BEING (ENS)

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2017.

Being (Latin: ens) is that which is (ens est id quod est).1 Being (ens) is that which has the
act of being (esse).2 The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion, but implies a composition
of a subject (that something which is and is the real subject to which the act of being belongs),
and an act (the very act of being or esse of that something). A cat, a dog, a rock are all beings
(entia). They are all things or realities. However, strictly speaking, being (ens) does not have
the same meaning as reality or thing (res), for while the term res or thing expresses the
quiddity or essence (essentia) of the being (ens),3 being (ens) is derived from the act of being
(esse)4 (dicitur res secundum quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero
secundum quod habet esse5).

Being (ens) is the present participle of the verb to be (Latin: esse) and we say that being
(ens) signifies a thing in so much as it is, somewhat in the same way that a swimmer designates
a person who swims, or a painter, someone who paints, or a student, designating someone
who studies. Ens un participio presente del verbo essere, come vivente lo di vivere e
sapiente di sapere. Diciamo anche che lamante colui che ama, lo studente colui che studia
e il governante colui che governa. Il participio (amante, studente) si pu dunque indicare
anche per mezzo di espressioni come colui che In questo modo sesprimono le due
dimensioni intrinseche al participio: qualcuno che svolge unazione.

Allo stesso modo, ci che , chiamato ente (anche se si potrebbe dire che ci che esiste
esistente, di fatto questo termine stato poco usato in metafisica). Lespressione ente
equivale pertanto a cio che : significa la cosa che , in quanto possiede lessere. Tale
espressione esprime perci una nozione composta, che include un qualcosa (il soggetto
dellessere, che sempre qualcosa dotata di unessenza determinata) e il suo essere (ci che fa
che il soggetto esista). Per iniziare a capire la distinzione tra queste due dimensioni (il soggetto o
sostanza, e il suo essere) basta pensare alla differenza tra queste due questioni: che cosa sono i
dinosauri (questione dellessenza di qualcosa) e se esistono dinosauri (questione
dellesistenza).6

In metafisica denominano ente tutto ci che realizza lessere, latto di essere. Ente o
essente sono infatti il participio presente del verbo essere, come cantante il participio
presente del verbo cantare, e attaccante del verbo attaccare.

Esiste tuttavia una differenza fondamentale fra gli esempi proposti e la realt dellente.
Una distinzione importante, che la mera grammatica non capta. Un cantante di professione,

1
Cf. In I Phys., lect. 3, n. 21 ; In Boeth. De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 24.
2
Cf. In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
3
Cf. De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, c.
4
Cf. In IV Metaphy., lect. 2, no. 553.
5
In II Sent., q. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.
6
M. PREZ DE LABORDA and L. CLAVELL, Metafisica, EDUSC, Rome, 2006, p. 24.

1
anche quando non canta, continua a essere un cantante, e continua a essere molte altre cose
ancora: una donna, un uomo, un padre o una madre di famiglia, un amico di certe altre persone, e
cos via. E qualcosa di simile si pu dire dellattaccante anche quando non sta effettivamente
svolgendo unazione di attacco sul campo di calcio. Invece, senza lessere, lente non ci sarebbe
proprio, ricadrebbe nel nulla. Possiamo cominciare a intravedere ci per il fatto che lessere
latto radicale, intimissimo e costitutivo al quale si appoggia ogni altra perfezione, o dal quale
deriva, senza che egli riposi a sua volta su di un altro atto previo. In questo senso, lessere latto
primario di qualsiasi altro atto e perfezione.7

Grammaticalmente, ens un participio, participio presente attivo. il participio

presente del verbo latino esse, come essente il participio presente attivo dellinfinito essere la
parola ente procede direttamente dalla forma latina ens.

Ens dunque un participio. Ora, la forma participiale si chiama participio perch

prende parte di due elementi, cio partecipa alla natura del nome e alla natura del verbo: ha un
aspetto di sostantivo e un aspetto di azione. Per esempio, quando diciamo lo studente, siamo
abituati a pensare ad una persona, un uomo, che viene indicato muovendo dalla sua attivit di
studiare: luomo che si dedica allo studio; in realt per, nel participio non si dice se il
soggetto sia uomo o meno. Il soggetto resta allora in s indeterminato, viene indicato soltanto
dalla prospettiva, dal punto di vista, dellazione che svolge: cantante colui che canta.
Non so chi , non so cosa , so soltanto una cosa: che canta.

