Daf Ditty Yevamot 5: tzara’at exempla

The Metzora being purified with the two birds.

By Dutch engraver Simon Fokke, 1712-1784. Rijksmuseum

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§ The Gemara comments: This works out well with regard to that which the school of Rabbi
Yishmael taught, that all garments mentioned in the Torah are composed of linen or wool.
However, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who do not accept this opinion, from where
do they derive the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition?

As stated previously, the conclusion that the positive mitzva to place fringes on a garment overrides
the prohibition against mixing linen and wool is derived from a free expression in a biblical verse;
however, the expression is free for interpretation only in the opinion of the tanna from the school
of Rabbi Yishmael.

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The Gemara responds: They derive it from the verse mentioned with regard to the halakhot of
the purification of a leper from his leprosy [tzara’at]:

-‫ָכּל‬-‫ט ְוָהָיה ַביּוֹם ַהְשִּׁביִﬠי ְיַגַלּח ֶאת‬ 9 And it shall be on the seventh day, that he shall shave all
‫ְזָקנוֹ ְוֵאת ַגֹּבּת‬-‫ר ֹאשׁוֹ ְוֶאת‬-‫ ֶאת‬,‫ְשָׂﬠרוֹ‬ his hair off his head and his beard and his eyebrows, even all
-‫ ְיַגֵלַּח; ְוִכֶבּס ֶאת‬,‫ְשָׂﬠרוֹ‬-‫ָכּל‬-‫ ְוֶאת‬,‫ֵﬠיָניו‬ his hair he shall shave off; and he shall wash his clothes, and
.‫ ְוָטֵהר‬--‫ְבָּשׂרוֹ ַבַּמּ ִים‬-‫ ְוָרַחץ ֶאת‬,‫ְבָּגָדיו‬ he shall bathe his flesh in water, and he shall be clean.
Lev 14:9

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 “And it shall be on the seventh day, that he shall shave all his hair off his head and his beard
and his eyebrows, even all his hair he shall shave off”

As it is taught in a baraita: Since it states, “all his hair,” what is the meaning when the verse
states “his head”? The baraita explains that as it is stated:

‫ ְפַּאת ר ֹאְשֶׁכם; ְול ֹא‬,‫כז ל ֹא ַתִקּפוּ‬ 27 Ye shall not round the corners of your heads, neither
.[‫ ֵאת ְפַּאת ְזָקֶנ‬,‫ַתְשִׁחית‬ shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard.
Lev 19:27

“You shall not round the corners of your heads” i.e., it is prohibited to shave the corners of the
head, I would derive that even a leper is included in this prohibition.

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Therefore, the verse states explicitly: “His head,” to teach that the mitzva that a leper must shave
overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head by shaving. The Gemara adds:
And this tanna holds that the shaving of the entire head is considered rounding.

Some Sages maintain that one violates the prohibition against rounding the corners of his head
only when he leaves some hair intact and removes the corners alone. Conversely, this tanna holds
that even when one removes all of the hair on the head, as a leper does when he performs his ritual
shaving, as this act includes the corners, he thereby transgresses the prohibition against rounding
the corners. This demonstrates that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition.

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The Gemara raises an objection against that claim. This proof can be refuted: What about the
fact that the prohibition against rounding is specific in that this prohibition is not equally
applicable for all, as it does not apply to women, and therefore other cases cannot be derived from
it? One cannot learn from this halakha that a positive mitzva that applies only to some people
overrides even a prohibition that applies equally to all people.

Rather, the Gemara provides an alternative suggestion: The principle that a positive mitzva
overrides a prohibition is derived from the superfluous phrase: “His beard” (Leviticus 14:9). As
it is taught in a different baraita: What is the meaning when the verse states: “His beard”? After
all, a beard is already included in the phrase: “All his hair.” The baraita answers: As it is stated
with regard to priests:

,‫יקרחה ) ִיְק ְרחוּ( ָק ְרָחה ְבּר ֹאָשׁם‬-‫ ה ל ֹא‬5 They shall not make baldness upon their head, neither
‫ל ֹא‬--‫ וְּפַאת ְזָקָנם ל ֹא ְיַגֵלּחוּ; וִּבְבָשָׂרם‬shall they shave off the corners of their beard, nor make any
.‫ ָשָׂרֶטת‬,‫ִיְשׂ ְרטוּ‬ cuttings in their flesh.
Lev 21:5

“Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard” I would derive that even a leper who
is a priest is included in this prohibition against shaving his beard. Therefore, the verse states
“his beard” in the case of a leper.

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However, the shaving of one’s beard is also a prohibition that is not equally applicable for all, as
it does not apply to women. Therefore, it is necessary to develop this argument further. And if this
derivation from the term “his beard” is not referring to the matter of a prohibition that is not
equally applicable for all, as the principle that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition that does
not apply equally for all has already been derived from the phrase “his head,” then the repetition
of this specific scenario must serve to expand upon the teaching.

Consequently, refer it to the matter of a prohibition that is equally applicable for all, i.e., that
a positive mitzva that is not equally applicable for all overrides even prohibitions that apply equally
to all people.

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The Gemara rejects this proof: Still, it is necessary for the verse to state: “His beard.” This phrase
is not in fact superfluous at all, as it has a novelty: It could enter your mind to say that priests
are different; since the verse includes for them additional mitzvot it is appropriate to be more
stringent with them, and therefore one might think that a positive mitzva should not even override
a prohibition that is not equally applicable for all.

Consequently, the verse states: “His beard,” and it thereby teaches us that even with regard to
priests a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition that is not equally applicable for all. This means
that the principle that a positive mitzva overrides even a prohibition that is equally applicable for
all cannot be derived from here.

§ Rather, the Gemara rejects this line of reasoning in favor of an alternative answer. The principle
that a positive mitzva overrides a prohibition is derived from a different interpretation of the
phrase “his head,” cited by this tanna. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “He
shall shave all his hair off his head” (Leviticus 14:9); what is the meaning when the verse states:
“His head”? The baraita explains: As it is stated with regard to a nazirite:

‫ַיֲﬠֹבר‬-‫ ַתַּﬠר ל ֹא‬,‫ ְיֵמי ֶנֶדר ִנְזרוֹ‬-‫ה ָכּל‬ 5 All the days of his vow of Naziriteship there shall no razor
-‫ְמל ֹאת ַהָיִּמם ֲאֶשׁר‬-‫ ַﬠד‬:‫ר ֹאשׁוֹ‬-‫ַﬠל‬ come upon his head; until the days be fulfilled, in which he
,‫ַגֵּדּל ֶפַּרע‬--‫ ָקֹדשׁ ִיְהֶיה‬,‫ַיִזּיר ַליהָוה‬ consecrateth himself unto the LORD, he shall be holy, he shall
.‫ְשַׂﬠר ר ֹאשׁוֹ‬ let the locks of the hair of his head grow long.
Num 6:5

“No razor shall come upon his head” (Numbers 6:5), I would derive that even a leper who is a
nazirite is prohibited from shaving his head upon purification. Therefore, the verse states: “His
head.” This teaches that the positive mitzva for a leper to shave overrides the prohibition of a
nazirite.

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The Gemara responds that this proof can be refuted as well: What about the fact that the
prohibition of a nazirite is not especially severe, as a leprous nazirite can request to have his
nazirite vow dissolved by a Sage? Since he can nullify the prohibition against shaving, this
prohibition is evidently not very severe, and therefore one cannot prove anything with regard to
all of the prohibitions of the Torah from this case.

The Gemara adds: As, if you do not say this, that the prohibitions of a nazirite are not as severe
as other prohibitions, that halakhic ruling that we maintain that a positive mitzva does not
override both a prohibition and a positive mitzva would be negated.

Summary

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:1

1
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Yevamos_5.pdf

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The Gemora seeks to find a source according to the Chachamim (who maintain that the words
wool and linen are not extra and therefore the juxtaposition cannot be expounded) that a positive
commandment overrides a prohibition. The Gemora answers: It is derived from the word rosho,
his head, which is written in the verses discussing a metzora shaving his head (part of his
purification process).

