sensitive» data that should enter the national DNA database. Indeed, even
long after l. n. 85 of 2009 established the «bank» of such data, no implementing
decree entrusted with the specific regulation of the guarantees to be respected in the
selection, the custody, the management and the conservation and the access to such
data has been issued. A legislative intervention, therefore, is required.
4. Genetics and, above all, neurosciences lend themselves to further and not less
delicate employments in the criminal trial: just think to the role they may play with
regard to the assessment of imputability, to that of the conscious participation of
the defendant to trial, and to that of the true or false character of the declarations
rendered by those heard or examined through the proceedings (person under
investigation, defendant, witness), on which, in particular, we would better linger.
Here the problem of safeguarding the protection of untouchable values of the
legal order, which represent just as many limits in the penal fact-finding, joins the
more general problem – all along, at the centre of an unceasing debate – of the
position of the judge before the contribution of science and, in particular, of the so-
called «new sciences».
In this regard, our criminal procedure code forbids the use, even with the
concerned person’s consent, of «methods or techniques which may influence the
freedom of self-determination, or alter the capacity to recall and evaluate facts» (art.
188 c.p.p. and 64.2 c.p.p., with specific reference to the questioning of the person
under investigation). Moreover, and more generally, also the respect of «human
dignity», as a fundamental principle that the European Court of Human Rights
deduced from art. 3 ECHR, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatments
(Eur. court 18/12/1996 Aksoy vs. Turkey) and which is now set by art. 1 of the Nice
Charter as an autonomous right irradiating its efficacy on the whole system of
European safeguards, deserves consideration.
R. E. Kostoris 339
5. Lowering ourselves into the concrete, as one of the new frontiers of neurosciences
is represented by functional magnetic resonance imaging, which some would employ
as an instrument to measure truth or lie, we have to ask ourselves whether such
a technique would comply with the above limits; whether it might influence on
the freedom of self-determination and on intellectual abilities. And, moreover, how
much reliable could it be.
Under the first aspect, scientists tend to exclude prejudices to or interferences
with intellectual abilities, maintaining that neuroimaging techniques would limit
themselves to «monitor» thought as it takes form, without interfering with its
development.
Nevertheless, such an answer cannot put an end to every discourse.
First, there is reason to maintain that such techniques could be never applied to
the person under investigation during his/her questioning. This subject’s position is
made quite particular by virtue of the right to silence set forth by art. 64.3 b c.p.p. As
he/she does not have any «duty to collaborate», in respect to the right of self-defence,
whenever he/she would decide to answer, he/she could not be subjected to any form
of introspection on his/her own mind, even if it would not determine any obstacle
to self-determination.
A doubt might remain for the case in which it was the person under investigation
himself/herself to ask such an experiment: such a will could be considered an
expression precisely of that right to self-defence that it is to be protected. In this
regard, the evocative warning on the prohibition for the defendant to undergo the
truth serum given by Francesco Carnelutti several years ago is still resounding: there
is a paradox, he said, in the fact that such a subject is denied this possibility of
protecting his moral freedom, by exposing, in turn, the defendant to the risk of
a conviction. Now, art. 64.2 c.p.p. rightfully considers moral freedom as a non-
disposable good – and this is, incidentally, the best means to protect it indeed – but
of course, if we were really sure that there is not the minimum risk of affecting it
– and we will shortly see if this is really possible in the case of functional magnetic
resonance imaging – the possibility for the defendant to «ask to be believed» also
through the application of introspective scientific techniques, as such, would not
appear forbidden. It would be, instead, whenever, upon the defendant’s request to
employ it to declare his/her non-imputability or partial imputability, because the
presence of the alleged insanity, which supposedly persists at the time of the trial,
would not allow to ascribe such a request to a fully conscious and voluntary act of
self-defence (while the defence counsel, as such, could not possibly dispose of a
personal right of the defendant).
A different position from that of the defendant and the person under investigation
is that of the witness, who is, instead, obliged to give true answers and does not
benefit of a right to personal defence. Here we are at the heart of the problem: we
340 Genetics, neurosciences and criminal trial
need to verify whether the functional magnetic resonance, even though not causing
any perceptive or mnemonic alterations, could however influence the moral freedom
of the person.
Under this aspect, offering a totally reassuring answer is not easy. The dynamic
of the operation itself seems to entail somehow coercive forms: the person shall be
introduced in a machine represented by a closed cylinder and examined while he/she
is inside. It is difficult to maintain that this would not influence the mind-set – and
perhaps also the physical state – of the examined person, the anxiety that such a form
of examination may engender in him/her. Could he/she who finds himself/herself
in a state, albeit transitory, of substantial containment be considered really free from
any conditioning?
Moreover, and more generally, may the penally sanctioned prohibition of lying
for the witness – or also the right of the State to know the truth, of which such a
prohibition is expression – assume the forms of a right to «know», we might say
«forcefully» that truth by «entering» directly the mind of those who should reveal
it? Facing the State’s right to truth, is there a right of the subject to the reserved
dominion of his/her interna corporis?
Of course, also needs of different nature shall be taken into account. Let us
consider a borderline case. Let us imagine that a terrorist attack has been prepared;
that the bomb is already in the place where it is meant to explode; that a person
knows its location and that the truth of the information is essential to avoid a mass
killing. In the United States some hypothesised even the lawfulness of torture (a
«legal torture») whenever it could be useful to prevent, as in this case, the death of
many persons. Against such a cruel expedient – certainly prohibited – the coactivity
and the influence on the personal sphere of the resonance could appear of little
significance compared with the interests at stake. This is a peculiar example, but one
that makes us reflect. A unidirectional protection of the moral freedom of the person
may clash with the need for protecting not less important values. We should ask
ourselves whether we should apply also to this field the principle of proportionality,
tolerating partial attenuations of the former protection in particular and however
exceptional and circumscribed cases in which at least the life of other persons is at
stake.
6. The other unsolved aspect is the problem of the reliability of such neuroscientific
techniques.
We should not forget that neuroimaging still belongs to the experimental studies,
even if some courts has already started applying it (quite discussed is, in particular,
the «Albertani case»).
Most of all, we should not forget that, however, it measures a phenomenon from
an objective point of view: it merely detects the presence of certain reactions at the
R. E. Kostoris 341
blood and brain level, which, on the one hand, can depend also by factors different
than lie, and, on the other hand, do not say anything at all on the reasons of the
alteration; similarly, the individuation of alleles in a person’s DNA seems to offer
only an abstract degree of probability of abnormal behaviours, but does not ensure
that in the concrete case the homicidal raptus is due to that specific cause. There is
always an all but linear and not abstractly measureable interrelation between genetic
factors and environmental factors.
We are, therefore, before techniques that offer elements of knowledge – as the
previous presentations by the scientists have demonstrated – that present however
margins of imprecision and fallibility and that may be subject to also significantly
different readings. They certainly unveil the limits of classic psychiatry, but they
are far from being self-sufficient. In no case, however, they could be considered
autonomously, detached from the other findings of the trial (the traditional
psychiatric, medical forensic, criminological acquisitions, but also the results of
testimonies and documents). The decision of the judge – who is the expert of the
experts, not because he/she is given with a superior knowledge than the expert’s,
which he/she needs precisely due to the intrinsic limits of his/her notions of common
man, but because he/she is called to assess the expert survey in the light of the other
findings of the trial – shall always derive from an integrated consideration of all the
evidences, which might also mitigate or contradict the value of the single scientific
data – even when «validated» through experimentation and consent within the
relevant scientific community – in the framework of the specific context considered.
All this, without forgetting that in order to take a decision of conviction the judge
shall be able to exclude culpability «beyond any reasonable doubt».
Genetica, neuroscienze e processo penale: brevi considerazioni sparse
Roberto E. Kostoris
1. Per mia fortuna faccio il professore di procedura penale e non il giudice! Dover de-
cidere facendo concreta applicazione di nuove scienze che sollevano problemi così insidiosi,
così complessi, in parte irrisolti, che aprono questioni così profonde, che rimandano – come
diceva Francesca Zanuso – alle angosce e ai dubbi della nostra stessa esistenza, è un compito
che – se assolto con coscienza – diventa davvero quasi sovraumano.
In ogni caso, per cercare di orientarsi in materie tanto delicate il processualpenalista non
può che affidarsi ad alcuni “indicatori di direzione” generali, cioè ad alcuni principi di fondo
dell’ordinamento, pur sapendo che si possono presentare zone grigie dove la traccia si fa più
incerta e le soluzioni diventano più opinabili.
2. Anzitutto va detto che la tematica si colloca nella generale cornice del perenne con-
flitto tra autorità e libertà che connota tutta la dinamica del processo penale. Genetica e
neuroscienze sono al servizio dell’autorità, cioè dello Stato, perché interessano in vario modo
l’accertamento penale. Ad esse si oppone la sfera riservata dell’individuo, sia sotto il profilo
della tutela della privacy, sia sotto il profilo della difesa della sua stessa essenza di persona, che
è esposta ad essere aggredita dalle prime; con il rischio di trasformare la persona in “cosa”.
Il tempo e lo spazio ristrettissimi consentono di fare in questa sede solo un discorso ap-
pena abbozzato, molto generale e di tono sostanzialmente assertivo, cercando di individuare
alcuni punti fermi, ma soprattutto prospettando alcuni problemi aperti.
3. Iniziamo da qualche considerazione su questioni che sembrano di più agevole inqua-

dramento. Mi riferisco al tema – comunque estremamente “sensibile” - dei dati genetici.
Qui i problemi si concentrano, per un verso, sul versante del prelievo coattivo dei cam-
pioni biologici a fini di identificazione della persona e di indagine e prova nel processo pe-
nale, e, per l’altro, su quello della conservazione e dell’accesso alle informazioni del DNA: in
sostanza, le questioni che riguardano la “banca dati genetica”.
In ordine al prelievo coattivo, la disciplina del nostro codice risulta nel complesso ab-
bastanza rispettosa della libertà personale (la cui limitazione appare comunque, non dimen-
tichiamolo, di modesta entità), della tutela della salute e del rispetto della dignità della per-
sona (pure esse interessate in misura, tutto sommato, marginale), almeno con riguardo agli
accertamenti compiuti dal pubblico ministero o in relazione al compimento di una perizia;
qualche dubbio di ortodossia costituzionale può residuare invece rispetto alla disciplina del
prelievo effettuato dalla polizia giudiziaria (art. 349 c.p.p.), dato che relativamente ad essa
non è prevista la convalida di un giudice, come richiesto dall’art.13.2 Cost. per gli atti che
344 Genetica, neuroscienze e processo penale
incidano sulla libertà personale, ma solo un’autorizzazione, per giunta preventiva, e che può
addirittura essere data in forma orale, da parte del pubblico ministero.
Ancora largamente irrisolto è invece il problema della tutela della riservatezza rispetto ai
dati genetici “sensibili” che dovrebbero affluire nella banca dati nazionale del DNA. Infatti,
alla l. n.85 del 2009 che ha istituito la “banca”, pur a distanza di tanto tempo, non hanno
ancora fatto seguito i decreti attuativi che avrebbero dovuto disciplinare specificamente le
garanzia da rispettare nella selezione, nella custodia, nella gestione e conservazione e nell’
accesso ai dati. Qui urge, dunque, un intervento del legislatore.
4. Genetica e soprattutto neuroscienze si prestano però a ulteriori e non meno delicati

impieghi nel processo penale: basti pensare al ruolo che esse possono giocare in ordine all’ac-
certamento dell’imputabilità, a quello della cosciente partecipazione al processo dell’imputa-
to, e a quello del carattere veridico o menzognero delle dichiarazioni rese dalle persone sen-
tite o esaminate nel procedimento (indagato, imputato, testimone), sul quale, in particolare,
converrà soffermarsi.
Al più generale problema – da sempre al centro di un incessante dibattito – della posi-
zione del giudice di fronte all’apporto della scienza, e, in particolare, delle cosiddette “nuove
scienze”, qui si aggiunge quello di far salva la tutela di valori intangibili dell’ordinamento, che
rappresentano altrettanti limiti all’accertamento penale.
A tale riguardo, viene anzitutto in gioco il divieto che compare nel nostro codice di rito
di utilizzare, anche con il consenso dell’interessato, «metodi o tecniche idonei a influire sulla
libertà di autodeterminazione, o ad alterare la capacità di ricordare e valutare i fatti» (art.188
c.p.p. e 64.2 c.p.p., con riferimento specifico all’interrogatorio dell’indagato). Inoltre, e più
in generale, deve essere considerato anche il rispetto della “dignità umana”, come principio
di fondo che la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha ricavato dall’art. 3 CEDU, che pone il
divieto di trattamenti inumani e degradanti (C. eur. 18/12/1996 Aksoy c. Turchia) e che ora
figura come diritto autonomo, di efficacia irradiante sull’intero sistema delle garanzie euro-
pee, nell’art. 1 della Carta di Nizza.
5. Scendendo nel concreto, poiché una delle nuove frontiere delle neuroscienze è rappre-
sentata dalla risonanza magnetica funzionale per immagini, che si vorrebbe impiegare come
strumento per misurare la verità o la menzogna, c’è da domandarsi se una tecnica di questo
tipo sarebbe rispettosa di simili limiti; se potrebbe incidere sulla libertà di autodeterminazio-
ne e sulle capacità volitive. Ed, inoltre, quanto potrebbe essere attendibile.
Sotto il primo profilo, gli scienziati tendono ad escludere compromissioni o interferenze
sulle capacità volitive, sostenendo che le tecniche di neuroimaging avrebbero la caratteristica
di limitarsi a “monitorare” il pensiero mentre esso si forma, senza interferire con il suo svi-
luppo.
Sennonché, una tale risposta non vale a chiudere ogni discorso.
Anzitutto, è da ritenere che tecniche simili non potrebbero in ogni caso essere applicate
nei confronti dell’indagato durante il suo interrogatorio. La posizione di questo soggetto
è infatti resa del tutto particolare per effetto del diritto al silenzio che gli attribuisce l’art.
64.3 b c.p.p. Non avendo un “dovere di collaborare”, in omaggio al diritto all’autodifesa,
quand’anche si risolvesse a rispondere, egli non potrebbe comunque essere assoggettato ad
R. E. Kostoris 345
alcuna forma di introspezione nella sua mente, anche qualora essa non determinasse ostacoli
all’autodeterminazione.
Un dubbio potrebbe residuare per il caso in cui fosse egli stesso a richiedere tale esperi-
mento: una tale volontà si potrebbe ritenere, infatti, espressiva proprio di quel diritto di au-
todifesa che si vuole tutelare. Risuona ancora vivo in proposito il suggestivo monito lanciato
in anni lontani da Francesco Carnelutti in rapporto al divieto per l’imputato di sottoporsi al
siero della verità: c’è un paradosso – egli diceva – nel fatto che a tale soggetto venga negata
questa possibilità per tutelare la sua libertà morale, esponendolo però in cambio al rischio
di una condanna. Ora, la libertà morale è oggi giustamente considerata dall’art. 64.2 c.p.p.
un bene indisponibile − e questo, sia detto per inciso, è il miglior mezzo per tutelarla dav-
vero − ma certo, se realmente si fosse sicuri che non esista il minimo rischio di intaccarla
− e verificheremo tra un attimo se davvero ciò sia possibile nel caso di risonanza magnetica
funzionale per immagini - la possibilità per l’imputato di “chiedere di essere creduto” anche
facendo applicazioni di tecniche scientifiche introspettive non sembrerebbe, di per sé, vietata.
Lo sarebbe, invece, in ogni caso, se questo soggetto chiedesse il suo impiego in funzione di
una declaratoria di non imputabilità o parziale imputabilità, perché la presenza del preteso
vizio di mente, che si deve supporre persistente al tempo del processo non consentirebbe di
ascrivere ad un atto pienamente cosciente e volontario di autodifesa la sua richiesta (mentre il
difensore, in quanto tale, non potrebbe disporre di un diritto personalissimo dell’imputato).
Diversa rispetto a quella dell’imputato e dell’indagato la posizione del testimone, che è
invece obbligato a rendere risposte veridiche e non fruisce di un diritto di difesa personale.
Qui ci si trova al cuore del problema: occorre verificare se la risonanza magnetica funzionale,
pur non determinando alterazioni percettive o mnestiche, possa comunque incidere sulla
libertà morale della persona.
Sotto questo profilo, non sembra facile dare una risposta del tutto tranquillizzante. Che
tale tecnica implichi forme in qualche misura costrittive sembrerebbe discendere, infatti, dalla
stessa dinamica dell’operazione: la persona deve essere introdotta in un macchinario rappre-
sentato da un cilindro chiuso ed esaminata mentre si trova al suo interno. Difficile sostenere
che ciò sia ininfluente sullo stato d’animo – e forse sullo stesso stato fisico – dell’esaminato,
sull’ansia che in lui quella forma di escussione può generare. Potrebbe dirsi realmente libero
da condizionamenti chi si trovi in uno stato, sia pur transitorio, di sostanziale contenzione?
Inoltre, e più in generale, il divieto penalmente sanzionato di mentire per il testimone –
o, se si preferisce, il diritto dello Stato di conoscere la verità da parte sua, di cui quel divieto è
espressione – possono assumere le forme di un diritto ad “apprendere”, si potrebbe dire “for-
zosamente” quella verità “entrando” direttamente nella mente di chi dovrebbe rivelarla? Di
fronte al diritto alla verità da parte dello Stato esiste o no un diritto del soggetto al riservato
dominio dei suoi interna corporis?
Naturalmente, occorre anche farsi carico di istanze di diversa natura. Consideriamo un
caso limite. Immaginiamo che sia stato preparato un attentato; che la bomba si trovi già
nel luogo dove dovrà esplodere; che una persona ne conosca l’ubicazione e che la veridicità
dell’informazione sia essenziale per evitare una strage. Negli Stati Uniti si è addirittura ipotiz-
zata la liceità della tortura (di una “tortura legale”) quando possa servire a prevenire, come in
questo caso, la morte di molte persone. Rispetto ad un espediente così cruento – sicuramente
vietato – la costrittività e l’incidenza nella sfera personale della risonanza potrebbero appa-
346 Genetica, neuroscienze e processo penale
rire ben poca cosa in rapporto alla posta in gioco. È un esempio particolare, ma fa riflettere.
Una tutela unidirezionale della libertà morale della persona si può scontrare con l’esigenza
di tutelare valori non meno importanti. Ci sarebbe dunque da chiedersi se anche in questo
campo non si debba fare applicazione del principio di proporzionalità, tollerando parziali
attenuazioni della prima tutela in casi particolari e comunque eccezionali e circoscritti in cui
sia in gioco almeno il bene della vita di altre persone.
6. L’altro versante, che resta aperto, è rappresentato dal problema dell’ attendibilità di
simili tecniche neuroscientifiche.
Non si deve infatti dimenticare che la neuroimaging appartiene ancora agli studi speri-
mentali, anche se ne è stata fatta già qualche applicazione in giurisprudenza (molto scalpore
ha suscitato, in particolare, il “caso Albertani”).
Ma soprattutto non va dimenticato che essa misura comunque un fenomeno dal punto
di vista oggettivo: individua solo la presenza di certe reazioni a livello sanguigno e cerebrale,
che, per un verso, possono dipendere anche da fattori diversi dalla menzogna, e, per altro
verso, nulla comunque dicono sui motivi che hanno portato all’alterazione; come, del re-
sto, l’individuazione di alleli nel DNA di una persona sembra fornire solo un tasso astratto
di probabilità di comportamenti anomali, ma non assicura che nel caso concreto il raptus
omicida sia dovuto a quella causa. C’è sempre un’interrelazione tutt’altro che lineare e non
astrattamente misurabile tra fattori genetici e fattori ambientali.
Siamo perciò di fronte a tecniche che forniscono elementi conoscitivi – come ci hanno
dimostrato gli scienziati nelle relazioni precedenti – che presentano comunque margini di
imprecisione e di fallibilità e che possono essere soggetti a letture anche sensibilmente diver-
se. Svelano certo i limiti della psichiatria classica, ma sono tutt’altro che autosufficienti. In
ogni caso, non potrebbero mai essere considerati in modo autonomo, avulso dagli altri dati
di causa (le tradizionali acquisizioni psichiatriche, medico-legali, criminologiche, ma anche
le emergenze testimoniali e documentali). La decisione del giudice – che è perito dei periti,
non in quanto possa vantare conoscenze superiori a quelle del perito, delle quali ha invece
bisogno proprio per i limiti intrinseci delle sue nozioni di uomo comune, ma in quanto è
chiamato a valutare la perizia alla luce degli altri dati di causa – deve sempre discendere da
una considerazione integrata di tutte le risultanze probatorie, che potrebbe anche attenuare
o smentire il valore del singolo dato scientifico – quand’anche “validato” da sperimentazioni
e consenso nella comunità scientifica di riferimento - nel quadro del contesto specifico preso
in considerazione. Non dimenticando mai che il giudice per emettere una decisione di con-
danna deve essere in grado di escludere la colpevolezza “al di là di ogni ragionevole dubbio”.
Neurosciences, genetics and criminal law. Rhapsodic reflections1
Riccardo Borsari
One might maintain, with reason, that the questions raised by the controversial
acquisitions of neurosciences and genetics on law, especially, for what matters here,
criminal law, «come from afar»2 and yet constitute an empirical challenge to legal and
philosophical reflection, stimulated to rethink ancient problems (the brain/mind
relation) and traditional categories (liberty/responsibility).
Without bothering Cesare Lombroso3, a news story dating back almost fifty years
ago contributes, with the evocative force of reality, to concretely found this statement.
In 1966 Charles Whitman climbed the tower of the University of Texas with a
bag full of weapons and ammunitions, killed the clerk at the entrance and shoot at
two families that were climbing the stairs; from the balcony he started shooting on
all the people he could see moving. Before being shot down, he killed 14 persons and
wounded 32. At his home, the police found his mother and his wife dead and a note
by him: «I don’t really understand myself these days. I am supposed to be an average
reasonable and intelligent young man. However, lately (I can’t recall when it started)
I have been a victim of many unusual and irrational thoughts. (…) I talked with a
Doctor once for about two hours and tried to convey to him my fears that I felt come
overwhelming violent impulses. After one session I never saw the Doctor again, and
since then I have been fighting my mental turmoil alone, and seemingly to no avail.
(…) It was after much thought that I decided to kill my wife, Kathy, tonight after I
pick her up from work at the telephone company. I love her dearly, and she has been
as fine a wife to me as any man could ever hope to have. I cannot rationally pinpoint
any specific reason for doing this». Whitman was 25 years old, had an IQ 2% higher
than the average population, was a former marine, had studied engineering and
worked for a bank and had been Scout Instructor. During the autopsy a tumour, a
1
2
See, also with regard to the different paradigms of analysis of mental insanity, A. Manna, Diritto
penale e neuroscienze: un’introduzione, in O. Di Giovine (ed.), Diritto penale e neuroetica, Atti del
Convegno 21-22 maggio 2012, Università degli Studi di Foggia, Padova, 2013, p. 3 ff. For a first
framework see, for the moment, L. Sammicheli, G. Sartori, Neuroscienze giuridiche: i diversi livelli
di interazione tra diritto e neuroscienze, in A. Bianchi, G. Gulotta, G. Sartori (eds.), Manuale di
neuroscienze forensi, Milano, 2009, p. 15 ff.
3
Cf. S. Montaldo (ed.), Cesare Lombroso. Gli scienziati e la nuova Italia, Bologna, 2010.
348 Neurosciences, genetics and criminal law
glioblastoma, big as a five cents dollar coin, developed deep in the encephalon under
the thalamus, which leaned against the hypothalamus and compressed the amygdala,
the structure regulating emotions – according to many neurologists of that time, that
was the cause of his behaviour.
Recently, in the United States4, but also in Italy (see the decisions of the Corte
Assise Appello Trieste5 and the Giudice per l’udienza preliminare at the Tribunale di
Como6), within a, so to say, global debate7, there is an increasingly frequent request
for functional magnetic resonances or positron emission tomographies aimed at
assessing the functionalities of specific brain sectors of defendants; the objective is
to point at neurological injuries or faults capable to annul voluntary control8: it is
like they wanted to maintain «I did not do it, my brain did it»9. The incapability of
distinguishing good from evil and of controlling one’s own actions, with obvious
reflections on the judgement of responsibility and on the punishment, can be
configured by pathologies seriously compromising the functionality of the central
nervous system10.
Precisely with regard to the problems of the impact of genetics and neurosciences11
on criminal law, today under the focus of speculative and practical attention, the
thought of the Master Giuseppe Bettiol sounds very topical, other than primarily
important. With extreme synthesis12, indeed, we might remember how the type of
man, so to say, presupposed by Bettiol is represented as a being responsible for his
own actions, capable of moving the course of things and arbiter of his own destiny;
the capability of understanding and of willing is the man’s capability of perceiving,
4
On which A. Santosuosso, B. Bottalico, Neuroscienze e diritto: una prima mappa, in A. Santosuosso
(ed.), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, Pavia, 2009, p. 33 ff.; M. Freeman, O.R. Goodenough (eds.), Law,
Mind and brain, Ashgate, 2009, p. 5 ff.
5
Decision of October 1st, 2009.
6
Decision of May 20th, 2011. See. F. Casasole, Neuroscienze, genetica comportamentale e processo
penale, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2012, p. 110 ff.
7
In German literature, see, for all, S. Schleim, T.M. Spranger, H. Walter (hrsg.), Von der Neuroethik
zum Neurorecht?, Göttingen, 2009.
8
M. Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, in “Iustitia”, 2011, p. 439 emphasises
that the rapid development of neurobiology «induced some lawyers to draw undue and hurried
conclusions on the eclipse of the liberty of will, of culpability and of responsibility» (our transl.).
9
Which would be the «true culpable»: see J. Greene, J. Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes
nothing and everything, in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London - Series B: Biological
Sciences, 2001, p. 1775 ff.
10
S. Larizza, Sui limiti posti dal sistema penale alla recezione degli esiti conoscitivi della “neuroimaging”, in
M.G. Ruberto, C. Barbieri (ed.), Il futuro tra noi. Aspetti etici, giuridici e medico-legali della neuroetica,
Milano, 2011, p. 35 highlights how the question of criminal behaviour’s aetiology is being reprised.
11
For an overall outline, see P. Pietrini, G. Rota, Il comportamento umano tra geni e cervello: alcune
considerazioni sullo stato attuale delle conoscenze neuroscientifiche, in O. Di Giovine (ed.), Diritto penale
e neuroetica, cit., p. 11 ff.; L. Eusebi (ed.), Dinamiche della volizione e libertà, Milano, 2008. A broad
picture in A. Lavazza, L. Sammicheli, Il delitto del cervello. La mente tra scienza e diritto, Torino, 2012.
12
I owe these cues to the volume of professor S. Riondato, Un diritto penale detto «ragionevole».
Raccontando Giuseppe Bettiol, Padova, 2005, passim.
R. Borsari 349
individuating and comprehending the consequences of his own acting within the
ethical-social meaning that they present in the historical situation they happen to
affect; it implies the conscience of the objective, the reasonableness of the motive,
the congruity of the action. All this laid down in concrete life, because criminal law
is made «for man in general, who has his own concrete life of joy and of pain in the
framework of the concrete values of life». In the prescriptive perspective assumed by
Bettiol, he poses first of all the value of the man given with free will – «man is saved
only when he is considered as a value, as an end, as a being of reason»; his main aim
is to safeguard the moral, legal and political liberty of man; Bettiol says that «man,
while being no angel nor fragment of nature, has always been able to distinguish
what is bad from what is good not on the basis of an als ob (as if ), as in that case life
would be a fiction, but on the basis of an ontological criterion that brings us close
to being and, thus, to truth … having the power to act differently than how one has
acted is not a mystery, as our own conscience is source of knowledge and truth» (our
transl.).
Coherently, according to the Master, culpability is a concept of value that
presupposes a judgement of disapproval for what has been done, it is a wilfulness
that should not be, it is not much the intentionality of the unlawful act, but rather
the unlawful intention, that is, a wilfulness determined to action whereas it should
and could have been otherwise determined. Inasmuch as «judgement of personal
condemnation for the perpetration of a fact harming a protected interest», it is made
of the capability of understanding and willing, of the voluntariness of the fact within
the respective limits of intent and negligence and of the possibility of a normal
motivation of will («esigibilità»). The principle of culpability is therefore necessary in
order to grant privates the certainty of free choices of action13.
This is not enough.
Bettiol adheres to the Gesinnungstrafrecht, thus maintaining – we apologize
for a certain simplification and simplism – that this contributes to and founds an
authentically personalistic imputation. Gesinnung is mentality, is conscious interior
orientation of a subject who determines himself with reference to certain values of
the social community, it is conscious disposition of the acting subject before certain
values. While intentions and (psychical) motives14 imply and end up into a finding of
fact, the Gesinnung implies an ethical-legal assessment on an analogous finding and
permits the construction of the moral personality of the acting subject. Criminal law
of interior attitude suits, therefore, the ethicality of the human person that manifests
itself in the attitudes of conscience and in the choice of the motivations to action.
The personalisation-ethicisation brings to the humanisation of penal responsibility
13
Cf. G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni su colpevolezza e prevenzione, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1987, p.
865 ff.
14
See. P. Veneziani, Motivi e colpevolezza, Torino, 2000.
(although in the persistence of a criminal law characterised by the harm to a legal

good) 15.
Giuseppe Bettiol’s conceptions, especially when it comes to the centrality of
free will and of moral judgement16, stimulate reflection with peculiar profundity,
considering the fact that in the last years genetic research applied to the study of human
behaviour and neurosciences brought and keep bringing a significant impulse to the
knowledge concerning the increase of the risk of anti-social behaviours by subjects
carrying particular genes or characterised by particular cerebral configurations17.
Brain imaging techniques allow us to know the modalities of the brain in action,
while it thinks, while it feels emotions etc.
On the one hand, it would appear therefore illogical not to employ these new
techniques that have enriched the «toolbox»18 and that permitted to ascertain, for
instance, that cerebral maturity is not reached until the age of 21; on the other hand,
we ask ourselves whether the contributions of neurosciences and their impact on law
15
It is worth remembering that the Italian Constitutional Court in judgement n. 322 of 2007
(concerning the issue of the error on the age of the victim in sex crimes) stated that: «The principle of
culpability cannot be sacrificed by ordinary legislator in the name of a more effective penal protection
of other values, even when they have constitutional nature… The principle of culpability is guarantee of
free choices of action based on an anticipated assessment (calculability) of the legal-penal consequences of
one’s own behaviour … it has a founding role with respect to the re-educative function of punishment
… The legislator may well grade, within the different forms of culpability, the psychological coefficient
of participation of the author to the fact having regard to the nature of the offence and of the interests
that ought to be preserved… but in no case can the legislator totally discount such coefficient:
otherwise, establishing the occurrence of repressive needs capable of justifying a renunciation to the
requirement of culpability – in view of the protection of other constitutional interests, such as normally
those protected by criminal law – would be an appreciation left to mere legislative discretion, with the
following emptying of the function of guarantee and foundation of the principle of culpability» (our
transl.).
16
See, ex multis, M. De Caro, A. Lavazza, G. Sartori, Siamo davvero liberi? Le neuroscienze e il mistero
del libero arbitrio, Torino, 2010; M. Gazzaniga, Chi comanda? Scienza, mente e libero arbitrio, Torino,
2012; R. Kane (ed.), Free Will, Oxford, 2009.
17
M. Bertolino, Il breve cammino del vizio di mente. Un ritorno al paradigma organicistico?, in
A. Santosuosso (ed.), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, cit., p. 121 ff., who, with regard to the needs of
humanisation and personalisation of responsibility, highlights how «too often substantive premises
are bound to evidentiary logics that bring to privilege the fact impersonally intended … without any
doubt, also neurosciences, whose scientific conquers are not ignored by law, contribute to enrich
the catalogue of such schemes …in particular, when neurosciences are applied to the judgement of
imputability, also the problems of the author risk to become victim of a process of objectivisation and
standardisation, which is charming in its component of guarantee of certainty of the judicial finding
… but all of this also entails the risk of a “proceduralisation” of dogmatic substantive categories, in the
sense of the substitution of the constitutive elements of crime with evidentiary canons, which engenders
a confusion between the object of finding and the instrument of finding. In other words, coming back
to the constitutive element of the capability of understanding and willing, it ends up in being forged
and absorbed by the relative evidentiary question, the resolution of which nowadays is increasingly
entrusted to neurosciences» (our transl.).
18
I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce?, in O. Di Giovine (ed.), Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit.,
p. 28 who deems «absurd not to keep into account the new neuroscientific techniques» (our transl.).
R. Borsari 351
are effectively exceptional in nature or not and, consequently, whether they predicate
totally new concepts and solutions or not19.
Also the Corte di Cassazione seems to adopt, at least in part, this perspective, when
it affirms, in its decision n. 867 of 2011, that the revision of the trial can be based
on issues, such as imputability, that, while having been already considered by the
judge, can be evaluated according to the employment of new techniques; the Court
maintains, in particular, that the «novelty of the scientific evidence can be related to
the object to be ascertained or to the method discovered or experimented after the
trial by now defined, as long as capable in itself to produce new factual elements»
(our transl.); in other words, after the «European revision», the «scientific revision»,
given that, according to the Court, the previous decisions denying revision in case
of already appreciated scientific evidences, «were based especially on a positivistic
conception of science intended as a set of complete, certain and unique knowledge.
It refuses the idea that the notion of science comprises the concept of fallibility, of
relativity, of evolution, it rejects the method of refutation and falsifiability, as well
as the research and the evaluation of other different reconstructions of the historical
fact aimed at demonstrating that no alternative can be reasonably configured, it
does not accept the perspective that the use of a different method, albeit applied
to the same elements, can produce completely different results … It goes together
with the concern of a logical incompatibility between the need of certainty and
stability typical of the fact-finding carried out in the criminal trial and ensured by the
final judgement and the gnoseological ends of science, which, by its own nature, is
characterised by the incompleteness and temporariness of the cognitive acquisitions
that have been obtained»20.
Many questions arise, one of the most relevant of which concerns – as highlighted
in many studies by Professor Ronco – the so-called explicative capability of such
studies on the behaviour of the specific acting subject on a specific criminal fact; the
possible influence that can be connected to a certain gene shall be examined in the
light of a plurality of factors, such as other genes and environmental factors. Each
factor of biological risk should be therefore verified in the interaction with each
specific factor of environmental risk, according to increasingly complex and inter-
disciplinary models in which genetic data integrate with those of psychophysiology,
of neuropsychology, of brain imaging, of neurology, of hormonal functioning, of
neurotransmitters and of the environmental influences. The complex interaction
between biological and environmental data predicates the necessity of an accurate
personalisation of the explicative model, also in the light of possible employments
19
In this sense, A. Santosuosso, Il dilemma del diritto di fronte alle neuroscienze, in Id. (ed.), Le
neuroscienze e il diritto, Pavia, 2009, p. 11.
20
On these topics, also with regard to the famous Daubert judgement, see S. Fuselli, Apparenze.
Accertamento giudiziale e prova scientifica, Milano, 2008.
in malam partem of such evidences and of the related risks of transforming the
judgement on the fact in judgement on the person and on his/her predisposition to
commit crimes of the kind of that being judged, aggravated by the circumstances that
certain anomalies could be present at the moment of the trial but not at the moment
of the fact – not to mention the doubts on the reliability of certain evidences and
the risk of breaches to privacy and human dignity. It is no coincidence that some
scholars highlighted the descriptive and non-explicative nature of the model offered
by neurosciences, which limits itself to discover the correlations between brain
functions and behaviour and risks to trigger circular, and to this purpose tautological,
reasoning: he has cerebral anomalies and he has committed a crime, becomes: he
has cerebral anomalies to the extent that he committed a crime; and finally: he has
committed a crime because of cerebral anomalies21.
The rediscovery of and the great attention paid to the Phineas Gage’s case
(Damasio, in the famous book Descartes’ Error has reconstructed by computer the
areas of brain damaged by the bar, noticing that some zones of the prefrontal cortex
had been struck and that this had determined a frontal syndrome characterised also
by the lack of control of primary impulses) embodies the conviction, supported
by the precision of ever more powerful and refined (but also dynamic, easily
manipulated and often difficult to decipher also for the experts) techniques22, that
idiosyncratic, asocial, violent or self-destructive behaviours are due to – traumatic,
pathological, congenital or environmental23 – modifications of the cerebral structure
and/or functioning of a specific individual compared to the average population. In
such a perspective, the distinction between organic pathologies and psychological
diseases, being the aetiology of any psycho-behavioural affection rooted in a material
cerebral basis.
The so-called neuro-law24 appears, which implies four theses: 1) cerebralism,
according to which the brain or genes are often the most important or fundamental
level in order to understand the behaviour which is the subject of law, especially
criminal law (however, there is the problem of the explanation level); 2) localisationism,
according to which criminal violence phenomena arise casually from dysfunctions
within specific cerebral areas – moreover, also other typologies of behaviour may
find their own peculiarity in the functioning of structures of the nervous system
(however, there are problems concerning the strong neuronal plasticity and the
interconnections between different areas); 3) revisionism, according to which the
21
I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce?, cit., p. 31.
22
For an informed and critical framework see M. Bertolino, Prove neuro-psicologiche di verità penale,
in www.penalecontemporaneo.it.
23
See O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, in “Archivio penale”, 2011, p. 838 ff.
24
See E. Picozza, L. Capraro, V. Cuzzocrea, D. Terracina, Neurodiritto. Una introduzione,
Torino, 2011; S. Zeki, O.R. Goodenough (eds.), Law & the Brain, London, 2006.
R. Borsari 353
presumption of liberty and the other classical institutes/notions today cannot be

regarded at without considering the developments of science (however, there is the
problem of the normative character of legal orders); 4) alterization, according to
which, as a considerable part of violence arises from cerebral diseases, the authors of
such acts are biologically different from normal persons (the risks of discrimination
are evident).
The framework that unfolds under the observer’s eyes, therefore, intertwines
neurosciences, cognitive sciences, behavioural genetics, evolutionistic theory,
philosophy of law, moral philosophy, case law and philosophical anthropology.
The resulting image of man appears at first sight quite different from how we are
accustomed to think of ourselves25, mainly because we reason and act in ways that are
generally unknown to ourselves; and we should ask us if we are equal amongst each
other in the way we state to be equal before the law.
It could be the case that, although certainly equal as members of the homo sapiens
sapiens species, we are irreparably different as for our natural, especially genetic,
equipment and, consequently, in the structure and functioning of the brain26; the
idea that some character traits are written in our genes and are able to influence
complex social behaviours opens the door to legal consequences, concerning equality,
of contrasting tenor: from the risk of discriminations to the idea that «the bad guys»
are simply «sick persons».
Apart from the specific procedural27 and substantive issues raised by the named
scientific acquisitions, we want to highlight here their potential impact on the
foundation of law, in particular criminal law, on the foundation of imputation,
of punishment and of the idea of responsibility, in dialogue with philosophy and
human sciences; genetic and neuroscientific discoveries, starting from the most
famous experiment by Benjamin Libet, would put in discussion the idea of free will,
which would turn out to be a mere illusion (a useless illusion, according to some),
engendered by our cognitive structures, with every reflection on punishment and its
functions28.
According to a reconstruction, at the time 0 a motorbike crosses my way; after
50-60 milliseconds my brain «see» the scene; after 100-150 milliseconds my foot,
instructed by my brain, brakes; after 500 milliseconds I realize what just happened and
after 650 I can comment it; almost half a second elapses from the visual perception
of the episode and my awareness of it, despite, in the meanwhile, I have braked. That
25
Cf. D. Eagleman, Incognito. The secret Lives of the Brain, New York, 2011.
26
Cf. P.S. Churchland, L’io come cervello, Milano, 2014.
27
See M. Ronco, Sulla “prova” neuroscientifica, in “Archivio penale”, 2011, p. 855 ff.
28
On the relation between liberty of will and the penal norms’ function of «cultural orientation» of
citizens see, for all, E. Musco, Le misure di sicurezza detentive. Profili storici e costituzionali, Milano,
1978.
half a second separates my awareness of a fact from the fact itself, the happening of its
conscious perception, that is, the brain (cerebral activity without specification) from
the mind (conscious cerebral activity).
Let us remember Benjamin Libet’s experiment, or its outcomes29.
A volunteer is asked to press, from time to time, a button, at his own will; before
him there is a clock ticking time away in hundredths of a second. A broad series
of experiment showed that 200 milliseconds pass from the moment in which the
subject decides to press the button and the moment in which he actually presses
it. Nothing strange. But if we recorded each time the so-called readiness potential
engendered in the supplemental motor cortex in the imminence and in preparation
of each action, we would ascertain that it precedes action of 550 milliseconds and
therefore our decision to press the button of 350 milliseconds. My brain seems to
know that I want to press the button with an advance of 350 milliseconds.
Holmes, famous American lawyer of the second half of the Nineteenth century
and member of the Supreme Court, wrote: «If I were having a philosophical talk
with a man I was going to have hanged (or electrocuted), I should say, I don’t doubt
that your act was inevitable for you, but to make it more avoidable by others we
propose to sacrifice you for the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier
dying for your country, if you like. But the law must keep its promises».
What are the impact and the scope of sciences’ progresses in the comprehension of
the human being, especially through the analysis of his brain? Can we speak of crime
not in terms of missed adaptation in a sociological key but as cerebral malfunctioning
in a neuroscientific key? A certain train of thought would promote the idea of a sort
of «prejudice» in favour of a scientific perspective that places law in an ancillary
position; how Jasanoff writes, neurolaw proposes itself as a cultural turn towards the
conviction that science may bring to error-proof legal results, therefore just, where
law, itself, may fail. In the socio-technological imaginary law is epistemologically
subordinated to science, neurosciences must and can strengthen legal institutions
and enter the trials inasmuch as science itself is conceptualized as given with intrinsic
normativity; the basic assumption is that the anthropology of human sciences has
changed under the pressure of scientific naturalism.
A (pretended) new image of man emerges, under certain aspects contradictorily30,
not any more as divided between body and soul, free, rational, but rather as a product
29
B. Libet, Mind Time. Il fattore temporale nella coscienza, Milano, 2007. Recently the experiment
has been refined by J.-D. Haynes: see J.-D. Haynes, Posso prevedere quello che farai, in M. De Caro,
A. Lavazza, G. Sartori, Siamo davvero liberi? Le neuroscienze e il mistero del libero arbitrio, cit. p. 5 ff.
Critically, M. Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, cit., p. 444 ff.
30
See L. Eusebi, Neuroscienze e diritto penale: un ruolo diverso del riferimento alla libertà, in L.
Palazzani, R. Zannotti (eds.), Il diritto nelle neuroscienze. Non «siamo» i nostri cervelli, Torino, 2013,
p. 123: «Nowadays, in fact, in many sectors, the role of individual autonomy is more than ever asserted.
But at the same time, more than ever, we doubt that it really exists, at least in some way» (our. transl.).
R. Borsari 355
of the evolution, irrational and dominated by passions, much less free of what is
generally believed due to genetic-cerebral conditionings31.
What neurosciences call for and impose is, thus, a reflection on free will and on
the implied notion of personal responsibility32. The (legal) blame founded on the
«power to act otherwise» - therefore the «essence» of culpability in a normative sense
as acquired by the current penalistic reflection – is founded on the freedom of will;
without freedom of will the norm would loose its necessary function of cultural
orientation for the citizens. Free will – that is, the fact that the defendant was able
to understand the nature and the consequences of his own acting and to choose
freely to perform a criminal action while being it possible to do otherwise – is the
foundation on which imputability and punishability lay33.
There are, as we said, positions34 upholding that free will is an illusion, which law
cannot ignore; and others that attribute to new positions a «collective» value, rather
than an individualistic one, as they derive precisely from the collective interactions
of many brains; other positions maintain that free will is a reality resulting, so to say,
from a complex process of interaction between genetic components and environment
operating both at a philogenic and at an ontogenic level35.
A relevant aspect, predicating adequate valorisation also, or better, especially by
criminal lawyers, consists in the fact that authoritative scholars – I think in primis
of the mind scientist J. Searle – accept the idea of free will based on information
on the structure and the functioning of the brain offered by neurobiology. If this is
the case, if we propend for such a construction, then neuroscientific discoveries end
up with strengthening the idea that freedom does not constitute a fiction useful to
found imputation, but its ontological basis rationally founding and justifying the
judgement of responsibility. On the contrary, there is the risk that the results of these
evidences might be used against the liberty of the person and support a sort of a
totally deterministic new criminological scientism.
Recent empirical studies on liberty, determinism and responsibility seem to express
what nowadays seems to be the preferable position, that is the «compatibilist»36
position, that is, choosing for liberty although in a context that can be defined
as deterministic; indeed, modern compatibilistical theory allows to reconcile the
31
Cf. T. Metzinger, Il tunnel dell’io. Scienza della mente e mito del soggetto, Milano, 2010.
32
See, widely, D. Terracina, Problematiche del diritto penale, in E. Picozza, L. Capraro, V.
Cuzzocrea, D. Terracina, Neurodiritto, cit., p. 187 ff. For an outline of the discussion and of the
(also) German literature see the good work by A. Nisco, Il confronto tra neuroscienze e diritto penale sulla
libertà di volere, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2012, p. 499 ff.
33
On this topic A. Nisco, La tutela penale dell’integrità psichica, Torino, 2012, passim.
34
For deeper insights, M. Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, cit., p. 441 ff.
35
Cf. P.J. Richerson, R. Boyd, Non di solo geni. Come la cultura ha trasformato l’evoluzione umana,
Torino, 2006.
36
See D. Dennet, L’evoluzione della libertà, Milano, 2004.
deterministic approach with the acknowledgement of spaces of liberty, intended as

a free will not as much in terms of absolute lack of conditionings, but rather as
a capacity of willing led by unavoidably present conditionings which the agent is
capable of evaluating, since, otherwise, pure case would dominate. A lesser or higher
degree of conditioning influences all our choices and therefore also the possible choice
of offending, to which the definition of conditioned moral liberty could apply; no
absolute liberty, then, in this vision, but a manoeuvring space limited by our own
history, ours as in great part built by us. Man is free but his liberty is conditioned
by the biological inheritance, by the social environment, by the concrete situations
he happens to find himself in, which are the field of possibilities amongst which he
can choose.
In the discussion about free will responsibility is kind of a «stone guest». Those
who worry about the erosion of liberty by determinism37 are often afraid especially
of a loss of sense of the practices of responsibility attribution, so to say.
The capacity of self-determination, that is, of acting based on motives that the
subject considers prevailing on others that could have brought him to a different
choice, embodies the empirical content of penal imputability; this fails whenever
conditionings are such as to hinder a conscious, rational, reasoned choice.
On the level of criminal liability, and especially of imputability, these considerations
result into the idea that we cannot give up the latter, as expression of a punitive system
informed to reasonability intended as practical wisdom, as axiological adequacy or
coherence. In order to be reasonable, criminal liability shall reflect criteria that are
legal, not moral, but it makes sense only inasmuch as compatible with criteria of
attribution of an, also moral, responsibility38. However, in order to be reasonable,
criminal liability, shall also face rationality issues strictly internal to the penal system,
issues of truth of competence of the scientific knowledge, amongst which those
concerning neuro-sciences and genetics when discussing about imputability.
Now, the idea of a principle of criminal responsibility as responsibility of a subject
capable of self-determining does not seem to have been set aside yet39: that the
motivational processes guiding human behaviour are neural processes does not mean
that they can be reduced to pure cerebral functions from which the acting of the
subject would depend in an exclusive manner. Such neuroscientific reductionism40
poorly fits the complexity of man and his mind – which besides does not mean to
deny the value of neurosciences as an «useful complement to the expert assessment»:
37
See M. Priarolo, Il determinismo. Storia di un’idea, Roma, 2011, especially p. 99 ff.
38
See D. Pulitanò, Ragionevolezza e diritto penale, Napoli, 2012, p. 18 ff.
39
Cf. A. Oliverio, Cervello, Torino, 2012, p. 150: «As it can be seen, neuroscientists themselves, or at
least the most aware ones, have some reservations about a simplifying determinism. Neurosciences tell
us that we are human beings because we have the brain we have: a brain that has its own advantages and
faults, its rules and conditionings but also its degrees of freedom» (our transl.).
40
A. Manna, Diritto penale e neuroscienze: un’introduzione, cit., p. 10 speaks of penal «neo-positivism».
R. Borsari 357
neuroscientific data, intended as risk factors, of probability of mental illness and/

or social dangerousness, should be assumed as a neuroscientifically certain clue
from which the judge can logically infer, on the basis of consolidated experiences,
the demonstration of the fact to be proven, that is mental illness and/or the higher
probability of a criminal behaviour41.
Also the aspect concerning the research on the neuronal basis of moral judgement
– the biological mechanisms in charge of the formation of morals and the taking
of decisions before ethical dilemmas, which increasingly often touch criminal law
(issues of the end of life and more) – is implied.
The experiments of the railway trolley and of the fat man42 have demonstrated
that the aggressive action personally involving the subject activates different areas of
the brain (emotions and social cognition) from those activated by the utilitarian and
rational decision to take an impersonal and mediated harmful action (abstract and
rational thought). It follows, in extreme synthesis, that not merely rational factors are
responsible for moral judgement, but also emotional factors have a role in it, with all
the due consequences; it follows also that rational and conscious are not synonyms.
Hauser, psychologist and developmental biologist, writes that « What blood flow
provides, in the form of a snapshot of the brain, is an image of what happens when
we detect a moral conflict. Brain imaging spits out a description of whether an
individual perceives conflict in a dilemma, the sources of conflict, and the nature of
the resolution». «Warning: This isn’t a prescriptive claim. Reading blood flow is no
better than reading tarot cards when it comes to working out what one ought to do».
A neuroscientist can explain the engagement in a crime of an individual in a
certain way and an economist can explain it in another, without being one of the two
explanations true or false; and the fact that there could be also another explanation,
the fact that of the very same phenomenon there could be many «whys» does not
exclude liberty, at the best it denies that liberty, absolute and lacking concreteness,
that no one can seriously maintain. Explaining conscience or that part of conscience
that is free choice through neurons and synapses could be a possibility, but not the
only possibility, as it could be part of the explanation and not the whole explanation.
In fact, in moral dilemmas, the developmental explanation seems to occupy a deeper
and preceding level: neurology, indeed, illustrates what does happen in brain when
we take one decision or the other, and thus tell us the how of a phenomenon;
developmental theory tries to explain to us why that happens. But a trick hides also
behind such statements: explaining the origins of a phenomenon is the same than
explaining its causes?
41
Cf. L. De Cataldo Neuburger, Neuroscienze e diritto penale. La scienza come, quando e perché, in A.
Santosuosso (ed.), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, cit., p. 141 ff.
42
On which, within a wider, deeper and innovative study, see O. Di Giovine, Un diritto penale
empatico? Diritto penale, bioetica e neuroetica, Torino, 2009, p. 99 ff.
The discourse would bring us far, too far for this paper, maybe seeking to
recuperate the sense of a whole knowledge43.
One might, also provocatively, wonder whether, to this end, Pascal was right,
when he stated that «the last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an
infinity of things which are beyond it».
43
O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, cit., p. 853.
Neuroscienze, genetica e diritto penale. Considerazioni rapsodiche
Riccardo Borsari
Potrebbe con fondamento sostenersi che le questioni sollevate dalle acquisizioni, pur
controverse, delle neuroscienze e della genetica sul diritto, in particolare, per quel che qui
interessa, penale, «vengono da lontano»1 e tuttavia costituiscono una sfida empirica alla rifles-
sione giuridica e filosofica, stimolata a ripensare problemi antichi (il rapporto cervello/mente)
e categorie tradizionali (libertà/responsabilità).
Senza scomodare Cesare Lombroso2, un episodio di cronaca risalente a quasi cin-
quant’anni or sono contribuisce, con la forza suggestiva della realtà, a fondare concretamente
questa affermazione.
Nel 1966 Charles Whitman salì sulla torre dell’università del Texas con una borsa piena
di armi e munizioni, uccise l’addetto all’ingresso e sparò a due famiglie che salivano le scale;
dalla balconata cominciò a sparare su tuti quelli che vedeva muoversi. Prima di venire abbat-
tuto, uccise 14 persone e ne ferì 32. A casa sua la polizia trovò madre e moglie morte e un suo
biglietto: «Non riesco a comprendermi in questo periodo. Mi ritengo un giovane intelligente
e ragionevole, tuttavia ultimamente sono vittima di pensieri irrazionali e insoliti. Dopo una
lunga riflessione ho deciso di uccidere mia moglie Kathy, stanotte. La amo teneramente ed è
stata la miglior moglie che un uomo potrebbe sperare di avere. Non sono capace di darmi una
spiegazione razionale per quello che sto per fare … Ho parlato per due ore con un medico,
cercando di esporgli le mie paure, gli ho detto che mi sentivo sopraffatto da impulsi violenti
incontrollabili. Dopo quel colloquio, non sono tornato dal medico e ho cercato di domare il
caos della mia mente, apparentemente senza successo». Whitman aveva 25 anni, un QI del
2% più intelligente della popolazione media, ex marine, aveva studiato ingegneria e lavorato
in banca, era stato istruttore scout. Durante l’autopsia fu trovato un tumore, un glioblasto-
ma, grande come una monetina da cinque centesimi di dollaro, sviluppatosi nella profondità
dell’encefalo sotto il talamo, che s’appoggiava sull’ipotalamo e comprimeva l’amigdala, strut-
tura che regola le emozioni – secondo molti neurologi dell’epoca, quella fu la causa del suo
comportamento.
1
V., anche in relazione ai diversi paradigmi di analisi dell’infermità di mente, A. Manna, Diritto
penale e neuroscienze: un’introduzione, in O. Di Giovine (a cura di), Diritto penale e neuroetica, Atti
del Convegno 21-22 maggio 2012, Università degli Studi di Foggia, Padova, 2013, p. 3 ss. Per un
primo inquadramento v., intanto, L. Sammicheli, G. Sartori, Neuroscienze giuridiche: i diversi livelli
di interazione tra diritto e neuroscienze, in A. Bianchi, G. Gulotta, G. Sartori (a cura di), Manuale
di neuroscienze forensi, Milano, 2009, p. 15 ss.
2
Cfr. S. Montaldo (a cura di), Cesare Lombroso. Gli scienziati e la nuova Italia, Bologna, 2010.
360 Neuroscienze, genetica e diritto penale
Nei tempi recenti, negli Stati Uniti3, ma anche in Italia (sentenze Corte Assise Appello
Trieste4 e Giudice per l’udienza preliminare presso il Tribunale di Como5), vengono, nell’a-
bito di un dibattito per così dire globale6, con frequenza crescente richieste risonanze ma-
gnetiche funzionali o tomografie a emissione di positroni al fine di valutare le funzionalità
di specifiche aree cerebrali degli imputati; lo scopo è quello di evidenziare lesioni o difetti
neurologici tali da annullare il controllo volontario7: è come se si volesse sostenere «non l’ho
fatto io ma il mio cervello»8. L’incapacità di distinguere il bene e dal male e di controllare i
propri atti sono le circostanze, con ovvii riflessi sul giudizio di responsabilità e sulla pena, che
possono essere configurate dalle patologie che compromettono gravemente la funzionalità del
sistema nervoso centrale9.
E proprio in relazione alle problematiche, oggi al centro dell’attenzione speculativa e
pratica, dell’impatto della genetica e delle neuroscienze10 sul diritto penale suona attualissi-
mo, oltre che di primaria importanza, il pensiero del Maestro Giuseppe Bettiol. In estrema
sintesi11, infatti, può ricordarsi come il tipo d’uomo per così dire presupposto da Bettiol è
rappresentato da un essere responsabile delle proprie azioni, capace di muovere il corso delle
cose e arbitro del proprio destino; la capacità di intendere e di volere è la capacità dell’uomo
di percepire, individuare e comprendere le conseguenze del proprio agire nel significato etico-
sociale che esse presentano nella situazione storica sulla quale vanno ad incidere; in essa sono
implicate la consapevolezza del fine, la ragionevolezza del motivo, la congruità dell’azione. Il
tutto calato nella vita concreta perché il diritto penale è fatto «per l’uomo in genere che ha
una sua concreta vita di gioia e di dolore nel quadro dei concreti valori della vita». Nella pro-
spettiva prescrittiva assunta da Bettiol, egli pone anzitutto il valore dell’uomo dotato di libero
3
Su cui A. Santosuosso, B. Bottalico, Neuroscienze e diritto: una prima mappa, in A. Santosuosso
(a cura di), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, Pavia, 2009, p. 33 ss.; M. Freeman. O.R. Goodenough (eds.),
Law, Mind and brain, Ashgate, 2009, p. 5 ss.
4
Sentenza del 1 ottobre 2009.
5
Sentenza del 20 maggio 2011. V. F. Casasole, Neuroscienze, genetica comportamentale e processo
penale, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2012, p. 110 ss.
6
Nella letteratura tedesca, per tutti, S. Schleim, T.M. Spranger, H. Walter (hrsg.), Von der
Neuroethik zum Neurorecht?, Göttingen, 2009.
7
Rimarca che il rapido sviluppo della neurobiologia abbia «indotto alcune giuristi a trarre indebite e
affrettate conclusioni sull’eclisse della libertà del volere, della colpevolezza e della responsabilità», M.
Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, in “Iustitia”, 2011, p. 439.
8
Che sarebbe dunque il «vero colpevole»: v. J. Greene, J. Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes
nothing and everything, in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London - Series B: Biological
Sciences, 2001, p. 1775 ss.
9
Evidenzia come si riproponga la questione dell’eziologia del comportamento criminale S. Larizza, Sui
limiti posti dal sistema penale alla recezione degli esiti conoscitivi della “neuroimaging”, in M.G. Ruberto,
C. Barbieri (a cura di), Il futuro tra noi. Aspetti etici, giuridici e medico-legali della neuroetica, Milano,
2011, p. 35.
10
Per un quadro d’insieme v. P. Pietrini, G. Rota, Il comportamento umano tra geni e cervello: alcune
considerazioni sullo stato attuale delle conoscenze neuroscientifiche, in O. Di Giovine (a cura di), Diritto
penale e neuroetica, cit., p. 11 ss.; L. Eusebi (a cura di), Dinamiche della volizione e libertà, Milano,
2008. Un ampio affresco in A. Lavazza, L. Sammicheli, Il delitto del cervello. La mente tra scienza e
diritto, Torino, 2012.
11
Sono debitore per questi spunti al volume del professore S. Riondato, Un diritto penale detto
«ragionevole». Raccontando Giuseppe Bettiol, Padova, 2005, passim.
R. Borsari 361
arbitrio – «l’uomo è salvato solo quando venga considerato come un valore, come fine, come
essere di ragione»; la sua finalità principale risiede nella salvaguardia della libertà morale, giu-
ridica e politica dell’uomo; dice Bettiol, «l’uomo, pur non essendo né angelo né frammento
di natura, ha sempre saputo distinguere ciò che è male da ciò che è bene non sulla base di
un als ob (come se), perché allora la vita sarebbe una finzione, ma sulla base di un criterio
ontologico che ci avvicina all’essere e quindi alla verità … potere agire diversamente da come
si è agito non è un mistero perché anche la nostra coscienza è fonte di conoscenza e verità».
Coerentemente, la colpevolezza è per il Maestro un concetto di valore che presuppone
un giudizio di disapprovazione per ciò che si è compiuto, è una volontà che non ci doveva es-
sere, non è tanto volontarietà dell’illecito quanto volontà illecita, ossia volontà determinatasi
all’azione mentre avrebbe dovuto e potuto determinarsi diversamente. In quanto «giudizio
di riprovazione personale per la perpetrazione di un fatto lesivo di un interesse protetto», si
compone di capacità di intendere e volere, volontarietà del fatto nei limiti rispettivi di dolo
e colpa e possibilità di una normale motivazione della volontà (esigibilità). Il principio di
colpevolezza è quindi necessario per garantire al privato la certezza di libere scelte d’azione12.
Non basta.
Bettiol aderisce al Gesinnungstrafrecht, con ciò ritenendo – si scuserà una certa semplifi-
cazione e semplicismo – che ciò contribuisca e fondi una imputazione autenticamente perso-
nalistica. Gesinnung è mentalità, è consapevole orientamento interiore di un soggetto che si
determina con riferimento a taluni valori della comunità sociale, è consapevole disposizione
del soggetto agente di fronte a certi valori. Mentre intenzioni e motivi(psichici)13 implicano e
si esauriscono in un accertamento di fatto, la Gesinnung implica, su un analogo accertamen-
to, una valutazione etico-giuridica e permette di costruire la personalità morale del soggetto
agente. Il diritto penale dell’atteggiamento interiore si attaglia perciò all’eticità della persona
umana che si manifesta negli atteggiamenti di coscienza e nella scelta delle motivazioni dell’a-
zione. La personalizzazione-eticizzazione porta alla umanizzazione della responsabilità penale
(pur nella persistenza di un diritto penale caratterizzato dalla lesione di un bene giuridico)14.
Le concezioni di Giuseppe Bettiol, in particolare quanto a centralità del libero arbitrio
e del giudizio morale15, sollecitano dunque con peculiare profondità la riflessione, in con-
12
Cfr. G. Fiandaca, Considerazioni su colpevolezza e prevenzione, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1987, p.
865 ss.
13
V. P. Veneziani, Motivi e colpevolezza, Torino, 2000.
14
Merita ricordare quanto affermato dalla Corte Costituzionale nella sent. n. 322 del 2007 (in tema
di errore sull’età della persona offesa nei delitti sessuali): «Il principio di colpevolezza non può essere
sacrificato dal legislatore ordinario in nome di una più efficace tutela penale di altri valori, ancorché
essi pure di rango costituzionale … Il principio di colpevolezza è garanzia di libere scelte d’azione sulla
base di una valutazione anticipata (calcolabilità) delle conseguenze giuridico-penali della propria
condotta … ha un ruolo fondante rispetto alla funzione rieducativa della pena … Il legislatore ben può
nell’ambito delle diverse forme di colpevolezza graduare il coefficiente psicologico di partecipazione
dell’autore al fatto in rapporto alla natura della fattispecie e degli interessi che debbono essere preservati
… ma in nessun caso gli è consentito prescindere in toto dal predetto coefficiente: altrimenti, stabilire
quando ricorrano esigenze repressive atte a giustificare una rinuncia al requisito della colpevolezza –
in vista della tutela di altri interessi di rango costituzionale, come, di norma, quelli protetti in sede
penale – diverrebbe un apprezzamento rimesso alla mera discrezionalità legislativa, con conseguente
svuotamento delle funzioni garantistica e fondante del principio di colpevolezza».
15
V., ex multis, M. De Caro, A. Lavazza, G. Sartori, Siamo davvero liberi? Le neuroscienze e il mistero
siderazione del fatto che negli ultimi anni la ricerca genetica applicata allo studio del com-
portamento umano e le neuroscienze hanno apportato e vieppiù apportano un significativo
impulso alle conoscenze circa l’aumento del rischio di comportamenti antisociali da parte di
soggetti portatori di determinati geni o caratterizzati da particolari configurazioni cerebrali16.
Le tecniche di brain imaging consentono di conoscere le modalità di funzionamento del cer-
vello in azione, mentre pensa, prova emozioni etc.
Per certi versi parrebbe dunque illogico non avvalersi di queste nuove tecniche che hanno
ampliato «la scatola degli attrezzi»17 e hanno consentito di appurare, ad esempio, che la matu-
rità cerebrale non sarebbe raggiunta prima dei 21 anni; per altri, ci si chiede se effettivamente
gli apporti delle neuroscienze e il loro impatto sul diritto rivestano o meno carattere di ecce-
zionalità e, conseguentemente, predichino o meno concetti e soluzioni totalmente nuove18.
Sembra porsi almeno in parte in quest’ottica pure la Corte di Cassazione, laddove affer-
ma, con la pronuncia n. 867 del 2011, che la revisione del processo può basarsi su questioni
già prese in considerazione dal giudice, come l’imputabilità, delle quali tuttavia possa darsi
una valutazione fondata sull’impiego di nuove tecniche; sostiene in particolare la Corte che «la
novità della prova scientifica può essere correlata all’oggetto stesso dell’accertamento oppure
al metodo scoperto o sperimentato successivamente a quello applicato nel processo oramai
definito, di per sé idoneo a produrre nuovi elementi fattuali»; insomma, dopo la «revisione
europea», la «revisione scientifica», posto che, reputa la Corte, la precedente giurisprudenza,
che negava la revisione in caso di prove scientifiche già apprezzate, «si fonda(va) anzitutto
su una concezione positivistica della scienza intesa come insieme di conoscenze complete,
certe, uniche. Esso rifiuta l’idea che nella nozione di scienza sia insito il concetto di fallibilità,
di relatività, di evoluzione, rifugge il metodo della smentita e della falsificabilità, nonché la
ricerca e la valutazione di altre differenti ricostruzioni del fatto storico al fine di dimostrare
che le alternative non sono ragionevolmente configurabili, non accetta la prospettiva che
l’utilizzazione di un diverso metodo, pur se applicato agli stessi elementi, possa produrre esiti
del libero arbitrio, Torino, 2010; M. Gazzaniga, Chi comanda? Scienza, mente e libero arbitrio, Torino,
2012; R. Kane (ed.), Free Will, Oxford, 2009.
16
M. Bertolino, Il breve cammino del vizio di mente. Un ritorno al paradigma organicistico?, in A.
Santosuosso (a cura di), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, cit., p. 121 ss., la quale, in relazione alle esigenze
di umanizzazione e personalizzazione della responsabilità, evidenzia come «troppo spesso le premesse
sostanziali sono piegate a logiche probatorie che portano a privilegiare il fatto impersonalmente inteso …
ad arricchire il catalogo di questi schemi contribuiscono senza ombra di dubbio anche le neuroscienze,
le cui conquiste scientifiche non sono ignorate dal diritto … in particolare, quando le neuroscienze
vengono applicate al giudizio sull’imputabilità, anche le problematiche dell’autore rischiano di diventare
vittima di un processo di oggettivizzazione e di standardizzazione, che affascina nella sua componente
di garanzia della certezza dell’accertamento giudiziale … ma tutto ciò implica anche il rischio di una
“processualizzazione” delle categorie dommatiche sostanziali, nel senso della sostituzione degli elementi
costitutivi del reato con canoni probatori, da cui consegue una confusione fra oggetto dell’accertamento
e strumento dell’accertamento. In altri termini, per tornare all’elemento costitutivo della capacità di
intendere e di volere, esso finisce con l’essere forgiato e assorbito dalla relativa questione probatoria, per
la risoluzione della quale oggi si fa sempre più affidamento sulle neuroscienze».
17
I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce?, in O. Di Giovine (a cura di), Diritto penale e neuroetica,
cit., p. 28 che reputa «assurdo non tenere in considerazione le nuove tecniche neuroscientifiche».
18
In questo senso A. Santosuosso, Il dilemma del diritto di fronte alle neuroscienze, in Id. (a cura di),
Le neuroscienze e il diritto, Pavia, 2009, p. 11.
R. Borsari 363
affatto diversi … Ad esso si accompagna la preoccupazione di una inconciliabilità logica tra

le esigenze di certezza e di stabilità proprie dell’accertamento effettuato nel processo penale e
assicurate dal giudicato e le finalità gnoseologiche della scienza contraddistinta, per sua stessa
natura, dalla incompletezza e provvisorietà delle acquisizioni conoscitive raggiunte»19.
Si affollano numerosi interrogativi, uno dei più rilevanti dei quali concerne – come evi-
denziato in vari studi dal professore Ronco – la per così dire capacità esplicativa di detti
studi sul comportamento dello specifico soggetto agente su di uno specifico fatto criminoso; la
possibile influenza ricollegabile a un determinato gene va infatti esaminata alla luce di una
molteplicità di fattori, tra cui gli altri geni e fattori ambientali. Ciascun fattore di rischio
biologico dovrebbe dunque venire verificato nell’interazione con ciascuno specifico fattore
di rischio ambientale, secondo modelli sempre più complessi e interdisciplinari che vedano
integrarsi i dati genetici con quelli della psicofisiologia, della neuropsicologia, dell’imaging ce-
rebrale, della neurologia, del funzionamento ormonale, dei neurotrasmettitori e degli influssi
dell’ambiente. La complessa interazione tra dati biologici e ambientali predica la necessità di
una accurata personalizzazione del modello esplicativo, anche alla luce di possibili impieghi
in malam partem di dette prove e di correlati rischi di trasformazione del giudizio sul fatto in
un giudizio sulla persona e sulla sua predisposizione a commettere delitti del tipo di quello
oggetto di giudizio, aggravati dalla circostanza che talune anomalie potrebbero essere presenti
al momento dell’accertamento ma non esserlo state al momento del fatto – e ciò senza dire
dei dubbi di attendibilità di talune prove e del rischio violazioni della privacy e della dignità
umana. Non è un caso che taluni studiosi abbiano evidenziato la natura descrittiva e non
esplicativa del modello offerto dalle neuroscienze, il quale si limita a scoprire le correlazioni
tra funzioni cerebrali e comportamento e rischia di innescare ragionamenti circolari e al fine
tautologici: presenta anomalie cerebrali e ha commesso un crimine, diventa: presenta ano-
malie cerebrali tant’è vero che ha commesso un crimine; e infine: ha commesso un crimine a
causa delle anomalie cerebrali20.
La riscoperta e la grande attenzione riservata alla vicenda di Phineas Gage (Damasio, nel
famoso libro L’errore di Cartesio ricostruì al computer le aree del cervello danneggiate dalla
sbarra, riscontrando che erano state colpite alcune zone della corteccia prefrontale e che ciò
aveva determinato una sindrome frontale caratterizzata anche dal mancato controllo degli
impulsi primari) incarna la convinzione, supportata dalla precisione di tecniche sempre più
potenti e raffinate (ma anche dinamiche, manipolabili e sovente difficili da decifrare persino
per l’esperto)21, che comportamenti idiosincratici, asociali, violenti o autodistruttivi siano do-
vuti a modificazioni – traumatiche, patologiche, congenite o per effetto ambientale22 – della
struttura e/o del funzionamento cerebrale di uno specifico individuo rispetto alla media della
popolazione. In quest’ottica va sfumando la distinzione tra patologie organiche e disturbi
psicologici, essendo l’eziologia di ogni affezione psichico-comportamentale radicata su base
materiale cerebrale.
19
Su questi temi, anche in relazione alla notissima sentenza Daubert, v. S. Fuselli, Apparenze.
Accertamento giudiziale e prova scientifica, Milano, 2008.
20
I. Merzagora Betsos, Colpevoli si nasce?, cit., p. 31.
21
Per un quadro informato e critico v. M. Bertolino, Prove neuro-psicologiche di verità penale, in www.
penalecontemporaneo.it (21 ottobre 2014).
22
V. O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, in “Archivio penale”, 2011, p. 838 ss.
Va affermandosi il cosiddetto neurodiritto23, il quale implica quattro tesi: 1) il cerebrali-

smo, secondo cui il cervello o i geni costituiscono spesso il livello più importante o fondamen-
tale per comprendere la condotta che è oggetto del diritto, specie penale (permane tuttavia
il problema dei livelli di spiegazione); 2) il localizzazionismo, in base al quale i fenomeni di
violenza criminale sorgono causalmente da disfunzioni all’interno di specifiche aree cerebrali
– peraltro anche altre tipologie di condotta possono rinvenire la propria peculiarità nel fun-
zionamento di strutture del sistema nervoso (rilevano tuttavia i problemi della forte plasticità
neuronale e delle interconnessioni tra aree); 3) il revisionismo, secondo cui la presunzione di
libertà e gli altri istituti/concetti classici non possono oggi venire riguardati senza considerare
gli sviluppi della scienza (permane tuttavia il problema del carattere normativo degli ordi-
namenti); 4) l’alterizzazione, per cui, dato che una parte considerevole della violenza sorge
da disfunzioni cerebrali, gli autori di tali atti sono biologicamente differenti dalle persone
normali (si manifestano, all’evidenza, rischi di discriminazione).
Il quadro che si spiega sotto gli occhi dell’osservatore intreccia dunque neuroscienze,
scienze cognitive, genetica comportamentale, teoria evoluzionistica, filosofia del diritto, filo-
sofia morale, giurisprudenza e antropologia filosofica.
L’immagine di uomo che ne deriva pare di primo acchito piuttosto differente da come
siamo soliti pensarci24, principalmente in quanto ragioniamo e agiamo in modi a noi stessi
per lo più ignoti; e vien da chiedersi se siamo uguali tra noi al modo in cui ci diciamo uguali
di fronte alla legge.
Potrebbe darsi il caso che, pur certamente uguali in quanto membri della specie homo
sapiens sapiens, siamo irrimediabilmente diversi in dotazioni naturali, in particolare genetiche
e, a cascata, nella struttura e nel funzionamento del cervello25; l’idea che taluni tratti caratte-
riali siano scritti nei nostri geni e siano capaci di influenzare comportamenti sociali complessi,
apre potenzialmente la via a conseguenze giuridiche, in punto di uguaglianza, di tenore con-
trastante: dal rischio di discriminazioni all’idea che «i cattivi» siano semplicemente «malati».
Al di là delle specifiche questioni processuali26 e sostanziali che le acquisizioni scientifiche
in parola suscitano, preme qui evidenziarne il potenziale impatto sul fondamento del diritto,
in particolare penale, sul fondamento dell’imputazione, della pena e dell’idea di responsabi-
lità, in dialogo con la filosofia e le scienze umane; le scoperte genetiche e neuroscientifiche,
a partire dal notissimo esperimento di Benjamin Libet, metterebbero in discussione l’idea di
libera volontà, la quale risulterebbe essere una mera illusione (un’inutile illusione, secondo ta-
luni), generata dalle nostre strutture cognitive, con ogni riflesso sulla pena e le sue funzioni27.
Secondo una ricostruzione, al tempo 0 il motorino mi attraversa la strada; dopo 50-60
millisecondi il mio cervello «vede» la scena; dopo 100-150 millisecondi il mio piede, istruito
dal mio cervello, frena; dopo 500 millisecondi mi rendo conto dell’accaduto e dopo 650 posso
23
V. E. Picozza, L. Capraro, V. Cuzzocrea, D. Terracina, Neurodiritto. Una introduzione, Torino,
2011; S. Zeki, O.R. Goodenough (a cura di), Law & the Brain, London, 2006.
24
Cfr. D. Eagleman, Incognito. The secret Lives of the Brain, New York, 2011.
25
Cfr. P.S. Churchland, L’io come cervello, Milano, 2014.
26
V. M. Ronco, Sulla “prova” neuroscientifica, in “Archivio penale”, 2011, p. 855 ss.
27
Sulla relazione tra libertà del volere e funzione di «orientamento culturale» dei cittadini da parte della
norma penale, v., per tutti, E. Musco, Le misure di sicurezza detentive. Profili storici e costituzionali,
Milano, 1978.
R. Borsari 365
commentarlo; fra la percezione visiva dell’episodio e la sua presa di coscienza da parte mia
passa quasi mezzo secondo, nonostante nel frattempo io abbia frenato. Quel mezzo secondo
separa la mia presa di coscienza di un fatto dal fatto stesso, l’accadimento dalla sua percezione
cosciente, cioè il cervello (attività cerebrale senza specificazioni) dalla mente (attività cerebrale
cosciente).
Ricordiamo l’esperimento di Benjamin Libet, ovvero i relativi esiti28.
Si chiede a un volontario di premere di tanto in tanto un pulsante, a suo piacimento;
davanti a sé v’è un orologio che scandisce il tempo in centesimi di secondo. Una nutrita serie
di esperimenti ha dimostrato che passano in media 200 millisecondi tra quando il soggetto
decide di premere e quando effettivamente preme il pulsante. Nulla di strano. Ma, se si re-
gistra ogni volta il cosiddetto potenziale di prontezza che si genera nella corteccia motoria
supplementare nell’imminenza e in preparazione di ogni azione, si constata che questo prece-
de l’azione di 550 millisecondi e quindi la nostra decisione di premere il pulsante di ben 350
millisecondi. Il mio cervello sembra quindi sapere che io voglio premere il pulsante con un
anticipo di 350 millisecondi.
Holmes, famoso giurista americano della seconda metà dell’800 e membro della Corte
Suprema, scriveva: «Se mi capitasse di avere una discussione filosofica con un uomo destinato
a essere impiccato o giustiziato sulla sedia elettrica per un mio verdetto, dovrei dire: “Non
dubito che la tua condotta ti sia risultata ineluttabile, che tu non abbia potuto fare altrimenti,
ma, affinché quella condotta diventi evitabile per altri, proponiamo di sacrificarti per il bene
comune. Ti puoi considerare un soldato che muore per il proprio paese, se preferisci. Ma è
necessario che la legge mantenga le sue promesse».
Quali sono l’impatto e la portata dei progressi della scienza nella comprensione dell’es-
sere umano specie attraverso l’esame del suo cervello? Possiamo parlare del delitto non in
termini di mancato adattamento in chiave sociologica ma come malfunzionamento cerebrale
in chiave neuroscientifica?
Vorrebbe, secondo una certa corrente di pensiero, farsi strada l’idea di una sorta di «pre-
giudizio» a favore di una prospettiva scientifica che colloca il diritto in una posizione an-
cillare; come scrive Jasanoff, il neurodiritto si propone come una svolta culturale verso la
«convinzione che la scienza possa portare a esiti giuridici a prova di errore, quindi giusti,
dove il diritto, di per sé, può fallire». Nell’immaginario sociotecnologico il diritto viene epi-
stemologicamente subordinato alla scienza, le neuroscienze devono e possono potenziare le
istituzioni legali ed entrare nei processi in quanto la scienza stessa è concettualizzata come
dotata di intrinseca normatività; l’idea di base è che sia mutata l’antropologia delle scienze
umane sotto la pressione del naturalismo scientifico.
Emerge, per certi versi contraddittoriamente29, una (pretesa) nuova immagine dell’uo-
28
B. Libet, Mind Time. Il fattore temporale nella coscienza, Milano, 2007. Di recente, ha affinato
l’esperimento J.-D. Haynes: v. J.-D. Haynes, Posso prevedere quello che farai, in M. De Caro, A.
Lavazza, G. Sartori, Siamo davvero liberi? Le neuroscienze e il mistero del libero arbitrio, cit., p. 5 ss.
Criticamente, M. Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, cit., p. 444 ss.
29
V. L. Eusebi, Neuroscienze e diritto penale: un ruolo diverso del riferimento alla libertà, in L. Palazzani,
R. Zannotti (a cura di), Il diritto nelle neuroscienze. Non «siamo» i nostri cervelli, Torino, 2013, p.
123: «Oggi, effettivamente, viene rivendicato come non mai, in molti settori, il ruolo dell’autonomia
individuale. Ma come non mai si dubita, nel contempo, che essa, almeno in qualche modo, davvero
mo, non più diviso tra anima e corpo, libero, razionale, bensì frutto dell’evoluzione, irrazio-
nale e dominato dalle passioni, molto meno libero di quel che per lo più si crede in ragione
dei condizionamenti genetico-cerebrali30.
Quel che le neuroscienze sollecitano e impongono è allora una riflessione sul libero arbi-
trio e sull’implicato concetto di responsabilità personale31. Il rimprovero (giuridico) fondato
sul «potere agire diversamente» – dunque «l’essenza» della colpevolezza in senso normativo
come acquisita nell’odierna riflessione penalistica – si fonda sulla libertà del volere; senza
libertà del volere la norma perderebbe la sua necessaria funzione di orientamento culturale
dei cittadini. Il libero arbitrio – ovverosia il fatto che l’imputato sia stato in grado di com-
prendere la natura e le conseguenze del proprio agire e di scegliere liberamente di compiere
un atto criminale pur potendo fare altrimenti – costituisce il fondamento si cui poggiano
l’imputabilità e la punibilità32.
Si spazia, come detto, da posizioni33 che sostengono essere il libero arbitrio un’illusione,
cui il diritto non può rimanere indifferente; ad altre che attribuiscono alle nuove posizioni
una valenza non individualistica bensì «collettiva», derivando esse appunto dalle interazioni
collettive di molti cervelli; ad altre ancora che invece sostengono essere il libero arbitrio una
realtà frutto, per così dire, di un processo complesso di interazione tra componenti genetiche
e ambiente che opera sia a livello filogenetico sia ontogenetico34.
Un aspetto rilevante, che predica adeguata valorizzazione anche, anzi soprattutto dagli
studiosi del diritto penale, risiede nel fatto che autorevoli studiosi – penso in primis allo
scienziato della mente J. Searle – accolgono l’idea del libero arbitrio sulla base di informazioni
che la neurobiologia propone sulla struttura e il funzionamento del cervello. Se così fosse, se
si propende per questa impostazione, le scoperte neuroscientifiche finiscono con il rafforzare
l’idea che la libertà non costituisca una utile finzione per giustificare l’imputazione, bensì la
sua base ontologica che fonda e giustifica razionalmente il giudizio di responsabilità. V’è al
contrario il rischio che gli esiti di queste prove possano venire utilizzati in senso contrario alla
libertà della persona e sorreggano una sorta di nuovo scientismo criminologico totalmente
deterministico.
Recenti studi empirici su libertà determinismo e responsabilità esprimerebbero quella
che forse è la posizione oggi da preferire, ovverosia quella «compatibilista»35, nel senso di
un’opzione a favore della libertà pur in un contesto definibile come deterministico; la mo-
derna teoria compatibilistica infatti rende conciliabile l’impostazione deterministica con il
riconoscimento di spazi di libertà, nel senso di una libertà del volere non tanto in termini di
esista».
30
Cfr. T. Metzinger, Il tunnel dell’io. Scienza della mente e mito del soggetto, Milano, 2010.
31
V., ampiamente, D. Terracina, Problematiche del diritto penale, in E. Picozza, L. Capraro, V.
Cuzzocrea, D. Terracina, Neurodiritto, cit., p. 187 ss. Per una panoramica della discussione e della
dottrina (anche) tedesca si veda il bel contributo di A. Nisco, Il confronto tra neuroscienze e diritto penale
sulla libertà di volere, in “Dir. pen. proc.”, 2012, p. 499 ss.
32
In argomento A. Nisco, La tutela penale dell’integrità psichica, Torino, 2012, passim.
33
Per approfondimenti si rinvia a M. Ronco, Gli sviluppi della neurobiologia e la libertà personale, cit.,
p. 441 ss.
34
Cfr. P.J. Richerson, R. Boyd, Non di solo geni. Come la cultura ha trasformato l’evoluzione umana,
Torino, 2006.
35
V. D. Dennet, L’evoluzione della libertà, Milano, 2004.
R. Borsari 367
assenza assoluta di condizionamenti quanto piuttosto in quelli di una capacità di agire gui-
data da condizionamenti, inevitabilmente presenti perché, altrimenti, dominerebbe il puro
caso, nei confronti dei quali tuttavia l’agente possiede capacità di valutazione. Un maggiore o
minore grado di condizionamento vale per tutte le nostre scelte e dunque pure per l’eventuale
scelta di delinquere, per la quale potrebbe applicarsi la definizione di libertà morale condi-
zionata; nessuna libertà assoluta, dunque, in questa visione, bensì uno spazio di manovra
limitato dalla nostra storia, nostra in quanto in gran parte costruita da noi. L’uomo è libero
ma la sua libertà è condizionata dalla eredità biologica, dall’ambiente sociale, dalle situazioni
concrete in cui egli viene di volta in volta a trovarsi e che costituiscono il campo delle possi-
bilità tra cui può scegliere.
Nella discussione sul libero arbitrio la responsabilità è una sorta di convitato di pietra.
Chi si preoccupa dell’erosione della libertà da parte del determinismo36 spesso teme soprat-
tutto una per così dire perdita di senso delle pratiche di attribuzione della responsabilità.
La capacità di autodeterminazione, di agire cioè in base a motivi che il soggetto agente
considera prevalenti su altri che lo avrebbero portato a una scelta differente, incarna il conte-
nuto empirico dell’imputabilità penale; questa viene meno quando i condizionamenti sono
tali da impedire una scelta consapevole, razionale, ragionata.
Sul piano della responsabilità penale, e dell’imputabilità in particolare, siffatte conside-
razioni si traducono nell’idea che di quest’ultima non si può fare a meno in quanto espres-
sione di un sistema punitivo informato a ragionevolezza intesa come saggezza pratica, come
adeguatezza o coerenza assiologica. La responsabilità penale per essere ragionevole deve ri-
specchiare criteri che sono giuridici e non morali, ma essa ha un senso esclusivamente in un
ambito di compatibilità con criteri di attribuzione di una responsabilità anche morale37. La
responsabilità penale, tuttavia per essere ragionevole, deve confrontarsi anche con questioni
di razionalità in senso stretto interne al sistema penale, questioni di verità di competenza del
sapere scientifico, tra cui quelle che attingono le neuroscienze e la genetica quando si discorre
di imputabilità.
Orbene, sino ad ora l’idea di un principio di responsabilità penale come responsabilità
di un soggetto capace di autodeterminarsi non pare accantonata38: che i processi motiva-
zionali che guidano il comportamento umano siano processi neurali non significa che essi
siano riducibili a pure funzioni cerebrali da cui in maniera esclusiva dipenderebbe l’agire del
soggetto. Siffatto riduzionismo neuroscientifico39 mal si attaglia alla complessità dell’uomo e
della sua mente – il che peraltro non significa disconoscere la valenza delle neuroscienze come
«utile complemento alla valutazione peritale»: il dato neuroscientifico, nel senso di fattore di
rischio, di probabilità di malattia mentale e/o di pericolosità sociale, andrebbe assunto come
indizio, neuroscientificamente certo, dal quale il giudice può inferire logicamente, sulla base
36
V. M. Priarolo, Il determinismo. Storia di un’idea, Roma, 2011, specie p. 99 ss.
37
V. D. Pulitanò, Ragionevolezza e diritto penale, Napoli, 2012, p. 18 ss.
38
Cfr. A. Oliverio, Cervello, Torino, 2012, p. 150: «Come si vede, sono gli stessi neuroscienziati, o
almeno quelli più consapevoli, ad avanzare riserve nei confronti di un determinismo semplificante.
Le neuroscienze ci dicono infatti che siamo esseri umani perché abbiamo il cervello che abbiamo: un
cervello che ha i suoi pregi e difetti, regole e condizionamenti, ma anche i suoi gradi di libertà».
39
Di «neo-positivismo» penale parla A. Manna, Diritto penale e neuroscienze: un’introduzione, cit., p.
10.
di esperienze consolidate, la dimostrazione del fatto da provare, ovverosia la malattia mentale

e/o la maggiore probabilità di un comportamento criminale40.
Implicato è altresì il profilo che tocca la ricerca sulle basi neuronali del giudizio morale,
i meccanismi biologici preposti alla formazione della morale e all’assunzione di decisioni di
fronte ai dilemmi etici, che sempre più toccano il diritto penale (questioni di fine vita e altro).
Gli esperimenti del carrello ferroviario e dell’uomo grasso41 hanno dimostrato che l’azio-
ne aggressiva che coinvolge personalmente il soggetto attiva aree cerebrali diverse (emozioni e
cognizione sociale) da quelle attivate dalla decisione utilitaristica e razionale di intraprendere
un’azione lesiva impersonale e mediata (pensiero astratto e razionale). Se ne trae, in estrema
sintesi, che non sono solo fattori razionali a dare conto del giudizio morale ma che in esso
hanno un ruolo anche fattori emotivi, con ogni conseguenza; se ne trae ulteriormente che
razionale e consapevole non sono sinonimi. Scrive Hauser, psicologo e biologo evolutivo: «Il
flusso sanguigno ci permette di avere, sotto forma di istantanea del cervello, un’immagine di
ciò che accade quando rileviamo un conflitto morale. Il neuroimaging ci dice se l’individuo in
un dilemma percepisce un conflitto, le fonti di un conflitto, la natura della sua risoluzione;
ma, attenzione: questa non è un’affermazione prescrittiva. Quando si vuole scoprire che cosa
bisognerebbe fare, l’interpretazione del flusso sanguigno non è molto più utile di quella dei
tarocchi».
Un neuroscienziato può spiegarci in un modo il ricorso al crimine di un individuo e un
economista può spiegarcelo in un altro, senza che una delle due spiegazioni sia vera o falsa; e il
fatto che ci possa essere anche un’altra spiegazione, che di uno stesso fenomeno possano essere
dati plurimi «perché» non nega la libertà, al massimo nega quella libertà assoluta e priva di
concretezza che nessuno può seriamente sostenere. Spiegare la coscienza, o quella parte della
coscienza che è la libera scelta, attraverso neuroni e sinapsi potrebbe essere una possibilità,
ma non l’unica possibilità, così come potrebbe essere una parte della spiegazione e non tutta
la spiegazione. Anzi, nei dilemmi morali, la spiegazione evoluzionistica parrebbe porsi a un
più profondo e antecedente livello: la neurologia, infatti, ci illustra cosa succede nel cervello
quando prendiamo l’una o l’altra decisione, e quindi ci dice il come di un fenomeno; la teoria
evoluzionista cerca di spiegarci il perché ciò avvenga. Però anche dietro a queste affermazioni
si cela un tranello: spiegare le origini di un fenomeno è la stessa cosa che spiegarne le cause?
Il discorso porterebbe lontano, troppo lontano per questa sede, in cerca, forse, di recupe-
rare il senso di un sapere unitario42.
Vien da chiedersi, volendo provocatoriamente, se, al fine, non fosse nel giusto Pascal,
quando affermava che «il supremo passo della ragione sta nel riconoscere che c’è un’infinità
di cose che la sorpassano».
40
Cfr. L. De Cataldo Neuburger, Neuroscienze e diritto penale. La scienza come, quando e perché, in
A. Santosuosso (a cura di), Le neuroscienze e il diritto, cit., p. 141 ss.
41
Su cui, nell’ambito di un più ampio, profondo e innovatore studio, v. O. Di Giovine, Un diritto
penale empatico? Diritto penale, bioetica e neuroetica, Torino, 2009, p. 99 ss.
42
O. Di Giovine, Chi ha paura delle neuroscienze?, cit., p. 853.
Genetics: overview of United States criminal law1
Deborah W. Denno
Table of contents: Introduction. − I. How does the gene-environment interaction work?