Bisogna per notare che in latino il termine pi forte, molto pi forte: il participio
studens, per esempio, indica non soltanto una persona la cui attivit abituale di studiare,
bens il soggetto che adesso-sta-studiando. Cos, ens indica un soggetto che sta-essendo, indica il
soggetto nellesercizio stesso dellattivit di cui si parla. Come camminante colui che sta-
camminando, cos ente colui che sta-essendo.8

Il participio significa in primo luogo un soggetto o natura e poi (connotativamente)

lessere-atto di questo soggetto o natura. Nellente (id quod est) ci-che (id quod) significa la
cosa, mentre il verbo (est) significa latto (esse). Perci, con la nozione di ens si esprime
innanzitutto e principalmente la cosa e poi e conseguentemente lessere. Se ente significasse
principalmente lessere come significa la cosa che ha atto di essere allora senza dubbio
significherebbe che qualcosa . Ma non significa principalmente la composizione che implicita
quando dico , ma la consignifica in quanto significa la cosa-che-ha-essere. Ente significa
direttamente il soggetto che esiste; ma siccome partecipa del verbo, significa anche (in
obliquo, in modo secondario, consignifica) lessere (esse).9

Being (ens) is not a simple notion but implies a composition of a subject and an act:
The notion of being (ens) is not a simple notion; it implies the composition of a subject (id
quod) and an act (est). Two elements are involved in this notion: something which is and the
very act of being (esse) of that thing. That something plays the role of a subject, that is, the

7
T. MELENDO, Metafisica del concreto, Leonardo da Vinci, Rome, 2005, pp. 53-54.
8
C. FERRARO, Appunti di metafisica, Lateran University Press, Vatican City, 2013, p. 37.
9
J. VILLAGRASA, Metafisica II, APRA, Rome, 2009, p. 11.

2
particular reality to which the esse belongs (as the subject of the act of laughing is the person
who laughs).

Nevertheless, the two elements constitute a unity: one element (ens) implies the
presence of the other element. When we say being (ens) we refer implicitly to its esse even
though we do not yet form the judgment it is or that something is. Likewise, when we hear
the verb is alone, we either assume its subject, or we discover the absence of a subject of the
act.

We can sum this up as follows: 1) Being (ens) signifies principally the thing which is:
being (ens) designates it insofar as it has the act of being (esse); 2) Consequently, being (ens)
signifies concomitantly the esse of that thing, because a thing can only be if it possesses the act
of being (esse); 3) Therefore, being (ens) refers to something that exists in reality.10

Metaphysics is about the science of real beings with their respective acts of being, the act
of being (esse) being the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections11; it is not about
an analysis of the most general notion of being (ens generalissimum), as many of the rationalist
and essentialist-inspired manuals of ontology published over the course of hundreds of years
would have us believe. A merely abstract and generic notion of being (ens) would exist in the
minds of philosophers who would deal with metaphysical realities as though they were logical
concepts. Thus, according to Scotus and Surez, we first know individual existent beings through
our intelligence, and then we abstract their common nature, thereby obtaining their essence.
Finally, we arrive at a supreme genus, which is most abstract and separate from experience, and
this is supposed to be being (ens). This was the notion of being (ens), whose content was no
longer real being, but the most general idea of being, inherited by rationalism. This explains why
metaphysics, as rationalism understood it, was prejudically tagged as a science that has nothing
to do with experience and the real world.12

Concerning Francisco Surezs essentialism, the Thomist Joseph M. De Torre writes:

According to Surez, the concept of being is the product of an abstraction, whereby the mind
separates the essence from the existence: this is the meaning of ens as a noun, whereas ens as a
participle corresponds to the act of existing. In the latter case, the concept of being is analogical,
and here Surez agrees with St. Thomas; but in the former case it is univocal, and here Surez
joins Duns Scotus. However, ens as a noun corresponds to the real essence, i.e., essence as non-
contradictory, or capable of existing in act, and that is the object of metaphysics, which Surez
defines as the science which looks at being as being, or in so far as it abstracts from matter as to
its being.

Consequently, it seems that, for Surez, metaphysics is to reality what the abstract is to
the concrete. Being is conceived as essence. His conclusions could not be more opposed to those
of St. Thomas himself, although they could well be endorsed by most of the Thomists mentioned
earlier. His formalism or essentialism is much more thoroughgoing and consistent than even that
of Duns Scotus, and he definitely shifts the emphasis from God to man by focusing on the

10
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, pp. 18-19.
11
Cf. De Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
12
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 30.