This is a superfluous word because the Torah had stated already that he shall shave off all his hair;
why is it said? It is written elsewhere [Vayikra 19:27]: You shall not round the corners of your
head (cutting the ‘payos,’ corners of the hair from his temples). I would have thought that this
prohibition includes the metzora, and he cannot shave his sideburns, the possuk says rosho,
teaching us that he shaves his entire head.

The Gemora explains that this Tanna maintains that one who shaves off all his hair from his head
(like the metzora is required to do) has in fact violated the prohibition of rounding the corners on
his head. It emerges that we learn that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all
his hair overrides the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. We derive from here that
all positive commandments can override a prohibition. The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason
the positive commandment can override this prohibition is because the prohibition against
rounding the corners of one’s head is a prohibition that is not applicable to all (a woman is not
subject to this prohibition). (We cannot derive from here to other instances, where the prohibition
is a universal one.)

The Gemora presents another source: It was taught in a braisa: What is derived from the word
rosho, his head? It is written regarding a nazir [Bamidbar 6:5]: A razor shall not pass over his head.
(This prohibition forbids him to shave any part of his head with a razor.) I would have thought that
one who is a metzora and a nazir would not be permitted to shave his head (even for the purification
process), the Torah teaches us that the positive commandment for a metzora to shave his head
overrides the prohibition of the nazir against shaving his head with a razor. We can derive from
here to all instances that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

The Gemora objects: Perhaps the reason the positive commandment can override this prohibition
is because the prohibition forbidding a nazir to shave is a lenient one, for a nazir can release himself
from his prohibitions by imploring a sage to annul his vow. (We cannot derive from here to other
instances, where the prohibition is a strict one.)

The Gemora returns to the juxtaposition of tzitzis and shatnez. The Gemora explains that there is
an extra word in the verse even according to the Chachamim. The Torah could have written: You
shall make yourself tzitzis (fringes); why did the Torah write gedilim, twined fringes? It is to make
the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us
that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment
can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word gedilim is not extra since it teaches us that
each corner of the garment must have four threads. The Gemora states: There is still an extra word
in this verse. The Torah could have written: You shall not wear shatnez, wool and linen. Why did

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the torah write the word together? It is to make the verse available for expounding; the fact that
the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez.
This indicates that a positive commandment can override a prohibition.

The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: the word together is not extra since it is teaching us
that if one fastens a woolen garment to a linen garment with two passes of the needle (forming a
complete stitch), he may not wear the garment, but if they are fastened with only one pass of the
needle, it is not regarded as a connection, and they may be worn.

The Gemora states: There is still an extra word in this verse. The Torah could have written: You
shall not wear wool and linen together. Why did the torah write the word shatnez? It is to make
the verse available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us
that one can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment
can override a prohibition. The Gemora rejects this explanation, as well: The word shatnez is not
extra since it teaches us that one has not violated the prohibition against wearing shatnez unless
the wool and linen threads are combed, spun, and woven together.

The Gemora answers: The word shatnez teaches us everything. The word is extra and therefore it
is available for expounding; the fact that the Torah juxtaposes these two verses, teach us that one
can make tzitzis even in a case of shatnez. This indicates that a positive commandment can override
a prohibition. However, if this word were intended only for this teaching, the Torah could have
written a more common term, such as kilayim, meaning mixture; why did the Torah use the term
shatnez? It is to learn the additional halacha that one has not violated the prohibition against
wearing shatnez unless the wool and linen threads are combed, spun, and woven together.

The Gemora states: We have successfully found a source teaching the principle that a positive
commandment overrides a standard prohibition; where do we find that a positive commandment
overrides a prohibition that is subject to the penalty of kares, thus requiring the verse aleha to teach
that one cannot perform yibum on his wife’s sister?

The Gemora states: Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of bris milah
(circumcision), which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.
The Gemora objects: Bris milah is different because there were thirteen covenants sealed in regard
to this commandment. Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of korban pesach, which
can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the penalty of kares.

The Gemora objects: Korban pesach is different because there is a penalty of kares for one who
refrains from offering the korban pesach. Perhaps it can be derived from the positive mitzvah of
offering the daily korban tamid, which can be performed even on Shabbos, which is subject to the
penalty of kares. The Gemora objects: Korban tamid is different because it is a korban, which is
offered constantly. The Gemora proposes to derive this principle from all three of these mitzvos
together. This is rejected because all three mitzvos existed before the Giving of the Torah.

A POSITIVE COMMANDMENT OVERRIDING TWO PROHIBITIONS

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Reb Moshe Rozmerin in Dvar Moshe states that the Rambam maintains that one who rounds the
corners of his head has violated two prohibitions; one for cutting his payos (corners), and another
for following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Our Gemora states that the positive commandment for the metzora to remove all his hair overrides
the prohibition of rounding the corners on one’s head. According to the Rambam, it is actually
overriding two prohibitions. Tosfos above (3b) discussed this issue and did not cite our Gemora
as a proof. Other Rishonim maintain that a positive commandment cannot override two
prohibitions. A question is brought in the name of the Lubliner Gaon: The Gemora later (20b)
states regarding a widow falling to yibum to a Kohen Gadol that it is a situation where the positive
commandment of yibum can possibly override the prohibition of a Kohen Gadol marrying a
widow.

He asks: There are two prohibitions for a Kohen Gadol to marry a widow; one is lo yikach (he
shall not take her), and the other is lo yechallel (he shall not desecrate the kehuna). How can the
positive commandment of yibum override two prohibitions?

Reb Chaim Ozer in Achiezer (Even Ezer, 4) answers: The Rishonim concede when the two
prohibitions are dependent on each other, that the positive commandment can override both
prohibitions. The basis for the prohibition of desecrating the kehuna is because it is an illicit
relationship; once the mitzvah of yibum overrides the prohibition of lo yikach, it becomes a
permitted relationship and there will be no prohibition of lo yechallel.

[It would seem to me that this is dependent on how we understand that a positive commandment
cannot override two prohibitions. We can explain that each prohibition strengthens one another,
and the positive commandment cannot override any of them; or perhaps the positive
commandment does override one of the prohibitions, but it does not have the capabilities to
override the second one. Reb Chaim Ozer would be in accordance with the latter explanation.]

According to the Achiezer, we can answer the Dvar Moshe’s question. The positive commandment
for the metzora to cut his hair overrides the prohibition against rounding the corners of one’s head,
and consequently, there will be no prohibition of following in the statutes of the non-Jews.

Tefillah – Efforts and Hope

The Gemora had stated: Korban tamid is different because it is a korban, which is offered
constantly. Tefillah is also something which is recited on a constant basis. R’ Chaim Meir Yechiel
of Moglenitza summoned one of his Chasidim after Shacharis one day and told him that for some
time, he had noticed the Chosid’s look of distraction and lack of Kavanah during davening. The
Chosid admitted that he felt unprepared for davening and that he was waiting to be stimulated from
Shomayim. The Rebbe told him that according to R’ Yehoshua b. Levi in Brachos (26b), Tefilos
were established to replace the Korban Tamid – morning and afternoon.

Chazal point out that although the fire which consumed these Korbanos came down from
Shomayim, the Kohanim were still required to bring their own fire. The same is true regarding
Tefilah. You must bring your own fire to start with, and hope to merit help from Shomayim.

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 EXPOUNDING "SEMUCHIN" TO TEACH "ASEH DOCHEH LO
TA'ASEH"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:2

The Gemara discusses at length the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." It proposes
that this principle is derived from the proximity of the prohibition against wearing Kil'ayim with the
command to make Tzitzis for one's garment. The proximity (Semuchin) of these two verses teaches
that one may place threads of wool on a garment of linen in order to make Tzitzis, and that the Mitzvas
Aseh of Tzitzis overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.

