CRITIQUE OF HOBBES’S DETERMINISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

Hobbes’s Determinism

The nominalistic and mechanistic materialism of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) maintains

a strict determinism, a denial of human free will. Hobbes defends determinism throughout his
writings, such as in his The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (1640, two portions of which
appearing in 1650 with the titles Human Nature or the Fundamental Elements of Policy and De
corpore politico), Leviathan (1651, his most famous and influential work), De corpore (1655)
and Of Liberty and Necessity (1654). Hirschberger observes that “naturalism dominates the
anthropology of Hobbes. Man is matter; understanding and reason are sensuality, and hence are
activities differentiated from those of animals only in degree. Man’s actions are only an interplay
of forces resulting from sense stimuli and sense reactions. Man is not free. He, as well as the
animal, is a captive of the mechanism that rules the senses. We affirm whatever appears to us to
be pleasant in sensation. What is unpleasant we minimize and reject.”1 Sofia Vanni Rovighi
explains that, for Hobbes, “non c’è libertà: Neque libertas volendi vel nolendi maior est in
homine quam in aliis animalibus (ibid.), poiché la volizione è un motus e il moto è determinato
dalla causa che lo produce. Nel trattare della causa e dell’effetto, infatti, nel cap. 9º del De
corpore Hobbes definito agente il corpo che genera o distrugge un accidente in un altro corpo, e
aveva assunto come esempio la trasmissione del moto locale. Un corpo è agente perché è in moto
e urta un altro corpo, il quale si trova sulla sua traiettoria. (Il fatto di essere in moto secondo una
certa traiettoria è un accidente del corpo che chiamiamo agente o movente; il fatto di trovarsi su
quella traiettoria è un accidente del corpo mosso). Ora, quando certi accidenti, nell’agente e nel
paziente, si incontrano, ossia quando c’è la causa integra, l’effetto non può non seguire (De
corpore, cap. 9, n. 3). Così, quando in un uomo ci sono certe tendenze e certi sentimenti, c’è la
causa integra perché si produca quell’effetto che è la volizione; quindi non c’è libertà di volere,
ma libertà di fare. Si può parlare di libertà, intendendo per azioni libere quelle volute dal
soggetto e non impostegli dal di fuori (si chiamerà libero il moto di un uomo che cammina
perché vuol camminare e non perché è trascinato a forza; ma il suo voler camminare è
determinato dalle cause delle sue tendenze) (De corpore, cap. 25, n. 13). Hobbes svolse la sua
tesi negatrice della libertà nella polemica col Vescovo Bramhall (English Works, voll. IV e V),
ma l’argomento fondamentale è sempre quello del De corpore: se ci fosse libertà non ci sarebbe
nesso fra causa ed effetto, ossia, in ultima analisi, come osserva J. Laird,2 si negherebbe lo stesso
principio di identità, poiché, se ogni cosa è necessariamente quella che è, e se è quella che è in
funzione di certi antecedenti, anche la volizione è quella che è in funzione di certi antecedenti.3

1
J. HIRSCHBERGER, The History of Philosophy, vol. 2, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959, p. 194.
2
J. LAIRD, Hobbes, London, 1934, p. 190.
3
Ma il problema è, come osserva lo stesso Laird, quali siano questi antecedenti. Se sono soltanto moti locali, spinte
che vengono dal di fuori, la libertà è impossible; ma se fra gli antecedenti c’è un soggetto spirituale, sottratto
all’azione determinante delle cause esterne; se c’è un soggetto capace di autodeterminarsi, l’affermazione della
libertà non nega affatto il principio di identità. Si badi però che ho detto fra gli antecedenti; ho detto azione
determinante delle cause esterne. Affermare la libertà non vuol dire infatti affermare che le cause esterne non
abbiano nessuna azione sulla volontà (che è volontà di un uomo, inserito nella natura e in un contesto sociale); vuol
dire solo negare che tale azione sia sempre ed in ogni caso determinante, irresistibile. Ma per Hobbes la volizione è

1
Altri argomenti di Hobbes mirano a confutare quelli di Bramhall in favore di libertà (le pene
sarebbero inutili, non avrebbero senso la lode e il biasimo ecc.): e qui Hobbes ha buon giuoco: le
pene, il biasimo, la lode fanno parte, secondo lui, delle cause della volizione.”4