3
concept of being (an idea in the human mind) rather than on reality as such outside man and
transcending him.

Transition to Rationalism. Essence, for Surez, is whatever can be conceived by the

human mind as an objective or logical (non-contradictory) possibility (as distinct from St.
Thomas real potentiality for being), and subsistence is the ultimate determination of the
essence, which makes it capable of receiving existence.13

Existence is thus one of the modes or states of the essence: possible (of reason) or actual
(existent). And so, in the actual existent there is no real distinction of essence and existence.
Due to the abstractive or essentialist approach of his metaphysics Surez had a profound
impact on the Cartesian rationalists.14 One can appreciate Pope Leo XIIIs recommendation in
his historic Encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) on the restoration of Thomism (reiterated by all
popes ever since), to go to the primary sources, namely to the works of St. Thomas himself,
rather than to his commentators.15

Concerning the anti-realist, essentialist conception of being by the rationalist Wolff, De

Torre observes the following: Just as Spinoza had done, Wolff criticized Descartes for not
having defined the basic notions with enough precision, and turned to Surez, whom he held in
unqualified esteem.16 Thus he amalgamated the essentialistic metaphysics of both Surez and
Leibniz, following the Cartesian method of clear and distinct ideas with Spinozian rigor.

For Wolff, the possible is identical with the thinkable (in Greek: noumenon), i.e., with
whatever human reason can think of as non-contradictory. The principle of contradiction is thus
conceived as a principle of thinking, and only by derivation a principle of being.17 Moreover, the
possible is identical with being (ens), which is simply whatever can exist, and therefore that to
which existence is not repugnant,18 which is the same as the essence pure and simple: Essence
is the first thing we conceive about beingWithout it, being cannot be.19 Activity follows the
essence.20

Thus the following equation is established: being = essence = possibility = the thinkable.
This is a far cry from the metaphysics of the act of being (esse). But it is the only metaphysics

13
Cf. C. FABRO, Introduccin al tomismo, Rialp, Madrid, 1967, pp. 95-97.
14
Cf. E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 96-
120.
15
J. M. DE TORRE, The Humanism of Modern Philosophy, Southeast Asian Science Foundation, Manila, 1989, pp.
41-42.
16
C. FABRO, op. cit., p. 157; E. GILSON and T. LANGAN, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Random
House, New York, 1964, p. 173.
17
For realistic metaphysics it is the other way round.
18
C. WOLFF, Ontologia, n. 134.
19
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 144.
20
C. WOLFF, op. cit., n. 169.

4
known by subsequent philosophers, beginning with the empiricists and Kant,21 and somehow
adopted by not a few Scholastics ever since.2223

Alvira, Clavell and Melendo write in their Metaphysics: It would be incorrect to

consider being as a vague and indeterminate attribute which would belong to all things as their
least perfection. Some philosophers understood being as the poorest concept, as that which is left
after having set aside all the characteristics which differentiate things from one another. For
them, it would be the most abstract and empty notion, one which can be applied to everything
(maximum extension), because it has practically no content (minimum comprehension), and
indicates no more than the bare minimum that all things have in order to be real.

This manner of looking at being is a logical approach rather than a metaphysical one,
and it impedes any understanding of esse as the act of things, possessed in a different way in
each one of them, and in the most perfect manner in God.

This logical way of considering being was explicitly devised by rationalist philosophers,
particularly, Wolff and Leibniz. But even Scotus and Surez had earlier regarded being (ens) as
the most indeterminate concept whose content is identified with the possible essence. Thus,
they made being (ens) and essence identical, and regarded the essence as a neutral element with
respect to the act of being (esse), thus reducing essence to a simple possibility of being.
Pursuing this line of thought, Wolff defined being as that which can exist, that is, that whose
existence is not contradictory (Wolff, Ontologia, 1736 ed., n. 134). He therefore divided being
(ens) into possible and actual; the primacy of being belongs to possible being, for actual being is
no more than the formers being put into act.24

One of the main deficiencies inherent in this position is the following: thought absorbs
or assimilates being (ens), since this extremely indeterminate notion of being exists only in the
human mind, as a result of logical abstraction. Therefore, it would not be a real being but a
conceptual being. In rationalism, possibility is understood as the non-contradictory character
of a notion, that is, the possibility of being thought of or intellectually conceived.25