− A. Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. − B. Mitigation stories. − 1. The Stephen
Mobley story. − 2. The Susan Smith story. − C. “Exotic” mitigation stories. − II. Behavioral
genetics evidence cases: 2007-2011. − A. When and how evidence is introduced. − B. The
types of evidence introduced. − C. Why evidence is introduced. − III. The state of behavioral
genetics evidence now. − A. Are Courts still skeptical? − 1. The first study: 1994-2007. − 2.
The second study: 2007-2011. − B. Is behavioral genetics evidence effective? − C. Are there
new trends or arguments? − D. The potential impact of Cullen v. Pinholster. − 1. History and
evidence. − 2. Behavioral genetics cases. – Conclusion.
Introduction
In 2011, Jared Lee Loughner unleashed tragedy on a nation with a shooting
rampage in Tucson, Arizona. In a matter of minutes, Loughner killed six people,
including a federal judge, and injured thirteen others, including a congresswoman.
Following this scene of devastation, legal attention turned to who would represent
Loughner and what Loughner’s defense would be. Evidence showed that the troubled
Loughner had long planned his highly public acts, and he disclosed no remorse.
Social outrage was huge, Loughner’s legal options limited. Yet, predictions for a
defense surfaced: Loughner’s attorneys would likely scrutinize Loughner’s life and
1
This chapter was part of a talk I presented at the University of Padova’s conference on “Genetics,
Robotics, Law, Punishment” held in Padova, Italy on 30 September − 1 October 2013. I thank Silvio
Riondato and Debora Provolo for sponsoring the conference as well as all of the conference participants,
especially Lorenzo Pasculli, for their insightful comments. This chapter derives in large part from this
Author’s article originally published in 2011 Michigan State Law Review 967, which also contains all
the references and citations upon which this chapter relies in addition to this chapter’s Appendix. I am
indebted to three sources for research funding: Fordham Law School, the Fordham University Faculty
Research Grant, and the Arthur and Charlotte Zitrin Foundation.
370 Genetics: overview of United States criminal law
lineage across generations in an effort to garner him an insanity defense or avoid

the death penalty. Indeed, a few months later, Loughner’s lawyers filed subpoenas
for the public health records of twenty-two of Loughner’s relatives on his mother’s
side, making requests as far back as 1893, the year Loughner’s maternal great-
grandmother was born. Presumably, if Loughner’s relatives revealed serious mental
and behavioral disorders over the course of a century, such a legacy, along with a
distressed environment, could help explain Loughner’s violent propensities and the
need to mitigate his punishment.
Defense efforts to examine behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases are not
new, of course. They can be effective but prone to sensationalism. News articles, for
example, have greatly embellished the defense tactics in the trial and sentencing of
murderer Bradley Waldroup, given Waldroup’s specific genetic make-up or “warrior
gene,” as the media (but no scientist) has dubbed it. In 2006, Waldroup brutally killed
his wife’s friend and attempted to kill his wife during what the State characterized
as Waldroup’s intentional and premeditated actions spurred by a domestic dispute.
In the end, Waldroup shot his wife’s friend eight times and slit open her head, then
moved on to attack his wife repeatedly with a machete. Waldroup’s defense counsel
requested that forensic psychiatrist William Bernet assess Waldroup, only for Bernet
to discover that Waldroup possessed a particular variant of a very rare deficiency of
monoamine oxidase A (MAOA). According to Bernet, this deficiency, when added
to Waldroup’s history of severe child abuse, “‘created a vulnerability that [Waldroup]
would be a violent adult.”’ Evidence of this gene-environment combination in
Waldroup’s background also proved pivotal to jurors declining to sentence Waldroup
to death. As one juror characterized some of the jury’s deliberations, “‘There was
more to [Waldroup’s] whole life that led to that moment [of killing].”’ When asked if
her assessment took into account Waldroup’s genetics, she responded, “‘Oh I’m sure
. . . And his background − nature vs. nurture.”’
Press accounts of the Waldroup case, however, provided the public with little
more than a dramatized narrative of Waldroup’s mitigating evidence. Writing about
Waldroup, articles ran with a range of unfortunate headlines: “Can Your Genes
Make You Murder?” or “Pity the Poor Murderer, His Genes Made Him Do It.”
These depictions propelled the view that behavioral genetics evidence can get a
defendant “off the hook” entirely for a crime; yet, the reality is that such evidence is
mostly offered to mitigate punishment once a defendant’s guilt has been established.
The distinction is important. There are vast differences in the way evidence is used
between these two phases of a case. The press also fostered a level of cause-and-
effect between genetics and behavior that Waldroup’s attorneys simply never argued,
twisting the media’s glint nearly exclusively on Waldroup’s genetics.
Not surprisingly, scientific advances and rising acceptance of genetics research
have fueled a focus on the use of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal trials and
D. W. Denno 371
death penalty cases. At the same time, accurate accounts are lacking and questions
remain on how United States courts view such evidence and how attorneys select and
apply it in litigation. This chapter addresses those questions.
The following pages provide a unique study of all criminal cases (totaling thirty-
three) that addressed behavioral genetics evidence from June 1, 2007, to July 1,
2011. The Study builds upon this Author’s prior research on all criminal cases
(totaling forty-eight) that used such evidence during the preceding thirteen years
(1994-2007). This combined collection of eighty-one criminal cases employing
behavioral genetics evidence offers a rich context for determining how the criminal
justice system has handled genetics factors over nearly two decades, but also explains
why the last four years reveal particularly important trends.
In general, behavioral genetics researchers study both genetic and environmental
sources of variation in human behavioral traits (for example, mental illness and
risk taking) in an effort to measure the inheritance of particular characteristics.
Therefore, the field of behavioral genetics is broadly interdisciplinary, incorporating
findings from genetics, biology, psychology, sociology, and statistics, as well as other
disciplines. While genes influence behavior, they do not govern nor determine it.
Rather, “genes play a vital role in the body’s development and physiology, and it
is through the body, acting in response to and upon surrounding environments,
that behavior manifests itself.” Behavioral genetics evidence includes, but is not
limited to, the study of the defendant’s family history as well as direct testing of
the defendant’s physiological makeup by way of brain scans, for example. Both
approaches are informative for explaining why a defendant engaged in criminally
violent behavior. As one expert explained in the context of the Loughner case, for
example, “Short of a brain scan that shows mental defect, a family history of mental
illness is the most persuasive evidence that someone had significant mental problems
at the time of the crime.”
For decades, the concept of ties between genetics and crime has been haunted
with controversy. As late as 1992, for example, the National Institutes of Health
gained worldwide press for defunding a conference on genetics and crime due to
claims that a genes-crime link stood for racism and eugenics. As one behavioral
scientist recently exclaimed, for the past three or four decades ‘“most criminologists
couldn’t say the word “genetics” without spitting.’” Yet presently, at least one hundred
studies indicate a tie between genetics and criminality, and criminologists are slowly
being encouraged to examine the association further in light of other research on
behavioral problems (such as alcoholism and mental illness) that demonstrate some
kind of genetic foundation.
Most of these researchers are also quick to clarify their view on how genes
and criminality intertwine. They debunk, for example, a wrong−but common
− stereotype that an individual’s “genotype” or “genetic constitution” is static, as
though there is a “crime gene” that “hardwires” certain people to violate the law.
This perspective, however entrenched in the public’s mind, has no scientific support.
Rather, an overwhelming amount of evidence shows that genes are controlled by the
environment and can either enhance or heighten the likelihood of a certain behavior,
such as criminality, based on the surrounding circumstances. Thus, an individual’s
genetic structure may act developmentally in the context of social variables by
potentially predisposing an individual to behavioral tendencies, such as aggression,
which may or may not result in law-breaking. For example, many people may share
a genetic proclivity for aggression, but some may never act out their impulses in any
physical way while others may become violent career criminals. This tight association
between genetics and environment explains why Loughner’s attorneys would also
look carefully at his immediate family, home, school, and peer relationships in
addition to any genetic factors (such as mental illness) in order to better assess why
he engaged in such violence.
Part I of this chapter introduces the use of behavioral genetics evidence in
criminal cases by comparing two earlier cases involving two substantially different
defendants − Stephen Mobley (whose evidence was rejected) and Susan Smith
(whose evidence was accepted). For example, much of the controversy surrounding
Mobley’s case stemmed from the assumption that attorneys would abuse behavioral
genetics evidence to support their positions and that courts would countenance the
distortions. This chapter concludes that such predictions are, with rare exceptions,
unfounded.
Part II discusses the thirty-three behavioral genetics and crime cases that this
Author studied between June 1, 2007, and July 1, 2011. These cases share two
important characteristics. First, they all constitute murder convictions in which
(with one exception) defendants attempted to use behavioral genetics evidence as a
mitigating factor in a death penalty case (as Stephen Mobley and Susan Smith did).
Second, the behavioral genetics evidence is introduced mostly to verify a condition
(such as a type of mental illness) that is commonly acceptable for mitigation. Thus,
the question now is not whether courts will accept behavioral genetics factors (they
overwhelmingly do), but rather what role those factors will play in particular cases
in the context of mitigation evidence. According to this Author’s Study, for example,
there was no case in which behavioral genetics factors were introduced by the State,
much less used as aggravating evidence or indications that a defendant would be
a future danger to others. Compared to prior cases, attorneys are more likely to
submit such evidence to demonstrate a defendant’s inheritance of substance or
alcohol abuse. These results challenge arguments that such evidence will be legally
detrimental to a defendant. Indeed, this Study’s results indicate that, at the very least,
behavioral genetics evidence has no decipherable impact on a defendant’s case or, at
most, it becomes an effective tool along with a range of other kinds of variables in
D. W. Denno 373
rendering a defendant ineligible for the death penalty. Courts also appear willing
to accept behavioral genetics evidence as part of a defendant’s mitigation story,
even if genetics renders that story a more troubling one in terms of the defendant’s
purported propensities.
Part III compares this Study of thirty-three cases to the Author’s prior study
of forty-eight cases in order to examine whether courts have changed their use of
behavioral genetics evidence in the last four years relative to the preceding thirteen
years. Overall, courts today appear far less skeptical about accepting behavioral genetics
evidence, and they do so in the majority of cases in which defense attorneys attempt
to offer it. In contrast to past years when courts often questioned the applicability or
relevance of such information, recent findings indicate that their focus has turned to
whether the evidence, when used with other factors in mitigation, can outweigh the
aggravating factors that support a death sentence.
It remains to be seen whether or how such trends will be affected by Cullen
v. Pinholster (2011), the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision restricting
prisoners’ efforts to seek federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Two of the cases in this chapter’s Study have
already been impacted by Pinholster. Regardless, behavioral genetics evidence seems,
on the surface, to have reached a status commensurate with other kinds of evidence
without the baggage of abuse with which it has typically been associated.
This chapter has a number of caveats, of course, particularly given the subject
matter. Because nearly all of the eighty-one cases in this Author’s studies involve
death sentences, comparisons across time can be a challenge. Litigation and appeals
can go on for many years, and outcomes may be continually shifting, hence the
potential effect of Pinholster. Any assessment of trends, therefore, must be taken in
context because it may reflect in part outcomes in cases originating in different years
or even decades. Nonetheless, clear changes within this chapter’s sample are evident,
and the focus is on those that are real rather than potentially random.
This chapter acknowledges another concern. Cases involving behavioral genetics
evidence incorporate many other variables about the defendant − biological,
sociological, and environmental − in addition to the nature of the crime and the
defendant’s criminal history. The jury’s weighing of these aggravating and mitigating
factors in a death penalty case is an intricate process. Therefore, this Study’s results do
not purport to suggest that the inclusion of behavioral genetics evidence was the sole
cause of any particular case outcome; this kind of causal mechanism is as impossible
to isolate or measure for behavioral genetics evidence as it would be for any other
kind of variable. That said, this Study’s case comparisons can help steer conclusions
in one direction or another about whether behavioral genetics evidence can make a
contribution, irrespective of other potential influences.
Overall, most courts seem to focus on screened and scientifically acceptable
studies or information on behavioral genetics. Their primary emphasis also concerns

how a defendant’s genetic makeup and environment might bear on that defendant’s
punishment. Within the next decade or so, as this interactive gene-environment
research becomes even more scientifically sound, courts will find it ever more useful.
After all, as the following pages demonstrate, a gene is not just a gene. It is only one
part of a defendant’s story.
I. How does the gene-environment interaction work?

Behavioral geneticists generally classify the link between genetics and the
environment in three primary ways. “Passive gene-environment correlation” occurs when
parents, the source of their children’s genes, are also one key source for the content of
their children’s environment. For example, parents of superior intellect may transmit
to their children not only strong cognitive capabilities, but also mentally stimulating
surroundings. “Evocative gene-environment correlation” exists when individuals with
different genotypes evoke different responses from people and therefore change their
environment. Thus, a cooperative child may elicit substantially different reactions
from parents and teachers than an aggressive child in part because of the differences
in how the two children behave. “[A]ctive gene-environment correlation” arises when
individuals seek experiences consistent with their genetically transmitted abilities
and behaviors so that they can create a complementary environment. Thrill-seekers,
for example, may select jobs or hobbies that reinforce their inherited proclivities,
such as parachuting, mountain climbing, etc.
Substantial research also shows that as individuals develop from childhood to
adulthood, genetic influences on their behavior strengthen while shared environmental
factors wane. This pronounced impact of genetic makeup is unsurprising given
that individuals acquire greater control over their choices and surroundings as they
become more independent from their parents and families. In essence, then, aging is
accompanied by increases in active gene-environmental correlational processes and
decreases in passive gene-environmental correlational processes.
In criminal cases, evidence concerning behavioral genetics covers all three types of
gene-environment classifications. It includes, for example, the study of a defendant’s
physiological makeup as well as family history for potential associations with a
range of disorders including violence, mental illness, depression, mental retardation,
alcoholism, and substance abuse. The presence of such disorders in a defendant’s
family can indicate that they were genetically transmitted to the defendant.
D. W. Denno 375
A. Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors

In a capital case, behavioral genetics evidence can be used in one of two ways:
first, during the guilt-or-innocence phase in which the State must prove a defendant
committed an alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt; and/or second, during the
penalty phase when the jury has found the defendant guilty of the capital crime
and then hears evidence of aggravation from the State and mitigation from the
defense when determining whether a defendant should be sentenced to death. There
is a critical distinction between the ways evidence is used in these two phases. The
guilt-or-innocence phase involves a factual determination of whether a defendant
committed the crime. In contrast, the penalty phase concerns “the moral and
normative choice” of whether a defendant “deserve[s] to die”. In order to ensure
consistency in comparing cases, this chapter focuses on the use of behavioral genetics
evidence during the penalty phase irrespective of whether some cases also raised such
evidence during the guilt-or-innocence phase. The penalty phase of a capital case is
typically far better documented than the guilt-or-innocence phase, which may have
occurred years before and may not have been fully explicated either in a court case or
some other accessible format.
It is within this death penalty context that most of the cases analyzed in the
Author’s Study also raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In order to assess the
validity of these kinds of challenges, the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington
(1984) established a two-pronged test: first, counsel’s performance must actually
be “deficient,” and second, this deficient performance must have “prejudiced” the
defendant. Of course this Strickland test and its interpretations are far more intricate
than what is presented here for the purpose of establishing basic guidelines.
In addition to rules attempting to ensure the quality of a defendant’s representation,
the great majority of death penalty states require that a fact-finder consider and
weigh both aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case. This balancing
is important. In most jurisdictions, aggravating circumstances must outweigh
mitigating circumstances for a defendant to be sentenced to death. However, the
Supreme Court has also upheld a Kansas death penalty statute that allowed jurors
to impose the death penalty when aggravating circumstances were not required to
outweigh mitigating circumstances, including when aggravating and mitigating
circumstances were equally distributed. Regardless, if a defendant challenges a death
sentence, a reviewing court must reweigh the aggravating evidence against the totality
of available mitigating evidence.
Under Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim has merit only
if “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial [including the sentencing phase] cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” To succeed on such a claim, the defendant must show that
his trial counsel’s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances and resulted in
prejudice against him. The sentence will be disturbed only if a reviewing court finds
a “reasonable probability” that, absent counsel’s errors, the verdict or sentence would
have been different. A court must therefore determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that if trial counsel had presented the omitted mitigating evidence, the
fact-finder would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant the death penalty.
Mitigating evidence usually includes information about a capital defendant’s
background and life prior to his crime. In contrast, the prosecution’s presentation
of aggravating evidence includes those circumstances surrounding a crime and a
defendant’s prior criminal record. Death penalty jurisdictions vary with respect to
the types of aggravating and mitigating circumstances they enable a fact-finder to
consider. Common statutory aggravating factors include the following: commission
of an offense in an “[e]specially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,” “[u]se, threatened
use or possession of a deadly weapon,” or commission of an offense expecting to
receive something of “pecuniary value.” Statutory mitigating factors can include the
“age of the defendant” or the “defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of the defendant’s conduct.” According to the Supreme Court, defendants can also
present mitigating evidence relevant to “any aspect of [the] defendant’s character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.” This is a highly open-ended standard that
allows a defendant to introduce a full range of factors. Guidelines for how to weigh
or balance these factors are similarly flexible. In an effort to structure what could be a
substantial amount of information − including many different types of scientific tests
and theories − attorneys often attempt to combine it all into a compelling “story.”
B. Mitigation stories
A defendant’s “mitigation story” can be critical to determining whether a
defendant will be executed. Mitigating factors are far-reaching and subjective; they
can prompt jurors to feel empathy and connection with a defendant who jurors have
just convicted of committing horrendous acts. The evidence can also profile and
detail a defendant’s damaged and disabled brain so that jurors can comprehend how
distorted a defendant’s thought processes may have been throughout that defendant’s
life, including the seconds immediately preceding the defendant’s crime. Statutory
and non-statutory mitigating factors can likewise pertain to circumstances at the
scene of the crime, for example, if “the defendant was under unusual or substantial
duress.” The purpose of expert testimony, if it is offered, can further assist jurors in
experiencing the defendant’s particular worldview. In essence, mitigation − as well
D. W. Denno 377
as the Court’s “any aspect of the defendant’s character or record” standard − can
present the defendant’s biography in a way that can attempt to tip the scale toward
life rather than death. Such guidelines are also remarkably flexible. The trial judge in
Jeffrey Landrigan’s sentencing hearing, for example, concluded that one of the two
non-statutory mitigating circumstances operating on Landrigan’s behalf was “that
Landrigan’s family loved him,” evidence that would be irrelevant for Landrigan as a
defense against a murder conviction.
Such elasticity enables defendants to submit as mitigation behavioral genetics
evidence that goes back generations. Regardless, over the years, some courts have
viewed behavioral genetics factors skeptically, even when deciding capital cases.
One example of this attitude is the 1994 appeal of Stephen Mobley, a watershed
moment in the modern use of behavioral genetics evidence and a comparison case
for this chapter’s Study. Indeed, Mobley marks the start of this Author’s seventeen-
year analysis of the application of such evidence in criminal cases; the case’s facts and
defense strategy seemed to strike a modern nerve, both socially and legally. Mobley’s
mitigation story is also complex.
1. The Stephen Mobley story

Mobley’s 1991 crime − the attempted robbery of a Domino’s Pizza store that ended
with the needless murder of the store’s manager − prompted particular challenges for
his court-appointed attorneys. Mobley’s “numerous” confessions and the dearth of
“‘traditional mitigation evidence”’ did not make for a sympathetic story. As a white
adult of twenty-five years, Mobley was economically privileged, had no history of
physical or sexual abuse, and also demonstrated an early and continuous history
of severe personal and behavioral disorders that were pronounced even when he
was awaiting trial. Prospects for any defense appeared slight. Yet, in the course of
analyzing Mobley’s family, a relative testified that four generations of Mobleys −
including Mobley’s uncles, aunts, and a grandfather − engaged in acts of violence,
aggression, and behavioral disorder. Such behavior ranged from serious crimes
(murder and rape) to extreme spousal abuse, alcoholism, explosive temperaments,
and antisocial conduct.
In order to further probe this lead, Mobley’s attorneys made two moves.
First, they requested experts and financial support so that scientific tests could be
conducted to determine if Mobley showed any kind of genetic or neurochemical
imbalance. Second, they introduced into evidence a then-recent article published
in the prestigious journal Science, reporting the results of genetic testing of a Dutch
kindred of four generations. The kindred comprised a number of males affected by
a syndrome characterized by borderline mental retardation and serious behavioral
dysfunction such as impulsivity, verbal and physical aggression, and violence. The
acts of violence included rape, sexual abuse, attempted murder, and arson. Tests on
these males showed evidence of MAOA deficiency, which was passed from mother
to son and linked to regulating aggression.
Mobley’s attorneys wanted to investigate whether Mobley was also afflicted by
the MAOA deficiency or by a comparable kind of disability because it was likely
that Mobley had inherited a propensity for criminality. In their mind, the trial court
should have enabled Mobley to be so tested. Certainly such testing was allowed in the
Bradley Waldroup case that would arise over a decade later. Yet, the Georgia Supreme
Court rejected that reasoning and affirmed the trial court’s holding, relying on the
lack of a showing of any causal link between Mobley’s genetics and his violence. As
the court explained, the genetics theory involved in Mobley’s case “will not have
reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty in the near future and Mobley could
not show that such a stage will ever be reached.”
After further legal wrangling over such “an unorthodox mitigating defense that
attempted to show a possible genetic basis for Mobley’s conduct,” the Georgia Supreme
Court again denied genetic testing for Mobley, but for a somewhat different reason
than it had expressed three years earlier. In the court’s view, Mobley had in fact been
“able to present the genetics theory” through a relative’s testimony about the family’s
generations of behavioral problems. Further, even if the court had allowed genetic
testing, “there ha[d] been no showing that a geneticist would have offered additional
significant evidence.” Ultimately, however, family history evidence alone failed to
mitigate in Mobley’s case. In 2005, after additional appeals, he was executed.
Mobley’s request for genetic testing − in addition to other events at the time −
invited pervasive national and international debate on the political and scientific
acceptability of behavioral genetics evidence of criminality. The debate invoked earlier
controversies: the historical association of genetics evidence with the Holocaust, the
chilling of free will, the stigmatization of disordered populations, the absolution
from social responsibility, and the fear that juries would be unduly swayed by the
seemingly more objective and precise nature of genetic studies. These concerns
also played into the 1992 conference at the University of Maryland regarding the
potential racial bias of such evidence.
After Mobley, predictions were also made that attorneys would increasingly
attempt to introduce behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases during the guilt-
or-innocence phase or as mitigation during the penalty phase. While such predictions
are difficult to measure, this Author’s study of cases from 1994-2007 suggested that
the strategy grew in use, especially for the defense. Not only were behavioral genetics
studies becoming more sophisticated, but so were defense attorneys, especially in
their willingness to rely on interdisciplinary research. Likewise, the particularly
strong reaction against Mobley’s case seems, in retrospect, an outlier because other
cases at the time were also introducing behavioral genetics evidence. The highly
D. W. Denno 379
publicized case of Susan Smith, for example, appeared to use such evidence far more
successfully.
2. The Susan Smith story

Susan Smith’s 1995 trial in South Carolina took place one year after Mobley’s
controversial appeal. Smith was convicted of murdering her two young sons by
causing her car to roll into a lake with her sons strapped inside. She ultimately avoided
a death sentence seemingly in part because her defense team introduced mitigating
evidence that she had suffered from depression since childhood. According to Smith’s
defense, she was on the verge of committing suicide and taking her two children with
her when she changed her mind at the last minute and leaped from the car, all the
while watching while the car submerged. Testimony indicated that Smith’s state of
mind was so distressed at the time that she was not able to think about her drowning
children.
In an effort to support its case, the defense presented expert witness testimony of
Smith’s family history and upbringing. According to defense witness and psychiatrist
Seymour Halleck, M.D., there was a high incidence of depression and mental illness
in Susan Smith’s family. Her older brother Michael, her grandmother, and her aunt
had all attempted suicide; this pattern indicated that it was likely that Smith herself
was genetically predisposed to depression (such high levels of mental illness in the
family “increases [a person’s] chances threefold” for depression). Defense witness
and social worker Dr. Arlene Andrews created a “genogram,” shown in Figure 1,
which illustrated the family’s history of behavioral disorder across three generations.
The genogram contained details of each relative who had experienced one or more
of a number of serious conditions: depression, a suicide attempt or suicide success
(Smith’s father), alcohol abuse, mental retardation, or other disability. In addition to
the genetics evidence, testimony revealed that Smith’s early childhood upbringing
was characterized by family tension and instability due to her parents’ separation,
followed by her father’s suicide when Smith was six years old. Dr. Andrews testified
that these events led to the development of Smith’s dependent depressive disorder,
in which she constantly needed love and attention from those around her and was
frequently distraught over losing this emotional support.
Drawing on this history, the defense brought up Smith’s first suicide attempt at
age thirteen to demonstrate how Smith’s upbringing had affected her mental health.
During her later teenage years, Smith’s stepfather sexually abused her. Dr. Andrews
testified that this trauma further exacerbated Smith’s depression, as she was afraid to
lose her stepfather, but at the same time felt that she was violating her own moral
code. Smith’s second suicide attempt came at the age of eighteen, Dr. Andrews
testified, most likely because Smith was afraid of losing the relationships with her
forty year-old supervisor and thirty-year-old co-worker, both of whom she had been
involved with sexually.
Smith’s marriage to David Smith, the father of their two children, was rocky
and characterized by repeated intervals of separation and reconciliation. During one
of these separation periods, Smith had intimate affairs with Tom Findlay as well
as Findlay’s father, Cary, who owned Conso Products, where Smith was employed.
David Smith found a letter Smith had written to Tom Findlay and pressed Smith into
giving him the details of the affair, including Smith’s relationship with Cary Findlay.
The prosecution argued that Smith killed her children because Tom Findlay did not
want to be burdened by someone who had a “readymade” family. The defense, on the
other hand, argued that Smith was driven to commit suicide because her husband’s
threat to disclose her affairs would have left her jobless, disgraced, and alone.
These kinds of fears, in the past, had aggravated Smith’s depressive disorder and
had prompted her suicidal attempts. The situation was no different here. However, the
defense argued, at the last minute, that Smith, perhaps in a moment of unconscious
self-preservation, jumped out of the car without thinking and did not realize that she
had left her two children in the car to die. Since her depression prevented her from
possessing the necessary mental state for premeditated murder, the defense argued,
Smith should not be given a death sentence. Closing arguments reiterated this
theme of lifelong disorder. The strategy also explained why the defense “presented
the evidence about Susan Smith’s entire life, going all the way back generations to
show her bloodline and her genetic inheritance and her susceptibility to pressure,
and coming all the way forward.”
Media interviews with some of the members of Smith’s jury indicated that such
biographical evidence appeared to be persuasive in their decision to reject the death
penalty. Smith received a life term with the opportunity to be paroled in 2024.
According to some jurors, particular aspects of Smith’s life circumstances appeared
to explain the reasons for her behavior − the suicide of her biological father followed
by molestation and sexual abuse by her stepfather, as well as Smith’s own suicide
attempts at ages thirteen and eighteen and her troubling sexual relationships while
she was an adult. In the eyes of one juror, for example, such family tragedies were
“not dealt with properly, and that led up to what [Smith] did” and “the irrational
decisions that she made.” In the eyes of another juror, the actions of Smith’s stepfather
were partly responsible, and he “‘should be locked up with her.”’ Yet another juror
expressed concern over Smith’s mental illness and the hope that Smith would get the
appropriate help for it in prison.
At the same time, Smith’s jury still found her guilty of murder because they were
convinced that she had understood the difference between right and wrong; she
had also made a conscious decision to drown her sons, and she could have decided
otherwise. Compared to the Stephen Mobley case, however, there was no evidence
D. W. Denno 381
in Smith’s case of a strong legal or public outcry against the use of behavioral genetics
evidence. Nor do news stories about the Smith case appear to associate her with a
kind of behavioral genetics defense.
C. “Exotic” mitigation stories

There is no mystery about why Susan Smith avoided a death sentence. Reasons
include Smith’s lack of past violent conduct, her history of family abuse, her
depression and mental health challenges, her remorse, as well as her attorneys’ efforts
to offer uncontroversial genetics evidence. However, this chapter’s message is not
based on an attempt to substantively compare Smith’s case with that of Stephen
Mobley. Instead, what Smith’s case shows is the importance of behavioral genetics
evidence to telling a defendant’s story, whether or not that evidence successfully
outweighs the aggravating factors in that story or is even particularly compelling.
In Smith’s case the evidence appeared persuasive, perhaps in part because behavioral
genetics factors also reveal as much about environmental influences on a defendant
as they do about a defendant’s heritable traits.
Indeed, modern research continues to emphasize the importance of environmental
effects on behavior, thereby dashing the common myth that an individual’s genetic
structure is unchanging. During the past decade in particular, criminological
investigations have increasingly incorporated genetic, biological, and social measures
as vehicles for understanding crime. When these studies employ many different
kinds of variables, their results show that genetics and biology continually accentuate
the significance of social factors on behavior − so much so that the three interactive
categories (“genetic,” “biological,” and “social”) are often difficult to separate and
decipher. Recent federally-funded meetings on genetics and crime emphasize this
very interactive aspect, and the meetings have ceased to draw the negative publicity
that they have in the past.
Irrespective of how researchers are handling this evidence, different courts can
still have varying perspectives. The Mobley court, for example, viewed the theory of
a link between behavioral genetics and violence as “unorthodox.” In 2001, a Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals panel in Landrigan v. Stewart (2001) still considered such
evidence “exotic” and ineffectual as mitigation. As recently as 2007, in Schriro v.
Landrigan (2007), the United States Supreme Court validated the Ninth Circuit
panel’s assessment by directly quoting part of the panel’s conclusions.
At the same time, a fuller account of the Landrigan case shows twists and turns
in how the evidence was treated because the Ninth Circuit was, at one point, more
accepting of it. Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in
1993, one year before Stephen Mobley. After the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
Landrigan’s conviction and sentence and the district court rejected Landrigan’s
petition for habeas corpus relief, Landrigan appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Landrigan’s numerous post conviction appeals and petitions were based in
part on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his counsel did not
investigate and introduce a sufficient amount of acceptable mitigating evidence. The
three-judge appellate panel denied Landrigan’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
and affirmed the district court’s decision. Citing Mobley v. Head and Turpin v. Mobley,
the panel emphasized that the “rather exotic genetic violence theory” pinpointing the
impact of Landrigan’s “biological background” would not have affected the outcome
of Landrigan’s trial, even if the theory had been introduced. As the panel explained,
“although Landrigan’s new evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it
would also have shown the court that it could anticipate that he would continue to
be violent.” Given Landrigan’s reluctance to express remorse or provide the reasons
for his crimes, his behavioral genetics would not have been persuasive.
After further petitions, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that
Landrigan’s case be reheard en banc. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion indicated a considerable amount of openness and receptivity concerning
Landrigan’s efforts to introduce mitigating genetic and family history evidence.
Such receptivity was short-lived, however. In 2007, on grant of certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, forcefully supporting a number of the
concerns about Landrigan’s dangerousness that were articulated by the Ninth
Circuit’s initial decision. Addressing Landrigan’s alleged genetic predisposition to
violence, for example, the Court found it “difficult to improve upon the initial Court
of Appeals panel’s conclusion” that Landrigan “‘not only failed to show remorse
or offer mitigating evidence, but he flaunted his menacing behavior”’; therefore,
“‘assuring the court that genetics made him the way he is could not have been very
helpful.”’ Describing Landrigan’s mitigation evidence as “weak,” and noting that
“the postconviction court was well acquainted with Landrigan’s exceedingly violent
past and had seen first hand his belligerent behavior,” the Court concluded that
the district court did not abuse “its discretion in declining to grant Landrigan an
evidentiary hearing.”
Presumably, Landrigan, like Mobley, would have implications for other kinds
of behavioral genetics evidence cases, irrespective of the types of factors those other
cases may try to introduce. Both Landrigan and Mobley questioned the value,
relevance, and significance of such evidence in the context of a defendant’s appeal
for mitigation. At the same time, the Supreme Court has in no way dismissed the
potential applicability of behavioral genetics evidence in cases where the Court may
perceive the evidence as more acceptable and the defendant as more remorseful.
The Court did not provide a test or standard suggesting how it may weigh such
D. W. Denno 383
information in the future; yet it did accentuate particularly negative aspects of

Landrigan’s attitude and demeanor that other defendants may lack.
This Author’s Study of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal court cases is an
effort to determine how courts have treated such evidence following the Landrigan
Court’s conclusions. As Part II shows, there is no court that has been so dismissive of
the evidence, quite the contrary. Instead, courts seem to take the evidence in stride
with what a defendant has to offer, whether or not that perspective changes the
outcome of the defendant’s case.
II. Behavioral genetics evidence cases: 2007-2011

This Part analyzes thirty-three criminal cases that have referred to behavioral
genetics evidence over the past four years, that is, since June 1, 2007, when this
Author’s last study of behavioral genetics evidence ended, to July 1, 2011. These
thirty-three cases, which are listed in this chapter’s Appendix and examined in Charts
1-5, were compiled using legal research databases only. Other cases may exist in
which behavioral genetics evidence was at issue or could have been at issue; however,
such cases were not available in legal databases and likewise were not made known
publicly in a way that made them readily verifiable (for example, there were only
news articles written about them). This selection strategy promotes consistency across
cases and accountability across time periods, not only within this particular Study,
but also with the Author’s earlier study of forty-eight behavioral genetics evidence
cases (1994-2007).
Of course, there are vastly different types of behavioral genetics evidence, as this
chapter discusses. It is somewhat artificial to aggregate all the research under one
heading. This type of lumping can also potentially confuse debates about when
and where such evidence should be appropriately applied. The umbrella heading
of “behavioral genetics evidence” is used here, however, to make general points,
while recognizing that the conclusions could differ in their accuracy and relevancy
depending on the type and quality of evidence at issue (for example, MAOA
deficiency compared to a family history). The next Section examines the behavioral
genetics evidence uncovered in this Study by answering a series of questions about
when and how courts apply it.
A. When and how evidence is introduced

All but one of the thirty-three cases began as a capital case in which the defendant
was initially sentenced to death by a judge or jury, as Chart I shows. The single
exception is Morris v. Malfi (2011), which started as a life-in-prison case in which
the defendant challenged his sentence claiming he was tried and adjudicated while
incompetent. It is striking, then, that behavioral genetics evidence is of significance
nearly exclusively in death penalty cases, and it is applied in no case involving less
than a life sentence. Thus, discussions of the effects of such evidence in the guilt-or-
innocence phase of a trial, while conceptually important, are not directly applicable
to situations where genetics factors are instead used as mitigation evidence in the
penalty phase of a capital trial.
Attempts to exclude such evidence therefore affect most strongly a pocket of
individuals facing the possibility of execution. The implications can be powerful for
those defendants’ fates. In ten of this Study’s thirty-three cases, defendants originally
sentenced to death had their death sentence vacated on appeal. In seven of those
ten cases, a counsel’s failure to adequately investigate or present behavioral genetics
evidence (mostly along with other factors) was grounds for vacating a death sentence
and remanding for imposition of a sentence of life in prison. In yet another case, the
court granted an evidentiary hearing where the petitioner claimed that his counsel’s
failure to find witnesses and records on his background constituted ineffective
assistance. According to the petitioner, an adequate investigation would have revealed
a range of disorders: a genetic predisposition to alcoholism and mental illness; a
childhood filled with “physical abuse, neglect, abandonment, and poverty”; as well
as mental illnesses that were never treated, “including depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder (‘PTSD’), attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, and polysubstance
abuse.” Because alcoholism and violence were prevalent in the petitioner’s family,
the mitigating evidence that counsel ignored “would have shown that petitioner was
born ‘into a family marked by extreme pathology and dysfunction over multiple
generations.”’
This Author’s prior analysis of forty-eight behavioral genetics evidence cases (from
1994-2007) showed that attorneys employed three basic rationales for presenting this
evidence: (1) to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) to provide
proof and diagnosis of a defendant’s mitigating condition; and (3) to indicate some
likelihood of the defendant’s future dangerousness. As Chart 2 shows, however, in
this chapter’s examination of thirty-three cases during the last four years, attorneys
used only the first two of these three rationales (thereby eliminating the rationale of
future dangerousness). The great majority of cases (twenty-six cases or seventy-nine
percent) involved petitions and appeals by defendants based on claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to present behavioral genetics evidence
adequately. In addition to applying behavioral genetics evidence to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel, some defendants also incorporated the evidence to prove the
existence of a mitigating factor. Indeed, nearly half of the cases (fifteen cases or forty-
five percent) used behavioral genetics evidence to prove or support a diagnosis of a
defendant’s mitigating condition. Of course, some of the thirty-three cases relied
D. W. Denno 385
on both rationales (ineffective assistance and proof of diagnosis), thereby creating

an overlap between the categories. Strikingly, no case utilized behavioral genetics
evidence to indicate the likelihood of a defendant’s future dangerousness; indeed,
only three of the forty-eight cases in this Author’s prior study appeared to incorporate
behavioral genetics evidence for this purpose. This finding is significant in light of
prior concerns (expressed by Landrigan, for example) that such evidence would be
used to predict defendants’ future dangerousness (or some variant of that theme). In
fact, there is little-to-no indication that such an application would pose a real legal
threat.
Chart 3 considers the purpose that attorneys have for relying on behavioral
genetics evidence in the death penalty context. Notably, in all but four of the thirty-
three cases, the evidence is used to mitigate a death sentence. In an additional three
cases, behavioral genetics evidence was raised to support a claim under Atkins v.
Virginia (2002). In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that executing mentally retarded
individuals violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Of course, until 2002, Atkins was not an available vehicle in which to incorporate
behavioral genetics evidence although it is a particularly apt place for it now. Lastly,
in Morris v. Malfi (2011), as mentioned, the only non-death penalty case, behavioral
genetics evidence was interjected to support arguments that the defendant was
not competent to stand trial, the only case in this survey that raised a competency
argument.
Most surprisingly, in no case in this Study did the State introduce behavioral
genetics evidence in any capacity, much less as an aggravating factor. As mentioned,
this Author’s pre-2007 study did find three cases in which behavioral genetics evidence
appeared to be used to indicate a defendant’s future dangerousness. Yet, such a rare
occurrence within a pool of eighty-one cases examined during a seventeen-year period
stunts prior expectations that such evidence would be manipulated to justify the
death penalty. This outcome may also be explained in part by the increasing quality of
the admitted experts and evidence, which could preclude extreme characterizations
or conclusions that a defendant may be “hard-wired” into dangerousness. While
behavioral genetics evidence is viewed as a double-edged sword, each side of that
sword is not the direct flip of the other. The hurdles for the State are substantially
different from those for the defense and their evidence and arguments may not be
comparably compelling.
B. The types of evidence introduced

This Section covers a wide span of information under the title, “types of evidence
introduced.” The discussion starts with an overview of the four overlapping categories
of types of evidence, and then also considers what kinds of expert witnesses are
needed to present it. Included is an examination of courts’ perceptions of the experts
and the substance of their testimony, especially in the context of defendants’ claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Overall, the analysis illustrates the wide variety of
factors that come into play in capital cases and the need for a case-by-case perspective.
Chart 4 shows specifically the nature of the behavioral genetics evidence sought
to be admitted in these cases. This evidence breaks down into four overlapping
categories (signifying that some cases have multiple types of evidence): (1) expert
testimony, (2) family history, (3) behavioral history, and (4) medical history.
Behavioral histories could consist of school records or other testimony regarding
childhood behavior relevant to genetic disorder diagnoses. Medical records could
comprise any documented medical history be it physical or psychological.
As would be expected, most of the information in Chart 4 derives from some kind
of expert evaluation or family history (twenty-four and eighteen cases, respectively),
rather than a behavioral or medical history (four and three cases, respectively).
However, there is overlap between these two categories given that in several of the
cases, experts testified to some extent about the defendants’ family histories. In
general, all four groups are directed toward similar types of information even if its
source varies or it is characterized in different ways.
Family history evidence is especially diverse and has been used to show genetic
predispositions towards many different conditions. It is often introduced through the
testimony of the defendant’s relatives and also through expert testimony. While in
some cases, the behavioral genetics evidence presented consisted almost wholly of the
defendant’s family history, in other cases, defendants had requested experts to assess
the mitigation value of establishing a genetic predisposition towards a condition
or behavior. For instance, in Rhoades v. Henry (2011), the defendant submitted a
1000-page proffer on appeal, which contained declarations from a variety of sources:
a neuropsychologist; an expert who was both a psychiatrist and neurologist; police
officers; the defendant’s family and friends; medical and criminal records for both
the defendant and his family members; the defendant’s elementary school transcript;
as well as “a family tree depicting drug and alcohol abuse, suicide, intelligence,
mental health, and criminal convictions.” According to the neuropsychologist, “‘The
alcoholism and suicides seen in past generations of [the defendant’s] family very
likely played a genetic role in the mental and emotional health of [the defendant]
and his siblings.”’ Nonetheless, it was the family context of physical and sexual abuse,
as well as medical problems and the defendant’s chronic use of methamphetamine,
that “may well have damaged [the defendant’s] brain in areas critical to impulse
control and the ability to think clearly in high pressured situations.” Even so, the
court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, and the
defendant’s sentence and convictions were affirmed.
D. W. Denno 387
The defendant in Hawkins v. Wong (2010) had a more favorable outcome. He

claimed that his counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to hire a social
historian who could have explained how the defendant’s background influenced his
behavior. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that his
counsel was ineffective. The mitigating evidence would have shown that Hawkins
was genetically predisposed to alcoholism and mental illness. A social historian could
have also testified about Hawkins’s family tree, which included many alcoholics and
indicated a family genetic predisposition to alcoholism, as well as included a range
of violent, abusive, and mentally ill or handicapped persons. The court allowed an
evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
As with other kinds of evidence, courts vary on whether behavioral genetics
information need be presented by experts. Some courts have said that an expert is
not necessary to testify about behavioral genetics factors because the court or the
jury is capable of inferring that a defendant’s disposition is inherited. For example, in
Hodges v. Bell (2008), the defendant wanted a mitigation expert to testify about the
genetic transmission of drug and alcohol dependency. The trial court’s decision to
deny expert services was upheld because counsel was deemed capable of presenting
to the court information about the defendant’s substance addictions and the court
was able to process that information without the need for an expert. In Woodall v.
Simpson (2009), the failure to present a genetic defect defense was also not ineffective
assistance of counsel because the court found that the jury could have inferred that,
genetically, the defendant’s family had a history of mental problems. In Darling v.
Secretary (2010), the court determined that since there was contradictory evidence
concerning whether the defendant actually suffered from frontal lobe brain damage,
counsel was not ineffective in failing to obtain an evaluation and relying instead on
a defense witness’s testimony. Likewise, the court in Wood v. Schriro (2007) denied
defense counsel’s request for a neurometric brainmapping technician for the purpose
of diagnosing organic brain damage and/or psychopathology in the defendant,
finding that “there appear[ed] to be no support for this type of examination.”
Despite the lack of complete deference to mental health experts, at least one
court has acknowledged the tension between the legal field and medical field.
In Jones v. Ryan (2009), the district court dismissed each ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on finding that the failure to hire a mental health expert (among other
claims) was not prejudicial to the defendant because there was not enough evidence
presented to show that the defendant suffered from neurological damage caused
by head trauma or other factors. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
agreed with the defendant that his counsel was ineffective. By allowing a court-
appointed expert to testify about the defendant’s mental health at sentencing, instead
of hiring a mitigation expert or psychiatrist, defense counsel violated the American
Bar Association guidelines, Supreme Court precedent, and Ninth Circuit law. The
court found that the district court acted improperly in weighing the testimony of the
experts in order to determine who was the most credible and whether the defendant
had presented evidence confirming that he had neurological damage. In essence,
it was not the proper role of the district court to find a “definitive diagnosis” or to
evaluate the credibility of the experts.
For any one of a number of reasons, other courts seem to be more comfortable
drawing conclusions about behavioral genetics evidence presented by experts. In Hall
v. Quarterman (2009), for example, the district court noted testimony presented by
and against the defendant on the issue of mental retardation and stated some of
the genetic conditions the defendant might have. Rather than frame mental health
findings strictly in terms of the expert’s direct testimony, the district court took
the expert’s findings and drew its own conclusions with respect to the possibilities.
According to the court:
In addition to [the expert, Dr. Sally Church’s] diagnosis that Applicant is mentally re-
tarded, Dr. Church note[d] that Applicant’s physical appearance is typical of a person
who suffers from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol Effect. It is entirely possible
that Applicant suffers from one of these conditions as there is evidence that Applicant’s
mother was an alcoholic. Either of these conditions would be a correlate of Applicant’s
mental retardation.
Also, Applicant exhibits characteristics consistent with genetic disorders such as XXY,
Kleinfelter Syndrome, YYX, Extra Y Chromosome, or Fragile X Syndrome. All of these
disorders are usually related to mental retardation and are present at the time of birth.
C. Why evidence is introduced

Regardless of how behavioral genetics evidence is presented, Chart 5 indicates
that most of the evidence is applied to validate the existence of a serious condition,
typically a mental illness or addiction. A defendant could introduce this evidence as
mitigation during the penalty phase or at trial during the guilt-or-innocence phase,
irrespective of whether that evidence was accompanied by genetic associations.
Therefore, most of the factors listed in Chart 5 constitute traditional kinds of defenses
and mitigating evidence that courts have long admitted into court for a wide range
of reasons.
Chart 5 also depicts the different reasons defendants have offered for submitting
behavioral genetics information and how receptive courts have been to it. Chart 5’s
label, Genetics Evidence Offered by Defendant, refers to instances where defendants
presented evidence to show they were genetically predisposed toward a particular
condition or behavioral pattern. In comparison, the label Genetics Evidence Rejected
by Court, refers to the few instances where courts refused to admit behavioral genetics
evidence either at trial or in post-trial proceedings or they were simply silent on the
D. W. Denno 389
issue.
Overall, Chart 5’s statistics indicate that in almost all cases where a defendant
presented behavioral genetics evidence, the court admitted the evidence at trial
or analyzed the evidence in post-trial proceedings. This response was consistent
among all of Chart 5’s eleven categories: substance dependency, alcohol dependency,
mental illness, depression, mental retardation, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia,
predisposition toward violence, propensity toward criminal behavior, sexual sadism,
and family dysfunction. It is striking that behavioral genetics evidence is primarily
used to validate the existence of a substance or alcohol dependency, followed by
either unspecified or specified (e.g., depression) mental illness, then some kind of
propensity for criminality or violence, and lastly, family dysfunction. Relative to
these other conditions, however, the substance/alcohol dependency association is
especially pronounced. In twenty of the thirty-three cases examined − or well over
half (sixty-one percent) of all the cases − courts found a link between alcohol and/
or substance abuse and behavioral genetics evidence. In sharp contrast, courts linked
behavioral genetics evidence solely to other conditions in only thirteen cases (thirty-
nine percent). It is important to note that in most cases where a defendant presented
evidence of a genetic predisposition to alcohol or substance dependency, that
defendant also presented evidence of a genetic predisposition to other conditions.
Regardless, the alcohol/substance abuse claim is pervasive and far more substantial
when compared to this Author’s study of pre-2007 cases. It appears attorneys are
more willing to submit such evidence, perhaps because the science of addiction has
progressed so rapidly.
Apart from the particular type of behavioral genetics evidence, however, there are
varying ways defendants offer such evidence and courts either accept or reject it. For
example, Schurz v. Schriro (2007) concerned evidence involving three of Chart 5’s
categories: substance dependency, alcohol dependency, and family dysfunction. In
Schurz, the defendant offered evidence that his counsel should have investigated and
presented the following areas of mitigation: a genetic predisposition toward addiction
and mental illness; possible fetal alcohol syndrome; a history of alcoholism among
family members, including his mother, father, grandfather, grandmother, and aunts
and uncles; serious and ongoing parental neglect, chronic alcohol and substance
abuse, and physical neglect. In its evaluation of the merits of the defendant’s claim,
the court conceded to the dysfunctionality of the defendant’s “home environment”;
it noted that as a youth the defendant was forced to experience “his family’s
alcoholism, verbal and physical abuse, which was at times severe, lack of nurturing
from his parents, and family fights and violence.” Yet the district court still denied
habeas relief, predicting that “the sentencing court would have assigned minimal
significance to the new declarations providing additional detail about Petitioner’s
dysfunctional family history.”
Whether courts treat evidence of a defendant’s mental retardation any differently

remains to be fully seen until a larger sample of cases evolves. Regardless, as mentioned
previously, there were three cases in this Study where counsel introduced genetics
evidence for the purpose of contending that the defendant was mentally retarded and
therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia (2002). One of the
three courts agreed with that argument.
Overall, most courts accepted the evidence that defendants offered, even when
that evidence could be viewed as controversial or potentially stigmatizing. In Morales
v. Mitchell (2007), for example, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding
that the defendant’s counsel was ineffective because the counsel had failed to conduct
an adequate investigation of potentially mitigating evidence. That search would
have revealed the defendant’s extensive family history of alcoholism, the defendant’s
own alcoholism and how it affected him (such as being prone to blackouts), his
upbringing (alcoholic and absent parents, and a mentally retarded brother), as well
as “[t]he role of alcohol in the Native American Indian culture in which he was
raised.” The defendant’s parents, grandparents, uncle, and aunts were alcoholics, and
several relatives died from cirrhosis of the liver. All of this information was positively
influential in terms of mitigation. The defendant was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus, and his death sentence was vacated.
Chart 5 also lists categories that could potentially be considered as aggravating
at first glance but, within a proper context, could serve as mitigation. In Creech v.
Hardison (2010), for example, the defendant, Creech, claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel at his resentencing hearing due to his counsel’s inadequate research
on mitigation evidence. According to a psychologist who testified at Creech’s
resentencing hearing, Creech “probably had a genetic or biological predisposition
for violence” based on the psychologist’s examination of records, mental health
reports, an interview with Creech, and the results of various psychological tests. The
psychologist also concluded “that Creech had an antisocial personality and scored
in the 96th percentile of the prison population for psychopathy.” This information
was used as mitigating evidence during the sentencing hearing for Creech’s murder
of his fellow inmate. On appeal, Creech also introduced new evidence from a 2005
neurological examination, showing that he had “‘bilateral brain damage that affected
[his] insight, judgment and capacity to exercise social inhibitions.”’ After reviewing
the record, however, the court found that “the state district court expressly considered
the various mitigating circumstances.” While “[a] neurologist’s opinion that Creech
has brain damage may be more specific than [the psychologist’s] testimony,” it offered
“only a modest counterweight” to the aggravating factors involved in Creech’s case;
these factors included Creech’s long criminal record as well as the “brutal manner” in
which he killed a more vulnerable fellow inmate “over a petty dispute.”
Brant v. State (2009) is notable both because it is the only case that concerned
D. W. Denno 391
sexual sadism and because behavioral genetics evidence was mentioned in passing
during the trial. According to a forensic psychiatrist for the defense, Brant suffered
from sexual sadism which “in most cases arises out of a genetic predisposition and
unhealthy childhood environment.” Concerning the sexual battery involved in the
case, the psychiatrist stated that Brant possessed “‘a substantial impairment in his
ability to conform his conduct with the requirements of the law”’ because of both his
sexual sadism and the effects of methamphetamine. The underlying sexual disorder
which hindered Brant’s ability to control his sexual impulses was exacerbated when
he ingested drugs. In addition, a PET scan of Brant’s brain indicated “underactivity”
in the areas associated with impulse control and good judgment. Nevertheless,
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Brant’s death sentence, unconvinced that the
mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence. At the same time, the
court did not throw doubt on the validity of the behavioral genetics evidence, nor
turn it into a vehicle for aggravation.
III. The state of behavioral genetics evidence now

This Part has two goals: it discusses this Author’ Study of thirty-three behavioral
genetics evidence cases in more depth and it compares the Study to the results of
this Author’s prior research on forty-eight behavioral genetics evidence cases decided
between 1994-2007. This comparison is made by way of addressing a series of
questions about the findings and then the overall impact of behavioral genetics
evidence.
A. Are Courts still skeptical?

1. The first study: 1994-2007
In 1994, defense preparations for Mobley v. State (1995) drew world-wide publicity
because of Mobley’s counsel’s unprecedented efforts to gather behavioral genetics
evidence to prevent Stephen Mobley’s execution. According to some commentators
at the time, the availability of such testing would prompt political and moral abuses
of highly controversial information. Yet this Author’s earlier survey of the forty-eight
cases that had used behavioral genetics evidence during the thirteen years following
Mobley (1994-2007) showed no apparent basis for these concerns. There were
no abuses of the ilk that had been predicted and most courts still questioned the
relevance of such evidence when attorneys attempted to introduce it at the penalty
phase, a tactic consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2007 conclusions in Schriro v.
Landrigan (2007).
In essence, during the thirteen years between Mobley and Landrigan, there had
been seemingly few changes in social and legal attitudes toward behavioral genetics.
The topic remained controversial for many of the same reasons espoused at the
1992 University of Maryland conference. Moreover, the applicability of behavioral
genetics evidence as mitigation in death penalty cases still seemed to baffle the press
and public, thereby accentuating the controversy.
There were exceptions, of course, as the Susan Smith case illustrated. In Von
Dohlen v. State (2004), for example, which was decided a decade after Mobley, the
court remanded the defendant’s case for resentencing in light of the mitigating
evidence that attorneys presented, which had included behavioral genetics factors.
Notably, such evidence was sufficiently compelling even without a testifying
expert documenting the defendant’s genetic proclivity for mental disorder or other
troublesome conditions. The passage of time may have been a positive influence
on Von Dohlen’s outcome, although such an explanation is speculative. Regardless,
the case remains unusual when compared to a larger group of opinions that have
viewed behavioral genetics evidence either as inconsequential or, on a far lesser scale,
potentially predictive of a defendant’s future violent tendencies.
Consistent with Mobley and Landrigan, this Author’s earlier study showed
that courts articulated five major reasons for rejecting a defendant’s submission of
behavioral genetics evidence: (1) The mitigation evidence the defense had already
submitted was sufficient and further information concerning the defendant’s genetic
attributes would most likely not have influenced the defendant’s sentence; (2)
behavioral genetics evidence is not as valid and reliable relative to other evidence
introduced at trial, especially when there is conflicting testimony among the experts;
(3) an association between a defendant’s behavioral genetics and criminal behavior is
“unorthodox” or “exotic”; (4) even if behavioral genetics evidence is accepted at trial,
it can be detrimental to a defendant’s case because it indicates that the defendant
will commit further acts of violence and be a danger to society; and (5) behavioral
genetics evidence collides with some courts’ views of criminal responsibility, which
may favor safeguarding the community rather than rehabilitation.
This Author’s studies provide little support for any of these five rationales. For
example, both studies have shown that behavioral genetics evidence can have a
beneficial impact for some defendants in some cases, particularly when it bolsters
or interacts with other kinds of mitigating evidence. There are also compelling
arguments that behavioral genetics evidence is relevant and useful if applied in a
limited way, such as to buttress other mitigating conditions, or to verify the existence
of a condition that a court may question. Likewise, courts’ rendering of behavioral
genetic factors as “unorthodox” or “exotic” ignores the reality that such information
has a long history in legal cases, even if that past was controversial or seemingly
forgotten by more recent decisions, such as Mobley and Landrigan. Indeed, this
D. W. Denno 393
Author’s research uncovered eighty-one such cases over the past seventeen years.
The remaining rationales also lack support. While courts and commentators
have long-stressed the double-edged-sword aspect of behavioral genetics evidence,
this characteristic is inherent to many other mitigating factors. The Supreme Court’s
reliance on certain kinds of neuroscientific findings in Roper v. Simmons (2005) is an
apt illustration. In Roper, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited the execution of persons under age eighteen at the time
their crimes were committed. The Court reasoned that relative to adults, juveniles
are more immature and irresponsible, vulnerable to negative pressures from their
peers and environment, and fragile and unstable in their identities. Although these
disparities explained why juveniles may be less culpable, they also heightened the
likelihood that juveniles would engage in impulsive thinking and criminality. The very
factors that argued against juveniles’ eligibility for the death penalty also made them
more prone to misconduct − truly a double-edged sword. Likewise, the argument
that behavioral genetics evidence conflicts with some courts’ theories of criminal
responsibility again reveals the confusion concerning the disparate standards relevant
for the guilt-or-innocence phase of a trial as opposed to the penalty phase of a trial.
The standard for mitigation evidence is far broader given the purpose that it serves.
Another aspect complicating these already difficult cases involves the apparent
ignorance of some courts in dealing with the interactions among social, biological,
and genetic variables. As this chapter has shown, however, such variables are so
intertwined it would be an artificial and misleading process to attempt to separate
them for purposes of sentencing. Yet, the latest discoveries in behavioral genetics
have not fallen on courts’ deaf ears in more recent times. Indeed, the next Section’s
discussion of cases using behavioral genetics evidence during the last four years
suggests that much of this judicial skepticism has ebbed if not disappeared entirely.
2. The second study: 2007-2011

Courts during 2007-2011 seemingly quelled questioning whether sound
behavioral genetics evidence should be admitted as mitigation at all during the
penalty phase. Rather, the question now is whether sufficient evidence has been
presented and, if so, how much weight it should be given. In all thirty-three of the
decisions this Author examined, for example, courts appeared to at least consider
behavioral genetics evidence in their analysis of mitigating factors and whether an
attorney has rendered ineffective assistance. Likewise, none of the courts squarely
rejected the introduction of behavioral genetics evidence nor referred to it as “exotic”
or “unorthodox.”
Courts’ views of the weight such evidence should have take a variety of forms
and, unsurprisingly, rely on case specific facts. Even when courts did not find that
behavioral genetics evidence was likely to affect the outcome of the case or was
outweighed by aggravating factors, they still addressed and acknowledged family
history. Particularly striking over the last four years were arguments concerning
defendants’ genetic proclivities to alcohol and substance abuse − a far larger percentage
than had previously been found. Again, regardless of whether such evidence positively
affected the outcome of the defendant’s sentence, courts did take it into account in the
same way they would other kinds of mitigating evidence. According to the court in
Rhoades v. Henry (2011), for example, the evaluations of two experts indicating that
Rhoades likely has a genetic predisposition to serious disorders were not sufficiently
strong to shed light on Rhoades’s mental and emotional states of mind at the time he
committed the murders. One expert stated that alcoholism and suicides in Rhoades’s
family “very likely” indicated a genetic factor in his mental health. Another expert
concluded that Rhoades “inherited the diseases of alcoholism and drug abuse”
and that he was “born into a family that suffered from major mental illness and
neuropsychological impairment.” Yet the court viewed the reports of both experts
to be “speculative” and “indeterminate,” concluding that the aggravating factors in
Rhoades’s case outweighed the mitigating factors. The district court and the Ninth
Circuit also considered the reports of the experts in their analysis of Rhoades’s claim,
and both courts viewed the information in the same way. As such evidence becomes
more sophisticated, the analytical tilt may change.
These kinds of balances are perhaps most intricately assessed in cases (previously
discussed) where defendants have a proclivity for criminal conduct in unsympathetic
circumstances. In Creech v. Hardison (2010), for example, the defendant, while serving
a life sentence for murder, murdered another prisoner by hitting him with a battery-
filled sock and stomping on his head and neck. The state court considered both
aggravating and mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s young age (mitigating),
genetic or biological predisposition for violence (mitigating), and the nature of the
crime (highly aggravating) − holding that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors, a conclusion the district court endorsed. The court found that the
sentence would have been the same even with (among other factors) the “possibility
of a biological predisposition listed as a mitigating factor.” Likewise, in Schurz v.
Schriro (2007), the defendant − facing the death sentence for murder after splashing
the victim with gasoline and setting him on fire − claimed on appeal that several
mitigation factors should have been presented at his sentencing hearing. These
mitigators included a genetic predisposition toward addiction and mental illness,
exposure to neurotoxins, as well as a family life of violence and crime. The Schurz court
acknowledged all these influences; yet, it concluded, like the court in Creech, that the
defendant did not show these factors affected his ability to control, comprehend, or
perceive his actions at the time of the murder and that the outcome in the sentencing
court would have been the same. The court in Brant v. State (2009) similarly affirmed
D. W. Denno 395
the defendant’s death sentence, unconvinced that the mitigating evidence (genetic
predisposition to sexual sadism, unhealthy childhood environment, family history
of depression, and drug use) outweighed the aggravating evidence (premeditation
and attempts to cover up the crime, and calm demeanor after the crime). Brant’s
impairment due to abnormal brain functioning and drug use, while mitigating, was
“not so mitigating as to make his death sentence disproportionate.”
Even in cases where defendants’ propensities for violence are not as marked,
many courts remain unpersuaded by behavioral genetics evidence of substance
abuse. Yet, again, the important point here is that the courts accept the validity of
the evidence irrespective of whether it affects their decision about the sentence. In
Keough v. State (2010), for example, the defendant introduced evidence at his post-
conviction hearing regarding a family history of alcoholism. However, the defendant’s
convictions and death sentence were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals on
the basis that further investigation into his chronic alcoholism would have done little
to change the outcome of the case; the jury had already heard testimony about the
defendant’s alcohol use on the night of the murder and had already rejected a defense
theory of voluntary intoxication. In Commonwealth v. Gibson (2011), the court
similarly concluded that the new mitigation evidence presented by the defendant,
which included a family history of alcohol abuse spanning at least three generations,
was not reasonably likely to have swayed a juror to alter his or her vote. Thus, the
court denied the defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief.
Other courts in the last four years have tended to give behavioral genetics
evidence (including alcohol or substance abuse) more weight − some to the point
of considering it an error not to have a pretrial hearing on a defendant’s genetic
predisposition; others have made it grounds for vacating a death sentence. In
Hawkins v. Wong (2010), for instance, the court allowed an evidentiary hearing on
the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, part of which concerned the
failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, including the defendant’s
genetic predisposition to alcoholism and mental illness. According to the defendant,
the mitigating evidence omitted by counsel would have shown that the defendant
was born “into a family marked by extreme pathology and dysfunction over multiple
generations.” In Morales v. Mitchell (2007), the court conclusively held that defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to conduct an investigation
into mitigating evidence − information that primarily consisted of alcoholism in
Morales’s family, Morales’s own alcoholism and its effects on him, as well as his
family upbringing. The district court in Allison v. Cullen (2010) also vacated the
defendant’s death sentence and granted relief on his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel for his counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence. This evidence
included expert statements that the defendant might have a genetic predisposition to
alcoholism, substance abuse, and mental illness. Lastly, in Hall v. McPherson (2008),
the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the habeas court’s vacation of McPherson’s
death sentence. According to the court, the defendant’s trial counsel should have
investigated further into McPherson’s background, which included a family tree
showing a genetic predisposition to substance abuse disorder; failure to do so was
due to inattention, rather than to a strategic decision.
B. Is behavioral genetics evidence effective?

One way to try to measure the potential effectiveness of behavioral genetics
evidence in criminal cases is to provide a thorough sense of how the evidence is
being used. In most of the thirty-three cases in this Author’s Study, at least one of
the defendants’ claims alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to
adequately investigate or present mitigating evidence of behavioral genetic factors.
Morales v. Mitchell (2007) is one case where counsel’s failure to present this evidence
was on strong ground. Morales was a Native American man with a family history of
alcoholism. During the penalty phase of his case, the only evidence presented was the
defendant’s unsworn statement. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that counsel’s
failure to present any mitigation evidence constituted deficient performance. Among
the points that the court agreed should have been raised by trial counsel during the
penalty phase was the defendant’s “chaotic and dysfunctional family environment”
and “[t]he role of alcohol in the Native American Indian culture” in which the
defendant lived. The court found persuasive the “volume and compelling nature”
of the evidence of Morales’s “tumultuous life, continued and uncontrolled alcohol
and drug abuse, dysfunctional family history, potential mental health problems, and
detailed cultural background”; thus, there was a “reasonable probability that effective
counsel could have achieved a different outcome.”
In Hamilton v. Ayers (2009), the Ninth Circuit also seemed to suggest that
counsel’s failure to include behavioral genetics evidence was an influential argument
for claiming ineffective assistance. Hamilton was facing the death penalty and
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus based on his claim that he was incompetent to
stand trial and that his counsel had not thoroughly investigated his mental state. The
district court rejected Hamilton’s petition despite expert testimony that Hamilton
had a family history of genetic disorders and a traumatic upbringing. In a 2009
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court remanded the case, with instructions to
reduce Hamilton’s death sentence to life imprisonment without parole. The court
found that Hamilton’s counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence, such as documentation of Hamilton’s mental health history.
Among the mitigation information that should have been submitted was a family
history of depression and mental health issues, including indications that Hamilton’s
D. W. Denno 397
parents and extended family suffered from depression and suicidal thoughts, and
his paternal great-grandmother and cousin committed suicide. In addition, one
expert who testified at Hamilton’s habeas hearing stated that Hamilton “was raised
in an environment of intergenerational alcoholism.” Given the new evidence, the
court concluded that Hamilton’s trial counsel’s investigation “fell far below the
constitutional floor” and was prejudicial.
Success in this arena depends on a wide range of factors. In other recent appeals,
courts have not given behavioral genetics evidence as much weight. In 2010, the
same court of appeals that vacated Hamilton’s death sentence, affirmed a denial of
habeas for another defendant’s guilt phase and reversed the district court’s grant of
habeas relief as to the penalty phase. In Mickey v. Ayers (2010), the district court
agreed that the defendant’s counsel could have made a successful mitigation case
with evidence that the defendant’s genetic propensities, when combined with his
family upbringing and mental illness, caused him to be predisposed to alcohol and
drug dependency. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the second
penalty phase expert’s research into genetic links of certain diseases was in a nascent
stage at the time of trial; therefore, the defendant’s counsel was not deficient in
failing to provide the expert with the defendant’s family history of substance abuse.
In general, both of this Author’s studies show that, as would be expected,
counsel’s failure to present behavioral genetics evidence alone was often not enough
to constitute ineffective assistance. But, when coupled with other factors, courts were
less reluctant to grant evidentiary hearings or to vacate death sentences altogether for
ineffective assistance.
C. Are there new trends or arguments?

This chapter reports a number of new trends and arguments since 2007. The first
trend concerns the changed role of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases.
In this Author’s original study of forty-eight cases, most cases employed behavioral
genetics evidence in three primary ways: (1) to support a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, (2) to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant’s mitigating condition,
and/or (3) to indicate some likelihood of the defendant’s future dangerousness. This
Author’s most recent study of thirty-three cases showed, however, that there was no
third category and that no case applied behavioral genetics evidence to predict the
defendant’s dangerousness. Nor was the evidence ever used by the prosecution, much
less as an aggravating factor. While this Author’s original study did not report many
cases in which the evidence was implemented detrimentally, the discovery that it has
never been so used in the last four years is startling. After all, this finding contradicts
the Supreme Court’s view in Landrigan that such evidence could be submitted to
enhance the perception of a defendant’s level of dangerousness.

Second, in light of the Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002),
behavioral genetics evidence now may play a larger role in defendants claiming a
genetic predisposition to mental retardation and mental incompetence. In Ex parte
Smith (2010), for example, Smith tried to argue that he was mentally retarded and
not eligible for the death penalty. Smith stated that he had a genetic predisposition to
mental retardation and that five of his family members suffered from the same mental
infirmity. However, in an Atkins hearing, the court determined that Smith was not
mentally retarded because he had failed to demonstrate substantial or significant
deficits in adaptive behavior, either at the time of the murders or before the hearing.
There was a different outcome in Commonwealth v. Williams (2010). In Williams, the
issue also was whether the defendant was mentally retarded and therefore ineligible
for the death penalty. An expert stated that the defendant was born with “some
genetic predisposition to mental retardation,” and he had closed-head injuries as a
child due to abuse. The court evaluated the expert opinions and determined that
Williams was mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty.
In Morris v. Malfi (2011), the defendant claimed that his due process rights
were violated because he was tried and adjudicated while mentally incompetent.
During the penalty phase of his trial, Morris submitted evidence of head injuries,
including two in the frontal part of his brain, the area that controls emotions,
impulses, and inhibition of behavior. Morris also submitted a 2009 evaluation and
report by Dr. Natasha Khazanov, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Khazanov reviewed and
evaluated psychological and medical records pertaining to Morris’s head traumas,
criminal cases, and family medical and psychiatric history, as well as conducted
neuropsychological testing on him. In her report, Dr. Khazanov stated, among
other things, that Morris had a genetic predisposition to chronic psychopathology,
specifically paranoid schizophrenia.
As this chapter previously mentioned, the Author’s 2007-2011 Study also
revealed more cases in which courts incorporated behavioral genetics evidence to
support defendants’ claims of the inheritance of alcohol and drug dependency. This
trend was particularly pronounced relative to other kinds of factors. Regardless, as
these results make clear, courts seemingly no longer view any type of scientifically
accepted behavioral genetics evidence as “exotic” in the same way that Landrigan did.
Nor is there any overt indication that behavioral genetics evidence has reinforced
concerns expressed in the context of Mobley, most particularly worries that actors
in the criminal justice system would increasingly and irresponsibly rely on distorted
information in their decision making.
Indeed, as this Author has previously contended, concerns over behavioral
genetics evidence in criminal cases can be a red herring, deflecting attention from
the realization that courts can genetically stereotype defendants irrespective of any
D. W. Denno 399
attempt made by those defendants to submit genetics arguments. While no such case
was found in this Author’s most recent Study, the Author did find such a case in the
prior study. In State v. Madey (2002), the defendant, who pled guilty to misdemeanor
assault after two police officers tried to take her into protective custody for public
intoxication, challenged the court’s probation requirements, one of which mandated
that she write an essay on “alcoholism and the American Indians.” The requirements
were also made in the context of the court’s numerous and unsubstantiated comments
about Madey’s ethnic proclivity for alcoholism. These comments included asking
Madey’s mother whether “she knew ‘anything about genetic predisposition to
alcoholism?”’ or “if she had ‘ever been on an Indian Reservation?’ and if she had
ever seen ‘the Scotch or Irish drinking?”’ The court even asked the mother whether
she “had a concern that her daughter would become ‘a flaming alcoholic’ because,
with such an ethnic background, ‘there [was] nothing she can do about it.”’ In
turn, the court continually speculated about the degree of the defendant’s future
dangerousness, even characterizing the defendant’s potential state of being a murder
victim as a danger to others: “[I]f you start drinking like this, you’re a danger. You
will go out and get yourself attacked, or murdered, or something, and every time
somebody is killed or raped in society, that diminishes the public safety overall.” In
vacating the defendant’s sentence and remanding, the appellate court noted that not
only were the trial court’s comments completely unrelated “to an interest in doing
justice,” but that the defendant did not “attempt[] to use her family background to
excuse her behavior.”
In Madey, the genetic stereotyping was in the court’s eyes only, a potential
cause for concern in any case, no matter the defense or evidentiary circumstances.
Yet some courts have not needed a cultural stereotype to use genetics wrongly. In
2011, for example, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit overturned a federal district court’s decision to sentence a defendant
to six-and-a-half years in a child pornography case because the court had made
inappropriate conclusions about genetic proclivities. In the district court’s eyes, the
defendant would recidivate and continue viewing child pornography “because of an
as-of-yet undiscovered gene.” Such a marker is “‘a gene you were born with,”’ the
court stated to the defendant, “‘[a]nd it’s not a gene you can get rid of.”’ Rejecting
as “‘virtually worthless”’ the two psychological evaluations that demonstrated the
defendant was “at a low to moderate risk to re-offend,” the court reiterated to the
defendant a genetic prediction: “‘You are what you’re born with. And that’s the only
explanation for what I see here.”’ The Second Circuit panel made clear its stance
about such an “unsupported theory of genetics,” emphasizing the district court’s lack
of fairness and integrity and ordering the defendant to be sentenced by a different
judge. Such cases emphasize all the more the enhanced need for a measured judiciary.
D. The potential impact of Cullen v. Pinholster

After Schriro v. Landrigan (2007), Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) is the only Supreme
Court case that has addressed behavioral genetics evidence. Yet, unlike Landrigan,
Pinholster does not focus so much on the type of evidence at issue, but rather on
how and when such evidence can be evaluated. It is seemingly irrelevant that the
evidence happened to include behavioral genetics factors. Thus, while Pinholster is
a significant and complicated case, this Section’s overview is confined specifically to
the issues at hand.
Pinholster is pertinent to this chapter’s discussion for two reasons. First, the case’s
complex procedural history is an all-too-classic example of a prisoner’s extraordinary
challenges with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Second, the Pinholster
Court’s holding could substantially impact currently-pending behavioral genetics
cases (including those examined in this chapter), as well as future cases involving
behavioral genetics evidence. Before Pinholster, for example, federal habeas courts
could hold hearings and evaluate new evidence when they reviewed how state
courts construed federal law under AEDPA. State prisoners who had been unable to
adequately present their claims in state court could seek habeas relief in federal court.
As a result of Pinholster, however, such federal review has been severely limited, thus
hindering state prisoners’ efforts to garner federal habeas relief. As Professor Samuel
Wiseman has shown, Pinholster substantially changes the foundation in which
federal courts can review state records in habeas cases, thereby magnifying the need
for prisoners to adequately develop their records and claims in state court.
Petitioners have begun to create strategies to circumvent Pinholster; yet it
remains unclear how effective these strategies will be. To provide context for such
modifications, the next part of this Section examines the procedural history and
evidence that frames Pinholster. The discussion then considers how Pinholster may
affect currently pending and future behavioral genetics evidence cases.
1. History and evidence

In 1984, Scott Lynn Pinholster was convicted in state court of murder. After
accepting and rejecting several attorneys and even representing himself at one point,
Pinholster later reconsidered and accepted the two attorneys the court appointed. In
a hasty effort to prepare Pinholster’s mitigation case, Pinholster’s counsel consulted
with an expert whose conclusions were not in Pinholster’s favor. According to the
expert, Pinholster “did not manifest any significant signs or symptoms of mental
disorder or defect other than his antisocial personality disorder by history.” In
addition, the expert considered Pinholster “cognitively functional, without brain
damage.” Pinholster’s counsel did not contact the expert again, nor any other expert.
Indeed, Pinholster’s attorneys billed a total of 6.5 hours in preparation for the penalty
D. W. Denno 401
phase; Pinholster’s mother was the only defense witness at the proceeding.
After the jury sentenced Pinholster to death, Pinholster twice sought habeas
relief in the California Supreme Court. He alleged that his trial counsel had failed
to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.
In an effort to bolster his claim, Pinholster introduced additional evidence: school,
medical, and legal records; as well as declarations from family members, one of his
trial attorneys, and a psychiatrist. While arguing to the state court that his counsel
performed deficiently, Pinholster also contended that his attorneys should have
pursued and presented information about the following three matters: Pinholster’s
family members and their criminal, mental, and substance abuse problems;
Pinholster’s schooling; and Pinholster’s medical and mental health history, including
his epileptic disorder. The California Supreme Court summarily denied relief.
Pinholster subsequently filed a habeas petition claiming that his counsel should
have provided one of his key experts, Dr. John M. Stalberg, with his family history,
particularly as related to mental disorders; as a result, Dr. Stalberg “would have
made further inquiry ‘before concluding that [Pinholster] had merely a personality
disorder.”’ The district court held Pinholster’s petition in abeyance, and the California
Supreme Court ultimately denied his second habeas petition because it lacked merit.
After the case was sent back to federal court, Pinholster next requested an
evidentiary hearing, which, while denied for the guilt phase, was granted for
the penalty phase. This time, Pinholster had two experts present new mitigation
evidence, including testimony that his childhood was much worse than his mother
had described. The revelations about Pinholster’s family were striking: his biological
father was a drunk, “had mood swings and fits of anger, and was eventually diagnosed
as paranoid with narcissistic personality disorder.” Pinholster’s older brother Alvin,
while charged with the rape and sodomy of a young teen, was found incompetent
to stand trial and diagnosed with schizophrenia. Alvin later committed suicide.
Pinholster’s other siblings were similarly troubled. His younger brother Terry
evidenced mild depression and heavily used drugs. His half-sister Tammy, by age
eleven, began abusing alcohol and, by age seventeen, was arrested with her boyfriend
for the sexual assault of a young teenage girl. Pinholster’s half-brother Guy evidenced
manic depression, and another half-brother Gary was characterized as “an alcoholic
with severe mood swings.”
Pinholster’s own disorders fit the family pattern but also indicated that accidents
and injuries appeared to be part of the source. According to Pinholster’s experts,
for example, Pinholster “had suffered brain damage that explained his aggressive,
impulsive, and antisocial behavior.” One of the experts, a pediatric neurologist,
also testified that Pinholster “sustained frontal-lobe injuries” as a result of two car
accidents, occurring during childhood. This expert derived this conclusion from two
findings: Pinholster’s diagnosis of epilepsy and documentation that, at age nine, he
had an abnormal electroencephalogram (EEG).