The Gemara concludes that this is a valid source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" according to d'Vei
Rebbi Yishmael who maintains that the verse of Kil'ayim contains an extra phrase which gives us
license to apply Semuchin and to derive that the Aseh of Tzitzis overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.
According to the Rabanan, however, there is no extra phrase in the verse (because they maintain that
the phrase "Tzemer u'Pishtim" is necessary to teach that the prohibition of Kil'ayim applies only to a
mixture of wool and linen and not to any other mixture). The Gemara asks what the source is, according
to the Rabanan, for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh," since Semuchin can be applied only
when there is an extra phrase in the verse.

What is the Gemara's question? It is only Rebbi Yehudah who requires an extra phrase ("Mufneh") in
the verse in order to expound Semuchin. The Rabanan who argue with d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael may
follow the view of the Rabanan who argue with Rebbi Yehudah and do not require an extra phrase in
order to expound Semuchin.

(a) TOSFOS (DH l'Rabanan) says that the Gemara asks this question merely to cover all possibilities,
including the possibility that the Rabanan agree with Rebbi Yehudah.

(b) The RITVA answers that the Rabanan -- who disagree with Rebbi Yehudah and apply Semuchin
even when there is no extra phrase in the verse -- nevertheless require an extra phrase to extend the law
derived from Semuchin to other cases through a Binyan Av. When there is no extra phrase, the law
derived through Semuchin applies only to the specific case mentioned in the verse and cannot be
applied to other cases. (See also ME'IRI)

(c) The TOSFOS HA'ROSH in the name of RABEINU MEIR explains that even if the Rabanan
maintain that we expound Semuchin, perhaps in this case the Semuchin does not teach that one may
place Tzitzis of wool on a garment of linen. Perhaps according to the Rabanan (who do not maintain
that whenever the verse says "Beged" it refers exclusively to wool and linen) the Semuchin teaches a
different Halachah altogether -- the Halachah of Rava, that Tzitzis of wool be may place on a garment
of any material (including linen), but Tzitzis of linen may be placed only on a garment of linen or other
non-wool material (and Tzitzis made of any other material may be placed only on a garment made of
the same material).

2
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/yevamos/insites/ye-dt-005.htm

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 THE TEACHING OF THE VERSE OF "ROSHO"

The Gemara explains that the verse, "Rosho" -- "On the seventh day he shall shave off all of his hair,
[and the hair of] his head" (Vayikra 14:9), teaches that the Mitzvas Aseh for a Metzora to shave his
hair overrides the Lo Ta'aseh against shaving the hair of the corners of one's head ("Hakafas ha'Rosh").
The Gemara suggests that this is the source for the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." The Gemara
(5b) concludes that there is another source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" -- the verses which teach
that the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.

If another source teaches that an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh, why is the verse of "Rosho" necessary?
Once the Torah teaches that an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh, that principle may be applied to a Metzora
who is obligated by a Mitzvas Aseh to shave his entire head, even though a Lo Ta'aseh prohibits one
from shaving his entire head. If an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh in the case of Tzitzis and Kil'ayim
(where the Lo Ta'aseh applies to everyone), then in the case of a Metzora -- where the Lo Ta'aseh
against shaving the entire head applies only to men and not to women -- the Aseh certainly should
override the Lo Ta'aseh. (The Gemara in Nazir 58a implies that according to the Tana who expounds
the verse of "Rosho," the source for "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh" is not the verses regarding Tzitzis, but
the word "Rosho" in this verse. The Sugya here, however, does not agree with that Tana.)

(a) TOSFOS (DH Mah l'Lav) answers that the verse of "Rosho" is needed to teach a different
Halachah and not the principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." It teaches that shaving the entire head is
considered "Hakafah" ("Hakafas ha'Rosh Shmei Hakafah") and it would have been prohibited had it
not been for the Mitzvas Aseh.

(b) Alternatively, without the verse of "Rosho" one might have thought that the second verse quoted
by the Gemara -- the verse of "Zekano" -- does not refer to the Mitzvas Aseh of a Kohen Metzora to
shave his hair and does not teach a new principle of "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh v'Aseh" in the case of
a Kohen Metzora. Rather, one might have thought that the verse of "Zekano" refers to the Mitzvas
Aseh of an ordinary Metzora to shave his hair, a case in which there is only a Lo Ta'aseh not to shave,
and thus the Aseh certainly overrides the Lo Ta'aseh. The verse of "Rosho" teaches that "Zekano"
indeed refers to a Kohen Metzora and teaches that an Aseh overrides both an Aseh and a Lo Ta'aseh.

A POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR "ASEH DOCHEH LO TA'ASEH

SHE'YESH BO KARES"

The Gemara seeks a source for the principle that "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh she'Yesh Bo Kares," a
Mitzvas Aseh overrides even a Lo Ta'aseh which is punishable with Kares.

How does the Gemara know that an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh which is punishable with Kares?
There seems to be evidence to the contrary. The fact that the Torah specifically teaches, in the case of
Tzitzis made from Kil'ayim, that an Aseh overrides an ordinary Lo Ta'aseh (one which is not
punishable with Kares) implies that an Aseh does not override a Lo Ta'aseh which is punishable with
Kares. Why, then, does the Gemara seek a source to prove that it does?

(a) TOSFOS (6a, DH Ta'ama) explains that one might have thought that the verse of Tzitzis does not
teach that an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh, but rather it teaches the Halachah of Rava, that Tzitzis of
wool or linen may be placed on a garment of any material. Without the verse, one would have thought

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that the Tzitzis must be made from the same material from which the garment is made. Since the verse
is needed to teach that the garment may be made from a different material than the Tzitzis, one might
have assumed that the verse cannot be used to teach "Aseh Docheh Lo Ta'aseh." Consequently, the
Gemara is justified in seeking another source that teaches that an Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh that has
Kares.

(b) TOSFOS further suggests that perhaps the Mitzvas Aseh of Tzitzis is considered a weaker Aseh
because it does not apply to everyone (women are exempt from the Mitzvah of Tzitzis). For this reason,
a verse is needed to teach that the Mitzvah of Tzitzis nevertheless overrides the Lo Ta'aseh of Kil'ayim.

(This answer does not explain why the Gemara attempts to derive from the Mitzvah of Milah that an
Aseh overrides a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares. Milah also is a Mitzvah which does not apply to everyone,
and nevertheless it overrides a Lo Ta'aseh that has Kares. Accordingly, the Mitzvah of Tzitzis certainly
should override an ordinary Lo Ta'aseh.) (See MELO HA'RO'IM to 6a for another possible answer.)

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:3

As we noted on yesterday’s daf, the mitzvah of yibum (levirate marriage) is an example of the
classic rule aseh dokheh lo ta’aseh – that performance of a positive commandment can push aside
a negative commandment. Our Gemara continues its discussion of other such cases and their
sources.

Someone suffering from tzara’at – Biblical leprosy – is obligated to remove himself from the
community until he recovers. Once his lesions are declared to be non-leprous, he undergoes a ritual
purification ceremony as preparation for his return to the community, which involves shaving off
all of the hair on his body (see Vayikra 14:1-9). This commandment stands in apparent
contradiction to the prohibition forbidding shaving one’s peyot (see Vayikra 19:27), yet is
expressly permitted by the Torah – another case of aseh dokheh lo ta’aseh.

The prohibition against cutting off peyot is understood by the Mishna in Kiddushin to apply only
to men and not to women, since the Torah places this negative commandment in the same context
as the prohibition against “destroying” one’s beard (which is understood as forbidding shaving
with a razor), something that does not apply to women. According to the Torah, one is not obligated
to leave the area of the peyot untouched, but rather a person is not allowed to have his hair cut in
such a way that the hair of his temples would be even with the hair behind his ears.

The Rambam suggests that these prohibitions stem from a connection with avodah zara – idol
worship – and that these types of haircuts were part of idolatrous practice, as the priests would cut
their hair in this fashion (see the Rambam in Hilkhot Avodat Kochavim 12:1,7). Others simply say
that this law is a gezeirat ha-katuv – a rule in the Torah whose explanation we cannot fully
understand.

3
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_yevamot_27/

16
The Gemara concludes that a positive commandment defers a negative commandment. This is
derived from the Torah using the word rather than the three words .4

The Gemara then seeks the source that a positive commandment can defer even a negative
commandment that is punishable with ‫ כרת‬.