To consider esse as existence is a logical consequence of identifying being (ens) with

possible essence, separated from the act of being. There arise two worlds, so to speak: the ideal
world made up of abstract essences or pure thought, and the world of realities enjoying factual
existence. The latter is no more than a copy of the former, since it does not add anything to the
ontological make-up of things. As Kant said, the notion of 100 real guilders does not in any way
differ from the notion of 100 merely possible guilders.26

21
Cf. E. GILSON, Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1952, pp. 112-
121.
22
Cf. J. E. GURR, S.J., The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Some Scholastic Systems, 1750-1900, Marquette
University Press, Milwaukee, 1959.
23
J. M. DE TORRE, op. cit., p. 74.
24
This division of being (ens) into possible and actual became widespread. It is still accepted by some
contemporary Thomist philosophers of essentialist tendencies.
25
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 24.
26
Cf. I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason, B 628/A 600.

5
 The distinction between ideal and abstract essence on one hand, and the real existence
on the other, has given rise to serious repercussions in many important philosophical questions.
In the domain of knowledge especially, this has led to the radical separation of human
intelligence from the senses: essence would be the object of pure thought, whereas factual
existence would constitute the object grasped by the senses (this gave rise to the equally wrong
extreme positions of rationalism and empiricism or positivism; in the case of Leibniz, it gave rise
to the opposition between logical truths and factual truths).

Another consequence of this view is the attempt to prove the existence of the First
Cause starting from the idea of God (ontologism): God would be the only essence which
includes existence among its attributes, and therefore, God should exist. This proof ends up
with a God which exists only in the mind.27

Though it does include treatment of notions, metaphysics is not focused on notions but
rather on reality, on real beings. Nulla di pi alieno dalla verit del concepire la metafisica, cos
come si fatto per secoli, come lanalisi della nozione generalissima dellente (ens
generalissimum); una riflessione meramente concettuale, in parte aliena, parallela e previa alla
comprensione delle realt concrete e particolari che compongono il cosmo. Uno studio, di
conseguenza, i cui risultati potrebbero applicarsi a tutto, a forza di non includervi alcun
contenuto proprio.

Il tema della metafisica invece tutto lopposto: non affatto una nozione, ma la realt
come in s. Perci, quando le si d lappellativo di ente, tale vocabolo indica una conoscenza
pregna di contenuto; un sapere nel quale, in forma del tutto peculiare e in certo modo dialettica,
si ingloba tutto ci che nelluniverso esiste. E che richiama in modo primario, come dicevamo
nellIntroduzione, ci che c di pi elevato in questo insieme: la persona (umana, angelica e
divina).

Di conseguenza, quando penso o dico ente nel modo dovuto, comprendendo realmente
ci che faccio, non solo non escludo il soggetto umano, con tutti i suoi problemi vitali ed
esistenziali, ma lo indico con assoluta priorit rispetto a ci che gli inferiore. Tuttavia, com
logico, anche luniverso impersonale viene incluso nellaffermazione di entee nella sua totale
integrit: considerando tanto i suoi aspetti pi comuni quanto le sue pi specifiche differenze.
Come afferma Cardona, appoggiandosi a Tommaso dAquino, il concetto di ente non il pi
vuoto e astratto, ma il pi pregnante e concreto: unde omnia alia includuntur in ente unite et
distincte, sicut in principio [= per cui tutte le altre cose sono incluse nellente in modo unito e
distinto, in quanto il loro principio](In Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3).28

Lidea che andr facendosi sempre pi chiara a mano a mano che avanziamo nella
nostra analisi, che la conoscenza metafisica si elabora alla luce dellatto di essere; e questatto,
lessere, contemporaneamente principio di universalit e principio di singolarit: per il suo
essere ogni ente in relazione con tutti gli altri che compongono luniverso perch tutti sono .
E lessere , in fin dei conti, ci che fa che questa realt sia questa, e quella sia quella, nella sua
ultima e definitiva concretezza.

27
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
28
C. CARDONA, Para recristianizar la inteligencia, in Divus Tomas, 1990, nn. 1-2, p. 15.