But doesn’t Hobbes admit a freedom from physical coaction? Yes, he does, but this is not
what is meant by free will. Copleston explains that, for Hobbes, “natural liberty means simply
the absence of external hindrances to motion; and it is perfectly consistent with necessity, that is,
with determinism. A man’s volitions, desires and inclinations are necessary in the sense that they
are the results of a chain of determining causes; but when he acts in accordance with these
desires and inclinations, there being no external impediment to prevent him from so acting, he is
said to act freely. A free man is thus ‘he that in those things which by his strength and wit he is
able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to do.’5”6 Fazio and Gamarra note that “in un
sistema meccanicistico e materialistico non c’è spazio per la libertà. Hobbes riduce la libertà
all’assenza di ostacoli esterni al potere. Più in concreto, Hobbes l’identifica con la libertà di
movimento; questa libertà è, quindi, comune agli animali e agli uomini.”7 Thonnard states that,
for Hobbes, “the psychological activity of man, although quite complex, is ruled, like all the
other movements of the universe, by the laws of mechanistic determinism. The only freedom
admitted consists ‘in the absence of all those impediments to action which are not contained in
the nature and in the intrinsic quality of the agent.’8 This is freedom from ‘coaction,’ or the
simple absence of constraint; the liberty of ‘indifference,’ or free will, is but an illusion. It is a
word destined to hide the ignorance which we have of the true causes of our decisions.”9 In book
II, chapter 21 of his Leviathan, Hobbes writes: “Liberty or freedom, signifies (properly) the
absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion) and may be
applied to less to irrational, and inanimate creatures, than to rational. For whatever is so tied, or
environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the
opposition of some external body, we say it has not liberty to go further. And so all living
creatures while they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chains; and of the water while it
is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread itself into a larger space, we use to
say, they are not at liberty, to move in such a manner, as without those external impediments
they would…And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a free
man is he, that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to
do what he has a will to do.”10 Hobbes does admit that we have freedom from physical coaction,
but this is not what we are referring to when we are talking about free will, for even animals like
dogs and horses, lacking intellect and rational appetite (will), also have this type of ‘freedom.’
Anable states: “Freedom from physical coaction is immunity from an external restraining
physical force. An animal now released from a cage or trap has this kind of freedom; so, v.g., has
an untethered horse, or a child rescued from kidnappers. Obviously, our question of freedom of

soltanto il risultato di moti locali, quindi si capisce che non possa essere libera. È il materialismo di Hobbes, il suo
meccanicismo, quello che comanda il suo determinismo.
4
S. VANNI ROVIGHI, Storia della filosofia moderna, La Scuola, Brescia, 1976, pp. 237-238.
5
T. HOBBES, Leviathan, 2, 21 ; E. W., III, pp. 196-197.
6
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book II, vol. 5, Image Doubleday, New York, 1985, pp. 44-45.
7
M. FAZIO and D. GAMARRA, Introduzione alla storia della filosofia moderna, Apollinare Studi, Rome, 1994, p.
147.
8
T. HOBBES, Of Liberty and Necessity.
9
F.-J. THONNARD, A Short History of Philosophy, Desclée, Tournai, 1956, p. 575.
10
T. HOBBES, Leviathan, II, 21.

2
the will is in no way concerned with this kind of freedom.”11 Hobbes the determinist accepts
only freedom from physical coaction and denies that we have freedom in the strict sense.
Explaining freedom in the strict sense, Celestine Bittle writes: “In the strict sense, freedom
means the absence of intrinsic necessity or determination in the performance of an act.
Something is ‘intrinsically necessary,’ when it is determined by its very nature to be what it is
and to act as it does. This type of ‘freedom’ applies to the will when we speak of ‘free will,’ and
we mean that the will is free from intrinsic necessity or determination in at least some of its acts.
Hence, when it is said that the will is ‘free,’ it is implied that the will is not necessitated by its
nature to act in a determined manner, but is capable of choice even when all the conditions for
acting are present.”12

Raymond J. Anable, S.J.’s Defense of Freedom of Choice

“Freedom of choice. N.B. This is the type of freedom we shall vindicate for some of
man’s (his deliberate) acts of will. This type of freedom means immunity from internal coaction
or restraint; and when we claim this freedom for man’s deliberate acts of will, we mean that this
faculty is of such a nature that even when it is proximately prepared for action, the will is such
by its very nature that it can act or not act, can act in this way or in that. The phrase ‘freedom of
choice’ is an apt one, for it is the power of a choosing faculty, the power to take a course of
action or to refuse to take it, or to take one course of action rather than another.