According to the Ninth Circuit, all of this evidence demonstrated that Pinholster’s
trial counsel were ineffective in complying with Strickland v. Washington (1984).
Indeed, the court stressed the paucity of counsel’s billing records, which “confirm
counsel’s own admissions that they spent almost no time preparing for the penalty
phase hearing that would determine whether Pinholster would live or die.” Thus,
the court set forth two conclusions in accordance with Strickland. First, Pinholster’s
counsel were “deficient” for neglecting to research Pinholster’s history so that they
could provide mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. Second, such deficiency
“prejudiced the defense,” thereby rendering the California Supreme Court’s denial of
relief on ineffective assistance as a contravention of Strickland.
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was followed by an opinion which,
while not directed at Pinholster’s behavioral genetics evidence, surely would have
some bearing on how such evidence could be considered for future inmates. Writing
for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas took a different stance, for example, on
how to interpret trial counsel’s billing records, stressing that the records showed
that Pinholster’s counsel had indeed investigated mitigating evidence. In reversing
the Ninth Circuit, Justice Thomas explained that “[t]here [was] no reasonable
probability that the additional evidence presented at Pinholster’s state proceedings
would have changed the verdict.” Not only would the supplementary information
have “largely duplicated the mitigation evidence of [Pinholster’s] mother and brother
at trial,” but any new documentation that may have been offered “is of questionable
mitigating value.” Although Justice Thomas did not address Pinholster’s genetic
evidence specifically, the prior opinion, Pinholster v. Ayers (2009), did discuss the
records Pinholster sought to introduce.
Yet, despite the fact that behavioral genetics information was presented as part of
the mitigating evidence at issue in the Pinholster Court’s review, the Court’s holding
is not based on the genetic nature of the evidence. At the same time, Pinholster has
already had an impact on behavioral genetics evidence cases, and it can be expected
to have further influence.
2. Behavioral genetics cases

Behavioral genetics evidence is often not introduced until post-conviction
proceedings, and the cases using it frequently involve ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Therefore, Pinholster could have a considerable impact on currently-pending
behavioral genetics cases.
Two petitioners in this chapter’s survey have already had their cases remanded
in light of Pinholster (see the Appendix listing Ryan v. Detrich (2011) and Ryan v.
Jones (2011)). In each of the cases, the failure to adequately investigate or present
D. W. Denno 403
behavioral genetics evidence (along with other factors) was grounds for vacating a
death sentence and remanding for imposition of a sentence of life in prison. At the
present time, it is unclear whether these petitioners’ death sentences will remain
vacated. Since Pinholster was decided, lower courts have been more reluctant to grant
evidentiary hearings; the decision places a greater burden on a petitioner to adequately
develop the factual record in state court, making it uncertain whether federal courts
will be permitted to fill the gap in situations where a petitioner is unable to do so.
As Professor Wiseman explains, “Without the safeguard of federal fact development
under [AEDPA], cases of egregious unfairness in state post-conviction procedures
will demand new solutions.”
The cases following Pinholster suggest that petitioners seeking habeas relief in the
federal courts, particularly those who have claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
will face higher hurdles. Pinholster makes clear that federal courts should be basing
their determination on whether to grant habeas relief solely on evidence found within
the state record. This situation poses a considerable barrier for petitioners whose
grounds for relief are rooted in the inadequacy or absence of certain evidence in state
proceedings. In seven of the cases in this chapter’s Study in which the petitioner’s
death sentence was vacated or an evidentiary hearing was upheld, the decision was
based precisely on the failure to adequately investigate or present behavioral genetics
evidence in state court. It is unclear whether the same results would follow had these
cases been decided after Pinholster.
Pinholster, of course, did not mandate that courts take a less favorable approach
to behavioral genetics evidence specifically. At the same time, reaction to the Court’s
holding indicates that cases seeking appellate relief on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a category into which behavioral genetics cases have typically
fallen, may receive cooler reception in the federal courts. This potential outcome may
have implications for the likelihood of success of behavioral genetics cases in general
irrespective of any actual change in courts’ views of genetics evidence. Indeed, a
change in standards to one of greater deference to state and attorney determinations
might pose additional problems for petitioners seeking to introduce new facts to the
record.
One way for a petitioner to avoid the hurdles created by Pinholster would be to
convince the court that the petitioner’s claims were not “adjudicated on the merits”
in state proceedings. The future success rate of these claims may be an indicator of
whether new evidence remains a key component in obtaining federal habeas relief
on two levels − in the context of behavioral genetics evidence and also in the broader
sense of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in habeas proceedings.
Conclusion
For decades, the link between behavioral genetics and criminality has been
haunted with controversy, raising questions about how such evidence is, or should
be, applied. This chapter tackles those questions by analyzing a unique study of all
criminal cases (totaling thirty-three) that addressed behavioral genetics evidence from
June 1, 2007, to July 1, 2011. The Study builds upon this Author’s prior research on
all criminal cases (totaling forty-eight) that used such evidence during the preceding
thirteen years (1994-2007). This combined collection of eighty-one criminal cases
employing behavioral genetics evidence offers a rich context for determining how the
criminal justice system has been handling genetics factors for nearly two decades, but
also why more recent years reveal particularly important discoveries. Results suggest
that not only is much of the controversy surrounding behavioral genetics and crime
unwarranted, the use of such evidence has been misunderstood.
From 2007-2011, for example, behavioral genetics evidence has appeared to
have been applied almost exclusively as mitigating evidence in death penalty cases
and primarily in two ways to support claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for
neglecting such evidence or to provide proof and diagnosis of a defendant’s mitigating
condition. Strikingly, this Study found no case during 2007-2011 in which behavioral
genetics factors were introduced by the State, much less used as aggravating evidence
or as indications that a defendant would be a future danger to others. These findings
debunk arguments that such evidence will be legally detrimental to a defendant.
Indeed, in most cases, the evidence is so tightly intertwined with other factors in a
defendant’s life that the particular impact of behavioral genetics can be difficult to
isolate. This Study’s results suggest that, at the very least, behavioral genetics evidence
has no decipherable impact on a defendant’s case or, at most, it becomes an effective
tool along with a range of other kinds of variables in rendering a defendant ineligible
for the death penalty. Courts appear willing to accept behavioral genetics evidence
as part of a defendant’s mitigation story, even if genetics renders that story a more
troubling one in terms of the defendant’s purported propensities. The 2007-2011
period also showed a number of break-a-way trends from earlier years. For example,
there were substantially more cases that incorporated behavioral genetics evidence
of any kind. In addition, there was a clear increase in the number of cases in which
defendants submitted proof of a genetic propensity for alcoholism and/or substance
abuse.
Overall, this chapter’s research shows that courts accept behavioral genetics
evidence in the majority of cases in which defense attorneys attempt to offer it. In
contrast to past years when courts at times questioned the applicability or relevance
of such information, recent findings indicate that their focus has turned elsewhere.
In particular, courts emphasize the importance of determining whether the evidence,
D. W. Denno 405
when used with other factors in mitigation, can outweigh the aggravating factors that
support a death sentence. The coming years will reveal whether such trends will be
affected by Cullen v. Pinholster (2011), the Supreme Court’s recent decision restricting
prisoners’ efforts to seek federal habeas relief under AEDPA. Regardless, behavioral
genetics evidence seems, on the surface, to have reached a status commensurate with
other kinds of evidence without the baggage of abuse with which it has typically been
associated.
Figure 1
Genogram Presented in the Susan Smith Case*
Johnson Harrison Vaughan Albright

?
S D D A A D
Linda Infant Harry

DSA D D D D DS
Michael Scotty Susan

DS DS
or Deceased
D Depression
S Suicide attempt
A Alcohol abuse according to self or family report
Mental retardation, disability
* Modified for presentation purposes


D. W. Denno 407

D. W. Denno 409
Appendix
Criminal cases referencing behavioral
genetics evidence:
June 1, 2007 - July 1, 2011
Loving v. United States, 64 M.J. 132 (C.A.A.F. 2006), 68 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2009),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 67 (2010).
Hamilton v. Ayers, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
583 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2009).
Mickey v. Ayers, No. C-93-0243 RMW, 2006 WL 3358410 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17,
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 606 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 419 (2011).
Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, Nos. 00-
3694/3787, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5909 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008).
Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007).
Schurz v. Schriro, No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 2808220 (D. Ariz. Sept.
25, 2007).
Wood v. Schriro, No. CV-98-053-TUC-JMR, 2007 WL 3124451 (D. Ariz. Oct.
24, 2007).
Berryman v. Ayers, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2007 WL 1991049 (E.D. Cal. July
10, 2007); see also Berryman v. Wong, No. 1:95-CV-05309-AWI, 2010 WL
289181, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010).
Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 2008).
Williams v. Norris, No. 5:07cv00234 SWW, 2008 WL 4820559 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 4,
2008), aff’d, 612 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).
Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2009).
Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 2009).
Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 692356 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17,
2009).
Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S.Ct. 2091 (2011). The
U.S. Supreme Court later reversed and remanded the case in Ryan v. Jones, 131 S.
Ct. 2091 (2011), in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (D. Ariz. 2009).
Woodall v. Simpson, No. 5:06-CV-P216-R, 2009 WL 464939 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24,
2009).
Hall v. Quarterman, No. 4:06-CV-436-A, 2009 WL 612559 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9,
2009).
Hawkins v. Wong, No. CIV S-96-1155 MCE EFB DP, 2010 WL 3516399 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 2, 2010).
Morris v. Malfi, No. C 06-7409 SI, 2010 WL 2629738 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010),
aff’d, 449 F. App’x 686 (9th Cir. 2011).
Creech v. Hardison, No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1338126 (D. Idaho Mar.
31, 2010).
Allison v. Cullen, No. CV 92-06404 CAS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82957 (C.D. Cal.
July 22, 2010); see also Allison v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(publishing only the judgment portion of the decision).
Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011).
The U.S. Supreme Court later reversed and remanded the case in Ryan v. Detrich,
131 S. Ct. 2449 (2011), in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Ex parte Smith, No. 1080973, 2010 WL 4148528 (Ala. Oct. 22, 2010).
Keough v. State, No. W2008-01916-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 2612937 (Tenn.
Crim. App. June 30, 2010), vacated, 356 S.W.3d 366 (Tenn. 2011).
Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.
Dec. LEXIS 193 (Pa. D. & C. May 13, 2010).
Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001-CV-W-FJG, 2010 WL 4386532 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 28, 2010).
Darling v. Sec’y, No. 6:07-cv-1701-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 2471441 (M.D. Fla. June
17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1492 (2011).
Turner v. Epps, No. 4:07CV77-WAP, 2010 WL 653880 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 2010),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 998 (2012).
Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 763
(2011).
Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 401
(2011).
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512 (Pa. 2011).
Genetics. Applications within the Spanish law and criminal proceedings1
Óscar Morales García
Table of contents: 1. Spanish substantive law and its developing case law. - 1.1. The impact
of neurobiological pathologies non associable to psychiatric diagnosis criteria. - 1.2. Genetic
predisposition to a violent response. - 2. The impact of genetics in the procedural field.
1. Spanish substantive law and its developing case law

Genetics and neurobiology are able to present premature diagnostics of certain
illnesses un-related to psychiatry that impact in the processes determining human
behavior.
The statement above gives rise to a debate confronting freedom vs. human
determinism exceeding the scope of this work2. It would be somehow dishonest to
criticize that culpability is the cohesive criteria for the (normative) attribution of a
1
Translated from Spanish by Matilde Fourey, Attorney at Uría Menéndez, Barcelona (Spain). Extended
version of the lecture given in the International Congress Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment, held in
Padova-Treviso the 30 September and 1 October 2013. I acknowledge Prof. Silvio Riondato and Dr.
Debora Provolo their kind invitation to participate in the Congress.
2
For a general overview, see E. Demetrio Crespo’s magnificent work, Libertad de voluntad, investigación
sobre el cerebro y responsabilidad penal, in “Indret”, 2/2011, passim, containing an exhaustive examination
of the question’s current state, especially in German bibliography. The author addresses the perspective
of freedom not only from neurobiology but also from the criminal law viewpoints, highlighting the
insurmountable differences arising from «the misnamed categorical failure»: the analysis of the same
phenomenon (freedom) from the perspective of science (empiric and criminal) with different methods
and objectives.
Reporting on the lack of harmony between the medical and legal concepts of mental illness, N.
Eastman, C. Campbell, Neuroscience and legal determination of criminal responsibility, in “Nature
Reviews”, Vol. 7, April 2006, p. 312. The authors also allude to the different interest of empiric and
medical sciences in concepts that are eventually interlinked: while neuroscience is interested in the
concepts of “emotion” and “thought”, (criminal) Law is interested in the concepts of “intent” and
“culpability”, which complicates the understanding between both worlds.
412 Genetics. Applications within the Spanish law and criminal proceedings
fact to its author based on the model’s obsolescence, due to the progress of empiric
sciences, without recognizing the capacity of culpability and its demonstration
to work as a guarantee in the criminal procedure. At the same time, it would be
scarcely prudent to preach for immediate changes to take place in criminal Law and
procedure as a consequence of results that are not yet empirically sufficiently verified.
However, it is worth underlining that the criteria to reduce or exclude the author’s
responsibility linked to suffering from illnesses is currently circumscribed in our
country to the diminution of the author’s ability to discern good from evil. There
are few rulings in which an author distinguishing the difference between right and
wrong and knowing his actions’ transcendence is declared non-liable, even if he has
a marked tendency to carry out such actions.
This is closely related to the debate on free will, the presumed existence of which
is the basis for Spanish criminal liability rules3. The impossibility to adjust a behavior
to the standards set forth in legislation is the foundation of the decision to reduce or
exclude criminal responsibility. In general, such reduction or exclusion will not apply
when the author is able to identify the wrongfulness of his actions4.
Hence the existing link, in the Spanish criminal system, between the reduction
of penalty due to a default in the author’s responsibility and purely psychiatric
foundations. The author’s culpability will be reduced when his illness can be
associated to clinical diagnosis reference books referred to the subject’s psyche and
are, additionally, linked with the specific behavior developed by the author. Only
such illnesses with a pathologic, organic, reflection in the author’s mind will be taken
into consideration when reducing his responsibility. That is where the application of
security measures based on danger prognosis takes on its real meaning, if the mental
illness persists after carrying out the criminal act.
Case law is clearly in favor of identifying the extenuating circumstance of mental
3
See, for example, E. Demetrio Crespo’s abstract of Hassemer’s thesis on this subject, Libertad,
pp. 17-20. In El legado genético y el prinicipio de culpabilidad. Algunas conclusiones provisionales, in El
Derecho ante el Proyecto Genoma Humano, vol. II, Bilbao, 1994, p. 67, J.L. De La Cuesta maintains
that, in order to choose between two non-accredited theories, determinism and free will, it is always
best to start from a concept such as freedom, merely intuitive but «a socially accepted value governing
social life, which criminal Law can hardly disregard, especially when existing alternatives do not lead
to better solutions».
4
Regardless of whether or not the nineteenth-century categories are still suitable to a criminal justice
administration based on humanity and proportionality values, the axis of which is the human being and
the legal attribution of dignity, I fully agree with E. Demetrio Crespo, Libertad, cit., p. 31, that it is
no longer possible to neglect what we effectively know from his empirical verification: «this increasingly
complex reality requires to consider if the glasses we are using provide us enough “visual acuity” or,
on the contrary, only allow us to assess things from a partial and reductionist perspective that may be
mistaken».
Ó. Morales García 413
anomaly5 with the binomial foundation psychological cause-psychiatric effect6. At the

same time, the psychological cause is often required in pathological terms, translating
to a psychiatric mental illness psychologically affecting the subject7. In short, the
reduction of the author’s criminal culpability due to a responsibility deficiency is
necessarily linked to pathological consequences, that is, the psychiatric effect. The
physical effect is, in turn, identified with the ability to discern good from evil and
adjust one’s behavior to such knowledge. Though as we will see below, the importance
of both abilities attributed to the subject is not alike8, and that historically explains and
justifies the reason why some anomalies or personality disorders such as psychopathy
do not fit in the pattern: their pathological basis is not clear; their effect in the ability
to discern good from evil is nil. The consequences of such disorders in the subject’s
ability to decide are not relevant enough to this effect, closing the argumentative
circle: the ability to decide is presumed, the free will is the starting point.
In this scenario, the extenuating circumstance of mental anomaly set forth in
the criminal Code would not be able to offer a predictable answer to those cases in
5
Article 20.1 of the Spanish Criminal Code sets forth that: «The following persons shall not be
criminally accountable: 1º those who, at the time of committing a crime, due to any mental anomaly or
alteration, cannot comprehend the unlawful nature of the act or act in line with such comprehension».
6
The Sentence of the Spanish Supreme Court (“SSC”) dated 22 October 2003 [RJ 2003, 7630]
explains the foundation of irresponsibility in the Spanish legal system: «The Criminal Code of 1995
(RCL 1995, 3170 and RCL 1996, 777) is incardinated in a mixed system regarding the incidence of
psychological anomalies or disorders in criminal responsibility, as the exemption or semi-exemption
require a psychological anomaly or disorder as cause and the subject’s diminished or annulled ability to
comprehend the illegality of his behavior or to act according to such comprehension, as a consequence
and effect of such anomaly or disorder».
7
See the Sentences of the SSC dated 9 March 2005 (RJ 2005, 4043) and 19 December 2011 (RJ
2012, 8615). The latter explains that: «The mixed system of the Criminal Code is based on the double
requirement of a bio-pathological cause and a psychological effect, the suppression or serious alteration
of the ability to comprehend the illegality of one’s behavior or to establish one’s behavior according to
that comprehension».
8
Both elements, cognitive and volitive, are alluded to in case law rulings doctrinally speculating about
the reach of the extenuating circumstance set forth in article 20.1 of the Spanish criminal Code. In
principle, both should be given a similar relevance. It is not the case, however, in court rulings of a
decisive nature, namely sentences setting the impact of pathological illnesses on the author’s criminal
responsibility and the determining of the penalty. This occurs, for example, in the Sentence of the
Supreme Court dated 30 April 2009, JUR 2009, 218028, in which the court refers to the analogous
extenuating circumstance («atenuante de análoga significación») in the case of a brain tumor causing
evident behavioral dysfunctions though the subject still possesses the unimpaired capacity to discern
good from evil. The Supreme Court assesses the case in the following terms: «The appellant demands
the application of the extenuating circumstance of mental alienation set forth in article 21.1 and 20.1
of the Criminal Code. As examined in the precedent ground, the appellant suffers from a sporadic
paraphilia presenting an impulsive change of behavior with an organic basis and from a brain tumor
diagnosed since 1996 which slightly diminishes his volitive capacities. The biological requirement is
met for there is a psychological anomaly. However, the legal psychological requirement is not met as it
hasn’t been proved that he didn’t comprehend what he was doing or that he had an altered perception
of reality. The existence of the referred illness did slightly influence him in the commission of the crime;
therefore, the application of the analogous extenuating circumstance is correct».
which the subject suffers from a non-psychiatric illness, of a genetic basis or not, or
an illness of a purely genetic basis yet not psychiatric.
We will address both matters separately.
1.1. The impact of neurobiological pathologies non associable to psychiatric diagnosis

criteria
The field of neurobiology is rich in corroborated hypothesis of illnesses with a
pathological basis though not relatable to diagnosis reference books at use. Some of
them have been the object of the most recent literature and can be used as reference
for the analysis of the case law infra.
(i) The Charles Whitman case9. In 1996, Charles Whitman murdered his wife
and mother, left for the University of Texas, Austin, where he fired and murdered
15 more people from the flat roof. After being taken down at the University an
autopsy was performed, revealing a 5 centimeter brain tumor that pressured the
hypothalamus and compressed the amygdala, which adjusts the emotional processes
and especially those referred to fear (own survival) and aggression10. No doubt
the subject is conscious of what is right and what is wrong; he does not find any
satisfactory explanation to his attraction for homicidal behaviors (I wouldn’t even
qualify them as violent, as that didn’t seem to be the leitmotive of his acts); and
of course, the subject does not suffer from a classic psychiatric illness: he doesn’t
suffer from schizophrenia, psychosis nor mental retardation. In short, no psychiatric
pathological basis influencing the subject’s psyche is described. Thus, if we follow
our case law’s logic, which we will expose later on, should Charles Whitman have
committed his massacre in Spain and survived it doesn’t seem probable that we could
have escaped our own conceptual prison. And that even if we hadn’t asked ourselves
if, under a pathological conditioning (a tumor) and its context (causing variations in
the amygdala), the volitive process as such was still working in the brains and psyche
of the subject – which doesn’t even amount to asking whether or not the volitive
9
Repeatedly cited in this article’s bibliography. Lately, and for all, in D. Eagleman, Incognito. The secret
lives of the brain, 2013, p. 183.
10
D. Eagleman, Incognito. The secret lives of the brain, cit., p. 184 and 185, incorporates what Whitman
wrote in his diary days before he died: «The truth is that I can’t seem to understand myself these days.
I supposedly am an intelligent and reasonable young man. However, lately (I don’t remember how it
started) I have been the victim of numerous unusual and irrational thoughts». After killing his wife he
added: «After a lot of thought, I have decided to kill my wife, Kathy, tonight (…) I love her deeply, and
she has been as good a wife to me as any man could desire. Rationally, I can’t find any specific reason to
do it». In his diary, Whitman, a man of a more than reasonable intelligence, a bank employee, a former
boy scout child and a monitor, described by all his friends and acquaintances as someone as reasonable
as anyone who claim to be so can really be, added the following: «I imagine I gave the impression of
having brutally assassinated my beloved ones. I just tried to do a quick and conscientious work. (…)
If my life insurance policy is valid, please cancel my debts. (…) [A]nonlymously donate the rest to a
foundation for mental health. Investigation may prevent similar tragedies to come».
ability of the subject was diminished or neutralized.

(ii) Let us also consider the (real) case11 of an individual with an ordinary
behavior and normal heterosexual parameters. Suddenly, he starts to feel a strong
sexual attraction for young children (a paraphilia: a diagnosis traditionally associated
to personality disorders unrelated to a pathological basis). The subject starts to
compulsively download enormous quantities of child pornography and attempts to
seduce his teenage daughter, for which he is sentenced to three years of imprisonment,
substituted by a preventive-curative therapy. The acute headaches he starts feeling
after being hospitalized, where he carries on with his new sexual behavior, invite
the doctors to perform a tomography imaging, discovering an enormous tumor in
his orbitofrontal cortex. After its extirpation the subject’s behavior went back to the
normality observed before its genesis, losing any sexual attraction for minors. Shortly
after, the subject’s behavior indicated a new sexual compulsion towards minors, and
he was thus subjected to new exploratory tests. The tumor had regrown and was
extirpated again, this time definitively. The subject turned back to his original sexual
behavior, in heterosexual normal parameters and without any remains of his former
interest for minors. Removing the tumor, the attraction completely disappears; the
tumor regrows and so does the attraction; extirpated again, so does again his sexual
pedophile impulse. Little medical experiments bring that much clarity on the brain
functioning and malfunctioning in the presence of pathologies lacking a psychiatric
basis. In this case, a reduction of the subject’s criminal responsibility would neither be
accepted in our system, according to the general postulates on criminal responsibility
applied by the Supreme Court case law.
Few are the appellation or cassation rulings in Spain which have faced cases like
the two mentioned above, though such situations cannot be said to be exceptional
either. Indeed, the example of the brain tumor and the paraphilia is not unusual
and has generated some rulings that confirm, as we anticipated earlier, the idea that
the lack of responsibility possesses one insurmountable barrier: a pathological basis
mentioned in diagnosis reference books.
An example substantially similar to Eagleman and Bauman’s, a paraphilia
associated with a brain tumor, is portrayed in the Supreme Court’s ruling dated
30 April 2009, (JUR 2009, 218028). The Court excludes the application of the
extenuating circumstance of severe mental anomaly set forth in article 20.1 of
11
Also repeatedly cited in this article’s bibliography. Lately, and for all, in D. Eagelman, Incognito,
cit., p. 187; and M. Bauman, The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to impulsive
Violence: Is it relevant to Criminal Trials?, in “Neuroethics”, 6 (2) 2013, p. 297, among others (accessible
on-line at: http://www.pc.rhul.ac.uk/sites/rheg/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/genetic-italy-case.pdf).
Bauman’s perspective, however, refers to whether or not, in hypothesis such as the case presented in this
example, the average man should also be afflicted by a brain tumor in order to be used as a valid abstract
comparative concept. If not, the perspective of the average man may not be a determining comparative
factor, by comparing radically different perspectives.
the Spanish Criminal Code, redirecting the situation to a mere diminution of

responsibility applying the analogous extenuating circumstance of severe mental
illness12. That is to say that the Court does not believe there is a severe mental
illness, but rather something similar, yet different13. Furthermore, the referred ruling
emphasizes the subject’s ability to discern good from evil14, as a question weighing
more than the diminishment of his volitive capacity. The Court does not address,
however, a major question, which is the value to be attributed to the ability to discern
good from evil in a pathological context clearly defined: a tumor neurologically
associated to a basic alteration of the subject’s behavior. The fundamental question
that any Court ought to answer before a pathological reality, be it psychiatric or
not, such as the one demonstrated in this case, is whether or not the subject is
able to correctly go through the process of determining good and evil or if such
distinction becomes different/indifferent for the subject due to his new physical
condition, a brain tumor, being able to recognize that his new sexual behavior is
deemed incorrect by the social majority while presently lacking any commitment to
those valuating rules15. The equivalent conditions theory (“teoría de la equivalencia
de las condiciones”) becomes useful in this kind of process, where the condition to be
suppressed is absolutely effective in the progress of the action committed. Of course,
it may be objected that the starting point is the subject’s ability to understand the
12
On the analogous extenuating circumstance see infra and footnote 18.
13
The reasoning of the Court is the following: «The appellant considers the first instance Court has
mistakenly evaluated the evidence consisting in a medical expert report (pages 524 to 535) and the
medical documents attached to the defense writ consisting in eight X-ray photographs resulting
from computerized axial tomography, a non-confirmed diagnosis certificate dating from 2007 and
communications of temporary incapacity due to common contingencies. The sentencing Court
considers to be proven that the appellant suffers from a sporadic paraphilia, presenting an impulsive
behavioral change with an organic basis and a brain tumor diagnosed since 1996, which slightly diminish
his volitive capacities. This has granted him the analogous extenuating circumstance of psychological
alteration. In pages 534-535 of the case file the medical conclusions are stated and the sentencing Court
make them its own for in the referred documents no conclusion is reached regarding the existence
of a serious cognitive alteration (“he can tell good from evil”). Regarding his volitive capacity, those
documents indicate that “his interior free will to inhibit such changes is diminished”, referring to his
behavioral changes. Thus, nothing is said regarding the diminishment or annulation of that volitive
capacity. On the other hand, the documents attached to the defense writ do not indicate a severe
diminishment or annulation of his intellective or volitive capacities. Thus, the first instance Court has
correctly evaluated the expert reports as they do not allow for a higher diminishment of the penalty than
what was granted by the sentencing Court (extenuating circumstance analogous to mental disorder)».
14
Specifically, the Court affirms: «the legal psychological requirement is not met because it is not
affirmed that he didn’t understand what he was doing or that his conscience of reality was altered».
15
This is the reason why M. Bauman, The Monoamine, cit., p. 302, questions the necessity, in cases
such as a paraphilia associated with a tumor, that in order to be adopted as an abstract concept and a
comparative reference, the average man should also be afflicted of a brain tumor. Otherwise, it would
be impossible to know the manner in which the subject faces the valuation of his sexual behavior from a
cognitive stand point (not volitive, not yet) and whether or not this process is identical to the hypothesis
of absence of bio-pathological cause.
illegality of his acts, though it would be presumptuous in the current state of the art
to affirm that there is but one unique and univocal cognitive process tending to that
end. Again, the more effective the pathological (non-psychiatric) cause involved in
the development of the facts, the more autonomous and farther from the ordinary
standards will be the process of understanding the illegality of the action. In any
event, the criminal irresponsibility and the extenuating circumstance based on this
belong to a category only applicable to exceptions, to the cognitive abnormality, that
cannot be solely referred to normality but to the ensemble of possible abnormalities,
without aprioristic exclusions based on the cause that is generating them.
In other cases associated to brain tumors, the so called minor case law (of the
Provincial Courts) has opted for declaring the complete criminal irresponsibility
through the application of the extenuating circumstance of mental alienation16. It
needs to be pointed out, however, that the brain tumor becomes relevant so far
as it may explain a mental illness of a psychiatric basis referred in the diagnosis
reference book DSM-IV. It is thus not a ruling in which reflection is put into the
legal/criminal consequences of the existence of a neurobiological pathology with a
non-psychological foundation in the agent’s responsibility, in the event that there is
a verified interference of the tumor with normal brain processes. It is rather a ruling
addressing the hypothesis that a tumor may be the probable joint cause (together
with a previous accident) of a personality disorder, referring again to the ability of
such disorder to annul the intellective and volitive capacities.
The situation does not improve by turning to hypothesis of exclusion or
diminishment of criminal responsibility of a pathological basis yet different from
mental anomaly, such as the perception alteration foreseen in article 20.3 of the
code17. First, the very same extenuating circumstance has a legal limit: any perception
16
The Provincial Court of Madrid (Section 4), in its Sentence no. 62/2009, dated 1 June (JUR 2010,
14410), inserted the suffering of a brain tumor by the subject as a joint cause for the mental disorder
he experienced, which led to the application of the complete extenuating circumstance of mental
alienation. This ruling develops the following reasoning: «The defendant, who is currently 53 years
old was being treated in the Centre for Mental Health of Villaverde, for a chronic delusional disorder
and recurring depressive episodes. When he was 33, he was involved in a car accident that caused the
fracture of his parieto-occipital region, as a consequence of which he could never go back to work,
receiving a pension for his inability. Three years later, a delusional disorder gradually appeared which
has become chronic over the years, consisting in believing that a person, his victim, is the cause for
the subject’s physical ailments. Later on, as a consequence of the facts that are being sentenced here,
the defendant has been detected a brain tumor in his pituitary gland, the dimension of which might
possibly be the cause of the subject’s symptoms, that he deliriously attributed to his neighbor. In
short, the defendant suffers from a delusional disorder (297); recurrent depression (296.3); organic
personality disorder (310.1) and pituitary macroadenoma. We have to conclude that the defendant’s
illness caused the annulment of his volitive and cognitive capacities, thus granting the mental alienation
set forth in article 20.1 of the criminal code».
17
Article 20.3 of the Criminal code stipulates that: «The following persons shall not be criminally
accountable: 3º whoever, due to suffering alterations in perception from the time of birth, or from
childhood, has his perception of reality seriously altered».
alteration (whatever that may mean), must be suffered from birth or childhood,
which should exclude ex lege all serious non-pathological illnesses that are unrelated
to genetics (or which cannot be unquestionably linked to genetics – note that the
presumption of innocence is not applicable when we are analyzing culpability)
originated after childhood.
Furthermore, the extenuating circumstance set forth in article 20.3 of the
criminal Code refers to the case of non-correspondence between the society’s
cultural values and the values effectively absorbed by the subject18, as a consequence
of a malfunctioning in the cerebral system for interpreting values, which will again
exclude the application of this extenuating circumstance to the cases in which the
subject (like Whitman) do not suffer from a clear defect in the value interpreting
system, and less so since birth or childhood.
Neither does appealing to the situations of non-requirement (“inexigibilidad”) to
behave in accordance with Law provide a solution to such cases. First, because non-
requirement is a conceptual category, dogmatic if you please, though not positive, not
set forth as such in Spanish positive law. The excusing state of necessity (article 20.7
SCC) or the insurmountable fear (article 20.6), both set forth in Spanish positive law,
dogmatically refer to such concept. In short, those are circumstances in which the
environmental context determines a quasi-automatic response in the acting subject;
always under the premise that the exceptionality of the environmental context turns
the act in (statistically) unrepeatable. I am not saying that non-requirement as a
category is not the fitting concept to place such behaviors (in fact, non-requirement
seems to embrace them very well, at least literally), but its translation to Spanish
positive law is restricted to extreme environmental contexts completely unrelated
to a genetic predisposition or to the appearance of neurologic illnesses unrelated to
psychiatric disorders with a traditional pathological basis.
In view of this, the only viable way out left by the legislator and the case law to the
phenomenon of acting under the influence of congenital illnesses or non-psychiatric
brain malfunctioning is the analogous extenuating circumstance19. This extenuating
18
In extenso, F. Morales, La alteración de la percepción: contenido y límites (artículo 8.3 CP), in
“Cuadernos de política criminal”, 1990, p. 71 ff. Though it is referred to article 8.3 of the former
criminal Code, this extenuating circumstance has not been substantially altered in the current version
of the Code, set forth in article 20.3.
19
Article 21 of the criminal Code sets forth the semi-extenuating circumstances and the mitigating
circumstances. The first semi-extenuating circumstance (art. 21.1 CC) refers precisely to the mental
anomaly foreseen in article 20.1, when not all the requirements of a complete exemption of criminal
responsibility are met. In case law, its application is of a quantitative nature (lower intensity of the
psychological influence caused by the psychiatric pathological basis) and is thus not a solution for
those cases in which the link to a psychiatric illness is missing. The 7th circumstance of article 21,
however, sets forth the analogous extenuating circumstance, defined as “any other circumstance with
an analogous signification to the circumstances above”. It offers a criminal responsibility reduction in
a much lesser extent (operating as an ordinary circumstance it imposes the ordinary penalty framework
circumstance would reduce the agent’s responsibility if similar causes (but different)
to those described in the above paragraphs concur. That is, something similar to a
perception alteration or to a severe mental anomaly, though not exactly, be it because
the pathological basis is lacking or because the anomaly is not suffered from birth or
childhood, etc20. However, the application of this extenuating circumstance responds
to exceptionality criteria. Its use in our criminal system allows alleviating the State’s
criminal response in such cases in which the subject’s behavior evidences traces of the
pure and autonomous extenuating circumstances’ basic requirements, though not all
of them concur. Its application to a criminal behavior deriving from a neurobiological
and/or genetically based illness would imply an express acknowledgement that these
behaviors have no consideration in the Spanish criminal system.
In Whitman’s case, his elimination aborted in some way the debate on the social
response to be given (through the State) to this kind of cases. The situation of the
“pedophile” is different, for he was sentenced for child abuse. Once the tumor was
extracted, it is clear that nothing justified the application of security measures based
on a forecast of his dangerousness after the crime; in the Spanish criminal system,
that would imply his return to an ordinary penitentiary regime until the completion
of his sentence. If the neurobiological tie determining (totally or mainly) the agent’s
behavior cannot be linked to a severe mental dysfunction with a psychiatric basis, the
neurobiological reasons will not be relevant to criminal Law. It will keep judging the
author as a free man, sending general deterrent messages through the reaffirmation of
the law by processing and sentencing him and projecting upon the author individual
in its lower half).

20
In this position, see the Sentence of the Supreme Court dated 30 April 2009, (JUR 2009, 218028).
Clearly, the Sentence of the Supreme Court dated 23 October 1984, RJ 1984/5060, also referred to
mental illnesses attributed to neurobiological causes, such as a tumor. The ruling states that: «even then,
and according to what has been stated in ground no. 3 of the appeal, different degrees of lucidity exist
between vigil consciousness and entire consciousness, all accepted in case law, going from one to the
other, legally frameworked, or depending on the application of the complete or semi-complete mental
alienation; the transitory mental dysfunction; outburst and blind rage in a severe or normal range, or as
an analogous circumstance stated in no. 10, here invoked as being applicable. The truth is that, against
the usual belief, the perfect framing of the facts does not only depend on the degree of consciousness
with which the acts were carried out or on the intensity of the dysfunction suffered by the subject, but
also to other conditioning circumstances that we have to consider, such as: mental illness in the cases
of alienation; morbidity or brain damage unbalanced by an exogenous cause regarding some mental
disorders; psychological normality in passionate states, more or less disrupted by the stimulus’ intensity,
or those originated in character defects or character deviations or abnormalities producing deviated or
criminal behaviors even in a psychologically normally functioning brain without the intervention of
emotion or, finally, a whole range of unconsciousness situations presenting common notes with the
above described circumstances though not fully fitting, such as behavior abnormalities caused by an
incipient brain tumor, a dysendocriny or an irritability burst produced by an hypoglycemia, which
would depend on the application of the so called analogous extenuating circumstance (an analogous
situation to the above, though not exactly) set forth in no. 10 of article 9º…)».
deterrent messages of an impossible effectiveness21. There is no possible individual

deterrent message so far as the subject is cured, and the general deterrent message is
not very flattering, for little motivation can derive from knowing that under such
circumstances the author’s acting against the law will still be punished through a legal
blame. Thus, only a merely retributionist message derives from the fact22 (and not
from the responsibility deriving from the fact) or the systemic thesis which always
lead back to neo-retributionism23. And this is where the debate turns fiercer between
scholars supporting a reformation of the Spanish criminal system of attributing
responsibility able to avoid not only the theoretical problems of retributionism24,
but more importantly the practical problems posed by neuroscience, and those who
maintain that the system should remain just slightly permeable to the evolution of
neurobiology in order to preserve the social basis of the attribution of responsibility25-26.
A typical debate in the commencement of a scientific revolution that is just starting
to provide tangible results, generating reservations basically among the defenders of
the legal theory of crime and the criminal system as a whole. Obviously, the aims
of criminal Law may be reconsidered so as to keep the building standing, but that
would amount to cheat in the game of solitaire, for it doesn’t face the problem nor
it contributes to improve one’s own position. In this regard, the substantive Law
cannot give up a systematic interpretation allowing article 20.1 of the criminal Code
to be effective upon those who could not act consistently with the logic “knowing
the rules/acting accordingly” for being affected by an a neurobiological anomaly
21
D. Pavlovic, Right to be wrong: if brain is Guilty, are We Responsible?, in “The Open Ethics Journal”,
2, 2008, p. 41.
22
D. Pavlovic, Right to be wrong, cit., p. 41.
23
With a broad acceptance not only among scholars. In fact, in Spain, the Jakobsian message has
cheekily leaked in the criminal Code reformation recently submitted to the Parliament (October 2013).
Article 80 of the criminal Code (on the adjournment of penalties depriving of liberty under two years)
is expected to change in the following terms: «The penalties depriving of liberty over one year will not
be adjourned where not doing so may be necessary to secure the general confidence in the application
of the law infringed by the offence». The reformation may be consulted in www.congreso.es.
24
On the necessary modification of the retributive conception of attributing responsibility, J. Green,
J. Cohen, For the Law, neuroscience changes Nothing and Everything, in “Philosophical Transactions:
Biological Sciences”, vol. 359, nº 1451, Law and the Brain, pp. 1776, 1777 and, especially, p. 1784.
Also, broadly, D. Eagleman, Incognito, cit., pp. 183-232.
25
Including broad bibliography, with special attention given to Hassemer’s thesis, as pointed out above,
E. Demetrio-Crespo, Libertad, cit., pp. 17-20.
26
Among the skeptical ones, the preventions of such authors in whose countries allow for security
measures to be applied prior to committing the offence must be highlighted. Thus, N. Eastman, C.
Campbell, Neuroscience, cit., p. 317, alert of the possibility of a use/abuse of the neurosciences’ progress
in the application of security measures prior to the commission of the offence based on a forecast of
dangerousness to third parties of those suffering by a neurological ailment: «...this further emphasizes
the risk of (mis) use of biological evidence that shows a tendency towards violence being adopted
towards preventive detention». The authors are also persuaded of the necessity to divide neurobiology
and law, alerting of the risk: «That is, there is a risk of even the courts not properly maintaining the
boundary between scientific evidence and legal decision» (p. 312).
unconventionally psychiatric27. And it is obvious that it will modify not only the
traditional conception of attributing responsibility, but responsibility as a whole. For
the information provided by empirical sciences on the limits of our capacity to know
and act freely cannot be regulated from the point of view of social “sciences” to the
extreme of becoming unrecognizable. This is not compatible with the principle of
proportionality on which the contemporaneous criminal systems are based and, of
course, with the idea of responding for one’s own acts.
1.2. Genetic predisposition to a violent response

Scientific genetic development is not indifferent to criminal Law regarding the
attribution of responsibility. The decoding of human genomics and the deepening
in the individual’s genetic features has allowed to determine, in the past few years,
the statistical incidence of certain genetic anomalies in the context of aggressive
responses with the capacity to affect fundamental legal interests.
The case of Monoamine Oxidase A (hereinafter “MAOA”) is doubtless the one with
the higher degree of development do date. Genetic studies combined with prolonged
periods of empirical studies on the surrounding environment reach undisputable
results in medical bibliography on the predisposition to a violent behavior in certain
contexts. Indeed, low levels of MAOA, or MAOA-Low (hereinafter “MAOA-L”),
combined with a surrounding environment of sexual o physical abuse during
childhood generate a predisposition to a violent response to a provocation, close
to 85%. MAOA-L + adverse environment can thus be determining in the reaction
of the individual afflicted by the genetic alteration in the hypothesis of a previous
provocation28.
In short, the scientific verification of the high probability of a violent over-reaction
towards a previous provocation by MAOA-L carriers + adverse environment compels
us to question the suitability of such behaviors to be subsumed in the extenuating
circumstance of serious mental alteration.
It is worth warning that Spanish case law has never seriously faced29 the suitability
27
In Italian literature, clearly, V. Di Mascio, Neuroscienza forense: spiragli applicativi e possibili sviluppi
nel sistema processuale penale, 2011-2012, pp. 137 to 140.
28
Discovery usually attributed to Dr. James Fallon. About this, see the interesting article published
by L.M. Ariza in the Spanish journal “El País” on 29 January 2012, elaborated based on interviews
conducted with James Fallon.
29
The only case that could be deemed to be remotely related is stated in the Sentence of the Provincial
Court of Guipúzcoa (Section 2) dated 24 march 1998, ARP 1998\766, with a single legal ground,
that analyzes the case of sexual assaults reiterated in time (for years) from the defendant upon his
minor daughters (4 to 17) and his own sister (between 8 and 15 years old); facts that were completely
admitted by the defendant. The sentence rules out any possible influence of genetics on the substantive
criminal law, but it is not clear from the text whether the genetic-grounded arguments of the defense
of the extenuating circumstance set forth in article 20.1 of the criminal Code to
harbor hypothesis of genetic predisposition, so we can only speculate on the answer
to be granted by case law to a mixed pathological-psychological system such as
the one described above. We know that in the field of brain tumors unrelated to
a classic psychiatric diagnosis, case law rejects the diminishment of the author’s
responsibility, reducing the penalty solely through the extenuating circumstance
analogous to mental alteration. Thus, a similar answer should be expected regarding
genetic predisposition. Especially if we take into account that in conditions differing
from the initial hypothesis, that is when there is no previous provocation, MAOA-L
carriers + adverse environment do not present cognitive or volitive limitations in the
sense to which the Spanish case law appeals30.
This kind of cases simply does not seem to have surfaced in the Spanish forensic
debate. Responsibility for the current situation cannot be exclusively attributed to
the legislative work, as the extenuating circumstance is in my opinion sufficiently
malleable to harbor this kind of cases if, after the corresponding debate, it was the
most appropriate conclusion31 (regarding this, see infra). An explanation may be
found in the predictability of case law in this sort of matters, together with the
lawyer exposed in the ruling were accompanied by an expert witness report or introduced in the debate
by the lawyer’s conclusions report. The Sentence assesses the matter in the following words, scarcely
elaborated: «And regarding the penalty, all the arguments of the defense lawyer tending to show a
“pathological” conduct, a “genetic issue”, a permanently abnormal life, are not tenable. Setting aside
the lack of evidence concerning the foregoing, the fact that the wife and the injured parties clearly
state to have forgiven him, relating that their will is that he is released from jail as soon as possible,
may be caused by the precarious situation in which they are, for the sole revenue was the salary of
the defendant, or to a complete instability accrediting more than ever the necessity of a long term
educational treatment. Such treatment shall be united to a financial help, otherwise it will be of no use.
Even if we admit a strong understanding between the defendant and his victims, sickly understanding
though understanding after all, and accepting the genetic inheritance alluded to by his lawyer, the
terrible family environment with such examples as the one that is being judged, separating the author,
the Court shall sentence in a prudent yet firm way such an abnormal behavior, deeming 15 years
imprisonment as fitting. The existence of two requirements allowing the imposition of this penalty by
themselves must be presently noted».
30
There is a similar situation in Canadian law, where the legal description of mental disorder reminds
of the Spanish case law on article 20.1 of the Criminal code: «No person is criminally responsible for
act committed or an omission made while suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person
incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong»
(reference to the Canadian criminal code: C-46, s.16). This country’s case law has also been modeling
the content of the concept of mental disorder, the sense of which highly complicates the inclusion of
MAOA-L cases in that conceptual development. About this, see S. Halwani, D. B. Krupp, The Genetic
defence: The impact of Genetics on the concept of Criminal Responsibility, in “Health Law Journal”, Vol.
12, 2004, pages 52 to 54. The authors affirm in page 54: «…wrong means morally wrong rather than
legally wrong, and therefore the defence is available to an accused “if he is incapable of understanding
that the act is wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of reasonable members of society. There
is no evidence that an individual with a MAOA defect does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his act».
31
Regarding the capacity of article 20.1 of the criminal Code to harbor these cases, vid. the interrogations
developed infra.
reasonable preconception of legal actors before the perspective of failing; or it may

simply be due to the general ignorance on the progress of genetics and their incidence
in certain conducts able to damage legal interests that are essential to the community.
The disparity of the state of technique from one state to another is surprising.
The excellent case law study of Professors Deborah Denno and Arthur McGivney32
highlights such difference, not only due to the quantitative basis of the study,
referred to 81 rulings related to the treatment of genetic predisposition to a violent
behavior, but rather by qualitative matters such as the way by which those questions
are introduced in the procedure and the way the Courts address the solution in
each case, especially when the penalty at stake is death. Certainly, the procedural
features of each country respond to a myriad of historical reasons. Starting from the
procedural possibility offered by the American law to incite rulings’ revisions based
on failure of the defense to use the appropriate means in the trial which derived in a
condemnatory ruling; the truth is that such a possibility is resorted to. And its use in
this particular field is not only the evidence of a different attitude between American
and Spanish legal operators, but it supposes the ordinary acknowledgement of
the influence of these questions in the criminal response: the possibility to revise
the rulings in which the defense lawyer did not appeal to genetic reports implies
the existence of rulings in which ordinarily appealing to such reports the lawyer
accomplished a significant victory in the defense of his client. The admission of a
revision based on the failure to employ useful means does not make sense if the
means are not previously admitted to be useful33.
In order to contextualize the state of Spanish law the Bayout case examined in
Italy is of particular interest, as stated in the Sentence of the Trieste Court of Appeal
dated 18 September 2009. The defendant, schizophrenic untreated for the 6 months
prior the facts, was aggressed and provoked by a group of south-American boys. An
hour and a half after the aggression and the provocation, having gotten possession
of a knife, he stabbed a south-American citizen he had taken for one of the boys
with whom he had had the previous altercation. The first instance ruling partially
32
D. Denno, A. McGivney, Court’s increasing consideration of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal
cases: results of a longitudinal study, 2011, in “Michigan State Law Review”, pp. 968 to 1028.
33
In the study carried out by D. Denno, A. McGivney, Court’s cit., pp. 1028 ff., the influence of
introducing genetic predisposition in the judicial results is proven, especially in the cases of death
penalty and very probably, as the authors point out, because of the existence of death penalty. However,
genetic predisposition wasn’t always harbored by the American Courts. Among the most representative
cases that opened the public debate on the effectiveness of proving the genetic predisposition to a violent
behavior, Stephen Mobley’s case stands out. He was diagnosed MAOA-L + adverse environment, but
the Judge considered the law was not yet prepared for this kind of forensic evidence, being executed
on March 2005. On this, see also the authors cited in this footnote (pages 980 and following), N.
Eastman, C. Campbell, Neuroscience, cit., p. 313; and K. Ching, Pleading for Mercy and Mitigation:
The use of behavioral Genetic Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, in “Washington Undergraduate Law
Review”, Vol. II, 2007, p. 14 ff.
applied the extenuating circumstance of mental anomaly as a consequence of the

schizophrenia suffered by the defendant, however not applying the penalty reduction
in its whole extent (up to 1/3 of the penalty). The appeal Court considered the
suffering of MAOA-L by the defendant had been proved, reducing the penalty to its
limit of 1/334.
The ruling is interesting because it surfaces the fundamental problems to be
taken into account regarding genetic predisposition and the possibility to exempt
the subject of criminal responsibility. As a previous note, however, it is not clear that
Italian case law has accepted genetic predisposition and, specifically, MAOA-L +
adverse environment as an extenuating circumstance. It rather seems that the appeal
Court sanctions the application of the semi-extenuating circumstance of mental
disorder due to its concurrence together with schizophrenia in the author, thus
extending to their maximum the effects of the extenuating circumstance on the final
penalty. In short, it appears more as a quantitative than a qualitative question35. Yet
we could understand that the maximization of the effects of the semi-extenuating
circumstance caused by the verification of MAOA-L amounts to affirming that the
extenuating circumstance of MAOA-L is being applied. But the truth is that we have
no detailed knowledge of the extension of the penalty reduction had only MAOA-L
concurred (without the schizophrenia to support the application of the extenuating
circumstance, as it happened). The only effect of MAOA-L in this particular case
was limited to reducing the penalty based on the application of an extenuating
circumstance granted for different reasons; the contribution of MAOA-L in such
a reduction was so limited that it could be characterized as a simple mitigating
circumstance.
That being said, the truth is that the consideration by the Trieste Court of the
concurrence of MAOA-L evidences two basic questions that scholars and case law
should not lose sight of in this type of matters.
In the first place, that genetic predisposition should not be distinguished in
causal terms from any of the classic mental disorders able to convene the complete
or incomplete extenuating circumstance. The subject’s act should be directly
34
A second Italian ruling recognize the incidence in responsibility of «alterations in a brain area
regulating aggressive actions and, from the genetic standpoint, of factors generally associated to a higher
risk of evidencing an impulsive, aggressive and violent behavior». Addressing the case and analyzing it
in depth, M.T. Collica, Il riconoscimento del ruolo delle neuroscienze nel giudizio di imputabilità, in
“Diritto penale contemporaneo”, 2012, pages 1 and following.
35
This is connected to the reflection of the experts group constituted in the Nuffield Council of Bioethics
expressed in Genetics and Human Behavior: the ethical context, published in 2002 and cited by A.
Santosuosso, Il dilemma del diritto di fronte alle neuroscienze, in A. Santosuosso (a cura di), Le
neuroscienze e il diritto, Padova, 2009, p. 15. The practice group exposes, as cited in the aforementioned
author in his work, that «it is not possible, based on the available knowledge, to affirm that there are
genetic conditions that justify the exclusion of criminal responsibility, but some of those conditions
may be taken into consideration when determining a penalty (sentencing) that could be diminished».
causally connected to the presence of MAOA-L. As we informed at the beginning

of this section, scientific investigations carried out to date evidence that MAOA-L
is only relevant to determine the correlation degree to violent responses under
two conditionings: (i) its combination with a surrounding environment, such as a
verified sexual, physical or mental child abuse36; and (ii) the existence of a previous
provocation: MAOA-L + adverse surrounding is not scientifically related to aggressive
inclinations un-connected to a previous provocation37.
The Trieste ruling does not seem to sufficiently assess any of the aforementioned
conditionings, opting for the verification of the presence of MAOA-L without
further specification.
On the one hand, the legal ground dedicated to this question does not contain
any pronouncement on the kind of abuse the subject – an immigrant – may have
been the victim during his childhood, nor on the surrounding in which the abuse
may have taken place. The Court’s reflection in its legal ground on the concurrence
of MAOA-L seems more of a scientific discovery by the Court than an individual
evidence process in which the elements concerning the subject’s specific genetic
predisposition should be accredited, otherwise turning the expert report ineffective38.
Furthermore, the Court does not evaluate whether or not the time taken by the
subject to objectify his response to a previous violent provocation was in accordance
with the standard model response of MAOA-L39. Note that the defendant takes one
hour and a half to carry out the acts that would conduct to the tragic death of the
south-American citizen he took for one of his previous attackers. Clearly, this could
suggest that the triggered violent action was not a reaction linked to MAOA-L.
On the other hand, the attention given by the American Courts but also and
especially by the Trieste Appeal Court to hypothesis of genetic predisposition makes
us wonder whether or not we are facing true mental illnesses and, finally, if their
application absolutely prejudges individual freedom of will and, in turn, the very
same basis of the criminal attribution of responsibility40. It is true that the subject
36
Critical with this aspect, A. Urruela, La predisposición genética a la agresividad como fundamento
de una reducción de condena, in http://www.institutoroche.es/Legal_comentarios_de_actualidad/V87.
html. In turn, M. Bauman, The Monoamine, cit., p. 301, questions in his analysis whether or not
schizophrenia would be a specific surrounding environment.
37
M. Bauman, The Monoamine, cit., p. 302 ff.
38
On the problems threatening the appropriate valuation of the neuro-scientific expert report by the
judge, see M. Bertolino, Prove neuro-psicologiche di verità penale, in “Diritto penale contemporaneo”,
2010-2012, p. 9. In particular, the author’s reflections on generality and generalization. Warning us of
the necessity to individualize the subject’s genetic predisposition as opposed to the impulse of granting
the subject a reduction or exemption of criminal responsibility by the mere fact that he is classified
amongst a group of similar subjects, N. Eastman, C. Campbell, Neuroscience, cit., p. 316.
39
M. Bauman, The Monoamine, cit., p., 302.
40
The second section of the extenuating circumstance stated in article 20.1 of the criminal Code may
provide an answer to these cases, which in my opinion would be erroneous. This circumstance exempts
from criminal responsibility when there is a transitory mental disorder, which in contrast to the mental
afflicted from MAOA-L belongs to numerous population groups, which in principle

would not distinguish him from the population groups suffering from mental
illnesses with a pathological basis.
But the debate on the freedom of will is not different from the debate that could
originate regarding schizophrenia or other mental illnesses. We have highlighted
above the uniting feature of the DSM-IV and other diagnostic reference books. The
evidence on the existence of a mental disorder afflicting the subject in the criminal
procedure, in order to normatively attribute an act to its author is of an eminently
inferential nature. The judge will seek the psychiatrist’s assistance, who will be able to
submit his clinical diagnosis after the subject’s appropriate examinations, looking for
a common nomenclature in the diagnosis reference books that will allow the same
language to be spoken in Spain, Italy or the United States. However, the psychiatrist
will not be able to affirm before the Judge if the subject acted under the influence
of his illness in the moment of committing the facts, or if his criminal behavior
was carried out in normal parameters. The sentencing body will have to decide,
attending to the diagnosed illness and the behavioral traits statistically associated to
it, whether or not the subject acted under his illness’ effects in every specific case. In
such cases, the subject’s capacity to understand and act accordingly must be affected
in such a degree that he could not be motivated by the criminal law to act differently.
And that is an inferential judgment. Nothing different comes out regarding genetic
predisposition in cases such as MAOA-L + adverse surrounding41. What medicine
is able to demonstrate to the sentencing judge is that, where there is a previous
provocation, the individuals affected by MAOA-L in an adverse surrounding will
normally react to the provocation with a violent behavior (up to 85%). It cannot
prove that it happened in the specific case, nor can it directly demonstrate to the
Judge that during the commission of the facts the subject was acting under the effects
of schizophrenia, as opposed to a moment of lucidity. Psychiatry and genetics can
endeavor to examine an individualized model of mental illness or genetic mutation
possibly suffered by the author, the record of his surroundings and the result of the
clinical examinations. The remainder is an inference process corresponding to the
Judge alone.
disorder does not require a pathological basis, is not continued in time and its cure would be effective
and without sequelae (the ruling of the Supreme Court dated 6 July 2001 (RJ 2001, 5262) is of this
opinion). MAOA-L + adverse surrounding explain unfathomable or unusual aggressive reactions in
previous provocation contexts, and its concurrence will probably not affect the subject’s ability to
discern good from evil. But the transitory mental disorder is also defined by its exceptional irruption
lacking any risk of reiteration, which usually leads to the defendant’s absolution without any security
measure being applied. But the application to MAOA-L of an extenuating circumstance may not be
able to ignore the statistical probability of the subject reiterating his behavior in similar conditions,
which would be extremely high, and would frontally oppose transitory mental disorder and MAOA-L
+ adverse surrounding.
41
M. Bauman addresses this issue in The Monoamine, cit., p. 303 ff.
2. The impact of genetics in the procedural field

The question is considerably different in the procedural field. There, genetics
seem to be manna to the Courts in order to establish the identity of the responsible
individual. Genetic markers can be a solid guaranty to exclude criminal responsibility
due to the high probability of attributing a genetic profile to an individual, thus very
probably excluding the remainder of the population42. Lastly, from the victimologic
point of view, the contrasting of genetic markers allows in many cases, especially in
sexual offences, to identify the author with margins of doubt close to zero.
However, it is still true that the procedure of taking samples tending to the
author’s identification through his genetic markers can constitute a risk to the
remaining 0.1%; that is to the individual whose markers will be compared to those
found in the crime scene. Risks for the fundamental rights and their articulation in
legislation; risks of sample contamination and risks in the contrasting procedure,
especially regarding the contrasts with samples held in databases.
Spanish procedural law unsystematically regulates the collection of samples,
analysis and use of genetic markers as an evidence mechanism. The general regime
is set forth in articles 326 and 363 of the Criminal Procedural Law, which is in turn
indirectly completed by Organic Law43 10/2007 regulating DNA markers databases.
Each country’s legislation is certainly competent to determine the procedure to
gather samples in the crime scene with or without a judicial authorization, and with
or without a judicial authorization when they belong to the suspect (who consents)44.
The truth is that in the Spanish procedural system the collection of samples in a crime
scene, the suspect’s bodily interventions and the performance of the corresponding
analysis would in principle require a judicial authorization.
Thus, article 326.3 establishes that: «Before the existence of fingerprints or traces
the analysis of which could contribute to the elucidation of the investigated facts, the
investigation Judge may adopt or order to the Judicial Police or the forensic doctor
to adopt the necessary measures for the collection, custody and analysis of those
samples gathered in conditions determining their authenticity».
And article 363 sets forth further authenticity requirements: «If justified reasons
exist, the investigation Judge may order, in a motivated ruling, to gather from the
suspect those biological samples that are necessary to determine his DNA profile. For
this purpose, he can decree those inspection, recognition or bodily intervention acts
42
Regarding this, C.Mª Romeo, S. Romeo, Los identificadores del ADN en el sistema de Justicia Penal,
Aranzadi, 2010, pp. 37 ff.
43
Which means qualified law under Spanish constitutional system, requiring at least, half plus one of
the total voting power to be approved (176 of 350 in Spain).
44
See the compared panoramic in L.Mª Prieto, La Ley Orgánica de Registro de perfiles de AND para
fines de investigación criminal, en el marco del derecho comparado, in La Ley, 40107-2008.
that adjust to the principles of proportionality and reasonability».

The literality of the articles above, operated by the Organic Law 15/2003 dated 25
November, reforming the criminal Code, left no doubts to the Supreme Court that
the collection of dubitable samples in a crime scene had to be judicially controlled;
the DNA evidence deriving from samples collected with no such control became
illicit and null45.
The Organic Law 10/2007, however, nuances the requirements of article 326.3.
If the literality of this article requires a judicial pronouncement for the collection of
samples in the crime scene, which does not appear as irrational for the investigation
Judge must direct the investigation, the Third Additional Provision of OL 10/2007
reminds of the capacities and competences of the judicial police, allowing them to
decide on the collection, custody and analysis of the traces permitting the extraction
of an identifying genetic profile46.
The literality of the above highlights the first of the referred risks, that is, the
violation of fundamental rights. The case law developing the aforementioned articles
is constituted by two non-jurisdictional agreements of the Supreme Court’s Criminal
Section47. Note that non-jurisdictional agreements in Spain, which are not adopted
following the jurisdictional functions attributed by the Constitution and the law,
are binding as a consequence of a jurisdictional agreement, which is non-binding by
definition48.
45
Sentence of the Supreme Court no. 501/2005 dated 19 April. Regarding it, see C. Figueroa’s
analysis, Cooperación policial e intercambio de perfiles de ADN, in La Ley Penal, no. 54, Studies’ section,
pages 7 and following. However, turning its back to this Supreme Court ruling, the Provincial Court
of Barcelona, in its resolution dated 17 October 2006, ratified the collection of samples in a crime scene
without any judiciary control, mentioning that such control would only be necessary in the cases where
a criminal proceeding has been initiated, though not when it hasn’t been started yet and the police
begins its investigating labors.
46
The OL 10/2007 Third Additional Provision states that: «During the investigation of the offences
listed in letter a) of article 3.1, the judicial police will collect samples and fluids from the suspect, the
arrested or the defendant, and from the crime scene. The collection of samples needing an inspection,
examination or bodily intervention, carried out without the affected person’s consent will always
require a motivated ruling, according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedural Law».
47
The non-jurisdictional agreement of the Criminal Section’s plenary dated 3 March 2005 sets forth
the following: «First matter: Is the judicial authorization enough to collect samples for a DNA analysis
upon a person that has not been informed of his right not to incriminate himself and who is not assisted
by a lawyer? Agreement: Article 778.3 of the Criminal Procedural Law is a sufficient legal habilitation
to carry out this investigation proceeding».
In turn, the non-jurisdictional agreement of the Criminal Section’s plenary dated 31 January 2006
establishes the following: «The judicial police can collect genetic remains and biological samples
abandoned by the suspect without a judicial authorization».
48
The non-jurisdictional agreement of the Criminal Section dated 18 July 2006 sets forth: «This
Section’s agreements (non-jurisdictional plenary session) are binding. That is not irrelevant for non-
jurisdictional agreements are not always followed by a ruling in which the Court exposes the content
of its agreements. Therefore, their content is binding to Judges and Courts even if it hasn’t been
incorporated to jurisdictional rulings and is not considered case law».
After the agreements of the Criminal Section dated 2005 and 2006, the Sentence
of the Supreme Court issued on 7 July 2010 distinguishes a myriad of cases49 that are
little compatible with the literality of the articles on this matter50:
t Collection of samples in the crime scene: it will be the exclusive competence
of the judicial police, not requiring any judicial intervention. The judicial
police will have to assume control of the samples and guarantee the custody
chain. The investigation Judge may only decide on the admission of the
collected samples as investigation proceedings51.
t Collection of the victim’s biological samples located or found in the suspect’s
personal belongings. Idem to the previous point.
t Collection of biological matter directly from the suspect. The following
situations may be distinguished:
Collection of samples from the suspect’s body with his consent. Only the
presence of his lawyer is required.
Collection of samples from the suspect’s body without his consent.
Judicial authorization will be required, according to the proportionality
principle.
Collection of samples belonging to the arrested suspect though not
directly from his body. Judicial authorization will not be required, nor
consent or legal counsel. It will thus be possible to gather the suspect’s
hair he may have left in his cell.
The judicial motivated ruling, which implies a procedure of balancing interests,
that is necessary for the collection of samples, its analysis and the incorporation of
the results to the criminal procedure is thus substituted by the police’s sole activity in
a non-negligible set of cases52. The legal quantitative limits that proportionality needs
to bear in mind, that is, the collection and analysis of samples in the most serious
criminal hypothesis, cede to the profit of the free judgment of the Security Forces
and Bodies53. The guaranty of judicial control also cedes in typically controversial
49
See J. Sánchez, La prueba de ADN: pronunciamientos de la jurisprudencia, in La Ley, 7720, 21
October 2001, p. 3.
50
Particularly critical with the plenary non-jurisdictional agreement dated 31 January 2006, C.Mª
Romeo, S. Romeo, Los identificadores, cit., pp. 98 and 99.
51
Agreeing with this interpretation, as accepted in case law, M.-J. Dolz, ADN y derechos fundamentales
(breves notas sobre la problemática de la toma de muestras de ADN –frotis bucal- a detenidos y sospechosos,
in La Ley, 7774 dated 12 January 2012; J.A. Del Olmo, Las garantías procesales en la identificación de
imputados mediante perfiles de ADN, in La Ley penal, no. 91, Studies’ section, 2012, p. 6.
52
Pleading for the judicial police acting without the control of the judiciary regarding the collection
of dubitable samples in the crime scene, J. Martin, Controversia jurisprudencial y advances legislativos
sobre la prueba pericial de ADN en el proceso penal (en especial, a base de datos policial sobre identificadores
obtenidos a partir del ADN, creada por la Ley Orgánica 10/2007, de 25 de noviembre), in La Ley, no. 46,
Studies’ Section, 2008, p. 4.
53
Among others, Mª A. Pérez, El ADN como método de identificación en el proceso penal, in “Revista do
Ministerio Público”, Octubre Diciembre 2012, p. 138.
situations such as obtaining the suspect’s consent: if its obtaining is possible for who
has arrested the suspect, the only guaranty that he has not been deceived or coerced
is the presence of his lawyer. That subsequently forces him to exercise nullity actions
against the sample if the surveillance conditions in which it was obtained were not
reasonable. Lastly, the proportionality appraisal inherent to any fundamental rights’
limitation, that only the Judge is legitimated to do, also cedes54.
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the police acting outside the margin of judicial
intervention connects with the following risk: the contamination of samples in the
event the police does not follow the defined protocol. This protocol is established in
Order JUS/1291/2010, dated 13 May, of the Ministry of Justice, by means of which
the rules to prepare and remit the samples to be analyzed by the National Toxicology
and Forensic Sciences’ Institute are approved. Especially, regarding the obtaining of
samples to be submitted to procedures of genetic identification, article 28 establishes
the processes possessing the capacity to alter a sample’s integrity to carry out a DNA
analysis.
In order to continue highlighting the validity risks of identification carried
out by means of a genetic profile, we have to underline the following processes,
possessing such capacity to interfere with validity: (i) the contamination due to
human biological matter, that can mean the erroneous belief that an un-related third
party had a previous contact with the investigated crime scene; (ii) the transfer of
biological evidence, that can equally imply the erroneous belief that an un-related
third party was present in the crime scene; (iii) the degradation of DNA, by means
of UV-light, which may distort the obtained results.
In order to avoid the risks of the aforementioned sampling, article 29 imperatively
orders to extract the samples in the following manner:
t To isolate and protect the crime scene as soon as possible and collect the
biological evidences;
t To wear clean gloves and to change them frequently, especially when
biological evidences with a probable different origins are handled;
t To avoid talking, coughing or sneezing over the samples. To wear a mask;
54
Mª A. Pérez, El ADN, cit., p. 140. The proportionality appraisal should also extend, in my opinion,
to hypothesis of collecting genetic samples abandoned by the suspect. Unless we understand that our
right to intimacy vanishes with the voluntary abandonment, and that no reasonable expectation of
destruction exists upon the material abandoned with such finality, I don’t see how this proportionality
appraisal can be avoided. Efficacy reasons may be adduced, and I could even agree with the arbitration
of mechanisms eluding the inefficiency of continually seeking authorization (that could be obtained
ex post, for example, with an impending obligation to destroy the sample should the authorization be
denied). But I don’t see a way of avoiding the proportionality appraisal between the right to intimacy
and the process’ legitimate interests (of a police or judicial investigation) where intimacy does not always
cede without a controllable legal ground. They understand, however, that the lack of authorization
regarding abandoned organic samples should not necessarily result in nullity, C.Mª Romeo, S. Romeo,
Los identificadores, cit., p. 101 ff.
t To wear a lab coat, protective shoe covers and other protective clothing;
t To use disposable instruments of a single use whenever it is possible, or to
clean them thoroughly before collecting another biological evidence;
t Not to add conservatives to the samples;
t To let the samples dry at room temperature, in a protected place, before
wrapping and sending them to the laboratory;
t To wrap every sample separately;
t To wrap the samples in paper bags or cardboard boxes, avoiding the use of
plastic. Hyssops must be boxed in specific boxes;
t The use of equipment working in the visible rank of the spectrum is
recommended;
t The use of reagents with proven compatibility with genetic samples is
recommended;
t To immediately send the samples to the laboratory.
No reference is made to double sampling for the purpose of contrasting evidence,
nor to the way in which those double samples should be treated and sent to the
laboratory.
Regarding the obtaining of indubitable samples, that is, belonging to the suspect’s
body, mandatory mechanisms are foreseen to guarantee the reliability of the sample
(article 30). Thus, the obtaining of hair or blood should respond to the technical
specifications stated therein so as to guarantee the trustworthiness of the sample in
subsequent analysis.
The first question is what happens in the event of a protocol breach, or in all cases
preceding the enforcement of that protocol. What accrediting value will be given by
the sentencing Court to a sample collected against the legal procedure. Until now,
the Supreme Court case law was contented with the judicial testimony of those who
intervened in the collection of samples in order to validate its accrediting capacity.
Again, the Sentence of the Supreme Court dated 7 July 2010, subsequent the coming
into force of the Order regulating the protocol for obtaining samples, seems to be
content with the mere affirmation in trial by the acting police officers in order to
link the samples, the suspect and the followed custody chain. Without mistrusting
the professional performance of the acting officers, it doesn’t seem probable that a
professional will constantly criticize the validity of his work and, on the contrary, it
is likely that he is inclined to constantly confirm the reasonability of the procedure
he followed. As a consequence, it should be mandatory that the Court explores the
specific way in which the samples were collected as a minimum and essential validity
requirement regarding evidence that is to be incorporated to the oral trial, which has
an incriminatory capacity.
The breach of the protocols established in Order JUS/1291/2010 should thus
be linked with the evidence validity rules and, especially, the extent of the breach
of essential procedural rules determining the nullity of evidence in our legal system.
Certainly, the breach of essential procedural rules is referred to the procedural
regime and its incidence in the fundamental rights of the injured party; we could
thus succumb to temptation and affirm that a protocol breach is not equivalent to
a breach of essential procedural rules55. The latter, however, will only be respected if
the evidence to be introduced in the oral trial was originally obtained according to
its inherent minimum guaranties, whether or not such guaranties are directly related
to the most personal fundamental rights (intimacy, privacy, etc.) or if they affect
rights of an institutional nature, or the right to effective judicial protection. The
non-respecting of the protocols for the collection of samples, that have been legally
designed, locate the States’ Security Forces and Bodies in the field of prohibition of the
public authorities’ arbitrary acts (article 9.3 of the Constitution). Its confirmation by
the Courts would in turn infringe the right to effective judicial protection (and to a
fair trial, ex article 24 of the Constitution). A light interpretation such as the Supreme
Court’s on the validity of the samples the obtaining of which infringes the Order in
force in the moment of the ruling and the European comparative frameworks56 is,
in my opinion, detrimental of the right to effective judicial protection and is framed
in the temptation to apply the ius puniendi once the material truth is known, even if
that truth has been reached through a spurious process.
All the above brings us to the third risk: contrasting the samples collected from
the suspect, presuming the validity of the collecting process, with the DNA files
registered in the police databases created pursuant to OL 10/2007.
OL 19/2007 allows the Judicial Police to gather samples from crime scenes, which
presupposes the later judicial control of the case and, consequently, of the police
activity; but, in time, it enables the Security Forces and Bodies to gather samples in
ordinary police investigations, without the effective or possible intervention of the
judiciary, and the incorporation of the analysis’ results to DNA police databases.
¿How can we guarantee the reliability of the collection and analysis of the samples,
and the custody chain, in these conditions?57 The Supreme Court, again, seems to feel
55
Clearly, the Sentence of the National Court no. 39/2005, dated 30 November, ratifying the police’s
acts to document the objects from which they collected a DNA sample only after the obtaining of the
analytical results. What looks like a simple formality change holds a risk non-confirmable without
affecting the right to effective judicial protection: the risk that the sample thus gathered was not what
was stated in the documentary evidence, but rather an adjustment to the results previously obtained.
The custody chain does not need to be materially completed; in fact, material rigor during custody is
worthless if the means by which it was guaranteed are not formalized.
56
See the reference alluded to by Mª J. Cabezudo, La regulación del “uso forense de la tecnología del
ADN” en España y en la UE: identificación de cinco nuevas cuestiones controvertidas, in “Revista General
de Derecho Procesal”, 26, 2012, p. 9, to the protocols established by the International Society for
Forensic Genetics (ISFG). With no legal value, they are still extraordinarily alike the requirements
contained in Order JUS/1291/2010, dated 13 May.
57
Along with the interrogation that the Supreme Court answers by ratifying the errors at the suspect’s
comfortable with the mere presumption of veracity of the databases held in public
registries58. However, the presumption of veracity cannot be alleged as a mechanism
to avoid control on the incriminating evidence, as it would not only affect the rights
of the defense, but the very same presumption of innocence, which may be destroyed
through a mechanism presumably valid as a consequence of being held in a public
database, though de facto potentially completely irrational59.
As a consequence, legal coordination of the precepts regulating the collection
of samples in the crime scene, the suspect’s body, and its custody and analysis must
be improved. Fingerprints have admittedly become a part of the ordinary forensic
practice with barely any contesting deriving from errors in the taking of evidence.
But a fingerprint is unique, yet genetic markers can be obtained in infinity of
hypothesis and circumstances: remains of saliva, blood, urine, semen, tissue or hair
are all fit to obtain genetic markers. The aforementioned remains can be found in
many places, forms and conditions. This multiplies the risk of confusion in the
process of attributing a fact, given the quasi-absolute reliability of evidence correctly
accomplished. If the identity of the marker’s possessor can be almost certain, the risk
of indubitably attributing a fact to the marker’s possessor will be much greater, and
so any caution taken upon the samples is paltry60.
The Supreme Court case law has found the formula to escape from the system’s
deficiencies in the vast majority of the cases that have arisen regarding the process
of collecting samples, the custody chain and the samples’ analysis, confirming their
incriminatory result in the criminal procedure. Different standards exist when it
expense, C.Mª Romeo, S. Romeo, Los identificadores, cit., p. 191, set down some others with no little
relevance: «¿suspect of which offence? It is known that this is determining to decide if the DNA profile
is legally qualified to be inscribed in the database. ¿Who will take this decision? ¿Will the Judge be able
to intervene previously, and how will this intervention be made effective?».
58
Clearly, the Sentence of the Supreme Court no. 880/2011, dated 26 July.
59
However, see M.-J. Dolz, ADN, cit., page 4, for whom alleging the incorrect incorporation of
profiles to the database deriving from samples gathered from the suspect with his consent but without
legal counsel and judicial control, should not be receivable (the author is a Public Prosecutor’s office
representative before the Supreme Court). Nor would be the receiving in Spain of data coming from
other countries’ databases gathered with the same procedure.
60
To M.-J. Dolz, ADN, cit., page 5, on the contrary, no doubts exist on the necessity to loosen
procedural guarantees in the field of collecting and analyzing samples, and using the results as evidence
through DNA. The author equates the situations in which the samples have been obtained with the
suspect’s consent, without legal counsel or judicial control resulting in a condemnatory ruling, and those
obtained in the exact same way leading to an absolution. He questions whether or not the Supreme
Court would dare releasing from prison all those sentenced as a result of DNA evidence deriving from
samples collected with their consent yet without judicial control or legal counsel, asserting that many
of them could be the authors of serious terrorism offences, rape, etc. The answer will logically depend
on the importance of the purpose (obtaining a profile regardless of the method) or the means through
which we meet that purpose (a fair trial with all guarantees, including the defense rights and the nemo
tenetur). In similar terms, J. Sánchez, La prueba de ADN, cit., in the case law exposition performed
throughout his work.
comes to measuring the impact of genetics in the criminal Law and procedure, and
in the field of substantive criminal law, so slightly permeable to scientific progress in
the direction of improving the procedure of attributing responsibility.
Part III
Human enhancement, robotics, artificial intelligence
International protection and limits to the right to self-determination for the

bio-technological strengthening of one’s own person1
Francesco Salerno
Table of contents: 1. The “open” structure of the norms protecting human rights: the
ECHR. - 2. Different nature and prescriptive intensity of the obligations for the protection
of human rights. - 3. The right to self-determination of the human person. - 4. The
(circumscribable) scope of the international protection of the “user” of bio-technology. - 5.
International limits to the right to self-determination for the bio-technological strengthening
on one’s own person. - 6. Limits imposed by the “Oviedo system” to personal choices. - 7.
Reasons for legitimate interferences by national authorities according to the safeguard clause.
- 8. Relevance and limits of the national or sub-regional more favourable treatment.
1. The “open” structure of the norms protecting human rights: the ECHR
According to the definition of the Cartagena Protocol of 29 January 2000 on
biosafety (additional instrument to the Rio de Janeiro Convention on biologic diversity
of 5 June 1992), the expression “modern biotechnology” implies «the application of:
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or b. Fusion of
cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive
or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding
and selection»2. In other words, the biotechnological approach may manifest itself
under the double vest of both the introduction of extraneous DNA fragments
through the techniques of recombinant DNA, and the cellular fusion so to overcome
the barriers between species by obtaining anyway results that cannot be realised in
1
2
Cartagena Protocol, art. 3, lett. i). On this protocol see also infra, footnote 3.
438 International protection and limits to the right to self-determination
nature. Both research and the use of such a technique usually take place only for
therapeutic reasons but they may also respond to the individual desire of improving
his/her own performances3.
In international human rights law there is no specific norm protecting the
individual wilfulness of taking advantage of biotechnologies by undergoing
treatments to strengthen one’s own person4. However, following a frequent tendency
in practice, this safeguard aspect gradually materialises thanks to the “open” structure
that characterises international instruments of human rights protection and makes
them in various ways permeable to emerging interests and values unexpressed in the
text of the single treaty, inasmuch as however included within the objectives and
principles that uphold it. Besides, precisely in order to safeguard ever new needs
for protection, four “generations” of human rights have succeeded one another,
in testimony of the growing expectations of protection gradually regulated at an
international level: civil and political rights, then social rights, then the protection
of environment until the fourth, more recent, acquisition of the rights of the future
generations on which we will return later. All these four dimensions are relevant
to appreciate the expectations of protection with regard to the multiform and ever
faster developments of science and technique, included those directly useful to
health and individual wellbeing, thus – where appropriate – to the “strengthening”
of the human person5. This functional link with the centrality of human person in
its several “dimensions” does not consent to establish any separateness between the
several stages as, instead, the observation of the reciprocal interaction does.
We will centre our analysis on the paradigmatic case of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). Such an instrument has a position of absolute relevance
in the whole scene of human rights for some of its specific characteristics. First of all,
the ECHR presents itself as a regulation of “constitutional” value for State parties, to
the extent it sets joint obligations to respect and to ensure respect also in situations in
which the jurisdiction of the State party is not full6. In order to strengthen its value
of “European public order”, the ECHR permeates of itself also the EU legal order:
however, since a long time, the latter has bound itself to respect human rights as
granted by the ECHR (art. 6 TEU), independently of the perspectives of its future
3
On the fluidity of the boundary between interventions aiming at the improvement of health and those
aimed at the strengthening of the person see infra § 5 and footnote 65.
4
See, in general, amongst others, Ordine internazionale e valori etici (VIII Convegno della SIDI, Verona
26-27 giugno 2003), edited by N. Boschiero, Napoli, 2004, p. 365 ff.; Bioetica e biotecnologie nel
diritto internazionale e comunitario. Questioni generali e tutela della proprietà intellettuale, edited by N.
Boschiero, Torino, 2006.
5
See European Court of Human Rights, 19 July 2002, Koch, application n. 497/09 § 51. The decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights can be found in http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int.
6
Infra also § 2.
F. Salerno 439
accession still to be perfected7. Secondly, the ECHR is provided with a permanent

jurisdiction, the European Court of Human Rights, which makes an autonomous
interpretation of the relative prescriptions when it is called to find any violation.
The assumed victims of a violation may file an application directly to the Court,
which is, thus, in contact with the “living” needs of society – even without the
“mediation” of national judges, as it happens for the EU Court of Justice – by
dialoguing with them precisely in the perspective of a constant “actualisation” of
normative precepts. The capacity of the European judge to read such spontaneous
social dynamics and to rationalise them within the normative framework of the
Convention making it effective explains the extraordinary request for “access” to
its jurisdiction, which ends up with bending to its purposes the original content
of the conventional protection updating its scope, modifying – whereas necessary
– the previous case law8. To develop such hermeneutical approach, the Court
“dialogues” both with national legal systems of State parties, and with other
international normative sources. The purpose is different. In the first case, the judge
verifies which is the level of convergence of States parties to the ECHR towards a
“common feeling” capable to make acceptable its “synthesis” in a general and shared
principle of law, susceptible to integrate the conventional formula by moulding it
in continuity with the effective element of national law9. In the second case, the
European judge, affirming that the Convention cannot be placed in an international
legal void (jurisprudence of the vacuum)10, tries to recover the normative model that
better clarifies on an international level the kind of protection at stake. It is on the
basis of these two indicators – one “internal” to the ECHR’s social body, one external
to it – that the conventional text evolves assuming new meanings and prescriptive
contents11. The work of “fertilisation” of the conventional text takes place within the
7
Cf. ECHR, Communication commune des présidents Costa et Skouris, in http://www.echr.coe.int; Fifth
negotiation meeting between the CDDH and the European Commission on the accession of the European
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2
§ 65 ff.
8
In consideration of this, Protocol n. 14 to the ECHR has “rationalised” the jurisdictional system by
configuring the role of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights as the only place
where to establish orientative precedents for the minor articulations of the same Court: La nouvelle
procédure devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme après le Protocole n° 14. Actes du colloque tenu
à Ferrara les 29 et 30 avril 2005, edited by F. Salerno, Bruxelles, 2007.
9
On the integrative function of the general principles of law and their capability to favour the
evolutionary interpretation of conventional norms: F. Salerno, Principi generali di diritto, in Digesto
IV, vol. XI, Torino, 1996, p. 533 ff.
10
See in this regard F. Salerno, Diritto internazionale. Principi e norme, Padova, 20133, pp. 179 and
192 ff.
11
According to the European Court of Human Rights the «Convention en général … constitue un
traité de garantie collective des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales [et] doit être interprétée
et appliquée d’une manière qui en rende les exigences concrètes et effectives» (decision 26 October
2000, Sanles Sanles, ric. n. 48335/99, p. 7).
ECHR in both cases, regardless of a necessary dependence of the incisive character

of such an evolution upon the convergence of the two indicators. In this regard, the
applicative development of art. 8 of the ECHR is emblematic. The obligation of
States to respect private life in its many perspectives of “development” embraced the
“spontaneous” evolution of national legal systems towards the removal of forms of
discrimination against the homosexuals, by inducing the European Court of Human
Rights to revise the initial indications of the European Commission of Human
Rights inclined to legitimise penal prescriptions punishing homosexual behaviour12.
The same happened in the case of transsexualism: first denied and then absorbed
in the scope of the safeguard of art. 813. It follows that the same international rule
originates many prescriptive indications that are expression of the same protected
value. In other words, the original conventional bond connotes itself as a “principle”
articulated in several “rules” of various content susceptible to be changed in time due
to the continuous evolution of the State parties’ “legal conscience” 14. Nevertheless,
these situations are not considered alien to the object of the ECHR, to the extent
that the Court considers them as an autonomous expression of the right to private
life.
Sometimes, in order to consolidate and expand such normative datum also in
a more analytical manner, the determination of the Council of Europe’s Member
States to adopt new conventional instruments may be of some help. A manifestation
of such a determination – with regard to the topic we deal with here – is the Oviedo
Convention of 1997 (henceforth: “1997 Convention”) for the protection of human
rights and dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and
medicine: it is essentially a framework-convention establishing a set of principles
and entrusting (art. 31) the more detailed regulation to successive protocols, which
States can adhere to only after having ratified the 1997 Convention. At the moment
three Protocols have been adopted (1998, 2002, 2005). They concern respectively:
the prohibition of cloning of human being, the implantation of organs and tissues
of human origin and, finally, biomedical research15. What emerges is an “Oviedo
12
Theory and practice of the European convention on human rights, edited by P. Van Dijk, F. Van
Hoof, A. Van Rijn, L. Zwakk, Oxford, 20064, p. 678 ff.; C. Pitea, Art. 8, in Commentario breve alla
Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, edited by S.
Bartole, P. De Sena, V. Zagrebelsky, Padova, 2012, p. 330.
13
European Court of Human Rights, 11 July 2002, Goodwin, application n. 28957/95, § 74 f.
14
Lacking such a factor, for instance, the Court has not acknowledged the right to euthanasia yet and it
has not equalized homosexual wedding and heterosexual wedding. These “rights” might find objective
collocation within the pertinent conventional formulas (art. 2, 3 and 8 of ECHR), but until now the
Court avoided to enunciate them precisely because it does not deem possible to catch their presence
within the legal conscience of State parties.
15
The functional link is explicated in art. 31 of the 1997 Convention: «Protocols may be concluded …
with a view to developing, in specific fields, the principles contained in this Convention». The texts of
the Convention of 1997, of the following Protocols as well as of their explicatory reports can be found
F. Salerno 441
system” which is only partially similar to the ECHR, since the European Court of
human rights is entrusted solely with a consultative function (art. 29 of the 1997
Convention), thus excluding the possibility for individuals to challenge directly
the violations suffered by hand of a State party. However, the rules of the “Oviedo
system” interact under several aspects with the ECHR conveying the meaning of the
principles of the latter16: in these circumstances the alleged victim can make use of
the judicial mechanism of the ECHR to enforce those values that have been specified
in the “Oviedo system” 17. Moreover the “Oviedo system” is connected, under many
aspects, with conventional instruments of universal scope, especially with the above-
mentioned Cartagena Protocol of 2000, which various European States (such as
Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy) not yet parties to the 1997 Convention
or the Protocols thereof have ratified18. Therefore it does not seem improper to recall
the “Oviedo system” in the Italian legal order, even though, until now, Italy has not
yet ratified the Convention, although authorised to do so by the Parliament a few
years ago19. In such conditions Italy is not bound to respect the obligations set by
the Convention (and by its Protocols), but one cannot elude its reflections on those
ECHR rules – which are granted prevalence over any other legislative rule by art.
117, para. 1, Const. – that inspired the “Oviedo system” and that shall therefore
be interpreted in the light of the most recent diplomatic practice of the same State
parties of the ECHR (Article 31, para. 3, of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties)20. This is further consolidated by the fact that some principles affirmed
in the “Oviedo system” are in any case binding for Italy by reason of arts. 1 and 3 of
in http://www.conventions.coe.int.
16
Cf. R. Lawson, Dwelling on the Threshold: On the Interaction Between the European Convention
on Human Rights and the Biomedicine Convention, in Human Rights and Biomedicine, ed. by A. Den
Exter, Antwerpen, 2010, p. 23 ff. For references to the Oviedo Convention and to its additional
Protocols albeit within the field of application of the ECHR see European Court of Human Rights, 9
March 2004, Glass, application n. 61827/00 § 58; 8 July 2004, Vo, n. 53924/00 §§ 35 and 84; 10 April
2007, Evans, application n. 6339/05 § 39; 11 October 2007, Özalp, application n. 74300/01; 13 May
2008, Juhnke, application n. 52515/99 § 56.
17
In the explicatory report to the 1997 Convention is clarified (§ 165) that «This Convention does
not itself give individuals a right to bring proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights.
However, facts which are an infringement of the rights contained in this Convention may be considered
in proceedings under the European Convention of Human Rights, if they also constitute a violation of
one of the rights contained in the latter Convention».
18
The same happens with regards to universal instruments: the UNESCO Declaration of 2005 on
bioethics and human rights in its preamble recalls (infra) the “Oviedo system”.
19
Cf. law 28 March 2001, n. 145, in Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 95 of 24 April 2001. On this see V. Tonini,
La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo sulla biomedicina secondo la giurisprudenza italiana, in “Riv.
dir. int.”, 2009, p. 116 ff.
20
Such a dimension is totally eluded by Italian courts, notwithstanding the variety of positions
expressed by judges with regard to the relevance to be attributed to the 1997 Convention (on this see F.
M. Palombino, La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo secondo il giudice italiano, in “Giurisprudenza
costituzionale”, 2011, p. 4811 ff.).
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to which moreover the
more intense constitutional safeguard of art. 11 Const. applies, albeit only in respect
of cases regulated by EU law.
There is also another factor that makes the normative framework and the
interaction between different sources very complex in this subject. The expansion of
international law towards the new frontiers of “bioethics” entails facing a “private”
dimension involving the behaviour of scientists and health workers often “self-
regulated” through the respective organised communities, also on an international
level. The UNESCO Declaration of 19 October 2005 on “Bioethics and Human
Rights”21 recalls in its preamble the codes and guidelines adopted by such associations
as the “World Medical Association” and the “Council for International Organizations
of Medical Sciences”, as well as the reference to the acts that form the “Oviedo
system”.
These are technical and especially deontological rules that have no proper
normative value inasmuch as they are defined out of the national mechanisms
of production of law. The international rules set forth by the ECHR and by the
“Oviedo system”, however, cannot ignore this dimension of self-regulation. This is
confirmed by art. 4 of the 1997 Convention, according to which «Any intervention
in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant
professional obligations and standards». Also the European Court of Human Rights
takes into account the “professional guidelines” in assessing the medical procreation
practices under art. 8 of the ECHR22. Since it has to frame such space of “self-
regulation” within a unitary perspective of “governance” of situations deserving
protection, international law mandates States to involve also “private” sectors in a
public debate, by assuming, especially through dedicated “Ethical Committees”,
indications that are the result of their participation. A punctual promotion of such
organisms at an “appropriate level” can be found – amongst others – in art. 28
of the 1997 Convention and in arts. 19 and 22, para. 2, of the above mentioned
UNESCO Declaration of 19 October 2005 on “Bioethics and Human Rights”23.
The various longstanding ethical Committees operating in the biomedical sector on
a national, international and also infra-national level are precisely entrusted with
that function, confirming that the “ethical truth” cannot be a State monopoly24. At
the same time, “objective” law (which includes domestic law but also transnational
and supranational rules) defines on its own the relevant ethical criteria, transforming
21
Cf. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, ed. by H. A. M. Ten Have,
M. S. Jean, UNESCO, 2012.
22
European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit., § 39.
23
Cf. C. Huriet, Ethic Committees, in The UNESCO Universal Declaration…, cit., p. 265 ff.
24
S. Maljean-Dubois, Bioèthique et droit international, in “AFDI”, 2000, p. 87.
F. Salerno 443
them into legal standards25.