6
 Tutti gli enti sono: lessere principio di universalit; e tutto ci che c in ogni ente
(anche gli aspetti che lo caratterizzano, distinguendolo da qualsiasi altra realt) : lessere il
principio radicale di singolarizzazione.29

Metaphysics, therefore, is a metaphysics of real beings which are because of the act of
being (esse) and not an essentialist-rationalist logic which focuses on abstract concepts. Melendo
writes: Stiamo capendo meglio ci che implica la metafisica come sapere dellente in quanto
ente: la disciplina che considera tutto quello che nella stretta misura in cui possiede ed
esercita latto di essere.

Insomma la metafisica studia tutto: realt inanimate, piante, animali, persone e, al

vertice, Dio stesso. Tutto: ci che semplice e ci che composto, ci che necessario e ci che
contingente, ci che naturale e ci che artificialee perfino, in modo derivato e improprio,
i semplici esseri finiti, pensati o immaginati. E, allo stesso tempo, i diversi aspetti o componenti
di ciascuna di queste realt: il loro intimo nucleo costitutivo ousa o sostanza, secondo la
terminologia classica e le loro propriet o attributi accidentali, perfino i pi periferici o
passeggeri.

Tutto, insisto. Ma tutte le cose, nellesatta proporzione in cui gli compete lessere,
perch si tratta di esaminarle, tutte e ciascuna, in quanto sono. Pertanto, e qui sta la chiave, il
filosofo le contempla e analizza senza annullare la diversit che, proprio in quanto ente,
riguarda e arricchisce ci che esiste.

La metafisica non misura tutte le realt alla stessa stregua; non ci offre un mondo
monocromatico, diluito e senza contorni. Infatti considera tutto come ente e, di conseguenza,
secondo il suo calibro ontologico e daccordo con la modalit che lessere ha in ciascun oggetto.
La metafisica scienza del reale, cos com. Non lo studia, pertanto, cos come si trova nel
pensiero (in quanto pensato), e neppure nella misura e nella proporzione con cui risulta
manipolabile, utile, di profitto o piacevole. Ma solo in quanto .30

Ci che proprio e discriminante di tutta la metafisica considerare la realt, nel suo

insieme o in dettaglio, alla luce dellatto di essere. Questo si pu fare, dicevo, in modo
universale, secondo i principi e le relazioni presenti diversificati e singolarizzati tutto ci che
esiste per il fatto che esiste; o in maniera pi determinata, analizzando la configurazione concreta
che lessere e i principi e le relazioni che a esso si riferiscono adottano in una propria e specifica
realt. Ci che determina il sapere metafisico il fatto dilluminare con la chiarezza abbagliante
che emana dallatto di essere.

Proprio questo si vuole affermare quando si dice che la metafisica studia lente in
quanto ente. Questultima espressione equivale, come abbiamo gi detto, a in quanto possiede
essere. Ente ci-che-, ci-che-ha-essere (quod est, quod habet esse, secondo i latini).31

29
T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
30
T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
31
T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 56.

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 Essence (essentia) is that which makes a thing to be what it is, while act of being (esse)32
is that which makes a thing to be. Every finite being (ens) has a real distinction between essence
(essentia) and act of being (esse) as two metaphysical co-principles.33 With God, the Infinite
Being, on the other hand, essentia and esse are identified. Gods Essence is Esse.34