“Freedom of choice means that the will, even when proximately disposed for action, can
choose either to act or not to act. When is the will ‘proximately disposed for action’? As we saw
in Chapter XI, the will can act only when a good, apprehended by the intellect, is presented to it.
Immediately following such an apprehended reasonable good, there is an indeliberate, necessary
(non-free) act of will, an act of inclination towards that object, if it is apprehended as reasonable
good, or an act of aversion from it, if it is apprehended as non-good, or evil. But, has the will,
besides these indeliberate acts which necessarily follow intellectual apprehension, another type
of act in which even in the presence of apprehended reasonable good, it is not determined or
necessitated by its own internal nature? It has such acts, and these are its deliberate acts.

“Let us examine this basic notion in a concrete case. You have $10,000, and a car
salesman considers you a ready prey. He talks to you about his latest streamlined model. On the
supposition that you have no car, but that you are at least faintly interested in having a car – and
on the further supposition that you are reasonable – what is your psychic state during and
immediately after that sales-talk? The car is desirable, and almost irresistible, as you listen to the
salesman. That urge, or impulse, or strong inclination to buy, which you are conscious of, is an
indeliberate, non-free act of your will, a conscious inclination towards an intellectually
apprehended good. You may, without second thought, act impulsively and toss the agent your
$10,000, as you drive away, even before the agent comes to the end of his appealing sales-talk.
But, if you are reasonable, you will never forget, even during the sales-talk, that you cannot have
the car and your $10,000. Now the car is apprehended as evil, or non-good, in the sense that its
acquisition means parting with your hard-earned money. And following that thought, you will be

11
R. J. ANABLE, Philosophical Psychology, Fordham University Press-Declan X. McMullen Co., New York,
1952, p. 193.
12
C. N. BITTLE, The Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 377-378.

3
conscious of another urge, or indeliberate act of your will, an act of aversion: another necessary,
non-free act of your will. Now, as you intellectually ponder both sides of the ‘bargain,’ you are
conscious of these conflicting acts of will. Now the will must choose: this act of will is going to
be ‘deliberate,’ for it follows intellectual deliberation, or the pondering of the good and the non-
good involved in your eventual choice. And this act of the will, we shall show, is free, i.e., even
with this intellectually apprehended good before it, and hence, proximately disposed for action,
there is nothing in the nature of the will itself which makes it choose one of these alternatives
rather than the other.

“…Antecedent Psychic Acts Necessary for an Act of Free Choice. Recall that an act of
will is a conscious inclination towards an intellectually apprehended good or a conscious
aversion from an object intellectually apprehended as evil. Hence, there is required: (1)
Conscious attention for any act of will. (2) Deliberation for any will-act of free choice. The
object, we have seen, in itself has aspects of both good and non-good, but unless I apprehend
both of these aspects, there is no possibility of my choosing. Intellectual deliberation makes me
aware of the objective indifference of the particular good before me, or of at least some of the
reasons for and against my choosing this object. If the object is apprehended under one aspect
only, v.g., as good, there follows, and must follow, the indeliberate conscious inclination towards
that object. Conversely, if the object is apprehended only under the aspect of non-good, there is
an indeliberate, necessary act of will-aversion from the object. Deliberation – or the
apprehension of both aspects – proximately prepares the will for its deliberate act. And this is
only another way of saying that this subsequent act of will is deliberate, in the sense that it
follows mental deliberation…

“Evidence for Freedom of Deliberate Acts of Will…The Metaphysical Argument. This is

an a priori argument, but a cogent one, as indeed are all valid metaphysical arguments. We shall
argue to the freedom of our rational appetitive faculty from the nature of the will and its relation
to intellectual deliberation.

“In intellectual apprehension I can and do become aware of the objective indifference, or
the aspects of both good and non-good in this particular object, course of action, etc. In other
words, in any and every object which I consider, I apprehend that this particular object is good,
but not good in every respect, that its goodness is desirable, but simultaneously that its goodness
is limited, and hence, not compelling. To conclude from this that we must in consequence have a
faculty of free choice as the natural supplementary power of intellect, is a priori argument, if you
will, but it does show clearly why the rational appetitive faculty which we have, should be free in
its deliberate acts.

“It would be absurd to postulate a faculty which at one and the same time could have
reasonable good for its formal object, and still be free to choose or reject perfectly apprehended
infinite (i.e., irresistible) good. But it is equally absurd to maintain that our rational appetitive
faculty should have to choose that good which here and now we apprehend as non-good in one
or many respects. Hence, the fact that our rational cognitive power shows us every particular
good as non-irresistible – simultaneously as good and non-good – is indicative both of the basic
reason for, and the ontological necessity of freedom for the will in its deliberate acts.

4
 “Metaphysical Proof for the Freedom of Deliberate Acts of Will. If intellectual
deliberation has any purpose (ratio essendi), the will must have freedom of choice in its
deliberate acts ; But, intellectual deliberation has supreme purpose ; Therefore, the will has
freedom of choice in its deliberate acts.