The extension of international protection and the multifaceted social base that is
interested by it, produces an increasingly complex normative framework in which
different and also opposite values coexist. The dialectic of values in this regard can
be referred to the same person or also to different persons up to the configuration
of a possible tension between individual dimension and general interest, in the
different “ordering” levels in which this is mainly managed and defined: State, EU
and international level. In all these situations a process of necessary “coexistence” of
values at stakes is triggered. The outcome of such coexistence leads unavoidably to
the compression of one or more of them. The European Court of Human Rights is
well aware of this, to the extent that the Court makes itself one of its architects by
resorting to the criterion of proportionality to balance the different values of the
Convention legitimately.
2. Different nature and prescriptive intensity of the obligations for the protection of
human rights
In the ECHR system there are different “deontic” levels, depending on the
intensity of the protection, which may have full perceptive dimension or develop
according to a decreasing degree of intensity (although never fading completely).
Only for expositive clarity, we can recall that the “core nucleus” is without any doubt
expressed by rights that cannot be derogated for any reason (art. 15, para. 2 ECHR).
This nucleus is followed by those rights that are subjected to a variously wide margin
of appreciation, a margin that sometimes is quite significant, as it happens for the
choice of the electoral and Parliamentary model more adequate to enforce the right
to representative democracy (art. 3 additional Protocol to the ECHR) 26 or for the
preferences granted to the prevailing religion (or “religious feeling”) in a certain
country27. In such cases, what matters are the historical and cultural traditions of the
25
J. Ayllón, Biotecnología y dignidad humana en la jurisprudencia, in Biotecnología, Derecho y dignidad
humana, Comares, 2003, p. 88. On the “phenomenon of hybridation between ethics and law”, D.
Ruggiu, Diritti e temporalità, Bologna, 2012, p. 117; see also ibid., p. 160 ff. e 168 ff. The need for
dialoguing with “non-State” forms of regulation explains the resort to soft law promotional formulas;
see in this regard, amongst others, the recommendation of the EC Commission of 7 February 2008,
n. 2008/345/CE, on the behavioural code for a responsible research in the field of nanosciences and
nanotechnologies: in OJEU, L 116 of 30 April 2008, p. 46 ff.
26
Cf. F. Salerno, “Sovranità liquida” ovvero il diritto alla democrazia rappresentativa tra sovranità
costituzionale ed obblighi internazionali, in Per il 70. Compleanno di Pierpaolo Zamorani, edited by L.
Desanti, P. Ferretti, D. Manfredini, Milano, 2009, p. 363 ff.
27
Current international law seems to include within the State’s margin of discretion the opportunity
to assign a certain privilege to the religious tradition of the Country, by recognising certain festivities
or by publicly exposing symbols of a particular religion (European Court of Human Rights, 18 March
2011, Lautsi e altri, application n. 30814/06, § 68 ff.).
State and the way certain values are perceived. Also the individual freedom of choice
on bio-technological strengthening on one’s own person is affected by the ethical
values of the State (other than by its scientific and technological capacities) 28.
The variegated modulation of the obligations of human rights protection becomes
even more significant when measured to the type of conduct required to the States
upon which such obligations fall. In this regard, the distinction is between “positive”
and “negative” obligations. The latter are univocal, as the State is obliged “not to do”,
that is to say, not to interfere on the private dimension as protected by international
law. An emblematic case is the prohibition of torture, according to which the State
cannot allow its organs to behave that way. The negative content of the obligation
of conduct is applied uniformly, as it admits no inflection. The positive obligation,
instead, implies that the State performs a certain activity – concerning a specific
conduct or specific results – capable to concretise the benefit that international law
aims at granting for the individual, included the protection from other non-State
actors’ interferences29. In the latter case, the ECHR does not indicate the means
a State has to adopt but it leaves them to the discretional assessment of the State
itself, taking into consideration also the concrete chances the latter has to obtain
the prescribed result in a given situation on which it has «jurisdiction» according to
Article 1 of the ECHR. Moreover, we need to clarify that, also with regard to art. 8 of
the ECHR, the alternative between positive and negative obligations is not as rigid as
to be neatly «designed» for a specific protection30. The right to life established by art.
2 of the ECHR imposes on State the negative obligation not to kill a human person
without any legitimate reason to do so (for instance, an armed conflict), but it also
requires the obligation for the State to set up adequate procedural mechanisms in
order to ascertain the legitimacy of a person’s death.
The international protection of human rights is related to their progressively
transnational dimension, evoking the action that State parties to pertinent
instruments such as the ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights are to take so to ensure their respect, although within the limited
areas in which they can exercise their jurisdiction and influence. In this case, States’
conduct is directed and assessed according to due diligence parameters, as it concerns
situations that escape (although sometimes temporarily) their full effective control31
28
European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit. § 77.
29
C. Pitea, op. cit., p. 304; European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit. § 75.
30
Cf. European Court of Human Rights, 13 February 2003, Odièvre, application n. 4236/98 § 40;
10 April 2007, cit. § 75; 25 September 2012, Godelli, application n. 33783/09 § 47 («The boundaries
between the State’s positive and negative obligations under art. 8 do not lend themselves to precise
definition»); 2 October 2012, Knecht, application n. 10048/10 § 55.
31
European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 2004, Ilaşcu, application n. 48787/99; International Court
of Justice, 26 February 2007, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, § 430; full textin www.icj-cij.org.
F. Salerno 445
or that fall under other States’ sovereignty. Such indications may therefore come to
regulate also the conduct of States parties towards non-party States. We find this
in the «General Comment» n. 14 (2000) of the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights concerning the right to health as established by art. 12
of the respective Covenant. According to the Committee, States parties have the
obligation to «respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to
prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to
influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law»32. The same rule
is codified in various instruments concerning biotechnologies. Art. 21, para. 1, of the
UNESCO Declaration of 2005 affirms that: «States, public and private institutions,
and professionals associated with transnational activities should endeavour to
ensure that any activity within the scope of this Declaration, undertaken, funded
or otherwise pursued in whole or in part in different States, is consistent with the
principles set out in this Declaration». Art. 29 of the 2005 Protocol to the Oviedo
Convention of 1997, concerning bio-medical experimentation, considers the all but
rare possibility that «sponsors or researchers» subject to the jurisdiction of a State
party of the Protocol fund or develop (plan or direct) researches also in non-party
States: in such a situation the country shall adopt «appropriate» measures to ensure
that the private person subject to its jurisdiction carries out those «extra-territorial»
researches according to the «principles» on which the dispositions of the Protocol are
based33.
According to the explanatory report to the Protocol, the State party’s obligation
to adopt, if necessary, «appropriate measures to that end» is configured with regard
to those private subjects «who fall under the authority of the State concerned»34,
based on effective and qualified personal connections, such as the registered office
32
§ 39; full text in: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR.
33
According to the explanatory report of the 2005 Protocol (§ 138), «the term “principles” implies
that while it may be impracticable to implement all the detailed provisions contained in this Protocol
when a research project is carried out in a State that is not party to the Protocol, it is nevertheless
mandatory to observe the principles that those provisions develop. … This does not imply that a body
in the State Party to the Protocol has the authority to approve research in the non-Party State if that
State does not approve the research, or to override its regulations. However, researchers from the Party
State may be required to observe additional conditions, in accordance with the principles on which
the provisions of this Protocol are based, to those applicable in non-Party States». This orientation can
be found also in similar fields, such as the above-mentioned (supra § 1) Cartagena Protocol of 2000
annexed to the Convention of Rio of 1992 on biologic diversity, the “system” of which does not apply
to human genetic material: Conference of Parties (COP), decision II/11 § 2 (1995). art. 24 of the
Protocol establishes that «Transboundary movements of living modified organisms between Parties and
non-Parties shall be consistent with the objective of this Protocol. The Parties may enter into bilateral,
regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements with non-Parties regarding such transboundary
movements».
34
Explanatory Report, § 139.
of the corporation sponsoring the research activity or the conduction of activities

in the territory of that State aimed at directing the research35. As the requirement
concerns the respect of the «principles» of the Protocol in addition to the conditions
provided for by the State that materially hosts the research36, the State to which
the research belongs shall set in its own jurisdiction specific conditions for extra-
territorial research activities if, like public control, they are not established by the
former State but they reflect «principles» of the Protocol.
3. The right to self-determination of the human person

Such a framework of rules defined at an international level gradually converges
toward the formation of customary norms of general scope. A manifestation of this
is the right to self-determination of the human person with particular regard to
the application of bio-technological devices on his/her own body. Its genesis can be
found in art. 8 of the ECHR that, in the evolving interpretation of the European
Court for Human Rights, grants the right of the individual to the respect of his/her
own private life as well as to the respect of the choices on the relative «development»,
regardless its «contextualization» within a family environment37. Such a right to
«personal autonomy» is a manifestation of the human person38 and it includes also
the right to establish and develop relations «with other human beings and the outside
world»39. The content of this individual self-determination cannot be typified in
itself, because, as the European Court for Human Rights underlines, «the notion
of “private life” within the meaning of art. 8 of the Convention is a broad concept
which does not lend itself to exhaustive definition»40. The right to individual self-
determination reflects choices on one’s own private life that the State shall respect
also with regard to aspects that are not directly covered by the material safeguard of
art. 8 of the ECHR41.
This is not a purely negative obligation, as the State has the positive obligation to
ensure that the interested subject is in the condition of fully consciously exercise his/
her own choice42. Precisely to this end, in the bio-medical field it is required that the
35
Ibidem.
36
Explanatory Report, § 138.
37
For the punctual distinction between the two profiles, European Court of Human Rights, 13
February 2003, Odièvre, application n. 42326/98 § 28.
38
A. Sassi, Autodeterminazione e consenso informato tra diritto interno e fonti europee, in Diritti, principi
e garanzie sotto la lente dei giudici di Strasburgo, edited by L. Cassetti, Napoli, 2012, p. 313.
39
European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit. § 71.
40
European Court of Human Rights, 19 July 2012, Koch, application n. 497/09 § 51.
41
European Court of Human Rights, 20 January 2011, Haas, application n. 31322/07 § 50; 19 July
2012, cit. § 65 ff.
42
European Court of Human Rights, 19 July 2012, cit. § 52.
F. Salerno 447
State respects the principle of the «informed consent» when it comes to apply decisive
therapeutic treatment to deal with and possibly solve certain pathologies (art. 5 of
the 1997 Convention). The obligation to grant full information to the individual
with regard to medical treatments of whatever nature is punctually established by art.
7 of ICCPR, at least to prevent tortures or mistreatments. The same principle shall
apply, as we will see, to the case of bio-medical treatment aimed at the strengthening
of the human person, especially when capable to determine irreversible effects.
The right to self-determination of the human person is not absolute, although
it is supported by the (full) informed consent to certain interventions on one’s own
body. It is international law itself that poses limitations by recalling values such as
the «integrity» and «dignity» of the human person. These are ethical evaluations that
result in a legal prohibition whenever – as in the case of cloning – the aim is that of
preventing a phenomenon that is widely practiced in the animal and vegetal world
without causing a different evaluation of the belonging of the local product to its
«natural» species43.
4. The (circumscribable) scope of the international protection of the “user” of bio-technology

The individual right to self-determination – no matter how much informed
– concerns choices that have to confront the comprehensive framework of values
protected by the ECHR. Sometimes the contrast is neat. For instance, the European
Court for Human Rights excludes – at the moment – that art. 2 of the EHCR
protects the right to suicide. In other words, also because of a lack of agreement
between States parties, there is not a complete freedom of choice of the human person
on this value44. The Court explains such a limitation with the very nature of the right
to life, which is an absolute value, rectius a «right» that cannot be disposed of within
the same margins established by norms granting freedoms45. And indeed the Court
acknowledged that the «negative» aspect operates within the field of the freedom of
religion, of trade union freedom or of the right to representative democracy itself,
43
Cf. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, cit., p. 159 ff.; more generally:
K. L. Macintosh, Human Cloning. Four Fallacies and Their Legal Consequences, Cambridge, 2013.
44
European Court of Human Rights, 20 January 2011, cit. § 54 ff.; 19 July 2012, cit. § 70. On the
personalist perspective of the Italian Constitution and its different “readings”: F. Faenza, Profili penali
del suicidio, in Trattato di biodiritto, Il governo del corpo, edited by S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C.M.
Mazzoni, S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, vol. II, Milano, 2011, p. 1808 ff. However the interactions between
ECHR and the “Oviedo system” cannot be neglected (supra, footnote 15). Thus, the right to life cannot
be absolute as it has to comply with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatments (Theory
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 391), amongst which there are the
hypotheses of overtreatment prohibited by the 1997 Convention, as it disregard the consent of the
person that suffers the relative interventions.
45
European Court of Human Rights, 29 April 2002, Pretty, application n. 2346/02 § 39.
by consenting precisely not to believe in any religion, not to join any union nor to
express one’s own «right» to vote.
According to art. 8 of the ECHR the individual has wide margins to «qualify»
the developments of his/her own life, or rather his/her own personal identity. By
emphasising such a need, the European Court for Human Rights has framed within
art. 8 the right of the individual to know his/her own biological identity46 as well as
the right to transsexualism47.
This is not an unlimited faculty, though. The Protocol of 1998 forbids the cloning
of human beings; the same prohibition is repeated by art. 3 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The unconditioned tenor of such a prescription reflects an
absolute value to defend in protection of the integrity of the human being.
Due to the nature of such a limitation the activity of the researcher that, in order
to strengthen his/her own and other people’s life, realises an automaton does not
seem to be forbidden, even if the automaton’s composition is partially cellular. In
a future perspective, one might think to a partly mechanical creature functional
to the «production» of tissues and organs meant to be transplanted in the human
being48. One may also think to a sentient (and sensitive) automaton, in other words
a robot that is not a mere artefact but the conscious manufacturer of its own will49.
It is still (for how long?) premature to face the question of a «dignity» of the robot
as a legal subject different from its own manufacturer (and not as an «asset» of the
latter), although we could not frame it in the defining category of «human being»50.
46
European Court of Human Rights, 13 February 2003, cit., §§ 29 and 44; 20 December 2007,
Phinikaridou, application n. 23890/02 § 45; 25 September 2012, cit., § 47 ff.
47
Supra.
48
On the combination between organic and inorganic matter: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri,
Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, Nanoscienze e nanotecnologie, 9 June 2006, p. 24; the full text can
be found on: http://www.palazzochigi.it/bioetica/testi/Nanoscienze_Nanotecnologie.pdf. In this
case, once established whether the whole product can be patented as «synthetic» process, it would be
necessary to assess whether the human parts can be separated from the whole product and attracted by
a legal evaluation on the «decent» use (S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, in Trattato di biodiritto, Il
governo del corpo, cit., vol. I, Milano, 2011, p. 56) and – possibly – regardless of any profit (art. 3 of the
European Charter of fundamental rights).
49
Cf. F. Grigenti, Ambivalenza prometeica e nanotecnologie, in Forme di responsabilità, regolazione
e nanotecnologie, edited by G. Guerra, A. Muratorio, E. Pariotti, M. Piccinini, D. Ruggiu,
Bologna, 2011, p. 27 f. On the so-called «post-human» see S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere dei diritti,
Roma-Bari, 2012, p. 341 ff.; Id., La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, 20122, p. 73 ff.
50
On definition issues, L. Olivieri, Persona ed essere umano: spunti per una nozione giuridica di
persona alla sfida delle biotecnologie, in Bio-tecnologie e valori costituzionali. Il contributo della giustizia
costituzionale, edited by A. D’Aloia, Torino, 2005, p. 435 ff. The greatest reservation on the «humanist»
consideration of the robot is given by the alleged lack of «free will» of the sentient automaton, which
would always be an expression of induced «automatic» processes. It can be noticed, though, that, even
without having inhibitory mechanisms, the automaton has much more «mathematical» alternatives
that can all be equally activated, while the human person has less concrete choices to make even in a
framework of «absolute» free will. Moreover, lacking any inhibitors and provided that it is impossible to
insert indicators of emotion in the robot, the automaton operates on the basis of «pure» (mathematical)
F. Salerno 449
Without considering here the «right to life» of the sentient robot, its bio-mechanical
constitution and composition in itself is not alien to the present field of investigation
due to the possible impact of the automaton on the collective «good» of the integrity
of the human being51.
5. International limits to the right to self-determination for the bio-technological

strengthening on one’s own person
The integrity of the human being limits the right to self-determination as
configured in art. 8 of the ECHR. It is necessary, though, to establish its scope. In
this regard, it shall be reminded that the right to the “development” of one’s own
private life set forth by art. 8 does not pose any conceptual differences between the
self-determination of the individual to modify his/her own sex and an analogous self-
determination of the individual to create irreversible conditions for strengthening his/
her own person through bio-technological means. In both cases technology comes
to help individual choices not supported by considerations of pathologic necessity52.
Art. 8 protects also the latter type of choices53, but in such a way to comply with the
whole system of ECHR guarantees. The limits to that depend on the impact that
individual choices may have on several levels: on the individual who practices them,
on other individuals who are presently connected to him/her in various ways or on
others who may become connected to him/her in the future.
According to the most recent case-law, art. 8 presents an high degree of protection
capable to sacrifice other aspects also granted by the ECHR. Thus, art. 8 includes
within the right to family life also the right to have children, if necessary, through
assisted fertilization techniques that the State has the positive obligation to grant54.
But art. 8 also comprises the “negative right” not to have children. For this reason
the European Court of Human Rights includes in art. 8 the right to abortion as
a legitimate expression of the mother’s self-determination: the right to one’s own
private life and to a certain “model” of family life results therefore in a compression
of a potential right to life of the suppressed embryo or foetus, so that it has no right
to life according to art. 2 of the ECHR55.
Despite the radical implications acknowledged by art. 8 to the individual right
rationality, whereas the human person may also diverge from an «objective» rationality: in this
perspective the essence of free will remains a purely human prerogative.
51
Infra.
52
This is the case of genic therapies: C. Faralli, S. Zullo, Terapia genica e diritti della persona, in
Trattato di biodiritto. Il governo del corpo, cit., vol. II, cit., p. 520.
53
L. Tomasi, Art. 8, in Commentario breve alla Convenzione europea …, cit., p. 299 ff.
54
European Court of Human Rights, 2 October 2012, cit., § 54.
55
European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit., § 54. On the mother’s primary interest see
also Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 389 ff.
to self-determination on one’s own life, the relative determinations find a first

limitation whenever they are capable to irreversibly deprive those who intend to
take advantage of bio-technological human “strengthening” of their own capacity to
self-determination56. In other words, the right to the respect of the human person’s
private life cannot go – according to the ECHR and the coordinated instruments
such as those of the “Oviedo system” – as far as to consent bio-technological implants
that would prevent the same individual to express other autonomous choices in
the future. Just for the nature of the protected “good” – the individual right to
one’s own model of life – the ECHR cannot legitimise concrete acts of disposal
that compromise in nuce the capacity to self-determination in itself. For the same
reasons, the European Court of Human Rights excludes – as we saw – the right to
suicide, which would otherwise nullify the value of the right to life as an inescapable
requirement for the enjoyment of other rights57, or authorises also radical limitations
to political rights and to the activity of party formations whenever such limitations
are needed to preserve the existence of the democratic State that represents the only
constitutional model complying with the effective exercise of the rights protected by
the ECHR58.
A second typology of limitations derives from the relational dimension of the
human being. The European Court of the Human Rights asserts that art. 8 protects
«to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings»59. In the logic of the human person as a “social animal” the ECHR
legitimises initiatives that limit the sphere of liberties when it comes to protect the
general interest of the human population as a whole60 or whenever there is an “abuse
of rights” – according to art. 17 – for the prejudicial effects deriving from the exercise
of a legitimate right within another person’s individual sphere.
The indicated limitations do not exclude forms of individual self-determination
radically diverging from the conventional model of coexistence among human beings,
such as the choice to live as a hermit. In these cases, the individual self-determination
may, at best, raise the need for a direct control on the person when his/her behaviour,
without him/her to be an “outlaw”, is susceptible to determine a social danger. The
ECHR considers (art. 5, para. 1) the figure of the “vagrant” or other similar categories
56
«Self-replicating nanoparticles could act through the same working system as a computer virus: they
could activate themselves automatically and spread themselves so to destroy the basic elements for the
functioning” (Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, op. cit., p. 13, our
transl.).
57
Supra.
58
European Court of Human Rights, 13 February 2003, Refah Partisi, application n. 41340/98.
59
European Court of human rights, 16 December 1992, Niemietz, application n. 13710/88 § 29.
60
According to the European Commission for human rights, «the claim to respect for private life is
automatically reduced to the extent that the individual himself brings his private life into contact with
public life or into close connection with other protected interests» (decision 12 July 1977, Bruggemann,
application n. 6959/75 § 56).
F. Salerno 451
such as the persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts: the purpose is not
that of “criminalising” choices of such kind, but rather that of justifying measures
limiting the personal freedom of individuals that made them, in order to protect
general interests such as the possible propagation of infective diseases the person is
carrying. This disposition clearly shows that the ECHR authorises States to prevent
and repress behaviours that result from a lawful self-determination but are susceptible
to have prejudicial effects on the entire human society.
Obviously, the more widespread and profound the choice expressed by the
individual is, the more marked the “social dangerousness” scenario becomes. The
strengthening of the human being by giving him superior abilities compared with
the others’ certainly would be such a widespread and profound choice. Such a sort of
eugenics in bio-technological key would create a totally new61 human being, hardly
compliant with the principle of non-discrimination (art. 14 ECHR) if such a model
of “dignity of life” would not potentially accessible to every human being62.
There is another and more latent consequence in this scenario: the influence of
bio-technological manipulations on human DNA with reflections that potentially
regard the whole humankind. The effect of such “self-determination” disregards
the procedure employed, regardless whether the strengthening is realised through a
product present in nature or in a synthetic way63. The process is evident with regard
to the techniques of recombinant DNA, as it is for the use of nanobiotechnologies
that «do not limit themselves to provide new technological opportunities for the
production of materials or plastic and chemical substances … but combine inorganic
nanomaterials with organic molecules, by intervening on cellular metabolism to
influence the production of molecules or the transmission of information or to create
new cellular structures or supports for the construction of new complex molecules
or atomic assemblers for the creation of new molecular frameworks. In sum, we
would have the intentional alteration of living organisms through the manipulation
of DNA in order to create moleculesize machines, devices synthesising any single
piece of a variety of macromolecules, by penetrating into and integrating with the
cells of living organisms»64.
It is not easy to trace the legal boundaries of the employment of this technology
61
S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, cit., p. 54.
62
«If dignity is inherent to every human being, it applies equally to all» (R. Adorno, What is the role
of “human nature” and “human dignity” in our biotechnological age, in “Amsterdam Law Forum”, 2011,
p. 56). On this topic see C. Campiglio, Eugenetica e diritto internazionale, in Ordine internazionale e
valori etici, cit., p. 453 ff.
63
This does not prevent us to note, under other points of view, the existence of legally appreciable
differences between the two aspects. On patents concerning isolated human genomic DNA see US
Supreme Court, 13 June 2013, n. 12–398 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, in
http://www.supremecourt.gov.
64
Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, op. cit., p. 11 (our transl.).
or other similar technologies combined with the “natural” cellular component.

A possible line of discrimination could be drawn between what is functional to
improve health and what, instead, merely strengthens human life. But it is not always
easy to trace such a distinction65. Let us consider the case of the “manipulation”
of gametes for strictly therapeutic purposes, in the respect of the couple’s right
to become parents of a “healthy” creature. The route research could take and its
voluntary application by the interested individual shall be framed within appropriate
legal principles already capable to be assumed by current international regulations
protecting human dignity from certain medical treatments. This is imposed by the
circumstance that the boundaries to the employment of such techniques, according to
whether they are aimed at curing pathologies or at strengthening healthy individuals,
are ever more labile as they get ever more close to the primary “source” of biological
existence: DNA. This kind of interventions may interfere with the “natural” attribute
of the human person and on his/her “inborn” data. Thus, also the judgement of
value on the legal filed does not necessarily depends on the degree of complexity of
the bio-technological manipulation on the human body, but rather on its possible
consequences.
6. Limits imposed by the “Oviedo system” to personal choices

It is in such scenario that we shall consider the Oviedo Convention of 1997 with
its three additional Protocols. As we already noticed, the “Oviedo system” represents
a development and an expansion of principles already underlying the ECHR and
in particular its art. 866. Particularly, art. 2, para. 3, of the 2005 Protocol configures
the relevance of these principles in the dimension of the medical intervention on
the human body, which includes the “physical” intervention as well as “any other
intervention in so far as it involves a risk to the psychological health of the person
concerned”. International law, therefore, takes charge of preserving the psychophysical
integrity of the human person and, eventually, his/her “dignity”. This dimension
is subtracted to any individual assessment so to be subjected to an “objective”
evaluation67. Still, a full convergence of evaluations between State parties of the
ECHR on the way of conceiving “human dignity” is lacking, as such a convergence
is lacking, a fortiori, when it comes to the way in which human “dignity” shall be
protected in the case of choices of bio-technological strengthening. If human life is
considered a “gift”, the strictly “conservative” point of view is bound to prevail, so
that no interventions capable to alter the essential features of the “gift” should be
65
See C. Faralli, S. Zullo, op. cit., p. 521 ff.
66
Supra.
67
In this regard, see E. Pariotti, I diritti umani: concetto, teoria, evoluzione, Padova, 2013, p. 187.
F. Salerno 453
allowed. If the “individualistic” point of view prevails, “biology is not a destiny any
more”68, so that human life (and its biological components) is a “good” susceptible
to be employed and, thus, to be disposed of in legally permitted forms. The former
position would entail a conceptually absolute limitation to bio-technological
treatments; the latter, instead, would allow the employment of the human body to
its own improvement and strengthening69.
There is, though, a point of convergence between the two different perspectives, in
the sense that States converge in maintaining that “disposability” and “strengthening”
of one’s own body shall comply with the right to self-determination of the person
concerned by the intervention, in particular with the highest information possible
on the possible consequences so to make the individual aware of the choice he/she is
called to express or to revoke it promptly70. The “positive” obligation falls upon the
State, which is called to ensure that those in charge with the cure and the strengthening
of the body concerned behave accordingly. The central question, however, concerns
the typology of interventions that can be forbidden although authorised by the “fully
informed” interested individual. If we exclude the already mentioned prohibition
of cloning of human beings (1998 Protocol), the conventional instruments of the
“Oviedo system” limit themselves to establish a general criterion for “balancing
values”: bio-medical interventions shall respect the integrity of the human being (art.
5 of the Convention of 1997, art. 1 of the Protocol of 2002), of the general interest
of humankind, also not to compromise the rights of future generations (recital 12
of the preamble to the 1997 Convention71 and, more punctually, art. 16 of the
UNESCO Declaration of 200572). From such statements clearly emerges the so-
called “principle of precaution” that in international law limits the employment of
scientific and productive means in case of uncertainty on the negative consequences
– if not even the harms – that they might cause with regard to goods or interests
that the same international law is aimed to protect. This principle is precisely evoked
in the mentioned practice in order to protect the genetic identity and integrity of
the human being in an inter-generational perspective73. Such an approach does not
exclude research, experimentation and practical application of bio-technological
68
S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, cit., pp. 57 and 59 (our transl.).
69
In this regard, see R. Brownsword, Ethical Pluralism and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnology, in
Biotechnologies and international human rights, ed. by F. Francioni, Oxford, 2007, p. 46 ff.
70
Art. 5 of the Oviedo Convention of 1997 as well as the attached explanatory report: §§ 37 and 38.
71
«Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future
generations».
72
«The impact of life sciences on future generations, including on their genetic constitution, should be
given due regard».
73
Cf. E. Seng, Human Cloning; Reflections on the Application of Principles of International Environmental
and Health Law and their Implications for the Development of an International Convention on Human
Cloning, in “Oregon Review of International Law”, 2003, p. 119 ff.; see, in this regard, also R.
Molanda, Intervenciones genetico sobre et ser humano y derecho penal, Granada, 2006, p. 272.
innovations on the human body, but it dictates a punctual and constant verification
to prevent that humankind is exposed – according to the present knowledge – to the
risk of unpredictable prejudicial consequences74.
The indication is connected with other sectors of international law that
contemplate rights of future generations (the fourth generation of human rights75),
recalling the States’ responsibility on this matter. The undisputed relevance in the
bio-technological field of the principle of precaution is due to the nature of the
obligation that falls upon the States76. This is an obligation «of conduct» that each
single State shall observe within the limits of the means at its concrete disposal.
International law appreciates the bona fide fulfilment of the obligation if accomplished
through the diligence required from that State. The balance between such principle
and individual expectations for the realisation of one’s own personality (principle of
autonomy) should be configured in the sense that the former succumbs to the latter
when the risk in the inter-generational dimension is attenuated or is lacking. The
application of such a principle shall unavoidably respect different stages depending
on whether it is relevant for pure research, experimentation or the application of
their results77. The first and the second can be easily eluded in the same perspective of
the principle of precaution, as a correct assessment of the risks inherent to a certain
scientific activity depends on the higher degree of knowledge that one can have
about it.
At the present stage of scientific knowledge, the development of robotics is
conceptually less inhibited than it is for the manipulation of the human body, as
the former does not have any direct and immediate prejudicial effects on the inter-
generational perspective. Similarly, there is the need for containing a possible negative
impact of on the integrity of the human being, to the extent that we can recall here
the famous Asimov’s “three laws” aiming at inserting in the programming of robots
74
On the need for reducing the level of unpredictability: M. Buiatti, Le biotecnologie, Bologna, 20042,
p. 126; on the need for monitoring: G. Battaglino, Regolamentazione delle attività biotecnologiche,
in Le biotecnologie: certezze e interrogativi, edited by M. Volpi, Bologna, 2001, p. 89 ff. Here we are
not assessing the international regulations on genetic testing: in this regard see art. 12 of the 1997
Convention («Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as
a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease
may be performed only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject
to appropriate genetic counselling») and especially the relevant interpretative indications emerging from
the explanatory report to the Convention (paragraphs 78 ff.).
75
Supra.
76
For a reconstruction of such a principle, see M. Purdue, Integrated Pollution Control in the
Environmental Protection Act 1990: A Coming of Age of Environmental Law?, in “Modern Law Review”,
1991, p. 535 ff.
77
On the distinction between scientific research and patentability to commercial purposes of the
research outcomes, see EU Court of Justice, 18 October 2011, C-34/10, Brüstle § 40; for a comment
see S. Vezzani, Invenzioni biotecnologiche e tutela dell’ordine pubblico e della morale nel diritto europeo
dei brevetti: il caso Brüstle, in “DUDI”, 2012, p. 447 ff.
F. Salerno 455
inhibiting data to prevent their behaviour from harming humankind78.

Rather than setting rigid boundaries, conventional instruments preferred to
articulate “value” parameters of reference to be concretely verified by social control
procedures (Article 16 of the 1997 Convention79), in which public bodies entrusted
with precise evaluations on the legitimacy of certain bio-medical techniques of
intervention play a decisive role. The social control shall take place within States,
which – as we will see in the two following paragraphs – may determine punctual
limitations and “more favourable” practices. Such ambivalence involves both the side
of the “user” of the bio-technological therapy and the side of the researcher who is
called to “discover” it. The individuation of research objectives and of the relative
practical applications with regard to legitimate forms of human strengthening
falls within a wide margin of States’ discretion. The national model is to be drawn
from different indicators prefiguring the type of conduct adopted by States: from
constitutional principles to defined and authorised clinical practices80.
7. Reasons for legitimate interferences by national authorities according to the safeguard

clause
The wide margin of State parties’ discretion on the respect of private life does not
mean their full liberty to take any sort of initiative, both preclusive and permissive.
As far as such determinations concern the sphere of respect of private life, the ECHR
adopts a number of guiding-criteria that must be invoked to justify any kind of
initiative. Such criteria are to be coordinated and integrated in the light of the
principle of precaution. The consequence of this is coordination between general
rules, or between “principles”, which is susceptible to be differently perceived within
the various national contexts. This is possible because the rules that come into play
are very flexible according to the level of “due diligence” that each State is concretely
able to predispose or to the kind of “ethical” sensibility that it shows. However, no
matter how high the level of States’ autonomy is, States remain part of a system of
international rules that defines their normative coordinates. The interference of the
State shall be justified within the respect of a general interest of society, especially
considering the circumstances required by art. 8, para. 2, of the ECHR81. This means
that prohibitions of all kind shall first of all be provided by law (even if not necessarily
78
Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_laws_of_robotics.
79
The Communication of the EC Commission on Towards a European Strategy on Nanotechnology
(Bruxelles, 12 May 2004, COM(2004) 338 def.), maintains that «an open, traceable and verifiable
development of nanotechnology, according to democratic principles, is indispensable» (art. 3.5.1).
80
European Court of Human Rights, 10 April 2007, cit., § 39.
81
European Court of Human Rights, 29 April 2002, cit., § 68 ff.
expressed in a legal act) and cannot be discriminatory, for religious reasons82. This
includes criminal rules, especially those aimed at deterring “managers” and “users”
of bio-technology from committing attempts harming the integrity of the human
person83. A criminal offence of such a kind could concern both the event in itself (for
instance, cloning) and the conduct preliminary to its verification. The criterion of
proportionality between the effects of the measure and the right to be “compressed”
should always be respected. Also benefits and prizes can be normatively established
so to encourage those forms of strengthening that are coherent with general interests.
8. Relevance and limits of the national or sub-regional more favourable treatment

Both the ECHR and the “Oviedo system” include the so-called clause of the
more favourable treatment84. Such a clause preserves national – or supranational –
legislation providing for more favourable conditions. The inclusion of such a clause
is a diffused practice within the international conventions on human rights, in the
assumption that the rules they provide for configure a minimum due protection,
enabling national laws or other laws to freely raise the threshold of protection, being
logically undisputed that the minimum standard is included in the higher one. Also
EU law (as made clear by recital 7 and art. 2, para. 1, of Directive No. 2010/63 on
the protection of animals used for scientific purposes) knows such an approach,
to the extent that it recognizes, within a material regulation of harmonisation, the
opportunity of preserving “more favourable” regulations pre-existing in member
States85. But this is an ever less undisputable approach, first of all because the
parameter of normative comparison typical of international law is made more by
principles than by norms, so that the regulatory declination of the former becomes
autonomous and hardly relatable to considerations of higher or minor valorisation
of the protected interest. The assessment of the more favourable treatment is made
82
European Court of Human Rights, 23 June 1993, Hoffmann, application n. 12875/87 § 30 ff.
83
On the «orientating» function of penal precepts: M. Petrone, Biotecnologie e problemi penalistici, in
Le biotecnologie: certezze e interrogativi, cit., p. 160.
84
Art. 53 ECHR, art. 27 of the 1997 Convention, art. 34 of the 2005 Protocol.
85
According to art. 2, para. 1, of the Directive, «Member States may, while observing the general
rules laid down in the TFEU, maintain provisions in force on 9 November 2010, aimed at ensuring
more extensive protection of animals falling within the scope of this Directive than those contained
in this Directive». The derogating disposition is thus explained by the seventh recital of the directive:
«Attitudes towards animals also depend on national perceptions, and there is a demand in certain
Member States to maintain more extensive animal-welfare rules than those agreed upon at the level of
the Union. In the interests of the animals, and provided it does not affect the functioning of the internal
market, it is appropriate to allow the Member States certain flexibility to maintain national rules aimed
at more extensive protection of animals in so far as they are compatible with the TFEU». On the
topic, see also R. Bin, Freedom of Scientific Research in the Field of Genetics, in Biotech Innovations and
Fundamental Rights, ed. by R. Bin, S. Lorenzon, N. Lucchi, Milano, 2012, p. 137.
F. Salerno 457
even more problematic as international law seems increasingly inclined to define by

itself a determined balance of values and therefore their assessment, so that the more
favourable treatment in a national or supranational context could alter precisely the
balance established within the international instrument.
The different sensibilities of State parties to the ECHR on the nature of human
life itself, that is, whether it is a “gift” or a “good”, unavoidably lead States to lean
towards solutions aimed to privilege either an absolutely conservative approach on
human dignity, or an utilitarian approach and therefore to balance interventions and
interferences in a way or another.
Then there is the fact that States do not have certain and univocal data o bio-
technological impact: different conclusions follow also with regard to the resort to
autonomous ethical parameters. Thus, lacking established epidemiological testing,
not everybody agrees with the assertion according to which epigenetic mutations are
inherited by the future generation86.
For these different reasons, the parameter of “more favourable treatment”
becomes rather equivocal in its contents, except for the part in which it refers to
the undisputed principles in protection of human dignity stated at an international
level. One cannot dispute those criteria that make the principle of precaution more
rigorous by limiting experimentation and the application susceptible to determine
irreversible effects on human dignity and integrity, or by imposing more strict
verification procedures on this. In this sense the formula contained in art. 27 of the
1997 Convention is absolutely pertinent: «None of the provisions of this Convention
shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to grant
a wider measure of protection with regard to the application of biology and medicine
than is stipulated in this Convention»87.
86
Cf. V. L. Chandler, Paramutation: From Maize to Mice, in “Cell”, 2007, p. 641 ff.
87
Italic added.
Tutela internazionale e limiti del diritto all’autodeterminazione per il

potenziamento bio-tecnologico della propria persona
Francesco Salerno
Sommario: 1. La struttura “aperta” delle norme a tutela dei diritti umani: la CEDU. - 2.
Diversa natura ed intensità precettiva degli obblighi a tutela dei diritti umani. - 3. Il di-
ritto all’autodeterminazione della persona umana. - 4. L’ambito (circoscrivibile) di tutela
internazionale per il “fruitore” della bio-tecnologia. - 5. Limiti internazionali al diritto di
autodeterminazione per il potenziamento bio-tecnologico della propria persona. - 6. Limiti
imposti dal “sistema Oviedo” alle scelte personali. - 7. Motivi di interferenze legittime delle
autorità nazionali in base alla clausola di salvaguardia. - 8. Rilevanza e limiti del trattamento
più favorevole su base nazionale o sub-regionale.
1. La struttura “aperta” delle norme a tutela dei diritti umani: la CEDU

Secondo la definizione data dal Protocollo di Cartagena del 29 gennaio 2000 sulla bio-
sicurezza (strumento addizionale alla Convenzione sulla diversità biologica di Rio de Janeiro
del 5 giugno 1992), il termine “moderna bio-tecnologia” implica «the application of: a. In vi-
tro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct
injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic
family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that
are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection»1. In altri termini, l’approccio
bio-tecnologico può manifestarsi sotto la duplice veste sia dell’introduzione di frammenti
estranei di DNA attraverso le tecniche di DNA ricombinante, sia della fusione cellulare in
modo da superare le barriere fra le specie ottenendo comunque risultati non realizzabili in
natura. Tanto la ricerca che l’utilizzo di queste tecniche avvengono solitamente per ragioni
terapeutiche ma possono anche rispondere al desiderio dell’individuo di migliorare le proprie
prestazioni2.
1
Protocollo di Cartagena, art. 3, lett. i). Su questo protocollo vedi anche infra, nota 32.
2
Sulla fluidità del confine tra interventi miranti al miglioramento della salute e quelli invece finalizzati
al potenziamento della persona: infra § 5 e nota 64.
460 Tutela internazionale e limiti del diritto all’autodeterminazione
Nel diritto internazionale sui diritti umani non vi è una norma specifica che tuteli la
volontà dell’individuo di avvalersi delle bio-tecnologie sottoponendosi a trattamenti per il
potenziamento della propria persona3. Tuttavia, seguendo una tendenza frequente nella pras-
si, questo profilo garantistico prende progressivamente corpo grazie alla struttura “aperta”
che caratterizza gli strumenti internazionali a tutela dei diritti umani e che li rende in vario
modo permeabili alla emergenza di interessi o valori inespressi nel testo del singolo trattato
perché comunque compresi negli scopi e nei principi che lo sorreggono. D’altronde, proprio
per salvaguardare sempre nuove esigenze di tutela si sono succedute quattro “generazioni”
di diritti umani, a testimonianza delle crescenti aspettative di tutela via via regolamentate a
livello internazionale: i diritti civili e politici, poi quelli sociali, quindi la tutela dell’ambiente
fino alla quarta, più recente, acquisizione del diritto delle generazioni future su cui proprio
avremo modo di ritornare più avanti. Tutte e quattro le dimensioni evocate vengono in evi-
denza per apprezzare le aspettative di tutela in relazione ai multiformi e sempre più accelerati
sviluppi della scienza e della tecnica, ivi compresi quelli direttamente fungibili alla salute ed
al benessere individuale, quindi – se del caso – al “potenziamento” della persona umana4.
Proprio questo nesso funzionale con la centralità della persona umana nelle sue varie “dimen-
sioni” non consente di stabilire una separatezza tra i diversi stadi quanto invece osservarne la
reciproca interazione.
A titolo paradigmatico l’analisi va incentrata sulla Convenzione europea dei diritti
dell’uomo (CEDU). Questo strumento riveste una posizione di assoluto rilievo nel panorama
complessivo sui diritti umani per alcune sue specifiche caratteristiche. Anzitutto la CEDU si
pone come disciplina di valenza “costituzionale” per gli Stati parti, tanto da investirli di ob-
blighi solidali da rispettare e far rispettare anche in situazioni nelle quali la giurisdizione dello
Stato parte non sia piena5. A rafforzare la sua valenza di “ordine pubblico europeo”, la CEDU
permea di sé anche l’ordinamento dell’UE: in ogni caso, questa si è da tempo unilateralmente
vincolata a rispettare i diritti umani quali garantiti dalla CEDU (art. 6 TUE), indipendente-
mente dalle prospettive della sua futura adesione tuttora da perfezionare6. In secondo luogo,
la CEDU è provvista di una giurisdizione permanente, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo,
che svolge una interpretazione autonoma delle relative prescrizioni quando ne deve appurare
eventuali violazioni. Le pretese vittime di una violazione possono rivolgersi direttamente alla
Corte, la quale si mette così direttamente in collegamento - senza quindi neppure la “media-
zione” del giudice nazionale come avviene per la Corte di giustizia dell’UE nel caso del rinvio
pregiudiziale - con le istanze “vive” della società dialogando con esse proprio nella prospettiva
di una costante “attualizzazione” dei precetti normativi. La capacità del giudice europeo di
3
Cfr. in generale, tra l’altro, Ordine internazionale e valori etici (VIII Convegno della SIDI, Verona
26-27 giugno 2003), a cura di N. Boschiero, Napoli, 2004, pp. 365 ss.; Bioetica e biotecnologie nel
diritto internazionale e comunitario. Questioni generali e tutela della proprietà intellettuale, a cura di N.
Boschiero, Torino, 2006.
4
Vedi Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 19 luglio 2002, Koch, ric. n. 497/09 § 51. Le decisioni
della Corte europea dei diritti umani sono reperibili nel sito http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int.
5
Infra anche § 2.
6
Cfr. ECHR, Communication commune des présidents Costa et Skouris, in http://www.echr.coe.int; Fifth
negotiation meeting between the CDDH and the European Commission on the accession of the European
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013, 47+1(2013)008rev2
§ 65 ss.
F. Salerno 461
leggere questa spontanea dinamica sociale e di razionalizzarla nella cornice normativa della
Convenzione rendendola effettiva spiega la straordinaria richiesta di “accesso” alla sua giuri-
sdizione, che finisce col piegare a propri fini l’originario contenuto della tutela convenzionale
aggiornandone la portata, modificando – ove necessario – la precedente giurisprudenza7. Per
sviluppare tale approccio ermeneutico, la Corte “dialoga” sia con i sistemi giuridici nazionali
degli Stati parti, sia con altre fonti normative internazionali. La finalità è diversa. Nella prima
ipotesi, il giudice verifica quale sia lo stadio di convergenza degli Stati parti della CEDU verso
un “comune sentire” idoneo a rendere accettabile la sua “sintesi” in un principio di diritto
generale e condiviso, suscettibile di integrare la formula pattizia plasmandola in continuità
con il dato effettivo dei diritti nazionali8. Nella seconda ipotesi, il giudice europeo, partendo
dal presupposto che la Convenzione non può essere collocata in un vuoto giuridico interna-
zionale (dottrina del vacuum)9, cerca di reperire il modello normativo che meglio chiarisce a
livello internazionale il tipo di tutela in giuoco. È sulla base di questi due indicatori - l’uno
“interno” al corpo sociale della CEDU, l’altro esterno ad esso - che il testo convenzionale
si evolve assumendo sempre nuovi significati e contenuti precettivi10. L’opera di “fertiliz-
zazione” del testo convenzionale avviene nell’ambito della CEDU in entrambi i casi, senza
che il carattere incisivo di tale evoluzione dipenda necessariamente dalla convergenza dei
due “indicatori”. Emblematico al riguardo lo sviluppo applicativo dell’art. 8 della CEDU.
L’obbligo degli Stati di rispettare la vita privata nelle sue varie prospettive di “sviluppo” ha
accolto l’evoluzione “spontanea” dei sistemi giuridici nazionali verso la rimozione di forme di
discriminazione nei confronti della condizione omosessuale inducendo la Corte europea dei
diritti umani a rivedere le iniziali indicazioni della Commissione EDU incline a legittimare
prescrizioni penali che punivano la condotta omosessuale11. Lo stesso è avvenuto per il caso
del transessualismo: inizialmente negato e poi assorbito nella sfera di garanzia dell’art. 812. Se
ne evince che dalla medesima regola internazionale si dipanano più indicazioni prescrittive
che sono espressione dello stesso valore tutelato. In altri termini, il vincolo pattizio originario
si connota alla stregua di un “principio” che si articola in più “regole” di vario tenore suscetti-
7
In considerazione di ciò, il Protocollo n. 14 alla CEDU ha “razionalizzato” il sistema giurisdizionale
configurando il ruolo della Grande Camera della Corte europea dei diritti umani quale unica sede in
cui stabilire precedenti orientativi per le articolazioni minori della stessa Corte: La nouvelle procédure
devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme après le Protocole n° 14. Actes du colloque tenu à Ferrara
les 29 et 30 avril 2005, a cura di F. Salerno, Bruxelles, 2007.
8
Sulla funzione integrativa dei principi generali di diritto e la loro idoneità a favorire l’interpretazione
evolutiva delle norme convenzionali: F. Salerno, Principi generali di diritto, in Digesto IV, vol. XI,
Torino, 1996, p. 533 ss.
9
Cfr. in proposito F. Salerno, Diritto internazionale. Principi e norme, Padova, 20133, pp. 179 e 192
ss.
10
Secondo la Corte europea dei diritti umani, la «Convention en général … constitue un traité de
garantie collective des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales [et] doit être interprétée et
appliquée d’une manière qui en rende les exigences concrètes et effectives» (decisione 26 ottobre 2000,
Sanles Sanles, ric. n. 48335/99, p. 7).
11
Theory and practice of the European convention on human rights, ed. by P. Van Dijk, F. Van Hoof, A.
Van Rijn, L. Zwakk, Oxford, 20064, p. 678 ss.; C. Pitea, Art. 8, in Commentario breve alla Convenzione
europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, a cura Di S. Bartole, P. De
Sena, V. Zagrebelsky, Padova, 2012, p. 330.
12
Corte europea dei diritti umani, 11 luglio 2002, Goodwin, ric. n. 28957/95 § 74 s.
bili anche di mutare nel tempo per il continuo evolversi della “coscienza giuridica” degli Stati
parti13. Tuttavia, queste situazioni non vengono considerate di per sé estranee all’oggetto della
CEDU tanto che la Corte le valuta come espressione autonoma del diritto alla vita privata.
Talora, per consolidare ed espandere questo dato normativo anche in modo più analiti-
co, sovviene la determinazione degli Stati membri del Consiglio d’Europa di adottare nuovi
strumenti convenzionali. Ne è una manifestazione - per l’argomento qui affrontato - la Con-
venzione di Oviedo del 1997 (di seguito “Convenzione del 1997”) sulla protezione dei diritti
umani e la dignità della persona umana nel campo della bio-medicina: si tratta essenzialmen-
te di una convenzione-quadro che fissa una serie di principi rimettendo (art. 31) la disciplina
più dettagliata a protocolli successivi, ai quali gli Stati possono aderire solo se abbiano anche
ratificato la Convenzione del 1997. Al momento ne sono stati adottati tre (1998, 2002,
2005) riguardanti rispettivamente: il divieto di clonazione di esseri umani, il trapianto degli
organi e di tessuti di origine umana ed infine la ricerca biomedica14. Ne emerge un “sistema
Oviedo” solo in parte simile alla CEDU, dal momento che alla Corte europea dei diritti
umani è rimessa una funzione consultiva (art. 29 della Convenzione del 1997) escludendo
di conseguenza che l’individuo possa far valere direttamente le violazioni di cui è vittima ad
opera di uno Stato parte. Tuttavia le norme del “sistema Oviedo” interagiscono sotto diversi
profili con la CEDU canalizzando il significato dei principi propri di quest’ultima15: in tali
circostanze la pretesa vittima può utilizzare il meccanismo giurisdizionale della CEDU per far
rispettare quei valori del “sistema Oviedo” che vi si siano “materializzati”16. Inoltre il “sistema
Oviedo” si raccorda sotto più profili con strumenti convenzionali di portata universale, in
specie con il già ricordato Protocollo di Cartagena del 2000 cui aderiscono vari Stati europei
(come Germania, Regno Unito e Italia) che al momento non sono parti della Convenzione
del 1997 o dei relativi Protocolli17. Perciò, a prescindere dallo stato delle ratifiche, non sembra
13
È in mancanza di tale fattore che, ad esempio, la Corte non ha tuttora accolto il diritto all’eutanasia e
non ha equiparato il matrimonio omosessuale a quello eterosessuale. Questi “diritti” potrebbero trovare
obiettiva collocazione nelle formule pattizie pertinenti (articoli 2, 3 e 8 della CEDU), ma la Corte
si è finora trattenuta dall’enunciarli proprio perché non ritiene possibile coglierne la presenza nella
coscienza giuridica degli Stati parti.
14
Il legame funzionale è esplicitato nell’art. 31 della Convenzione del 1997: «Protocols may be
concluded … with a view to developing, in specific fields, the principles contained in this Convention».
I testi della Convenzione del 1997, dei Protocolli successivi come anche dei rapporti esplicativi all’una
e agli altri sono reperibili nel sito http://www.conventions.coe.int.
15
Cfr. R. Lawson, Dwelling on the Threshold: On the Interaction Between the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Biomedicine Convention, in Human Rights and Biomedicine, ed. by A. den Exter,
Antwerpen, 2010, p. 23 ss. Per riferimenti alla Convenzione di Oviedo ed ai suoi Protocolli addizionali
ma nell’ambito di applicazione della CEDU, vedi Corte europea dei diritti umani: sent. 9 marzo 2004,
Glass, ric. n. 61827/00 § 58; sent. 8 luglio 2004, Vo, n. 53924/00 §§ 35 e 84; sent. 10 aprile 2007,
Evans, ric. n. 6339/05 § 39; decisione 11 ottobre 2007, Özalp, ric. n. 74300/01; sent. 13 maggio 2008,
Juhnke, ric. n. 52515/99 § 56.
16
Nel rapporto esplicativo della Convenzione del 1997 si chiarisce (§ 165) che «This Convention
does not itself give individuals a right to bring proceedings before the European Court of Human
Rights. However, facts which are an infringement of the rights contained in this Convention may be
considered in proceedings under the European Convention of Human Rights, if they also constitute a
violation of one of the rights contained in the latter Convention».
17
Lo stesso peraltro avviene con strumenti di portata universale: la Dichiarazione UNESCO del 2005
su bioetica e diritti umani richiama (infra) nel preambolo il “sistema Oviedo”.
F. Salerno 463
improprio richiamare il “sistema Oviedo” nell’ordinamento italiano benché l’Esecutivo non

abbia voluto finora depositare lo strumento di ratifica della Convenzione nonostante da anni
il Parlamento l’abbia autorizzato18. In tali condizioni l’Italia non è vincolata a rispettare gli
obblighi della Convenzione (e tanto meno dei relativi Protocolli), ma non se ne possono però
eludere i riflessi su quelle regole della CEDU – garantite nell’ordinamento italiano dall’art.
117, 1° comma, Cost. – da cui il “sistema Oviedo” prende spunto e che vanno dunque in-
terpretate alla luce della più recente prassi diplomatica degli stessi Stati parti della CEDU
(art. 31 § 3 della Convenzione di Vienna del diritto dei trattati del 1969)19. Questo dato si
consolida ulteriormente se si considera che taluni principi enunciati nel “sistema Oviedo”
sono comunque vincolanti per l’Italia in ragione degli articoli 1 e 3 della Carta UE dei diritti
fondamentali, cui peraltro si attaglia la più intensa garanzia costituzionale dell’art. 11 Cost.,
sia pure limitatamente a fattispecie disciplinate dal diritto dell’UE.
Vi è poi un ulteriore fattore che rende in questa materia oltremodo articolato il quadro
normativo e l’interazione tra le diverse fonti. L’espansione del diritto internazionale verso la
nuova frontiera della “bio-etica” comporta il confronto con una dimensione “privata” che
coinvolge la condotta di scienziati e operatori sanitari sovente “auto-regolata” attraverso le
rispettive comunità organizzate anche a livello internazionale. La Dichiarazione UNESCO
del 19 ottobre 2005 su “Bioethics and Human Rights”20 richiama nel preambolo i codici e
le guidelines adottate da associazioni quali la “World Medical Association” ed il “Council
for International Organizations of Medical Sciences” alla stessa stregua del riferimento agli
atti che compongono il “sistema Oviedo”. Si tratta di regole tecniche e soprattutto deonto-
logiche che non hanno un valore normativo in senso proprio poiché definite al di fuori dei
meccanismi statali di produzione del diritto. Al tempo stesso, però, la normativa interna-
zionale contenuta nella CEDU o nel “sistema Oviedo” deve tener conto di questo spazio di
auto-regolamentazione. Ne è conferma l’art. 4 della Convenzione del 1997, in base al quale
«Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance
with relevant professional obligations and standards». Anche la Corte europea dei diritti umani
tiene conto delle “professional guidelines” nel valutare le pratiche mediche procreative alla luce
dell’art. 8 della CEDU21. Dovendo però ricondurre questo spazio di “autoregolamentazione”
ad una prospettiva unitaria di “governance” di situazioni meritevoli di tutela, il diritto inter-
nazionale impone agli Stati di coinvolgere anche i settori “privati” in un confronto pubblico
assumendo, in specie tramite appositi “Comitati etici”, indicazioni che siano frutto della
loro partecipazione. Una puntuale promozione di tali organismi ad un “livello appropriato”
si ritrova - tra l’altro - nell’art. 28 della Convenzione del 1997 e negli articoli 19 e 22, 2°
comma, della già ricordata Dichiarazione UNESCO del 19 ottobre 2005 su “Bioethics and
18
Cfr. legge 28 marzo 2001, n. 145, in Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 95 del 24 aprile 2001. Sul punto vedi V.
Tonini, La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo sulla biomedicina secondo la giurisprudenza italiana,
in “Riv. dir. int.”, 2009, p. 116 ss.
19
Questa dimensione è del tutto elusa dalla giurisprudenza italiana, nonostante la varietà di posizioni
da essa espresse in ordine al rilievo da attribuirsi alla Convenzione del 1997 (sulle quali vedi F. M.
Palombino, La rilevanza della Convenzione di Oviedo secondo il giudice italiano, in “Giurisprudenza
costituzionale”, 2011, p. 4811 ss.).
20
Cfr. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, ed. by H. A. M. Ten Have,
M. S. Jean, UNESCO, 2012.
21
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sentenza 10 aprile 2007, cit., § 39.
Human Rights”22. I vari Comitati etici da tempo operanti nel settore bio-medico a livello
internazionale, nazionale e anche infra-nazionale sono per l’appunto preposti a questo scopo,
confermando che la “verità etica” non può essere monopolio dello Stato23. Al tempo stesso il
diritto “oggettivo”, quello cioè di emanazione statale, interstatale o sovranazionale, assume
“in proprio” criteri etici delineandone una “giuridicizzazione”24.
L’estensione della tutela internazionale e l’articolata base sociale che ne è interessata pro-
duce però un quadro normativo sempre più complesso nel quale coesistono istanze valoriali
diverse anche in contrapposizione tra loro. La dialettica dei valori in proposito può essere
riferita alla medesima persona o anche a persone diverse fino a configurare una possibile
tensione tra la dimensione individuale e l’interesse generale, nei diversi livelli “ordinatori”
in cui questo viene principalmente gestito e definito: statale, dell’UE ed internazionale. In
tutte queste situazioni si innesca un processo di necessaria “coesistenza” tra valori in giuoco il
cui esito concreto conduce inevitabilmente alla compressione di uno o più di essi. La Corte
europea dei diritti dell’uomo ne è ben consapevole, tanto che essa stessa se ne rende artefice
ricorrendo al criterio della proporzionalità per bilanciare in modo legittimo i diversi valori
presenti nella Convenzione.
2. Diversa natura ed intensità precettiva degli obblighi a tutela dei diritti umani
Nel sistema della CEDU coesistono diversi livelli “deontici” secondo che la tutela con-
figurata rilevi nella sua piena dimensione precettiva ovvero si dipani (senza mai sfumare del
tutto) secondo un grado decrescente di intensità. Solo per chiarezza espositiva, si potrebbe
ricordare che il “nucleo duro” è senz’altro espresso dai diritti per i quali non è ammessa alcuna
deroga di sorta (art. 15 § 2 della CEDU). Ad esso fanno seguito quei diritti in relazione al
cui godimento sia ammesso un margine di apprezzamento variamente ampio, talora notevole
come accade per la scelta del modello elettorale e parlamentare più idoneo a rendere effettivo
il diritto alla democrazia rappresentativa (art. 3 del Protocollo addizionale alla CEDU)25 o
per le preferenze accordate alla religione (o al “senso religioso”) prevalente in un determinato
paese26. A pesare in questi casi sono le tradizioni storiche e culturali dello Stato ed il modo
22
Cfr. C. Huriet, Ethic Committees, in The UNESCO Universal Declaration…, cit., p. 265 ss.
23
S. Maljean-Dubois, Bioèthique et droit international, in “AFDI”, 2000, p. 87.
24
J. Ayllón, Biotecnología y dignidad humana en la jurisprudencia, in Biotecnología, Derecho y dignidad
humana, Comares, 2003, p. 88. Sul “fenomeno di ibridazione tra etica e diritto”, D. Ruggiu, Diritti
e temporalità, Bologna, 2012, p. 117; vedi anche ivi, p. 160 ss. e 168 ss. La necessità di dialogare
con forme “a-statali” di regolamentazione spiega il ricorso a formule promozionali di soft law; vedi al
riguardo, tra l’altro, la raccomandazione della Commissione CE del 7 febbraio 2008, n. 2008/345/
CE, recante il codice di condotta per una ricerca responsabile nel settore delle nanoscienze e delle
nanotecnologie: in GUUE, L 116 del 30 aprile 2008, p. 46 ss.
25
Cfr. F. Salerno, “Sovranità liquida” ovvero il diritto alla democrazia rappresentativa tra sovranità
costituzionale ed obblighi internazionali, in Per il 70. Compleanno di Pierpaolo Zamorani, a cura di L.
Desanti, P. Ferretti, D. Manfredini, Milano, 2009, p. 363 ss.
26
Il diritto internazionale attuale sembra far rientrare nel margine di apprezzamento dello Stato
l’opportunità di assegnare un certo privilegio alla tradizione religiosa del paese, riconoscendo
determinate festività o esponendo in pubblico simboli di una determinata religione (Corte europea dei
diritti umani, sentenza 18 marzo 2011, Lautsi e altri, ric. n. 30814/06, § 68 ss.).
F. Salerno 465
di percepire determinati valori. Anche la libertà di scelta individuale sul potenziamento

bio-tecnologico della propria persona risente dei valori etici dello Stato (oltre che delle sue
capacità scientifiche e tecnologiche)27.
La variegata modulazione degli obblighi a tutela dei diritti umani diventa ancora più
significativa se commisurata al tipo di condotta richiesto agli Stati che ne sono destinatari. La
distinzione in proposito è tra obblighi “positivi” e obblighi “negativi”. I secondi sono univoci,
dal momento che lo Stato è tenuto “a non fare”, vale a dire a non interferire sulla dimensione
del privato quale tutelata dal diritto internazionale. Caso emblematico è il divieto di tortura,
in forza del quale lo Stato non può porre in essere comportamenti di quel genere da parte
di propri organi. Il contenuto negativo dell’obbligo di condotta, in quanto insuscettibile di
alcun temperamento, è di applicazione uniforme. L’obbligo positivo implica invece per lo
Stato lo svolgimento di una certa attività – che riguarda una determinata condotta o specifici
risultati – idonea a rendere concreto il beneficio che il diritto internazionale intende assicu-
rare al privato, anche mettendolo al riparo da interferenze di terzi privati28. In quest’ultimo
caso, la CEDU non indica quali siano i mezzi che lo Stato deve predisporre, rimettendoli
alla valutazione discrezionale del medesimo ed alle possibilità che quello ha di farlo in una
data situazione concreta su cui pure avrebbe “giurisdizione” ai sensi dell’art. 1 della CEDU.
Va peraltro chiarito che, anche in relazione all’art. 8 della CEDU, l’alternativa tra obblighi
positivi e negativi non è talmente rigida da essere “disegnata” in modo netto per una specifica
tutela29. Il diritto alla vita di cui all’art. 2 della CEDU impone allo Stato l’obbligo negativo di
non uccidere la persona umana se non sussistono ragioni legittime per farlo (ad esempio un
conflitto armato), ma richiede pure l’obbligo per lo Stato di predisporre misure processuali
adeguate per appurare se sia stata legittima la morte di una persona.
La tutela internazionale dei diritti umani si rapporta alla loro dimensione progressiva-
mente transnazionale, evocando l’azione che gli Stati parti degli strumenti pertinenti come
la CEDU ed il Patto sui diritti civili e politici devono espletare per assicurarne il rispetto
nei pur limitati ambiti entro cui sono in grado di esercitare la loro giurisdizione o la loro
influenza. La condotta degli Stati è in questo caso indirizzata e valutata secondo parametri di
due diligence perché riferita a situazioni che sfuggono (se del caso, momentaneamente) al loro
pieno controllo effettivo30 ovvero che rientrano nella sovranità di altri Stati. Tali indicazioni
possono perciò anche spingersi a regolare la condotta di Stati parti verso Stati non parti dei
trattati in esame. Lo si ritrova nel “General Comment” n. 14 (2000) del Comitato dell’ONU
per i diritti economici, sociali e culturali relativamente al diritto alla salute quale garanti-
to dall’art. 12 dell’omologo Patto. Secondo il Comitato, gli Stati che ne sono parti hanno
l’obbligo di «respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent
27
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sentenza 10 aprile 2007, cit. § 77.
28
C. Pitea, op. cit., p. 304; Corte europea dei diritti umani, sentenza 10 aprile 2007, cit. § 75.
29
Cfr. Corte europea dei diritti umani: sentenza 13 febbraio 2003, Odièvre, ric. n. 4236/98 § 40;
sentenza 10 aprile 2007, cit. § 75; 25 settembre 2012, Godelli, ric. n. 33783/09 § 47 («The boundaries
between the State’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise
definition»); sentenza 2 ottobre 2012, Knecht, ric. n. 10048/10 § 55.
30
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sentenza 8 luglio 2004, Ilaşcu, ric. n. 48787/99; Corte internazionale
di giustizia, sentenza 26 febbraio 2007, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, § 430; il testo completo è reperibile nel sito www.icj-cij.org.
third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to influence these
third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and applicable international law»31. Lo stesso indirizzo è codificato in più strumenti
riguardanti le biotecnologie. L’art. 21 § 1 della Dichiarazione UNESCO del 2005 così re-
cita: «States, public and private institutions, and professionals associated with transnational
activities should endeavour to ensure that any activity within the scope of this Declaration,
undertaken, funded or otherwise pursued in whole or in part in different States, is consistent
with the principles set out in this Declaration». Il Protocollo del 2005 alla Convenzione di
Oviedo del 1997, che riguarda la sperimentazione bio-medica, prende in esame all’art. 29
l’eventualità, tutt’altro che rara, che “sponsors or researchers” soggetti alla giurisdizione di
uno Stato parte del Protocollo finanzino o svolgano (pianifichino o dirigano) ricerche anche
in uno Stato non-parte: in tale situazione il paese parte deve assumere misure “appropriate”
affinché la persona privata soggetta alla propria giurisdizione svolga quelle ricerche “extra-ter-
ritoriali” in modo conforme con i “principi” su cui si fondano le disposizioni del Protocollo32.
L’obbligo per lo Stato parte di assumere, se necessario, «appropriate measures to that end» si
configura, secondo il rapporto esplicativo al Protocollo, in relazione a quei privati «who fall
under the authority of the State concerned»33 in base a legami personali effettivi e qualificati,
come può essere la sede sociale della società che sponsorizza l’attività di ricerca oppure lo
svolgimento nel territorio di quello Stato di attività miranti a dirigere la ricerca in questione34.
Poiché il vincolo riguarda il rispetto dei “principi” del Protocollo in aggiunta alle condizioni
già previste dallo Stato che ospita materialmente la ricerca35, lo Stato “di origine” della ricer-
ca dovrà configurare nel proprio ordinamento condizioni specifiche per l’attività di ricerca
extra-territoriale se, come per il controllo pubblico, quelle non sono previste dal primo Stato
ma riflettono per l’appunto “principi” del Protocollo.
31
§ 39; il testo completo è reperibile nel sito: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR.
32
Secondo il rapporto esplicativo del Protocollo del 2005 (§ 138), «the term “principles” implies
that while it may be impracticable to implement all the detailed provisions contained in this Protocol
when a research project is carried out in a State that is not party to the Protocol, it is nevertheless
mandatory to observe the principles that those provisions develop. … This does not imply that a body
in the State Party to the Protocol has the authority to approve research in the non-Party State if that
State does not approve the research, or to override its regulations. However, researchers from the Party
State may be required to observe additional conditions, in accordance with the principles on which
the provisions of this Protocol are based, to those applicable in non-Party States». L’orientamento si
riscontra anche in altri campi affini, come il già ricordato (supra § 1) Protocollo di Cartagena del 2000
annesso alla Convenzione di Rio del 1992 sulla diversità biologica, il cui “sistema” non si applica al
materiale genetico umano: Conference of Parties (COP), decisione II/11 § 2 (1995). L’art. 24 del
Protocollo stabilisce che «Transboundary movements of living modified organisms between Parties and
non-Parties shall be consistent with the objective of this Protocol. The Parties may enter into bilateral,
regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements with non-Parties regarding such transboundary
movements».
33
Explanatory Report, par. 139.
34
Ibidem.
35
Explanatory Report, par. 138.
F. Salerno 467
3. Il diritto all’autodeterminazione della persona umana

Questo quadro di regole definite a livello internazionale converge gradualmente verso
la formazione di norme consuetudinarie di portata generale. Ne è manifestazione il diritto
all’autodeterminazione della persona umana per ciò che riguarda in particolare l’applicazione
sul proprio corpo di ritrovati bio-tecnologici. La sua genesi si ritrova nell’art. 8 della CEDU,
che nell’interpretazione evolutiva della Corte europea dei diritti umani garantisce il diritto
dell’individuo a vedersi rispettata sia la propria vita privata che le scelte sul relativo “svilup-
po”, a prescindere dalla sua “contestualizzazione” in un ambito familiare36. Questo diritto
alla “personal autonomy” costituisce una manifestazione della persona umana37 ed include
il diritto di stabilire e sviluppare anche rapporti “with other human beings and the outside
world”38. Il contenuto di questa autodeterminazione individuale non è di per sé “tipicizzabi-
le”, dal momento che, come sottolinea la stessa Corte europea dei diritti umani, «the notion
of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which
does not lend itself to exhaustive definition»39. Il diritto all’autodeterminazione individuale
riflette scelte sulla vita privata che lo Stato deve rispettare anche rispetto a profili che non
rientrino direttamente nella sfera di garanzia materiale dell’art. 8 della CEDU40.
Non si tratta di un obbligo puramente negativo, poiché lo Stato ha l’obbligo positivo di
mettere l’interessato nella condizione di poter esercitare in piena consapevolezza la propria
scelta41. Proprio a questo fine, nel campo bio-medico si è sviluppato il vincolo dello Stato ad
osservare il principio del “consenso informato” quando si tratta di applicare all’interessato
trattamenti terapeutici risolutivi per affrontare e possibilmente risolvere determinate pato-
logie (art. 5 della Convenzione del 1997). L’obbligo di assicurare una piena informazione
dell’individuo in relazione a trattamenti medici di qualunque natura è sancito puntualmente
dall’art. 7 del Patto sui diritti civili e politici, sia pure per evitare torture o maltrattamenti.
Lo stesso principio deve valere come si vedrà nell’ipotesi in cui il trattamento bio-medico sia
finalizzato al potenziamento della persona umana, tanto più se suscettibile di determinare
effetti irreversibili.
Il diritto all’autodeterminazione della persona umana non è però assoluto ancorché sup-
portato dal (pieno) consenso informato rispetto a determinati interventi sul proprio corpo.
È lo stesso diritto internazionale a porre limitazioni quando richiama valori quali “integrità”
e “dignità” della persona umana. Si tratta di valutazioni certo etiche che però si traducono in
divieti giuridici quando – come nel caso della clonazione – si vuole deliberatamente evitare
un fenomeno ampiamente praticato nel mondo animale e vegetale senza che ciò dia luogo ad
una differente valutazione circa l’appartenenza del prodotto locale alla sua specie “naturale”42.
36
Per la puntuale distinzione tra i due profili, Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 13 febbraio 2003,
Odièvre, ric. n. 42326/98 § 28.
37
A. Sassi, Autodeterminazione e consenso informato tra diritto interno e fonti europee, in Diritti, principi
e garanzie sotto la lente dei giudici di Strasburgo, a cura di L. Cassetti, Napoli, 2012, p. 313.
38
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 10 aprile 2007, cit. § 71.
39
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 19 luglio 2012, Koch, ric. n. 497/09 § 51.
40
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 20 gennaio 2011, Haas, ric. n. 31322/07 § 50; sent. 19 luglio
2012, cit. § 65 ss.
41
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 19 luglio 2012, cit. § 52.
42
Cfr. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, cit., p. 159 ss.; più in
4. L’ambito (circoscrivibile) di tutela internazionale per il “fruitore” della bio-tecnologia

Il diritto individuale all’autodeterminazione – ancorché informato – riguarda tuttavia
scelte che devono misurarsi con il quadro complessivo di valori garantiti dalla stessa CEDU.
Talora il contrasto è netto. Ad esempio, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo esclude – al
momento - che l’art. 2 della CEDU tuteli il diritto al suicidio, in altri termini non vi è –
anche per l’assenza di una convergenza degli Stati parti - una libertà completa di scelte della
persona umana su tale valore43. La Corte spiega questa limitazione con la stessa natura del di-
ritto alla vita che è un valore assoluto, rectius un “diritto”, sulla cui disponibilità non vi sono i
margini previsti da norme che invece garantiscono libertà44. E difatti la Corte ha riconosciuto
che il profilo “negativo” operi nel campo della libertà religiosa, della libertà sindacale o dello
stesso diritto alla democrazia rappresentativa consentendo appunto di non credere in alcuna
religione, di non associarsi ad alcun sindacato ovvero di non esprimere il proprio “diritto” di
voto.
Ai sensi dell’art. 8 della CEDU esistono vasti margini per l’individuo di “qualificare”
lo sviluppo della propria vita, o meglio la propria identità personale. Valorizzando questa
esigenza, la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo ha tra l’altro ricondotto all’art. 8 il diritto
dell’individuo a conoscere la propria identità biologica45 e il diritto al transessualismo46.
Non si tratta però di una facoltà illimitata. Il Protocollo del 1998 stabilisce il divieto di
clonazione di esseri umani; lo stesso divieto è ribadito dall’art. 3 della Carta UE dei diritti
fondamentali. Il tono incondizionato di questa prescrizione riflette un valore assoluto da
difendere a tutela dell’integrità dell’essere umano.
Proprio per la natura di questo limite non sembra che sia vietata l’attività del ricercatore
che, per potenziare la propria e l’altrui vita, realizzi un automa, anche se la sua composizione
sia in parte cellulare. Si potrebbe pensare, ragionando in termini piuttosto futuribili, ad una
creatura in parte meccanica ma funzionale alla “produzione” di tessuti ed organi destinati ad
essere impiantati sull’uomo47. Ma si potrebbe anche creare un automa senziente (e sensitivo),
generale: K. L. Macintosh, Human Cloning. Four Fallacies and Their Legal Consequences, Cambridge,
2013.
43
Corte europea dei diritti umani: sent. 20 gennaio 2011, cit. § 54 ss.; sent. 19 luglio 2012, cit. § 70.
Sulla prospettiva personalista della Costituzione italiana e le sue diverse “letture”: F. Faenza, Profili
penali del suicidio, in Trattato di biodiritto, Il governo del corpo, a cura di S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando,
C.M. Mazzoni, S. Rodotà, P. Zatti, vol. II, Milano, 2011, p. 1808 ss. E tuttavia non si possono
trascurare le interazioni tra CEDU e “sistema Oviedo” (supra, nota 15). Così il diritto alla vita non può
essere assoluto dovendo rispettare il divieto di trattamenti umani e degradanti (Theory and Practice of
the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 391), tra cui non possono essere elusi gli accanimenti
terapeutici vietati dalla Convenzione del 1997 in quanto prescindono dal consenso della persona che
subisce i relativi interventi.
44
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 29 aprile 2002, Pretty, ric. n. 2346/02, § 39.
45
Corte europea dei diritti umani: sent. 13 febbraio 2003, cit., §§ 29 e 44; 20 dicembre 2007,
Phinikaridou, ric. n. 23890/02 § 45; 25 settembre 2012, cit., § 47 ss.
46
Supra.
47
Sulla combinazione tra materia organica ed inorganica: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri,
Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, Nanoscienze e nanotecnologie, 9 giugno 2006, p. 24; il testo completo
è reperibile su: http://www.palazzochigi.it/bioetica/testi/Nanoscienze_Nanotecnologie.pdf. In questa
ipotesi, stabilito se il prodotto unitario sia brevettabile in quanto processo “sintetico”, si tratterebbe
di valutare se le parti umane siano scomponibili dal prodotto unitario ed attratte da una valutazione
F. Salerno 469
in altri termini un robot che non sia un semplice artefatto ma esso stesso artefice cosciente del
proprio volere48. È ancora (ma per quanto?) prematuro affrontare la questione di una “digni-
tà” del robot quale soggetto giuridico distinto dal suo artefice (e non suo “bene”) benché non
lo si potrebbe inquadrare nella categoria definitoria di “essere umano”49. Senza però entrare
nel merito di un “diritto alla vita” per il robot senziente, la sua costituzione e composizione
bio-meccanica non è di per sé estranea al presente campo di indagine per il possibile impatto
dell’autonoma sul “bene” collettivo dell’integrità dell’essere umano50.
5. Limiti internazionali al diritto di autodeterminazione per il potenziamento bio-tecnologico

della propria persona
L’integrità dell’essere umano limita il diritto di autodeterminazione prefigurabile ai sensi
dell’art. 8 della CEDU, ma se ne deve stabilire la portata. Al riguardo va tenuto presente che
il diritto allo “sviluppo” della propria vita privata di cui all’art. 8 non pone concettualmente
differenze tra l’autodeterminazione dell’individuo a modificare il proprio sesso e un’analoga
autodeterminazione che miri a creare condizioni irreversibili di potenziamento della pro-
pria persona attraverso l’ausilio bio-tecnologico. In entrambi i casi la tecnologia sovviene
a sostegno di scelte individuali non supportate da considerazioni di necessità patologica51.
L’art. 8 tutela anche la seconda tipologia di scelte52, ma in modo compatibile con il sistema
complessivo di garanzie della CEDU. I limiti al riguardo dipendono dall’impatto che le scelte
individuali possono avere a più livelli: sullo stesso individuo che le pratica, su altri individui
che nel presente siano a quello variamente collegati o su altri ancora che potrebbero divenirlo
in futuro.
Nella giurisprudenza più recente l’art. 8 presenta un elevato grado di protezione idoneo
giuridica sull’uso “dignitoso” (S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, in Trattato di biodiritto, Il governo del
corpo, cit., vol. I, Milano, 2011, p. 56) e – se del caso – avulso dal profitto (art. 3 della Carta dell’UE
sui diritti fondamentali).
48
Cfr. F. Grigenti, Ambivalenza prometeica e nanotecnologie, in Forme di responsabilità, regolazione e
nanotecnologie, a cura di G. Guerra, A. Muratorio, E. Pariotti, M. Piccinini, D. Ruggiu, Bologna,
2011, p. 27 s. Sul c.d. “post-umano”, vedi S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere dei diritti, Roma-Bari, 2012,
p. 341 ss.; Id., La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, 20122, p. 73 ss.
49
Sulle questioni definitorie, L. Olivieri, Persona ed essere umano: spunti per una nozione giuridica
di persona alla sfida delle biotecnologie, in Bio-tecnologie e valori costituzionali. Il contributo della
giustizia costituzionale, a cura di A. D’Aloia, Torino, 2005, p. 435 ss. La maggiore riserva rispetto
alla considerazione “umanista” del robot è costituita dalla presunta assenza di “libero arbitrio”
dell’autonoma senziente, che sarebbe sempre espressione di processi “automatici” indotti. Varrebbe
però osservare che l’autonoma, se non ha meccanismi inibitori, ha molte più alternative “matematiche”
tutte parimenti attivabili mentre la persona umana ha meno scelte concrete da compiere pur in un
quadro di libero arbitrio “assoluto”. Si può peraltro aggiungere che, in assenza di inibitori e sempre
che non si riesca a introdurre nel robot indicatori di emotività, l’automa opera sulla base di “pura”
razionalità (matematica), là dove la persona umana può anche divergere da una razionalità “oggettiva”:
in questa “variabile” l’essenza del libero arbitrio resta solo prerogativa umana.
50
Infra.
51
È il caso delle terapie geniche: C. Faralli, S. Zullo, Terapia genica e diritti della persona, in Trattato
di biodiritto. Il governo del corpo, cit., vol. II, p. 520.
52
L. Tomasi, Art. 8, in Commentario breve alla Convenzione europea …, cit., p. 299 s.
a sacrificare altri profili pure garantiti dalla CEDU. Così nel diritto alla propria vita familiare
l’art. 8 include il diritto ad avere figli anche, se necessario, mediante tecniche di fecondazione
assistita che lo Stato ha l’obbligo positivo di assicurare53. Ma nell’art. 8 rientra anche il “diritto
negativo”, vale a dire quello di non avere figli. Perciò la Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo fa
rientrare nell’art. 8 il diritto di aborto come manifestazione legittima di autodeterminazione
della madre: il diritto alla propria vita privata e a un determinato “modello” di vita familiare
finisce così col comprimere un potenziale diritto alla vita dell’embrione o del feto soppresso
di modo che non ne sussiste il diritto alla vita nei termini dell’art. 2 della CEDU54.
Nonostante le implicazioni radicali riconosciute dall’art. 8 al diritto individuale di au-
todeterminazione sulla propria vita, le relative determinazioni conoscono un primo limite
se idonee a privare in modo irreversibile la capacità di autodeterminazione del soggetto che
intende fruire del “potenziamento” bio-tecnologico55. In altri termini, il diritto al rispetto
della vita privata della persona umana non può spingersi - per la CEDU e strumenti ad essa
coordinati quali quelli contenuti nel “sistema Oviedo” - fino al punto da consentire impianti
bio-tecnologici che impedirebbero allo stesso individuo di esprimere in futuro altre autono-
me scelte. Proprio per la natura del “bene” protetto – il diritto individuale sul proprio model-
lo di vita – la CEDU non ne può legittimare atti concreti di disponibilità che pregiudicano
in nuce la stessa capacità di autodeterminazione. Per le stesse ragioni la Corte europea dei
diritti dell’uomo esclude – come si è visto - il diritto al suicidio che altrimenti annullerebbe
il valore del diritto alla vita ineludibile presupposto per il godimento di altri diritti56 ovvero
autorizza limitazioni anche radicali ai diritti politici e all’attività di formazioni partitiche se
tali limitazioni sono necessarie per preservare l’esistenza dello Stato democratico che costitu-
isce l’unico modello costituzionale compatibile con il godimento effettivo dei diritti garantiti
dalla CEDU57.
Una seconda tipologia di limitazioni discende dalla dimensione relazionale dell’essere
umano. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo asserisce che l’art. 8 tutela «to a certain degree
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings»58. Nella logica della
persona umana come “animale sociale” la CEDU legittima iniziative limitative della sfera
di libertà quando si tratta di preservare l’interesse generale della stessa collettività umana59
ovvero nel caso in cui – ai sensi dell’art. 17 – vi sia un “abuso di diritto” per gli effetti pregiu-
dizievoli derivanti dall’esercizio di un proprio legittimo diritto nella sfera altrui.
Le limitazioni indicate non escludono forme di autodeterminazione individuale diver-
53
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 2 ottobre 2012, cit., § 54.
54
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 10 aprile 2007, cit., § 54. Sull’interesse primario della madre,
vedi anche Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 389 ss.
55
«Le nanoparticelle auto-replicanti potrebbero agire con lo stesso sistema di funzionamento del virus
di un computer: attivarsi automaticamente e diffondersi fino a distruggere gli elementi basilari per il
funzionamento» (Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, op. cit., p.
13).
56
Supra.
57
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 13 febbraio 2003, Refah Partisi, ric. n. 41340/98.
58
Sent. 16 dicembre 1992, Niemietz, ric. n. 13710/88 § 29.
59
Per la Commissione EDU, «the claim to respect for private life is automatically reduced to the extent
that the individual himself brings his private life into contact with public life or into close connection
with other protected interests» (decisione 12 luglio 1977, Bruggemann, ric. n. 6959/75 § 56).
F. Salerno 471
genti radicalmente dal modello convenzionale di coesistenza tra esseri umani, come la scelta
di vivere da eremita. L’autodeterminazione individuale può al più sollevare in tali casi l’esi-
genza di un controllo diretto sulla persona se la sua condotta, senza che si tratti di un “fuori
legge”, sia suscettibile di determinare un pericolo sociale. La CEDU prende in esame (art. 5
§ 1) la figura del “vagabondo” o altre categorie affini quali l’alienato, l’alcolizzato o il tossico-
mane: lo scopo non è quello di “criminalizzare” questo tipo di scelte ma di giustificare misure
limitative della libertà personale degli individui che l’abbiano compiute per proteggere inte-
ressi di natura generale come il possibile propagarsi di una malattia contagiosa di cui la perso-
na sia portatore. Da questa disposizione appare dunque chiaramente che la CEDU autorizza
gli Stati a prevenire e reprimere quelle condotte frutto di una lecita autodeterminazione in-
dividuale ma suscettibili di determinare effetti pregiudizievoli per l’intera collettività umana.
Lo scenario di “pericolosità sociale” diventa ovviamente ancora più marcato quanta più
vasta e profonda risulta la scelta espressa dall’individuo. Lo sarebbe il potenziamento dell’es-
sere umano conferendogli capacità superiori agli altri. Questa sorta di eugenetica in chiave
bio-tecnologica creerebbe un essere umano del tutto inedito60 difficilmente compatibile con il
principio di non-discriminazione (art. 14 della CEDU) se questo modello di “dignità di vita”
non fosse potenzialmente accessibile a tutti gli esseri umani61.
Vi è un’ulteriore e più latente conseguenza insita in questo scenario: l’incidenza delle
manipolazioni bio-tecnologiche sul DNA umano con riflessi che potenzialmente riguardano
l’intero genere umano. L’effetto di tale “autodeterminazione” prescinde dal tipo di proce-
dimento utilizzato, senza quindi che rilevi se il potenziamento si realizzi con un prodotto
presente in natura o realizzato in modo sintetico62. Il processo è palese per quanto riguarda le
tecniche del DNA ricombinante, così come l’uso di nanobiotecnologie che “non si limitano a
fornire nuove opportunità tecnologiche per la produzione di materiali o di sostanze plastiche
e chimiche … ma combinano nanomateriali inorganici e molecole organiche, intervenendo
nel metabolismo cellulare per condizionare la produzione di molecole o la trasmissione di
informazioni oppure per creare nuove strutture cellulari o supporti per la costruzione di nuo-
ve molecole complesse o assemblatori di atomi per la creazione di nuovi assetti molecolari.
Avremmo insomma l’intenzionale alterazione di organismi viventi attraverso la manipolazio-
ne del DNA per creare moleculesize machines (macchine molecolari), congegni che sintetiz-
zano pezzo per pezzo una varietà di macromolecole, penetrando e integrandosi nelle cellule
degli organismi viventi”63.
Non è agevole delineare i confini giuridici sull’impiego di questa tecnologia o di altre
affini in combinazione con la componente cellulare “naturale”. Una discriminante possibile
è costituita dalla distinzione netta tra ciò che è funzionale a migliorare la salute e ciò che
60
S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, cit., p. 54.
61
«If dignity is inherent to every human being, it applies equally to all» (R. Adorno, What is the role
of “human nature” and “human dignity” in our biotechnological age, in “Amsterdam Law Forum”, 2011,
p. 56). Sull’argomento vedi C. Campiglio, Eugenetica e diritto internazionale, in Ordine internazionale
e valori etici, cit., p. 453 ss.
62
Ciò non impedisce di rilevare sotto altri aspetti l’esistenza di differenze giuridicamente apprezzabili
tra i due profili. In materia di brevetti aventi ad oggetto DNA genomico umano isolato v. US Supreme
Court, 13 giugno 2013, n. 12–398 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, in http://
www.supremecourt.gov.
63
Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri, Comitato nazionale per la bioetica, op. cit., p. 11.
invece serve solo a potenziare la vita umana. Ma non è semplice fare concretamente questa
distinzione64. Si consideri la “manipolazione” dei gameti che avvenga a scopi strettamente
terapeutici, nel rispetto del diritto della coppia a divenire genitori di una creatura “sana”. Il
percorso che potrà fare la ricerca scientifica e la sua volontaria applicazione ad opera della
persona interessata vanno collocati nel quadro di principi giuridici pertinenti già assumibili
dalla disciplina internazionale contemporanea che tutela la dignità umana rispetto a determi-
nati trattamenti medici. Lo impone la circostanza che i confini nell’impiego di tali tecniche,
secondo che mirate a curare patologie o a potenziare individui sani, sono sempre più labili
man mano che ci si avvicina alla “fonte” primaria dell’esistenza biologica: il DNA. Questo
tipo di interventi può incidere sul connotato “naturale” della persona umana e sui suoi dati
“innati”. Perciò, anche il giudizio di valore sul piano giuridico non dipende necessariamente
dal grado di complessità della manipolazione bio-tecnologica sul corpo umano, quanto dalle
sue possibili conseguenze.
6. Limiti imposti dal “sistema Oviedo” alle scelte personali