32
Explaining certain features of the act of being (esse) as act, Alvira, Clavell and Melendo state: a) Above all, esse
is an act, that is, a perfection of all reality. The term act is used in metaphysics to designate any perfection or
property of a thing; therefore, it is not to be used exclusively to refer to actions or operations (the act of seeing or
walking, for instance). In this sense, a white rose is a flower that has whiteness as an act which gives the rose a
specific perfection. Similarly, that is which is applied to things indicates a perfection as real as the perfection of
life in living things. In the case of esse, however, we are obviously dealing with a special perfection.
b) Esse is a universal act, that is, it belongs to all things. Esse is not exclusive to some particular kind of
reality, since without esse, there would be nothing at all. Whenever we talk about anything, we have to
acknowledge, first of all, that it is: the bird is, gold is, the clouds are.
c) Esse is also a total act: it encompasses all that a thing is. While other acts only refer to some part or aspects
of being, esse is a perfection which includes everything that a thing has, without any exception. Thus, the act of
reading does not express the entirety of the perfection of the person reading, but esse is the act of each and of all the
parts of a thing. If a tree is, then the whole tree is, with all its aspects and parts its color, shape, life and growth
in short, everything in it shares in its esse. Thus, esse encompasses the totality of a thing.
Esse is a constituent act, and the most radical or basic of all perfections because it is that by which things
are. As essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that (chair, lion, man), esse is that which makes things to
be. This can be seen from various angles:
(i) Esse is the most common of all acts. What makes all things to be cannot reside in their principles of diversity
(their essence), but precisely in that act whereby they are all alike, namely, the act of being.
(ii) Esse is by nature prior to any other act. Any action or property presupposes a subsisting subject in which it
inheres, but esse is presupposed by all actions and all subjects, for without it, nothing would be. Hence esse is not an
act derived from what things are; rather it is precisely what makes them to be.
(iii) We have to conclude, by exclusion, that esse is the constituent act. No physical or biological property of
beings their energy, molecular or atomic structure can make things be, since all of these characteristics, in order
to produce their effects, must, first of all, be.
In short, esse is the first and innermost act of a being which confers on the subject, from within, all of its
perfections. By analogy, just as the soul is the form of the body by giving life to it, esse intrinsically actualizes
every single thing. The soul is the principle of life, but esse is the principle of entity or reality of all things(T.
ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 20-22).
33
Being is a real and intelligible principle, and the knowledge of its reality cannot be separated from the knowledge
of its intelligibility. This dissociation has been carried out in formalistic scholasticism which speaks of the
distinction between essence and existence, instead of the genuinely metaphysical theory of the real composition of
essence and act of being. The former distinction is made between between actual existence, considered as mere
facticity, and the essence considered merely as possible. Essence and existence are, then, no more than two different
states of mind with respect to the same thing considered respectively as a possibility, and as actually existing.
Existence, in this case, does no more than add the concrete and irrational character of the fact to the abstract and
intelligible notes of the essence. Some scholastics even ended up speaking about a distinction between the esse
essentiae, and the esse actualis existentiae, which corresponds to a merely logical starting point (as a reply to the
question what is a thing quid est and if a thing is an est ), but this is a starting point without any
metaphysical dimension.
The real distinction between essence and act of being is not to be identified with the couple to be thought to
really be. The authentic real composition of essentia esse is not the formal nexus of two modes of a being, but
rather the structuring of two real co-principles which make up the primary reality of being.
This composition is the transcendental structure of reality, which occurs in all finite beings inasmuch as they are
beings. This composition of essence and act of being (esse) is real: they are really distinct metaphysical principles
which constitute the radical unum which is being. It is necessary to admit this composition as real (and not only
cum fundamento in re), because finite things are, but they are not the act of being (esse), they do not exhaust being
(esse) either in intensity or in extension. They are, but without being being (esse): they have being (esse), they
participate in being (esse). The participating principle (the potency: essence) cannot be really identified with that
which is participated (the act: being esse). If essence and esse were identified, the real principle of limitation

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 When we say that God is Being and that man is a being, being here is predicated of
their subjects analogically, not equivocally nor univocally. Aristotle discovered the analogical
nature of being. Before him, being was considered univocally, as taught by Parmenides. Aristotle
explained that being is predicated of different subjects in various ways, but always in reference
to a principal meaning. If being (ens) were to be understood in a univocal manner, then all reality
would be deemed to be in the same manner, which would lead to monism. Everything would be
seen as identically one, and therefore, there would be no difference between God and creatures
(pantheism). Taking into account the analogical notion of being (ens), however, we can speak
about God and creatures as beings, maintaining at the same time the infinite distance between
them. By way of analogy, created being leads us to the knowledge of the divine Being and its
perfections. That is why this question is of utmost importance for metaphysics and theology.35

Explaining how being (ens) is analogical, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo write: We have
already seen that being (ens) is predicated of various subjects in an analogical manner. we
shall strive to see in what sense being (ens)is analogically attributed to reality, and how this
analogy is based on the act of being (esse) which beings share in different degrees.

One and the same term is analogically attributed to two realities whenever it is
attributed to each of them in a way which is partially the same and partially different. This is
what happens in the case of being (ens). This term is attributed to everything which is, but it does
not apply to everything in the same way. As in the case in any other predication, the ultimate
basis of analogy lies in the very same realities to which the analogical term refers: they are partly
the same and partly different. Hence, being (ens) is attributed to God and to creatures
analogically, because there is a certain similarilty between creatures and the Creator, but it goes
with a dissimilarity which is equally clear: God and creatures are (similarity), but God is by
essence, whereas creatures are only by participation (dissimilarity). Even within the realm of the
categories, being (ens) is attributed analogically to substance and to accidents. They both are and
can, therefore, be called beings (similarity); the substance, however, is by itself, whereas the
accidents are in something else, namely, in a substance (dissimilarity).