“Proof of the Minor: It is unquestioned and unquestionable that man acts as man –
reasonably – only subsequent to deliberation. Hence, deliberation has supreme purpose or
significance in human life.

“Proof of the Major: In every act of deliberation I become aware of the objective
indifference, or simultaneous aspects of good and non-good, in this particular object. But the
will, as a faculty whose formal object is rational good, cannot be forced to choose what is
presented to it as non-good. This would involve a contradiction in the nature or being of the will
itself.13 Yet, subsequent to deliberation, in this life, every good presented to the will (either
because of its contingent, finite nature, or because of our imperfect cognition of it), is
simultaneously presented as non-good. Therefore, the only purpose of deliberation must be to
present to the will a good which, as simultaneously non-good, cannot compel a faculty whose
formal object is rational good.

“Hence, in a particular will act, subsequent to deliberation, the ‘determinatio ad unum’

(the determination to do A rather than not to do A), cannot have been made by the object as
presented by the intellect, nor by the nature of the will as such.

“Then, ‘I,’ de-facto freely choose or make this determination rather than that one. And
since ‘I’ do this through my faculty which seeks rational good, we refer this freedom to the will
itself.”14

Defenses of Free Will by Gardeil, O.P. and Royce, S.J.

H. D. Gardeil, O.P.’s Defense of Free Will: “a) The Requirements of Morality. – No free
will, no morality! It would be easy to elaborate on this theme, which, so far as it goes, does
constitute a most valuable argument. But whatever else may be said on this score, St. Thomas
has given us the wholesum and substance of it in the following terse rejoinder: ‘I answer that
man has free will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and
punishments would be in vain.’15 To this, nothing material could be added.

13
The contradiction in the nature of the will, if the will were not free in its deliberate acts, may be stated thus: a) the
will would be necessitated by a “good” which (as deliberation makes clear) is presented to it as non-necessitating.
Thus, if forced by its nature, v.g., to take the “good,” it would be forced by its nature to take what by its very nature
it must avert from: or, putting the same contradiction in still another way, b) the result of intellectual deliberation is
that the will is moved or pulled by its very nature in two ways
< ---------- and ---------- >
and this is as far as its nature itself takes it. Therefore, its nature cannot at the same time take it only one way
< ---------------
or
-------------- >
14
R. J. ANABLE, op. cit., pp. 193-195, 197-199, 203-204.
15
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1, c.

5
 “b) The Nature of the Free Act. – The pivotal argument for free will, however, the one
that stays all others, is based on the nature of the free act itself. Admittedly, it is conscious
experience that reveals this act to us, but only when this experience is put through the crucible of
metaphysical analysis does the testimony of consciousness become a decisive argument. Hence,
also, the custom of referring to the present argument as the metaphysical proof, or the proof from
the nature of the will.

“For the basic explanation of the free act St. Thomas always appeals to the rational nature
of man, particularly and more directly to his faculty of judgment. Some beings act without the
power of judgment; others, through the intervention of a judgment. If the judgment is instinctive,
not resulting from rational insight, as in the case of brute animals, then there can be no freedom
in the act. But if, as in the case of man, the judgment derives from deliberation and comparison
instituted by reason, then the ensuing act is a product of free will. This power of free
determination is possible because in contingent matters, in judgments that are not intrinsically
necessary, reason may take any of several opposite courses. Since human actions have to do with
particular matters, and since these matters as performable are contingent realities, man’s reason
can form various practical judgments concerning them, none of the judgments being determined
or necessary. In short, the freedom of man’s will is a necessary consequence of his rational
nature. St. Thomas presents the argument as follows: ‘Man acts from judgment, because by his
apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But, because this
judgment in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of
comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being
inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses…Now
particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it
necessary that man have free will.’16

“With respect to the subject or agent, therefore, freedom has its source in reason; with
respect to the object, it lies in the contingent or particular nature of the goods confronting the
agent. In terms of the object we may, as St. Thomas often does, state the argument of free will as
follows: In face of contingent or particular goods the will remains free; only the absolute or
universal good necessarily moves it. These two proofs, moreover, the one from the object and the
other from the rational nature of man, are complementary, since the human or free act is the
product of the reciprocal application of intellect and will.

“As for the experience or consciousness of freedom which is often invoked as an

argument for free will, this refers specifically to the awareness of the nonnecessary character of
the judgments on which my eventual decision rests. I may judge that a given means would be
effective for the attainment of an end in view, and so I decide upon it; but at the same time I am
aware that the reason or motive which prompts me to act is not irresistible, or compulsive. The
good with which I am confronted is a contingent or particular good; therefore my choice cannot
but be free. In a word, my consciousness of being a free agent is the consciousness of having a
reason which judges and evaluates; it is not the feeling of an instinctive impulse coming, so to
speak, from nowhere, as it is so often imagined.