È in questo scenario che va considerata la Convenzione di Oviedo del 1997 con i suoi
successivi tre Protocolli addizionali. Come già si è detto, il “sistema Oviedo” rappresenta uno
sviluppo ed una espansione di principi già sottostanti alla CEDU ed in particolare al suo art.
865. In specie, l’art. 2 § 3 del Protocollo del 2005 ne configura la rilevanza nella dimensione
dell’intervento medico sul corpo umano, che include sia l’intervento “physical”, sia «any
other intervention in so far as it involves a risk to the psychological health of the person con-
cerned». Il diritto internazionale si fa quindi carico di preservare l’integrità psico-fisica della
persona umana e in definitiva la sua stessa “dignità”. Questa dimensione è sottratta ad apprez-
zamenti individuali per essere ricondotta ad una valutazione “oggettiva”66. Manca però una
piena convergenza di valutazioni tra Stati parti della CEDU sul modo di intendere la “dignità
umana” e a fortiori sul modo in cui vada preservata la “dignità” umana in relazione a scelte
di potenziamento bio-tecnologico. Se si considera la vita umana un “dono”, finisce inevita-
bilmente col prevalere il punto di vista strettamente “conservativo” per cui non andrebbero
consentiti interventi che alterano i connotati essenziali del “dono”. Se invece prevale il punto
di vista “individualistico”, la “biologia non è più un destino”67 di modo che la vita umana (e
le sue componenti biologiche) è un “bene” suscettibile di impiego e quindi di disponibilità
in forme giuridicamente lecite. La prima posizione imporrebbe una limitazione concettual-
mente assoluta ai trattamenti bio-tecnologici; la seconda invece consente l’impiego del corpo
umano per migliorarlo e potenziarlo68.
Esiste però un punto di convergenza tra le diverse posizioni di pensiero, nel senso che gli
Stati convergono nel ritenere che “disponibilità” e “potenziamento” del proprio corpo devono
64
Vedi già C. Faralli, S. Zullo, op. cit., p. 521 ss.
65
Supra.
66
Cfr. in proposito E. Pariotti, I diritti umani: concetto, teoria, evoluzione, Padova, 2013, p. 187.
67
S. Rodotà, Il corpo “giuridificato”, cit., pp. 57 e 59.
68
Cfr. in proposito R. Brownsword, Ethical Pluralism and the Regulation of Modern Biotechnology, in
Biotechnologies and international human rights, ed. by F. Francioni, Oxford, 2007, p. 46 ss.
F. Salerno 473
rispettare il diritto all’autodeterminazione della persona interessata dall’intervento, in parti-

colare con la massima informazione possibile sulle possibili conseguenze in modo da rendere
l’individuo consapevole della scelta da esprimere ovvero di revocarla in modo tempestivo69.
L’obbligo “positivo” è a carico dello Stato il quale deve assicurare un comportamento con-
seguente da parte di coloro che siano preposti a curare e potenziare il corpo dell’interessato.
La questione centrale attiene tuttavia alla tipologia di interventi suscettibili di essere vietati
ancorché autorizzati dall’interessato “pienamente informato”. Se si esclude il già ricordato
divieto di clonazione di esseri umani (Protocollo del 1998), gli strumenti convenzionali af-
ferenti al “sistema Oviedo” si limitano a stabilire un criterio generale di “ponderazione di
valori”: gli interventi bio-medici devono essere rispettosi dell’integrità dell’essere umano (art.
15 della Convenzione del 1997, art. 1 del Protocollo del 2002), dell’interesse generale del
genere umano (art. 2 della Convenzione del 1997, art. 3 del Protocollo del 2005), anche per
non compromettere i diritti delle generazioni future (12° considerando del preambolo alla
Convenzione del 199770 e, in modo più puntuale, art. 16 della Dichiarazione UNESCO del
200571). Da queste enunciazioni trapela chiaramente il c.d. “principio di precauzione” che
nel diritto internazionale limita l’impiego di mezzi scientifici e produttivi nell’incertezza delle
conseguenze negative – se non dei danni – che ne potrebbero derivare rispetto a beni o inte-
ressi che lo stesso diritto internazionale intende proteggere. Questo principio viene appunto
evocato nella prassi in esame per preservare l’identità e l’integrità genetica dell’essere umano
in una prospettiva inter-generazionale72. Un simile principio non preclude del tutto ricerca,
sperimentazione ed applicazione pratica di innovazioni bio-tecnologiche sul corpo umano,
ma ne impone una verifica puntuale e costante per non esporre – in base alle conoscenze
attuali – la stessa specie umana al rischio di conseguenze pregiudizievoli imprevedibili73.
L’indicazione si allaccia ad altri settori del diritto internazionale nei quali sono ben pre-
senti diritti delle generazioni future (appunto, la quarta generazione dei diritti dell’uomo74),
richiamando la responsabilità degli Stati al riguardo. La rilevanza ormai incontroversa, nel
69
Art. 5 della Convenzione di Oviedo del 1997 nonché il rapporto esplicativo che l’accompagna: §§
37 e 38.
70
«Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future
generations».
71
«The impact of life sciences on future generations, including on their genetic constitution, should be
given due regard».
72
Cfr. E. Seng, Human Cloning; Reflections on the Application of Principles of International Environmental
and Health Law and their Implications for the Development of an International Convention on Human
Cloning, in “Oregon Review of International Law”, 2003, p. 119 ss.; vedi al riguardo anche R.
Molanda, Intervenciones genetico sobre et ser humano y derecho penal, Granada, 2006, p. 272.
73
Sulla necessità di ridurre il grado di imprevedibilità: M. Buiatti, Le biotecnologie, Bologna, 20042, p.
126; sull’esigenza del monitoraggio: G. Battaglino, Regolamentazione delle attività biotecnologiche, in
Le biotecnologie: certezze e interrogativi, a cura di M. Volpi, Bologna, 2001, p. 89 ss. Non è in questa
sede valutata la disciplina internazionale sui test genetici: vedi in proposito l’art. 12 della Convenzione
del 1997 («Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the subject as a
carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or susceptibility to a disease
may be performed only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject
to appropriate genetic counseling») e soprattutto le rilevanti indicazioni interpretative che emergono dal
rapporto esplicativo alla Convenzione (paragrafi 78 ss.).
74
Supra.
campo bio-tecnologico del principio di precauzione va però ricondotta alla natura dell’ob-
bligo che così si configura in capo agli Stati75. Si tratta più specificamente di un obbligo “di
condotta” che il singolo Stato deve seguire nei limiti dei mezzi di cui concretamente dispone.
In sostanza il diritto internazionale apprezza il rispetto in buona fede dell’obbligo se ese-
guito secondo la diligenza richiesta a quello Stato. Il bilanciamento di questo principio con
le aspettative individuali all’affermazione della propria personalità (principio di autonomia)
andrebbe configurato nel senso che il primo si flette a favore del secondo quando si attenua o
è assente il rischio nella dimensione intergenerazionale. L’applicazione di tale principio deve
inevitabilmente osservare stadi diversi secondo che esso rilevi per la ricerca pura, la sperimen-
tazione o l’applicazione dei risultati76. La prima e la seconda sono difficilmente ineludibili
nella stessa prospettiva del principio di precauzione, dal momento che una corretta verifica
dei rischi inerenti ad una data attività scientifica dipende dal maggiore grado di conoscenza
che se ne può avere.
Allo stadio attuale della conoscenza scientifica, lo sviluppo della robotica si presenta con-
cettualmente meno inibito di quanto invece avviene per le manipolazioni sul corpo umano,
in quanto il primo non presenta diretti e immediati effetti pregiudizievoli sulla prospettiva
inter-generazionale. E ugualmente non manca l’esigenza di contenere un possibile impatto
negativo dei robot sulla integrità dell’essere umano, tanto da poter qui ricordare le note “tre
leggi” di Asimov miranti ad inserire nella programmazione del robot dati inibitori per evitare
che la sua condotta pregiudichi il genere umano77.
Gli strumenti convenzionali, piuttosto che individuare rigide linee di confine, hanno
preferito enunciare parametri “valoriali” di riferimento la cui concreta verifica è rimessa a pro-
cedimenti di controllo sociale (art. 16 della Convenzione del 199778), nei quali diventa deci-
sivo il ruolo di organismi pubblici preposti ad operare precise valutazioni sulla legittimità di
talune tecniche di intervento bio-mediche. Il controllo sociale va svolto all’interno degli Stati,
i quali – come si vedrà nei due paragrafi seguenti – possono determinare limiti puntuali e pra-
tiche “più favorevoli”. Questa ambivalenza può valere sul duplice versante sia del “fruitore”
della terapia bio-tecnologica, sia del ricercatore che deve “scoprirla”. Rientra pertanto in un
ampio margine di apprezzamento degli Stati individuare in modo “pubblico” obiettivi della
ricerca e relative applicazioni pratiche in relazione a forme legittime di potenziamento uma-
no. Il modello nazionale va ricavato da diversi indicatori che prefigurano il tipo di condotta
che lo Stato segue: dai principi costituzionali alle pratiche cliniche definite e consentite79.
75
Per una ricostruzione di questo principio, vedi M. Purdue, Integrated Pollution Control in the
Environmental Protection Act 1990: A Coming of Age of Environmental Law?, in “Modern Law Review”,
1991, p. 535 ss.
76
Sulla distinzione tra ricerca scientifica e brevettabilità a fini commerciali dei relativi risultati, vedi
Corte di giustizia dell’UE, 18 ottobre 2011, causa C-34/10, Brüstle § 40; per un commento cfr. S.
Vezzani, Invenzioni biotecnologiche e tutela dell’ordine pubblico e della morale nel diritto europeo dei
brevetti: il caso Brüstle, in “DUDI”, 2012, p. 447 ss.
77
Cfr. http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tre_leggi_della_robotica.
78
Nella Comunicazione della Commissione CE su Verso una strategia europea a favore delle nanotecnologie
(Bruxelles, 12.5.2004, Bruxelles, 12 maggio 2004, COM(2004) 338 def.), si ritiene «indispensabile che
lo sviluppo delle nanotecnologie sia trasparente, tracciabile e verificabile secondo i principi democratici»
(§ 3.5.1).
79
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 10 aprile 2007, cit., § 39.
F. Salerno 475
7. Motivi di interferenze legittime delle autorità nazionali in base alla clausola di salvaguardia
L’amplissimo margine di apprezzamento degli Stati parti sul rispetto della vita privata
non si traduce nella loro piena libertà di operare ogni genere di iniziative, tanto preclusive
che permissive. Nella misura in cui determinazioni del genere afferiscono alla sfera di rispetto
della vita privata, il diritto europeo pone in essere una serie di criteri-guida che vanno comun-
que addotti a giustificazione di qualunque tipo di iniziativa. Tali criteri vanno coordinati ed
integrati alla luce del principio di precauzione. Ne discende un coordinamento a livello di re-
gole generali, o se si preferisce di “principi”, che è suscettibile di essere diversamente percepito
nei singoli ambiti nazionali. Lo consentono le stesse regole in giuoco ampiamente disposte
ad essere flessibili in considerazione vuoi del grado di “due diligence” che ciascuno Stato è
in grado di predisporre concretamente, vuoi del tipo di sensibilità “etica” che vi si manifesta.
Tuttavia, per quanto si innalzi il livello di autonomia degli Stati, questi restano pur sempre
all’interno di un sistema di regole internazionali che ne definisce le coordinate normative.
L’interferenza dello Stato deve essere giustificata nel rispetto di un interesse generale della so-
cietà, in specie considerando le circostanze richieste dall’art. 8 § 2 della CEDU80. Vale a dire
che divieti di qualunque genere devono avere anzitutto una valenza normativa (anche se non
necessariamente espressi in un atto di legge), né possono essere discriminatori ad esempio,
per ragioni religiose81. Vi rientra la normativa penalistica, in specie per dissuadere “gestori”
e “fruitori” della bio-tecnologia dal commettere tentativi che ledono l’integrità della persona
umana82. Una fattispecie penale del genere potrebbe riguardare sia l’evento in sé (ad esempio,
la clonazione), sia la condotta prodromica al suo verificarsi. Deve però essere sempre rispet-
tato il criterio di proporzionalità tra effetti della misura e diritto “compresso”. Vi può anche
essere il ricorso alla normativa “premiale” per incentivare quelle forme di potenziamento che
risultino coerenti con gli interessi generali.
8. Rilevanza e limiti del trattamento più favorevole su base nazionale o sub-regionale

Sia la CEDU che il “sistema di Oviedo” prevedono la c.d. clausola del trattamento più
favorevole83. Questa fa salva quella legislazione nazionale – o sovra-nazionale – idonea a
determinare condizioni più favorevoli. È prassi diffusa nelle convenzioni internazionali sui
diritti umani includere una clausola del genere nell’assunto che le regole ivi contemplate
configurano una tutela minima comunque dovuta, consentendo che le leggi nazionali o di
altra natura elevino liberamente la soglia di tutela essendo logicamente incontroverso che
lo standard minimo sia comunque compreso in quello più elevato. Anche il diritto dell’UE
(come denotano il 7° considerando e l’art. 2 § 1 della direttiva n. 2010/63 sulla protezione
degli animali utilizzati a fini scientifici) conosce tale approccio tanto da riconoscere, nell’am-
bito di una normativa materiale di armonizzazione, l’opportunità di preservare le normative
80
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 29 aprile 2002, cit., § 68 ss.
81
Corte europea dei diritti umani, sent. 23 giugno 1993, Hoffmann, ric. n. 12875/87 § 30 ss.
82
Sulla funzione “orientativa” del precetto penale: M. Petrone, Biotecnologie e problemi penalistici, in
Le biotecnologie: certezze e interrogativi, cit., p. 160.
83
Art. 53 della CEDU, art. 27 della Convenzione del 1997, art. 34 del Protocollo del 2005.
“più favorevoli” preesistenti nei singoli Stati membri84. Ma si tratta di un approccio sempre
meno incontrovertibile anzitutto perché il parametro di raffronto normativo proprio del di-
ritto internazionale è costituito più da principi che da norme, di modo che la declinazione
regolatoria dei primi diventa autonoma e difficilmente rapportabile a considerazioni di mag-
giore o minore valorizzazione del bene protetto. La valutazione del trattamento più favorevole
è resa ancora più problematica dal momento che il diritto internazionale si mostra in modo
crescente propenso a definire esso stesso un determinato equilibrio di valori e dunque una
loro ponderazione, talché il trattamento più favorevole in ambito nazionale o sovranazionale
potrebbe alterare proprio l’assetto stabilito nel vincolo internazionale.
Le diverse sensibilità degli Stati parti della CEDU sulla stessa natura della vita umana, se
cioè “dono” o “bene”, finiscono inevitabilmente per far inclinare gli stessi su soluzioni tese a
privilegiare ora un approccio assolutamente conservativo sulla dignità umana ora un approc-
cio utilitaristico e quindi a bilanciare gli interventi e le interferenze in un senso o nell’altro.
Vi è poi da considerare che gli Stati non dispongono di dati certi ed univoci sull’impatto
bio-tecnologico: ne discendono conclusioni diverse anche per il ricorso ad autonomi parame-
tri etici. Così, mancando test epidemiologici accertati, non è del tutto condivisa l’affermazio-
ne secondo cui i cambiamenti epigenetici siano ereditati o meno dalla generazione futura85.
Per queste diverse ragioni, il parametro di “trattamento più favorevole” diventa alquanto
equivocabile nei contenuti se non per la parte in cui si raccorda ai principi incontrovertibili
asseriti a livello internazionale a tutela della dignità umana. Non sono controvertibili quei
criteri che rendono più rigoroso il principio di precauzione limitando la sperimentazione e
l’applicazione suscettibile di determinare effetti irreversibili sulla dignità e l’integrità umana,
ovvero imponendo procedure di verifiche più rigorose al riguardo. In tal senso è assoluta-
mente pertinente la formula contenuta nell’art. 27 della Convenzione del 1997: «None of the
provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibil-
ity for a Party to grant a wider measure of protection with regard to the application of biology and
medicine than is stipulated in this Convention»86.
84
In base all’art. 2 § 1 della direttiva, «nel rispetto delle disposizioni generali del TFUE, gli Stati membri
possono mantenere disposizioni vigenti al 9 novembre 2010, intese ad assicurare una protezione più
estesa degli animali che rientrano nell’ambito di applicazione della presente direttiva rispetto a quella
prevista nella presente direttiva». Il settimo considerando della direttiva così spiega la disposizione di
deroga: «L’atteggiamento nei confronti degli animali dipende anche dalla percezione nazionale e in
taluni Stati membri vi è l’esigenza di mantenere norme in materia di benessere degli animali più ampie
di quelle approvate a livello dell’Unione. Nell’interesse degli animali e purché ciò non pregiudichi il
funzionamento del mercato interno, è opportuno consentire agli Stati membri una certa flessibilità nel
mantenere le norme nazionali miranti ad una protezione più estesa degli animali nella misura in cui
esse siano compatibili con il TFUE». Sull’argomento, vedi anche R. Bin, Freedom of Scientific Research
in the Field of Genetics, in Biotech Innnovations and Fundamental Rights, ed. by R. Bin, S. Lorenzon,
N. Lucchi, Milano, 2012, p. 137.
85
Cfr. V. L. Chandler, Paramutation: From Maize to Mice, in “Cell”, 2007, p. 641 ss.
86
Corsivo aggiunto.
Biorobotics, robotics and criminal law1
Table of contents: A) Biorobotics, brain-machine interfaces and human strengthening:

precautionary philosophy and heuristics of risk contrasting. - 1. Neurosciences, behavioural
genetics and criminal law. - 2. Distinction between robotics and biorobotics. - 3. Human,
physical and cognitive strengthening: man as, and beyond, the machines. - 4. Legal issues:
the case of malfunctioning of the bionic limb. - 5. Human strengthening technology and
its distinction from the notion of therapy. - 6. The effects of strengthening technologies:
effects limited to the individual and effects extended to environment and future generations.
- 7. The effects of strengthening technologies (on the individual, on the environment and
on future generations) and the condition of “double epistemic uncertainty”. - 8. Ethical
uncertainty: the ethical debate between supporters and detractors. - 9. Scientific uncertainty
and the model of regulation. The precautionary principle and the heuristics of risk aversion.
- B) Robotics, drones and Artificial Intelligences. - 1. Robotics and (strong or weak) Artificial
Intelligence: no difference between robots and the human mind? - 2. Intelligent robots
equipped with autonomy to decide. The use of artificial agents in complex organisational-
decisional procedures. Fields of application. - 3. The original problem: what is intelligence?
The strong A.I. and Turing’s “imitation game”. a) The intelligence as behavioural reactivity.
- 4. The confutation of Turing: Searle’s “Chinese room” experiment. The weak A.I. and
Intelligence as intentionality and “understanding” of meanings. - 5. Common sense and the
sphere of emotions. - 6. The ontological charter of machines and the problem of legal liability
for/of intelligent robots’ action. - 7. Criminal liability profiles: the imaginary hypothesis of
robots as criminally liable non-human agents, new subjects of criminal law. - 8. If robots are
means and not agents. The hypothesis of criminal liability of the programmer or user. - 9.
The problem of the predictability of the conducts of intelligent robotic systems. - 10. The
liability of the programmer.
1
478 Biorobotics, robotics and criminal law
A. Biorobotics, brain-machine interfaces and human strengthening: precautionary

philosophy and heuristics of risk contrasting
1. Neurosciences, behavioural genetics and criminal law

In the field of neurosciences, great interest has been raised by the recent studies on
molecular biology and behavioural genetics which, acknowledging that the volitional
process has a biological basis, aim at studying the influence of the genetic heritage
on the behaviour and personality of human beings. In particular, it is held that the
presence in the individual of a certain kind of genes, such as the MAOA, meaning
that, although in probabilistic and risk-percentage terms, the subjects who have this
kind of genes, in particular if they are exposed to stressful situations, have an higher
chance to adopt that behaviour.
These scientific discoveries dissolve a well-established cultural prejudice in the
Western culture: Cartesian dualism that postulates the separation between body and
soul, between mind and brain, between rex extensa and res cogitans, or in the most
modern formulations, the «property» dualism à la Karl Popper, who stated that body
and mind are made of the same matter, but they have different properties.
It must be said that rigorous and infallibly reductionist biodeterminist
approaches and interpretations are rejected even by the strongest supporters, on
the basis of the evidence according to which identical brains do not exist and,
consequently, identical persons with an identical behaviour do not exist, and that
both neurosciences and behavioural genetics do not acknowledge any scientific
experimentation models on human behaviour. The human genome-mapping project
proves how the gene sequence of each person is unique and unrepeatable, avoiding
any too machinelike conception of our life.
However, the discovery of a biochemical base of the decision-making process,
together with the philosophical mind studies, brings into question important
cornerstones of Western culture and influences important categories of criminal
law and procedure. These new scientific methodologies and discoveries enter the
criminal trial and call for a reflection about substantial categories: the category of
imputability and, even before, the concept of free will, come to play2. Freedom is
2
It is necessary to recall the well-known Libet’s experiment that demonstrates that the individual who
acts is conscious of its decision to move a limb only after the brain activated itself to start the movement;
the consciousness of an action begins about half a second after the “readiness potential” is set; the
volitional process starts subconsciously and the action starts before the individual gains consciousness
of it. According to Libet, free will does not depict a voluntary decision-making process, but expresses
itself by controlling the result; therefore “conscious and voluntary decisions” are not determinations to
action, but conscious veto functions as opposed to impetuses with of instinctive and biological nature.
On this issue, from a penal point of view, see A. Manna, Diritto penale e neuroscienze: un’introduzione,
in Diritto penale e neuroetica, edited by O. Di Giovine, Padova, 2012, p. 3; M. Ronco, Sviluppi delle
M. B. Magro 479
interpreted as a limited, weak, ever-changing notion and the concept of free will
itself is intended as the result of three different levels: the genetic makeup, its
psychophysical development, the environmental influence. The decision-making
process does not proceed in accordance to algorithmic and deterministic physics,
but abides by unknown laws that operate through “jumps” and “gaps” that break
causal determinism.3
From this acknowledgement a concept of self determination as a “veto power”,
as a capability to moderate compulsive behaviour, has been developed, therefore a
“social” and “adaptive” concept of free will, that is a result and outcome of a rational
process of cultural influence, an interaction between genetic and environmental
elements that work on different levels.
This results in a definition of the ability to take action as an ability to control
motor impulses and of the ability to understand as comprehensive of empathy,
moral thinking and counterfactual reasoning; thus, a different understanding of
the categories of intent and negligence arises, corroborating that conception of
culpability in a normative sense, other than that of culpability in the psychological
sense, which seems to be more entrenched on a biological substratum; there are
also important effects on the measure and on the function of punishment whereas
the general preventive conception of punishment expresses a function of inhibition,
cultural orientation and veto that has a neurological effect on the control functions;
moreover, these studies are useful to assess the capacity to be a party to legal
proceedings and the declaratory evidence; with regard to some categories of crimes
concerning drug addiction, the acquisitions of neurosciences allow to conveniently
manage special-preventive functions, in the phase of the execution of punishment.
2. Distinction between robotics and biorobotics

The field of robotics and biorobotics is by definition inter-disciplinary, as computer
science, engineering, electronic mathematics, neurosciences and biology researches
converge in it. Robotics also encompasses the study of Artificial Intelligence,
that is, the making of machines capable of feeling, of adapting themselves to the
environment, of learning, of evolving and even “capable of empathy”. These machines
have the following characteristics: they are interactive, reactive to the environment
and they act in an autonomous, unpredictable, non-predetermined, flexible and
neuroscienze e libertà del volere: un commiato o una riscoperta?, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit., p. 57;
M. Bertolino, L’imputabilità penale fra cervello e mente, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit., p. 83.
3
J.R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, in “The New York Review of Books”, 1998, p.65. Searle
identifies at least three gaps in the human decision-making process: 1) between the possible decisions
and the chosen one; 2) between decision and action 3) between the start of the action and the
continuation of the action.
easily influenced way, thus, they are given with autonomy, adaptability, inasmuch as
they are able to improve their own performances. The most topical and practically
relevant aspect of robotics concerns biorobotics, that is the combination of robotic
parts within the human body (wearable computers, computer implants in the body,
artificial bionic limbs, human-machine interfaces and the strengthening of human
attentive and mnemonic capabilities through brain implants on healthy individuals
for medical or ameliorative purposes).
The interrelation between man and machine follows two different paths: in the
first one, concerning bionics and biorobotics, the man incorporates the machine in
the second one, regarding robotics and artificial intelligences, the machine tends to
reproduce human features. A new aspect is that of synthetic biology, or the use of
new technologies in wich natural and synthetic molecular components are combined
together and reorganised so to create genetic circuits and therefore new organisms
(so-called artificial neural networks).
Biorobotics consists in the phenomenon of man-machine hybridization or in
the graft in the human body of electronic storage devices, hardware, software inner
brain computers and robots for therapeutic and strengthening purposes, directly
controlled by brain activity, through electrodes stably implanted in the brain. The
surprising element, which distinguishes man-machine hybridization from other non-
cybernetic prostheses, is precisely the interaction between nervous system, cerebral
impulses and the prosthesis’ animation, with the possibility to activate not only
exiting fluxes (brain-nerve endings-chip-robotic arm), with the aim to control the
motion of arm’s prosthesis through cerebral pulses, but also incoming fluxes (robotic
arm, chip, nerve endings, brain), with the aim of restoring the subject’s perception of
movement. Indeed, biorobotics makes use of the so-called man-machine interfaces:
channels that offer the possibility to influence the state of mind or of consciousness
of a person and to send out electrical external signals directly to the brain. The bionic
limb is able to recognise the will of the subject and to fulfil in real time a motor order
of the brain. The interfaces between the human brain and the machine allow to read
and use the neural signals associated to the cognitive activity in order to control an
artificial limb or the trajectory of a mobile robotic platform4.
These bionic researches especially intend to reactivate or substitute lost sense-
motor functions, but they pave the way to the strengthening of sense-motor and
cognitive apparatuses that are functioning properly.
4
There are also brain-machine interfaces that, by carrying signals to the central or peripheral nervous
system of a human being, modify its activity, just as it happens in the case of interfaces used to control
tremors in individuals suffering from Parkinson’s disease.
M. B. Magro 481
3. Human, physical and cognitive strengthening: man as, and beyond, the machines
The issue of human enhancement concerns the techniques to strengthen both
the cognitive-intellectual qualities and the physical qualities (aesthetic, physical or
in life expectancy). Cognitive enhancement is defined as amplification, extension
or strengthening, internal or external, of mental and neurological systems and
processes of storage, organization and elaboration of information. Therefore, it
affects perception, attention, comprehension and memory.
As cognitive neurosciences advance, the chances of enhancing typically human
cognitive capabilities are constantly expanding. Still, until now it was the new
computing and computer technologies that generated great performances on the
capacity to elaborate information. Hardware and software are able to provide the
human beings with cognitive abilities that in many respects overtake those of
biological brain. We are used to resort to external hardware in order to strengthen
our cognitive capabilities through calculators and personal computers that carry out
for us routine tasks in order to make intelligible an amount of data that could not
possibly be processed by human perceptual systems.
Today the new challenge is to improve human physical and cognitive capabilities
and to update them to the computer abilities of machines, in order to overcome the
limits of the human brain and body. Electronic storage devices equip our brain with
a sort of external extension, allowing us to store everything that we could not store,
and to focus on tasks more complex than the storage of information, just like and
maybe better than machines.
4. Legal issues: the case of malfunctioning of the bionic limb

The emergence of cybernetics and man-machine hybridization raises quite
relevant legal issues. Among these issues there is also the (civil and criminal) liability
towards third parties for the functioning and the malfunctioning of the results of
hybridization of a subject who has bionic parts controlled neurologically. The actual
existence of man-machine hybridization phenomena (cyborg) should really make
us reflect also on the legal problems connected to the legal regime of liability for
harms caused to the hybridized ones and to third subjects. The criminal liability
profile, whenever crimes have been committed, raises the following questions: is it
possible to affirm if the accident has been caused by a problem of control of artificial
limbs on the basis of a scientific reconstruction of the working modes of the bionic
limbs? Who should be held responsible for the death of third parties, if it is not
possible to ascertain a manufacturing or functioning fault of the biological limb?
Can the “action” carried out through an artificial limb be considered “conscious
and voluntary”? In that respect, many are the problems, which will be debated later,
concerning the predictability of the outcomes of the bionic intervention and of

automatic learning.
At the heart of this matter there are the usual issues concerning the boundaries
of the disposability of the human body and of physical integrity, interlacing this
theme with the distinction between therapeutic treatment (and the connected
epistemological status) and non-therapeutic ameliorative treatment.
5. Human strengthening technology and its distinction from the notion of therapy
So-called enhancement technologies, that is, biomedical technologies, are not
aimed at treating a disease but at enhancing the normal physiological functions of
human beings. This gives rise to the problem of distinguishing between medical
enhancement, that is, for therapeutic purposes, and pure strengthening, not merely
from a practical standpoint, but rather from a bioethical and legal perspective. An
intervention aiming at correcting a specific pathology, a dysfunction or a deficiency
of the cognitive subsystem can be described as therapeutic. On the other hand, an
enhancement is not an intervention needed to remedy to a specific dysfunction. A
cognitively enhanced person is someone who has benefited from an intervention
that enhances the performances of a subsystem without correcting any peculiarities
identifiable as pathologies or as dysfunctions of the subsystem. Enhancement,
by definition, goes beyond the aims of medicine and of its epistemological status
(consensus, information, disposability of the state of health). This raises serious
concerns about its justifying foundation: the therapeutic model benefits from a
trust rooted in society, also when it concerns experimental therapies, due to the
lack of valuable therapeutic alternatives, to the existence of an informed consent,
and proportionally to the chances of success of the therapy, differently from the
enhancement technologies that seem to be lacking of that justifying model based on
art. 32 of the Italian Constitution5.
The point is that it is extremely difficult to trace a conceptual distinction between
therapy and enhancement, and one could even maintain that such a distinction lacks
of practical importance. Moreover, any therapy entails enhancement: in fact, it is
possible to affirm that the goal of medical science is to enhance the human condition.
Also the objective meaning of the notion of health, as synonym of a complete (and
utopian) well-being, inclusive not only of the physical dimension but also of the
psychic one, seems to annihilate the conceptual distinction between therapy and
pure non-therapeutic enhancement: the aim of reaching a psychic well-being
5
O. Eronia, Potenziamento umano e diritto penale, Milano, 2013; V.A. Amodio, Sui potenziamenti
cognitivi: fra trattamento terapeutico ed effetto dopante. Interrogativi etici e scientifici, in Neuroscienze e
persone. Interrogativi etici e scientifici, edited by L. Renna, Ed- Dehoiane, 2010, p. 271; A. Nisco, La
tutela penale dell’integrità psichica, Torino, 2012, p.138.
M. B. Magro 483
capable of enhancing human relations, work performances and, in general, one’s

own personal relationships, is an aim pursued by our Constitution and by scientific
evolution, as an instrument of development of the human personality. Therefore, on
a practical level there are great difficulties to differentiate between recovery of lost
capabilities and expansion of capabilities. The standard of contemporary medicine
involves many practices that do not aim at treating diseases or lesions: for instance,
preventive medicine, palliative cures, sports medicine, plastic and cosmetic surgery,
contraceptive devices and fertility treatments. In addition, it is unclear how to
classify interventions that reduce the probability of disease or death: vaccination can
be seen as an enhancement of the immune system or, as an alternative, as a preventive
therapeutic intervention; similarly, an intervention that slows down the ageing
process can be considered both as an enhancement and as a preventive therapeutic
intervention reducing the probability of disease and disability6.
6. The effects of strengthening technologies: effects limited to the individual and effects
extended to environment and future generations
There are typologies of enhancement, such as the implantation of neural cells
and biorobotics, that have effect only on those who are directly involved, even if
permanently (for instance neural implants, or all the medical or biological operations
on phenotypes that are not transmitted to heirs; transcranial magnetic stimulation,
which operates by stimulating the cerebral cortex electrically, in this way enhancing
motor, coordination and memory performances; biorobotics). Moreover, some
enhancers’ technologies have effects that reach out to the environment and that
modify the genetic structure of future individuals permanently, as they affect the
individual’s genetic inheritance (for example, genetic enhancements). In regard to
this typology there are pressing problems of governance and regulation of situations
characterised by a deep uncertainty over the consequences of human action from
the point of view of their interactions with other individuals and the environment.7
7. The effects of strengthening technologies (on the individual, on the environment and on
future generations) and the condition of “double epistemic uncertainty”
6
Amongst the strong supporters of the moral sustainability of human strengthening technologies, N.
Bostrom, A. Sandber, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, 2009, in www.
nicckbostrom.com; N. Bostrom, J. Savulescu, Human Enhancement Ethics. The state of the Debate,
2008, in www.nickbostrom.com.
7
Comitato nazionale per la Bioetica, opinion Neuroscienze e potenziamento cognitivo farmacologico: profili
bioetici, 13 March 2013, www.governo.it/bioetica/pareri_abstract/Enhancement_cognitivo_13032013.
pdf.
The issue of enhancement opens up a new frontier of bioethical debate, raising

a series of ethical concerns due to the situation of dual epistemic uncertainty
that characterises it. The effect of neurological stimulation on the control of the
individual on the cerebral activity is still being investigated and experimentation and
no guidelines or scientific models have been experimented and corroborated at a high
degree of acceptance and recognition within the scientific community. Therefore, the
first level of epistemic uncertainty is a scientific one. In fact, most of such techniques
– of which some could be achieved in the future, others are still undergoing the first
experimentation – are relatively new, so that there is no certainty or, better, there is no
statistical evidence of their possible use in terms of effectiveness, safety, both on the
short and long term. On the contrary, we must clarify that at the moment the debate
is based more on the promises of genetic engineering than on the actual possibilities
of intervention. Also scientific studies on the use of pharmacological therapies are
not confirmed by a significant number of clinical cases and, consequently, they are
not reliable, which makes scientific literature on the topic very ephemeral. Thus,
science is in a condition of uncertainty as regards the possible beneficial effects
(both on the short and long term) on the individual and in a condition of total
incapability of predicting long-term prejudicial effects on human health in general.
The more such technologies are addressed to affect directly the individual’s cerebral
and physical skills, sometimes with permanent effects, sometimes with effects limited
in time, the more doubts are bound to increase. Science loses its role of knowledge
inspiring politics and law and, on the contrary, scientific and technological practices
are reasons for uncertainty, since they produce innovations whose side effects can be
negative and unexpected, but also beneficial.
8. Ethical uncertainty: the ethical debate between supporters and detractors

The second level of uncertainty concerns the assessment, on a moral and ethical
level, of the effects on individuals, future generations and environment. This gives
rise to the problem of how to evaluate, in ethical terms, the refinement of enhancing
techniques. The question is whether the choice of altering our own state of mind, our
own body, in order to improve ourselves and our performances, is morally and legally
acceptable; whether the authenticity (is the life of an individual who improved his
potentialities more authentic?), even before human dignity, is a value endangered by
these technologies.
Indeed, on a bioethical and philosophical level, the technological evolution calls
into question the notions of “human” and “humanity”. On one side, there are the
techno-determinists and pessimists, hostile to a world dominated by technology, as
opposed to these, on the other side, there are the technocrats, who, on the contrary,
M. B. Magro 485
believe in an unlimited supremacy of science. In any case, apart from these contrasts,
there is the need to acknowledge that technology causes cultural conditioning, that
it solves problems but it creates new ones, that it affects the human vision of the
world and interferes with the systems of interpersonal interaction. Technology is not
neutral: for this reason it is necessary to deal with the issue of formation, information
and responsibility in the use of technologies. The reconstruction of the standards of
the definition of the concept of “human” and its possible transcendencies started a
few years ago as a process within the field of doping in sports and currently within
the field of research and combination of human parts and machine parts, and thus
within the creation of cyborgs and hybrids. We should ask ourselves whether it is in
our disposability to modify our “natural” equipment of sense-motor and cognitive
capabilities through bionic operations. An affirmative response to this question
raises in turn questions about the persistence of personal identity, before and after
the bionic operation. More specifically: can a modification of mental, sensorial
and motor functions, made possible by bionic systems, produce a modification of
personal identity? What alterations of the continuity of mental/cerebral conditions of
an individual can be acceptable from the point of view of the protection of personal
identity? The contemporary philosophical debate on the psychological or physical
conditions of persistence of personal identity provides conceptually relevant tools
to deal with these ontological issues. The concept of human existence and human
identity is interpreted in evolutionist terms. The evolution-enhancement becomes
the metaphor of human existence. Within the evolutionary model, what we conceive
as human is a mere artefact of a given moment in time.
In the current debate supporters who elaborate theories and arguments in
defence of enhancements (libertarian theory, utilitarian theory, of the so-called
“technophiles”: Nicholas Agar, Allen Buchanan, Nick Bostrom, John Harris, Julian
Savulescu) confront detractors or the so-called “bionconservatives”, who analyze
the possible threats for the human being and future generations. In this perspective
the problem of enhancement is faced within the field of the theories of justice,
with a specific reference to the problem of inequality (enhanced/unenhanced), of
possible repercussions of the access to enhancement on non-acceptance of disability
(considering the constantly growing gap between the dis-abled, the able, the super-
able or the enhanced)8. The question is: what will the social consequences be in terms
of inequality, of centralisation of power and of technocratic power in the long run?
Do these technologies accentuate or create social inequalities or do they reach a target
of moral and social improvement? Would disabled people, those who a are less gifted
cognitively be even more discriminated compared to enhanced individuals? And if
8
Amongst these: Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass, Jurgen Habermas, Georige Sandel. In this regard, J.
Habermas, The future of Human Nature, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003; M. Sandel, What’s Wrong
with Enhancement, in www.bioethics.gov, 23 December 2002.
these technologies would be available to everybody, would there be the opposite risk
of levelling conditions?
9. Scientific uncertainty and the model of regulation. The precautionary principle and the
heuristics of risk aversion
If we hypothesise that the effects of bionic and biorobotic enhancement are
detrimental (to the individual, to future generations and to the environment), or
partly beneficial to the individual but detrimental to future generations and the
environment, then we must admit that the possible criminalisation of the technologies
of biorobotic human enhancement finds its foundation in the classic paradigm of
legitimisation of the prohibition to harm third parties or ourselves.
However if, as we said, there is a total scientific uncertainty about the harmfulness
of those interventions, and their beneficial effects are ascertained only from a physio-
psychic point of view, on the individual subject to the intervention. Thus, the
hypothetical and possible criminalisation of these technologies in this case would
reflect an inversion of the paternalistic paradigm strong and weak: what is good for
the human being is prohibited on the assumption that enhancement is a display of
trivial reasons. This would go beyond the prohibition to harm others or ourselves: it
is a glimpse of a norm of ultra-prudential prohibition that goes beyond the model
of justification of strong paternalism and that acknowledges the heuristics of strong
precaution. The precautionary principle postulates a strategy of management of risk
analysis in situations of uncertainty, complexity of choice and limits of the human
knowledge on the possible effects of technology. If interpreted in a strong sense, the
precautionary philosophy imposes the rule of total abstention whenever there is any
potential risk factor having uncertain consequences of uncertain extent, paralysing
any decision not reduced to a nihil agere, until there is no evidence of the total safety
of the activity undertaken. If interpreted in a less strong sense, the precautionary
principle forces to adopt all the measures necessary to eliminate or contain the risks
connected to the execution of an activity, especially when they concern goods of prime
importance, like human health or environment. The strong European normative
production over the last few years seems to be inspired, in different contexts at risk,
to the realisation of a “high level of protection”. The best instrument for achieving
such an objective is represented by a progressive extension of the application of the
precautionary principle to increasingly wider fields of protection in addition to the
original field of environmental protection, making it applicable to matters affecting
the protection of human health.
The precautionary norm, adopting an heuristics of loss aversion, heads towards
a prohibition or restriction of the activity, pushing for the decision that minimises
M. B. Magro 487
the risk of harm, rather than that emphasising the risk of benefits, regardless of
any scientific judgment about the chance for the action to reduce or exclude the
realisation of the harm. This way, the precautionary principle cautiously forbids what,
maybe and later, will turn out to be totally harmless (if not useful and beneficial).
The philosophy of thought and of public regulation inspired by the precautionary
principle concerns situations in which it is impossible to determine any chance of
a specific harm, by entering the moment of risk assessment, or management and
risk perception policies and the requests of social safety, therefore unhooking the
precautionary intervention from basis of truth-need and guiding it to a choice of
protections appropriate for a risk control (which is only presumptively supposed)
considered to be at a juridically acceptable level. The application of the precautionary
method plays the role of guiding principle for decisions made in conditions of
uncertainty, directed towards the prevention of the worst consequences amongst all
the available options and towards risk control, when scientific knowledge does not
allow to exclude, but neither to prove, the harmful nature of the activity carried out9.
B) Robotics, drones and Artificial Intelligences
1. Robotics and (strong or weak) Artificial Intelligence: no difference between robots and
the human mind?
The making of machines capable of human-like performances represents one of the
most complicated cruxes of science. In this perspective of research is set the regulation
of Artificial Intelligence. The expression “Artificial Intelligence” (A.I.) was coined in
1956 by McCarthy during an inter-disciplinary seminar. It stands both for a term
and for a discipline, and expresses the idea that every aspect of human intelligence
can be reproduced. Even though many, sometimes also contradictory, definitions
have been suggested, the feature that combines all of them and characterises the
essence of A.I. is to duplicate, reproduce through electronic devices the human brain
activity, that is the activity representing the most essential human faculty.
Indeed the idea that machines can perform operations typical of human
intelligence, or at least some of its functions, dates back from the Sixteenth century
and today appears in form of computers, as an incarnation of “thinking machines”.
9
In this regard M.B. Magro, Enhancement cognitivo, biases ed euristiche: politiche di regolazione pubblica
e principio di precauzione, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit., 2012, p.139.
2. Intelligent robots equipped with autonomy to decide. The use of artificial agents in
complex organisational-decisional procedures. Fields of application
In complex organisations there are intelligent technological and information
systems capable of taking autonomous decisions (decisions that do not require
of any explicit authorization by a human being) and that serve as a support to
managers especially in the management of high-risk technological infrastructures.
Artificial organizations are structures replicating the human ones, within which
every intelligent agent, named personoid, has a very specific role (entailing access
to information, duties and responsibilities) and activates different decision-making
processes. Decision-making is a reasoning activity implying the need to take a
choice, caused by an information received; it is an organisational process guided by
information, knowledge and preferences in order to reach a predefined goal.
Presently A.I. are employed in robotics, that is in the making of intelligent
machines capable of interacting physically with the outside world and of handling
objects, often equipped with an expert system, namely computational systems
provided with a specialized knowledge. But even in the most sophisticated and
advanced applications, A.I. showed some fundamental limits that we will analyse
later.
Areas of application. The areas of application of Artificial Intelligences are the most
disparate: from artificial agents and artificial neural networks in the economic field
(robots act like intelligent and emotionless economic agents, and therefore they realise
the conditions of competitive balance between demand and supply, that is, the model
of perfect allocative efficiency), to the creation of service and assistance robots (robot
carers). In medical science, with the emergence of minimal invasive surgery, robots are
used in the so-called telesurgery. Very wide applications can be found in the military
field, with the use of drones as weapons and robot soldiers. In this respect it is important
to recall the exhortations of many scientists to forbid the use or to be cautious in using
lethal autonomous robots, such as intelligent military systems capable of deciding
autonomously, with possible devastating consequences. These robot weapons can trigger
lethal weapons without a human intervention in the decision-making process, and,
therefore, the international criminal Court declared them illegal.
There are applications in working environments, but also in the domestic environment,
like service or recreational robots (an example of this emotional projection-attribution
can be by the robot dog Aibo, which Sony stopped producing after having manufactured,
between 1999 and 2006, over 150.000 specimens).
Within the teaching environment, intelligent machines capable of “reading” human

emotions have been built (so-called affective computing). These cases give rise to
problems concerning mainly the protection of privacy and human dignity. Affective
computing is a system which has access to several clues of the users’ emotional state,
calculated both on biometric data related to emotional responses (perspiration, pupil
enlargement and so on), and on the analysis of gestures, postures, and other evident
M. B. Magro 489
behaviours of the subjects. The system evaluates the entirety of this information to
understand whether an individual is interested to an argument, whether he is distracted,
or whether he is discouraged. On the basis of these assumptions, the system will choose
the form of interaction with its user that is contextually more appropriate to facilitate
the learning process. It is not possible to exclude that such a system, once developed, will
be maliciously used unbeknown to users, with the aim of collecting an emotional profile
and to use the emotional responses generated on the basis of the collected information
for commercial purposes. We should, therefore, ask ourselves in what circumstance the
personal data collection and elaboration by robots is legitimate or it is a threat to the
dignity of users, violating their rights to safety and privacy.
Finally, a very important area of application is the employment of A.I. as a technological

support in large complex organizations aimed at taking decisions and, in the economic
field, even at carrying out economic operations and transactions. In the economic field
some object that it is not the ability of the artificial agent to realise the balance of the
market, but the implicit intelligence of the mechanism and of the market rules that
realise the balance, if not obstructed by external factors10.
The debate on A.I. answers to the following questions: can machines think? Is it
possible to replicate human intelligence? Can thought take place outside a human
cranium? And again: are Artificial Intelligences, as provided with autonomy, subjects
capable of really displaying their “own” intentionality and consequently their own
acting? Are they subjects capable of expressing decisions and do they have free will?
Are they capable of feeling emotions?
The basic theoretical paradigm is the mind-computer analogy and the mind-
computer isomorphism, which need not to be intended in an ontological-structural
sense, but in an analogical and functional sense. Various philosophers of mind of the
last fifty years discussed on these issues, opposing a functionalistic approach, which
endorses the functions carried out by human mind and machines, as able to carry
out symbolic-computational functions to a more incisive and structuralist approach.
3. The original problem: what is intelligence? The strong A.I. and Turing’s “imitation
game”. a) The intelligence as behavioural reactivity
What are the characters connoting (also non-human) subjectivity? The Turing test,
also called “the imitation game”, is used to determine whether a machine is intelligent.
The Turing test demonstrates that a computer is not only a computational system
(a software plus a possible hardware support) that interacts with the surrounding
environment, that reacts to the stimulations of that environment (reactive); capable
of taking decisions and, consequently, of acting, autonomously, of reaching a specific
predefined or negotiated goal (proactive); capable of communicating (coordinate
10
M. Sundel, Behavior Change in the Human Services, Behavioral and Cognitive Principles and
Applications, SAGE Pubblications, 2004.
itself, cooperate, negotiate) with other agents and/or human beings (capability of
social interaction).
If we assume a conception of intelligence of a behavioural and interactive kind
(according to which behaviour is susceptible of analysis and interpretation in terms
of behavioural constructions such as stimulus, answer, impulse, saturation), then we
could say that calculators and A.I.s obey to psychological laws and they are intelligent
agents inasmuch as they manipulate and use symbols in a formal and abstract way.
Alan Turing is the founder of the school of thought called strong artificial
intelligence that maintains that computing machines are capable of expressing a
genuine thought and of generating intellectual processes identical to the human
ones11. There would not be any ontological-qualitative difference between human
brain and electronic brain and between human intelligence and artificial intelligence,
other than that concerning their location and physical support: the human head
being made of flesh, bones and other biological materials and the computing
structure being made out of metal and energy. An integral part of this functionalistic
perspective is the assimilation of brain to hardware (hard material: the mechanical
pats) and of mind to software (soft materials: programs and instructions). It is not
the structure that matters, but the function regardless of its physical location (brain-
machine). Therefore, a computer can be compared with a human being as for its
intelligence, if the performances carried out by a computer cannot be distinguished
from those carried out by human beings (functionalist theory). In other words: the
same software can be realized by different kind of hardware, the biological and the
mechanical one12.
Let us remember that there are researches aimed at providing robots with
artificial emotions and artificial conscience, making them increasingly similar to us.
It is possible to say that an artificial agent expresses emotions when it behaves in
ways that, in human beings, presume emotions? Emotions are a constitutive and
fundamental feature of human beings, inseparable from our other characteristics as
they are deeply grafted in our body, meant both as a combination of organs and as a
custodian of our identity, of our memories and of our history and experience.
Following this perspective, some have even pursued the cognitive purpose
to study, through the construction of intelligent machines, the human mind and
its operations. Human mind works as a formal and abstract entity and states of
mind are qualified by their function and not by their material peculiarity. Therefore
it is possible to presume that states of mind are untied from the neural organic
11
A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in “Mind”, 59, 236, 1950; A.M. Turing,
Calcolatori e intelligenza, in D. R. Hofstadter, D. C. Dennett (edited by), L’io della mente, Adelphi,
1985, pp. 61-100.
12
H. Putnam, I robot: macchine o vita creata artificialmente? in Mente, Linguaggio e Realtà, Milano,
Adelphi, 1987, pp. 416-438.
M. B. Magro 491
system and that the same neural system is reproducible. It has been developed the
connective paradigm of “neural networks” and the innovative attempt of cybernetics
to artificially reproduce the neural architecture of the human nervous system: if
intelligence is a manifestation of neural activity, then the artificial reproduction of
that activity would reproduce intelligence.
However, supporters of weak A.I. affirm that the construction of robots capable
of interacting emotionally obviously does not entail that they have a conscience.
These machines do not feel “true” emotions; they do not go beyond a simulation of
feelings supported by our projection.
Turing machines are psychologically isomorphous to human being, that is, they
have an identity as functional organization, but from this fact it is not possible to
believe that they have a conscience or an awareness of their acts. To have states of
mind detectable ab extra does not mean to own an authentic awareness of actions.
Also the use of an anthropomorphic vocabulary when describing characteristics,
properties and functioning of Artificial Intelligences and of computerized systems
does not concern the machine (the calculator) in itself, but the way we see the
machine, and indirectly ourselves13.
4. The confutation of Turing: Searle’s “Chinese room” experiment. The weak A.I. and
intelligence as intentionality and “understanding” of meanings
The other theory, that of weak artificial intelligence, based on the non-authenticity
of mechanic thought and of the ontological diversity between artificial intelligence
and natural intelligence, has been supported by many renowned scholars. Pursuant to
weak A.I., machines simulate and reproduce only intellectual human processes. They
affirm a concept of intelligence as wilfulness (essential dimension of conscience): this
characteristic distinguishes some states of mind, like beliefs, desires and intentions
and it distinguishes the human being from machines14. The fundamental assumption
is the impossibility for a computational machine to express the intentionality that
characterizes human beings and, even if in different ways, animals.
On the contrary, according to Searle, intentionality is an empirical matter of fact
that does not tell much about the causal relations between mind and brain, and allows
only to affirm that some cerebral processes exist; however an execution of a program
based on a given input is not in itself a sufficient condition for intentionality. The
Chinese room test shows that a computer can be an excellent formal manipulator of
symbols, but this activity does not include the activity of “comprehension” of meaning
13
On the contrary, Minsky claims the legitimacy/usefulness of the use of anthropomorphic terms.
14
J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, W.H. Freeman,
1976.
of that symbols and consequently it does not coincide with human intelligence,
which is always intentional and aware. The symbolic-computational system behaves
as “if ” it would understand Chinese, but it does not reproduce a human activity, it
simulates it because it lacks of the conscience of meanings15.
Searle takes into consideration the works on the simulation of human capability to
understand narrations, which requires a capability to answers to questions concerning
information not explicitly given by the narration, but deducible from it using general
knowledge. Result: the capability (of a human/of a machine) to handle information
received according to well-defined formal rules is not sufficient to explain the process
of understanding. It has been claimed the unintentional and, therefore, semantically
empty nature of symbols elaborated by an artificial system and, in conclusion, it
has been denied that mental processes can be reduced to computational processes
operating on formally defined elements. Intelligent robots do not have connection
and critique capabilities, in other words they do not have conceptual categories, they
lack a thinking self.
5. Common sense and the sphere of emotions

Moreover, it is important to point out that robots provided with artificial
intelligence and high-specialized knowledge lack, below this level of knowledge, a
level of common knowledge, so-called “common sense”, which every human being
has without having made any particular studies. Common sense is the sense that
allows us to connect different fields of specialized knowledge and to face problems
and solve them without the typical rigidity of the symbolic approach of intelligence.
Often an intelligent reaction to a particular situation is that which does take into
account the context, but which is not able to select which aspect of the context is
relevant. This kind of knowledge and approach corresponds to a concept of emotional
intelligence oriented toward “common sense”: hence the paradox that machines are
capable of reproducing the highest logic rigour but they cannot be programmed
on a minimum level of common intelligence (let us not forget Golemann’s studies
about the role of emotions in the decision-making process and about emotional
intelligence).
Conclusion: against functionalists, it is necessary to affirm structuralism. What
is important is not the function but the structure, the location where brain activity
is carried out and not how it is carried out. Wilfulness is located into the brain;
the mind is a causal effect of the brain. Consequently, any mechanism capable of
15
J. R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, in The Behavioral and Brains Sciences, 3, Cambridge
University Press, 1980; J. R. Searle, Menti cervelli e programmi in D. R. Hofstadter, D. C. Dennett,
cit., pp. 341-375.
M. B. Magro 493
generating wilfulness should necessarily have causal powers similar to those of the
brain, and that is impossible.
The theory according to which programs are not minds implies a stand against
the functionalist paradigm and its way to set up the mind-body problem. In fact, the
functionalist hypothesis, according to which mind is conceptually and empirically
detachable from the brain, is dangerously dualistic: a form of dualism that does
not follow faithfully the traditional Cartesian one, which states that there are two
categories of substances, but Cartesian inasmuch as what it is specifically mental does
not have any intrinsic connection with the properties of the brain16.
6. The ontological charter of machines and the problem of legal liability for/of intelligent
robots’ actions
Two opposite conceptions originate from the different visions and conceptions of
Artificial Intelligence (structuralist and functionalist). According to the structuralist
theory, intelligent robots are in any case instrumental objects and therefore, on a
moral and juridical level, they are worthy of protection only for their value; according
to the functionalist theory, they could be considered as “subjects”, as such worthy,
on a philosophical, moral and legal level, of possible protection for their subjectivity.
This poses the problem of the ontological theoretical status of the so-called A.I., that
is, particularly advanced artefacts: are they only simple objects or do they meet the
minimum requirements necessary for a recognition of a certain level of subjectivity17?
Therefore, the problem is to determine whether modern technology has created a new
type of subject, the non-human subject, a non-human agent that can be addressed
with a special declination of the legal language of rights and responsibilities18.
Obviously from the answer to these questions descends also the type of ‘law’ and
the type of ‘protection’ applicable to these artificial and intelligent systems (in that
case they can be subject to protection either under the aspect of penal protection of
patents or under the aspect of the protection of assets). Two are the paradigms that
in our culture found the expectation of a protection, the value that we suggest to
understand as highness-complexity of functions, and/or practical usefulness, and/
or rarity-originality and the subjectivity meant as a growing emotional sensitivity,
imagination and creativity, intellection as a logical thought, wilfulness, conscience,
16
Literature about A.I. includes many statements against classic dualism, because it suggests a new
dualism pretending to free cognitive processes from the concrete biochemistry of their material origins.
G. Fornero, Intelligenza artificiale e filosofia, in N. Abbagnano, Storia della filosofia, vol. IV, Torino,
1994, p. 514.
17
G. Taddei Elmi, Soggettività artificiali e diritto, report available on www.altalex.it.
18
A. Narayanan, D. Perrott, Can computers have legal rights? in Artificial Intelligence. Human Effects,
New York, Ellis Horwood, 1884, pp. 52-6.
self-conscience and self-determination.
7. Criminal liability profiles: the imaginary hypothesis of the robots as criminally liable
non-human agents, new subjects of criminal law
Let’s go back to the basic question: is the robot acting or being acted? Is it,
from a legal point of view, an object-instrument or a, even if indirect, subject or
a “new” subject? Are artificial Intelligences and intelligent robots provided with an
autonomous subjectivity, like collective entities, and therefore are they responsible
subjects, imputable and equipped with free will? This hypothesis raises various
problems concerning the definition of subjective capacity, of the notion of action, of
the notion of culpability: can robots be blamed and motivated? Do they express their
own will? May they be considered “offenders” and may their actions be considered
aware and voluntary? Therefore, it is all about defining whether these machines are
capable of acting and understanding to whom those actions, and the consequences
of those actions, can be attributed.
This topic presents an analogy with that concerning the administrative and penal
liability of collective entities and clashes with an anthropomorphic conception of
criminal law: collective entities have no body nor soul, but they are still “subjects”,
that is, offenders for the criminal law; robots have a “body”, a matter on which it is
possible to enforce a penal sanction (for example, the deactivation of the machine
or its destruction), but they do not have a soul, even if they are provided with an
autonomous decision-making capability and they are able to interact with the
surrounding environment19.
8. If robots are means and not agents. The hypothesis of criminal liability of the
programmer or user
If we believe that robots are not agents in a strict sense, then we have to face
the problem of the all-human liability of the programmer or of the user. How can
liability be ascribed to a human being, if we assume that the intelligent computer
system is a decision maker? As we said, it is assumed that intelligent robots act in
an unplanned and unpredictable way and that this unpredictability raises problems
concerning the criminal liability of programmers, manufacturers and users. If robots
and Artificial Intelligences are artefacts able to improve the capabilities of human
beings, means of support and communication, then there is a inverted problem of
penal imputation: the non-human agent acts, while the natural person answers for it.
G. Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities- from Science Fiction to Legal Social
19
Control, in “Akron Intellectual Property Journal”, 2010, p. 271.

M. B. Magro 495
However, the problem is to identify the subjective title of the charge against the
natural person. Excluding the cases of intentional misconduct, because a “voluntary”
action of a non-human agent imposes a liability on the human being and because the
robot’s action identifies itself with and represents the long arm of the human being,
there remains the cases of negligence, identified in a programming, manufacturing,
use, maintenance or functioning fault of an intelligent robot20.
9. The problem of the predictability of the conducts of intelligent robotic systems

In 1950 Isaac Asimov developed the three fundamental laws of robotics: 1) A
robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to
come to harm; 2) A robot must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except
where such orders would conflict with the First Law; 3) A robot must protect its own
existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.
From these laws it is possible to deduce the prohibition of creating robots that do
not comply with the three laws by Asimov. However, these three fundamental laws
contradict each other: what happens if someone orders a robot to harm a man for
the sake of another man? What happens if the commander orders a police robot to
arrest a suspect who is resisting the arrest? And moreover what happens if a surgery
robot persists on carrying out a lifesaving surgery against the will of a patient? Are
the laws of robotics regulating overall the behaviours of robots or is there a margin of
unpredictability in their behaviour?
The problems of comprehension and predictability of the outcomes of a
bionic intervention reveal a particular aspect of our limited capability to predict
the behaviour of robotic machines and artificial intelligence. These provisional
limitations were primarily discussed in relation to the general formulation of theories
of algorithmic undecidability; new cues for an epistemological reflection originate
from more recent studies in the field of machine learning. Bionic brain-machine
interfaces, to which we hinted earlier, require a training process to classify and
identify the neural signals associated to a human cognitive activity. It is not realistic
to think to equip a robot with a sufficiently detailed statement of what it has to do
or of what it is expected to encounter in the not well-defined spaces of a house, of
an office or of other environments where our everyday life flows. For this reason, in
order to be sufficiently autonomous and adaptable to take care of an elderly man
in his apartment, a robot needs to be capable of learning from experience. But this
20
In civil law the problem concerns the contractual liability for faults and the consequences connected
to the planning, construction and use of a robot; and of the tort liability of programmer, constructor
and user for the damages cause to third parties and not only to the contract counterparts. The recalled
schemes are those regarding legal representation, mandate, insurance contract, certification forms,
contractual and tort liability.
requirement has to face the fact that not always automatic learning techniques allow
us to understand if a robot has really learnt (or at least it got sufficiently closer to) what
we wanted to teach it. This in fact gives rise to problems of evaluation of the results
obtained from automatic learning processes by robots. Thus, the epistemological
reflection on automatic learning finds place within the more general framework of
the problems concerning the predictability of robotic systems’ behaviours21.
The studies of formal methods of software verification arise from the need to
verify whether for a calculator every execution of a specific program satisfies some
fundamental requirements. More recently, these methodologies have been extended
to the problem of specifying and verifying the properties of the systems, usually
called “hybrids”, which include several types of robotic systems. Some restrictive
results obtained with regard to hybrid systems reveal that, in general, these
methodologies do not allow to verify whether a robotic system satisfies or not specific
spatial or temporal boundaries during the execution of a given task. Thinking robots
do not act in a predictable way since their learning capability outlines a space of
unpredictability independent from scientific laws. Therefore it is assumed that
robots act unpredictably, in a way which is not regulated by strict scientific laws,
since Artificial Intelligences are capable of learning, of adapting themselves to the
surrounding environment, of deciding and of being creative, which provides them
with a quid pluris in comparison to the initial programming.
Moreover, the interaction between an open and conditioned learning system
typical of Artificial Intelligences and its surrounding environment (asynchronous
communication) is often subject to temporal bonds that do not permit to ensure
the participation of a human being to the control cycles. Consequently, Artificial
Intelligences, drones and intelligent robots cannot be totally controlled by men.
There are, therefore, insurmountable problems concerning the establishment of
liability within the legal order.
The characteristics of these computerized and expert systems is that they are able
to react to expected and predictable situations, but not to situations that, not being
predictable by a human being, cannot have been foreseen within the program or
in the rules built by a human being and constituting artificial intelligence. Is not
perhaps their alleged “unpredictability” or action causality – being they machines
and not human beings – predictable by the manufacturer who can program a limited
series of choices?
These are the normative implications of the epistemological considerations
about our limited capability to predict the behaviour of a fully-developed artificial
agent provided with a margin of creativity and decision-making ability without any
21
U. Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: crimes, contract and Torts, Springer, 2013; M. Durante, U.
Pagallo, Manuale di informatica giuridica e diritto delle nuove tecnologie, Torino, 2012.
M. B. Magro 497
apparent defect of control, use and maintenance by the manufacturer or by the

programmer.
10. The liability of the programmer
Sartor holds that the effects produced by the agent refers to the user not because
he wanted them but because he relied in a rational behaviour of the agent and because
he trusted the intentions of the agent which declared to aim to certain targets22. In
terms of criminal law, it is appropriate to refer to the negligence of the programmer,
that is, to the lack of diligence for not having predicted, during the programming
phase, a similar behaviour of the robot. The abstract and general predictability of
future, and not yet identified, harms is connected to liability for negligence, also
when all the links of the causal process are not known. Predictability works as a
component of negligence, also on the basis of scientific laws not verified by studies
nor consolidated, or in the total ignorance of causally explainable scientific laws,
with the risk of identifying negligence with precaution and prudentialism.
Anglo-Saxon literature speaks about predictability and logical and predictable
development, similarly to art. 116 of the Italian penal code which regards the
liability of the accomplice for a different, more serious but unwanted event, as long
as predictable, and even if all the links of the causal chain of production of the event
are not perfectly known. The difference is that the programmer or the user does not
contribute to the realization of a base-crime and therefore the rule of versari in re
illicita cannot apply, because the conduct of the physical person creates a condition
of lawful and tolerated risk.
Therefore, there is a need to develop a new normative concept of culpability
capable of allowing the elaboration of a concept of “programming negligence”,
where it is possible to hypothesise a cause for excluding culpability consisting in
the provision of security measures capable to prevent the perpetration of crimes by
intelligent robots (basically implementing the three laws of robotics of Asimov), in
addition to the classic clauses of exoneration of penal liability for defective products,
like for example the improper use of a robot, or the cas fortuit or force majeure.
22
G. Sartor, L’intenzionalità dei sistemi informatici e il diritto, in “Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ.”, 2003, 1,
pp. 23-51; Id., Intelligenza artificiale e diritto, Milano, 1996.
Biorobotica, robotica e diritto penale
Sommario: A) Biorobotica, interfacce cervello-macchina e potenziamento umano: filosofia precauzio-

nale e euristica di avversione al rischio. − 1. Neuroscienze, genetica comportamentale e diritto penale.
− 2. Distinzione tra robotica e biorobotica. − 3. Potenziamento umano, fisico e cognitivo: l’uomo come
e oltre le macchine. − 4. Le questioni giuridiche: il caso del cattivo funzionamento dell’arto bionico. −
5. Le tecnologie di potenziamento umano e la distinzione dal concetto di terapia. − 6. Gli effetti delle
tecnologie di potenziamento: effetti isolati all’individuo ed effetti estesi all’ambiente e alle generazioni
future. − 7. Gli effetti delle tecnologie di potenziamento (sull’individuo, sull’ambiente e sulle generazio-
ni future) e la condizione di “doppia incertezza epistemica”. − 8. L’incertezza sul piano etico: il dibattito
etico tra sostenitori e detrattori. − 9. L’incertezza scientifica e il modello di regolazione. Il principio di
precauzione e l’euristica dell’ avversione al rischio. − B) La robotica, i droni e le Intelligenze Artificiali.
− 1. La robotica e l’intelligenza artificiale (forte o debole): nessuna differenza tra robot e mente umana?
− 2. Robot intelligenti dotati di autonomia decisionale. L’utilizzo di agenti artificiali nei processi orga-
nizzativi-decisionali complessi. I campi di applicazione. − 3. Il problema a monte: cos’è l’intelligenza?
La IA forte e il “gioco dell’imitazione” di Turing. a) Intelligenza come reattività comportamentale. − 4.
La confutazione di Turing: il test della “stanza cinese” di Searle. La IA debole e l’Intelligenza come in-
tenzionalità e come “comprensione” di significati. − 5. Il senso comune e la sfera della emotività. − 6.
Lo statuto ontologico delle macchine e il problema della responsabilità giuridica per l’agire o dell’agire
dei robot intelligenti. − 7. I profili di responsabilità penale: l’ipotesi fantastica del robot come agente
non-umano responsabile penalmente, nuovo soggetto di diritto penale. − 8. Se i robot sono mezzi e
non agenti. L’ipotesi della responsabilità penale del programmatore o utilizzatore. − 9. Il problema della
prevedibilità dei comportamenti dei sistemi robotici intelligenti. − 10. La colpa del programmatore.
500 Biorobotica, robotica e diritto penale
A. Biorobotica, interfacce cervello-macchina e potenziamento umano: filosofia precauzionale e

euristica di avversione al rischio.
1. Neuroscienze, genetica comportamentale e diritto penale

Nell’ambito delle neuroscienze, molto interesse suscitano recenti studi di biologia mo-
lecolare e di genetica comportamentale che, riconoscendo una base biologica al processo
volitivo, sono volti a studiare l’influenza del patrimonio genetico sul comportamento e sulla
personalità dell’uomo. In particolare si ritiene che la presenza nell’individuo di un certo tipo
di geni, come il MAOA, esercita un‘influenza sul comportamento criminale, nel senso che se
pure in termini probabilistici e di percentuali di rischio, i soggetti che li possiedono, specie se
sottoposti ad esperienze stressanti, hanno una probabilità maggiore di svilupparlo.
Queste scoperte scientifiche dissolvono un pregiudizio culturale assai radicato nella cul-
tura occidentale: il dualismo cartesiano che postula la separazione tra corpo e anima, tra
mente e cervello, tra res extensa e res cogitans o, nelle formulazioni più moderne, il dualismo
“di proprietà” alla Karl Popper, secondo cui corpo e mente hanno la stessa materia, ma diverse
proprietà.
Occorre dire che vengono rifiutati approcci ed interpretazioni rigorosamente e infalli-
bilmente riduzioniste e biodeterministe anche dai più accesi sostenitori, sulla base dell’argo-
mento secondo cui non esistono cervelli identici e quindi individui identici che agiscono in
modo identico, e che sia le neuroscienze che la genetica comportamentale non conoscono
modelli di sperimentazione scientifica sul comportamento umano. Il progetto di mappatura
del genoma umano dimostra come la sequenza genetica di ciascun individuo sia unica ed
irripetibile. Ciò dovrebbe mettere al riparo da ogni riduzionismo e da una concezione troppo
meccanica della nostra vita.
In ogni caso, la scoperta di una base biochimica del processo decisionale, insieme a studi
di filosofia della mente, mette in discussione importanti caposaldi della cultura occidentale
ed incide su importanti categorie del diritto e del processo penale. Queste scoperte e nuove
metodologie scientifiche entrano nel processo penale ed impongono un ripensamento delle
categorie sostanziali: viene in rilievo innanzitutto la categoria della imputabilità e, a monte,
il concetto di libero arbitrio1. La libertà è intesa come concetto limitato, fragile, diseguale nel
tempo e il concetto stesso di libero arbitrio è inteso come la risultante di almeno tre livelli: il
1
Occorre richiamare il celeberrimo esperimento di Libet il quale dimostra che il soggetto agente è
consapevole della decisione di muovere un arto solo dopo che il cervello si è attivato per avviare il
movimento; la consapevolezza dell’azione avviene circa mezzo secondo dopo l’instaurarsi del “readiness
potential” (potenziale di prontezza); il processo volitivo si avvia inconsciamente e l’azione inizia prima
che l’individuo ne acquisti consapevolezza. secondo Libet il libero arbitrio non descrive un processo
decisionale volontario, ma si esprime nel controllarne il risultato; quindi le “decisioni coscienti e
volontarie” non sono determinazioni all’agire, ma funzioni coscienti di veto rispetto ad impulsi di
natura istintiva e biologica. Sul tema, sotto il profilo penalistico A. Manna, Diritto penale e neuroscienze:
un’introduzione, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, a cura di O. Di Giovine, Padova, 2012, p. 3; M. Ronco,
Sviluppi delle neuroscienze e libertà del volere: un commiato o una riscoperta?, in Diritto penale e neuroetica,
cit., p. 57; M. Bertolino, L’imputabilità penale fra cervello e mente, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit.,
p. 83.
M. B. Magro 501
corredo genetico, il suo viluppo psico-fisico, l’influsso ambientale. Il processo decisionale non
si muove secondo la fisica algoritmica e deterministica ma risponde a leggi sconosciute che
funzionano per “salti” e “lacune” che spezzano il determinismo causale2.
Da questa presa d’atto si elabora un concetto di libero arbitrio come “potere di veto”,
come capacità di inibire il comportamento impulsivo, quindi un concetto “sociale” e “adatti-
vo” di libero arbitrio, ovvero frutto e risultato di un processo di condizionamento culturale,
razionale, una interazione tra componenti genetiche ed ambientali che operano a diverso
livello.
Ne deriva una definizione della capacità di volere come capacità di controllare l’impulso
motorio e della capacità di intendere come comprensiva di empatia, di pensiero morale e di
ragionamento controfattuale; ne discende una diversa comprensione della categorie del dolo
e della colpa avvalorando quella concezione della colpevolezza in senso normativo, oltre quel-
la della colpevolezza in senso psicologico, che sembra più radicata su un sostrato biologico; ri-
percussioni importanti vi sono anche a livello di commisurazione della pena, e di finalità della
pena, laddove la concezione general preventiva della pena esprime quella funzione inibitoria,
di orientamento culturale e di veto che agisce a livello neurologico sulle funzioni di controllo;
ancora, tali studi sono proficui al fine della valutazione della capacità a stare in giudizio, della
valutazione della prova dichiarativa; rispetto certe categorie di reati legati alla dipendenza da
sostanze, le acquisizioni delle neuroscienze consentono di diversamente calibrare le finalità di
special prevenzione, nella fase esecutiva della pena.
2. Distinzione tra robotica e biorobotica

Il campo della robotica e della biorobotica è per eccellenza interdisciplinare, in quanto
in esso convergono ricerche d’informatica, di ingegneria, di matematica elettronica, neuro-
scienze, biologia. La robotica comprende anche lo studio delle Intelligenze Artificiali, ossia
la costruzione di macchine capaci di sentire, adattarsi all’ambiente, di imparare, dotate di
capacità evolutiva e persino “capaci di empatia”. Queste macchine presentano le seguenti
caratteristiche: sono interattive, reattive all’ambiente, agiscono in modo autonomo e im-
prevedibile e non determinato, flessibile e influenzabile; sono quindi dotate di autonomia,
adattabilità, in quanto sono in grado di migliorare le loro performance. L’aspetto più attuale e
con maggiori risvolti pratici della robotica riguarda la biorobotica, ovvero la combinazione di
parti robotiche nel corpo umano (computer indossabili, impianti di computer nel corpo, arti
bionici artificiali, della interfacce uomo-macchina e del potenziamento delle facoltà attentive
e di memoria dell’uomo mediante impianti cerebrali su soggetti sani a scopi terapeutici o
migliorativi).
L’interrelazione uomo macchina segue due percorsi diversi: quello della bionica o bio-
robotica, ove l’uomo ingloba in sé la macchina, e quello della robotica o delle intelligenze
artificiali, in cui la macchina tende a riprodurre le caratteristiche umane. Un aspetto nuovo è
quello della biologia sintetica, ovvero dell’uso di nuove tecnologie in cui componenti mole-
colari naturali o sintetiche sono combinate e riorganizzate in modo da creare circuiti genetici
2
J. R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, in “The New York Review of Books”, 1998, p. 65. Searle
individua almeno tre lacune nel processo decisionale umano: 1) tra le possibili decisioni e quella scelta;
2) tra la decisione e l’azione; 3) tra l’inizio dell’azione e la prosecuzione dell’azione.
nuovi e quindi nuovi organismi (le c.d. reti neurali artificiali).