The fact that the Torah uses the word ‫ עליה‬to teach that yibum may not be done in a case where the
brother’s wife is an ‫ ערוה‬indicates that without this special verse, the rule would be that it is
allowed. The Gemara identifies three possible sources that ‫ תעשה לא דוחה עשה‬even when ‫ כרת‬is
involved with the ‫לאו‬.

Each of these sources illustrates a mitzvah which can be done in violation of the laws of Shabbos,
a case where ‫ כרת‬is prescribed.

They are milah, korban Pesach, and the korban Tamid. Nevertheless, the Gemara finds a refutation
to each proof, and the next attempt is to use a ‫ שוה צד‬using two of the mitzvos at a time to act as a
united source.

This, however, also fails, as each set of two mitzvos share a common aspect which leaves the proof
inconclusive. Pesach and milah are both liable for ‫ כרת‬if not fulfilled. Pesach and Tamid are both
korbanos brought on the altar, and milah and tamid are mitzvos which each predated Sinai

At this point, with the sources having failed to be conclusive, we would not know that yibum might
have been allowed in a case of an ‫ ערוה‬.The Gemara continues its inquiry. On a technical basis,
Ritva asks why the ‫ פירכא‬against milah and Tamid is a problem.

The fact is that yibum also predates Sinai, as we find that it was practiced in the time of Yehuda
and Tamar. Nevertheless, Ritva answers that the observance of the custom of yibum in Sefer
Bereshis was not yet a commandment, and we cannot formulate a rule regarding mitzvah priorities
based upon what amounts to a mere custom.

Tosafos (‫ ) ומכולהו ה ד‬notes that aside from the Tamid, the Gemara apparently could have
introduced other korbanos which are brought on Shabbos into the equation. These would not be
rejected due to pre-dating Sinai. Tosafos answers that these other offerings are subject to a ‫פירכא‬
that they are brought regularly, they are ‫תדיר‬, and that is why they defer a ‫ לאו‬which has ‫ כרת‬.

4
https://www.dafdigest.org/masechtos/Yevamos%20005.pdf

17
The Sifrei (1) writes that dwelling in Eretz Yisroel is equal to all the other mitzvos.

Ramban (2) counts the mitzvah of dwelling in Eretz Yisroel as one of the 613 mitzvos of the Torah.
There is, however, considerable debate regarding the parameters of the mitzvah. One issue (3) is
whether the mitzvah is still in force after the Jewish People were exiled.

Another matter (4) is whether the mitzvah is obligatory (‫ )חיובית‬or optional (‫ )קיומית‬and there would
be no consequence for non-compliance with the mitzvah. A common question that arises
concerning this mitzvah is whether the mitzvah of moving to Eretz Yisroel overrides the mitzvah
of kibbud av v’eim.

Some authorities, based on a Midrash, conclude (5) that honoring one’s parents overrides the
mitzvah of dwelling in Eretz Yisroel. The Midrash (6) states that Hashem told Avrohom Avinu
explicitly that he is exempt from the mitzvah of honoring his parents to travel to Eretz Yisroel
whereas no one else is exempt from the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents to dwell in Eretz
Yisroel.

The Mabit, (7) on the other hand, ruled that one should not listen to his parents who are protesting
against his decision to move to Eretz Yisroel because the mitzvah of dwelling in Eretz Yisroel will
override the mitzvah to honor one’s parents. Further support for this position can be found in a
teshuvah of the Maharam M’Rothenburg (8).

Maharam M’Rothenburg writes that a child should not listen to his father who forbids him from
moving to Eretz Yisroel. The reason is that moving to Eretz Yisroel is a mitzvah, coupled with the
exposition cited in our Gemara, namely the mitzvos of honoring parents and Shabbos, are in the
same pasuk to teach that when it comes to fulfilling a mitzvah one does not listen to a parent.

18
On today’s daf, we find that the Baraisa proposes that were it not for the verse, one might think
that honoring parents overrides the Shabbos! Clearly, if such an idea could be entertained, it only
goes to prove the paramount importance of ‫ ואם אב כבוד‬.

The famous Yehudi HaKadosh, zt”l, would deliver a regular Gemara shiur to his students that
explored the commentary of Tosfos. One of his students was an extremely talented local boy who
was unfortunately orphaned of his father.

Once, the Rebbe interrupted their learning so that he could concentrate deeply on a certain subject.
His young student knew well that such a break could last an hour or more, so he took advantage
of the pause to go home and eat. The boy ate a quick meal and hurried out back to his Rebbe’s
home, but his mother called out after him that she wanted him to go up to the attic and bring
something down for her. In his rush to return to study, he ignored her call, but half-way back the
boy had second thoughts. “Isn’t the whole purpose of study to fulfill the mitzvos? Shouldn’t I
honor my mother instead?” he asked himself.

So he ran home and did as he was bid. Afterward he returned to his studies, and as he opened the
door to the Rebbe’s house, the Yehudi HaKadosh snapped out of his reverie and rose to his full
height as a sign of respect.

Beaming, the Yehudi HaKadosh asked, “What mitzvah have you just performed, because it has
brought the spirit of the great Amorah Abaye with you into my house.” The student told his story,
and the Rebbe explained to the rest of the students: “It is well known that Abaye was an orphan—
his name is an acronym of the verse, ‘For in You does the orphan find mercy.’ This is why his
spirit accompanies a person who fulfills the mitzvah of honoring his parents—so that he should
have a part in a mitzvah that was denied to him.

You want to know why am I smiling? Because Abaye came and answered my question on the
Tosafos!”

Rabbi Seth Goren writes:5

Back on Yevamot 3, the Gemara began talking about whether and how a specific positive
commandment can override a general prohibition. On today’s daf, the rabbis are still at it. As part

5
Myjewishlearning.com

19
of the conversation, the text turns to a conflict between communal health and individual religious
obligations.

For context, it helps to be familiar with the concept of a nazir (also known as nazirites), someone
who voluntarily vows to refrain from certain activities, including contact with dead bodies and the
consumption of grape products. (There’s actually an entire tractate of Talmud dedicated to
nazirites that we’ll begin learning early next year.)

As part of their constraints, a nazir isn’t permitted to cut the hair on their head. Numbers 6:5 is
pretty clear about this: “Throughout the term of their vow as nazirite, no razor shall touch their
head; it shall remain consecrated until the completion of their term as nazirite of God, the hair of
their head being left to grow untrimmed.”

In potential conflict with this, Leviticus 14:9 requires someone with leprosy to shave their body
hair: “On the seventh day all hair shall be shaved off — of head [literally, “his head”], beard, and
eyebrows. Having shaved off all hair, the person shall wash those clothes and bathe the body in
water — and then shall be pure.”

As we can see, there’s a general commandment — to shave all hair — and then a couple of specific
examples. In this list, the phrase “of head” (or “his head”) is the focus of the rabbis’ attention:

What is the meaning when the verse states: “His head”? As it is stated: “No razor shall come
upon his head.” (Numbers 6:5) I would derive that even a leper who is a nazirite (is prohibited
from shaving his head upon purification). Therefore, the verse states: “His head.”

Let’s unpack this. The rule in Leviticus concerning lepers says “all hair” must be shaved. So what’s
the point of including “his head” specifically? If the text had only made a general statement about
hair — and not specifically mentioned the hair on the head — the specific rule prohibiting a nazir
from shaving their head might be seen as taking precedence over the general requirement for a
leper to shave, potentially undermining public health needs and putting others in danger.
Therefore, this teaching suggests, the Torah added a specific additional requirement to require
even a leper who is a nazirite to shave their head.

The Gemara agrees that a nazir with leprosy has to shave, but it rejects this logic, noting that the
requirements for a nazirite in Numbers 6:5 include not one, but two commandments — one
positive and one negative: Don’t let a razor touch the head and let the hair on the head grow
unimpeded. Even if we say the specific commandment for lepers to shave their heads overrides
the specific prohibition barring nazirites from shaving their heads, can it override both a specific
prohibition and a specific positive commandment? That would seem a bridge too far.