16
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1.

6
 “c) Exercise and Specification. The indetermination of the will may be approached from
yet another point of view. We say that an act is free when it is not caused by a good that
necessarily moves the will. But this absence of predetermination in the will may result from two
sources, from the order of exercise and from the order of specification.

“For example, there may be two or more different means of arriving at a given end, say
two different roads leading to a town I want to visit. Since there is nothing in the nature of things
that compels me to take one road to the exclusion of the other, I am free to choose between them.
This freedom to choose one thing over another means that my act is free in the order of
specification. But even if we suppose there is only one road, I am still free, since my visiting the
town, which necessarily requires taking the only road, is a particular good, and so does not
present itself as absolutely necessary. Consequently my will remains free to decide to go or not
to go. And this power to will or not to will is called freedom of exercise.

“It scarcely needs mentioning, moreover, that both the freedom of exercise and
specification rest on the contingent or particular character of the goods in question. From the
standpoint of the agent, however, freedom of exercise is more basic, as even without the other it
is enough to guarantee freedom. But when freedom of exercise is lacking, no free will is possible
at all; whereas when specification is not free but self-imposed and necessary, as in the case of
only one means being available, the will is still free, not to choose between means, but to act or
not to act.

“d) Election (Choice) and the Practical Judgment. – As was noted earlier in examining
the various steps of the free act, intellect and will work conjointly in producing it. This reciprocal
movement or determination reaches a decisive stage at the last practical judgment. Suppose that
having experienced a wish for something, I decide to pursue it (intentio finis). Several means
being available, I deliberate about them. Sooner or later I must decide upon one. How is this final
decision made? It is made by the will, but only after the intellect has judged that this particular
means should be chosen. Through the last practical judgment (judicium practicum) of the
intellect, I determine the means to be adopted, and through an act of the will I choose it (electio).
In this process the judgment of the intellect and the choice of the will are applied concurrently.
Which of the two, it may be asked, is the determining factor? The answer is that both are
determining but from different points of view. In the order of specification, I have chosen
because I have judged; in the order of exercise, I have judged because I have chosen. These two
steps, choice and practical judgment, are distinct; yet it is important to bear in mind that one
determines the other, each in its own order. The free act, therefore, proceeds from intellect and
will together. Since in the last analysis, however, the final decision is made by the will through
the act of choice, we say that freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause: radix
libertatis sicut subjectum est voluntas, sed sicut causa est ratio.17”18

James E. Royce, S.J.’s Defense of Free Will: “Proofs of Freedom: Freedom from
External Necessity. That the will is not subjected to coercion by an external efficient cause
hardly needs proof. The act of the will is by its very nature an inclination, and coercion means

17
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2,
18
H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 (Psychology), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1956, pp. 212-216.

7
that one is made to act contrary to his inclination. A forced act of will is a contradiction. The
only thing which can move the will to act is a motive, and motive is not an efficient cause. The
will cannot be forced to elicit its own act (Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, a. 82, a. 1).

“Freedom from Internal Necessity. The real problem is the elimination of psychological
determinism, or necessitation by the very motives which the intellect presents to the will.
Ordinarily three proofs are given. The first is by far the most important, for it flows from an
analysis of the relation of intellect and will, and the role of the indifferent judgment in the act of
choice. Properly understood, it automatically answers most objections against moderate
indeterminism.

“1. From Indifferent Judgments.19 Will is determined only to the extent that intellect
determines it ; But intellect does not determine will with regard to the finite goods seen as finite ;
Therefore will is not determined with regard to finite goods seen as such.

“The major premise of this proof flows from the fact that will follows intellect: appetition
follows cognition, and the inclination of the will must correspond to the intellectual judgments
which elicit it.

“The minor premise simply examines the nature of the intellectual judgments which the
will follows. Finite goods are seen as not good in every respect, and therefore rejectable. Since
the intellect is capable of knowing the universal good, it recognizes any particular good as
contingent or non-necessitating. I can have adequate reason (even God himself as now known)
for doing something, but the reason does not tell me that I cannot do otherwise. Therefore I am
free to determine whether or not I shall act because of this motive.