La biorobotica consiste nel fenomeno della ibridazione uomo-macchina ovvero dell’ in-
nesto nel corpo umano supporti informatici, hardware, software, brain computer interni e
robot incorporati nell’uomo, controllati direttamente attraverso l’attività cerebrale, attraverso
elettrodi impiantati stabilmente nel cervello, con finalità terapeutiche o di potenziamento fi-
sico. Il dato sorprendente, che distingue l’ibridazione uomo-macchina dalle altre protesi non
cibernetiche, risulta proprio nell’interazione tra sistema nervoso, impulsi cerebrali e anima-
zione della protesi, con possibilità di innescare flussi non solo in uscita (cervello-terminazioni
nervose-chip-braccio robotico), al fine di comandare il movimento della protesi attraverso
gli impulsi cerebrali, ma anche in entrata (braccio robotico, chip, terminazioni nervose, cer-
vello), al fine di restituire al soggetto la percezione del movimento. La biorobotica si avvale
infatti delle c.d. interfacce cervello-macchina: canali che offrono la possibilità di influenzare
gli stati mentali/di coscienza di una persona e che permettono di trasmettere direttamente
al cervello dei segnali elettrici esterni. L’arto bionico è in grado di riconoscere la volontà del
soggetto ed eseguire gli ordini motori del cervello in tempo reale. Le interfacce tra cervello
umano e macchina consentono di leggere e utilizzare i segnali neurali associati all’attività co-
gnitiva per controllare un arto artificiale o la traiettoria di una piattaforma robotica mobile3.
Queste ricerche bioniche si propongono soprattutto di ripristinare o di vicariare funzioni
senso- motorie perdute, ma aprono la strada al potenziamento di apparati senso-motori e
cognitivi che funzionano regolarmente.
3. Potenziamento umano, fisico e cognitivo: l’uomo come e oltre le macchine

Il tema dell’enhancement umano concerne le tecniche di potenziamento sul piano co-
gnitivo - intellettivo e sul piano fisico (del miglioramento estetico, fisico o delle aspettative
di vita). L’enhancement cognitivo si definisce come una amplificazione, un’estensione, o un
potenziamento, interno o esterno, dei sistemi e processi mentali e neurologici di immagaz-
zinamento, organizzazione ed elaborazione delle informazioni; incide quindi su percezione,
attenzione, comprensione e sulla memoria.
Con l’avanzare delle neuroscienze cognitive, le possibilità di miglioramento delle capa-
cità cognitive proprie dell’uomo è in costante espansione. Eppure fino ad oggi, sono state le
nuove tecnologie di computing e informatiche a produrre ottime performance sulla capacità
di elaborare informazioni. Hardware e software sono in grado di dare agli esseri umani abilità
cognitive che per molti aspetti superano di gran lunga quelli del cervello biologico. Siamo
abituati a ricorrere a hardware esterni per potenziare le nostre capacità cognitive, facendo uso
di calcolatrici, personal computer, che eseguono per noi compiti di routine per rendere affer-
rabili una quantità di dati che i sistemi percettivi umani non potrebbero gestire.
La nuova sfida è oggi quella di migliorare le capacità fisiche e cognitive umane e di
metterle al passo con quelle informatiche delle macchine, in modo da superare i limiti della
mente umana e del corpo umano. I supporti informatici forniscono una sorta di estensione
3
Esistono interfacce cervello-macchina che, convogliando segnali verso il sistema nervoso centrale o
periferico di un essere umano, ne modificano significativamente l’attività, come avviene nel caso delle
interfacce usate per il controllo del tremore in soggetti affetti dal morbo di Parkinson.
M. B. Magro 503
esterna della nostra mente, consentendoci di conservare tutto ciò che non potremmo con-
servare, e di dirigere i nostri sforzi in compiti più complicati rispetto all’immagazzinamento
delle informazioni, come e forse meglio delle macchine.
4. Le questioni giuridiche: il caso del cattivo funzionamento dell’arto bionico

L’avvento della cibernetica e l’ibridazione uomo-macchina solleva problemi giuridici di
non poco conto. Tra questi v’è anche il profilo delle responsabilità verso terzi (civili e penali)
per il funzionamento o disfunzionamento dei risultati dell’ibridazione da parte di un sog-
getto che ha parti bioniche controllate a livello neurologico. La reale presenza dei fenomeni
ibridativi uomo-macchina (cyborg) deve farci riflettere anche sui problemi giuridici connessi
al regime giuridico di responsabilità per danni arrecati agli stessi soggetti ibridati, ma anche
a soggetti terzi. Il profilo di responsabilità penale, qualora siano stati realizzati reati, solleva
i seguenti interrogativi: è possibile affermare se l’incidente sia stato causato da un problema
di controllo degli arti artificiali sulla base di una ricostruzione scientifica delle modalità di
funzionamento degli arti bionici? A chi attribuire la responsabilità qualora venga cagionata
la morte di un terzo, se non è possibile accertare un vizio di costruzione o funzionamento
dell’arto biologico? L’ “azione” compiuta con un arto artificiale può essere considerata “co-
sciente e volontaria”? Sotto questo profilo si individuano problemi di prevedibilità degli esiti
dell’intervento bionico e dell’apprendimento automatico, che verranno trattati oltre, a cui
rinviamo.
Più a monte, si collocano i soliti profili relativi ai limiti alla disponibilità del corpo e della
integrità fisica, ove il tema si intreccia con la distinzione tra intervento terapeutico (e relativo
statuto epistemologico) e intervento migliorativo a scopo non terapeutico.
5. Le tecnologie di potenziamento umano e la distinzione dal concetto di terapia

Le c.d. enhancement technologies, ovvero le tecnologie biomediche, sono volte non già
a curare una malattia ma a potenziare le normali funzioni fisiologiche dell’essere umano. Si
pone quindi, non tanto sotto il profilo pratico, ma quello bioetico e giuridico, il problema
di distinguere tra enhancement medica, cioè a scopi terapeutici, e potenziamento puro. Un
intervento che mira a correggere una specifica patologia, una disfunzione, o un difetto di un
sottosistema cognitivo può essere definito come terapeutico. Un miglioramento invece non è
un intervento che serve a porre rimedio ad una disfunzione specifica. Una persona cognitiva-
mente potenziata, è qualcuno che ha beneficiato di un intervento che migliora le prestazioni
di un sottosistema senza correggere alcune specificità identificabili come patologia o come
disfunzione del sottosistema. Il potenziamento, per definizione, va quindi oltre gli scopi della
medicina e il suo statuto epistemologico (consenso, informazione, disponibilità dello stato di
salute). Il che suscita serie perplessità in ordine al suo fondamento giustificativo. Il modello
terapeutico gode di una giustificazione radicata nella società, anche qualora si tratti di terapie
sperimentali, in ragione dell’assenza di valide alternative terapeutiche, della presenza di un
consenso informato, e proporzionalmente alle probabilità di successo della terapia, diversa-
mente dalle tecnologie di potenziamento che parrebbero sfornite di tale modello giustificati-
vo fondato sull’art. 32 Cost.4.
Il punto è che è assai difficile concettualmente tracciare una distinzione tra terapia e
potenziamento, e si potrebbe perfino sostenere che essa manca di significato pratico. Inoltre,
ogni terapia comporta un miglioramento, anzi si può affermare che obiettivo della scienza
medica è migliorare la condizione umana. Anche l’accezione del concetto di salute in senso
soggettivo, come sinonimo di completo (ed utopico) stato di benessere, comprensivo non
solo di una dimensione fisica ma anche psichica, sembrerebbe annullare la differenziazione
concettuale tra terapia e potenziamento puro non terapeutico: l’obiettivo del raggiungimento
di uno stato di benessere mentale, tale da migliorare le relazioni umane, le proprie prestazioni
lavorative, in generale i propri rapporti personali, è un obiettivo della nostra Costituzione e
dell’evoluzione scientifica stessa, quale strumento di valorizzazione della personalità umana.
Vi sono quindi grandi difficoltà sul piano pratico a differenziare tra recupero di capacità perse
e ampliamento di capacità esistenti. Lo standard della medicina contemporanea include molte
pratiche che non mirano a curare le malattie o lesioni: per esempio, la medicina preventiva, le
cure palliative, la medicina dello sport, la chirurgia plastica ed estetica, dispositivi contraccet-
tivi e i trattamenti di fertilità. In secondo luogo, non è chiaro come classificare gli interventi
che riducono la probabilità di malattia e di morte: la vaccinazione può essere vista come un
potenziamento del sistema immunitario o, in alternativa, come intervento terapeutico pre-
ventivo; analogamente, un intervento che rallenta il processo di invecchiamento può essere
considerato sia come un miglioramento o come intervento terapeutico preventiva che riduce
il rischio di malattia e invalidità5.
6. Gli effetti delle tecnologie di potenziamento: effetti isolati all’individuo ed effetti estesi all’am-
biente e alle generazioni future
Vi sono tipologie di potenziamento, quali l’impianto di cellule neuronali, la biorobotica,
che hanno effetto solo sul soggetto direttamente coinvolto, anche se in modo permanente
(ad esempio gli impianti neuronali, ovvero tutti quegli interventi medici o biologici dei fe-
notipi che non si trasmettono agli eredi; la stimolazione magnetica transcranica, che agisce
stimolando elettricamente la corteccia cerebrale, così migliorando le prestazioni motorie, di
coordinamento, della memoria; la biorobotica).
Vi sono inoltre tecnologie di enhancers con effetti che si estendono sull’ambiente e che
modificano l’assetto genetico di individui futuri in modo permanente, in quanto incidono
sul patrimonio genetico dell’individuo (ad esempio i miglioramenti genetici). Rispetto questa
tipologia si pongono in modo più stringente problemi di governance e di regolamentazione
4
O. Eronia, Potenziamento umano e diritto penale, Milano, 2013; V.A. Amodio, Sui potenziamenti
cognitivi: fra trattamento terapeutico ed effetto dopante. Interrogativi etici e scientifici, in Neuroscienze e
persone. Interrogativi etici e scientifici, a cura di L. Renna, Ed- Dehoiane, 2010, p. 271; A. Nisco, La
tutela penale dell’integrità psichica, Torino, 2012, p.138.
5
Tra i convinti assertori della sostenibilità morale delle tecnologie di potenziamento umano, N.
Bostrom, A. Sandber, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Rthics, Regulatory Challenges, 2009, in www.
nicckbostrom.com; N. Bostrom, J. Savulescu, Human Enhancement Ethics. The state of the Debatte,
2008, in www.nickbostrom.com.
M. B. Magro 505
di situazioni caratterizzate da profonda incertezza sulle conseguenze dell’agire umano sotto il

profilo delle loro interazioni rispetto gli altri individui e rispetto l’ambiente6.
7. Gli effetti delle tecnologie di potenziamento (sull’individuo, sull’ambiente e sulle generazioni

future) e la condizione di “doppia incertezza epistemica”
Il tema del potenziamento apre una nuova frontiera del dibattito bioetico, destando una
serie di preoccupazioni etiche dovute alla situazione di doppia incertezza epistemica che lo
connota. L’effetto della stimolazione neurologica sul controllo dell’ attività cerebrale da parte
del soggetto è ancora oggetto di studio e sperimentazione e non vi sono linee guida o modelli
scientifici sperimentati e corroborati ad un grado di accettazione e di alto riconoscimento
nell’ambito della comunità scientifica. Dunque, il primo livello di incertezza epistemica è di
tipo scientifico. Infatti, si tratta per lo più di tecniche relativamente nuove, alcune futuribili,
altre allo stadio di prima sperimentazione, pertanto non vi è certezza o meglio, non vi è al-
cuna prova statistico scientifica sui loro possibili utilizzi in termini di efficacia, sicurezza, sia
nel breve che nel lungo periodo. Anzi, deve dirsi che, al momento, il dibattito si fonda più
sulle promesse dell’ingegneria genetica che sulle reali possibilità di intervento. Anche gli studi
scientifici sull’uso di terapie farmacologiche non sono corroborati da un numero consistente
di casi clinici e quindi sono privi di attendibilità e ciò rende la letteratura scientifica sul tema
una guida assai labile. Vi è quindi una condizione di incertezza della scienza circa i possibili
effetti benefici (sia nel lungo che nel breve termine) sul singolo individuo e una totale incapa-
cità di previsione di quelli dannosi per la salute umana in genere nel lungo termine. I dubbi
aumentano quanto più tali tecnologie sono destinate ad incidere direttamente sulle facoltà
cerebrali e fisiche dell’individuo, a volte con effetti permanenti, a volte con effetti limitati nel
tempo. La scienza perde il suo ruolo di sapere informatore della politica e del diritto e al con-
trario, le pratiche scientifiche e tecnologiche sono fonti di incertezza, in quanto produttrici di
innovazioni, i cui effetti collaterali possono essere negativi ed inaspettati, ma anche benefici.
8. L’incertezza sul piano etico: il dibattito etico tra sostenitori e detrattori

Il secondo livello di incertezza concerne la valutazione sul piano morale ed etico degli
effetti sull’individuo, sulle generazioni future e sull’ambiente. Si pone il problema del come
valutare, sotto il profilo etico, l’affinarsi di tecniche di potenziamento. Ci si chiede se la scelta
di alterare il proprio stato mentale o il proprio corpo nella ricerca di un sé più appagante,
di migliorare se stessi, le proprie prestazioni, sia moralmente e giuridicamente accettabile e
rientri nella disponibilità dell’individuo; l’autenticità (è più autentica la vita di un individuo
che ha migliorato le proprie potenzialità?), prima ancora della dignità umana, costituisca un
valore messo a repentaglio da queste tecnologie.
Invero, sul piano bioetico e filosofico, l’evoluzione tecnologica mette in discussione il
6
Comitato nazionale per la Bioetica, parere Neuroscienze e potenziamento cognitivo farmacologico:
profili bioetici, 13 marzo 2013, reperibile su www.governo.it/bioetica/pareri_abstract/Enhancement_
cognitivo_13032013.pdf.
concetto di “umano” e di “umanità”. Si schierano, contrapponendosi, da un lato i tecnodeter-

ministi e pessimisti, avversi ad un mondo dominato dalla tecnologia, dall’altro i tecnocratici
che viceversa professano un illimitato dominio della scienza. In ogni caso, a prescindere da
queste contrapposizioni, occorre prendere atto che la tecnologia provoca condizionamenti
culturali, che risolve problemi ma ne crea di nuovi, che incide sulla visione umana del mon-
do e che interferisce nei sistemi di interazione interpersonale. La tecnologia non è neutrale:
perciò occorre porre una questione di formazione, informazione e responsabilità nell’uso
delle tecnologie. La ricostruzione dei parametri di definizione del concetto di umano e le
sue possibili trascendenze è iniziata come processo qualche anno fa nell’ambito del doping
sportivo e attualmente nella ricerca e combinazione di parti umane e parti macchine e quin-
di nella creazione di cyborg o ibridi. È opportuno chiedersi se sia nella nostra disponibilità
modificare la nostra dotazione “naturale” di capacità senso-motorie e cognitive attraverso
interventi bionici. Una risposta positiva a tale quesito suscita a sua volta domande sulla
persistenza dell’identità personale, prima e dopo l’intervento bionico. Più specificamente:
una modifica delle funzioni mentali, sensoriali o motorie resa possibile dai sistemi bionici
può indurre una modifica dell’identità personale? Quali alterazioni della continuità degli stati
cerebrali/mentali di un soggetto possono essere accettabili da un punto di vista della tutela
della identità personale? Il dibattito filosofico contemporaneo sulle condizioni psicologiche
o fisiche di persistenza dell’identità personale fornisce strumenti concettualmente rilevanti
per affrontare questi problemi ontologici. Il concetto di esistenza umana e di identità umana
viene interpretato in termini evoluzionistici. L’evoluzione- miglioramento diviene la metafora
dell’esistenza umana. All’interno del modello evolutivo, quello che noi consideriamo umano
è un mero artefatto di un dato momento storico.
Il dibattito attuale vede fronteggiare sostenitori che articolano teorie e argomentazioni
a difesa del potenziamento (teoria libertaria, teoria utilitarista, dei c.d. “tecnofili”: Nicholas
Agar, Allen Buchanan, Nick Bostrom, John Harris, Julian Savulescu) e d’altro lato detrattori
o c.d. “bioconservatori” che analizzano le possibili minacce aperte all’uomo e alle generazio-
ni future. In questa prospettiva il problema del potenziamento viene affrontato nell’ambito
delle teorie della giustizia, con specifico riferimento al problema della disuguaglianza (po-
tenziati/non potenziati), delle possibili ripercussioni dell’accesso al potenziamento sulla non
accettazione della disabilità (dato il divario sempre crescente tra dis-abili, abili, super-abili o
potenziati)7. Ci si chiede: quali le conseguenze sociali, in termini di disuguaglianza, di accen-
tramento di potere, di potere tecnocratico, nel lungo periodo? Queste tecnologie accentuano
o creano diseguaglianze sociali o realizzano un obiettivo di miglioramento morale e sociale?
I disabili, coloro che sono meno attrezzati cognitivamente verrebbero ancor più discriminati
rispetto ad individui potenziati? E se tali tecnologie fossero accessibili a tutti, non si correreb-
be il rischio opposto di un livellamento delle condizioni?
7
Tra questi si annoverano Francis Fukuyama, Leon Kass, Jurgen Habermas, Georige Sandel. In
proposito, J. Habermas, The future of Human Nature, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003; M. J. Sandel,
What’s Wrong with Enhancement, in www.bioethics.gov, 23 dicembre 2002.
M. B. Magro 507
9. L’incertezza scientifica e il modello di regolazione. Il principio di precauzione e l’euristica

dell’avversione al rischio
Se ipotizziamo che gli effetti delle tecnologie di potenziamento bionico e biorobotico
sono dannosi (per l’individuo, per le generazioni future o per l’ambiente), o in parte benefici
per l’individuo ma dannosi per le generazioni future e per l’ambiente, dobbiamo riconoscere
che l’eventuale penalizzazione delle tecnologie di potenziamento umano di biorobotica trovi
fondamento nel paradigma classico di legittimazione del divieto di cagionare danno a terzi
o a se stessi.
Tuttavia, come si diceva, vige una totale incertezza scientifica sulla dannosità di tali inter-
venti, di cui vi è prova solo della beneficialità sotto il profilo fisico-psichico sul singolo indivi-
duo su cui vengono praticate, e nel breve termine. Pertanto, una ipotetica e futuribile penaliz-
zazione di queste tecnologie rifletterebbe una inversione del paradigma paternalistico forte e
debole: si vieta ciò che è bene per l’uomo sul presupposto che il potenziamento è espressione
di motivi futili. Si va oltre il divieto di cagionare danno a se stessi o ad altri: si intravede una
norma di divieto ultraprudenziale che va oltre al modello di giustificazione del paternalismo
forte e che recepisce l’euristica di precauzione forte. Il principio di precauzione postula una
strategia di gestione di analisi del rischio nelle situazioni di incertezza, di complessità della
scelta e di limiti della conoscenza umana sui possibili effetti della tecnologia. Intesa in senso
forte, la filosofia precauzionale impone la regola della totale astensione in presenza di qualun-
que fattore di rischio potenziale, riguardo al quale non si abbia certezza delle conseguenze, né
della loro portata, paralizzando qualunque decisione che non si risolva in nihil agere, finché
non venga addotta la prova della totale innocuità dell’attività intrapresa. In senso meno forte,
il principio di precauzione impone di adottare tutte le misure necessarie per azzerare o conte-
nere i rischi connessi allo svolgimento di un’attività, soprattutto se relativi a beni di rilevanza
primaria, quali la salute umana o l’ambiente. L’ intensa produzione normativa europea degli
ultimi anni appare ispirata, in diversi contesti di “rischio”, alla realizzazione di un “elevato
livello di tutela” prossimo a zero. Il miglior strumento perla realizzazione di questo obiettivo
è costituito dalla progressiva estensione dell’applicazione del principio di precauzione ad am-
biti di tutela sempre più ampi e ulteriori rispetto al settore originario della tutela ambientale,
trovando applicazione nelle materie incidenti sulla tutela della salute umana.
La norma precauzionale, recependo una euristica di loss aversion, si dirige in direzione del
divieto o della limitazione della attività, sollecitando la decisione che minimizza il rischio di
danno, piuttosto quella che valorizza il rischio di benefici, a prescindere da un giudizio scien-
tifico circa la probabilità che la misura riduca o escluda la verificazione del danno. In tal modo
il principio di precauzione vieta cautelativamente ciò che, forse e successivamente, si rivelerà
del tutto innocuo (se non addirittura utile e benefico). La filosofia di pensiero e di regolazione
pubblica ispirata al principio di precauzione concerne situazioni in cui è impossibile stabilire
alcuna probabilità di verificazione di un determinato danno, incuneandosi nel momento
della valutazione dei rischi, ovvero nelle politiche di gestione e di percezione del rischio e
nelle richieste di sicurezza sociale, e così sganciando l’intervento prudenziale da un sostrato di
verità- necessità ed orientandolo verso la scelta di cautele adeguate di contenimento di un ri-
schio (che è solo presuntivamente supposto) ad un livello ritenuto giuridicamente accettabile.
L’applicazione del metodo precauzionale svolge il ruolo di criterio guida delle decisioni assun-
te in condizioni di incertezza, in direzione della prevenzione delle conseguenze peggiori tra

tutte le opzioni disponibili e del contenimento del rischio, quando le conoscenze scientifiche
non consentano di escludere, ma nemmeno provano, il carattere dannoso dell’attività svolta8.
B)La robotica, i droni e le Intelligenze Artificiali
1. La robotica e l’intelligenza artificiale (forte o debole): nessuna differenza tra robot e mente
umana?
La costruzione di macchine dalle prestazioni human like si configura come uno dei nodi
più difficili della scienza. In questa prospettiva di ricerca si colloca la disciplina delle Intelli-
genza Artificiale. L’espressione “Intelligenza Artificiale” (IA) è stata coniata nel 1956 da Mc-
Carthy durante un seminario interdisciplinare. Essa indica sia un termine che una disciplina,
ed esprime l’idea che si possa emulare ogni aspetto dell’intelligenza umana. Sebbene siano
state proposte parecchie, talora anche contraddittorie, definizioni di tale disciplina, ciò che le
accomuna e connota lo spirito della IA è quello di imitare, riprodurre per mezzo di macchine
elettroniche l’attività mentale umana, ovvero quella che costituisce la facoltà più essenziale
dell’uomo.
Invero l’idea che le macchine possano compiere operazioni proprie dell’intelligenza uma-
na, o almeno alcune funzioni di essa, risale al seicento ed oggi si presenta nella forma del
computer, quale incarnazione di “macchine pensanti”.
2. Robot intelligenti dotati di autonomia decisionale. L’utilizzo di agenti artificiali nei processi
organizzativi-decisionali complessi. I campi di applicazione
Nelle organizzazioni complesse esistono sistemi informatici e tecnologici intelligenti in
grado di prendere delle decisioni autonome (decisioni che non prevedono alcuna esplicita
autorizzazione da parte di un essere umano) e che operano come supporto a manager soprat-
tutto nella gestione di infrastrutture tecnologiche ad alto rischio. Le organizzazioni artificiali
sono strutture mutuate da quelle umane, all’interno delle quali ogni agente intelligente, de-
nominato personoide occupa un ruolo ben preciso (che comprende accesso a informazioni,
doveri e responsabilità) e attiva diversi processi decisionali. La decision making è un’attività di
ragionamento che implica la necessità di compiere una scelta, provocata da una informazione
ricevuta; è un processo organizzativo guidato da informazioni, conoscenze e preferenze per il
raggiungimento di un Goal predefinito.
Attualmente le IA sono applicate alla robotica cioè nella costruzione di macchine intel-
ligenti capaci di interagire fisicamente con il mondo esterno e di manipolare oggetti, spesso
dotate di un sistema esperto cioè di sistemi computazionali dotati di conoscenze specialisti-
che. Ma anche nelle applicazioni più sofisticate ed evolute, le IA hanno mostrato alcuni limiti
di fondo che esamineremo oltre.
8
Sotto questo profilo M. B. Magro, Enhancement cognitivo, biases ed euristiche: politiche di regolazione
pubblica e principio di precauzione, in Diritto penale e neuroetica, cit., 2012, p.139.
M. B. Magro 509
Gli ambiti di applicazione. Gli ambiti di applicazione delle Intelligenze Artificiali sono i più di-
sparati: si va dagli agenti artificiali e reti neurali artificiali in ambito economico (i robot agiscono
come agenti economici intelligenti privi di emozioni, e quindi realizzano le condizioni di equili-
brio competitivo nella domanda e nell’offerta, ovvero il modello di efficienza distributiva perfetta),
alla creazione di robot di servizio e assistenziali (badanti robot). In medicina, con l’avvento della
chirurgia mini-invasiva, i robot sono utilizzati nella c.d. telechirurgia. Applicazioni assai vaste sono
in ambito militare, con l’uso di droni come armi e di robot soldati. In proposito si richiama il
monito di molti scienziati a vietare o a usare cautele nell’uso di robot autonomi letali, come sistemi
intelligenti in ambito militare in cui la decisione è autonoma, le cui conseguenze possono essere
assai devastanti. Questi robot armi possono innescare armi letali senza un intervento umano nel
processo decisionale e pertanto la Corte penale internazionale ne ha dichiarato l’illegittimità.
Vi sono applicazioni nel lavoro, ma anche in casa, come robot di servizio o ludici (un esempio di
questa proiezione-attribuzione affettiva è offerto dal robot cane Aibo, di cui la Sony ha interrotto la
produzione dopo averne costruito, dal 1999 al 2006, oltre 150.000 esemplari.
Nell’ambito dell’insegnamento sono state realizzate macchine intelligenti che “leggono” le emo-
zioni umane (c.d. computazione emotiva) In questi casi si pongono principalmente problemi di
tutela della privacy e di rispetto della dignità umana. La computazione emotiva è un sistema che
ha accesso a vari indizi dello stato emotivo degli utenti, elaborati a partire sia da dati biometrici
correlabili a risposte emotive (sudorazione, dilatazione delle pupille e così via), sia dall’esame di
gesti, postura e altri comportamenti manifesti dei soggetti. Il sistema valuta questo complesso
di informazioni per scoprire se un soggetto è interessato all’argomento, se si sta distraendo, se è
scoraggiato. In base a tali supposizioni, il sistema sceglierà una forma di interazione con il proprio
utente che sia contestualmente più appropriata a facilitare il processo di apprendimento. Non si
può escludere che un tale sistema, una volta sviluppato, sia dolosamente utilizzato all’insaputa
degli utenti, con la finalità di raccoglierne un profilo emotivo e di sfruttare a fini commerciali le
risposte emotive indotte in base alle informazioni raccolte. È dunque opportuno chiedersi in quali
circostanze la raccolta e l’elaborazione di dati personali da parte di tali robot sia legittima ovvero si
configuri come una minaccia per la dignità degli utenti, portando a una violazione del loro diritto
alla sicurezza, alla riservatezza.
Importantissima è infine l’applicazione delle IA come supporto tecnologico nelle grandi organiz-
zazioni complesse finalizzate a esprimere decisioni e persino, in ambito economico, a realizzare
operazioni e transazioni economiche. In ambito economico si obietta che non è l’abilità dell’agente
artificiale a realizzare l’equilibrio del mercato, ma l’intelligenza implicita del meccanismo e delle
regole di mercato che realizzano l’equilibrio, se non sono ostacolate da fattori esogeni 9.
Il dibattito sulle IA risponde alle domande: le macchine possono pensare? E’ possibile
riprodurre l’intelligenza umana? Il pensiero può avere sede fuori dal cranio umano? Ed anco-
ra: le Intelligenze artificiali, in quanto dotate di autonomia, sono soggetti realmente capaci
di manifestare una “propria” intenzionalità e quindi un proprio agire? Sono soggetti capaci di
esprimere decisioni e dispongono di libero arbitrio? Sono capaci di provare emozioni?
Il paradigma teorico di base è quello dell’analogia mente-computer e dell’isomorfismo
mente computer, da non intendersi però in senso ontologico-strutturale, ma in modo ana-
logico e funzionale. Su questi temi si sono confrontati filosofi della mente dell’ultimo mezzo
secolo, contrapponendo un approccio funzionalista che valorizza le funzioni svolte dalla men-
9
M. S. Sundel, Behavior Change in the Human Services, Behavioral and Cognitive Principles and
Applications, SAGE Publications, 2004.
te umana e dalla macchine, in quanto in grado di svolgere funzioni simbolico computazionali

da un approccio più critico e strutturalista.
3. Il problema a monte: cos’è l’intelligenza? La IA forte e il “gioco dell’imitazione” di Turing. a)

Intelligenza come reattività comportamentale
Quali sono le caratteristiche che connotano la soggettività (anche non umana)? Per de-
finire se una macchina è intelligente si ricorre al test di Turing detto anche “gioco dell’imita-
zione”. Il test di Turing dimostra che il computer è un sistema computazionale (programma
software più eventuale supporto hardware) che interagisce con l’ambiente circostante, che
reagisce agli stimoli di tale ambiente (reattivo); che è in grado di prendere decisioni, e di con-
seguenza di agire, in modo autonomo, per raggiungere un obiettivo predefinito o negoziato
(proattivo); è in grado di comunicare (coordinarsi, cooperare, negoziare) con altri agenti e/o
con esseri umani (capacità di interazione sociale).
Se si assume un concetto di intelligenza di tipo comportamentale e interattivo (secondo
cui il comportamento sia suscettibile di analisi e di interpretazione in termini di costrutti
comportamentali di base quali stimolo, risposta, impulso, saturazione), allora potremmo af-
fermare che i calcolatori e le IA obbediscono a leggi psicologiche e sono agenti intelligenti, in
quanto manipolano e usano simboli in modo formale e astratto.
Alan Turing è il fondatore della corrente di pensiero detta intelligenza artificiale forte che
ritiene i calcolatori macchine capaci di esprimere autentico pensiero e in grado di produrre
processi intellettuali identici a quelli umani10. Non vi sarebbe alcuna differenza ontologi-
co-qualitativa tra cervello umano e cervello elettronico e tra intelligenza umana e intelligenza
artificiale, poiché la sola differenza risiederebbe nella sede o nel supporto fisico: la testa umana
fatta di carne, ossa e altri materiali biologici e la struttura di un calcolatore fatto di metallo e
energia. Parte integrante di quest’ottica funzionalista è l’assimilazione del cervello ad un har-
dware (materiali duri: le parti meccaniche) e della mente ad un software (materiali morbidi:
i programmi e istruzioni). Non conta la struttura ma la funzione indipendentemente dalla
sede fisica (il cervello- la macchina) in cui essa risiede. Perciò un computer è paragonabile ad
un essere umano quanto ad intelligenza, se le prestazioni svolte dal computer non possono
essere distinte da quelle svolte dagli esseri umani (tesi funzionalista). Detto altrimenti: lo
stesso software può essere realizzato da tipi differenti di hardware, quello biologico e quello
meccanico 11.
Ricordiamo che vi sono ricerche finalizzate a dotare i robot di emozioni artificiali e di
coscienza artificiale, rendendoli così sempre più simili a noi. Si può dire che un agente ar-
tificiale manifesta emozioni quando si comporta in modi che, negli umani, presuppongono
emozioni? Le emozioni sono per gli umani un tratto costitutivo fondamentale, inseparabile
dalle altre nostre caratteristiche in quanto sono profondamente innestate nel corpo, inteso
sia come insieme di organi sia come depositario della nostra identità, che dei nostri ricordi e
10
A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in “Mind”, 59, 236, 1950. A. M. Turing,
Calcolatori e intelligenza, in D. R. Hofstadter, D. C. Dennett ( a cura di) L’io della mente, Adelphi,
1985, pp. 61-100.
11
H. Putnam, I robot: macchine o vita creata artificialmente? in Mente, Linguaggio e Realtà, Milano,
Adelphi, 1987, pp. 416-438.
M. B. Magro 511
della nostra storia ed esperienza.

Seguendo questo ordine di idee si è perfino perseguito lo scopo conoscitivo di studia-
re, attraverso la costruzione di macchine intelligenti, la mente umana e le sue modalità di
funzionamento. La mente umana opera come entità formale ed astratta e gli stati mentali
sono qualificati dalla loro funzione svolta e non dalla specificità materiale. Quindi è possibile
supporre che gli stati mentali siano slegati dal sistema neurale organico e che sia riproducibile
lo stesso sistema neurale. Si sviluppa il paradigma connessionista delle “reti neurali” e il ten-
tativo pioneristico della cibernetica di riprodurre artificialmente l’architettura neuronale del
sistema nervoso umano: se l’intelligenza è espressione dell’attività neuronale, la riproduzione
artificiale di tale attività avrebbe per ciò stesso riprodotto l’intelligenza.
In ogni caso, osservano i fautori della IA debole che la realizzazione di robot capaci
di interagire emotivamente ovviamente non comporta che abbiano una coscienza. Queste
macchine non provano “vere” emozioni, cioè non si va oltre una simulazione dei sentimenti
sostenuta dalla nostra proiezione.
Le macchine di Turing sono psicologicamente isomorfe all’uomo, ossia hanno una iden-
tità di organizzazione funzionale, ma da ciò non si può ritenere che abbiano una coscienza o
una consapevolezza del proprio agire. Avere stati psicologici rilevabili ab extra non significa
possedere autentica consapevolezza dei comportamenti. Anche l’ uso di vocabolario antro-
pomorfo nel descrivere le caratteristiche, le proprietà e il funzionamento delle Intelligenze
Artificiali e dei sistemi informatizzati non riguarda tanto la macchina (il calcolatore) in sé, ma
il modo in cui noi vediamo la macchina, e indirettamente noi stessi12.
4. La confutazione di Turing: il test della “stanza cinese” di Searle. La IA debole e l’Intelligenza

come intenzionalità e come “comprensione” di significati
L’altra tesi, quella della intelligenza artificiale debole, ossia della non autenticità del pen-
siero meccanico e della diversità ontologica tra intelligenza artificiale e intelligenza naturale
è stata sostenuta da autorevoli studiosi. Secondo la IA debole le macchine simulano e ripro-
ducono soltanto i processi intellettuali umani. Costoro affermano quindi una nozione di
intelligenza come intenzionalità (dimensione essenziale della coscienza): caratteristica che
contraddistingue certi stati mentali, quali le credenze, i desideri e le intenzioni e che diffe-
renzia l’uomo dalle macchine13. L’assunto fondamentale è l’impossibilità per una macchina
computazionale di manifestare l’intenzionalità che caratterizza gli esseri umani e, sia pure in
forme diverse, gli animali.
Per contro, secondo Searle, l’intenzionalità è un dato di fatto empirico che poco dice
circa le effettive relazioni causali tra mente e cervello, e che consente unicamente di affermare
che sussistono certi processi cerebrali; ma l’esecuzione di un programma su un dato input non
è di per sé una condizione sufficiente per l’intenzionalità. Il test “della stanza cinese” dimostra
che il computer può anche essere un ottimo manipolatore formale di simboli, ma questa
attività non racchiude quella della “comprensione” dei significati dei tali simboli e di conse-
12
Minsky al contrario rivendica la legittimità/utilità dell’uso di termini antropomorfici.
13
J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, W.H. Freeman,
1976.
guenza non coincide con l’intelligenza umana, la quale è sempre intenzionale e cosciente. Il
sistema simbolico-computazionale si comporta come “se” capisse il cinese, ma non riproduce
l’attività umana, la simula perché manca la coscienza dei significati14.
Searle prende in esame i lavori sulla simulazione della capacità umana di comprendere
narrazioni, che richiede l’abilità di rispondere a domande che coinvolgono informazioni non
fornite in modo esplicito dalla narrazione, ma desumibili da essa sfruttando conoscenze di
natura generale. Risultato: la capacità (di un uomo/una macchina) di manipolare le informa-
zioni ricevute secondo regole formali ben definite non è sufficiente a spiegare il processo di
comprensione. Si afferma il carattere non intenzionale, e, quindi, semanticamente vuoto, dei
simboli elaborati da un sistema artificiale e, in conclusione, si nega che i processi mentali pos-
sano essere ridotti a processi di natura computazionale che operano su elementi formalmente
definiti. I robot intelligenti non hanno capacità di connessione e di critica, ovvero non hanno
categorie concettuali, sono privi di un sé pensante.
5. Il senso comune e la sfera della emotività

In più, si fa notare che ai robot dotati di intelligenza artificiale, dotati di conoscenze alta-
mente specialistiche, manca, al disotto di queste conoscenze, il livello di conoscenze comuni,
il c.d. “senso comune”, ciò che tutti gli umani posseggono senza aver fatto studi particolari.
Il “senso comune” è quello che consente di collegare conoscenze specialistiche di campi di-
versi e di affrontare i problemi e di risolverli senza la rigidità tipica dell’approccio simbolico
dell’intelligenza. Spesso una reazione intelligente ad una certa situazione è quella che sì, tiene
in considerazione il contesto, ma che non è in grado di selezionare quale aspetto del contesto
sia rilevante. A questo tipo di conoscenza e di approccio corrisponde il concetto di intelligen-
za emotiva quella che orienta verso il “senso comune”: da qui il paradosso che le macchine
riescono a riprodurre il più altro rigore logico ma non riescono a essere programmate su un
livello minimo di intelligenza comune (non dimentichiamo gli studi sul ruolo delle emozioni
nel processo decisionale e gli studi sull’intelligenza emotiva di Golemann).
Conclusione: contro i funzionalisti, occorre affermare lo strutturalismo ovvero ritenere
che ciò che conta è la struttura e non la funzione, la sede dove si svolge l’attività, non come
si svolge l’attività cerebrale. L’intenzionalità trova sede nel cervello, la mente è un prodotto
causale del cervello. Ne segue quindi che qualunque meccanismo in grado di produrre inten-
zionalità dovrebbe necessariamente possedere poteri causali simili a quelli del cervello, cosa
che non è possibile.
La tesi secondo cui i programmi non sono menti implica una presa di posizione contro
il paradigma funzionalista e la sua maniera di impostare il mind-body problem. Infatti l’ipotesi
funzionalista secondo cui la mente sarebbe concettualmente e empiricamente separabile dal
cervello è pericolosamente dualistica: una forma di dualismo che non ricalca quello tradizio-
nale cartesiano che dichiara che esistono due generi di sostanze, ma cartesiano nel senso che
J. R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, in The Behavioral and Brains Sciences, 3, Cambridge
14
University Press, 1980; J. R. Searle, Menti cervelli e programmi, in D. R. Hofstadter, D. C.

Dennett, cit., pp. 341-375.
M. B. Magro 513
ciò che è specificatamente mentale non ha alcuna connessione intrinseca con le proprietà del
cervello15.
6. Lo statuto ontologico delle macchine e il problema della responsabilità giuridica per l’agire o
dell’agire dei robot intelligenti
Dalle diverse visioni e concezioni sulla Intelligenza artificiale (strutturalista e funzio-
nalista) derivano due opposte concezioni. Secondo la tesi strutturalista i robot intelligenti
sono comunque degli oggetti strumentali e dunque, sul piano morale e giuridico, meritevoli
di tutela solo per il valore che esprimono; secondo la tesi funzionalista potrebbero essere
considerati come “soggetti” e dunque meritevoli, sul piano filosofico, morale e giuridico, di
una eventuale tutela per soggettività. Si pone dunque la questione dello statuto ontologico
delle c.d. IA ovvero di artefatti particolarmente evoluti: semplici oggetti, oppure possiedono
la soglia dei requisiti minimi per il riconoscimento di un livello di soggettività16? Il proble-
ma quindi è stabilire se la tecnologia moderna ha creato una nuova tipologia di soggetto,
il soggetto non-umano, l’agente non-umano per il quale è possibile declinare il linguaggio
giuridico dei diritti e delle responsabilità17.
Ovviamente dalla risposta a tali questioni deriva anche il tipo di ‘diritto’ e il tipo di ‘tute-
la’ applicabile a questi sistemi intelligenti artificiali (in tal caso possono essere oggetto di tutela
sotto il profilo della tutela penale dei brevetti, o della tutela del patrimonio). Due sono i para-
digmi che nella nostra cultura fondano l’aspettativa di una tutela, il valore che suggeriamo di
intendere come elevatezza-complessità di funzioni, e/o utilità pratica, e/o rarità-originalità e
la soggettività intesa in un crescendo di sensibilità emotiva, immaginazione e creatività, intel-
lezione come pensiero logico, intenzionalità, coscienza, autocoscienza e autodeterminazione.
7. I profili di responsabilità penale: l’ipotesi fantastica del robot come agente non-umano respon-
sabile penalmente, nuovo soggetto di diritto penale
Torniamo alla questione di fondo: il robot agisce o è agito? È oggetto- strumento o
soggetto, anche se mediato, o meglio, un “nuovo” soggetto per il diritto? Le Intelligenze ar-
tificiali e i robot intelligenti sono dotati di soggettività autonoma, come gli enti collettivi, e
quindi sono soggetti responsabili, imputabili, dotati di libero arbitrio? Questa ipotesi solleva
problemi di definizione della capacità soggettiva, della nozione di azione, della nozione di
colpevolezza: i robot sono rimproverabili e motivabili? Esprimono una loro volontà, possono
essere “autori” di reati e il loro agire si può definire cosciente e volontario? Si tratta quindi
di definire se tali macchine siano capaci di compiere azioni e comunque di capire a chi tali
15
La letteratura della IA contiene molte denunce contro il dualismo classico, poiché essa propone un
neo dualismo che pretende di sganciare i processi cognitivi dalla biochimica concreta delle loro origini
materiali, G. Fornero, Intelligenza artificiale e filosofia, in N. Abbagnano (a cura di ), Storia della
filosofia, vol. IV, 1994, Torino, p. 514.
16
G. Taddei Elmi, Soggettività artificiali e diritto, relazione disponibile su www.altalex.it .
17
A. Narayanan, D. Perrott, Can computers have legal rights ? in Artificial Intelligence. Human Effects,
New York, Ellis Horwood, 1884, pp. 52-6.
azioni, e le conseguenze di tali azioni, debbano essere imputabili.

Il tema presenta un’analogia con quello della responsabilità penale-amministrativa degli
enti collettivi e cozza con una concezione antropomorfica del diritto penale: gli enti collet-
tivi non hanno corpo né anima, ma sono comunque “soggetti”, cioè autori di reati, per la
legge penale; i robot hanno un “corpo”, una materia su cui far ricadere la sanzione penale
(ad esempio, la disattivazione della macchina o la sua distruzione), ma non hanno un’anima,
pur essendo dotati di autonoma capacità decisionale ed essendo in grado di interagire con
l’ambiente18.
8. Se i robot sono mezzi e non agenti. L’ipotesi della responsabilità penale del programmatore o
utilizzatore
Se si ritiene che i robot non siano agenti in senso stretto, si pone quindi il problema della
responsabilità esclusivamente umana del programmatore o utilizzatore. A che titolo può es-
sere imputata la responsabilità all’uomo, se si assume che il sistema informatico intelligente è
un decision maker? Come abbiamo detto, si assume che i robot intelligenti agiscono in modo
non programmato e imprevedibile e questa imprevedibilità pone problemi di attribuzione
della responsabilità penale a carico dei programmatori, dei costruttori e degli utilizzatori. Se
i robot e le Intelligenze artificiali sono artefatti in grado di migliorare le capacità degli esseri
umani, mezzi di supporto e di comunicazione, si pone un problema inverso di imputazione
penale: qui l’agente non--umano agisce, la persona fisica ne risponde.
La questione è tuttavia individuare il titolo soggettivo dell’imputazione a carico della
persona fisica. Escludendo l’ipotesi dolosa, perché l’azione “volontaria” dell’agente non-uma-
no incardina responsabilità sull’uomo e perché l’azione del robot si indentifica e rappresenta
una longa manus della persona umana, residua il profilo colposo, individuato nel difetto di
programmazione, costruzione, scelta, utilizzo, manutenzione funzionamento di robot intel-
ligenti19.
9. Il problema della prevedibilità dei comportamenti dei sistemi robotici intelligenti

Nel 1950 Isaac Asimov elaborò le tre leggi fondamentali della robotica: 1) Un robot non
può danneggiare con azioni o omissioni un essere umano né permettere che un essere umano
riceva danno; 2) un robot deve obbedire agli ordini impartiti dagli esseri umani, a meno
che tale ordini non contravvengano alla regola n.1; 3) Un robot deve proteggere la propria
esistenza, purché questa autodifesa non contrasti con la regola n. 2 e n.1. Da queste leggi si
desume il divieto di creare robot che non rispettino le tre leggi di Asimov. Queste tre leggi
18
G. Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Intelligence Entities- from Science Fiction to Legal
Social Control, in “Akron Intellectual Property Journal”, 2010, p. 271.
19
Nell’ambito civile la questione si pone sul piano della responsabilità contrattuale per i vizi e
conseguenze connesse alla progettazione, costruzione e utilizzo del robot; e della responsabilità
extracontrattuale a carico del programmatore, del costruttore e dell’utilizzatore per i danni arrecati a
terzi e non solo alle controparti del contratto. Gli schemi richiamati sono quelli della rappresentanza,
del mandato, del contratto di assicurazione, forme di autenticazione, della responsabilità contrattuale
ed extracontrattuale.
M. B. Magro 515
fondamentali tuttavia sono tra loro contraddittorie: cosa accade se si ordini ad un robot di
ferire un uomo per il bene di qualcun altro? Che cosa succede se il comandante ordina ad un
robot poliziotto di arrestare un sospetto che fa resistenza all’arresto? E ancora cosa accade se
un robot chirurgo si ostina ad effettuare un intervento salvavita contro la volontà del pazien-
te? Le leggi della robotica regolano in modo assoluto il comportamento dei robot o vi è un
margine di imprevedibilità nel loro comportamento?
I problemi di comprensione e prevedibilità degli esiti di un intervento bionico rivela-
no un aspetto particolare della nostra limitata capacità di prevedere il comportamento del-
le macchine, della robotica e dell’intelligenza artificiale. Tali limitazioni previsionali furono
principalmente discusse in relazione alla formulazione generale dei teoremi di indecidibilità
algoritmica; nuovi spunti per la riflessione epistemologica provengono da studi più recenti
nel campo dell’apprendimento automatico. Le interfacce bioniche cervello-macchina, alle
quali è stato accennato, richiedono un processo di addestramento per classificare e ricono-
scere i segnali neurali associati all’attività cognitiva di un essere umano. Non si può realisti-
camente pensare di fornire a un robot una specifica sufficientemente dettagliata di ciò che
esso deve fare o aspettarsi di incontrare negli spazi non rigidamente definiti e controllati di
una casa, di un ufficio o di altri ambienti nei quali si svolge la nostra vita quotidiana. Per
questo motivo, un robot che sia abbastanza autonomo e adattabile per assistere un anziano
nel suo appartamento, deve essere un robot capace di apprendere dall’esperienza. Ma questa
esigenza deve confrontarsi con il fatto che i metodi di apprendimento automatico non sem-
pre consentono di appurare se il robot abbia veramente imparato (o anche solo approssimato
in modo soddisfacente) ciò che vogliamo insegnargli. Si pongono quindi problemi di valu-
tazione dei risultati ottenuti nei processi di apprendimento automatico da parte di robot.
La riflessione epistemologica sull’apprendimento automatico si inquadra dunque nella pro-
blematica più generale della prevedibilità dei comportamenti di sistemi robotici20.
Gli studi dei metodi formali di verifica del software nascono dall’esigenza di verificare
se ogni esecuzione di un determinato programma per un calcolatore soddisfi alcuni requisiti
fondamentali. Più recentemente, queste metodologie sono state estese al problema di speci-
ficare e verificare le proprietà di sistemi, generalmente detti “ibridi”, che comprendono varie
tipologie di sistemi robotici. Alcuni risultati limitativi che sono stati ottenuti a proposito dei
sistemi ibridi indicano che, in generale, non è possibile verificare con queste metodologie se
un sistema robotico soddisfi o non soddisfi determinati vincoli spaziali o temporali nell’ese-
cuzione di un dato compito. I robot pensanti non agiscono in modo prevedibile in quanto
la capacità di apprendimento tratteggia uno spazio di imprevedibilità che si sottrae alle leggi
scientifiche. Si assume quindi che i robot agiscono in modo imprevedibile, in modo non
regolato da rigorose leggi scientifiche, in quanto le Intelligenze Artificiali hanno capacità di
apprendimento, di adattamento all’ambiente, capacità decisionale e creatività che aggiunge
sempre un quid pluris rispetto la iniziale programmazione.
Inoltre, vi è di più che l’interazione tra un sistema aperto di apprendimento condiziona-
to proprio delle Intelligenze artificiali e il suo ambiente (comunicazione asincrona) è spesso
soggetta a vincoli temporali che non consentono di assicurare la presenza di un essere umano
nei cicli di controllo. Ne segue quindi che Intelligenze Artificiali, droni e robot intelligenti
20
U. Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: crimes, contract and Torts, Springer, 2013; M. Durante, U.
Pagallo, Manuale di informatica giuridica e diritto delle nuove tecnologie, Torino, 2012.
non sono completamente controllabili dall’uomo.

Si sollevano pertanto insormontabili problemi di accertamento della responsabilità
nell’ordinamento giuridico.
Le caratteristiche di questi sistemi informatizzati esperti è che sanno reagire a situazioni
previste o prevedibili, ma non a situazioni che, non essendo prevedibili da un essere umano,
non possono neppure essere previste nel programma e nelle regole che l’essere umano ha
costruito e che costituiscono l’intelligenza artificiale. La loro presunta “imprevedibilità” o
causalità dell’azione – essendo macchine e non uomini - non è forse, a sua volta, prevedibile
da parte del costruttore che può programmare una serie vincolata di scelte?
Queste sono le implicazioni normative delle riflessioni epistemologiche sulla nostra li-
mitata capacità di prevedere il comportamento di un agente artificiale evoluto, dotato di un
margine di creatività e decisionalità (è un decision maker) in assenza di un visibile difetto nel
controllo, uso, o manutenzione del produttore o del programmatore.
10. La colpa del programmatore

Sartor ritiene che gli effetti prodotti dall’agente si riferiscano all’utilizzatore non perché
li ha voluti ma perché ha confidato in un comportamento razionale dell’agente e perché si
è affidato alle intenzioni dell’agente che dichiarava di tendere a certi obiettivi21. In termini
penalistici, è appropriato fare riferimento alla colpa del programmatore, ovvero al difetto
di diligenza per non aver previsto, nella fase della programmazione, il comportamento im-
prevedibile del robot! La prevedibilità astratta e generica di futuri danni ancora non ben
identificati incardina la responsabilità per colpa, anche quando non sono noti tutti gli anelli
del processo causale. La prevedibilità opera come componente della colpa, anche sulla base di
leggi scientifiche non corroborate da studi e non consolidate, o nella totale ignoranza di leggi
scientifiche di spiegazione causale, con il rischio di identificare la colpa con la precauzione e
il prudenzialismo.
Nella letteratura anglosassone si parla di prevedibilità e di logico sviluppo prevedibile,
similmente al 116 c.p. in tema di responsabilità del concorrente per l’evento diverso più grave
non voluto, purché prevedibile, e anche se non sono perfettamente noti tutti gli anelli della
catena causale di produzione dell’evento. La differenza è che il programmatore o l’utilizzato-
re non concorrono nella realizzazione di un reato di base e quindi la regola del versari in re
illicita non vale, perché la condotta della persona fisica crea una condizione di rischio lecito
tollerato.
Occorre quindi elaborare un nuovo concetto normativo di colpevolezza che consente di
elaborare un concetto di “colpa da programmazione”, ove si può ipotizzare di prospettare una
causa di esclusione della colpevolezza consistente nella predisposizione di misure di sicurezza
che prevengano la realizzazione di reati da parte di robot intelligenti (in pratica che mettano
in atto le tre leggi della robotica di Asimov), oltre alle classiche cause di esonero della respon-
sabilità penale per prodotto difettoso, quale il caso di uso improprio del robot, o di fortuito
o di forza maggiore.
21
G. Sartor, L’intenzionalità dei sistemi informatici e il diritto, in “Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ.”, 2003, 1,
pp. 23-51; Id., Intelligenza artificiale e diritto, Milano, 1996.
Biorobotics and fundamental rights. Issues and limits of artificial intelligence1
Paolo Moro
Table of contents: 1. Preliminary remarks. – 2. Bionics and fundamental rights. – 3.

Philosophical origins of biorobotics. From cybernetics to artificial intelligence. – 3.1.
Cybernetics. – 3.2. Intelligent processes. – 3.3. Contrasting opinions. – 4. The thinking
machine. The computational project. – 5. The acting machine. The behavioural model. – 6.
Computer and human subjectivity. On the limits of artificial intelligence. – 7. The human
agent in relation. Another bio-robotics?
1. Preliminary remarks
In the contemporary era, technological applications of artificial intelligence are
engendering new ethical and legal problems, amongst which particular relevance
has the identity of the human person and of his or her fundamental rights in the
interaction with the most evolved technological devices of robotics and bionics.
Robotics is the set of theories studying the realisation of intelligent and highly
organised machines (robots), automated and able to emulate human reasoning and
behaviours.
Bionics is the science studying the sensorial and motion functions of living
organisms, with the aim of individuating technological devices capable of reproducing
or strengthening them.
Nowadays, the robot is a complex system imitating human activities by integrating
the achievements of artificial intelligence in several fields of behaviour and reasoning,
such as comprehension of natural language, automatic learning, representation of
knowledge, interactive communication.
Resorting also to robotics, bionics develops self-organising cybernetic systems
provided with intelligent skills, such as the capability of recognising external
1
518 Biorobotics and fundamental rights
stimulations (counter-reaction) and adapting themselves to the environment

(homeostasis).
Nevertheless, bionics differs from robotics for at least three aspects concerning
the man-machine interaction2: the lack of conscious control of the bionic device by
its programmer; the invasive nature of interaction; the capability of the bionic device
to recover and strengthen the organism’s functions.
Thus, while the robot and the man keep being physically distinct entities, in the
applications of bionics the man and the machine are not separated but they form
an integrated system where the interaction between the person and the electronic
prosthesis is not managed in a conscious manner.
This research deals with the phenomenon as a whole, whereas the expression
«biorobotics» means the sum of scientific theories and applications concerning the
systems of artificial intelligence realised in the field of bionics3.
2. Bionics and fundamental rights

The use of bionic prostheses may engender ethical and legal problems, because it
implies an invasive intervention that modifies the physical and psychical integrity of
the person and, therefore, may harm his or her fundamental rights.
Indeed, in case of a dispute between the physician performing the implantation
and the patient subjected to it, the possible grafting of a bionic prosthesis in the
human body may become a treatment harming human dignity (art. 1 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), of physical integrity (art. 3), of
individual liberty (art. 6) and of privacy (art. 8).
First of all, an intervention of functional recovery through the grafting of a bionic
prosthesis represents in any case harm to physical integrity, as any other surgical
intervention, but it is usually justified by the patient’s informed consent and by
the public duty of protection of health that the hospital and its physicians have.
This is what happens with traditional devices, such as artificial pacemakers using
electrical impulses released by electrodes in contact with cardiac muscles, in order
to regulate the heartbeat, but also with sophisticated devices, such as the «bionic
ear», characterised by the utilisation of stimulating electrodes, or the implantation of
electrodes for the deep brain stimulation.
2
A. Montanari, Scienza e immortalità terrena, in La sfida postumanista. Colloqui sul significato della
tecnica, a cura di L. Grion, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012.
3
T. Consi, B. Webb, Biorobotics, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2001; P. Dario, M.C. Carrozza,
E. Guglielmelli, C. Laschi, A. Menciassi, S. Micera, F. Vecchi, Robotics as a Future and Emerging
Technology: Biomimetics, Cybernetics, and Neuro-Robotics in European Projects, “IEEE Robotics and
Automation Magazine”, 12, 2, 2005, pp. 29-43; G. Tamburrini, E. Datteri, Machine Experiments
and Theoretical Modelling: from Cybernetic Methodology to Neuro-Robotics, in “Minds and Machines”,
15, 3-4, 2005, pp. 335-358.
P. Moro 519
Besides, the artificial bionic device represents a new type of prosthesis, which may
not only consent to recover lost functions, but also be able to strengthen existing
functions or to introduce new functionalities, although admittedly there is not a
precise boundary line between recovery and strengthening of motion or cognitive
abilities.
Thus, an intervention of bionic strengthening of a bodily organ may raise the
doubt whether the medical treatment may be considered harmful for human dignity
and for the very identity of the person.
By way of illustration, in the famous scientific experiment by Kevin Warwick,
an electrode has been implanted in the left arm of a healthy volunteer with the aim
of verifying the utility, the compatibility and the operability on the long term of a
microelectrodes vector situated within the median nerve, including the perception of
feedback signals and the use of a conveniently accessorized artificial hand4.
Bionics, indeed, blurs the boundary line between what is included in the category
of human dignity and what is not. In this field of application of the technological
evolution the question is whether the very identity of the person over time depends
exclusively on physio-psychic continuity, on the possession of an intact and natural
body, on the persistent provision of a thinking substance.
On the other hand, bionic non-therapeutic intervention may represent an
endangerment, if not a violation of the fundamental rights to personal liberty and
to privacy.
A paradigmatic example is given by the surgical implantation of specific Radio
Frequency Identification Devices (RFID), which transmit via radio a sequence
of impulses constituting a particular code for the localisation of persons or the
memorisation of information of interest (for instance, personal, health, and financial
data).
Finally, another important legal issue concerns the nature and boundaries of
the consent to the bionic intervention that, as any other case of medical treatment,
requires the free and informed consent of the patient subjected to the implantation,
based on the right of therapeutic self-determination and on the prohibition of
mandatory medical treatments.
In this case, Italian law establishes that the consent of the interested subject in a
penal controversy (art. 50 of the Italian penal code) and the preventive transaction
in a civil controversy (art. 1966 of the Italian civil code) are not effective when
they concern non-disposable rights, which are considered non-negotiable, thus it
is not clear whether the interested subject may dispose of the changing and the
projecting of his or her own identity by resorting not only to the recovery of reduced
4
K. Warwick, M. Gasson, B. Hutt, I. Goodhew, P. Kyberd, B. Andrews, P. Teddy, A. Shad,
The Application of Implant Technology for Cybernetic Systems, in “Archives of Neurology”, 60, 2003, 10,
pp. 1369-1373.
biological functions, but also to the strengthening of such functionalities through

the implantation of a bionic device.
This in fact gives rise to the problem of the definition of what is non-disposable,
since there is no classification of non-disposable rights and there is no determination
of what is harmful to human dignity, which is a vague if not undetermined category:
amongst the many discerning criteria there is art. 5 of the Italian civil code, according
to which the acts of disposal of one’s own body are forbidden whenever they cause a
permanent diminution of physical integrity or whenever they are otherwise contrary
to law, public order or public morals.
The rule cannot be considered a general criterion of reference to discriminate
the disposability or not of different legal situations, since it is a disposition that
expressly appeared in the code after a debated judicial question happened in Italy
during the Nineteen-Thirties concerning the legal responsibility of the surgeon for
the implantation of a sexual gland with the consent of the patient who underwent
the surgery.
Moreover, article 5 refers only to the diminution and not to the permanent
strengthening of physical integrity and of human identity brought by some biorobotics
applications, which, in view of the current developments of medical engineering,
may be also considered offensive and engendering criminal liability: however, the
patient’s consent to the violation of his or her own body integrity (volenti non fit
iniuria) remains ineffective when it comes to non-disposable rights.
3. Philosophical origins of biorobotics. From cybernetics to artificial intelligence

The protection of the person and of his or her rights, which are violated or
endangered by the interaction between the man and the machine, may be adequately
justified only through a reflection on the philosophical origin of biorobotics and, in
particular, on the anthropological conception representing the theoretical foundation
of biorobotics.
This vision developed through the modern scientific revolution and exploded
in the technological era of the Twentieth Century, implying that man is a highly
complex computing machine. This comparison between man and machine has been
realised through computer science, which implemented the computational project by
designating the calculating machine with anthropomorphic terms such as electronic
brain, memory and others.
The roots of biorobotics, which was developed from the bionic applications
of robotics, date back particularly to the studies on cybernetics and on artificial
intelligence of the second half of the Twentieth Century. The theoretical basis of
the functioning of robotic systems, which are non-invasive, and of bionic devices,
P. Moro 521
which are invasive, is the mathematical study of neuronal systems, which led to
the researches on artificial intelligence and to the elaboration of a general theory of
automata, which represents one of the fundamental problems of cybernetics.
3.1. Cybernetics
Cybernetics may be defined as the capability of an automatic system to order
information and adapt to the environment (homeostasis) through the control and
the correction of its own operations (retroaction or feed-back). The term is taken
from the Greek word indicating the art of the helmsman (kybernetés) that has the
control of a ship and that can govern it.
The father of cybernetics Norbert Wiener, in his 1948 fundamental book5, declares
that he wants to connect the research on human beings with that on machines in
order to grant an adequate control on both and upholds the theoretical impossibility
to distinguish the human nervous system from a mechanical communication system
such as the telephone6.
Wiener establishes boundaries between some distinctive features of computing
systems, such as, for instance, the autonomy of the calculating process, which shall
not require any human intervention, as well as the efficiency and the flexibility of
the data memorisation devices and the study of the nervous system. In the chapters
added in the 1961 edition, he introduces some topics that have become central
arguments in the research on artificial intelligence, such as the automatic learning and
the development of artificial systems capable of self-organising and self-replicating.
Wiener supposes that also in living organisms voluntary and reflex activity is
based on physiological mechanisms of counter-reaction and adaptation to the
environment, with the aim of reaching conditions of stability and balance, setting
the basis for the following and current studies on robotics.
3.2. Intelligent processes

In the Fifties, John McCarthy elaborates a computerized model of human mind
developing the ideas established by Wiener’s cybernetics and coins for the first time
the term «artificial intelligence», coming to elaborate the common guidelines of such
a research in a fundamental work published with Pat Hayes in 1969, where the
Authors point out the essence of the artificial intelligence system in its automatic
capability to perform a «common sense reasoning»7.
5
N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the machine, New York-Paris,
Hermann, J. Wiley, 1948.
6
Ibidem.
7
J. McCarthy, P.J. Hayes, Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence, in
“Machine Intelligence”, 4, 1969, pp. 463-502.
As Hayes stated in his naive physics manifesto8, what is meant to be represented

is the way in which people see the world, not the world as seen by physics, with the
resulting necessity to elaborate models concerning not only objects or events, but
also perceptions and actions concerning the modes of understanding the world by
the persons.
The cybernetic development of electronic processors suggested scientists to
compare the nature of the mental processes of elaboration and learning of information,
if based on a program limited to the mathematical and artificial theorisation of
natural and social processes of physio-psychic activity.
Indeed, the problems introduced by cybernetics and artificial intelligence, which
constitute the theoretical and application basis of contemporary biorobotics, impose
to study the most disparate disciplines, not only concerning hard sciences (such as
electronics, genetics or chemistry), but also humanities (such as law or literature),
keeping into account that computer science is a clearly interdisciplinary science.
The cybernetic comparison of the correspondences between human and artificial
neuronal structures has not brought to the point of replacing the complicated
structures of human brain with electronic circuits, but biorobotics reveals ever faster
technological progresses in the construction of devices of recovery and strengthening
of intelligent processes.
Amongst the several philosophical problems that this only apparently science-
fictional scenario poses to artificial intelligence, a twofold and ambivalent question
seems to prevail. Does man think and want as the machine does? Does the machine
think and want as a man does?
3.3. Contrasting opinions

It is discussed whether and to what extent distinctive features of human
subjectivity, such as conscience and will, may be transferred to a robot or a bionic
device.
Amongst the various opinions, two opposite theses may be distinguished: the
first maintains that the human being presents behaviours and reasoning that may
be perfectly imitated by a robot, the second states that the man’s essence is never
reproducible by a cybernetic machine.
If we convert such largely diffused theses in philosophical positions, we might
clearly notice the dogmatic opinion, according to which it is possible for the machine
to imitate human thoughts and behaviours (strong artificial intelligence), and the
sceptical opinion, according to which the machine is not intelligent because it has
not a truly human mind (artificial stupidity).
8
P.J. Hayes, The naive physics manifesto, in D. Michie (ed.), Expert Systems in the Micro-Electronic Age,
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1978.
P. Moro 523
Both opinions are naïve, since they reduce man and the machine to a unique
dimension. In the first conception it is presumed that the mind is only an algorithm,
which may be implemented in an expert system of artificial intelligence and which
is elaborated by the calculating reason and by the will reacting to external stimuli; in
the second conception it is supposed that the cybernetic machine cannot develop any
reasoning, nor imitate behaviours, nor feel emotions typical only of human nature.
4. The thinking machine. The computational project

Modern rationalism, according to which man is able to know what is good and
what is evil through the use of his own reason, contributed to base artificial intelligence
programs on the scientific method9 and led to frame machines and biological systems
capable of showing a functional behaviour within common schemes of algorithmic
origin, thus confirming the mathematical condition of cybernetics10.
Cybernetics has, in fact, deep historical roots, dating back to the late Middle Ages
and to the early dawn of modern philosophy, where several attempts of mechanisation
of thought through the canons of formal logic appeared.
The thinking machine imagined by Raimondo Lullo in his Ars generalis ultima
(1308), also called Ars magna, and in his compendious synthesis, the Ars brevis
(written between 1308 and 1311), represents the outcome of the elaboration of a
system of logic structured in a list of elementary concepts, expressed with symbols
and numbers, which, combined with each other according to given computational
rules, shall consent the constitution of a complete and universal knowledge11.
Such a conception engendered developments in different and important moments
of the emerging modern mathematism, of which it thus constitutes an interesting
anticipation: the utility of Lullo’s ars combinatoria for disputations and for the way
of developing speeches is explicitly commented and studied in detail by Giordano
Bruno (De compendiosa architectura et complemento Artis Lullii, 1582); during the
mid-Seventeenth century the organisational advantages of such a system, which
connects arithmetic and mechanics, are applied to the construction of a primitive
computing machine by Pascal; finally, in the later decades, the operational purpose
of symbolic logic set by Lullo is developed by Leibniz, with the aim of founding the
idea of a mathesis universalis precisely on combinatorial analysis12.
9
D.A. Gillies, Artificial intelligence and scientific method, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, trad.
it. Intelligenza artificiale e metodo scientifico, Milano, Cortina, 1998.
10
G. Tamburrini, I matematici e le macchine intelligenti, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2002.
11
P. Moro, Lullo giurista informatico. Dall’ars combinatoria all’informatica giuridica, in G. Ferrari,
M. Manzin (eds.), La retorica fra scienza e professione legale. Questioni di metodo, Acta Methodologica, 1,
Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, pp. 289-308.
12
W. Schmidt-Biggemann, Topica universalis. Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker
Wissenschaft, Hamburg, Meiner, 1983, p. 156 ff.
The rationalist origin of cybernetic justice shows itself so emblematically in the

well-known calculemus statement by Leibniz himself, according to whom whenever
controversies will arise, there will be no greater need for discussion between two
philosophers than the need for discussion between two calculators13.
However, the scientific literature of the Twentieth Century constantly implies
an analogy between man and machine and, more particularly, between artificial
intelligence and conscience.
It is well known that already in 1936 the British mathematician Alan Mathison
Turing designed a machine capable of exhibiting operations typical of the human
mind14. By analysing the mental computing process, Turing drew an analogy between
man and computer referring to «mental states» to define the inner configurations of
the machine and to the construction of a «brain» to trace the execution of his project.
In 1950, Alan Mathison Turing outlined the famous Imitation Game, a test
to establish whether a computer can elaborate a human thought: that is when, by
questioning a calculator without seeing it, a person cannot distinguish whether it is
a human being or a computer15.
More specifically, the test takes place in three separate rooms. In the first room
there is a human examiner; in the other two rooms there are another person and the
computer subjected to the test. The examiner only knows the names of the person
and of the calculator, without knowing who they really are, and interacts with them
only through another computer, with the task of discovering their identity within
a prefixed time limit. The machine passes the test if the examiner cannot identify it
in time.
Through the conception of this test, Turing presupposes a reductive notion of
intelligence and will, limited to the deductive computation and to the exterior
behaviour: a subject may be defined intelligent or not only if he reasons and behaves
in a certain way, through linguistic communication and the will to react to external
impulses.
5. The acting machine. The behavioural model

The Turing test shows that the modern scientific project is not only rationalist,
but also voluntarist.
13
«Quo facto, quando orientur controversiae, non magis disputatione opus erit inter duos philosophos, quam
inter duos computistas. Sufficiet enim calamos in manos sumere sedereque ad abacos, et sibi mutuo (accito si
placet amico) dicere: calculemus»: G.W. Leibniz, De scientia universali seu calculo philosophico, in Opera
Philosophica, in C.J. Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften con Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, VII,
Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms Verlag, 1978, p. 200.
14
A.M. Turing, On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, in Proceedings
of the London Mathematical Society, 42, 1936, pp. 230-265.
15
A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in “Mind”, 59, 1950, pp. 433-460.
P. Moro 525
The scientists who dealt with artificial intelligence have built common schemes
of algorithmic origin that correspond to logical protocols used in computer science
in the architecture of each software, to realise expert machines and biological systems
able to exhibit a functional behaviour.
These conceptual schemes are based on the prejudice according to which human
will manifests itself in a reactive conduct and is defined as the capacity of conscious
inhibition of a biological impulse: in such a perspective, the human willingness of
reacting to external stimuli allegedly characterises also the machine, which behaves
based on a sequence of automatic choices of environmental adaptation.
The interpretation of the machine’s intelligence based on the effects of the
reactive behaviour to external impulses derives from the theory of behaviourism
(or behavioural psychology), developed by the psychologist John Watson at the
beginning of the Twentieth Century on the assumption that explicit behaviour is the
unique unity of analysis that can be scientifically studied, as far as directly observable,
while introspection cannot provide any reliable data16.
Such a behaviourist approach, which reduces will to an objective phenomenon in
the psychological study of the moral act, influenced the famous theory of the society
of mind by Marvin Minsky, New York pioneer of the studies on artificial intelligence
and co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology A.I. Laboratory, as well
as winner of the Turing Award in 1969.
In his post-humanist and materialist reflection, Minsky reduces the individual
to a particularly complicated biological mechanism and maintains that the single
individual can free himself from the needs of the species and achieve in the future
earthly immortality thanks to the progresses of artificial intelligence and bionics17.
According to Minsky, brain is a highly complex machine comparable to a society
organised by a network of hierarchic and competitive interconnections between
multiplicities of strongly different components, called agents of the mind18.
Several researches on artificial intelligent agents have been developed from such
a theory. Artificial intelligent agents are advanced cybernetic systems presenting at
least three characters that are considered similar to those of the human being: they
are reactive, since they can react to the stimuli of environment; proactive, since they
can decide what to do and to undertake the actions required to realise what they
decided; interactive, since they can communicate between each other or with human
beings constituting a multi-agent system or agency.
16
J.B. Watson, Psychology as a behaviorist view, in “Psychological review”, 20, 2, pp. 158-177.
17
A. Montanari, Scienza e immortalità terrena, in L. Grion (ed.), La sfida postumanista. Colloqui sul
significato della tecnica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012.
18
M. L. Minsky, The Society of Mind, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986.
6. Computer and human subjectivity. On the limits of artificial intelligence

The ethical and legal questions posed by the development of expert systems of
artificial intelligence, especially in the field of biorobotics, may be dealt with only
through a critical reflection on the possibility to admit a real comparison between
calculating machine and human subject.
The reasons to doubt about the comparison between artificial intelligence and
human conscience are many.
1) Parifying the operations of intelligent machines to human faculties results in
a reductionist option, according to which human reasoning is narrowed to the sole
calculation.
The vision inaugurated by Turing, which presupposes the possibility that the
machine can imitate human reasoning, is still anchored to the European mathematism
of the modern age, as it arises from the conviction that logical activity is limited to
deductive operations and that subjective behaviour, unlike what happens in other
human situations, can be formalised through rules19.
2) A second presumption connected to the idea that artificial reason imitates
human intelligence is the one concerning the alleged neutrality of science. If we
remember the Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, every intelligent machine
is always the conditioned product of a subjective programming and it is the result of
hypothetical stipulations.
As neurophysiologic studies demonstrate, the visual knowledge of objects is often
conditioned by illusions, which exist because the visual system do not care about
providing the conscience with always physically correct data of reality, but it gives
relevant representations of what consents the interaction of the agent with reality
itself.
Moreover, it is very difficult to investigate the relation between the electro-
chemical activity of the brain, which can be examined as a phenomenon in third
person by using the presumed objectivity of the scientific method, and the conscious
perception, cognisable by the interested subject in first person only. Free will is
considered the only level of nature that can interpose a conscious assessment having
an outcome that is not determined by the physio-chemical antecedents of the brain20.
3) Cybernetics keeps being in contrast with the never totally predictable and
programmable nature of the activity developed by human intelligence and will.
Automation, which characterises, at least partially, every artificial intelligence
system and represents a constitutive element of computer science (in Italian, the
word «informatica», which stands for computer science, derives from the crasis of
19
H.L. Dreyfus, What computers still can’t do. A critique of artificial reason, New York, Harper & Row,
1972.
20
F. Tempia, Attività cerebrale e rappresentazioni mentali, in G. Cicchese, A. Pettorossi, S. Crespi
Reghizzi, V. Senni (eds.), Scienze Informatiche e Biologiche, Epistemologia e ontologia, Roma, Città
Nuova, 2011.
P. Moro 527
«informazione automatica» – «automatic information»), is not the reproduction of

the human behaviour or of mental activities.
The possibility of configuring a constant and serial repetition of authentically
human acts contrasts with the nature of human subjectivity, which is unpredictable
and cannot be reduced to a mere biological involuntary and automatic mechanism.
The universal mathematisation of the mind, in accord with the Turing’s
computational project, excludes every form of creativity, which still is considered the
qualifying character of intelligence, and requires the mind to perform completely
automatic operations precisely as a machine: therefore, from the artificial simulation
of intelligent behaviour in its entirety should derive also the creative invention,
which is exactly the salient element of mental activity21.
With the experiment of the Chinese room, John Searle confuted the Turing test,
demonstrating that the machine’s ability to manipulate the information received
according to pre-established formal rules in an unknown language (for instance, a
text in Chinese language) cannot sufficiently explain the process of comprehension
(for instance, the knowledge of common sense), given the non-intentional character
of the symbols elaborated by the artificial system, with the consequence that mental
processes cannot be reduced to processes of computational nature operating on
formally defined elements22.
4) At the present state of cybernetics and of the evolution of artificial intelligence,
computers cannot replicate nor formalise that mental procedure that may be defined
as intellectual intuition23.
Intuition is the ability to catch the essence of something independently from a
logical procedure of demonstrative kind. Aristotle recalls that such an ability shows
itself in human intelligence (anthrópinos noús) whenever it stays in «some moment»
and «in the better way of something whole, which is something different from
particular realities»24.
We must admit that in the studies of artificial intelligence applied to the
recognition of images, the vision of an object depends upon its whole finding: only
after several phases of elaboration of the signals coming from images, the computer
may identify an object and detect the category to which it belongs, but it cannot
imitate that mental activity that can provide a whole conscious perception of an
object recognised from several fragments of visual analysis, such as shape, colour and
movement.
21
F. Chiereghin, L’eco della caverna. Ricerche di filosofia della logica e della mente, Padova, Il Poligrafo,
2004, pp. 199-200.
22
J.R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs, in “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 3, 1980, pp. 417- 457.
23
E. Berti, Il pensiero come forma di vita: a proposito dell’«intelligenza artificiale», in AA.VV., La vita:
realtà e valore, Padova, Gregoriana, 1990, p. 42 ff.
24
Aristotele, Metafisica, XII, 9, 1075 a 7-10.
Such an aptitude to perceive the global sense of the examined object, thus being
able to offer a definition and the concept, develops on the basis of an analysis which
is not discursive, but, precisely, intuitive, which appears as a form of life and which,
lacking any logical procedure, cannot be formalised and, therefore, seemingly it
cannot be reproduced by computers25.
5) Artificial intelligence cannot replicate the activity of the conscience that
critically controls itself. Self-control means continually putting oneself in discussion
and, at the root of every critical conscience, it characterises the activity of authentic
philosophy.
Within the field of computer science, this form of awareness of its own limit, which
artificial intelligence is not able to accomplish, corresponds to the incomputable
(that is, non-decidable) problem for every computer: it is not possible to define an
algorithm of control of programs, capable of establishing whether, with regard to
certain inputs, a software stops and provides a coherent solution or instead does not
stop and provide an incoherent solution26.
The arithmetic root of such a question can be found in Gödel’s undecidability
theorem, according to which it is impossible to demonstrate the coherence of any
formal system within the system itself27.
The ability to radically and autonomously criticise any statement and, therefore,
also the very same constitutive logic of one’s own thinking seems to be precluded
to artificial intelligence, which, in any case, can be represented by a program that,
according to Gödel’s theorem, cannot be controlled by another program within the
same formal system.
Thus, the computational perspective, which constitutes the origin of the studies
and projects on artificial intelligence, shall consider also the thinking skills to re-
define itself, going beyond itself, that is to say, an infinite ability, therefore subtracted
to any possible calculation, which is one of the distinctive and irreducible forms of
human intelligence28.
The aporia of self-consciousness confirms that the activity of the human mind
goes beyond itself and that, unlike the operations of the expert system of artificial
intelligence, it cannot be formalised: the attempt to know objectively the act of thinking
25
E. Berti, Il pensiero come forma di vita: a proposito dell’«intelligenza artificiale», in AA.VV., La vita:
realtà e valore, cit., pp. 42-43.
26
D. Harel, Computers Ltd.: What They Really Can’t Do, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press,
2000.
27
K. Gödel, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I, in
“Monatshefte für Mathematick und Physik”, 38, 1931, pp. 173-198.
28
2004, pp. 200-201.
P. Moro 529
is reduced to what is thought already, since we cannot imagine a representation of

human subjectivity identified with the very same act of representing.
Such a condition of intelligence in act cannot be assimilated to that of a
mechanical or computational device and it seems to be a form that transcends itself
and combines therefore accomplishment and going beyond, reminding in its own
fullness and perfection to what, in its own defined boundaries, is always beyond
itself, as it happens in music when one perceives the sound and, at the same time,
catches the timber29.
6) We should add that human thought is a life form and such life form is original
and different than the one that can be recreated with artificial intelligence30.
As the examining impulse of self-consciousness demonstrates, human thought
distinguishes itself from artificial intelligence and recalls an original aspect of the
human being, that is the ability to reflect and criticise one’s own self.
While investigating the physical phenomenology of life, Hans Jonas cleverly
pointed out that in the living body’s metabolising system the method of production
and exchange of energy is also the result of metabolic activity, so the comparison of
the living body with the machine, which does not dispose of such a performance, is
not founded31.
7. The human agent in relation. Another bio-robotics?

As it often happens in science and technology, also in bio-robotics relation – the
essential dimension of human subjectivity – seems to be neglected.
Bio-robotics neglects that the human agent cannot be compared to the machine
because of his/her ability to enter in relation with others, in a multiplicity of past,
present and future forms. A bionic device that modifies the person’s identity affects the
interpersonal relation, which in contemporary mentality appears to be subordinated
to the needs of the individual also due to the assumption of neutrality of science
assumption of neutrality of science.
In the studies on artificial intelligence, aimed as they are at attempting to imitate
with technique human thought, it is often forgotten that the ontological structure of
human conscience is a relational one and it changes the ethical and legal perspective of
the individual. Someone observed correctly that «man is not a human subject closed
in himself, but a human subject who communicates and understands the other than
29
F. Chiereghin, L’eco della caverna. Ricerche di filosofia della logica e della mente, cit., pp. 349-350.
30
E. Berti, Il pensiero come forma di vita: a proposito dell’«intelligenza artificiale», in Aa.Vv., La vita:
realtà e valore, cit., p. 44; F. D’agostino, Bíos/Zoé/Psyché, in Parole di Bioetica, Torino, Giappichelli,
2004, p. 27 ff.
31
H. Jonas, Ist Gott ein Mathematiker? Vom Sinn des Stoffwechsels, in Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze
zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973.
himself» and that «the human subject does not think (at any level) without receiving
(…), thus without referring to others than himself»32.
Besides, also neurobiological investigation confirmed this relational structure of
conscience with the discovery of mirror neurons, which activates when the human
subject sees his own movement made by another person33, engendering an empathy,
which is at the same time rational and emotional, that justifies a relational and almost
intuitive comprehension of the other.
Such a dialogic structure of conscience does not concern an aspect of organic
and atomised relations of purely biological character, like that of Minsky’s society of
mind, but involves also the cognitive and moral aspect, as «man does not act without
any consequences on the others (and thus he does not avoid objective liabilities) and
without requesting anything from them»34.
Unlike artificial intelligence and by its own nature, human conscience combines
in reciprocity both cognitive thought and moral action, with the consequence that
the agent may be entitled to also legally relevant rights and duties.
Therefore, even admitting that the reticular connection of several calculators in
which expert systems “run” may be equalised to inter-subjective communication, one
asks if harmful actions may be subjectively attributed to the robot, the bionic device
or the cybernetic software, which should be objectively responsible for such actions,
inasmuch as they are harmful to inter-subjective foundations of human relations.
The effective balance between computational power and controllability of expert
systems shall be considered any time that the relational responsibility of the actions
taken by a machine and the relative effects on human relations are to be established.
First of all, the adaptation to environmental reactions, which characterises
robotics, makes it difficult to prevent the cybernetic machine’s behaviour and the
possible harms it caused, to the extent that it is necessary to study the several scenarios
of legal responsibility of the robot for the actions committed by others35.
Moreover, considering the possible introduction of juscybernetics in the solution
of judicial controversies, the difficulty of reducing the judge’s responsible decision to
an automatic software suggests to elaborate expert systems of artificial intelligence
that, while remaining “machines”, can develop reasoning models founded on
defeasible knowledge, which can be invalidated, to be considered certain until
prevailing opposite points of view that, like in a trial, manifest themselves in a logic
of objections confrontation36.
32
S. Cotta, Coscienza e obiezione di coscienza di fronte all’antropologia filosofica in Il diritto come sistema
di valori, Cinisello Balsamo, San Paolo, 2004, p. 159 (our transl.).
33
G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia, So quel che fai, Milano, Cortina, 2006.
34
S. Cotta, Coscienza e obiezione di coscienza di fronte all’antropologia filosofica in Il diritto come sistema
di valori, Torino, San Paolo, 2004, p. 159.
35
U. Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013.
36
G. Sartor, Intelligenza artificiale e diritto: un’introduzione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 116-117.
P. Moro 531
The principle of dialogue, which justifies the reciprocal coexistence of human

beings, might be the new ethical and legal frontier of another bio-robotics.
Biorobotica e diritti fondamentali. Problemi e limiti dell’intelligenza artificiale
Paolo Moro
Sommario: 1. Considerazioni preliminari. – 2. Bionica e diritti fondamentali. – 3. Origini filosofiche

della biorobotica. Dalla cibernetica all’intelligenza artificiale. – 3.1. Cibernetica. – 3.2. Processi intelli-
genti – 3.3. Opinioni contrastanti. – 4. La macchina per pensare. Il progetto computazionale. – 5. La
macchina per fare. Il modello comportamentista. – 6. Computer e soggettività. Sui limiti dell’intelli-
genza artificiale. – 7. Il soggetto in relazione. Un’altra biorobotica?
1. Considerazioni preliminari
Le applicazioni dell’intelligenza artificiale stanno generando nuovi problemi etici e giu-
ridici nell’epoca contemporanea, tra i quali assume particolare importanza l’identità della
persona umana e dei suoi diritti fondamentali nell’interazione con i più evoluti dispositivi
tecnologici della robotica e della bionica.
Robotica è l’insieme delle teorie che studiano la realizzazione di macchine intelligenti
altamente organizzate (robot), dotate di automazione e capaci di emulare ragionamenti e
comportamenti umani.
Bionica è la scienza che studia le funzioni sensorie e motorie degli organismi viventi, al
fine di individuare dispositivi tecnologici idonei a riprodurle o potenziarle.
Il robot è oggi un sistema complesso che imita attività umane integrando i risultati ottenuti
dall’intelligenza artificiale in vari ambiti del comportamento e del ragionamento, come la
comprensione del linguaggio naturale, l’apprendimento automatico, la rappresentazione
della conoscenza, la comunicazione interattiva.
Avvalendosi anche della robotica, la bionica sviluppa sistemi cibernetici che si autoorga-
nizzano e che sono dotati di capacità intelligenti, come riconoscere gli stimoli esterni (con-
troreazione) e adattarsi all’ambiente (omeostasi).
Però, la bionica si distingue dalla robotica per almeno tre profili che riguardano l’in-
terazione uomo-macchina1: manca un controllo cosciente del dispositivo bionico da parte
1
tecnica, a cura di L. Grion, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2012.
534 Biorobotica e diritti fondamentali
del programmatore; l’interazione è invasiva; il dispositivo bionico può recuperare ma anche

potenziare funzionalità dell’organismo.
Dunque, mentre il robot e l’uomo rimangono comunque entità fisicamente distinte,
nelle applicazioni della bionica uomo e macchina non sono separati, ma costituiscono un
sistema integrato nel quale l’interazione tra soggetto e protesi elettronica non è gestita in
modo cosciente.
La presente ricerca procede ad una trattazione unitaria del fenomeno, indicando con il
vocabolo “biorobotica” l’insieme delle teorie e delle applicazioni scientifiche dei sistemi di
intelligenza artificiale realizzati nel campo della bionica2.
2. Bionica e diritti fondamentali

L’uso di protesi bioniche può generare problemi etici e giuridici, in quanto si tratta di
intervento invasivo che modifica l’integrità fisica e psichica della persona e, pertanto, può
essere lesivo dei diritti fondamentali della medesima.
Infatti, in caso di controversia tra medico che esegue l’impianto e paziente che lo subisce,
l’eventuale innesto nel corpo umano di una protesi bionica potrebbe diventare un trattamen-
to lesivo della dignità umana (art. 1 della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Euro-
pea), dell’integrità fisica (art. 3), della libertà individuale (art. 6) e della riservatezza (art. 8).
Anzitutto, un intervento di recupero funzionale con innesto di protesi bionica costituisce
pur sempre una lesione dell’integrità fisica, come ogni intervento chirurgico, ma è di regola
giustificato dal consenso informato del paziente e dal dovere pubblico di tutela della salute da
parte della struttura sanitaria e del medico che ne fa parte. È quanto accade con dispositivi
tradizionali, come il pacemaker artificiale che usa impulsi elettrici, emessi da elettrodi in con-
tatto con i muscoli cardiaci, per regolare il battito cardiaco, ma anche con dispositivi sofisti-
cati, come la realizzazione di un “orecchio bionico” mediante l’utilizzo di elettrodi stimolanti
oppure l’impianto di elettrodi per la stimolazione cerebrale profonda.
Peraltro, il dispositivo artificiale bionico si configura come un nuovo tipo di protesi che
non solo può consentire di recuperare funzionalità perdute, ma anche di potenziare funzio-
nalità esistenti o di introdurre nuove funzionalità, pur dovendosi ammettere che non esiste
una linea di confine precisa tra recupero e potenziamento di capacità motorie o cognitive.
Dunque, un intervento di potenziamento bionico di un organo corporeo può generare il
dubbio se il trattamento sanitario possa considerarsi lesivo della dignità umana e della stessa
identità della persona.
Per esempio, nel noto esperimento scientifico di Kevin Warwick, è stato eseguito l’im-
pianto di un elettrodo nel braccio sinistro di un volontario sano con l’obiettivo di verificare
l’utilità, la compatibilità e l’operabilità a lungo termine di un vettore di microelettrodi posto
2
T. Consi, B. Webb, Biorobotics, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2001; P. Dario, M.C. Carrozza,
E. Guglielmelli, C. Laschi, A. Menciassi, S. Micera, F. Vecchi, Robotics as a Future and Emerging
Technology: Biomimetics, Cybernetics, and Neuro-Robotics in European Projects, in “IEEE Robotics and
Automation Magazine”, 12, 2, 2005, pp. 29-43; G. Tamburrini, E. Datteri, Machine Experiments
and Theoretical Modelling: from Cybernetic Methodology to Neuro-Robotics, in “Minds and Machines”,
15, 3-4, 2005, pp. 335-358.
P. Moro 535
all’interno del nervo mediano, inclusi la percezione di segnali di feedback e l’utilizzo di una
mano artificiale opportunamente accessoriata3.
Invero, la bionica rende sfumata la linea di demarcazione tra ciò che rientra nella catego-
ria della dignità umana e ciò che ne resta fuori. Ci si chiede in quest’ambito applicativo dell’e-
voluzione tecnologica se la stessa identità della persona nel tempo dipenda esclusivamente
dalla continuità fisiopsichica, dal possesso di un corpo integro e naturale, dalla dotazione
persistente di una sostanza pensante.
D’altro lato, l’intervento bionico non terapeutico può costituire messa in pericolo se non
violazione dei diritti fondamentali alla libertà personale e alla privacy.
Ne rappresenta un esempio paradigmatico l’impianto chirurgico di appositi dispositivi di
identificazione di frequenza radio (Radio Frequency Identification Device, abbreviato RFID),
che trasmettono via radio una sequenza di impulsi costituenti uno specifico codice, per la
localizzazione delle persone o per la memorizzazione di informazioni di interesse (ad esempio,
dati anagrafici, sanitari, finanziari).
Infine, un’ulteriore ed importante questione giuridica concerne la natura ed i limiti del
consenso all’intervento bionico che, come in ogni caso di trattamento sanitario, richiede il
consenso libero e informato del paziente che subisce l’impianto, in base al diritto di autode-
terminazione terapeutica e al divieto di trattamenti sanitari obbligatori.
In tal caso, la legge italiana stabilisce che il consenso dell’avente diritto in una controver-
sia penale (articolo 50 del codice penale) e la transazione preventiva in una controversia civile
(articolo 1966 del codice civile) non sono efficaci quando vertono su diritti indisponibili,
che sono considerati non negoziabili, sicché ci si domanda se sia nella disponibilità dell’inte-
ressato cambiare o progettare la propria identità facendo ricorso non soltanto al recupero di
funzionalità biologiche ridotte ma al potenziamento di tali funzionalità con l’impianto di un
dispositivo bionico.
In questo caso, si pone il problema della definizione di ciò che è indisponibile, non essen-
dovi classificazione di diritti indisponibili e non essendovi determinazione di ciò che è lesivo
o meno della dignità umana, categoria vaga se non indeterminata: tra i vari criteri discretivi vi
è l’articolo 5 del codice civile italiano, secondo il quale gli atti di disposizione del proprio cor-
po sono vietati quando cagionino una diminuzione permanente dell’integrità fisica, oppure
quando siano altrimenti contrari alla legge, all’ordine pubblico o al buon costume.
La regola non può essere considerata un criterio generale di riferimento per discriminare
la disponibilità o meno di differenti situazioni soggettive, trattandosi di una disposizione
comparsa espressamente nel codice in seguito al presentarsi illo tempore di una nota e dibattu-
ta questione giudiziaria, accaduta in Italia negli anni Trenta del secolo scorso e riguardante la
responsabilità giuridica del chirurgo per il trapianto di una ghiandola sessuale con il consenso
del paziente che aveva subito l’intervento.
Inoltre, la norma dell’articolo 5 si riferisce soltanto alla diminuzione e non al potenzia-
mento permanente dell’integrità fisica e dell’identità umana cui conducono alcune applica-
zioni della biorobotica che, alla luce degli attuali sviluppi dell’ingegneria medica, potrebbero
3
K. Warwick, M. Gasson, B. Hutt, I. Goodhew, P. Kyberd, B. Andrews, P. Teddy, A. Shad,
The Application of Implant Technology for Cybernetic Systems, in “Archives of Neurology”, 60, 2003, 10,
pp. 1369-1373.
anche essere considerate offensive e generatrici di responsabilità penale: in ogni caso, il con-
senso del paziente alla violazione dell’integrità del proprio corpo (volenti non fit iniuria) resta
inefficace quando riguarda diritti indisponibili.
3. Origini filosofiche della biorobotica. Dalla cibernetica all’intelligenza artificiale

La tutela della persona e dei suoi diritti, che sono violati o messi in pericolo dall’intera-
zione tra uomo e macchina, può essere adeguatamente giustificata soltanto riflettendo sull’o-
rigine filosofica e, in particolare, sulla concezione antropologica che costituisce il fondamento
teorico della biorobotica.
È una visione che si sviluppa con la rivoluzione scientifica moderna e che esplode nell’era
tecnologica del ventesimo secolo, presupponendo che l’uomo sia una macchina computante
altamente complessa. Questo paragone tra uomo e macchina si è realizzato con l’informatica,
che ha attuato il progetto computazionale designando la macchina calcolante con termini
antropomorfici come cervello elettronico, memoria ed altri.
Le radici della biorobotica, che si è sviluppata dalle applicazioni bioniche della robotica,
risalgono propriamente agli studi sulla cibernetica e sull’intelligenza artificiale della seconda
metà del Novecento. Infatti, la base teorica del funzionamento dei sistemi robotici, che non
sono invasivi, e dei dispositivi bionici, che sono invasivi, è lo studio matematico dei sistemi
neuronici, che ha condotto alle ricerche sull’intelligenza artificiale e all’elaborazione di una
teoria generale degli automi, costituente uno dei problemi fondamentali della cibernetica.
3.1. Cibernetica
La cibernetica può essere definita come la capacità di un sistema automatico di ordinare
informazioni e adattarsi all’ambiente (omeostasi) attraverso il controllo e la correzione delle
proprie operazioni (retroazione o feed-back). Il termine riprende la parola greca che indica
l’arte del timoniere (kybernetés) che ha il controllo di una nave ed è capace di governarla.
Il padre della cibernetica Norbert Wiener, nel suo fondamentale libro del 19484, dichiara
di voler collegare la ricerca sugli esseri viventi a quella sulle macchine per garantire un ade-
guato controllo su entrambi e sostiene l’impossibilità teorica di distinguere il sistema nervoso
umano da un sistema di comunicazione meccanico come quello telefonico5.
Wiener stabilisce dei legami tra alcune caratteristiche distintive dei sistemi di computo,
quali, ad esempio, l’autonomia del processo di calcolo, che non deve richiedere alcun inter-
vento umano, nonché l’efficienza e la flessibilità dei dispositivi per la memorizzazione dei dati
e lo studio del sistema nervoso. Nei capitoli aggiunti nell’edizione del 1961, introduce alcu-
ni temi destinati a diventare argomenti centrali della ricerca in intelligenza artificiale, quali
l’apprendimento automatico e lo sviluppo di sistemi artificiali in grado di auto-organizzarsi
e auto-riprodursi.
Wiener suppone che anche negli organismi viventi l’attività volontaria e riflessa sia basata
4
N. Wiener, Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and the machine, New York, Paris,
Hermann, J. Wiley, 1948.
5
Ibid.
P. Moro 537
su meccanismi fisiologici di controreazione e adattamento all’ambiente, al fine di raggiungere

condizioni di stabilità e di equilibrio, gettando le basi per gli studi successivi ed attuali sulla
robotica.
3.2. Processi intelligenti