Fortunately, there’s another justification for having the leprous nazir shave:

One cannot learn from a nazirite, as a leprous nazirite can request to have his nazirite vow
dissolved. So too, there is room to refute the proof from the halakhah of a nazirite that a positive
mitzvah overrides a prohibition, as he can request to have his vow dissolved.

20
In other words, the nazir’s vow is dissolvable. So we can resolve any conflict between the two
verses simply by releasing the nazir from their vow not to shave their head. Faced with this, the
Gemara rejects the nazirite example as proof that a positive commandment overrides a general
prohibition.

With that out of the way, the debate meanders on, tumbling through the rest of today’s daf and on
to the next (and the next and the next), leaving one repudiated text after another in its wake. I won’t
spoil the plot, but the sheer complexity, number of external references and length of this discussion
highlights the impressive undertaking that studying Talmud truly is.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:6

Much of yesterday, today’s (Yevamot 5), as well as the upcoming dapim are dedicated to the topic
of proof, and specifically, proof for the halacha that a positive mitzvah (otherwise known as a ‫מצות‬
‫ )עשה‬can override a negative mitzvah (otherwise known as a ‫)מצות לא תעשה‬.

And why is this the focus of our discussion? Because there is a biblical prohibition of a man
marrying his brother’s wife, which is then overridden in the case of Yibbum where a man ‘marries’
his brother’s wife.

In terms of today’s daf, a proof is found for the overall principle from the juxtaposition of the
mitzvah of tzitzit with the prohibition of sha’atnez (see Devarim 22:11-12) from where we learn
that the positive mitzvah of tzitzit overrides the negative mitzvah of sha’atnez. However, the
question to which the Gemara then turns is how do we know that this same calculus applies when
dealing with a more severe negative mitzvah such as the relationship between a Yavam and a
Yevama?

The pursuit of this proof spans over numerous dapim. However, I would like to make mention to
one line of enquiry in our daf where it is suggested that while no singular biblical source may exist
to provide the necessary proof, ‫‘ – תיתי מתרתי‬perhaps it can be deduced from two?’, meaning that
perhaps evidence can be drawn from two different sources which, together, may be sufficient to
prove this conclusion. And when I read this, I thought back to a very different pursuit of a very
different proof.

You may or may not know the story of Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, or how
his drive to pursue a proof led him to work in isolation for six years to try and solve this incredibly
difficult problem. Yet it was when he shared him proof in 1993 to great acclaim that it was soon
discovered that the proof contained a flaw in one area which, notwithstanding the incredible
creativity demonstrated in all the work he had done, meant that his proof was incomplete.

Wiles tirelessly tried and failed for over 14 months to repair his proof, and then, just over a year
after first sharing his proof, and just before he was about to give up, he had a revelation: “Suddenly,

6
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

21
totally unexpectedly, I had this incredible revelation. I realised that, although the Kolyvagin-Flach
method wasn’t working completely, it was all I needed to make my original Iwasawa theory work.”

As Simon Singh explains in his book on the topic, ‘Iwasawa theory on its own had been inadequate.
The Kolyvagin-Flach method on its own was also inadequate. Together they complemented each
other perfectly. It was a moment of inspiration that Wiles will never forget. As he recounted these
moments, the memory was so powerful that he was moved to tears: “It was so indescribably
beautiful; it was so simple and so elegant. I couldn’t understand how I’d missed it.”’

At times we often look for simple and singular solutions to our problems, and when we do so, we
often look towards one source with the hope that it can provide us with all that we need. But as
Wiles’ story demonstrates, sometimes it takes more than one source to help us reach the conclusion
and find the ‘proof’ that we are looking for, which means that there can be times when we miss a
solution that is staring right at us.

From here we should learn that ‫‘ – תיתי מתרתי‬perhaps it can be deduced from two?’ isn’t only a
suggestion that can be applied to Talmudic proofs or mathematical proofs, but also to other aspects
of life as well - and sometimes the right solution that we need requires the fusing of forces,
inspiration and wisdom from more than one singular source.

Aseh Doche Lo Taaseh 7

Aseh Doche Lo Taseh is a principle that allows one to violate a negative commandment in order
to fulfill a mitzvah.[1] An allegorical reason for this principle is that positive commandments
stem from the mitzvah to love Hashem and negative commandments stem from the mitzvah to
fear Him. Since loving Him is important important than fearing him the principle is that a
positive commandment overrides a negative commandment.[2]

If it can be avoided

1. If the entire situation of the negative commandment can be avoided so that one
can do the mitzvah without any prohibition one is obligated to do so and not

7
https://halachipedia.com/index.php?title=Aseh_Doche_Lo_Taaseh

22
 apply the principle of aseh doche lo taseh.[3] Many hold that this principle is
biblical.[4] Others hold it is rabbinic.[5]
2. If by avoiding the situation of the aveirah in order to fulfill the mitzvah one isn't
certain that one will fulfill the mitzvah then some achronim learn that it would be
permitted to have the aseh override the lo taseh.[6]

Reasons not to apply aseh doche lo taseh

Lo Taseh with Karet

1. If the lo taseh has the punishment of karet.[7]

Aseh Doche Lo Taseh and Aseh

1. One aseh can't override both a lo taseh and aseh. This idea is found in Beitzah
8b and Shabbat 133a with respect to Yom Tov.
2. It is a dispute if an aseh with karet can override both a lo taseh and an aseh.[8]

In the Bet Hamikdash

1. In the bet hamikdash. Rava in Zevachim 97b says that we don’t apply aseh doche
lo taseh in the bet hamikdash. His proof is that otherwise we should allow
breaking the bones of a korban pesach to eat the meat inside the bones since
eating the korban is a mitzvah. Rashba Eruvin 100a s.v. bha and Ritva 100a s.v.
amar cites Tosfot as using this rule to explain why aseh doche lo taseh doesn't
apply to sprinkling a mixture of bechor and olah blood. Rashi and Tosfot Eruvin
100a seems to ignore this rule and the Turei Even Rosh Hashana 28b s.v. hari
points this out.
2. Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Mishnayot Pesachim 3:7:13) writes that doing shechita of a
pesach while owning chametz is not disqualified from the principle of aseh doche
lo taseh because it is in the mikdash since the omission of the mitzvah of pesach
is punishable by karet. For other reasons aseh doche lo taseh might not be
relevant. His proof is Pesachim 59a that shechita of pesach overrides the
prohibition of sacrificing korbanot after the tamid shel ben haarbayim and
mikdash isn't relevant.

Simultaneous Fulfillment of Mitzvah and Prohibition

1. If the mitzvah isn’t fulfilled simultaneously with the prohibition (B’idna). The
Gemara Beitzah 8b establishes that one can’t violate an aseh that is overriding a
lo taseh if they aren’t simultaneous. The example is that it is forbidden to dig dirt
in order to fulfill the mitzvah of kisuy hadam on Yom Tov. Piskei Tosfot
Zevachim n. 69 writes that there is no requirement that the mitzvah and sin are
simultaneous if by definition there is no other way to fulfill the mitzvah unless a
sin is performed. (See Ri Chaver’s question on this Piskei Tosfot.) See

23
 Tosfot Bava Batra 13a who writes that a maaseh biyah isn't bidna of the kiyum of
pru urevu even though it is necessary for the mitzvah.
2. When one aseh is greater than another it isn't necessary for the mitzvah and
prohibition implied from an aseh to be simultaneous.[9]

Prohibition Due to Negligence

1. If the aseh was created because of your peshiya. Tosfot Eruvin 100a writes that if
the prohibition is created by your negligence we don’t allow an aseh to override a
lav. Tosfot Harosh 100a s.v. rabbi agrees. Rashba Eruvin 100a s.v. bha and Ritva
100a s.v. amar cite this from the Raavad and agree. Ayelet Hashachar Zevachim
80a adds that this is true even if the person who was negligent isn't the kohen
who is doing the mitzvah. Rabbi Akiva Eiger Ketubot 40a asks on Tosfot because
the gemara Ketubot 40a applies aseh overriding a lo taseh to a man who raped or
seduced a single woman who is forbidden to him even though that mitzvah was
created by his negligence. He answers that only if the mitzvah by definition is
created by negligence we apply aseh doche lo taseh, otherwise we wouldn’t apply
aseh doche lo taseh if the aseh could have been created without negligence and in
this instance it is. Sfat Emet Zevachim 80a agrees based on Pesachim 83 that
applies aseh doche lo taseh to burning notar on Yom Tov even though the
mitzvah was created through negligence since by definition notar is always
created through negligence.