“This indifferent or undetermined judgment regarding eligible goods is sometimes called

changeable, but this is misleading. It suggests that the judgment is a determining motive right
now, but that upon further information the judgment might change. This theory does not escape
psychological determinism, for it could be argued that the further information then determines.
Rather, right here and now with the information available I know that this good is nonnecessary,
and that another alternative is possible. Again, the judgment is not free (active), since the
intellect cannot help but know what it knows. But what is known in this instance is that this act is
choosable but rejectable; therefore the ultimate practical judgment to choose or reject it is
determinable (passive) by the will.

“2. From Direct Experience. …the act of choice seems to be as much a matter of
phenomenological observation as any other psychological fact. Choices and decisions are as
much a part of everyday experience as perceptions, images, or thinking. The capacity for
freedom may be a matter of inference, but the experience of choice is an empirical datum to be
observed and analyzed; the only alternative is the theory that this experience is a universal mass
illusion, which in turn becomes a fact which must be explained. Whatever metaphysical
implications are involved in its explanation, the fact seems inescapable.

19
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1 ; De Veritate, q. 24, a. 1.

8
 “Before choice, I am conscious of the alternatives before me, and that I see them as non-
necessitating. The whole process of deliberation is nonsense if the decision is already
determined.

“During choice, I am conscious that I actively determine the course to be taken. This
experience of the actual domination we exercise over the act of choice has been called by
psychologists ‘the active interposition of the ego.’ Although not open to quantitative
measurement,20 what we experience here is not a mere lack of necessitation or an ignorance of
motivating factors, but a positive exertion of influence on the part of the self…

“After choice, we experience remorse, self-approval, and other evidences of a sense of

responsibility. We are oftern clearly aware of the difference between hitting a person
accidentally and deliberately. No matter how sorry we feel over the former, we do not feel
responsible or guilty, as we would in the latter instance. We are quite conscious of whether or
not the act flowed from a deliberate choice on our part, and this is reflected in such expressions
as ‘I decided,’ ‘I made up my mind,’ ‘I made a choice,’ or ‘I yielded.’

“3. From Moral and Legal Obligation. Those who admit moral obligation or legal
responsibility must logically admit that man is not completely the victim of determining forces.
If a person cannot do otherwise, it is absurd to hold him responsible for what happens.
Obligation involves both the possibility of my doing something and the fact that I am not forced
to do it. Our entire legal system and administration of justice rests on this foundation. There
would be no point in an elaborate trial to ascertain whether or not the alleged murderer were sane
unless there was a difference between the normal man who can exercise free choice and the
person in whom some abnormality prevents this. The same argument holds for the notion of
merit and reward. Why praise a man for doing something unless he could have done
otherwise?…”21

Celestine N. Bittle’s Critiques of Various Kinds of Determinism

“1. Unconsciousness of Freedom

“John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) voices an objection against the freedom of the will on
psychological grounds. He contends that we cannot be conscious of this freedom. To be
conscious that we are free in our volition, it would be required, before we act, that we be
conscious of the fact that we could really act otherwise than we do. Consciousness, however,
Mill claims, merely tells us what we actually do or feel; it never tells us what we are capable of
doing. In other words, we are conscious of the act of willing, but not of the power of willing;
hence, it is impossible to know whether the power is free or determined.

“We admit that the power of the will as such is not an object of direct consciousness.
Mill, however, failed to note that every act of volition involves the actuation of the power of the
will, the fieri or developmental process of the volitional act itself.

20
Cf. R. C. McCARTHY, S.J., The Measurement of Conation, Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1926.
21
J. E. ROYCE, S.J., Man and His Nature, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961, pp. 204-207.

9
 “In the developmental process of many volitional acts, I am conscious that they are
elicited by motives, but the motives do not determine and necessitate the acts; I myself determine
the acts. I clearly perceive that I have here a motive plus something else which makes the
impulse of the motive effective; the act of the will is thus eventually determined, not by the
motive, but by the will itself. An analysis of the act of volition shows that two factors are
required: an impulse flowing from the motive which elicits, but does not compel, me to act; and a
positive consent of my will, supplementing the deficiency of the objective motive. At times,
therefore, I observe that I consent to the impulse originating from the motive, and at other times I
observe that I withhold my consent to the impulse originating from the motive; whether the act
of volition is set or not set, thus depends on the active interposition of my Ego and not merely on
the presentation of the motive. So long as the process and fieri of volition is protracted and not
completed, the final decision to act or not to act, to act this way or that way, rests in my power of
determination. The will, therefore, is the master of its own determinations; and as such it is free,
because the consent, as I know from my internal experience, is a freely exercised act of the will.
The experiments of Ach and others, mentioned in the preceding chapter, have definitely revealed
the Ego-in-Action in every deliberate decision.