The basis of the analogical predication of the notion of being (ens) is the act of being
(esse), since anything can be called being (ens) to the very extent that it has esse. Esse is
possessed either by essence or by participation, by the substance itself or in the substance,
actually or only potentially, and in the case of creatures, always as something received from God,
who is the Subsisting Esse. Whatever the relation each thing has to esse, it can, to that extent, be
called a being (ens): above all the substance, which has esse in se, and then quantity, quality,
relation and other accidents.36

Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo affirm that the metaphysical foundation of analogy lies in
the way esse is found in each being (ens): God is act of being (esse) fully and by essence,

(imperfection) would be the same as the real principle of perfection, which would violate the principle of non-
contradiction. There would be no proper explanation for the real existence of finite beings: we would be denying
either their reality or their finiteness(A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 116-117).
34
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 4.
35
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 31.
36
T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

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whereas creatures have the act of being by participation, in varying degrees of intensity and
levels of composition (of act and potency, substance and accidents, etc).37

Being (ens) is analogical by an analogy of proper proportionality38 and an intrinsic

analogy of attribution.39 Both Cornelio Fabro40 and Bernard Montagnes41 are in favor of the use

37
Cf. T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op. cit., p. 139.
38
A concept is predicated with an analogy of proportionality when several subjects possess a common perfection in
ways that are not exactly but only proportionately the same. There is but a certain similarity in the way the subjects
share in the perfection. The perfection of man, for example, is found univocally in all individual men; but the
perfection of intelligence is not found in an adult in the same way as it is found in a child; the same is true when
we compare the intelligence of a cultured person with that of a savage, or the intelligence of an angel with that of
man, or the intelligence of God with that of His creatures. In each of these cases, the same perfection (intelligence)
is found in a manner adequate (proportional) to the nature and special characteristics of the subject (cf. De Veritate,
q. 2, a 11; In Metaph., lect. 8).
Proportionality is used in philosophy to describe the different manners of being of things. For example, like
every inanimate being, every living being is one, but with a oneness that is far superior to that of inanimate beings.
The perfections of creatures, compared with the perfections of God, can be cited as another example. In spite of the
infinite distance separating God from His creatures, we can still attribute to Him perfections that we find in the
created order (wisdom, being, beauty, etc.), provided we do so proportionally, adapting them to His infinity (cf. De
Veritate, q. 23, a. 7, ad 9). Hence, we say: divine knowledge is to God as human knowledge is to man, but in an
incomparably superior way(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, pp. 64-65).
39
The Analogy of Attribution. The analogy of proportionality is founded on the analogy of attribution. With the
former, we compare structural similarities (isomorphisms) between different kinds of beings. Similarities of this
sort, however, can sometimes be reduced to a single principle from which they really proceed. This principle can
either be an efficient, final or exemplary cause; or at least a subject whom we attribute properly and principally the
perfection that is found in the many.
The analogy of proportionality only compares different proportions, abstracting from the possible dependence of
one proportion on another (e.g., in the case of God and creatures, the analogy of proportionality expresses only the
eminently superior degree in which God possesses the perfections we find in creatures). The analogy of attribution
goes one step further, for it points to one of the terms of comparison as principle of the rest (hence, we say that God
is the cause and principle of created perfections). It is as though, when comparing the photographs, drawings and
paintings of a person, we refer all of them to a primary subject or final term the concrete individual represented by
these pictures.
Therefore, a perfection is predicated with analogy of attribution if, among several subjects of a common
perfection, there is one which possesses the perfection in all its fullness, while the rest possess it by participation or
in a derived fashion. We distinguish these perfections in two steps: First, we see that something is predicated of
many individuals in several senses. Good, for example, is predicated analogically of the means to an end, actions,
things, persons, creatures and God. Then, we detect an order between these different senses. Good is said of the
means, for example, inasmuch as the latter helps us reach the end; hence, the end is good in a more primary way
than the means (which we describe as a useful good). This order of dependence has its ultimate principle in God
who is Good by essence (cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, SEI, Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526).
St. Thomas Aquinas explains: If a name can be predicated of many analogically, it is because of the relation of
the many to one subject (per respectum ad unum). This subject must, therefore, be implied in the notion of all the
restIt follows that the name should be predicated principally (per prius) of the former and secondarily (per
posterius) of the latter, following an order determined by the degree to which all the other subjects approach that one
subject. For example, healthy, which is said of animals, is also applied to a medicine insofar as that medicine is
able to cause health in animals; it is also applied to describe urine, inasmuch as urine is the sign of the animals
health(Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 6).
The analogy of proportionality is, therefore, essentially characterized by the following properties: a) There is
always an ad unum a central and primary meaning upon which all the rest depend. In the example of St. Thomas
Aquinas, the principal meaning of healthy (viz., physical health) is what determines its other meanings when
predicated of medicine, the climate, or urine. The derived meanings always imply the principal meaning; hence, a
healthy climate is climate that is conducive to health.