Possible to Uproot the Aseh

1. If the aseh is ita b’shayla and the lo taseh isn’t. Turei Even Rosh Hashana 28b
writes that the reason that Rabbi Yehoshua didn’t allow applying aseh doche lo
taseh to a case of a mixture of bloods is because the aseh wasn’t as serious as the
lo taseh. That is, when the blood of an olah mixes with a bechor since the olah
could be undone with hatarat nedarim the aseh isn’t as powerful as the kedusha of
bechor which couldn’t be undone with hatarat nedarim. The type of logic is also
found in Yevamot 5a.
2. When discussing a mitzvah of ben adam lchavero we can't apply aseh doche lo
taseh since it is possible for a mitzvah to be mochel and not have the mitzvah ben
adam lchavero. Ketubot 40a. See Shem Aryeh and Ramban Bava Metsia 33a.

Mitzvah and Prohibition in Another Chefsa

1. If the mitzvah and chefsa are in two chafasim. The Turei Even Rosh Hashana 28b
writes that even if the mitzvah is associated with one item and the prohibition is
associated with another we can still apply aseh doche lo taseh. His proof is that
we apply aseh doche taseh to eating a piece of kodshim that absorbed the taste of
another kodshim that is forbidden (Zevachim 97b), even though the taste of the
food and the food are separate entities. The same is true of two bloods that are

24
 mixed. Even if one is doing a mitzvah with one blood and a prohibition of bal
tosif with another blood it is permitted to say aseh doche lo taseh. The Haghot
Imrei Baruch argues with the proof of absorbed tastes because that could be
viewed as one entity. Ayelet Hashachar Zevachim v. 3 p. 96 agrees with the Turei
Even but notes that it is interesting. However, Sfat Emet Zevachim 80a s.v.
bgemara amar implies otherwise that one couldn’t apply aseh doche lo taseh to
two items where one has the aseh and one the lo taseh.

Partial Mitzvah

1. For a part of a mitzvah. Maharal Eruvin 100a writes that we don't apply aseh
doche lo taseh to fulfill the last three zerikot of an olah since the primary mitzvah
is already done with one zerika. Gilyonei Hashas Eruvin 100a explains that since
the four zerikot are one mitzvah we don't say that a part of a mitzvah should
allow using aseh doche lo taseh.

Prohibition by Definition Includes the Mitzvah

1. If the lo taseh by definition includes the case of the mitzvah aseh.

Tzlach Pesachim 49a has a dispute with his son whether one could apply aseh
doche lo taseh to the case of doing shechita on a korban pesach knowing that one
still owns chametz and can't get rid of it. He explains that in his opinion it is
impossible to have aseh doche lo taseh unless the mitzvah and prohibition
situationally overlap. But if by definition the prohibition includes the case of a
mitzvah and nonetheless forbids it, it must be that aseh doche lo taseh isn't
relevant here. Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Mishnayot Pesachim 3:7:13) cites that the
Turei Even Chagiga 4 s.v. istarich disagrees with the Tzlach and applies aseh
doche lo taseh even where the prohibition by definition includes the mitzvah. See
Tosfot's question in Zevachim 97b s.v. veched which might be a proof for Tzlach.

Sources
1. Shabbat 133a, Yevamot 3b
2. Ramban Shemot 20
3. Reish Lakish in Shabbat 133a
4. Sitrei Umaginei Yashar Vchadash p. 215 learns from the Rif (Tzizit) that avoiding aseh doche lo taseh when
possible is biblical. Torat Chesed EH 2:22:6 writes that it is a dispute in the gemara if Reish Lakish's
principle is biblical.
5. Tosfot Menachot 40a s.v. kiyvan implies that the principle of avoiding aseh doche lo taseh is only rabbinic
since he says that kilayim in tzitzit is completely permitted even if it could be avoided.
6. ↑See Chidushei Batra Yevamot 230 who argues on the Kehilat Yakov Yevamot 14 who says for a mitzvah
that has alternatives (e.g. yibum and chalitza) it isn't necessary to avoid applying aseh doche lo taseh because
perhaps you won't do the entire mitzvah.
7. Yevamot 3b
8. Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Pesachim 4b and 49a (and more concisely in Tosfot Rabbi Akiva Eiger on
Mishnayot Pesachim 3:7:13) proves from Tosfot Chullin 88a s.v. me'nayin that he holds that an aseh with
karet cannot override both a lo taseh and an aseh. However, Tosfot Zevachim 33b s.v. linyan holds that an
aseh with kodshim can override both an aseh and lo taseh. Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that this is also a

25
 dispute between the Rambam (Biyat Mikdash 3:18) holding like Tosfot Chullin and Raavad holding like
Tosfot Zevachim.
9. Tosfot Pesachim 59a. See Rabbi Akiva Eiger Pesachim 4a who learns that Even Haozer on MA 444:11 for
an interesting application of Tosfot.

Why does "aseh doche lo saaseh"?8

There is a halachic principle that ‫ עשה דוחה לא תעשה‬- when a positive and
negative mitzvah conflict, we obey the positive one. The Talmud learns this out of pesukim, but
what is the hashkafic/philosophical reason for this?

R' Nissim Gaon on Shabbos 132b says the following:

‫ובזה הפירוש שפירשנו יסיר מלבך ספק גדול שמסתפקין בו בני אדם ושואלין עליו והוא שאומרין מאחר שאנו‬
‫יודעין שאזהרת לאו קשה מציווי עשה היאך יבא עשה וידחה האזהרה של לאו שהיא חמורה ממנו ומדרך הידוע‬
.‫שהחמור דוחה הקל ולא עוד אלא שפעמים שעולה על דעתן שיש בענין הזה ענין חזרה בדבר הראשון‬
‫והתשובה הוא מה שהקדמנו שהאזהרה של לאו כך נאמרה מיוחדת וכי הציווי של עשה תנאי הוא בה וכן אמרו‬
‫רז"ל )ספרי פ' תצא( מחלליה מות יומת וביום השבת שני כבשים בני שנה שניהן בדיבור אחד נאמרו ערות אשת‬
‫אחיך ויבמה יבוא עליה שניהן בדיבור אחד נאמרו מה שאי אפשר לבשר ודם לומר שנא' אחת דיבר אלהים‬
‫ הבן דבר זה ושמור אותו כי הוא ספק גדול והרי גלינו אותו‬.‫שתים זו שמענו‬

...And with this explanation that we have explained a great doubt has been removed from you
heart, which what people have asked, being that we know that the warning from a prohibition is
more stringent than the commandment to do, how is it that the commandment comes and pushes
off the prohibition which is more stringent than it? As is known, normally the stringent pushes off
the lenient. Even more than this, that it may occur to you that there is a retraction of the original
statement in this. The answer is as he said, that the prohibition was specified as such, and the
commandment is a condition in it, as Chazal said, "those who desecrate is (shabbos) shall die"
and "on shabbos day, two sheep (are to be offered" were said with one statement, "do not reveal
the nakedness of your brother's wife" and "the yavam should come unto her" were said in one
statement, that which the ear cannot hear and the mouth cannot speak. Understand this, as it is a
great doubt and we have revealed it.