“2. Illusion

“Determinists frequently assert that our conviction of the freedom of the will is but an
illusion based upon an ignorance of the causes which produce the acts of the will. Since we are
not conscious of the underlying causes which determine the will to act, we have the feeling of
freedom in our acts; in reality, however, all acts of the will are determined.

“In answer to this objection, we assert, first of all, that an appeal to ignorance is the worst
sort of argument anyone can advance. Determinists labor under this ignorance as well as the
libertarians. The determinists have no more right to suppose that the unknown causes of our
voluntary acts are necessary in their operation than that they are free; we simply could not know
whether the will is free or determined under any circumstances.

“Secondly, this assertion of the determinists contradicts the experience of consciousness,

and consciousness is the ultimate source of knowledge in this matter. Our experience tells us that
the ignorance of the cause of actions occurring within us does not necessarily induce in us the
conviction that this cause is free. On the contrary, when we act on a momentary impulse and
without reflection, not knowing why we act, then we are convinced that our act was involuntary,
unfree, and irresponsible. On the other hand, when we reflect upon a project with careful
deliberation, consider all its advantages and disadvantages, investigate the various means at our
disposal, lay out a plan in all its details, weigh all the motives for and against a course of action –
in a word, when our knowledge is at its best – then it is that the conviction of the freedom of the
will and of its choice is greatest. It is, therefore, the incontrovertible testimony of our
consciousness that our conviction of freedom is not based on the illusion of ignorance but on the
certainty of knowledge.

“It is true, of course, that subconscious motives often influence the will. A mental act or
attitude frequently brings about the performance of an external act contrary to our resolutions. If
we bear in mind, however, the conditions required for the free exercise of the will, as stated in

10
the first section of this chapter, it will readily be observed that one or the other of these
conditions has not been verified. No libertarian claims that all acts of the will under all
circumstances are free, but borderline cases do not invalidate the instances where the requisite
conditions are clearly perceived by consciousness to have been verified for the free exercise of
the will. While many cases will always remain doubtful, many cases of the free exercise of the
will must be allowed by an unbiased observer.

“It is the verdict of our consciousness that the will is free in many of its acts. This verdict
must be accepted as true; otherwise the truth-value of our consciousness is destroyed, and
skepticism is the inevitable result.

“3. The Strongest Motive

“It is a stock argument of determinists that the strongest motive always does and always
must prevail, so that the will is intrinsically determined to yield to the strongest motive; the will,
therefore, is not free in its choice.

“The objection is invalid. Since the will is an appetency and as such can strive only for
what is perceived to be good, it is obvious that the motives draw the will in proportion to the
amount of value they contain. Slight values influence the will slightly, great values influence it
greatly. It is but natural, therefore, that the will, under ordinary and normal circumstances,
should and does strive for the greater value contained in the proposed motives. It would indeed
be most unusual, if this were not the case.

“The argument of the opponents, however, to be valid, must prove that man, under all
conditions, is necessitated to choose what is intellectually apprehended as possessing the
greatest objective attractiveness for the will.

“It will not do to assert, as the philosopher Bain apparently asserts, that the strongest
motive is the one which actually prevails. He is guilty of a begging of the question. Certainly, the
motive which is willed is the one which prevails, and in a sense this motive is the strongest. This
only means that the motive which prevails actually prevails, but does not settle the question
whether the will is determined or free in making a particular motive prevail.

“The only legitimate meaning which can be attached to the statement that ‘the strongest
motive always prevails and must prevail’ is the deterministic meaning that the objectively
strongest motive must prevail; the will must necessarily follow the motive containing, among
other motives present, the more preferable good considered by the intellect as such.

“J. Stuart Mill interprets the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which is most pleasurable,
because it is the more preferable good. He contends that the will is constrained to accept this
motive and yield to it. We claim that personal experience disproves this contention. It is not true
that we always choose the course of action which is most pleasurable. Every decent person not
infrequently resists temptations, recognized to be most pleasurable, for the sake of an ideal or
from a sense of duty, conscious of the fact that yielding to the temptation would be easy and
offering resistance to it is most difficult. Soldiers and martyrs prefer death to the violation of

11
their duty, even when excruciating agony accompanies the performance of their duty. To uphold
an ideal and to fulfill one’s duty under such conditions is indeed the stronger motive, but only
because the will makes it so; it is not more pleasurable in itself.