Negli anni Cinquanta John McCarthy elabora un modello computerizzato della mente
umana sviluppando le idee impostate dalla cibernetica di Wiener e conia per la prima volta il
termine “intelligenza artificiale”, giungendo ad elaborare le linee guida comuni di tale ricerca
in un fondamentale lavoro pubblicato con Pat Hayes nel 1969, ove si indica l’essenza del
sistema di intelligenza artificiale nella sua capacità automatica di eseguire “common sense
reasoning”6.
Come afferma Hayes nel suo naive physics manifesto 7, ciò che si vuole rappresentare è
il modo in cui le persone vedono il mondo, non il mondo come viene visto dalla fisica, con
la conseguente necessità di elaborare modelli che riguardano non solo oggetti od eventi, ma
anche percezioni e azioni inerenti alle modalità di comprensione del mondo da parte delle
persone.
Lo sviluppo cibernetico degli elaboratori elettronici ha suggerito agli scienziati di compa-
rare la natura dei processi mentali di elaborazione e apprendimento delle informazioni, anche
se in base ad un programma ridotto alla teorizzazione matematica ed artificiale dei processi
naturali e sociali dell’attività fisiopsichica.
Invero, i problemi introdotti dalla cibernetica e dall’intelligenza artificiale, che costitu-
iscono le basi teoriche e applicative della biorobotica contemporanea, impongono lo studio
delle più disparate discipline, non solo riguardanti le hard sciences (come l’elettronica, la ge-
netica o la chimica), ma anche le humanities (come il diritto o la letteratura), tenendo conto
che l’informatica è scienza palesemente interdisciplinare.
La comparazione cibernetica delle corrispondenze fra strutture neuronali umane ed ar-
tificiali non ha portato al punto di sostituire con circuiti elettronici le complicate strutture
del cervello umano, ma la biorobotica malcela progressi tecnologici sempre più rapidi nella
costruzioni di dispositivi di recupero e di potenziamento dei processi intelligenti.
Tra i vari problemi filosofici che questo scenario solo apparentemente fantascientifico
pone all’intelligenza artificiale sembra prevalere un duplice ed ambivalente quesito. L’uomo
pensa e vuole come la macchina? La macchina pensa e vuole come l’uomo?
3.3. Opinioni contrastanti

Si discute se e in quale misura caratteristiche distintive della soggettività umana, come la
coscienza e la volontà, possano essere trasferite ad un robot o a un dispositivo bionico.
Invero, tra le varie opinioni che si possono sostenere, si distinguono due tesi opposte: da
un lato, si può ritenere che l’essere umano presenti comportamenti e ragionamenti perfetta-
6
J. McCarthy, P.J. Hayes, Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence, in
“Machine Intelligence”, IV, 1969, pp. 463-502.
7
P.J. Hayes, The naive physics manifesto, in Expert Systems in the Micro-Electronic Age, a cura di D.
Michie, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1978.
mente imitabili da un robot mentre, dall’altro lato, si può affermare che l’essenza dell’uomo
non è mai riproducibile dalla macchina cibernetica.
Se si traducono queste tesi, peraltro largamente diffuse tra gli studiosi, in posizioni filo-
sofiche, risultano evidenti l’opinione dogmatica, secondo la quale è possibile che la macchina
possa imitare pensieri e comportamenti umani (intelligenza artificiale forte) e l’opinione scet-
tica, secondo la quale la macchina non è intelligente perché priva di una mente propriamente
umana (stupidità artificiale).
Entrambe le opinioni sono ingenue, perché riducono l’uomo e la macchina ad un’unica
dimensione. Nella prima concezione si presume che la mente sia soltanto un algoritmo, che
si può implementare in un sistema esperto di intelligenza artificiale e che è elaborato dalla
ragione che calcola e dalla volontà che reagisce agli stimoli esterni; nella seconda concezione
si suppone che la macchina cibernetica non possa svolgere ragionamenti, né imitare compor-
tamenti né provare emozioni tipiche soltanto della natura umana.
4. La macchina per pensare. Il progetto computazionale

Il razionalismo moderno, in base al quale si presume che l’uomo sia capace di conoscere
ciò che è bene e ciò che è male attraverso l’uso della propria ragione, ha contribuito a fon-
dare i programmi di intelligenza artificiale sul metodo scientifico8 e ha portato a ricondurre
a schemi comuni di origine algoritmica le macchine e i sistemi biologici capaci di esibire un
comportamento finalizzato, confermando il presupposto matematico della cibernetica9.
Difatti, la cibernetica ha radici storiche lontane, risalenti alla tarda età di mezzo ed all’au-
rora della filosofia moderna, ove appaiono svariati i tentativi di meccanizzazione del pensiero
utilizzando i canoni della logica formale e della matematica.
La macchina per pensare immaginata da Raimondo Lullo nella sua Ars generalis ultima
(1308), detta anche Ars magna, e nella sua sintesi compendiosa, l’Ars brevis (composta tra il
1308 e il 1311), costituisce l’esito dell’elaborazione di un sistema di logica strutturato in un
elenco di concetti elementari, espressi per simboli e per numeri, la cui combinazione secondo
date regole di calcolo deve rendere possibile la costituzione di un sapere completo e univer-
sale10.
Questa concezione ha suscitato sviluppi in diversi ed importanti momenti del nascen-
te matematismo moderno, del quale costituisce così un interessante anticipazione: l’utilità
dell’ars combinatoria di Lullo per le disputazioni e per il modo di condurre i discorsi è com-
mentata e approfondita esplicitamente da Giordano Bruno (De compendiosa architectura et
complemento Artis Lullii, 1582); i vantaggi organizzativi di questo sistema, che connette arit-
metica e meccanica, sono applicati alla costruzione di una primitiva macchina computante
da parte di Pascal a metà del Seicento; infine, nei decenni successivi, lo scopo operativo della
8
D.A. Gillies, Artificial intelligence and scientific method, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, trad.
it. Intelligenza artificiale e metodo scientifico, Milano, Cortina, 1998.
9
G. Tamburrini, I matematici e le macchine intelligenti, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2002.
10
P. Moro, Lullo giurista informatico. Dall’ars combinatoria all’informatica giuridica, in Aa.Vv., La
retorica fra scienza e professione legale. Questioni di metodo, Acta Methodologica, 1, a cura di G. Ferrari,
M. Manzin, Milano, Giuffrè, 2004, pp. 289-308.
P. Moro 539
logica simbolica impostata da Lullo è sviluppato da Leibniz, che si propone di fondare l’idea
di una mathesis universalis proprio sul calcolo combinatorio11.
L’origine razionalista della giustizia cibernetica si mostra così emblematicamente nella
nota affermazione calcolemus dello stesso Leibniz, secondo il quale “quando sorgeranno delle
controversie, non vi sarà maggior bisogno di discussione tra due filosofi di quanto ce ne sia
tra due calcolatori”12.
Comunque, nella letteratura scientifica del Novecento si presuppone costantemente
un’analogia tra uomo e macchina e, più in particolare, tra intelligenza artificiale e coscienza.
È noto che già nel 1936 il matematico inglese Alan Matison Turing progettò una mac-
china capace di esibire operazioni proprie della mente umana13. Analizzando il processo men-
tale di calcolo, Turing stabilì un’analogia tra uomo e computer riferendosi agli “stati mentali”
per definire le configurazioni interne della macchina e alla costruzione di un “cervello” per
delineare l’esecuzione del suo progetto.
Nel 1950, Alan Matison Turing definì il famoso Imitation Game, un test per stabilire
se il computer possa elaborare il pensiero umano: ossia quando, interrogando un calcolatore
senza vederlo, una persona non sappia distinguere se si tratti di un’altra persona oppure di
un computer14.
Più specificamente, il test si svolge in tre stanze separate. Nella prima stanza si trova l’esa-
minatore umano; nelle altre due stanze vi sono un’altra persona e il computer che si sottopone
al test. L’esaminatore conosce soltanto i nomi della persona e del calcolatore, senza sapere
chi siano effettivamente, e si relaziona con essi soltanto attraverso un computer, assumendo il
compito di scoprirne l’identità entro un limite di tempo prefissato. La macchina supera il test
se l’esaminatore non riesce a identificarla nel tempo prefissato.
Con l’elaborazione di questo test, Turing presuppone una nozione riduttiva dell’intelli-
genza e della volontà, limitate al calcolo deduttivo e al comportamento esteriore: un soggetto
può essere definito intelligente o meno esclusivamente se ragiona e si comporta in un certo
modo, attraverso la comunicazione linguistica e la volontà di reagire agli impulsi esterni.
5. La macchina per fare. Il modello comportamentista

Il test di Turing mostra che il progetto scientifico moderno non è soltanto razionalista,
ma anche volontarista.
Gli scienziati che si sono occupati di intelligenza artificiale hanno costruito schemi co-
muni di origine algoritmica, che corrispondono ai protocolli logici utilizzati in informatica
nell’architettura di ogni software, per realizzare macchine e sistemi biologici esperti capaci di
esibire un comportamento finalizzato.
Questi schemi concettuali sono basati sul pregiudizio secondo il quale la volontà umana
11
W. Schmidt-Biggemann, Topica universalis. Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker
Wissenschaft, Hamburg, Meiner, 1983, p. 156 ss.
12
G.W. Leibniz, Sulla scienza universale o calcolo filosofico, in Scritti di logica, I, Roma-Bari, Laterza,
1992, p. 172.
13
A.M. Turing, On computable numbers with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, in Proceedings
of the London Mathematical Society, 42, 1936, pp. 230-265.
14
A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, in “Mind”, 59, 1950, pp. 433-460.
si esterna in una condotta reattiva ed è definita come la capacità di inibizione cosciente di un

impulso biologico: in tale prospettiva, si ritiene che la volontà umana di reagire agli stimoli
esterni sia propria anche della macchina, il cui comportamento sarebbe fondato su una se-
quenza di scelte automatiche di adattamento all’ambiente.
L’interpretazione dell’intelligenza della macchina sulla base degli effetti della condotta
reattiva agli impulsi esterni deriva dalla teoria del comportamentismo (o psicologia compor-
tamentale), sviluppata dallo psicologo John Watson agli inizi del Novecento sull’assunto che
il comportamento esplicito è l’unica unità di analisi scientificamente studiabile, in quanto
direttamente osservabile, mentre l’introspezione non può fornire alcun dato affidabile15.
Questo approccio comportamentista, che riduce la volontà a un fenomeno oggettivo
nello studio psicologico dell’atto morale, ha influito sulla celebre teoria della society of mind
di Marvin Minsky, pioniere newyorkese degli studi sull’intelligenza artificiale e co-fondatore
del Laboratorio di IA del Massachusetts Institute of Technology, oltre che vincitore del Turing
Award nel 1969.
Nella sua riflessione postumanista e materialista, Minsky riduce l’individuo ad un mec-
canismo biologico particolarmente complicato e sostiene che il singolo possa affrancarsi dalle
necessità della specie e raggiungere in futuro l’immortalità terrena grazie ai progressi dell’in-
telligenza artificiale e della bionica16.
Secondo Minsky, il cervello è una macchina altamente complessa paragonabile ad una
società organizzata da una rete di interconnessioni gerarchiche e competitive tra una molte-
plicità di componenti fortemente diversi fra loro, denominati agenti della mente17.
Da questa teoria sono state elaborate molteplici ricerche sugli agenti artificiali intelligen-
ti, che sono sistemi cibernetici evoluti che presentano almeno tre caratteri che si reputano
simili a quelli del soggetto umano: essi sono reattivi, perché sono in grado di reagire agli
stimoli dell’ambiente; proattivi, perché sono in grado di decidere cosa fare e di intraprendere
le azioni necessarie a realizzare quanto deciso; interattivi, perché sono in grado di comunicare
tra loro o con esseri umani costituendo un sistema multiagente o agenzia.
6. Computer e soggettività. Sui limiti dell’intelligenza artificiale

Le questioni etiche e giuridiche proposte dallo sviluppo dei sistemi esperti di intelli-
genza artificiale, soprattutto nel campo della biorobotica, possono essere affrontate soltanto
riflettendo criticamente sulla possibilità di ammettere una reale comparazione tra macchina
calcolante e soggetto umano.
Le ragioni di dubbio intorno al paragone tra intelligenza artificiale e coscienza umana
sono molteplici.
1) L’innalzamento della macchina intelligente alle facoltà umane si traduce in una ridu-
zione delle capacità logiche del soggetto che, secondo questa convinzione, ragiona soltanto
15
J.B. Watson, Psychology as a behaviorist view, in “Psychological review”, 20, 2, pp. 158-177.
16
tecnica, cit.
17
M. L. Minsky, The Society of Mind, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986.
P. Moro 541
quando calcola.
La visione inaugurata da Turing, che presuppone la possibilità che la macchina riesca
ad imitare il ragionamento umano, resta tuttora ancorata al matematismo europeo dell’età
moderna perché nasce dal convincimento che l’attività logica sia limitata ad operazioni de-
duttive e che, contrariamente a quanto accade in diverse situazioni umane, il comportamento
soggettivo sia formalizzabile mediante regole18.
2) Una seconda presunzione che accompagna l’idea secondo la quale la ragione artificiale
imita l’intelligenza umana è quella relativa alla pretesa neutralità della scienza. Se si rammenta
il principio d’indeterminazione di Werner Heisenberg, ogni macchina intelligente è sempre
il prodotto condizionato di una programmazione soggettiva ed è frutto di stipulazioni ipo-
tetiche.
Come dimostrano gli studi di neurofisiologia, la conoscenza visiva degli oggetti è spesso
condizionata da illusioni, che esistono perché il sistema visivo non si preoccupa di fornire alla
coscienza dati sempre fisicamente corretti della realtà, ma di dare rappresentazioni rilevanti di
ciò che consente l’interazione del soggetto con la realtà medesima.
Inoltre, resta difficilmente investigabile la relazione tra l’attività elettro-chimica del cer-
vello, indagabile in terza persona come fenomeno utilizzando la presunta oggettività del me-
todo scientifico, e la percezione cosciente, conoscibile direttamente solo dall’interessato in
prima persona. La libertà della volontà è considerata l’unico livello della natura che può
frapporre una ponderazione cosciente il cui esito non è determinato dagli antecedenti fisico-
chimici del cervello19.
3) La cibernetica continua ad essere in contrasto con la natura mai completamente pre-
vedibile e programmabile dell’attività sviluppata dall’intelligenza e dalla volontà dell’uomo.
L’automazione, che caratterizza almeno parzialmente ogni sistema di intelligenza arti-
ficiale e che rappresenta un elemento costitutivo dell’informatica (termine che deriva dalla
crasi di “informazione automatica”), non è la riproduzione del comportamento umano né
tantomeno delle attività mentali.
La possibilità di prefigurare la ripetizione costante e seriale di atti autenticamente umani
confligge con la natura della soggettività, imprevedibile ed irriducibile soltanto ad un mecca-
nismo biologico involontario ed automatico.
La matematizzazione universale della mente, conforme al progetto computazionale di
Turing, esclude ogni forma di creatività, che pur si considera il carattere qualificante dell’in-
telligenza, e richiede che la mente esegua operazioni del tutto automatiche esattamente come
una macchina: pertanto, dalla simulazione artificiale del comportamento intelligente nella
sua interezza dovrebbe scaturire anche l’invenzione creativa che, appunto, è l’elemento sa-
liente dell’attività mentale20.
Con l’esperimento della stanza cinese, John Searle ha confutato il test di Turing, di-
18
H.L. Dreyfus, What computers still can’t do. A critique of artificial reason, New York, Harper & Row,
1972.
19
F. Tempia, Attività cerebrale e rappresentazioni mentali, in Scienze Informatiche e Biologiche,
Epistemologia e ontologia, a cura di G. Cicchese, A. Pettorossi, S. Crespi Reghizzi, V. Senni, Roma,
Città Nuova, 2011.
20
2004, pp. 199-200.
mostrando che la capacità della macchina di manipolare le informazioni ricevute secondo

regole formali prestabilite in una lingua sconosciuta (per esempio, un testo in lingua cinese)
non è sufficiente a spiegare il processo di comprensione (per esempio, le conoscenze di senso
comune), dato il carattere non intenzionale dei simboli elaborati dal sistema artificiale, con
la conseguenza che i processi mentali non possano essere ridotti a processi di natura compu-
tazionale che operano su elementi formalmente definiti21.
4) Allo stato attuale della cibernetica e dell’evoluzione dell’intelligenza artificiale, il com-
puter non è in grado di riprodurre né di formalizzare quel procedimento mentale che può
essere definito come intuizione intellettuale22.
L’intuizione è la capacità di cogliere l’essenza di una cosa indipendentemente da un
procedimento logico di tipo dimostrativo. Aristotele ricorda che questa abilità si manife-
sta nell’intelligenza umana (anthrópinos noús) quando essa sta “in qualche momento” e “nel
modo migliore in qualcosa di intero, che è qualcosa d’altro rispetto alle realtà particolari”23.
Negli studi di intelligenza artificiale applicata al riconoscimento delle immagini, si deve
ammettere che la visione di un oggetto dipende dal suo accertamento unitario: solo dopo va-
rie fasi di elaborazione dei segnali provenienti dall’immagine, il computer può identificare un
oggetto e rispondere a quale categoria appartiene, ma non può imitare quell’attività mentale
che riesce a dare una percezione cosciente unitaria di un oggetto che è riconosciuto da vari
frammenti di analisi visiva, come la forma, il colore o il movimento.
Questa attitudine a percepire il senso globale dell’oggetto indagato, riuscendo così a dar-
ne la definizione ed il concetto, si svolge sulla base di un’attività non discorsiva ma, appunto,
intuitiva, che appare una forma di vita e che, essendo priva di procedimento logico, non è
formalizzabile e, dunque, non sembra riproducibile dal computer24.
5) L’intelligenza artificiale non può riprodurre l’attività della coscienza che controlla cri-
ticamente se stessa. L’autocontrollo è la continua messa in discussione di se stessi che, alla
radice di ogni coscienza critica, caratterizza l’attività dell’autentica filosofia.
In ambito informatico, questa forma di consapevolezza del proprio limite, che l’intel-
ligenza artificiale non è in grado di compiere, corrisponde al problema incomputabile (cioè
indecidibile) per ogni computer: non è possibile definire un algoritmo di controllo dei pro-
grammi, capace di stabilire se, in relazione a determinati input, un software si ferma e fornisce
una soluzione coerente oppure non si ferma e fornisce una soluzione incoerente25.
La radice aritmetica di tale questione si trova nel teorema di indecidibilità di Gödel, per
il quale è impossibile dimostrare la coerenza di un qualunque sistema formale all’interno del
sistema stesso26.
La capacità di criticare radicalmente e di propria iniziativa qualunque affermazione e,
21
J.R. Searle, Minds, brains and programs, in “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 3, 1980, pp. 417-457.
22
realtà e valore, cit., p. 42 ss.
23
Aristotele, Metafisica, XII, 9, 1075 a 7-10.
24
realtà e valore, cit., pp. 42-43.
25
D. Harel, Computers Ltd.: What They Really Can’t Do, Oxford and New York, Oxford University
Press, 2000.
26
“Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I”: K.
Gödel, in “Monatshefte für Mathematick und Physik”, 38, 1931, pp. 173-198.
P. Moro 543
quindi, anche la stessa logica costitutiva del proprio stesso pensare appare preclusa all’in-
telligenza artificiale la quale, in ogni caso, è rappresentabile da un programma che, per il
teorema di Gödel, non può neppure essere controllato da un altro programma all’interno del
medesimo sistema formale.
Sicché la prospettiva computazionale, che costituisce l’origine degli studi e dei progetti
di intelligenza artificiale, deve tener conto anche della capacità del pensiero di ridefinire se
stesso, oltrepassandosi, ossia di una capacità infinita e, dunque, sottratta ad ogni calcolabilità,
la quale costituisce una delle forme distintive ed irriducibili dell’intelligenza umana27.
L’aporia dell’autocoscienza conferma che l’attività della mente umana oltrepassa se stessa
e che, a differenza delle operazioni del sistema esperto di intelligenza artificiale, non è for-
malizzabile: il tentativo di conoscere oggettivamente l’atto del pensare si riduce a ciò che è
già pensato, poiché non si può immaginare una rappresentazione della soggettività che si
identifica con l’atto stesso del rappresentare.
Questa condizione dell’intelligenza in atto non è assimilabile a quella di un congegno
meccanico o computazionale ed appare una forma che trascende se stessa e che, dunque, uni-
sce compimento e oltrepassamento, mostrando nella propria pienezza e perfezione il rinvio
a ciò che, nei propri confini definiti, è sempre al di là di se stessa, come avviene nella musica
quando si percepisce il suono e, nello stesso tempo, si coglie il timbro28.
6) Si deve aggiungere che il pensiero umano è una forma di vita e che tale forma di vita è
originaria e diversa da quella comunque ricostruibile con l’intelligenza artificiale29.
Come dimostra l’impulso esaminativo dell’autocoscienza, il pensiero umano si distingue
dall’intelligenza artificiale e richiama un aspetto originario del soggetto, che è la capacità di
riflettere e di criticare se stesso.
Indagando la fenomenologia fisica della vita, Hans Jonas ha acutamente rilevato che nel
sistema metabolizzante del corpo vivente il metodo di produzione e di scambio di energia è
anche il risultato dell’attività metabolica, sicché il paragone del corpo vivente con la macchi-
na, che non dispone di questa prestazione, non è fondato30.
7. Il soggetto in relazione. Un’altra biorobotica?

Come spesso accade nella scienza e nella tecnologia, anche nella biorobotica sembra
trascurata la dimensione essenziale della soggettività: la relazione.
Robotica e bionica trascurano che il soggetto non è paragonabile alla macchina per la sua
capacità di entrare in relazione con altri, in una pluralità di forme passate, presenti e future.
Un dispositivo bionico che modifica l’identità della persona incide sulla relazione interper-
sonale, che nella mentalità contemporanea appare subordinata alle esigenze dell’individuo
anche a causa della pretesa di neutralità della scienza.
27
28
29
realtà e valore, cit., p. 44; F. D’agostino, Bíos/Zoé/Psyché, in Parole di Bioetica, Torino, Giappichelli,
2004, p. 27 ss.
30
H. Jonas, Ist Gott ein Mathematiker? Vom Sinn des Stoffwechsels, in Organismus und Freiheit. Ansätze
zu einer philosophischen Biologie, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973.
Negli studi sull’intelligenza artificiale, protesi a cercare di imitare con la tecnica il pen-
siero umano, si dimentica che la struttura ontologica della coscienza umana è relazionale e
muta la prospettiva etica e giuridica del singolo. È stato giustamente osservato che “l’uomo
non è un soggetto chiuso in sé, bensì un soggetto comunicante e comprendente l’altro da sé”
e che “il soggetto non pensa (a tutti i livelli) senza ricevere (…), quindi senza riferirsi ad altri
da sé”31.
Peraltro, anche l’indagine neurobiologica ha confermato questa struttura relazionale della
coscienza con la scoperta dei mirror neurons, che si attivano quando il soggetto vede compiere
il proprio atto motorio da un’altra persona32, generando un’empatia, razionale ed emotiva allo
stesso tempo, che giustifica una comprensione relazionale e quasi intuitiva dell’altro.
Questa struttura dialogica della coscienza non concerne un aspetto di relazioni organiche
e atomizzate di carattere puramente biologico, come quello della society of mind di Minsky,
ma coinvolge anche l’aspetto conoscitivo e morale, perché “l’uomo non agisce senza ricadute
su altri (e quindi non evita responsabilità oggettive) e senza richieste nei loro confronti”33.
Diversamente dall’intelligenza artificiale e per la sua stessa natura, la coscienza umana
coniuga nella reciprocità il pensiero conoscitivo e l’azione morale, con la conseguenza che il
soggetto può essere titolare di diritti e doveri anche giuridicamente rilevanti.
Pertanto, anche ammettendo che la connessione reticolare di diversi calcolatori nei quali
“girano” sistemi esperti possa essere equiparabile alla comunicazione intersoggettiva, ci si
domanda se il robot, il dispositivo bionico o il software cibernetico possano comunque essere
soggettivamente imputabili di azioni dannose delle quali devono oggettivamente rispondere,
in quanto lesive di fondamenti intersoggettivi dei rapporti umani.
L’effettivo bilanciamento tra potere computazionale e controllabilità dei sistemi esperti
deve essere considerato ogni volta che si deve stabilire la responsabilità relazionale delle azioni
intraprese da una macchina e dei relativi effetti sui rapporti umani.
Anzitutto, l’adattamento alle reazioni ambientali, che caratterizza la robotica, rende dif-
ficilmente prevedibile il comportamento di una macchina cibernetica e i possibili danni da
essa provocati, tanto da rendere necessario studiare i vari scenari della responsabilità giuridica
del robot per fatto altrui34.
Inoltre, esaminando la possibilità di introdurre la giuscibernetica nella soluzione delle
controversie giudiziarie, la difficoltà di ridurre la decisione responsabile del giudice ad un
software automatico suggerisce di elaborare sistemi esperti di intelligenza artificiale che, pur
restando “macchine”, sviluppano modelli di ragionamento fondati su conoscenze defeasible,
cioè invalidabili, da considerare certe fino al prevalere di punti di vista contrari che, come nel
processo, si manifestano in una logica del confronto di obiezioni35.
Il principio del dialogo, che giustifica la coesistenza reciproca degli esseri umani, potreb-
be essere la nuova frontiera etica e giuridica di un’altra biorobotica.
31
S. Cotta, Coscienza e obiezione di coscienza di fronte all’antropologia filosofica, in Il diritto come sistema
di valori, Cinisello Balsamo, San Paolo, 2004, p. 159.
32
G. Rizzolatti, C. Sinigaglia, So quel che fai, Milano, Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2006.
33
S. Cotta, Coscienza e obiezione di coscienza di fronte all’antropologia filosofica, in Il diritto come sistema
di valori, cit., p. 159.
34
U. Pagallo, The Laws of Robots: Crimes, Contracts, and Torts, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013.
35
G. Sartor, Intelligenza artificiale e diritto: un’introduzione, Milano, Giuffrè, 1996, pp. 116-117.
If the agent is not necessarily a human being.

Some legal thoughts
Amedeo Santosuosso
Table of contents: 1. Agents, human beings and persons. – 1.1. The agent for the law. –
1.1.1. About the historical background. – 1.1.2. Endowed with reason and conscience. – 1.2.
The case of corporations. – 1.3. A first conclusion. – 2. May a robot be responsible for injuries
to a human? – 3. Some thoughts about things and persons for the law. – 3.1. Things and
persons in the Internet of Things. – 3.2. The physical (legal) person: what constitutes its unity?
– 3.3. Artificiality and the human biological compass – 3.4. If the agent is not governed by
the will of a human – 4. A beginning as conclusion.
1. Agents, human beings and persons

This paper deals with the legal definition of agent and its boundaries, if coincident
with those of a human being or not. The question, although not completely new, has
a renewed interest because of the increased presence of robots and automatic systems
in our societies.
In its general use the word agent has a sufficiently well defined, even though wide,
set of meanings that all refer to the very comprehensive idea of «an active cause; an
efficient cause»1. Basically there are four main (groups of ) meanings: a) «A force or
substance that causes a change: a chemical agent; an infectious agent» or «a natural
force or object producing or used for obtaining specific results: Many insects are agents
of fertilization»2; b) «One [presumably a human being: my note] that acts or has the
1
Random House Kernerman Webster’s College Dictionary, 2010 K Dictionaries Ltd. Copyright 2005,
1997, 1991 by Random House, Inc.
2
Hereinafter we refer to the definitions from two main US Dictionaries, available at http://www.
thefreedictionary.com (23 October 2014). The first one is from The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, Fourth Edition 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published
by Houghton Mifflin Company: «a) Agent: 1. One that acts or has the power or authority to act. 2.
546 If the agent is not necessarily a human being
power or authority to act» or «a person or thing that acts or has the power to act»; c)
«One empowered to act for or represent another: an author’s agent; an insurance agent»;
d) in linguistics, «the noun or noun phrase that specifies the person through whom
or the means by which an action is effected» or «a noun or noun phrase, denoting
an animate being that performs or causes the action expressed by the verb». To these
meanings a further very specific one has to be added: «A representative or official of
a government or administrative department of a government: an FBI agent», that is
the meaning of policeman and similar that can be found in all languages that use the
word agent and derives from the Latin ăg re.
Considered at a first level the above reported uses and definitions, one crucial
point can be pointed out: agent includes almost everything that is able to cause a
change, i.e. a force, a substance, a natural force, a natural object, a person/human
being, a person or thing that acts. Such a wide meaning is consistent with the use
that is stable also in the Italian language since its historical roots. In the first Italian
Dictionary (Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca, 1612)3 we can find two
extremely distant reference points, God and natural agents, with in the middle the
meaning of person empowered to represent another. The definition is as follows:
AGENTE: operante, faccente. Lat. agens. Comentatore di Dante nel 7 del Purgatorio.
«Dio agente di somma virtù, e infinita, la quale non richiede la materia innanzi disposta,
sì come gli agenti naturali, in produrre, ec. Diciamo anche, agente d’ alcuno, a colui, che
tratta negozj di quel tale. Lat. institor»4.
Nowadays the same width of use can be found in game theory and Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory. From the vast literature on these issues we can refer to
the concept of Autonomous Agent as «a collectively autocatalytic system performing
One empowered to act for or represent another: an author’s agent; an insurance agent. 3. A means
by which something is done or caused; instrument. 4. A force or substance that causes a change: a
chemical agent; an infectious agent. 5. A representative or official of a government or administrative
department of a government: an FBI agent. Linguistics. The noun or noun phrase that specifies the
person through whom or the means by which an action is effected». The second one is from The
Random House Kernerman Webster’s College Dictionary, 2010 K Dictionaries Ltd. Copyright 2005,
1997, 1991 by Random House, Inc.: «Agent 1. a person or business authorized to act on another’s
behalf. 2. a person or thing that acts or has the power to act. 3. a natural force or object producing or
used for obtaining specific results: Many insects are agents of fertilization. 4. an active cause; an efficient
cause. A linguistic form or construction, usu. a noun or noun phrase, denoting an animate being that
performs or causes the action expressed by the verb, as the police in The car was found by the police».
3
The Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca was the first Italian language vocabulary. First published
in 1612, it was realized and published by the the Accademia della Crusca, a cultural institution
founded in Florence in 1583. It was also the first great vocabulary of a modern language: http://
www.accademiadellacrusca.it/it/attivita/ristampa-anastatica-vocabolario-accademici-crusca-1612 (23
October 2014).
4
«Agent: who is acting, who is making/doing. From Latin Agens. A commentary of Dante’s Purgatory:
God agent of highest and infinite virtue, who does not require the matter to be previously existing,
differently from natural agents, […] It is also called agent one who acts for another. Latin Institor»
[translation from ancient Italian mine].
A. Santosuosso 547
one or more thermodynamic work cycles that: (1) measures useful displacements
from equilibrium from which work can be extracted; (2) discovers devices to couple
to those energy sources such that work can be extracted; and (3) applies work to
develop constraints to extract further work»5.
In addition, from a large and long-lasting debate on the WEB we can quote this
definition (that replies to the question if a Complex Adaptive System, is a living
entity or implies life): «As far as CAS involving life per se I think the better axiom is
that it involves Information Processing agents. Whether these are a protein molecule
responding to information from its environment with a change of conformation or
a living entity responding to a change in its environment with a volitional act they
can all be subsumed under the rubric of IP [Information Processing] Agent or IPA
for short»6.
It is interesting to notice that in this light the umbrella concept shifts from that of
an active/efficient cause to that of information processing ability. We may say that, in
this light, the ability to process information becomes the main essential basic feature
of an agent.
As very often happens it is literature to offer a certain intuition on similar ideas:
From the moment at which he realized that it is impossible not to stand at the centre of
the world, and that this holds equally for him and for every human being, or animal, or
even stone, or alga, or bacterium, he had to accept that there are only two solutions for
a description of the modes of behaviour that this situation implies. If the centre of the
world is active, the world itself, endowed and enriched with infinite centres, will in turn
infinitely active; alternatively, the centre of the world must be besieged by the world’s
totality, or, more exactly, must constitute its target7.
If all this is true, we may say that robots, software agents, clouds and any kind
of automatic system (able to process information), despite their nature of things and
not persons, are not prevented by definition to be agents, at least in the broader sense
we have seen above.
Thus the legal question might be formulated as follows: where does the law draw
the line of an agent, which is considered by the law (any kind of law: civil, criminal,
administrative) a legal agent? Is or should such a line be coincident with that between
things and persons?
5
M. Gambhir, S. Guerin, S. Kauffman, D. Kunkle, Steps toward a possible theory of organization, in
Proceedings, International Conference on Complex Systems (ICCS), Boston, MA, 2004.
6
D. Thayer (Senior Software Engineer at Microsoft) at http://www.linkedin.com/groups/Can-there-
be-universal-formal-853887.S.81908735 (11 December 2011).
7
G. Manganelli, Centuria. One hundred ouroboric novels, New York, McPherson & Company, 2005,
p. 105 (Italian edition, 1995).
1.1. The agent for the law

In the field of law the concept that seems to be closer to that of agent is that of an
individual or group that is allowed by law to take legal action, as plaintiff or defendant.
In English it is the word person that encompasses this broad concept of a human or
organization having legal rights and duties. Persons are traditionally «divided by the
law into either natural persons, or artificial. Natural persons are such as the God of
nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised by human laws for
the purposes of society and government, which are called corporations or bodies
politic»8. In civil law countries different words and concepts are used, such as soggetto
giuridico (Italian), sujet de droit (French) and Rechtssubjekt (German), even though
also in civil law legal tradition the divide between natural and artificial persons (such
as corporations) is well rooted.
All these lemmas, despite their significant different cultural and legal backgrounds,
cover, in the light and limits of this paper, the same basic meaning of an entity having
legal rights and duties. However, what are the material/biological boundaries of such
entity is a completely different chapter of the story and, as every legal scholar or
practitioner perfectly knows, law has a long practice of manipulating reality in order
to get its internal legal, and sometimes political, consistency.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights9 seems to solve once and for
all the problem when it establishes the full symmetry between the entity entitled
to all the rights and freedoms and a human being. The Declaration solemnly states
«All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights» (Article 1) and
«Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status» (Article 2).
However, things are harder to be conceptualized and it is easy to remark, on one
side, that such a symmetry has not existed prior to the 1948 Declaration and, on the
other side, that it is the same Article 1 that, in its second part, immediately reopens
the question when it states, «They [All human beings, note mine] are endowed with
reason and conscience». It seems that being a human being is not the only prerequisite
for enjoying equal dignity and rights and that also reason and conscience are required.
The question is worthy of a deeper consideration.
1.1.1. About the historical background

As for the symmetry of the entity entitled to rights and freedoms and a human
being, the question of “who” is the biological entity-owner of rights and liberties is
8
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, I, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765, p. 119.
9
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by General Assembly resolution 217A at its
3rd session in Paris on 10 December 1948.
A. Santosuosso 549
a troubled one. Traditionally, in modern constitutions, the human biological entity

was, at least prima facie, the unquestioned factual basis of the individual that the
law considered as the owner of rights and liberties. If we have look at the most
important declarations of rights we find what seems to be the same concept, even
though wording and phrasing are different.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) states that «all men are by nature
equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they
enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity […]». The United States Bill of Rights uses the word «person» (IV and V
Amendment, 1791) and states that «nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws» (XIV Amendment, 1868). The 1789
French Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen, notoriously inspired by the
American Declaration of Independence of 1776, states at Article first that «Men are
born and remain free and equal in rights». As seen above the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UN, 1948) states «All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights» (Article 1).
The Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948) «recognizes and guarantees the
inviolable human rights, be it as an individual or in social groups» (Article 2) and
states «All citizens have equal social status and are equal before the law, without
regard to their sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, and personal or social
conditions» (Article 3).
The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) starts
recognizing that «Human dignity is inviolable» (Article 1) and, at Article 2, states
«Everyone has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or morality.
Everyone has the right to life and to physical integrity. The freedom of the person is
inviolable». Finally, Article 3 stresses «All humans are equal before the law. Men and
women are equal».
It is not necessary to go on quoting other Constitutions to notice one thing,
which appears immediately evident. The framers or drafters use many different words:
«all men», «person», «citizen», «human being», «everyone», «no one», «individual»,
«humans», «men» or, more recently, «women». These wording is absolutely not
neutral and all the movement of women rights, starting from the English and French
revolutions to the suffragettes and finally in recent decades, so as the movement
against any kind of discrimination, witness how those words were not neutral or, at
least, had not been fairly interpreted.
This is particularly true in American constitutional history. Slavery and its
consequences are the «oldest, ugliest, and most persistent American constitutional
problem», Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman say in the Preface of their book on
Slavery and Its Consequences10. They stress how «the great American paradox is that
while slavery and the race problems that followed from it are in integral part of our
history, slavery and race discrimination are not part of the fundamental principles of
the nation – and never had been».
The Three-Fifths Compromise is perhaps the best example of political agreement
about a legal rule (and its underlying natural entities). The 1776 conventions that
approved Virginia’s Declaration of Rights clearly discussed the issue of slavery as
a matter of being slaves members of society or not (Edmund Pendleton proposed
to add, after the word «rights», «when they enter into a state of society»)11. Thus
the question was exactly in terms of constitutional access to society and rights and
liberties (even if denied). The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 1787
reached a compromise on the “federal number” clause, giving to slave states the
possibility to count three-fifths of their slaves as part of the population. Thus, we
could argue that each slave was considered, in constitutional terms, as «a human
being in society» only for three-fifths12.
Other similar problems arose for Indians and other kinds of minorities,
everywhere. All this is well known and widely studied, and confirms philosopher
Isaiah Berlin’s idea that «conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what
constitutes a self, a person, a man. Enough manipulation of the definition of man,
and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes»13.
1.1.2. Endowed with reason and conscience

As for the future, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights contains
a clarification that may give raise to further questions. Saying that all human beings
«are endowed with reason and conscience»14 it seems to assume that reason and
conscience are part of the essence of all human beings and thus are intrinsic qualities
of them. If so the consequence would be that a human being who lacks those qualities
is not a human being or is not a full human being or is not entitled to be equal in
dignity and rights.
If this is true a long list of further questions can be formulated: a) what is the
real meaning of reason and conscience; b) what about human beings that does not
10
R.A. Goldwin, A. Kaufman (eds.), Slavery and Its Consequences: the Constitution, Equality and Race,
Washington, DC, American Enteprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988, XIII.
11
W.M. Wiececk, “The Blessing of Liberty”: Slavery in the American Constitutional Order, in R.A.
Goldwin, A. Kaufman, op. cit., p. 29. D.E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, the Framers and the Living
Constitution, in R.A. Goldwin, A. Kaufman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 1-22.
12
W.M. Wiececk, op. cit., p. 31.
13
I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), in Id., Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1969 [It. ed. Id., Quattro saggi sulla libertà (1969), Milano, Feltrinelli, 1989, p. 200].
14
J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, Philadelphia,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, pp. 296-302.
A. Santosuosso 551
have such capacities: if those qualities are essential we should derive that they are not
humans; c) and what about human beings that does not have yet such full capacities,
for instance because they are newborn; d) and what about human beings who have
lost such full capacities; e) and what about no-human entities that have a certain
degree of reason and conscience (are they excluded by definition? or what is the degree
necessary in order of being considered?); f ) and, if the reply to the questions under e)
is that it is not sufficient having a certain (even high) degree of reason and conscience
to be accepted to the club of humans, the further question is as follows: what about
a human being who does not have (whatever the reason) his/her original reason and
conscience and is supplied with artificial reason and conscience?
Before exploring some of these questions, it is worth considering the case of
corporations and their legal status, as it has historically been the most important
theoretical legal gymnasium about non-human entities having rights and duties.
1.2. The case of corporations

Some aspects of the legal status of corporations are not so controversial. It
is universally admitted that a corporation, even though through its (human)
representatives, may have its own legal personality and has its own property rights15.
In addition, it can have obligations, duties and rights toward other corporations and
humans. Thus it is widely shared the concept of corporations as artificial entities,
which are created by state statute and are treated much like individuals under the
law, having legally enforceable rights, the ability to acquire debt and to pay out
profits, the ability to hold and transfer property, the ability to enter into contracts,
the requirement to pay taxes, and, in general terms, the ability to sue and be sued.
The rights and responsibilities of a corporation are independent and distinct from
the people who own or invest in them16.
As a consequence civil and administrative laws can address corporate misconduct
and really address it in different countries according to national laws. The huge
quantity of litigations before civil and administrative courts tell more than any
theoretical explanation about corporations as legal agents, either as (artificial) person
or soggetto giuridico or sujet de droit or Rechtssubjekt.
What is more controversial is the criminal liability of corporations, something
that has become a crucial topic in recent decades because of an alarming number
of environmental, antitrust, fraud, food and drug, false statements, worker death,
bribery, obstruction of justice, and financial crime involving corporations. The most
recent and prominent case in the United Sates has been the Enron scandal and
15
Even though corporate property rights can be considered a challenge to the liberal conception of
property rights: L. May, Corporate Property Rights, in “Journal of Business Ethics”, Jun. 1986, V, 3,
pp. 225-232.
16
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/corporations (8 December 2013).
in Europe the Parmalat case (Italy). While several jurisdictions have accepted and
applied the concept of corporate criminal liability under various models, other law
systems have not been able or willing to incorporate it. The traditional objection was
the principle societas delinquere non potest in the 19th century. The reason was that
the corporation is a legal fiction, which, lacking a body and soul, is not capable of
forming the criminal mens rea or to act in propria persona17.
Moreover, corporate criminal liability would violate the principle of individual
criminal punishment. This is a very sensitive point in Italy, where the Constitution
clearly states that «la responsabilità penale è personale»18 (Art. 27) and seems to exclude
any criminal responsibility for corporations. In Italy it is quite strong the idea that,
unlike human beings, corporations are only legal fictions19 and because of such
minor status cannot be held criminally liable. These are the main reasons why Italian
law, in order to fulfill the constitutional requirement of personality of punishment,
envisages just administrative sanctions20. However it is remarkable that the Italian
Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) has clearly stated that, whatever the legislative
label of the provision, the sanctions of the Italian law have the substantial nature of
criminal sanctions21.
In conclusion we may say that «similar to individuals, corporations have an
identifiable persona and the capacity to express moral judgments. Corporations
have an identifiable persona in the sense that they have a unique presence in the
community, different from that of their owners or managers; they have ‘ethos’ that
makes them unique and different from the individuals controlling or working for the
corporations. The ethos can be derived from the corporation’s dynamic, structure,
monitoring system, aims, policies, promotion of compliance with the laws, and
discipline of the employees. The United States Supreme Court has decided that
corporations have the capacity to express independent points of view and moral
judgments, and their freedom of speech should not be abridged without a compelling
state interest»22.
17
A.I. Pop, Criminal Liability of Corporations − Comparative Jurisprudence, Student Scholarship Paper,
2006, 81, http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/king/81. See also S.W. Buell, The Blaming Function of
Entity Criminal Liability, in “Indiana Law Journal”, 2006, 81, p. 473.
18
«Criminal liability is personal» [translation mine].
19
This question will be specifically discussed, below, in Paragraph 3.
20
Decreto legislativo n. 231/2001.
21
Cass. Pen., Sez. III, 30 January 2006 (Jolly Mediterraneo case).
22
I.A. Pop, op. cit. The decision of the US Supreme Court on freedom of speech of corporations is First
National Bank Of Boston V. Bellotti,, 435 U.S. 765, 787-95 (1978). See also: L. Friedman, In Defense
of Corporate Criminal Liability, in “Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y”, 2000, 23 (p. 833 ff.), p. 846; P.H. Bucy,
Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, in “Minn. L. Rev.”, 1991, 75 (p.
1095 ff.), p. 1099; E. Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation
and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, in “Buff. Crim. L. R.”, 2000, 4, p.
694.
A. Santosuosso 553
1.3. A first conclusion

The current idea that the action considered by the law is by definition an action
taken by a human being, or strictly referable to human beings, is false both because
we have many examples of actions taken by no-humans that are considered by the
law and because there are several examples of actions taken by humans that are not
considered by the law at least in relationship with the human who performed it.
2. May a robot be responsible for injuries to a human?

Before developing some legal thoughts about what happens in legal terms when
the agent is not a human being, it may be helpful to analyze a hypothetical story that
works as a logical exercise in order to explore the possible reaction of legal categories
to the interplay between robots and humans. Hereinafter the short story.
An assistant robot, whose name is AsRo, is at work in a hospital. AsRo administers
drugs to patients, gives first advice for simple problems, calls the physician when there
is a serious problem, checks to see that ventilators and feeding tubes are connected
and working, fixes machines when small problems occur.
An ill-intentioned person enters the hospital, goes to the bed of a patient and
starts disconnecting the ventilator. AsRo detects the malfunctioning and intervenes
in order to fix the machine. The ill-intentioned person attacks the robot. AsRo sends
the alarm and resists the assault. At the end the aggressor has personal injuries.
The legal question that might arise is as follows: who, if anyone, is responsible for
such personal injuries? Who should be charged for damages?
To attempt a response we assume that AsRo was designed having Asimov rules
as its ethical background. These well known rules are: a) A robot may not injure a
human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to be harmed; b) A robot
must obey the orders given to it by human beings, except where such orders would
conflict with the First Law; c) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.
Well, AsRo behavior prima facie violates the first rule, as AsRo has injured a human.
However, at a deeper level, it is clear that if AsRo had remained inactive during the
assault of the ill-intentioned person, AsRo would have violated the second part of the
first rule, where it is stated that a robot may not injure a human being even «through
inaction», allowing a human being to come to harm. And it is worth noting that the
ill-intentioned started disconnecting the ventilator (rather than directly assaulting
AsRo). Thus, AsRo had an obligation to fix the ventilator!
In the second part of his action the ill-intentioned turns directly against AsRo,
busily fixing the ventilator. During the scuffle between the robot and the human it is
the human who come off worse. In this case, AsRo can advocate the third rule, where
it is stated that a robot must protect its own existence «as long as such protection
does not conflict with the First or Second Laws». And, as we have seen, AsRo fully
respected the two previous rules.
On these basis we may say (as it is likely to be in several legal systems!), the
aggressor who would try to collect damages for his injuries would lose his lawsuit
against either the producer (who manufactured the robot according to a design
consistent with internationally accepted ethical rules) or the owner of the robot (who
used it in a proper way).
3. Some thoughts about things and persons for the law

Our societies are populated with human beings, corporations, robots, software
agents, clouds and several kinds of automatic systems. They all are able not only to
be an efficient cause but also to process information. The following legal thoughts have
to be considered as dispersed entities hopefully useful trying to reply to what should
be the legal frame able to encompass such multifarious reality.
3.1. Things and persons in the Internet of Things

The Internet of Things is the environment for all these agents. There are different
opinions on what the Internet of Things is and they range «from the original concept
proposed by Kevin Ashton at the Auto-ID Center of an informational network that
allows the look-up of information about real-world objects by means of a unique
ID called Electronic Product Code (EPC) and a resolution mechanism (ONS), to a
network of sensors, actuators and autonomous objects interacting with each other
directly. Machine-to-machine (M2M) communication is another term sometimes
associated with the later»23.
The crucial concept of the Internet of Things is to be related to «the integration of
the physical world with the virtual world of the Internet. There are physical objects
one wants to be able to track, to monitor and to interact with. Examples include
inanimate objects like pallets, boxes containing consumer goods, cars, machines,
fridges – and maybe even the infamous carton of milk or cup of yoghurt – as well
as animate objects like animals and humans. These are the things of the Internet of
Things – or to use a clearer term, the entities of interest»24. The distinction between
23
S. Haller, The Things in the Internet of Things, available at http://www.iot-a.eu/public/news/
resources/TheThingsintheInternetofThings_SH.pdf (The contents of the paper were presented as
a poster at the Internet of Things Conference 2010, Tokyo, Japan, http://www.iot2010.org/). The
proposal by K. Ashton is in S. Sarma, D.L. Brock, K. Ashton, The Networked Physical World,
Proposals for Engineering the Next Generation of Computing. Commerce & Automatic-Identification,
Auto-ID Center White Paper, October 2000.
24
S. Haller, op. cit.
A. Santosuosso 555
entities of interest and devices is important: «the entity of interest is the object that has
some value for the observer, the device is a technical component needed to observe
or interact with the entity of interest» 25.
The integration of humans and things has a clear development in the Industrial
Internet, a technological approach focused on «connecting more intelligent machines,
advanced analytics, and people at work». The project by General Electric aims at
«exploring how the Industrial Internet, predictive analytics and new machine-human
collaboration in the workplace can significantly boost productivity, create new jobs
and skills, and minimize unplanned downtime in major industries»26.
These few information about the Internet of Things allow us to put a couple
of points: a) the things to be connected are not necessarily things/objects (in their
traditional legal meaning of inanimate object opposed to human being or other
animal27); b) even when they are things/objects in traditional terms (thus, conceptually
opposed to persons), they might be able to process information and thus they are not
necessarily passive.
3.2. The physical (legal) person: what constitutes its unity?

Coincidence of «human individual» and the owner of rights and liberties is a
not natural entity and also conceals a conceptual fallacy. Hans Kelsen sharply
addresses the concepts of legal person and physical person in a well-known passage
from the General Theory of Law and State28. He firstly criticizes «the common way
of defining the physical (natural) person» and the use of formulas like «the physical
25
S. Haller, op. cit.
26
From M. Annunziata, P.C. Evans, The Industrial Internet@Work, General Electric Company, 2013
at http://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/GE_IndustrialInternetatWork_WhitePaper_20131028.pdf. For
the Minds+Machines project by General Electric see at http://www.ge.com/mindsandmachines. The aim
of the project is «exploring how the Industrial Internet, predictive analytics and new machine-human
collaboration in the workplace can significantly boost productivity, create new jobs and skills, and
minimize unplanned downtime in major industries». Industry 4.0 is also a project in the high-tech strategy
of the German government: see Project of the Future: Industry 4.0, http://www.bmbf.de/en/19955.
php. Till now the attention to these issues in Italy has been scarce: see http://www.meccatronica-world.
it/industrie-4-0-e-quarta-rivoluzione-industriale/ and http://www.weidmuller.it/docs/cw_index_
v2.aspx?id=97306&domid=1031&sp=I&m1=63532&m2=93085&m3=93097&m4=97306.
27
«An entity, an idea, or a quality perceived, known, or thought to have its own existence. […] Law
That which can be possessed or owned» (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
Fourth Edition, 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company, 2009, available at http://www.thefreedictionary.
com/). In the first Italian Dictionary (Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca, 1612) «nome di termine
generalissimo, e si dice di tutto quel ch’ è. Lat. res.», at http://www.accademiadellacrusca.it/it/attivita/
ristampa-anastatica-vocabolario-accademici-crusca-1612. In modern Italian «cosa» is «il nome più
indeterminato e più comprensivo della lingua italiana, col quale si indica, in modo generico, tutto quanto
esiste, nella realtà o nell’immaginazione, di concreto o di astratto, di materiale o d’ideale»: Dizionario
Treccani at http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/.
28
H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1945 (translated by
Anders Wedberg), Part One, Chapter IX, A-B, pp. 93-95.
person is a human being, whereas the juristic person is not» or the physical person
is «a human being considered as invested with rights, or considered as subject to
duties». Consequently, the current statement that «a person has duties and rights is
meaningless or is an empty tautology» as «the legal person is not a separate entity
besides “its” duties and rights, but only their personified unity or − since duties and
rights are legal norms − the personified unity of a set of legal norms».
Kelsen’s further step is expressed in the following crucial question: «What
constitutes this kind of unity? When does a set of duties and rights, a set of legal
norms, have this kind of unity?».
The answer is as follows: to say that a particular human being has a certain duty
or right, means only that a certain conduct of that individual is the content of a legal
duty or right. On the other hand legal norms only consider particular actions or
forbearances and, as far as they can be numerous, never regulate the whole existence
of the human individual: «Even the total legal order never determines the whole
existence of a human being subject to the order, or affects all his mental and bodily
functions». For this reason when we say that a slave is legally no person, or has no
legal personality, we mean «there are no legal norms qualifying any behavior of this
individual as a duty or a right».
The consequence is «the person exists only insofar as he “has” duties and rights;
apart from them the person has no existence whatsoever. To define the physical
(natural) person as a human being is incorrect, because man and person are not
only two different concepts but also the results of two entirely different kinds of
consideration. Man is a concept of biology and physiology, in short, of the natural
sciences. Person is a concept of jurisprudence, of the analysis of legal norms».
The answer to the further facet of the question on what constitutes the kind of
unity we call physical (natural) person is as follows: «the human being is not the
physical (natural) person but, so to speak, only “the compass” of a physical (natural)
person. The relation between a so-called physical (natural) person and the human
being with whom the former is often erroneously identified consists in the fact that
those duties and rights which are comprehended in the concept of the person all refer
to the behavior of that human being».
Thus, according to Kelsen «since the concept of the so-called physical (natural)
“person” is only a juristic construction and, as such, totally different from the concept
of “man”, the so-called “physical” (natural) person is, indeed, a “juristic” person. If
the so-called physical (natural) person is a juristic person, there can be no essential
difference between the physical (natural) person and what is usually exclusively
considered as a “juristic” person».
In brief, in the economy of this essay, the main points of Kelsen’s passage can
be summarized as follows: (a) the human being, as biological entity, is a different
entity than the physical person in legal terms; (b) the human being is the basis of
A. Santosuosso 557
the physical person in legal terms as a symbolic and linguistic unity; (c) the biological
human being is only the enclosing line (Kelsen uses the word compass, in double
quotes) of a physical person in legal terms; (d) the human being exists for the law
only for the limited part rights and duties refer to him; (e) the physical person in
legal terms and the juristic person (i.e. corporation) are both legal creations having in
common the character of artificiality.
All these propositions are based on certain assumptions, which make them possible.
Firstly, the biological, physiological and natural dimension can be clearly kept apart
from the legal dimension, and any mutual contamination can be expunged. This is
a prerequisite for linguistic and conceptual purification of the law from any residual
“primitive mythological thinking”.
Secondly, the possibility of keeping any biological feature of the physical person
apart from the legal concept of the physical person seems to require that there is
no conflict of normativity between law and other fields, such as biology. In other
words, neither scientific nor naturalistic normativity seem to be considered, making
the human being simply an unquestionably delimited fact, which allows norms to be
brought to unity.
Thirdly, and above all, a total, spatial and historical, symmetry is postulated
between the human being and the entity which law refers to while creating those
rights and duties, which are the elements of the physical person in legal terms. In
other words, the biological human being is a safe and unquestioned delimitation,
which encompasses rights and duties of the physical person in legal terms. Hence the
physical person in legal terms is a complex of rights and duties which, however wide
and numerous, all fall within a biological boundary, which is assumed to be certain
and stable. This boundary is the human individual biological entity that everybody
empirically knows in his clearly bordered materiality, substantially unvarying and
unsusceptible to change in extension and in kind.
Thus, if even physical (legal) persons are legal artifacts (according to Kelsen’s
teaching in mid Twenty century), nowadays we should not be surprised because of
a new question: may something different than a human being be a legal agent29?
The reply should be yes and the question should rather change into a) under what
conditions this may happen? and b) what are the required features and abilities in
order to recognize such a legal status?
3.3. Artificiality and the human biological compass

Assumed that something different than a human being (and different from
corporations and other well known examples of formal legal entities) can be a legal
agent, we should ask what does the assumption of artificiality solve and what it does
29
Besides corporations and other well known examples of formal legal entities, of course.
not.
As we have seen above Kelsen postulates a full symmetry between the entity which
law refers to while creating those rights and duties and the human being, which is
considered a safe and unquestioned compass. Well, the problem is that this compass
is not safe anymore. A physical person can be now the combination of several parts
and even devices: his/her original brain and body (eventually with parts/organs that
come from other humans or genetically modified animals), traditional prosthesis,
new prosthesis (which work through a brain-computer interface), brain-computer-
web devices, a companion robot and more.
Needless to say that in a picture like this there is nothing that is comparable to
a safe boundary, surely from a strict biological point of view. Of course the need
for a unity can find a reply by the unity of will: the boundary of an individual is the
result of the past and present decisions of the same person in order to add or exclude
some components/changes from his/her unity30. However this extension from the
traditional stable biological boundary to the power of choice of the individual is not
a fully safe criterion at least in two cases: a) when the elements forming that specific
individual unity include also artificial devices, which are able to process information
(e.g. a computer or a connection with the web – internet of things); b) when some
device entails an alteration of consciousness because of a neuroscientific intervention
(through drugs, surgery or any other kind of intervention).
In other words, if the unity is guaranteed by the will of that individual how
can the individual be empowered for such a difficult challenge? Law can intervene
assuring some external help. The question, or list of questions, is still the same we
posed some years ago starting from neuroscience31.
At that time we stressed that if the question of individual boundaries is given
priority, the old question of free will may no longer be at the forefront. Furthermore,
we may discover that an individual’s will is intertwined with those of other people/
entities. If so, should we move from the concept of an individual (free) will towards a
social group’s will? Are associations like this merely temporary? Is immediate opting-
out guaranteed? Who is the individual that will opt out? Will it be the “who” that
freely decided to join the association? Or will it be the “new who” that is the result
of the experience of association? Are they the same person? In other words, does the
30
A. Santosuosso, Persone fisiche e confini biologici: chi determina chi, in “Politica del diritto”, 2002,
4 (disponibile anche presso http://blog.centrodietica.it/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/santosuosso.
pdf). See also A. Santosuosso, Should privacy be abolished in genetics and biobanking? in U. Izzo, M.
Macilotti, G. Pascuzzi (eds.), Comparative Issues in the Governance of Research Biobanks. Property,
Privacy, Intellectual Property and the Role of Technology, Springer, 2013.
31
A. Santosuosso, B. Bottalico, Neuroscience, accountability and individual boundaries, in “Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience”, 3, Art. 46, December 2009. See also A. Santosuosso, V. Sellaroli, I.
Pavone, Drawing the boundary lines of humans: in whose bailiwick?, in “Derecho y Religiòn”, 2007, II,
pp. 11–36.
A. Santosuosso 559
individual identity survive the association? Is the free, informed decision to associate
a sufficient guarantee? Or should a guardian be appointed in order to assure the
freedom of decision (whose?) and respect for the conditions necessary for opting out?
Questions like these, even though not new in philosophical debate32, are now on the
legal agenda and require a social response. From a legal viewpoint the question might
be conceptualized as a matter of sovereignty. In other words, once nature is out of
play and is no longer able to tell us what to do or not to do, the question Who has the
power and is entitled to draw the boundary line for each individual? becomes crucial.
3.4. If the agent is not governed by the will of a human

Till now we have stretched human capabilities and have outlined some legal
devices that might be able to empower the technologically integrated human in order
to keep his/her sovereignty on his/her life. However we have to face also a completely
new reality, where the starting point of the (natural) entity is not a human being that
has been provided with a cornucopia of technical devices, but directly a full technical
artifact endowed with a certain degree of reason and conscience and able to have a
social interaction with both humans and entities having similar characteristics.
The question is on the agenda since the technology for designing and producing
cognitive robots, which are able to adapt and to develop in evolutionary terms, is
available and experiments are in progress. Some definitions of what is in progress in
technological terms might help focusing the issue.
A cognitive robot is an autonomous robot that exploits processes analogous to
cognitive processes. It has the ability of reasoning (process of modification of the
knowledge base of the robot through logical manipulation of the available knowledge);
the ability of planning (computation and selection of tasks, policies and procedures
for goal-directed robot behavior) and learning (process of modification of the
knowledge base of the robot gained through the interaction with the environment,
including people, that may produce a persistent change in the robot behavior)33.
Social robots are «embodied agents that are part of a heterogeneous group: a
society of robots or humans. They are able to recognize each other and engage in
social interactions, they possess histories (perceive and interpret the world in terms
of their own experience), and they explicitly communicate with and learn from each
32
D. Parfit, Reasons and persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.
33
C. Leroux, R. Labruto (eds.) Suggestion for a green paper on legal issues in robotics - Contribution
to Deliverable D3.2.1 on ELS issues in robotics, 2002, http://www.euroboticsproject.eu/cms/upload/
PDF/euRobotics_Deliverable_D.3.2.1_Annex_Suggestion_GreenPaper_ELS_IssuesInRobotics.pdf;
A. Santosuosso, C. Boscarato, F. Caroleo, Robot e diritto: una prima ricognizione, in “NGCC”,
July-August 2012, pp. 494-516.
other»34.
Evolutionary and/or developmental methods allow to synthesize robots that
develop their skills autonomously in interaction with the physical, and eventually
social, environment on the basis of an adaptive process driven by the ecological
condition in which the robot operate and on the basis of an utility function designed
by the experimenter. Of course such interaction requires a body through which they
are able to exploit the opportunities that their embodied and situated nature provides
them.
With Evolutionary robots we refer to a methodology that uses evolutionary
computation to develop controllers for autonomous robots, which operate in close
interaction with the environment and without human intervention. It is inspired
by the Darwinian principle of selective reproduction of the fittest. Evolutionary
robots use neural networks, genetic algorithms, dynamic systems, and biomorphic
engineering. Experiments are in progress showing that the survival probability (for
instance in terms of access to the source of energy) of a species is affected by the
behavior of other species35.
Among many other things it is remarkable that in this new generations of robots
the learning ability does not simulate “real” human intelligence. Rather, organic
molecules are used to produce that result. The huge flagship Human Brain Project,
recently launched by the EU, is mostly intended to increase this way of research36.
This is a true challenging reality for the society as a whole and for the law as well.
Just few points can be outlined:
A. We can say now that in a reasonable time we should be able to produce no-
human entities that have a certain degree of reason and conscience: should they be
excluded by definition from the club of humans or it is a matter of degree?
B. What about a human being who does not have (whatever the reason) his/
her original reason and conscience and is supplied with an artificial reason and
conscience? If the reply were that in this case such a composed entity might be
accepted because of his/her human biological background, the easy objection
might be that being a human animal gave a discriminatory advantage over
(artificial) entities that are endowed with reason and conscience and that (because
of their status of entities having reason and conscience) might disobey to such a
violation of basic rights that (as universal) should be recognized to them as well.
34
A. Billard, K. Dautenhahn, Experiments in learning by imitation - grounding and use of
communication in robotic agents, in “Adaptive Behavior”, 1999, 7(3/4), pp. 415-438.
35
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IOTYb05PGjw; see also P.A. Vargas, E.A. Di Paolo, I.
Harvey, P. Husbands (eds.), The Horizons of Evolutionary Robotics, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2014.
36
The Human Brain Project aims «to build a completely new information computing technology
infrastructure for neuroscience and for brain-related research in medicine and computing catalyzing a
global collaborative effort to understand the human brain and its diseases and ultimately to emulate its
computational capabilities»: https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/it.
A. Santosuosso 561
C. One (apparently) strong objection to the recognition of legal subjectivity to no-

human entities is that they do not own assets and liability susceptible of pecuniary
evaluation and are not able to call a lawyer and to stand before a court claiming
their rights. The reply is quite easy: the entity might have its own assets (similarly
to any other corporation) and might be programmed in order to be able to call a
lawyer and sue its counterparts.
4. A beginning as conclusion
The above outlined scenario is the beginning of a new era, not its end. To the
question whether human beings are disappearing, it is to be replied, no, they are not
disappearing, even though they are not anymore the only ones having rights and
duties. To the question if robots and automatic systems are equal to human being,
the reply is again, no, they will not be equal even though this is not a good reason for
not recognizing them any legal value and right.
In very practical terms we can say that in social relationship to more technical
complexity a longer chain of responsibilities corresponds. And, in general terms, the
social and legal systems become more complex. A huge job is on the agenda of open-
minded lawyers.
Modern technology and legal compliance
Eric Hilgendorf
Table of contents: Technology and law - the steering of the technological progress. – The
three tasks of technology law. – New tendencies in robotics. – Technological development
and social morality. – Robotics and the law. – 1. Medical robotics. – 2. (Partially) autonomous
motor vehicles and road traffic law. – 3. The use of unmanned air systems. – 4. Robots and
data protection law.
In this article, I want to offer some new ideas on the tasks of jurists engaging
themselves in the field of technology law. Traditionally, lawyers have been working
for example as judges, public prosecutors, attorneys, company lawyers, professors
of law or lawyers engaging themselves in legal politics and the creation of new law.
Now, a new type of lawyer seems to be emerging: the expert on legal compliance.
Technology and law – the steering of the technological progress

The relationship between technology and law is not without problems. It is
almost banal to point out that technological development does not merely increase
the range of choices we have available to us, helping us to structure the world and
freely develop ourselves according to the choices we make. Rather, it can also lead to
unintended consequences, which are contrary to our interests and wishes. This raises
the issue of shaping and controlling technological development. In a democratically
constituted polity, it should not be the large firms, nor the technical experts or
engineers, nor the large research institutions, who make the big decisions on the
direction technological development should take. Rather it should be the legitimate,
democratically elected parliament, representing its citizens, which should decide on
these essential questions after public discussion.
564 Modern technology and legal compliance
Up to now it has sometimes been suggested in the literature that technological

development cannot be steered. This is because it is said to develop according to its
own contingencies. Whoever argues this position, ignores the fact that the state has
controlled and steered technological development during the entire period for which
we have historical records1. Methods used have ranged from criminal prohibitions
without exceptions, to prohibitions subject to authorisation, all the way to subtle
influence exerted through research funding and tax law2. The degree of governmental
influence, in turn, is determined in part by public discourse in the society and in part
by the positions taken by the big actors influencing public opinion (for example the
press, television, associations and churches).
The importance of scientific and technological progress for society today is so
high that one often speaks of the so called “knowledge based society” (although the
expression “scientific knowledge based society” would be better). What is meant
is that of all the different kinds of knowledge – traditional knowledge, religious
knowledge, special knowledge of particular elites in society - the greatest importance
is attached to science based knowledge. The influence of the natural sciences and
technology on our lives is enormous. In view of the consequences which undesirable
developments in these areas could have, reference is being made increasingly to the
under-developed state of scientific and technical expertise in the general population.
(After all it is the citizens who elect the parliament). Thus Richard Winston, the
British sociologist of science, proposed “that the key to successful living in a society
dominated by advancing technology lies in better public engagement with science
and technology”3.
Steering technological development should not take place through individual
decisions made of necessity by a government but rather on the basis of an established
normative order, which is created particularly by law and social morality. All
technological innovation can be assessed on this basis, even though few innovations
generally attract so much attention that political authorities deal with the innovations
themselves. An example of a major theme in many European countries in the last
few decades was research on embryos and stem cells. For quite some time, however,
regulation of the internet, too, has been a big topic in political discussions, and it is
going to be an even bigger one in the future.
1
For a good overview of the technological development, see D.R. Headrick, Technology. A World
History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
2
New challenges are discussed in R. Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological
Revolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, and R. Brownsword, K. Yeung (eds.), Regulating
Technologies. Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological Fixes, Oxford, Hart, 2008. In German:
E. Hilgendorf, J.-P. Günther (eds.), Robotik und Gesetzgebung. Beiträge der Tagung, 2012, vom 7.
bis 9, Mai 2012 in Bielefeld (Robotik und Recht, Band 2).
3
R. Winston, Bad ideas? An arresting history of our inventions, New York, Bantam, 2010, p. 10.
E. Hilgendorf 565
The three tasks of technology law

What might be the tasks of Internet Law, the law of robotics, and of Technology
Law in general? The first task could be fitting new technical developments into the
current law by trying to identify, analyse and answer the most important emerging
legal questions on the basis of the current applicable law. To a large extent this work
is oriented towards legal and judicial practice. One could say it would be advising
the courts and lawyers on the current state of the law. In this way, Technology Law
would help to prepare legal authorities and professionals to deal with these emerging
situations.
A second task of Technology Law would be legal support: given the risks which
legal barriers might create, it is obviously important for actors in the area of
technological development, that means for scientists and engineers, to address as
early as possible any potential moral or legal objections to their research or research
results. There is a deplorable tendency in these professions to dismiss the normative
implications of their activities. This second task of technology law therefore would be
to provide exactly the legal support and assistance the actors need: at all stages in research,
development, production and marketing. This support would be available to ensure
conformity with the law. This could be called “technological advice” or “techno-legal
advice”.
It is important to recognise legal risks as early as possible and to propose measures
to eliminate or mitigate those risks. The term legal risks does not simply mean civil
or criminal liability. It also means business risks. Even a rumour, press report or an
announcement that the public prosecutor is contemplating an investigation could be
extremely damaging for a company operating in a given market. The function being
sketched out here is therefore quite similar to what commercial lawyers call “legal
compliance”. The idea comes originally from U.S. banking law and means something
like “conformity with the applicable law”. Viewed this way, “legal compliance”
should be so obvious for a business or research institution that it is never an issue for
discussion, particularly compliance with the criminal law. People who consistently
refuse to comply with the criminal law spend their time either in prison or in mental
institutions.
The widespread attention which the concept of legal compliance has received,
can best be explained by the fact that it has changed the way law is practiced: in the
past most lawyers, particularly criminal lawyers, had, so to speak, a retrospective
orientation. They acted or advised on liability in already existing cases, where
the actions potentially carrying liability had already taken place. The approach
“compliance” takes is entirely the other way around: organise business activities in
accordance with the law so that violations simple do not occur. In principle this
approach can be applied to any area of law, from the civil law to data protection all the
way to criminal law. Technology Law, as a practice oriented discipline, could operate
along much the same lines. Quite similarly, the lawyer’s job includes not only dealing
with existing cases but also evaluating any legal issues arising from technology which
is still in development in order to highlight possible legal violations early enough so
that the development can be modified so that the violations never occur. This kind
of legal advice is therefore future-oriented, and can be seen as a way of securing the
legal compliance of technology in the making.
A third task of modern technology law would be advising policymakers on public
policy issues. This would be done primarily from the perspective of how the law
should be shaped for the future. That means the question of whether new legislation
or at least the reform of old laws is or will be necessary in order to deal with new
issues raised by technological progress. For a lawyer active in this area of practice, it
is important to recognise when he is giving law-based advice and when he is giving
political policy advice. Demands for more criminal law are always problematic, and,
of course, as a matter of principle, must be justified on the basis of the ultima ratio
principle, namely when criminalisation is the only means available to achieve the
goal. The introduction of new criminal laws or the tightening up of existing criminal
laws is only valid when it is the least intrusive means to achieve the necessary
protection. Of course the temptation is always very high in the area of criminal legal
policy to give in to populist demands: When the mass media run a series of reports
about some huge scandal on the internet, calls for new criminal legislation frequently
follow almost immediately. Such calls all too often fall on receptive ears. This is why
new technological advances like the internet are particularly at risk of being over-
regulated by the criminal law.
New tendencies in robotics

Robotics is one of the most discussed topics in current technology. Along with
gene, information and nano technologies, it is one of the four key technologies
thought to play a decisive role in the future of our society (sometimes called “GRIN-
technologies”). As the other successful technologies, robotics expands our possibilities
to take action. Since not everything that can be done should be done, or undertaken
at all, the question arises how these technical developments are to be regulated by
means of norms and values.
Technological development is currently moving in the direction of a complete
interconnectedness of objects, which means, among other things, a convergence
of industrial robots and IT. This new and challenging development that has been
labelled “industry 4.0”. Four tendencies deserve our special attention:
E. Hilgendorf 567
1. Increasing autonomy: Through the use of modern computer-technology,

computers are able to carry out many different functions independently from
human inputs in the individual case (“autonomous systems”).
2. Ability to learn: By using sensor-technology, machines are able to

independently register and process information about the environment.
The technical developments of such sensors are enormous. The autonomic
systems, as it were, “learn” from their experiences. In this sense, there is a
connection between this research and artificial intelligence.
3. Networks: Autonomic systems are more and more connected with one another
either locally or through the internet. This means that the information
systems share with one another and establish relationships through networks.
Thus, robots become the “hands of the internet”.
4. Technological progress and convergence: Technological developments in

informatics, internet- and robot-technology progress at an accelerated rate
and the different technologies converge.
Law is a powerful means either to boost or to thwart this technological

development. In order to make innovation possible, legal aspects, ranging from civil
and criminal liability all the way to data protection, have to be scrutinized.
Technological development and social morality

The view that technological developments are mainly supported and determined
by research is a widely held prejudice. Of course, there can be no technological
progress without technological research and development. Whether such research
takes place and results in the development of products and whether the products can
be manufactured and sold, however, depends on whether the products are accepted
by the society in which they are produced. This is determined above all on whether
the new technologies can be harmonized with the prevailing ethical and legal norm
systems.
The evaluation of new innovative visions for technological developments is usually
(but not always) based on the standards of social morality. The problem with this
is that in modern societies there is not just one prevailing social morality but many
such moralities. These moralities compete with one another, but may also influence
and ultimately fuse with one another. Therefore, technological developments can
fail because the majority of the population (or at least the majority of politicians)
holds the view that a specific technology should be rejected. Nevertheless, morality
on its own is generally not enough to completely stop specific forms of research and
development. This only occurs when the moral evaluation itself in some way impacts
the law by determining that the technologies in question are not only against the
social moral norms, but also against the law.
However, law does not always inhibit technological developments but may also
support technological innovations. The range of possibilities extends from criminal
prohibition with reservation of authorization to the simple absence of any special
rules concerning moderate regulations to explicit support by granting tax advantages
and even governmental financial support for research.
Since the 1970’s, the question of morally regulating the development of
modern technologies has been intensely discussed. As a result of these discussions,
important new fields of applied ethics emerged: medical and bio-ethics, which
deals with questions concerning the regulation of modern medicine; information
and internet ethics which concerns the application to modern information and
internet technologies; and finally, roboethics. Some years ago, the Italian philosopher
Veruggio defined the term, roboethics, as follows: “Roboethics is the ethics inspiring
the design, development and employment of Intelligent Machines”4.
Roboethics is of course not an ethics developed for robots, as in Asimov’s famous
principles5. It is rather an ethics designed for humans to interact with robots6. On the
one hand, robotics is seen as a means to promote human society and the individual.
On the other hand, roboethics is supposed to stop the possible abuse of robots
against human interests. From this approach, many different fields of application of
roboethics can be developed even as the fields are in development, as, for example,
robots for industry, robots for human care, robots for security and military purposes,
especially drones and artificial intelligence (AI).
Ethical concerns with regard to robots run the risk of humanizing the problems
(risk of anthropomorphism) and therefore, the risk to make decisions on an overly
emotional basis (risk of emotionalizing). The mere term “robotics” easily leads to
anthropomorphic speculations and anxieties, in which humanoid robots or “artificial
humans” compete with, or even try to dominate their human creators. Mass media
films such as “Terminator” or “Matrix” make such futurist visions beloved themes
and contribute to a somewhat misleading understanding of robotics.
4
G. Veruggio, F. Operto, Roboethics: a Bottom-up Interdisciplinary discourse in the Field of Applied
Ethics in Robotics, in “International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE)”, 2006, 6 (12/2006), http://
www.i-r-i-e.net/inhalt/006/006_Veruggio_Operto.pdf, p. 1.
5
New research is done is this area as well. See, for example, W. Wallach, C. Allen, Moral Machines.
Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.
6
Good overviews in: M. Anderson, S. Leigh Anderson (eds.), Machine Ethics, Cambridge-New
York, Cambridge University Press, 2011; R. Capurro, M. Nagenborg (eds.), Ethics and Robotics,
Heidelberg, Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009; P. Lin et al. (eds.), Robot Ethics. The Ethical and
Social Implications of Robots, The MIT Press, 2012.
E. Hilgendorf 569
This kind of fallacious argumentation based on anthropomorphism can be avoided

if one pays close attention to actual technological developments. The latter concern
the establishment of (partial) autonomous systems which can help reduce burden for
humans in specific contexts. Such developments do not concern the production of
humanoid robots, which, as an artificially developed species, will one day attempt to
dominate the earth. The work done by lawyers today should be designed to maintain
a close relationship to real technological developments, as they are occurring in
informatics and engineering. It should not concern purely science fiction scenarios
but rather is meant to partner with the real developments in technology both today
and in the future.
Robotics and the law

The development and application of these autonomic systems do not only increase
the number of ethical considerations but also the various legal problems. The scope
of these basic questions extends from criminal and civil law liability problems and
concerns about data protection, to road traffic laws, cyber law, medical equipment
regulations, and insurance law.
The initial problems of such an approach are primarily semantic. Is it justified,
(in relation to issues of liability) to speak of the “action” of autonomic machines?
What meaning do we understand when we speak of the “autonomy” of a machine?
Is a machine able to accept “guilt” or at least can it be held responsible in the sense
of criminal or civil law? Is it possible de lege ferenda that machines having a certain
level of autonomy be considered to have the status of human agents? Can machines
be considered to be bearer of rights, such as basic liberties, as long discussed in the
science fiction literature?
Recently, these sorts of questions have been in raised in both the ethical and
philosophy of law literature. However, one has to keep in mind that the answering of
these questions does not at the moment have direct impact on the actual development
of robots. The legal issues under discussion are much more concrete and practical.
In the following, individual legal areas in the application of robotics are addressed
as examples.
1. Medical robotics
In the realm of medical technology, the application of robotics promises results,
which, through human effort alone, would not be possible. The robotic movements
are achieved with extreme accuracy. The increased efficiency and safety during
surgery and other medical procedures is due to the better visualization and increased
ergonomic comfort for those implementing the procedures. There are nevertheless
dangers associated with the use of robots. In this context, the discussion on the
“robodoc” may serve as an example7. The main point of consideration is the liability
for harm or damages to the patient when robotechnology is used in medical
procedures.
The initial point of consideration is the question whether and to what extent the
medical doctor can be held liable for damages inflicted on the patient by the use of the
robotic systems during treatment. With the implementation of European regulations
into national law, the national liability law as well as the provisions concerning
medical equipment are of considerable importance. As there is an absence of specific
laws for the purpose, the liability of the medical doctor is determined by applying the
already existing general provisions. The liability of the medical doctor is determined
variously by the different EU member states. In the Federal Republic of Germany,
there is a distinction between the civil and criminal liability of the medical doctor.
In comparison with other medical equipment, the application of robots for
surgery and other medical procedures has its own specific problems. Many norms for
the attribution of legal responsibility presuppose human intentional behavior. This
prerequisite seems to be especially problematic when applied to autonomous and
partially autonomous systems because a human operator does not directly control
these systems but the system acts on its own. Furthermore, what is particularly
problematic with these sorts of systems is who is to be held liable in cases of procedure
failure of the (partially) autonomous robots. Should it be the medical doctor or the
medical institution providing the service?
With respect to criminal law, we have to investigate both the criminal action
and who is culpable. The measure of due diligence is determined in criminal law
both subjectively and objectively. While the perpetrator in the context of subjective
negligence is judged according to individual skills, experiences and knowledge, what
is decisive for judgment of objective negligence, however, is how would a careful,
reflective human being act in the concrete situation of the perpetrator.
The infringement of existing regulations or provisions is of evidential importance
for the allegation of negligence. If there are no existing regulations, then one refers
to the basic social rational standards. The completely vaguely formulated question
concerning the behavior of a rational human agent in a comparable situation can
only be applied in the most minimal manner when complex surgery robots are
implemented.
Further ambiguities emerge when examining issues of illegality. According to
the generally recognized view, every medical treatment, which involves an intrusion
into the human body, is considered to be an assault in terms of criminal law. In
order to demonstrate innocence, the medical doctor needs a legally recognized
7
Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court), Urteil vom 13.6.2006 (VI ZR 323/04).
E. Hilgendorf 571
justification for the action under consideration. Such a justification could be the
consent of the patient to the medical treatment. For the legal consent it is required
that the medical doctor clearly explains the procedure in a manner suitable that
the patient understands. The implementation of new methods modifies the existing
requirements for explaining the procedure in a clear manner. The content and extent
of this duty to inform are nevertheless not explicitly stipulated.
Current law is not yet fully prepared to meet these challenges. Of course, there
are some regulations which can be applied to damages caused by implementing
robots. Nevertheless, the technological developments raise questions, which cannot
be answered by taking recourse to the previous dogmatic views without elaboration.
The legal uncertainties that emerge when implementing robots for surgery and
other medical procedures constitute a liability risk for the treating doctor, which the
suitable correctional measures are meant to reduce.
2. (Partially) autonomous motor vehicles and road traffic law

Robotic systems also provoke new legal problems for road traffic, which have
to be resolved on the level of international law. The defining rules and standards
concerning road traffic in Europe are in particular the 1968 Viennese Agreement
(VA) and the licensing of manufacturing specifications from the guidelines (RL
2007/46/EG). Furthermore, in the context of the licensing, the ECE-regulations of
the United Nations are relevant.
As international law, the VA states that the contracting parties adapt their national
road traffic rules to the determinations of the VA. The harmonized European and
international manufacturing vehicle specifications unify the national provisions and
therefore secure unified standards for vehicles. In relation to the new innovative
technologies especially with regard to road traffic, we face not only national but
also European and international legal challenges, which result in the need for legal
adjustment to the changed technological circumstances.
In today’s world, the diverse stabilization- and respectively, assistant-systems are
well recognized and accepted. To name some of the important ones are the ABS (anti-
blocking systems), ESC (electronic stability control), start- and stop-technologies,
as well as lane-, distance- and parking-assistants. However, the development of
the autonomous systems is not complete. Efforts to develop and implement the
autonomously acting vehicles have the consequence that the resulting legal challenges
have to first be recognized and then somehow resolved.
In some current research projects, autonomous vehicles have already been built
and some are also being tested. An example is the Google-car, which has drawn a
lot of public curiosity in the last few years. The question arises whether one could
introduce such vehicles in Europe without serious legal questions being triggered. It
has to be thoroughly investigated whether these vehicles can be licensed and whether
they can be used in terms of current law.
In this context, an essential problem is the control of the vehicle by the driver.
According to VA article 13, paragraph 1, permanent control of the car is explicitly
required. This requirement is also reflected in national road traffic laws (for example,
Germany in Paragraph 3, StVO). The rapidly developing motor vehicle technology,
which has as its goal the creation of higher standards of safety and driving comfort,
increasingly places this legally normed requirement for driver control into question.
In addition to fundamental ambiguities, as, for example, how to precisely define
the term “control” and its implicated scope, questions concerning the possible effects
on licensing arise and need to be solved. Thus, in this context, one may question
whether the driver of an autonomous vehicle who does not take on the task of
driving still controls the vehicle and whether this control has effects on the nature of
the vehicle itself.
Problems concerning liability in road traffic result. Especially, fault-based liability
in the form of the driver’s liability and tortious liability provides new challenges to
existing law. In addition to the question what standards of culpability with regard
to the foreseeability of damage should be, we also have to rethink the possibilities
for exculpation of the driver. There are further problems when one considers the
liability of the owner of the vehicle irrespective of culpability. For example, how does
one evaluate the risk of running the autonomous vehicle? All the above-mentioned
questions point to the considerable need to do research in the field of road traffic.
The objectives of such research should concern the creation of suitably adjusted and
unitary laws which contribute to legal security in the new technologies especially
with regard to road traffic.
3. The use of unmanned air systems

Within the last few years, the technology of unmanned air systems (UAS) has
spread rapidly all over the world. When examining the legal and ethical problems
which arise with the implementation of unmanned aircraft, the so-called drones,
military applications have to be distinguished from civil ones. At the moment, there
are hardly any national or European regulations for running drones for civilian
purposes.
Furthermore there is a legal limbo with regard to many aspects of the current
legal status of the military implementation of unmanned aircraft. Although specific
detailed legal regulations are absent, the technology has nevertheless been used in
military scenarios. To assess the legal situation, it is imperative to outline the state of
the art of current technologies. However, the rigorous confidentiality surrounding
the drone projects does not allow the obtaining of reliable information as well as the
E. Hilgendorf 573
legal and social-political monitoring of the individual procedures used.