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of both analogy of proper proportionality and the intrinsic analogy of attribution as regards the
analogy of being (ens).

b) The analogical concept is predicated per prius of the subject of the principal meaning. This subject is called
the principal analogate. Of the other subjects (called secondary analogates), the concept is predicated per posterius.
This analogy is called analogy of attribution because it involves the predication of a concept primarily to the
principal analogate, and its subsequent attribution to the other subjects by derivation.
The analogy of attribution can be extrinsic or intrinsic. It is extrinsic when only the principal analogate properly
and formally possesses the analogical perfection; the rest have it in an extrinsic and improper manner. This is the
case with the concept of health, for climate and medicine are said to be healthy only in an improper way not
because they have health, but because they are external causes of physical health.
More important because of its application to metaphysics is the intrinsic analogy of attribution. Here, the
analogical concept is properly predicated not only of the principal but also of the secondary analogates because the
former really causes the presence of the perfection of the latter. For example, in the substance is vis--vis the
accident is, being is principally attributed to the substance; but it is properly predicated of the accident by derivation
since the accident receives being by inhering in a substance. Another example: something is in potency vis--vis
something is in act: being is said primarily of act, and per posterius of potency (cf. In IV Metaph., lect. 1). Another
example: creatures are vis--vis God is: being is said principally of God, since He is being by essence; however, it
is properly predicated of creatures inasmuch as they receive being from God (creatures are beings by participation).
Still another example: God is Truth by essence, the origin of all truth; human judgments, though also properly called
true when they reflect reality, are only so by participation, for all truth found in creatures is a participated likeness of
the highest Truth.
The basis of intrinsic analogy of attribution is causality. Intrinsic analogy of attribution is a logical consequence
of the relations of causality among beings. It is based on the imperfect likeness of the effect to its proper cause.
Some remarks on this point:
a) Since one cannot give what one does not have, at least some perfections of the efficient cause will necessarily
be reflected in its proper effects. The efficient cause is, therefore, also an exemplary cause of its proper effects. It
follows that by studying the latter, we can, using the analogy of attribution, arrive at some knowledge of the former.
It is in this way that we arrive at an analogical knowledge of the nature of God on the basis of the manifold
perfections we find in creatures (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2).
b) Consequently, analogy of attribution implies both similarity and dissimilarity. The analogical concept is
predicated per prius of the cause, and per posterius of the effects. It is partly attributed to the effects inasmuch as
they are similar to the cause; but it is partly not attributed to them since they are also unlike the cause. Hence, the
universe is, at one and the same time, like God and unlike Him.
c) The foundation of the analogy of attribution is not an abstract idea but a real cause, the cause of the
participated likenesses of the perfection in the secondary analogates. For example, if being is common to God and
the world, it is not because the abstract notion of being is found in both of them, but because the being of the world
points to the Being of God as its principle and cause. It would be an error to establish the foundation of this
analogical community of being on the most abstract concept of being-in-general (esse commune), which is
necessarily univocal.
d) The ontological priority of the principal analogate does not always mean gnoseological priority, for
sometimes it is only through their effects that we can acquire a knowledge of the causes. This is the case with our
knowledge of God, the principal analogate of being. Though first in the ontological order, God comes after creatures
in the noetical order since it is the latter that we first know and apply names to. In the order of knowledge, therefore,
the meaning of our notions of being, goodness and truth applies primarily to creatures(J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit.,
pp. 65-69).
40
Cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalit, S.E.I., Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526.
41
Cf. B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l analogie de ltre daprs St. Thomas dAquin, Louvain, 1963.

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