“Most determinists interpret the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which, among others
present before the mind, represents the greatest good or value, without specifying whether or not
it be the most pleasurable; such an object or experience, presented as a motive, is the more
preferable and as such forces the will into acceptance. The point at issue is this: Is the will
compelled to choose the motive which the intellect proposes to it as possessing the greatest value
or attractiveness among conflicting motives, so that this particular motive has objective
preference, considered independently of any action of the will? Or on the contrary, can the will
confer subjective preference on any of the motives presented, irrespective of their objective
merits, thereby making an objectively weaker motive the strongest? In the former alternative the
objectively ‘strongest’ motive prevails under all conditions, and the will is determined in its
volition; in the second alternative the will itself determines which motive shall prevail, and it
cannot be said to be determined in its volition by the (objectively) ‘strongest’ motive.

“Of course, the will in choosing always prefers one motive to another and thereby shows
that this one pleases it more than the others; but does this preference of the will correspond to the
preceding judgment of the intellect as to preferableness? If man can act in opposition to this
judgment of the intellect and can prefer the weaker motive, then he determines himself and is
independent of the strength or weakness of the motives proposed by the intellect. Herein lies the
crux of the problem of free will.

“Ordinarily, the will accepts the side proposed as the better or the best; but not always. If
it were really true that the will always and necessarily prefers that which the intellect perceives to
be better or best, how then can it happen that we frequently deplore after our decision that we
have ‘acted against our better judgment,’ that we have ‘acted foolishly,’ having carelessly or
obstinately disregarded what we knew to be the better or best course of action? In many
instances we act contrary to our own interests, simply because we so desire, knowing full well
that we are harming ourselves by acting according to the whim of our will rather than according
to the objective merits of the motives as recognized by the intellect.

“It is not the objectively strongest motive which prevails against the will and determines
it to act; it is the act of the will which determines which motive shall be the strongest and shall
actually prevail.

“4. Influence of Character

“Some determinists, among them Schopenhauer, Wundt, Sidgwick, and others, impugn
the freedom of the will on the grounds that every act of man is determined by his character and
by the motives which influence the will at any particular moment. Oddly enough, some of these
philosophers and psychologists are reluctant to discard the concept of man’s responsibility for
his actions; they attempt to reconcile responsibility and the determinacy of character by pointing
out that ‘character’ is to a very great extent the result of man’s own actions and habits.

12
 “Character, we admit, undoubtedly exerts a great influence on the decisions of our will.
Knowing the character of a person often enables us to predict with probability how such a person
will act in a given set of circumstances. However, we are not determined entirely in our will acts
by the inherited and acquired dispositions of character.

“Here again we must appeal to personal experience. We are conscious of the weakness
and faultiness of character, of the pressure of long-standing acquired habits, of the frequency of
yielding to urgent passions; but we are also conscious that we can, though no doubt with
difficulty, resist the impulses which storm the citadel of the will. Many a drunkard and drug
addict has succeeded, perhaps after frequent relapses, in conquering his reigning passion by a
persistent struggle of his will.

“It is futile for the opponents to speak of ‘responsibility’ by stating that a person’s
character is the result of his own actions and habits. If the will is not free but determined, then all
the actions and habits which contribute to the formation of character are also determined. Man
cannot be held responsible for something he is incapable of doing or avoiding. Responsibility
presupposes the freedom of the will.

“5. The Principle of Causality

“Many determinists find the freedom of the will ‘inconceivable’ and ‘unintelligible’
because, in their opinion, a free act of the will would be an effect without a cause. They contend
that a free act would violate the Principle of Causality.

“In answer to this argument, we deny emphatically the supposition that an act of the will,
merely because it is a free act, is an effect without a cause. The Principle of Causality is a
metaphysical principle, and it is immediately evident. It states that where there is an effect there
must of necessity be a cause which produces this effect; that is to say, everything which receives
being and existence must receive this being and existence from something or somebody, because
a nonexistent being cannot give being and existence to itself.

“We admit the validity of the Principle of Causality in the case of the free act of the will
as an effect. A double cause is active in its production: a moral cause, namely, the motive; and
an efficient cause, namely, the Ego using the will as power. Hence, opponents are wrong when
they assert that a free act of the will violates the Principle of Causality.

“The Principle of Causality demands that every effect must necessarily have a cause; but
whether this cause acts in a free or in a determined manner, lies outside the purview of the
principle. So long as there is an efficient cause for the effect produced, the principle is satisfied.
In order that their objection be valid, determinists would have to prove that the Principle of
Causality demands that every effect must be produced by a necessary and not by a free cause.
They arbitrarily change the meaning of the axiom that ‘Every effect must necessarily have a
cause’ into the axiom that ‘Every effect must have a necessarily acting cause.’ The latter axiom,
however, involves an unwarranted assumption which amounts to a begging of the question,
because the postulate of a necessarily acting cause is the very point at issue.”22
22
C. N. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 391-398.

13