The problem of the legitimacy of the general implementation of drones is
narrowly connected with the question of the legitimacy of the deliberate killing,
so-called “targeted killing”, which predominantly is carried out today by unmanned
air systems (UAS). According to international views, there must be a distinction
between the use of drones in warfare zones and in zones which are not designated
as warfare zones. There is an alarming tendency to use “the end justifies the means”
arguments in this context, combined with an absence of any legal stipulations. For
the alleged legitimate goal of killing terrorists, or the elimination of terrorist cells,
one thereby accepts a violation of international law. So far there has not been any
powerful public opposition to this kind of argumentation.
In a first step, the moral and ethical problems as well as the immediate impact
of these technologies on international law have to be elaborated. Only then can the
establishment of new regulations dealing with the use and restrictions of military
drones be considered. It is necessary to consider the possible danger of a reduced level
of restraint when beginning a military conflict. This is due to the fact that, by using
drones, the number of dead soldiers on one’s own side is substantially minimized.
In such situations, there may also be something like a “play-station mentality”
and a morally and ethically alarming “loss of reality” due to the increasing spatial and
emotional distance between the pilots participating and the battle scenarios when
drones are implemented. With regard to the ever-increasing level of autonomy of the
implicated systems, one must consider the extent to which individual human beings
are involved in such actions and to what extent the individuals are absolved from
such decision processes. The question of legal responsibility of the robot system is a
core problem in the intersection between robotics and law and therefore is relevant
for the military implementation of robotic systems.
Fundamentally, current law does not provide attribution of responsibility to
a machine for any specific “behavior” undertaken by that machine. One always
attempts to trace the behavior of a machine back to a specific person who can be
held legally responsible for the action. There is a relatively well-defined chain of
responsibility in the military for remotely controlled drones, which does not differ
from the traditional military chain of responsibility. However, serious problems enter
the moment the robotic system makes autonomous decisions within the chain of
responsibility that cannot be clearly predicted, and cannot be traced back to one
person or group (e.g., programming of software, the manufacturer, or the current
operator). Up to now, the responsible military personnel have always provided
assurance that there will be a human being involved in the chain of decision making,
the so-called “man-in-the-loop”.
At this point, the definition of the alleged autonomy of robots comes into
question. In this context, it has to be clarified whether the person in the future
will just have the option to intervene within a more or less autonomous process,
e.g., veto-rights. One has to keep in mind when addressing these problems that the
window of response time of the action will become ever smaller due to technological
progress. There might occur situations in which only a robotic system is able to make
the decision within microseconds whether, in the case of being attacked, a deadly
counterattack is called for or not.
In addition, the international problems must also be discussed: Can one attribute
combat status to a more or less autonomously acting military robot? Can the pilot of
the drone who is several thousand kilometers away from the battlefield be considered
a combatant?
Still another point to consider is whether the target killing missions performed
for foreign secret services (e.g., the CIA) by these unmanned aerial vehicles or aircraft
violate the sovereignty rights in those lands in which the aerial strikes have taken
place but nevertheless are not at war with the land that executes these missions. One
has to carefully investigate the often used justification of the “global war against
terror,” or respectively against “the Al-Qaida network”.
In view of the rapid technological developments especially in the realm of
autonomous weapon systems, an international legal discussion is urgently indicated.
4. Robots and data protection law

The implementation of robotic systems also raises new questions in the realm
of data protection. On the one hand, there are ethical questions that concern, for
example, the combined effects of Ubiquitous Computing with robotics. On the
other hand, there are also legal problem-constellations connected with this in the
realm of data protection. The object of the data protection directive 95/46/EG is
the protection of privacy of natural persons when processing data related to these
persons. The technological progress in robotics raises the question whether the recent
technological opportunities lead to new legal problems with reference to the general
and more specifically with regard to legal problems of data protection.
Concerns about the legal ramifications should be oriented to the state of the
art in current research but should also illuminate fictional scenarios. Already today
completely autonomously driven vehicles are tested successfully on public roads8.
It seems that this technology will be ready in the not too distant future for market
distribution. Moreover, it is quite conceivable that there will many more options for
implementing robotic systems both in the private and public sectors.
What is especially problematic in all this with regard to data protection is the
8
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_car (23 October 2014).
E. Hilgendorf 575
sensorimotor mode of functioning and the networking of robotic systems. In order

to interact with human beings, or for the purpose of navigation, robots need to
obtain data from their current environment. It is not important whether the robot
itself collects and processes the data or whether it receives the data from a central
infrastructure. Such sensory systems, which consist of cameras and other sensors,
can convey by means of wireless signal the relevant information to all robots in the
near environment.
The possibility of the implementation of such networked environmental sensors
indicates the legal problems of data protection. Taking a photograph of an empty
street is itself not a problem. However, taking a picture of a person implies the
obtaining of person-related data. The development of newer and better sensors does
not only lead to technological problems but also legal problems of data protection.
One of the basic principles of data-protection laws is the characteristic of
transparency. According to the transparency principle, persons whose data are
collected and processed have to be informed. Moreover, the individuals concerned
must have the opportunity to inform themselves about what data was concretely and
specifically collected about them. As in video-surveillance in super markets, or the
sensory surveillance of public places, so also with robots that independently process
person-related data, the processing of this data must be indicated to the people
involved.
In addition to networking, the autonomous mode of functioning presents a
further new problem. With the implementation of a completely autonomous system
in which the user has no possibility to intervene, it is not possible to predict which
data will be collected about which persons. The problem is comparable to that of
accountability or responsibility according to civil law.
In many EU member states there are existing regulations for traditional video-
surveillance, but this is not true for the networked sensory systems in which there
are no national or supranational standards. Even in the draft for the planned EU’s
fundamental regulation for data-protection, robot systems are not taken into account.
In view of the ever-increasing technological progress on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, the immense importance of the data-protection laws for the freedom of
individuals, the early discussion of this theme is imperative.
The outlined problematic issues indicate the urgent necessity to consider the
legal implications with regard to robotics. Only the technology accepted by law and
society will be successful.
To sum up: in Technology Law, a new kind of lawyer is emerging: the expert
on legal compliance. Instead of looking at problematic cases that lie in the past,
the compliance advisor looks at technological projects and developments of the

present and gives advice how to avoid complications with the law in the future. His
professional attitude may be compared not so much to that of a judge, but to that of
an engineer: he wants to make things possible. Maybe, this new profession of legal
compliance will help to bridge the gap between law and technology at last.
Telerobotic surgery: a look back at the dawn of a new era
Ugur Tumerdem
Table of contents: 1. Introduction. – 2. History of telerobotic surgery. – 3. Telerobotics in

surgery today. – 4. Future developments and potential. – 5. Conclusions.
1. Introduction
The coining of the term robot is credited to the Czech playwright, Karel Capek.
In his science fiction play Rossum’s Universal Robots dated 1921, Capek envisions
a future dystopia where, robota (from the Czech word for slave), the mechanical
slaves revolt against mankind. Following this imaginary work and the developments
in electrical circuits and motor systems, Elektro developed by Westinghouse Inc. in
1939 was one of the first humanoid robots ever built1. However its only capabilities
were moving its arms up and down, rotating its head, turning on and off lights on
its eyes, and playing back recorded speeches. Following these imaginative examples,
Isaac Asimov wrote his groundbreaking stories on robots, which were later collected
under the name I, Robot. It was also in these stories where the first robot laws
were provided. Real working robots, as we know them in the modern sense, came
into existence in the 1950s. The first industrial robot was developed and patented
by Devol in 19542. Following this, two pioneers Devol and Engelberger started
Unimation Inc. in 1956, the first robotics company in history. The first Unimation
systems were used in the automotive industry. In 1969, Stanford Arm, the first 6
DOF freedom robot, for which complex arm kinematic solutions could be solved for
1
N. Sharkey, A. Sharkey, Electro-mechanical robots before the computer, Proceedings of the Institution
of Mechanical Engineers, Part C: “Journal of Mechanical Engineering Science” 223.1, 2009, pp. 235-
241.
2
R.M. Murray, et al., A mathematical introduction to robotic manipulation, CRC press, 1994.
578 Telerobotic surgery: a look back at the dawn of a new era
the first time, was developed by Scheinmann at Stanford University3. In the 1970s
and 1980s Japanese companies entered the robotics market, actually dominated it in
the 1980s and an explosion in the number of robots took place. Today’s industrial
robots are variations of these early examples, and have been almost perfected in terms
of performance. Today, more than 1.5 million of them are in use according to the
2013 statistics of the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). The reason why
robots are popular in industry is that they can work with great accuracy, repeatability,
can manage heavy loads and can operate under harsh working conditions, tirelessly.
However industrial robots can do repeatable work only in structured environments
whose parameters are coded into the robots. In unstructured environments, robots
can still not accomplish tasks that are easily realized by people. Under circumstances
where robot-like precision and power as well as human like manipulation skills are
required, teleoperation systems are often used. Teleoperation means remote operation
or operating systems from a remote place.
Teleoperation dates back to late 19th century, especially to the discovery of electric
circuits and radio. Nikola Tesla demonstrated one of the first teleoperation systems,
a remote radio controlled boat, which was at the same time one of the first RC
devices in the world, in 18984. The first master-slave teleoperation system in today’s
sense was developed by R. Goertz working at the Argonne National Laboratory
where Enrico Fermi had also developed the first nuclear reactor in the world5. This
system was developed to remotely manipulate objects in parts of a reactor where
people could not enter. The system was made up of two mechanically connected
pantographs. In the 1950’s and 1960’s Goertz further developed this system with
electromechanical actuators, such that the separated parts were electrically, not
mechanically, connected6. GE used the same idea in its YESMAN7 system in the
1950’s advertised as a machine with arms and hands. It can be understood from
this that teleoperation systems actually came into presence around the same time as
industrial robots, but with different applications. The MASCOT System was also a
teleoperation system developed in Italy for use at European Nuclear Energy Agency8.
This system also used electric motors and analog electronics. It was used until 1990
in analog mode and was later converted to digital electronics. Another teleoperation
3
M. Folgheraiter, G. Gini, MaximumOne: an anthropomorphic arm with bio-inspired control system,
in Biomimetic Neural Learning for intelligent robots, Berlin Heidelberg, Springer, 2005, pp. 281-298.
4
K. Goldberg, Networked Robots: Ten Years of Experiments, Algorithmic Foundations of Robotics VI,
Berlin Heidelberg, Springer, 2005, pp. 11-16.
5
R.C. Goertz, Mechanical master-slave manipulator, Nucleonics (US) Ceased publication 12, 1954.
6
R.C. Goertz, et al., The ANL Model 3 Master-Slave Electric Manipulator–Its Design and Use in a Cave,
Trans. Am. Nuclear Soc. 4.2, 1961.
7
Conveyor, Monoflo. “670 Of Current Interest ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING”.
8
L. Galbiati, et al., Control and Operational Aspects of the Mascot 4 force feedback servomanipulator of
JET, in Fusion Engineering, 1991. Proceedings., 14th IEEE/NPSS Symposium on. IEEE, 1991.
U. Tumerdem 579
system developed for nuclear plants was the British Rivet and later Spider systems
used between 1960s and 1980s9. The difference of these systems was that they were
mobile with tracks that enabled the manipulator to move around the facility.
Teleoperation in the 21st century is now very much intermingled with robotics.
Actually, according to the definition of robots by the ISO standard 8373 that came
into effect in 2012, a robot is an actuated mechanism programmable in two or more
axes with a degree of autonomy, moving within its environment, to perform intended
tasks. Autonomy in this context means the ability to perform intended tasks based on
current state and sensing, without human intervention. However, the term ’a degree
of autonomy’ also includes teleoperation. Since the systems used for teleoperation on
the user side and the remote side, are often robots, this kind of teleoperation is also
called telerobotics. One example of teleoperation is in robotic surgery, the main focus
of this paper, where a doctor uses specially developed robotic joysticks to control
robot instruments to operate on the patients. Another teleoperation example would
be the bomb defusing robots that are remotely controlled by soldiers or the police in
the field, which are actually very similar to the Rivet system in terms of mechanical
structure, but have more advanced capabilities. Yet another military application is
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or drones that are operated via satellite by pilots
using telepresence systems. A civilian application is in the excavation systems that
provide the operators with the ability to manipulate large loads for construction.
2. History of telerobotic surgery

The introduction of robotics and teleoperation into surgery actually coincided
with the revolutionary developments in surgery techniques. 1980s saw the
invention (or reinvention according to some) of the Minimal Invasive Surgery
(MIS) procedures. Minimal Invasive Surgery is the general name for techniques
that make use of endoscopes and remote operation capable surgical instruments, to
perform surgery on the patients through small incisions as opposed to open surgery.
Although first laparoscopy using such tools was performed in the beginning of 20th
century on dogs10, the beginning of the Minimal Invasive Surgery revolution is often
dated as 1985 or 1987 when Muhe and Mouret published their MIS results for
cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal) with laparoscopy11. What probably enabled
9
British Nuclear Energy Society. Remote Techniques for Nuclear Plant: Proceedings of the Conference
Organized by the British Nuclear Energy Society, Held at Stratford-upon-Avon on 10-13 May 1993,
Thomas Telford, 1993.
10
S.J. Spaner, G. Lorenwarnock, A brief history of endoscopy, laparoscopy, and laparoscopic surger, in
“Journal of Laparoendoscopic and Advanced Surgical Techniques” 7.6, 1997, pp. 369-373.
11
C.A. Blum, A. Craig, D.B. Adams, Who did the first laparoscopic cholecystectomy?, in “Journal of
minimal access surgery” 7.3, 2011, p.165.
this revolution was the invention of new technologies such as instrument mountable
cameras and specially designed laparoscopic tools that made MIS operations feasible
for a wide range of surgical tasks. The main advantage of MIS operations is that,
because incisions are very small, blood loss is decreased, risk of infection becomes
less, healing and discharging durations from hospitals decrease, complications are
less and scars are much less visible12. However one of the main problems in MIS or
laparoscopic surgery is the lack of ergonomics for the surgeon during operation. In
laparoscopic surgery, because surgeons can not directly see where they are operating
on, they have to make use of a camera or some other image transmitting device
which has a limited view of the inside of the patient, and furthermore they have to
deal with the fulcrum effect, moving the laparoscope around a single incision port,
exactly in the opposite direction of the instrument. It has been shown that MIS is
much more stressful for surgeons compared to open surgery and surgeons need to
concentrate more to achieve the same level of success as open surgery13. The explosion
in the number of robots in the 1980’s and the exceptional accuracy, repeatability and
speed of robots inspired researchers to apply robotics and teleoperation technology
in medicine and especially surgery. At the end of 1980’s US Army funded SRI
International and NASA research for telesurgery in the battlefield. The aim was to
provide surgery on soldiers with minimal harm to the doctors. SRI developed the
first telesurgery system at the end of the 1980s. This system was a very large open
surgery system, that could also provide force feedback. Following this success, SRI
was given research funding from National Institute of Health and DARPA (Defence
Advanced Research Projects Agency) and further developed its system14. Similar
funding was also given to institutions such as IBM, MIT, NASA, Computer Motion
Inc. With this funding IBM Watson Research Center developed a robot system that
could control the position of an endoscopic camera15. In 1994 Computer Motion
Inc. developed a robot endoscope system called AESOP that could be positioned
with voice commands and received for the first time FDA clearance in 199516.
Following the recent developments in minimal invasive surgery, Green at SRI
12
V. Velanovich, Laparoscopic vs open surgery, in “Surgical endoscopy” 14.1, 2000, pp. 16-21.
R.P. Kiran, et al., Operative blood loss and use of blood products after laparoscopic and conventional
open colorectal operations, in “Archives of surgery” 139.1, 2004, pp. 39-42; R. Tacchino, F. Greco,
D. Matera, Single-incision laparoscopic cholecystectomy: surgery without a visible scar, in “Surgical
endoscopy” 23.4, 2009, pp. 896-899.
13
R. Berguer, W.D. Smith, Y.H. Chung, Performing laparoscopic surgery is significantly more stressful
for the surgeon than open surgery, in “Surgical endoscopy” 15.10, 2001, pp. 1204-1207.
14
R.M. Satava, Surgical robotics: the early chronicles: a personal historical perspective, in “Surgical
Laparoscopy Endoscopy and Percutaneous Techniques” 12.1, 2002, pp. 6-16.
15
R.H. Taylor, et al., A telerobotic assistant for laparoscopic surgery, in “Engineering in Medicine and
Biology Magazine”, IEEE 14.3, 1995, pp. 279-288.
16
J.P. Ruurda, Th JMV van Vroonhoven, I.A.M.J. Broeders, Robot-assisted surgical systems: a new
era in laparoscopic surgery, in “Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England” 84.4, 2002, p. 223.
U. Tumerdem 581
developed a minimal invasive surgery system17 in 1994. In 1995 Medical Doctor

Frederik Moll realised that SRI telesurgery system could be extremely practical if
applied to Minimal Invasive Surgery which was perceived as a difficult operation18.
Following this realisation, to commercialise SRI’s technology, Intuitive Surgical
Inc. was founded. Intuitive Surgical started its operation by licensing SRI and IBM
patents in 1995. Intuitive developed its first Minimal Invasive Surgery robot calling
it Da Vinci and started animal experimentations in 1996. Da Vinci was available for
purchase in 1999 and received FDA clearance in 2000 for human surgery. Computer
Motion Inc. also started developing a MIS robot in 1996 calling it Zeus. It received
FDA clearance in 2001. First intercontinental telesurgery was also realised by the
Zeus system in 2001 between NY and Strasbourg (Operation Lindbergh)19. In
2003 Intuitive Surgical and Computer Motion battled over patents and decided to
merge due to legal complications under the banner of Intuitive. Zeus system was
discontinued and Da Vinci became the sole system for robotic MIS in the market.
Today Da Vinci system is used exclusively for MIS rather than the initial goal SRI
started with, which was telesurgery. This new robot differed from the previous
SRI robots, in that it was specialized for MIS, rather than open surgery, and this
required some tradeoffs. In robotic MIS, unlike other robotic applications, most of
the dexterity is required inside the human body, confined to a very small space, and
therefore the instrument of the Da Vinci robot has 5 degrees of freedom inside the
body, with the use of a pulley and wire transmission system20. The most important
advantage of the system is that the surgical instrument tips have 5 DOF, and can do
very precise motions in a very small area such as inside the human body. Outside the
body and around the incision port, the robot needs only two degrees of freedom. The
use of a pulley wire system meant that force feedback was now virtually impossible.
The Da Vinci system is composed of a Master console and a 4 armed Slave Robot.
The surgeon is comfortably seated on the console and can see the endoscope views
in 3D. Two 7 DOF robot arms are used by the surgeon to control two surgical
instruments exactly like the natural extension of his hands, inside the patient and the
two endoscopic cameras are positioned using the other two arms. Motion between
robots can be switched or put on hold by foot pedals. For stability purposes, Da Vinci
was designed as a system confined to an operating room. Although it is technically
and literally a teleoperation system, the master and slave robots are within the same
17
J.W. Hills, et al., Telepresence surgery demonstration system, in Robotics and Automation, 1994.
Proceedings, 1994 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 1994.
18
S. Dimaio, M. Hanuschik, U. Kreaden, The da Vinci surgical system. Surgical Robotics, Springer
US, 2011, pp. 199-217.
19
S.E. Butner, M. Ghodoussi, Transforming a surgical robot for human telesurgery, in Robotics and
Automation, IEEE Transactions on 19.5, 2003, pp. 818-824.
20
G.H. Ballantyne, F. Moll, The da Vinci telerobotic surgical system: the virtual operative field and
telepresence surgery, in “Surgical Clinics of North America” 83., 2003, pp. 1293-1304.
room, and the system cannot work in long distances, and therefore it is usually not
considered a telesurgery system.
3. Telerobotics in surgery today

After merging with Computer Motion Inc., Intuitive Surgical has become the sole
company providing telerobotic MIS systems. The company is growing the robotic
MIS market consistently, and has been successful in applying the system to various
kinds surgical operations. There are considerable advantages of robotic MIS over
conventional laparoscopic surgery. The advantages of robotic MIS are, improved
dexterity, tremor filtering, up to 5 times scaling of motion and microscopic precision,
lack of moment forces and impression of direct manipulation rather than mirror
imaging, 3-10 times image zooming, ergonomic position that provides the doctor
with longer endurance. The disadvantages are the loss of tactile feedback, larger trocar
radiuses and entry ports, less placement options for endoscope entry due to robot
size and collision possibility, and difficulty in operating in upper and lower abdomen
at the same time, difficult direct access to patient, requirement for specially trained
personnel, and the system cost which is about 2 million USD sales price and an extra
150-200 thousand USD for maintenance per year21. Also the single use instruments
that cost between 600-1000 USD per piece can be changed 3-8 times per operation,
driving up the costs depending on the operation. Although many papers demonstrate
the superiority of Laparoscopic and Robotic MIS with respect to open surgery in
many operations22, there is a lack of research papers that demonstrate the superiority
of robotic surgery with respect to pure laparoscopic surgery. Some papers actually
demonstrate that there is not a statistically significant difference in terms of results
between pure and robotic minimal invasive surgery procedures while saying that the
costs for robotically assisted surgery are higher23. There is a need for papers that use
randomized controlled experiments to compare these methods24. Due to the lack of
21
C. Ho, et al., Robot-Assisted Surgery Compared with Open Surgery and Laparoscopic Surgery: Clinical
Effectiveness and Economic Analyses [Internet], Ottawa: Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies
in Health (CADTH), 2011.
22
R.C. Frazee, et al., A prospective randomized trial comparing open versus laparoscopic appendectomy, in
“Annals of surgery” 219.6, 1994, p. 725; A.M. Lacy, et al., The long-term results of a randomized clinical
trial of laparoscopy-assisted versus open surgery for colon cancer, in “Annals of surgery” 248.1, 2008, pp.
1-7.
23
J.V. Joseph, et al., Robot-assisted vs pure laparoscopic radical prostatectomy: are there any differences?,
in “BJU international” 96.1 (2005): 39-42; L.H.P. Braga, et al., Systematic review and meta-analysis
of robotic-assisted versus conventional laparoscopic pyeloplasty for patients with ureteropelvic junction
obstruction:effect on operative time, length of hospital stay, postoperative complications, and success rate, in
“European urology” 56.5, 2009, pp. 848-858.
24
V. Ficarra, et al., Retropubic, laparoscopic, and robot-assisted radical prostatectomy: a systematic review
and cumulative analysis of comparative studies, in “European urology” 55.5, 2009, pp. 1037-1063.
U. Tumerdem 583
consensus there is a heated debate among doctors and scientists over the necessity of
robotic MIS. But since robotic surgery systems can make laparoscopic surgery more
ergonomic and faster25 they have made life easier for surgeons and have thus become
widely adopted. For instance certain specific operations such as hysterectomy and
prostatectomy the use of Da Vinci system can go up to 85% (in the US)26. This is
a significant number and despite the lack of overwhelming scientific justification in
terms of outcomes, it shows that robotic MIS is widely adopted. The reasons for this
adoption rate could be the operational advantages and speed robotics provides for
surgeons and hospitals, the confidence of patients in robotics technology, as well as
the marketing power. Other than the initial investment there doesn’t seem to be a
big difference in terms of the costs for surgical operations that use laparoscopic, open
and robotic surgery techniques27. Due to this, currently there about 2871 Da Vinci
systems around the world and about 80% of them are in the U.S. The numbers are as
follows: US: 2001, Japan: 105, U.K.: 91, Italy: 66, France: 63, Germany: 61, Turkey:
21, Greece: 828. Obviously not everything is perfect for patients that undergo Robotic
MIS and recently many lawsuits against Intuitive Surgical were filed in the U.S.
The claims of patients that were badly affected were that the surgeons are not well
educated for robotic surgery, and that Intuitive Surgical does not provide necessary
training, consulting, certification for doctors and institutions and does not have the
necessary procedures and regulations for such efforts29. American law firms still seek
patients that were badly affected after robotic surgery with TV advertorials, and it is
possible that this could turn into a class action lawsuit.
4. Future developments and potential

So what will be the future of robotics in MIS? The key reason for the dominance
of Intuitive Surgical in the MIS market, are the patents licensed in 1995 from SRI.
These patents give Intuitive Surgical the exclusive right in the ’manipulation of
human tissue and medical devices, for the purposes of not only animal and human
25
G. Hubens, et al., A performance study comparing manual and robotically assisted laparoscopic surgery
using the da Vinci system, in “Surgical endoscopy and other interventional techniques” 17.10, 2003, pp.
1595-1599.
26
D.V. Makarov, et al., The association between diffusion of the surgical robot and radical prostatectomy
rates, in “Medical care” 49.4, 2011, pp. 333-339.
27
M.C. Bell, et al., Comparison of outcomes and cost for endometrial cancer staging via traditional
laparotomy, standard laparoscopy and robotic techniques, in “Gynecologic oncology” 111.3, 2008, pp.
407-411.
28
Intuitive Surgical Investor Presentation Q4-2013.
29
R. Rabin, New Concerns on Robotic Surgeries, New York Times 9 (2013); P. Marks, Robo-surgeon da
Vinci faces lawsuits, New Scientist 217.2910, 2013, p. 20.
(open) surgery, but also laparoscopic surgery and microsurgery30. Similarly, the patent
licensed from IBM and the AESOP patents that were obtained after the merger deal
with Computer Motion in 2003 have paved the way for Intuitive Surgical to be the
only company in the Robotic MIS market. Perhaps due to lack of any competition,
the Da Vinci system has not seen any fundamental changes since its inception.
However, some of the patents that give the company this supremacy have started
to expire, and the last patent from SRI will expire by 201631. Many robotic surgery
companies are waiting for this date to enter the market, and introduce more radical
products. The competition in the market is expected to cause a drop in robotic surgery
costs and improve robot functionalities especially in the areas that Da Vinci system
is weak. There are already some companies that have come up with breakthrough
ideas in robotic surgery. These new ideas are usually in the form of different actuation
and control methods, however their impact could be huge. For example, the snake
like moving robotic catheter system from Hansen Medical is such a system32. The
system can enter the body just like normal catheter from a vein but, due to its
actuated catheter sheath which is teleoperated, it can achieve much more complex
operations in the heart such as atrial fibrillation to solve cardiac arrhythmia, or angio
and stent placement. This system could enable in the future, MIS procedures with
entry from natural orifices or veins and could be more minimal invasive than the
current systems. The company has already started operation and sold some systems
for catheter applications. The SPORT system developed at Vanderbilt University and
licensed to Titan Medical Inc. in Canada is also a breakthrough technology33. It can
realize MIS through a single port of about 15mm in diameter, which is close to the
Da Vinci port size and Da Vinci requires 4 entry ports. Once the laparoscope enters
the body, from inside it a stereo camera and two snake like robot arms emerge. These
arms are highly dexterous and can handle heavy loads. They can achieve similar MIS
procedures with the Da Vinci endoscopes requiring 3 less entry holes. This system
could provide much more minimal invasiveness.
Another company that provides a breakthrough is Canadian IMRIS, whose system
NeuroArm is a brain surgery (not MIS) robot that can operate together with an MRI
in the operating room34. This is a first, and a very difficult feat to accomplish, because
30
Annual Report Pursuant To Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal
Year Ended December 31, 2004, Form 10-K , Intuitive Surgical, Inc. 2005.
31
A.N. Hoffman, Intuitive Surgical, Inc.: How Long Can Their Monopoly Last?, 2010.
32
P. Kanagaratnam, et al., Experience of robotic catheter ablation in humans using a novel remotely
steerable catheter sheath, in “Journal of Interventional Cardiac Electrophysiology” 21.1, 2008, pp. 19-
26.
33
K. Xu, et al., System design of an insertable robotic effector platform for single port access (SPA) surgery, in
Intelligent Robots and Systems, 2009. IROS 2009. IEEE/RS International Conference on. IEEE, 2009.
34
G.R. Sutherland, P.B. McBeth, D.F. Louw, NeuroArm: an MR compatible robot for microsurgery,
International Congress Series. Vol. 1256. Elsevier, 2003.
U. Tumerdem 585
very high magnetic fields caused by the MRI make the operation of conventional
robot systems impossible, since motors need magnetic fields and electric current
control, to operate correctly and are usually made up of ferromagnetic materials.
NeuroArm on the other hand makes use of piezo-actuators and non-ferrous materials,
which are not similarly affected, from magnetic fields. Operation together with MRI
provides real time monitoring of brain condition, which was not possible before
with other robotic surgical systems. This kind of visual data feed could improve the
quality of robotic surgery tremendously. Furthermore this data could also be useful
for MIS surgery, providing realtime feedback to the surgeon, augmenting the 3D
vision from the endoscopic camera.
One other important development is the Raven open source surgical system
developed by a consortium of universities in the U.S led by the University of
Washington and UCSC35. The importance of this system is that many research
institutes around the world can purchase it, and can make improvements on the
existing code. This could potentially accelerate the speed with which robotic surgical
systems around the world are developed.
There are some other ideas that are still not pursued in full depth by these
institutions that robotic surgery could benefit from. One of these ideas is telesurgery,
or surgery from far, which was the initial motivation in robotic surgery research.
Time delays in communication networks between robots make telesurgery very
difficult or in some cases almost impossible. Although teleoperation can be realised
without much complication when time delay is less than 150ms, it has been observed
that surgeons are unable to coordinate their motions when the time delay is greater
than 500ms36. Especially the transmission of the sense of touch even with very low
latency can create instabilities in the system, rendering the teleoperation system
unusable. Therefore, developments in communication and networking technologies
are expected to contribute tremendously to telesurgery. The fact that, fiberoptic lines
are proliferating and getting cheaper, faster wireless and ubiquitous communication
technologies are emerging along with new developments such as Virtual Private
Networks(VPN) and Cloud architectures, could perhaps provide more secure and
reliable telesurgery in the future enabling a new revolution in the field. DARPA still
pursues and funds research for the development of TraumaPod, a remote controlled
35
M. J.H. Lum, et al., The RAVEN: Design and validation of a telesurgery system, in “The International
Journal of Robotics Research” 28.9, 2009, pp.1183-1197.
36
R. Rayman, et al., Long-distance robotic telesurgery: a feasibility study for care in remote environments,
in “The International Journal of Medical Robotics and Computer Assisted Surgery” 2.3, 2006, pp.
216-224; M. Perez, et al., Paradigms and experimental set-up for the determination of the acceptable delay
in telesurgery, Conference proceedings:... Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in
Medicine and Biology Society. IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society. Conference, Vol.
2007.
robotic surgery system that can be deployed in the battlefield37. However, telesurgery
could also be exploited for peaceful purposes, for instance it could be a means for
people in poorer or harder to reach areas to access higher quality medical services.
Another missing feature in today’s systems is tactile feeling. Because of the time
delays posing a threat to teleoperation systems and the fact that MIS robots make
use pulley-wire transmission for motion inside the patient, it is almost impossible to
transmit the sense of touch from the patient side robot to the surgeon with today’s
systems38. If the sense of touch were provided, robotic surgery could have a clearer
superiority over laparoscopic surgery. It is possible to transmit the sense of touch
with other actuators and control techniques that provide stable teleoperation under
time delays39, but for better performance further research in this field is necessary.
Also, new control systems could enable multiple doctors distributed over different
places to perform surgery cooperatively, or for instructing or consulting purposes40,
providing a new revolution in how surgery is taught and developed. Other important
developments could be augmented reality systems, which provide surgeons with
enhanced view of the patient’s real-time condition41. Fusing sensor data such as MRI,
CT, Ultrasound and X-Ray, information about the patient could be superimposed
to the 3D vision of the surgeons, giving them much superior control, superhuman
perception abilities, and diagnostic assistance when required during surgery. These
technologies would also help solve registration problems. Registration means
determining what part of the body in the operating environment corresponds to
which part in the preoperative images. It would help surgeons easily determine
entry ports from preoperative images and perform operations that could be risky
without this technology. Other very interesting developments are taking place in
medicine and engineering, and there are already some demonstrations that could be
disruptive technologies in the near future, that could change the destiny of robotics in
medicine. One of those systems is IBM’s Watson computer, which can communicate
with doctors by speaking and can understand what the doctors say by performing
37
P. Garcia, et al., Trauma Pod: a semiautomated telerobotic surgical system, in “The International
Journal of Medical Robotics and Computer Assisted Surgery” 5.2, 2009, pp. 136-146.
38
O.A. J. Van Der Meijden, M. P. Schijven, The value of haptic feedback in conventional and robot-
assisted minimal invasive surgery and virtual reality training: a current review, in “Surgical endoscopy”
23.6, 2009, pp. 1180-1190; S. Shimachi, et al., Adapter for contact force sensing of the da Vinci robot,
in “The International Journal of Medical Robotics and Computer Assisted Surgery” 4.2, 2008, pp.
121-130.
39
U. Tumerdem, K. Ohnishi, Robust four channel teleoperation under time delay by damping injection,
Mechatronics, 2009. ICM 2009. IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2009.
40
U. Tumerdem, K. Ohnishi, Acceleration consensus for networked motion control of telerobots, Advanced
Motion Control, 2008. AMC’08. 10th IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 2008.
41
F. Volont, et al., Augmented reality and image overlay navigation with OsiriX in laparoscopic and
robotic surgery: not only a matter of fashion, in “Journal of hepato-biliary-pancreatic sciences” 18.4, 2011,
pp. 506-509.
U. Tumerdem 587
natural language processing. It can search entire databases with speech queries, in
mere seconds and can assist doctors in diagnostics42. This could help doctors facing
unexpected developments during surgery and in case of emergencies. Another huge
potential is in the development of capsule robots that could enter the body and move
within, transmitting video or other sensor data wirelessly43. There are already systems
that can move in the intestinal tract, but once these robots could get smaller, they
could also move in the blood stream and reach very small targets in the cell level and
perform operations there. There are already examples of nanomotors moving within
cells controlled from outside with ultrasonic effects44. They could be integrated with
teleoperation systems to provide surgeons with access to places in the body that are
not easily reachable by conventional instruments. Another development is the 3D
printer, which could actually be called a robot on its own right. Researchers are
using 3D printers to print tissues45 and in the future the aim will be to print organs,
and although this field is in its infancy it is not hard to imagine these printers next
to the surgical robots of the future, providing the surgeons with fresh organs for
transplantation.
5. Conclusions
From the fact that the number of telerobotic surgery systems around the world is
increasing day by day, it is clear that robotic surgery is here to stay. Although there
are discussions about its effectiveness, one should keep in mind that the technology
is actually in its infancy. Currently, only a single company with limited resources and
without competition is producing these systems. However recent developments show
that new players and new technologies are about to disrupt the market and this will
enable a more competitive development environment with more brain power and
resources flowing into this field. This in return could also provide more democratic
healthcare services to people all around the world. The concurrent convergence of
various technologies in other fields that could also be of great benefit to robotic
surgery is a sign that a new era in surgical robotics is about to begin, and the next 20
years of robotic surgery is certainly going to be much more exciting than the last 20.
42
D.A. Ferrucci, Introduction to “This is Watson”, in “IBM Journal of Research and Development”
56.3.4, 2012, p. 1.
43
G. Ciuti, et al., Robotic magnetic steering and locomotion of capsule endoscope for diagnostic and surgical
endoluminal procedures, in “Robotica” 28.02, 2010, pp. 199-207.
44
W. Wang, et al., Acoustic Propulsion of Nanorod Motors Inside Living Cells, Angewandte Chemie
International Edition 53.12, 2014, pp. 3201-3204.
45
Y. Tan, et al., 3D printing facilitated scaffold-free tissue unit fabrication, in “Biofabrication” 6.2, 2014,
024111.
Robotics and criminal law

(robots, hybrids, chimeras, “technological animals”)1
Silvio Riondato
Table of contents: 1. Foreword. – 2. Robots as objects of penal protection. – 3. Robots

as instruments of crime. – 4. Robots as subjects of crime. – 4.1. Robots as «persons»? –
4.2. Robots as «enemies»? – 5. Preventing Enemy-Robots. Robots as «hybrids», robots as
«chimeras», robots as «crime»?
1. Foreword
The rapid developments in robot technologies and the increasing employment
of robots in the most disparate areas of everyday life call for a reflection on the
implications of robotics in law and, specifically, in criminal law2.
I will consider here the implications of robotics in substantive criminal law, with
particular (albeit not exclusive) reference to Italian law. I will not deal, therefore,
with the employment of robot technologies in criminal trials and, more generally, in
the administration of criminal justice.
There are at least three ways in which robots may play a role in criminal law:
a) as objects of (penal) protection (legal goods);
b) as instruments;
c) as subjects (either offenders or victims).
Of these three aspects, the most problematic is definitely the latter, as it somehow
entails an (at least fictitious) equation between the robot and the human being,
1
My thanks to Lorenzo Pasculli for his precious collaboration.
2
For a general overview of the impact of robots on law (included criminal law) see U. Pagallo,
The Laws of Robots. Crimes, Contracts, and Torts, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013. See also Id., Robotica,
in M. Durante, U. Pagallo (eds.), Manuale di informatica giuridica e diritto delle nuove tecnologie,
Torino, UTET, 2012, p. 141 ff. See also G. Grimaldi, L’uomo e l’automa fra téchne e Aufklärung, in
“Itinerari”, 2014, 2, 63.
590 Robotics and criminal law
with all its ethical, philosophical and legal consequences. On the contrary, the
employment of robots as instruments of crime and their qualification as legal goods
to be protected do not necessarily imply such assimilation between man and robots,
but instead they seem to presuppose a clear separation between them. However,
the novelties of the unstoppable scientific-technological progress raise the question
whether it is convenient to prevent even the creation of certain «technological
animals», also through penal norms, if appropriate.
2. Robots as objects of penal protection

If we consider robots as machines incapable of the unique moral, psychological,
intellectual, rational and reasonable human skills, then we may well consider them
as property. As such, they can well deserve to be protected by law, also with the
instruments typical of criminal law if necessary (for instance, when robots are
particularly valuable and sophisticated robots or they are used for important social
purposes). In such a conception, the qualification of robots as objects of penal
protection does not create any particular theoretical or practical problem.
Especially in view of the future evolutions of robot technologies, though, we feel
quite comfortable in admitting robots as possible legal goods worth to be protected
by criminal law, even assuming that, to a certain extent, some refined AI entities
could be equated to non-human «life forms». Besides, various systems of criminal
law do protect non-human beings from harm already. The most obvious example is
the penal protection of (non-human) animals.
The real problem is represented by the possibility to shift from the consideration
of robots as objects of protection from criminal aggressions to their qualification
as victims of crime. The issue is not so fantastic, facing both the foreseeable
developments of robotics (and especially AI entities) and the recent emergence of
interpretative orientations aiming at considering non-human life forms, especially
animals, proper crime victims. This perspective entails the attribution of rights and
interests to robots and fall under the more general problem whether robots might be
considered subjects of crime, which we will consider later.
3. Robots as instruments of crime

The qualification of robots as instruments of crime presupposes a conception of
robots as always depending on the human being and incapable of purely autonomous
action. Such qualification implies that robots are used by men as means to perform
criminal offences, which is probably the most ordinary occurrence at the current
state of robotic technology. The concrete examples of such case are the most disparate
S. Riondato 591
and they cover practically every sector of criminality, including crimes of negligence.
From AI devices used to disable the computerised security system of a bank or to
destroy or damage computer data, to robot planes, soldiers or weapons used in
modern warfare; from industrial robots accidentally causing personal injuries to a
worker to unmanned automatic weapons killing an innocent man during a military
operation.
The conception of robots as instruments of crime entails a clear distinction
between the instrument and the action in the theory and the structure of crime, as
devised by Delogu several years ago3. The action is always attributed to the human
being, both objectively (from a causal point of view, the robot cannot perform any
action without the previous creation and programming) and subjectively (the action,
no matter how complex, ultimately belongs to the human agent that knowingly and
willingly realises it). Incidentally, this is true also for crimes of negligence, as – at
least according to the Italian penal system – also the negligent action is voluntary
and conscious, while in this case is the harmful event that the agent does not want,
although he can foresee and prevent it.
The instrument, on the contrary, exists outside the (human) individual4 and, thus,
it may be entirely robotic, although it is used by men to supplement or to perform
their criminal actions. In this sense also a complex «action» of a robot entity (the
movements of a robotic arm, the calculations of an elaborate AI system, the shots
fired by a robot soldier…) are to be considered instrumental to the criminal action
(technically considered as an element of crime) entirely attributable to the human
being.
In this conception, the robotic nature of the instrument may have a particular
relevance, amongst others, as an element to measure the intensity of the mens rea as
well as the dangerousness or harmfulness of the overall action, which may be assessed
as aggravating or mitigating element by the court in sentencing (in the Italian system
the reference here goes to art. 133 of the penal code). The instruments of crime are
also relevant as goods that may be confiscated or seized, both in application of a
preventive or security measure or as consequence of the application of a criminal
sentence. Also international and supranational law (for instance, the Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption or the Council of Europe Convention
on the Protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse) includes the
«instrumentalities» of criminal offences amongst the possible objects (together with
the proceeds of crime) of confiscation5.
3
T. Delogu, Lo «strumento» nella teoria generale del reato, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1974, p. 275 ff.
4
Cf. F. Alimena, La questione dei mezzi idonei nel tentativo, Roma, in “Il Foro italiano”, 1930, p. 65.
5
On the notion of «instrumentalities» in the of the Council of Europe conventions see L. Pasculli,
Le misure di prevenzione del terrorismo e dei traffici criminosi internazionali, Padova, Padova University
Press, 2012, p. 249 ff.
The idea of robots as instruments of crime does not give raise to any particular new
problem with respect to the general issues concerning the instruments of crime in the
criminal law system. Once again, the problems start when we switch to a conception
of the robot as an autonomous entity capable of taking action notwithstanding the
intent or the negligence of the human creator or programmer. If we assume that AI
entities are capable to determine their own behaviour in complete independence,
then we should ask who should be held responsible for their criminal actions – which
could not be attributed to any human being.
Here we come again to the problem of the possible inclusion of robots amongst
the subjects of crime.
4. Robots as subjects of crime

The problem of the qualification of robots (in particular, AI entities) as subjects of
criminal law strictly depends on the solution of the more general question whether
a robot can be legally entitled to rights and duties – in other words, whether the
robot can be considered a so-called centre of legal imputation. Of course, ultimately,
the answer to this question depends on the anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric
vision of the world we assume as a starting point.
Let us consider the perspective of positive law.
4.1. Robots as «persons»?

In most Western jurisdictions, criminal law is centred on the human person.
Many constitutional traditions, as well as international charters of human rights
(the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 1966; the
European Convention on Human Rights; the Charter of the Fundamental Rights
of the European Union etc.) are all based on the common acknowledgement and
recognition of the value of the human person and committed to the protection of
fundamental human rights and liberties. The «human» attribute of such rights and
liberties speaks for itself. The strongest means to realise the protection of the human
person is precisely criminal law. The protection is double-sided: on the one hand
criminal law protects citizens from the harm caused by criminal offences, on the
other hand it protects the individual (suspected or accused of a crime) from unlawful
and arbitrary compressions of his fundamental rights and liberties.
This personalistic orientation of criminal law is confirmed by positive law as
numerous dispositions make reference to the notion of «person». It is a consolidated
and longstanding legal acquisition, though, that in time the legal notion of «person»
have expanded beyond the original naturalistic meaning of the word, so to include
other subjects that, while not being «persons» in nature, are considered «persons» by
S. Riondato 593
law («legal persons» or legal entities). This way, law – the same law created by humans
– has proved to be elastic enough to adjust itself to the emergence of new centres
of legal imputation. In various jurisdictions, this also brought to the extension of
criminal liability also to entities that are not human individuals.
The most typical example is that of corporations, which are considered «subjects»
of crime, for instance in those legal systems that adopt models of corporate criminal
liability, according to which corporations may be held responsible for crimes.
Corporations are generally considered also victims of crime, as such entitled to
compensation for damages. Another example is given by the fact that recently some
Authors and courts have suggested that (non-human) animals could be considered
victims of crime6 (besides, the quality of crime victim does not presuppose the same
psychological requirements of criminal liability).
However, it cannot be ignored that even such extensions of the notion of «person»
and, more specifically, the qualification of non-human entities as «subjects» of crime
are generally aimed at promoting or protecting the interests and values typical of
the human being. Indeed, the attribution of rights, interests and obligations to non-
human entities – be they animals or corporations – always takes place according
to the values and the sense of justice of human lawmakers. In other words, it is
men who decide what is right or wrong for non-human entities. In conclusion, as a
human product, criminal law (and law in general) cannot but be constructed around
the ultimate value of the human person.
In such a framework, there are no particular reasons to deny that also robots could
be potentially included within the extended notion of «persons» and be entitled to
rights and duties7, provided that it remains clear that:
t the legal recognition of attributes of «personality» or of human features
to robots would be purely fictitious. Indeed, robots are not capable of the
same moral, psychological and intellectual qualities of men. Even the most
sophisticated forms of Artificial Intelligence (AI) follow algorithms and paths
that have pre-established by their human creators: also robots capable to act
independently and unpredictably are programmed to do so (meaning that
men have always the power to prevent that);
6
Cf. A.N. Ireland Moore, Defining Animals as Victims of Crime, in “J. Animal Law”, 2005, p. 91
ff. As for case-law, see the Oregon Court of Appeals’ decision in the case State of Oregon v. Arnold
Weldon Nix reported at 251 “Or App” 449, 283 P3d 442 (2012), which maintained that animals can
be considered victims of crime. The Supreme Court allowed petition for review in the case, precisely
on the issue whether animals are to be considered «victims» pursuant to the Oregon Revised Statute
(sec. 161.067) when a criminal defendant has committed «animal neglect in the second degree» (ORS
167.325).
7
On the topic L. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, in “North Carolina L. Rev.”, April
1992, p. 1231 ff. For a parallelism between corporate criminal liability and the possible robot criminal
liability see P.M. Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective, Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on «Robotics and Automation, Workshop on Roboethics» (Rome, 14 April 2007).
t such a recognition would always be justified by the need or the opportunity

of pursuing particular human objectives, ultimately connected with the
protection of all-human values;
t it is always men that determine what is right and wrong for the robots,
according to their own sense of justice.
Outside the boundaries and limitations of the above-mentioned framework a
complete legal assimilation of robots to men to the purposes of criminal law it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to conceive. Some may be not satisfied with such
a reductive option and may push the analogy between men and robots to more
extreme consequences. In fact, some did conceive models of direct criminal liability
of robots, based on the debatable premise that robots are capable of action (actus
reus) and of culpability (mens rea)8. Apart from their (many) theoretical flaws, such
models cannot contradict the underlying idea that even a direct criminal liability of
robots would eventually serve human purposes (such as social control) and would be
based on the human sense of justice.
4.2. Robots as «enemies»?

Other than the expansion of the notion of legal personhood so to embrace non-
human entities, an opposite tendency is worth consideration. It is the tendency,
shared by different legal orders, to degrade the legal statute of particular (human)
persons in order to deprive them of those rights and liberties that would belong them
as human beings, generally (but not necessarily) by reason of their dangerousness (to
this trend belong the models of the theory of enemy criminal law9). Thus, certain
persons become non-persons. The most paradigmatic case is that of the so-called
«enemy aliens»10, a legal category created by the U.S. government in order to exclude
particular individuals not only from the safeguards granted by the U.S. constitution
8
Cf. G. Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Entities – from Science Fiction to Legal Social
Control, in “Akron Intell. Prop. J.”, 4, 2010, p. 171 ff. and Id., «I, Robot – I, Criminal» − When Science
Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots committing Criminal Offenses, in «Syracuse Sci. &
Tech. L. Reporter», 22, 2010, p. 1 ff. See also, amplius, Id., When Robots Kill: Artificial Intelligence
under Criminal Law, Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2013.
9
G. Jakobs, On the Theory of Enemy Criminal Law, 2010, on http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/bclc/crimweb/
foundation/Jakobs%20current.pdf (13 April 2014); M. Tondini, Beyond the Law of the Enemy. Recovering
from the Failures of the Global War on Terrorism through Law, 2007, http://www.juragentium.org/topics/wlgo/
cortona/en/tondini.htm (13 April 2014); C. Gomez-Jara Diez, Enemy Combatants versus Enemy Criminal
Law, in “Buffalo Law Review”, 2008, 1; C. Saas, Exceptional Law in Europe with Emphasis on “Enemies”.
Preventive Detention and Criminal Justice, 2012, http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/faculty/
adversaryconference/exceptionallawsineuropewithemphasisonenemiesapril2012.pdf (13 April 2014); M.
Papa, Droit pénal de l’ennemi e de l’inhumaine: un débat international, in “Revue de science criminelle et
de droit pénal comparé”, 1, 2009, p. 1 ff.
10
See, one for all, D. Cole, Enemy aliens: double standards and constitutional freedoms in the war on
terrorism, New York-London, New Press, 2003 and Id., Enemy Aliens, in “Stan. L. Rev.”, 54, 2002,
p. 953.
S. Riondato 595
to American citizens, but also from the enjoyment of some fundamental human
rights (to the extent that some of them have been subject to torture).
Given such tendency, is not unlikely that whenever robots should be considered
harmful or dangerous to men, they would be treated and fought as enemies. The
human reaction to a robot threatening serious harm to valuable human goods and
interests would be probably that of maintaining it unworthy of the legal treatment
granted to human beings (that is the rights and guarantees typical of criminal law
and procedure) and deserving to be neutralised or destroyed. The non-human nature
of robots would render the «war on robots» more justifiable than many other «wars»
that men are recently declaring with so much ease (the «war on poverty», «war on
crime», the «war on terror» etc.), where the «enemy» and the «alien» is another
«human» or «human-non-human» being.
5. Preventing Enemy-Robots. Robots as «hybrids», robots as «chimeras», robots as «crime»?

Besides, the creation of robots replicating too closely human qualities, of
«technological animals», in itself might be regarded at with diffidence by law. Not
only because of the personalistic (if not anthropocentric) conception adopted by
many jurisdictions, but also because of specific existing dispositions forbidding the
creation of non-human beings sharing human features. Such dispositions reveal a
legitimate human fear: the fear that man might someday loose control of its own
technological creations, which might turn against him11. The main problem that all
the areas I have covered so far have in common is the possible non-controllability by
man of his own technological creature having essential qualities that are human or
however similar to human qualities, included the strengthening of human qualities
to the point of crossing the limit of the human through superhuman and/or inhuman
entities, acting in a more or less relative autonomy. The employment of such entities
in war opens the most terrifying perspective.
In Italy a legislative disposition expressing this kind of concern may be found
in article 13 of Law n. 40 of 2004 on medically assisted procreation. Amongst the
many prohibitions concerning the experimentation and research on human embryos
established by article 13 there is the general ban of the production of hybrids and
chimeras. The creation of chimeras is expressly prohibited also in other jurisdictions,
such as the United States of America (USA Human Chimera Prohibition Act 2005)
Canada (Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004), confirming that the
need for control and regulation over the production of non-human creatures having
11
A fear that inspired many fictional works, starting from Čapek’s Possum’s Universal Robots, which
firstly introduced the word robot, from the Czech word «robota» (hard labour) [K. Čapek, R.U.R.
(Rosumovi Umělí Roboti), 1920].
human features is not merely an Italian concern.

Article 13 of the Italian Law 40/2004 technically refers to the so-called interspecies
living being, whereas «chimeras» are organisms having cells with different genetic
inheritance, coming from two or more genetically different animals, belonging to the
same or to different species, while «hybrids» are organisms having cells with the same
genetic inheritance, which is originated by crossing different species – as clarified by
the National Committee for Bioethics (CNB)12. However, in the common language
the word «chimera» is also used to denote a monster having different natures (in
Greek mythology the «chimera» was a fire-breathing monster resembling a lion in
the forepart, a goat in the middle, and a dragon behind) or, in a broadest meaning, to
denote a fantastic idea or figment of the imagination13, in which we may well include
the possibility of «humanised» robots. Besides, robots share with (non-human)
animals – which are the main elements of chimeras in its traditional or biological
conception – the common feature of being capable of action but not of rational
and moral thought. So that, if the rationale behind article 13 of Law 40/2004 is to
prevent the creation of beings having at the same time animal and human qualities
(such as the strength of a tiger and the mind of a man), then the norm may well
prelude to an analogous prohibition of the creation of beings having at the same
time robot and human qualities (such as the durability and the power of a machine
and the brain of a man), to be set once that robotics will be able to accomplish such
a creation.
The interesting thing is that the extant prohibition of the production of chimeras
is backed with a penal sanction. The violation of this prohibition is sentenced
with the same punishment established for the general violation of the prohibition
of experimentation on embryos, which is imprisonment up to three years and a
fine from 50.000 to 150.000 Euros, but for the former violation the court may
aggravate the sentence. In other words, criminal law is used to prevent (and repress)
the creation of (non-human) beings sharing human characters. The legislator chose
to protect the natural essence of the human person from the creation of different
creatures having some human features with the strongest and strictest instrument
available: punishment (and a very harsh punishment, indeed).
This does not seem consistent with the perspective of the legal admissibility of
the future creation of sophisticated AI entities having practically the same emotional,
moral, intellectual feelings of men. Nevertheless, regardless their legal admissibility,
12
Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica (Italy), Chimere ed ibridi con una riflessione particolare sugli ibridi
citoplasmatici, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 26 June 2009.
13
«Chimera», in Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica
Inc., 2014, in http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111597/Chimera (05 April 2014); E.
Casetta, Dall’ornitorinco alle chimere. Una sfida al realismo tassonomico, in “Intersezioni”, 2, 2010, p.
277.
S. Riondato 597
one cannot exclude that in the concreteness of factual reality robot entities of such
kind may be actually created.
In this (still purely imaginary) case, there can be two alternative scenarios, which
follow the two-fold (inclusionary/exclusionary or assimilationist/separationist)
perspective we have been tracing so far. Either robots will integrate completely in
human legal orders, becoming entitled to all the rights and liberties to which men
are entitled – with no limitation or distinction – or robots and men will disagree on
what is right and what is wrong (robots might refuse to be subject to human law and
might claim their own laws). Amongst the possible outcomes of the latter scenario
there is, of course, the ultimate war between men and robot, which may potentially
bring to the destruction of the human race.
At the present moment, the exclusionary and separationist perspective seems to
prevail – at least in jurisdictions that, like Italy, reject the possibility of the creation
of fantastic beings potentially escaping men’s control – as this ultimate war, with its
destructive effects, is precisely what the human laws we have been citing above are
aimed to prevent.
Robotica e diritto penale

(robot, ibridi, chimere, “animali tecnologici”)1
Silvio Riondato
Sommario: 1. Prefazione. – 2. Robot come oggetti di tutela penale. – 3. Robot come strumenti di rea-
to. – 4. Robot come soggetti del reato. – 4.1. Robot come «persone»? – 4.2. Robot come «nemici»? – 5.
Prevenire i Robot-Nemici. Robot come «ibridi», robot come «chimere», robot come «reato»?
1. Prefazione
I rapidi sviluppi delle tecnologie robotiche e il crescente impiego dei robot nei più dispa-
rati ambiti della vita quotidiana, richiedono una riflessione sulle implicazioni della robotica
nel diritto e, in particolar modo, nel diritto penale2.
Qui di seguito, andrò a considerare le implicazioni della robotica nel diritto penale so-
stanziale, con particolare (sebbene non esclusivo) riferimento al diritto italiano. Non tratterò,
quindi, l’impiego delle tecnologie robotiche nel processo penale e, più in generale, nell’am-
ministrazione della giustizia penale.
Ci sono almeno tre modi in cui i robot possono svolgere un ruolo nel diritto penale:
a) come oggetti di tutela (penale) (beni giuridici);
b) come strumenti;
c) come soggetti (rei ovvero vittime).
Di questi tre aspetti, il più problematico è sicuramente quest’ultimo, in quanto in qual-
che modo implica un’equazione (quantomeno fittizia) tra il robot e l’essere umano, con tutte
le relative conseguenze etiche, filosofiche e giuridiche. Viceversa, l’utilizzo dei robot come
strumenti di reato e la loro qualificazione come beni giuridici da tutelare, non comporta
1
Un sentito ringraziamento a Lorenzo Pasculli per la sua preziosa collaborazione.
2
Per una panoramica generale sull’impatto dei robot sul diritto (incluso il diritto penale) si veda U.
Pagallo, The Laws of Robots. Crimes, Contracts, and Torts, Dordrecht, Springer, 2013. Si veda inoltre
Id., Robotica, in M. Durante, U. Pagallo (a cura di), Manuale di informatica giuridica e diritto delle
nuove tecnologie, Torino, UTET, 2012, p. 141 ss. Vedi inoltre G. Grimaldi, L’uomo e l’automa fra
téchne e Aufklärung, in “Itinerari”, 2014, 2, 63.
600 Robotica e diritto penale
necessariamente tale assimilazione tra uomo e robot, ma piuttosto sembra presupporre una
netta separazione tra gli stessi. Tuttavia, le novità dell’inarrestabile progresso scientifico-tec-
nologico, sollevano la questione se sia opportuno impedire persino la creazione di determina-
ti “animali tecnologici”, anche attraverso delle norme penali, laddove appropriato.
2. Robot come oggetto di tutela penale

Se consideriamo i robot macchine incapaci di quelle abilità morali, psicologiche, intel-
lettuali, razionali e ragionevoli tipicamente umane, allora possiamo ben considerarli beni
patrimoniali. Come tali, possono ben essere meritevoli d’essere tutelati dalla legge, anche con
gli strumenti tipici del diritto penale, se necessario (per esempio, quando i robot siano parti-
colarmente preziosi e sofisticati o quando vengano utilizzati per importanti scopi sociali). In
tale accezione, la qualifica di robot come oggetto di tutela penale non crea nessun particolare
problema teorico o pratico.
Tuttavia, soprattutto in previsione dei futuri sviluppi della robotica, potremmo tranquil-
lamente ammettere i robot quali possibili beni giuridici meritevoli di tutela penale, fino ad
ipotizzare che, entro certi limiti, alcuni raffinati soggetti di intelligenza artificiale potrebbero
essere equiparate a “forme di vita” non-umane. Del resto, diversi sistemi di diritto penale tu-
telano già esseri non-umani da certe offese. L’esempio più evidente è quello della tutela penale
degli animali (non-umani).
Il vero problema è rappresentato dalla possibilità di passare dalla considerazione dei ro-
bot come oggetto di tutela dalle aggressioni penali, alla loro qualificazione come vittime di
reato. La questione non è così fantasiosa, di fronte sia ai prevedibili sviluppi della robotica (e
in particolar modo delle entità di intelligenza artificiale) sia alla recente comparsa di orienta-
menti interpretativi volti a considerare le forme di vita non umane, specialmente gli animali,
vere e proprie vittime di reato. Tale prospettiva comporta l’attribuzione di diritti e interessi
ai robot e rientra nel più vasto problema, che affronteremo più avanti, relativo al fatto che i
robot possano essere considerati soggetti del reato.
3. Robot come strumenti del reato

La qualifica dei robot come strumenti del reato presuppone una concezione dei robot
quali sempre dipendenti dall’essere umano e incapaci di azione puramente autonoma. Tale
qualificazione implica che i robot siano impiegati dagli uomini come mezzo per compiere i
reati - allo stato attuale della tecnologia robotica, questo è probabilmente il caso più consueto.
Gli esempi concreti di tale ipotesi sono i più disparati e coprono praticamente ogni settore
della criminalità, compresi i reati colposi. Dai dispositivi di intelligenza artificiali utilizzati
per disattivare il sistema di sicurezza informatico di una banca o per distruggere o danneg-
giare i dati di un computer, ad aerei, soldati o armi robotici utilizzati nelle guerre moderne;
dai robot industriali che accidentalmente provocano lesioni personali ad un lavoratore, alle
armi automatiche teleguidate che uccidono un uomo innocente nel corso di un’operazione
militare.
La concezione dei robot come strumenti del reato comporta una netta distinzione tra
S. Riondato 601
il mezzo e l’azione, nella teoria e nella struttura del reato, così come individuato da Delogu
diversi anni fa3. L’azione è sempre attribuita all’essere umano, sia oggettivamente (dal punto
di vista causale, il robot non può eseguire nessuna azione senza una precedente creazione e
programmazione) sia soggettivamente (l’azione, non importa quanto complessa, appartiene in
definitiva all’agente umano che la realizza con coscienza e volontà). Per inciso, questo è vero
anche per i reati colposi, poiché – almeno secondo il sistema penale italiano – anche l’azione
colposa è volontaria e consapevole, mentre in questo caso è l’evento dannoso a non essere
voluto dall’agente, nonostante quest’ultimo potesse prevederlo e prevenirlo.
Lo strumento, viceversa, esiste al di fuori dell’individuo (umano)4 e, perciò, può essere
completamente robotico, pur se impiegato dagli uomini per integrare o per compiere le loro
azioni criminali. In tal senso anche «azioni» complesse di un’entità robotica (il movimento di
un braccio robotico, i calcoli di un elaborato sistema di intelligenza artificiale, i colpi sparati
da un soldato-robot...) sono da considerarsi strumentali all’azione criminosa (tecnicamente
considerata quale elemento del fatto di reato) e interamente attribuibili all’essere umano.
In questa concezione, la natura robotica dello strumento può avere un particolare rilievo,
tra l’altro, quale elemento per misurare l’intensità della colpevolezza così come la pericolosità
o la lesività dell’azione complessiva, il che può essere valutato come fattore aggravante o atte-
nuante dal giudice in fase di condanna (nel sistema italiano il riferimento qui va all’art. 133
del codice penale). Gli strumenti del reato sono inoltre rilevanti anche come beni oggetto di
confisca o sequestro, sia in applicazione di misure preventive o di sicurezza sia in esecuzione
di una condanna penale. Anche il diritto internazionale e sovranazionale (per esempio, la
Convenzione di diritto penale sulla corruzione del Consiglio d’Europa o la Convenzione del
Consiglio d’Europa per la protezione dei minori contro lo sfruttamento e l’abuso sessuale) include
gli «strumenti» («instrumentalities») del reato (insieme ai proventi del reato) tra i possibili
oggetti di confisca5.
L’idea dei robot come strumenti del reato, non fa sorgere alcun nuovo particolare pro-
blema relativamente alle questioni generali riguardanti gli strumenti del reato nel sistema di
diritto penale. Ancora una volta, i problemi iniziano quando si passa ad una concezione di
robot come entità autonoma capace di agire indipendentemente dal dolo o dalla colpa del
creatore o programmatore umano. Se presupponiamo che i soggetti di intelligenza artificiale
siano capaci di determinare il proprio comportamento in completa autonomia, allora do-
vremmo chiederci chi debba essere ritenuto responsabile delle loro azioni criminose – dal
momento che non possiamo attribuirle ad alcun essere umano.
Ed ecco che si ripropone nuovamente il problema della possibile inclusione dei robot tra
i soggetti del reato.
3
T. Delogu, Lo «strumento» nella teoria generale del reato, in “Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.”, 1974, p. 275 ss.
4
Cfr. F. Alimena, La questione dei mezzi idonei nel tentativo, Roma, in “Il Foro italiano”, 1930, p. 65.
5
Sulla nozione di «instrumentalities» nelle convenzioni del Consiglio di Europa vedi L. Pasculli, Le
misure di prevenzione del terrorismo e dei traffici criminosi internazionali, Padova, Padova University
Press, 2012, p. 249 ss.
4. Robot come soggetti del reato

Il problema della qualificazione dei robot (in modo particolare delle entità di intelligenza
artificiale) come soggetti di diritto penale, dipende strettamente dalla soluzione della questio-
ne più generale se un robot possa essere legittimamente titolare di diritti e doveri – in altre
parole, se il robot possa essere considerato un cosiddetto centro d’imputazione giuridica. Sen-
za dubbio, la risposta a tale interrogativo dipende, alla fin fine, dalla visione antropocentrica
o non-antropocentrica del mondo che si assume come punto di partenza.
Consideriamo la prospettiva del diritto positivo.
4.1. Robot come «persone»?

Nella maggior parte degli ordinamenti occidentali, il diritto penale è incentrato sulla
persona umana. Molte tradizioni costituzionali, così come le carte internazionali dei diritti
umani (il Patto Internazionale sui Diritti Civili e Politici, New York 1966; la Convenzione
Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo; la Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea etc.) si
basano tutti sulla comune ammissione e riconoscimento del valore della persona umana e si
impegnano alla tutela dei diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali. L’utilizzo dell’aggettivo
«umano» per descrivere tali diritti è, di per sé, significativo. Lo strumento più efficace per rea-
lizzare la tutela della persona umana è proprio il diritto penale. La tutela è duplice: da un lato
il diritto penale protegge i cittadini dai danni causati dai reati, dall’altro protegge l’individuo
(sospettato o accusato di un crimine) da illegittime ed arbitrarie compressioni dei suoi diritti
e libertà fondamentali.
Questo orientamento personalistico del diritto penale trova conferma nel diritto positi-
vo, dal momento che numerose disposizioni fanno riferimento alla nozione di «persona». Si
tratta di un’acquisizione giuridica lungamente consolidata anche se, con il passare del tempo,
la nozione giuridica di «persona» si è estesa al di là dell’originario significato naturalistico del
termine, tanto da includere altri soggetti che, pur non essendo «persone» in natura, vengono
considerate tali dal diritto («persone giuridiche» o enti giuridici). In tal modo, il diritto – lo
stesso diritto creato dagli esseri umani – ha dimostrato d’essere sufficientemente elastico per
adattarsi all’emersione di nuovi centri di imputazione giuridica. In diversi ordinamenti ciò
ha anche portato all’estensione della responsabilità penale anche ad entità che non sono in-
dividui umani.
Il caso più tipico è quello delle società, che sono considerate «soggetti» del reato, ad esem-
pio in quei sistemi giuridici che adottano modelli di responsabilità penale degli enti in forza
dei quali le società possono essere ritenute responsabili di reati. Le società sono generalmente
contemplate anche come vittime del reato e come tali, sono titolari del diritto al risarcimento
dei danni. Un altro esempio è dato dal fatto che recentemente alcuni autori e alcuni tribunali
hanno suggerito che gli animali (non umani) possano essere considerati vittime di reato6
6
Cfr. A.N. Ireland Moore, Defining Animals as Victims of Crime, in “J. Animal Law”, 2005, p. 91
ss. Per quanto riguarda la giurisprudenza, si veda la decisione della Corte d’Appello dell’Oregon sul
caso State of Oregon v. Arnold Weldon Nix riportato in 251 “Or. App.” 449, 283 P3d 442 (2012), nella
quale si sosteneva che gli animali possono essere considerati vittime di reato. La Corte Suprema ha
accolto la richiesta di judicial review del caso, proprio in relazione alla questione se gli animali possano
essere considerati come «vittime» ai sensi dello Statuto Rivisto dell’Oregon (sec. 161.067), qualora un
S. Riondato 603
(d’altronde, la qualità di vittima di reato non presuppone gli stessi requisiti psicologici della
responsabilità penale).
Tuttavia, non si può ignorare che proprio tali estensioni della nozione di «persona» e, più
specificatamente, la qualificazione delle entità non-umane come «soggetti» del reato, siano so-
litamente finalizzate a promuovere o proteggere gli interessi e i valori tipici dell’essere umano.
Infatti, l’attribuzione di diritti, interessi ed obblighi a entità non-umane – siano esse animali
o società – avviene sempre in base ai valori e al senso di giustizia del legislatore umano. In
altre parole, sono gli uomini a decidere cosa è giusto o sbagliato per le entità non-umane. In
conclusione, in quanto prodotto umano, il diritto penale (e il diritto in generale) non può che
essere costruito attorno al valore ultimo della persona umana.
Sulla base di tale inquadramento, non ci sono ragioni particolari per negare la potenziale
inclusione dei robot nella nozione estesa di «persona» titolare di diritti e doveri7, fermo re-
stando che:
a) il riconoscimento giuridico ai robot degli attributi della «personalità» o delle carat-
teristiche umane, sarebbe puramente fittizia. Infatti i robot non sono dotati delle
stesse qualità morali, psicologiche e intellettuali dell’uomo. Persino le forme più
sofisticate di Intelligenza Artificiale (IA) seguono gli algoritmi e i percorsi prestabiliti
dai loro creatori umani: anche i robot capaci di agire indipendentemente e in modo
imprevedibile, sono programmati per farlo (il che significa che gli uomini hanno
sempre il potere di impedirlo);
b) un tale riconoscimento sarebbe sempre giustificato dalla necessità o opportunità di
perseguire particolari obiettivi umani, in ultima riconducibili alla tutela di valori
squisitamente umani;
c) sono sempre gli uomini a stabilire cosa sia giusto e sbagliato per i robot, secondo il
proprio senso di giustizia.
Al di fuori dei confini e dei limiti del quadro sopra menzionato, è molto difficile, se
non impossibile, concepire una piena assimilazione giuridica dei robot agli uomini ai fini
del diritto penale. Qualcuno potrebbe trovare insoddisfacente una visione così riduttiva e
potrebbe spingere l’analogia tra uomini e robot fino a conseguenze più estreme. Alcuni hanno
effettivamente concepito dei modelli di responsabilità penale diretta dei robot, fondati sulla
discutibile premessa che i robot sarebbero capaci di azione (actus reus) e colpevolezza (mens
rea)8. Tralasciando i (molti) vizi teoretici, tali modelli non sono comunque in grado di con-
traddire l’idea di fondo per cui persino una responsabilità penale diretta dei robot sarebbe, in
ultima, al servizio di obiettivi umani (come il controllo sociale) e fondata sul senso di giustizia
umano.
imputato fosse reo di «abbandono di animali di secondo grado» (ORS 167.325).
7
Sul tema L. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, in “North Carolina L. Rev.”, Aprile
1992, p. 1231 ss. Per un parallelismo tra la responsabilità penale delle società e l’eventuale responsabilità
penale dei robot si veda P.M. Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective, Atti del Convegno
IEEE su «Robotics and Automation, Workshop on Roboethics» (Roma, 14 aprile 2007).
8
Cf. G. Hallevy, The Criminal Liability of Artificial Entities – from Science Fiction to Legal Social
Control, in “Akron Intell. Prop. J.”, 4, 2010, p. 171 ss. e Id., «I, Robot – I, Criminal» − When Science
Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI Robots committing Criminal Offenses, in “Syracuse Sci.
& Tech. L. Reporter”, 22, 2010, p. 1 ss. Si veda inoltre, amplius, Id., When Robots Kill: Artificial
Intelligence under Criminal Law, Boston, Northeastern University Press, 2013.
4.2. Robot come «nemici»?

Oltre all’estensione della nozione di personalità giuridica tale da inglobare le entità
non-umane, merita d’essere considerata un’opposta tendenza. É la tendenza, condivisa da
diversi ordinamenti giuridici, a declassare lo status giuridico di particolari persone (umane)
al fine di privarle dei diritti e delle libertà che apparterrebbero loro in quanto esseri umani,
generalmente (ma non necessariamente) a causa della loro pericolosità (a questa tendenza
appartengono i modelli della teoria del diritto penale del nemico9). In tal modo, certe per-
sone diventano non-persone. Il caso più paradigmatico è quello dei cosiddetti «enemy aliens»
(«stranieri nemici»)10, categoria giuridica creata dal governo americano al fine di privare sin-
goli individui non solo delle garanzie garantite dalla Costituzione degli Stati Uniti ai cittadini
americani, ma anche del godimento di alcuni diritti umani fondamentali (al punto che alcuni
di tali individui sono stati sottoposti a tortura).
Alla luce di tale tendenza, non è improbabile che laddove i robot dovessero essere ritenuti
dannosi o pericolosi per gli uomini, possano venire trattati e combattuti come nemici. La
reazione umana ad un robot che minacciasse gravi offese a importanti beni e interessi umani,
sarebbe probabilmente quella di ritenere i robot indegni del trattamento legale garantito agli
esseri umani (cioè i diritti e le garanzie tipiche del diritto e della procedura penale) e merite-
voli di essere neutralizzati o distrutti. La natura non-umana dei robot renderebbe la «guerra
ai robot» meglio giustificabile rispetto alle molte altre guerre che di recente gli uomini vanno
dichiarando con tanta disinvoltura (la «guerra alla povertà», la «guerra al crimine», la «guerra
al terrorismo» etc.), dove il «nemico» e lo «straniero» sono altri esseri «umani» o «umani non-
umani».
5. Prevenire i Robot-Nemici. Robot come «ibridi», robot come «chimere», robot come «reato»?
D’altronde, la creazione di robot che replicano troppo da vicino le qualità umane, di
«animali tecnologici», potrebbe di per sé essere vista con diffidenza dalla legge. Non solo per
la concezione personalistica (se non antropocentrica) adottata da molte giurisdizioni, ma
anche a causa dell’esistenza di specifiche disposizioni che vietano la creazione di esseri non-
umani dotati di caratteristiche umane. Tali disposizioni rivelano un legittimo timore umano:
la paura che un giorno l’uomo possa perdere il controllo delle proprie creazioni tecnologiche,
le quali potrebbero rivoltarsi contro di lui11. Il problema principale comune a tutti i settori
9
G. Jakobs, On the Theory of Enemy Criminal Law, 2010, su http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/bclc/
crimweb/foundation/Jakobs%20current.pdf (13 aprile 2014); M. Tondini, Beyond the Law of the
Enemy. Recovering from the Failures of the Global War on Terrorism through Law, 2007, http://www.
juragentium.org/topics/wlgo/cortona/en/tondini.htm (13 aprile 2014); C. Gomez-Jara Diez, Enemy
Combatants versus Enemy Criminal Law, in “Buffalo L. Rev.”, 2008, 1; C. Saas, Exceptional Law in Europe
with Emphasis on “Enemies”. Preventive Detention and Criminal Justice, 2012, http://www.law.unc.edu/
documents/faculty/adversaryconference/exceptionallawsineuropewithemphasisonenemiesapril2012.
pdf (13 aprile 2014); M. Papa, Droit pénal de l’ennemi e de l’inhumaine: un débat international, in
“Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé”, 1, 2009, p. 1 ss.
10
Si veda, tra tutti, D. Cole, Enemy aliens: double standards and constitutional freedoms in the war on
terrorism, New Press, New York-London 2003 e Id., Enemy Aliens, in “Stan. L. Rev.”, 54, 2002, p. 953.
11
Un timore che ispirò molte opere di fiction, a partire da Possum’s Universal Robots di Capek, che
S. Riondato 605
fin qui considerati, è la possibile incontrollabilità da parte dell’uomo delle sue stesse creature
tecnologiche dotate di qualità essenziali umane o comunque simili a quelle umane, compreso
il potenziamento di qualità umane fino ad oltrepassare il limite dell’umano con entità sovrau-
mane e/o non-umane, che agiscono in più o meno relativa autonomia. L’impiego bellico di
tali entità apre prospettive terrificanti.
In Italia, una disposizione legislativa espressiva di questo tipo di timore può rinvenirsi
nell’articolo 13 della legge n. 40 del 2004 sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita. Tra i
tanti divieti posti dall’articolo 13 circa la sperimentazione e la ricerca sugli embrioni umani,
vi è il divieto generale di produrre ibridi e chimere. La creazione di chimere è espressamente
vietata anche in altre giurisdizioni, quali gli Stati Uniti d’America (USA Human Chimera
Prohibition Act 2005), e il Canada (Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004), il che
conferma come la necessità di controllare e regolare la produzione di creature non-umane
dotate di caratteristiche umane, non sia una preoccupazione esclusivamente Italiana.
L’articolo 13 della legge italiana n. 40/2004 tecnicamente si riferisce ai cosiddetti esseri
viventi interspecie, laddove le «chimere» sono organismi aventi cellule con patrimonio ge-
netico diverso, provenienti da due o più animali geneticamente differenti, appartenenti alla
stessa specie o a specie diverse, mentre gli «ibridi», sono organismi nei quali tutte le cellule
condividono lo stesso patrimonio genetico, originato da incroci tra specie diverse, così come
specificato dal Comitato Nazionale per la Bieoetica (CNB)12. Tuttavia, nel linguaggio comu-
ne la parola «chimera» è anche utilizzata per indicare un mostro polimorfo (nella mitologia
Greca la «chimera» era un mostro sputafuoco: leone nella parte anteriore, capra nel mezzo e
drago nella parte posteriore) oppure, in senso più ampio, un’idea fantastica o frutto dell’im-
maginazione13, il che può ben includere la possibilità di robot «umanizzati». Del resto, i robot
condividono con gli animali (non-umani) – che sono i componenti principali delle chimere
nella concezione tradizionale o biologica – la caratteristica comune d’essere capaci d’azio-
ne ma non di pensiero razionale e morale. Sicché, se la ratio dell’articolo 13 della legge n.
40/2004 è quella di impedire la creazione di esseri che abbiano allo stesso tempo qualità ani-
mali ed umane (come la forza di una tigre e l’intelletto dell’uomo), allora la norma potrebbe
ben preludere ad un analogo divieto rispetto alla creazione di esseri dotati, allo stesso tempo,
di qualità robotiche ed umane (come la durata e la potenza di una macchina e il cervello di
un uomo), da imporsi una volta che la robotica sarà in grado di realizzare una tale creazione.
La cosa interessante è che l’esistente divieto della produzione di chimere, è accompa-
gnato da una sanzione penale. La violazione di tale divieto è sanzionata con la stessa pena
prevista per la generica violazione del divieto di sperimentazione sugli embrioni, e cioè con
la reclusione fino a tre anni e la multa da 50.000 a 150.000 Euro, ma per la prima violazione
il giudice può aumentare la pena. In altre parole, il diritto penale è utilizzato per prevenire
per primo introdusse il termine robot, dalla parola ceca «robota» (lavori forzati) [K. Čapek, R.U.R.
(Rosumovi Umělí Roboti), 1920].
12
Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica (Italy), Chimere ed ibridi con una riflessione particolare sugli ibridi
citoplasmatici, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 26 giugno 2009.
13
«Chimera», in Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica
Inc., 2014, in http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111597/Chimera (05 April 2014); E.
Casetta, Dall’ornitorinco alle chimere. Una sfida al realismo tassonomico, in “Intersezioni”, 2, 2010, p.
277.
(e reprimere) la creazione di esseri (non-umani) che condividono caratteristiche umane. Il

legislatore ha scelto di tutelare l’essenza naturale della persona umana rispetto alla creazione
di diverse creature dotate di alcune caratteristiche umane mediante lo strumento più forte e
rigoroso a disposizione: la pena (e, invero, una pena molto severa).
Questo non sembra coerente con la prospettiva dell’ammissibilità giuridica di una fu-
tura creazione di sofisticate entità di intelligenza artificiale praticamente dotate degli stessi
sentimenti emotivi, morali ed intellettuali degli uomini. Tuttavia, a prescindere dalla loro
ammissibilità giuridica, non si può escludere che, nella concretezza della realtà fattuale, entità
robotiche di questo genere possano effettivamente essere create.
In tale (allo stato puramente immaginaria) ipotesi, ci potrebbero essere due scenari al-
ternativi che seguirebbero la duplice prospettiva (inclusivista/esclusivista o assimilazionista/
separazionista) che abbiamo fin qui delineato. O i robot si integreranno totalmente negli or-
dinamenti giuridici umani, diventando titolari di tutti i diritti e le libertà di cui sono titolari
gli uomini – senza limitazioni o distinzioni – oppure robot e uomini saranno in disaccordo
su cosa sia giusto e cosa sia sbagliato (i robot potrebbero rifiutarsi di essere assoggettati alla
legge umana e potrebbero rivendicare delle proprie leggi). Tra i possibili esiti di quest’ultimo
scenario, vi è senza dubbio, quello della guerra finale tra uomini e robot, che potrebbe poten-
zialmente portare alla distruzione della razza umana.
Al momento, la prospettiva esclusivista e separazionista sembra prevalere – almeno nelle
giurisdizioni, come l’Italia, che respingono la possibilità della creazione di esseri fantastici
che possono sfuggire al controllo dell’uomo – giacché questa guerra finale, con i suoi effetti
distruttivi, è esattamente ciò che le leggi umane che abbiamo menzionato sono finalizzate a
prevenire.
Note on the Authors
Gleb Bogush, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Lomonosov Moscow State
University, Russia; Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, National Research
University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia.
Riccardo Borsari, Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Padova,

Italy.
Gülay Bulut, Associate Professor at the Department of Genetics and Bioinformatics,

Faculty of Arts and Science, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey.
Stefano Canestrari, Full Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Bologna,

Italy; Member of the National Committee for Bioetics.
Carlo Casonato, Full Professor of Comparative Public Law at the University of

Trento, Italy.
Deborah W. Denno, Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law at Fordham University

School of Law of New York, U.S.A.
Eric Hilgendorf, Professor of Criminal law and Legal Informatics at the University
of Würzburg, Germany.
Roberto E. Kostoris, Full Professor of Criminal Procedure Law at the University

of Padua, Italy.
Natalya Krylova, Professor at the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology

of the Faculty of Law, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia.
Maria Beatrice Magro, Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the Guglielmo

Marconi University, Italy.
Andrea Manfrinati, Research Fellow in Social Psychology at the Department of

Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy.
Adelmo Manna, Full Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Foggia, Italy.
Leonardo Mazza, Full Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Siena, Italy.
608 Note on the Authors
Óscar Morales García, Professor of Law at the ESADE Ramon Llull University;
Head of the Criminal Law Department of the Barcelona office of Uría Menéndez
Law Firm, Spain.
Paolo Moro, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Padua, Italy.
Emrah Nikerel, Assistant Professor at the Department of Genetics and

Bioinformatics, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul; Assistant Professor at the Department
of Genetics and Bioengineering, Yeditepe University, Istanbul, Turkey.
Lorenzo Pasculli, Adjunct Professor in Law at the Department of Biomedical

Sciences of the University of Padua, Italy.
Pietro Pietrini, Full Professor of Clinical Biochemistry and Clinical Molecular

Biology at the University of Pisa; Director of the Clinical Psychology Branch,
Department of Neuroscience, Azienda Ospedaliero Universitaria Pisana, Pisa, Italy.
Debora Provolo, Research Fellow in Criminal Law at the University of Padua,

Italy.
Silvio Riondato, Full Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Padua, Italy.
Carlos María Romeo Casabona, Professor of Criminal Law, University of the

Basque Country; Director, Inter-University Chair in Law and the Human Genome,
University of Deusto and University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain.
Rino Rumiati, Full Professor of General Psychology at the Department of

Developmental Psychology and Socialization, University of Padua, Italy.
Francesco Salerno, Full Professor of International Law at the University of Ferrara,

Italy.
Amedeo Santosuosso, President of Chamber, Court of Appeal of Milan (I);

President of the European Centre for Law, Science and New Technologies (ECLT),
University of Pavia, Italy.
Giuseppe Sartori, Full Professor of Psychobiology and Physiological Biology at the

University of Padua, Italy.
Note on the Authors 609
Cristina Scarpazza, Psychologist, Expert in Neuropsychology, Ph.D. Candidate in

Cognitive Neurosciences at the University of Bologna, Italy.
Zsolt Szomora, Associate Professor at the Department of Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure, Faculty of Law, University of Szeged, Hungary.
Marta Tomasi, Research Fellow in Comparative Public Law at the University of

Trento, Italy.
Ugur Tumerdem, Assistant Professor at the Department of Mechanical Engineering

of Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.
Feridun Yenisey, Full Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure at the Faculty of
Law, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul, Turkey.
Francesca Zanuso, Full Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Verona,

Italy.
Mario Zatti, Formerly Director of the Department of Biomedical Sciences,

University of Verona, Italy.

Genetics, Robotics, Law Punishment

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t E. Pavanello, La responsabilità penale delle persone giuridiche di diritto pubblico, 2012

Prima edizione 2014, Padova University Press

Titolo originale Genetics, Robotics, Law, Punishment

© 2014 Padova University Press

Prima edizione digitale dicembre 2014.

Tutti i diritti di traduzione, riproduzione e adattamento, totale o parziale,

GENETICS, ROBOTICS, LAW, PUNISHMENT

Debora Provolo - Silvio Riondato - Feridun Yenisey

To the beloved memory of

Carlos María Romeo Casabona

Carlo Casonato, Marta Tomasi

Natalya Krylova, Gleb Bogush

Andrea Manfrinati, Rino Rumiati

Giuseppe Sartori, Cristina Scarpazza, Pietro Pietrini

Óscar Morales García

Maria Beatrice Magro

Presentation of the research

Genetics and robotics are characterised by strong developmental dynamics,

Genetics and biotechnology: an overview of criminal law in a global legal perspective1

Carlos María Romeo Casabona

Table of contents: 1. Criminal policy in relation to genetics and biotechnology. – 1.1.

1. Criminal policy in relation to genetics and biotechnology2

18 Genetics and biotechnology

recourse fundamentally linked to Administrative Law. In taking this approach, only a

1.2. Is the punishment of future-oriented crimes a symptom of a merely symbolic

20 Genetics and biotechnology

1.3. Criminal Law on biotechnology, going beyond its symbolic value

22 Genetics and biotechnology

24 Genetics and biotechnology

regulate research19. This intimidating prospect is compatible with the objectives of

2. Relaxing the principle of maximum certainty in defining offences. The influence of

26 Genetics and biotechnology

reflections I have included here.

2.1. The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning

occasions they have even considered cloning to be a criminal offence.

28 Genetics and biotechnology

literally by State lawmakers for criminal matters.

30 Genetics and biotechnology

lack of precision, cannot be exceeded by the Spanish legislator31.

ratified this Protocol on cloning: a note of clarification is included in this instrument

32 Genetics and biotechnology

3. Adapting the description of criminal action techniques and penal sanctions as a

34 Genetics and biotechnology

1995, cit., p. 63 ff.

3.2. Delimitation of the material object of the offence

3.3. Selection of actions or omissions deserving punishment

36 Genetics and biotechnology

3.4. Selecting the offence’s technical structure

38 Genetics and biotechnology

3.5. The specific description of the criminal action or omission

40 Genetics and biotechnology

from foreign centres outside Germany. In 2004 France established a moratorium

3.7. Fixing legal penalties: proportionality and suitability

assessments regarding the protection of preimplantational and gestational human

3.8. Special Criminal Law versus common penal code

Are we truly free?

1. Soul, freedom and truth

44 Are we truly free?

The minimal amount of information is needed when a choice is made between

The function f is therefore log2