8
https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/36969/why-does-aseh-doche-lo-saaseh

26
Likewise, Rashi on Berachos 20a sv "shev v'al ta'asheh" says the following:

‫וטומאת גופי' שהותרה לכהן ולנזיר ליטמא למת מצוה דקא מעקר בידים מפני כבוד הבריות דלאו שב ואל תעשה‬
‫הוא היינו טעמא דלא גמרינן מיניה דהתם לאו כבוד הבריות הוא דדחי לא תעשה דידה דמעיקרא כשנכתב ל"ת‬
‫דטומאה לא על מת מצוה נכתב כשם שלא נכתב על הקרובים‬

Tumah itself, which is permitted to a kohen and nazir in the case of a mes mitzva even though it he
is uprooting (the prohibition) actively because of the dignity of Man despite the fact that (he is not
violating passively), we do not extrapolate from there to elsewhere (that one can violate
prohibitions for the dignity of Man), because there the reason is not because of the dignity of Man
but because the prohibition originally was never said on such a case of a mes mitzva, just as it
was never said on the tumah of relatives.

The Ramban (Sh'mos 20:8) says that because positive mitzvos stem from loving HASHEM while
negative mitzvos stem from fear of HASHEM and love is greater than fear.
It's from the ‫( רמב"ן על התורה‬Sh'mos 20:8):

‫ כי‬,‫ והוא היוצא ממדת האהבה והוא למדת הרחמים‬,‫ואמת הוא ג"כ כי מדת זכור רמזו במצות עשה‬
‫ והוא למדת הדין‬,‫ ומדת שמור במצות לא תעשה‬,‫העושה מצות אדוניו אהוב לו ואדוניו מרחם עליו‬
‫ ולכן מצות עשה גדולה‬,‫ כי הנשמר מעשות דבר הרע בעיני אדוניו ירא אותו‬,‫ויוצא ממדת היראה‬
‫ כי המקיים ועושה בגופו ובממונו רצון אדוניו הוא‬,‫ כמו שהאהבה גדולה מהיראה‬,‫ממצות לא תעשה‬
‫ ולכך אמרו דאתי עשה ודחי לא תעשה‬,‫גדול מהנשמר מעשות הרע בעיניו‬.

So one can, for example, carry their kiddush cup and wine across the public domain to their
friend’s home where they have been invited (the friend has no cup or wine) on Shabbat, in order
to make kiddush? Positive mitzvah to make kiddush and negative mitzvah (prohibition) to carry
in public domain. Good to know...

I heard today in the name of Meshech Chochma (but I have no precise citation) as follows:

When one has these two choices —

• fulfilling thou-shalt, which forces him to violate the shalt-not, and

• obeying the shalt-not, which forces him to ignore thou-shalt
— one is forced to violate a command. In a case of coercion, one is absolved from guilt;
however, in case one is coerced to refrain from doing thou-shalt miztva, one does not get reward
for having done it. So consider the cost-benefit analysis:

• Fulfilling thou-shalt, which forces him to violate the shalt-not, means he gets reward
for fulfilling thou-shalt; violating the shalt-not incurs no penalty because it was
under duress.
• Obeying the shalt-not, which forces him to ignore thou-shalt, likewise gets him no
penalty; but also no reward for having done thou-shalt.

27
So the former option is preferable.

R. Elazar Azikri states (Sefer Chareidim Introduction) that not fulfilling a positive commandment
is more serious then violating a negative commandment. His proof is that a positive commandment
overrides a negative commandment (‫)עשה דוחה לא תעשה‬, so it is clearly more serious.

‫והראיה העצומה שאם לא היה עוון ביטול מצות עשה חמור מן דין עונש לא תעשה למה אתי עשה ודחי את לא תעשה וכי‬
‫דבר שאין עונש בביטול עשיתו יהיה חמור לדחות דבר שיש בו עונש בעשיתו אלא על כרחך אין הדבר כן‬

Aseh V'lo Saaseh9

Chaim B. tackles the question of the Maharatz Chiyus by discussing a situation where we have
one mitzvah that is both a lav and an aseh. He writes as follows:

Kiddushin 34 gives examples of mitzvos aseh which are not zman gerama which women therefore
are obligated to perform: hashavas aveidah, ma’akah, shiluach hakan. Tosfos asks why it is
relevant whether these mitzvos are zman gerama or not - since each of these mitzvos also is linked
to a lav which women are obligated in, women have to perform the action associated with the
mitzvah irrespective of the aseh.

Tosfos answers by devising cases where the aseh applies without the lav. The Ramban, however,
offers a more fundamental argument. In these cases the lav does not function as an independent
issur but is the Torah’s way of strengthening the mitzvas aseh – if the aseh does not apply, the lav
which goes hand in hand with it does not apply either.

The debate between Tosfos and Ramban seems to be how to understand intersecting lavim/mitzvos
– do we treat each factor independently or do the aseh and lav merge together and function as one
unit either based on the criteria of the aseh (in these cases) or the lav (perhaps in other cases).

Returning to the question of the Maharatz Chiyus: how we can say oseik b’mitzvah patur min
hamitzvah by tzedaka when the mitzvah carries with it two separate lavim? One might argue based
on the Ramban that the lavim are not independent issurim, but only serve to strengthen the aseh.
If the aseh is cancelled, the lavim do not apply either.

Coercion to perform the mitzvah of tzedaka (Kesubos 49)

Kesubos 49b tells us that Rava coerced R’ Nasan bar Ami to pledge a certain sum to tzedaka.
Tosfos asks: how did Rava have the right to coerce fulfillment of the mitzvah of tzedaka? Chulin

9
http://elomdus.blogspot.com/2007/10/aseh-vlo-saaseh.html

28
110 tells us that Bais Din cannot coerce someone to perform a mitzvas aseh which the Torah states
an explicit reward for performing [it is as if the Torah designated the reward and only the reward
be used as an incentive]. The Torah explicitly promises bracha for tzedaka, which would seem to
exclude coercion.

Tosfos offers three answers:

1) The gemara in Chulin excludes coercion by force; Rava used “verbal coercion” to talk Rav
Nasan into it.

2) The gemara in Chullin refers to voluntary pledges of tzedaka, but R’ Nasan lived in a city where
there was a contractual agreement among all members to contribute a set monthly payment.

3) Tzedaka is different than other mitzvos in that there are two lavim that go with it – lo t’ametz
and lo tikpotz. Coercion can be applied to force fulfillment of lavim.

4) A fourth answer not given by Tosfos but mentioned by other Rishonim: the gemara in Chulin
means that Bais Din in these cases is not forced to coerce obedience, but it does not mean that Bais
Din is prevented from doing so.

The Maharatz Chiyus in a number of places (e.g. Ateres Tzvi, Shu”t siman 13) questions Tosfos’
third answer. Bava Kama (56) tell us that someone watching/holding a lost article until its owner
claims it has the status of a shomeir sachar because the object’s guardian receives the “payment”
of being exempt from the mitzvah of tzedaka while watching the object – oseik b’mitzvah patur
min hamitzvah. Oseik b’mitzvah patur min hamitzvah is an exemption from mitzvos aseh, but not
lavim – e.g. travelers en route to perform a mitzvah are exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah
(Sukkah 25) but cannot eat in a treif restaurant.

If Tosfos is correct that the mitzvah of tzedaka carries with it two lavaim as well as the mitzvas
aseh, how can oseik b’mitzvah exempt the shomeir from the lavim of tzedaka? How are those
lavim different than the lav of eating tarfus?

A commenter, Anon1 makes the following comment on this Ramban:

I remember when R'Mayer Twersky explained this machlokes rishonim -- he gave two mehalchim
-- one focusing on whether the aseh and the lav were concurrent or not and the other focusing on
the mechanics of aseh docheh lo taaseh (hutrah vs. dechuyah).

First, I'm not sure what Anon1 means by explaining this Ramban as having to do with aseh docheh
lo saaseh. There is a separate issue also mentioned by Chaim B. in this post as follows:

29
why can’t women, who are not obligated in the aseh of Yom Tov because it is zman gerama, use
this oil for hadlakas neiros – since they are only obligated in the lav of Yom Tov, we should invoke
aseh doche lo ta’aseh?

Tosfos answers that since the lav of Yom Tov is conjoined to an aseh, it indicates (is a siman) that
this lav is stronger than other lavim and cannot be pushed off by an aseh.

This issue is obviously relevant to aseh docheh lo saseh. The issue is if you have a mitzvah that is
both an aseh shehazman grama and a lav, do we say the rule of ein aseh docheh lo saaseh v'aseh
for women. Clearly, that issue may be related to how the rules of aseh docheh lo saaseh work.

The first issue is a different one altogether. That issue is whether women are chayav at all in a
mitzvas aseh shehazman gerama that also has a lav associated with it. Meaning, even though they
are clearly patur from the aseh part, are they still chayav in the lav aspect.

I looked at the Ramban and my understanding was that the Ramban was saying that it depends on
how we phrase the lav. In a case like maakeh for example, how do we understand the lav? Is the
lav:

Do not refrain from putting up a maakeh.

Or is it:

Do not refrain from performing the mitzvah of maakeh.

The Ramban says that it all depends on how the lav is written in the Torah. In the cases above
(maakeh, hashavas aveidah, etc.) we read the lav in the latter sense. The lav is to not refrain from
the mitzvah. Therefore, if the aseh is zman gerama and, thus, there is no mitzvah, there is no lav
either by extension.

In my understanding of the Ramban I did not think the Ramban was making a general rule by all
mitzvos that have an aseh and a lav. Rather, the Ramban would analyze each case differently to
determine how exactly the lav is phrased.

30
 Taharat Ha-Metzora
Rav Ezra Bick writes:10

Parashat Tazria, like parashat Metzora, which follows it, deals exclusively with tum'a and tahara.
Specifically, the five kinds of tum'a described in these two parshiot (at least this year, they are two
parshiot), yoledet, metzora, zav, zava, and nida, form a subset of tum'a known in the halakha as
"tum'ot hayotzot migufo" (the source of tum'a is the body of the tamei; i.e., he or she is not tamei
by coming in contact with something else, but as a result of a body condition). These tum'ot are
set off from other tum'ot (contact tum'ot) in the Torah.

The most prominent of tum'ot - tum'at met (contact with a dead body) is found only in Bemidbar
(parashat Chukat), and even neveila and sheretz, which are contiguous to our present parshiot
(parashat Shemini) are appended to the discussion of the prohibition of EATING certain species.
It is, of course, true that the forbidden species are themselves described as "minim tmei'im," so
that it is indeed fair to say that we are in the middle of a section of "tum'a;" however, there is a
difference between a beheima tmei'a which is prohibited and the halakhic concept of tum'a

10
https://torah.etzion.org.il/en/taharat-ha-metzora

31
described in our parshiot. I shall not discuss what is the common concept to prohibited food and
objects which "contaminate," but no matter what that common point is, there is still an important
legal distinction between the two.

The Torah itself sets of the discussion in these two parshiot from that in Shemini, with a five-verse
conclusion to Shemini (11,43-47), stressing the theme of "kedusha" and "havdala," aside from
"tum'a and tahara," and finishing with the coda formula of "zot torat habeheima ve-ha'of...." Tazria
begins with a new "vayedaber HaShem el Moshe leimor" and "daber el bnei yisrael leimor," with
a separate "zot torat..." for yoledet (12,7), metzora (13,59), the purification of the metzora (14,54-
57), and the three emission tum'ot (15,32- 33).

Due to our distance from practical dealing with the subject, it is difficult for us to understand what
tum'a is. I shall try today to examine the concept as an autonomous one; that is, not by equating it
with some other concept (sin, etc.), but by trying to understand what the Torah says about it. For
this purpose, we shall primarily utilize metzora, who takes up not only the bulk of our parasha but
occupies an extreme position within the family of tmei’im and is therefore perhaps a clearer
indication of the internal meaning of tamei.

First, what does the status "tamei" imply? In parashat Shemini, regarding the contact tum'ot of
neveila and sheretz, the Torah simply stated that one is tamei. However, in Tazria, immediately
after introducing tum'at yoledet, the Torah stated the implications - "She shall not touch any sacred
thing, nor come into the sacred place (mikdash)" (12,4). This is the main ramification of tum'a -
one who is tamei is removed from the sacred provinces and prohibited to come into contact with
sacred objects.

Tum'a is an obstacle to kedusha. Removal from the mikdash is, halakhically, a gradated system
dependent on the severity of the tum'a, based on the verse in Sefer Bemidbar (5,1-4), which lists
metzora, zav, and tmei met. Metzora is the most severe, and his removal is not only from
"machaneh shechina" (the inner azara), like tmei met; and not only from "machaneh levia" (the
entire temple confines, har habayit), like zav, zava, nida, and yoledet; but even from "machaneh
yisrael" (the encampment in the desert, Yerushalayim in Eretz Yisrael). In other words, the verse
in Tazria (13,45-46), "And the tzarua who has the sore... he shall live in solitude, outside of the
encampment shall be his dwelling," is understood by the halakha (in light of the verses in
Bemidbar) to be an extension of the "nor come into any sacred place" imposed on the yoledet.

32
The machaneh Yisrael is also a "sacred place," albeit on a lesser level. The metzora is on the most
severe level of tum'a, if tum'a is understood as alienation from sanctity; he must dwell the farthest
from the center of sanctity of all tmei’im and is not even allowed to enter the sacred province of
the camp of Israel. This is reiterated at the end of the parasha - "You shall separate Bnei Yisrael
from their defilement; and they shall not die from their defilement, by defiling My dwelling which
is in their midst" (15,31). The fact that the dwelling of God is in the midst of the Jews makes the
presence of tum'a a dangerous situation. The entire camp of the Jews is the surrounding of the
dwelling of God, which is in "their midst."

This gives us the basic ingredient in understanding what is tum'a of a person. Tum'a is a state
which interferes and prevents the relationship of a man with the sacred, with kedusha. At the
strongest level, it prevents the integration of the tamei with the sacred community of Israel, on a
less severe level it obstructs his entrance into the realm of God's service, on the weakest level, it
interferes with his coming into the presence of God. In last week's shiur, this state was explained
in relation to death, taking "met" as the standard of tum'a. Death is the opposite of relationship to
the source of life, growth, and kedusha. Today, we shall try to see what can be derived from
metzora, rather than met. We shall concentrate on the purification ceremony of the metzora, which
is much more complicated than that for any other tamei (including tmei met, parashat Chukat). My
assumption will be that by seeing what a metzora must undergo to remove his status as tamei we
will achieve an understanding of what it is that he is removing.

The purification of a metzora (Parashat Metzora, ch. 14) has a number of distinct elements,
reminiscent of other procedures.

1. Two birds (kappara)

Two birds are taken, one of which is slaughtered and one freed "over the face of the field" (14,7).
This is strikingly similar to the two goats of Yom Kippur (Vayikra 16).

"The kohen shall command and TAKE for the purificant TWO LIVE PURE BIRDS.... and the
kohen shall command and SLAUGHTER THE FIRST BIRD.... and he shall SPRINKLE on
the purificant from tzara'at SEVEN TIMES, and purify him, and he shall SEND THE LIVE
BIRD ON THE FACE OF THE FIELD" (14,4-7).

33
"From the congregation of Bnei Yisrael, he shall TAKE TWO GOATS as a sin-offering.... and
Aharon shall SACRIFICE THE GOAT on which the lot "To God' fell.... and SPRINKLE (its
blood) on the kapporet and before the kapporet (SEVEN TIMES).... And Aharon shall press his
two hands on the head of the live goat... and SEND it with a ready man TO THE DESERT"
(16,5-21).

The most striking parallels here are two which are unique; first, the pairing of two animals which
are then separated to life and to death, and secondly, the freeing of an animal rather than sacrificing
it. The first is halakhically stressed by a requirement that the two birds of metzora and the two
goats of Yom Kippur be twin-like - identical in size and appearance, and that they are to be bought
as a pair (See Rambam, Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at 11,8; Hilkhot Avodat Yom Hakippurim 5,14. The
language is identical in both cases). The second is strengthened by the identical verb - "ve-shilach."
The Ramban (14,4; at the end) comments, "The reason (for the sending of the bird) is like the
secret of the sa'ir hamishtale'ach (scapegoat); there it is sent to azazel in the desert, and here to
flight in the field."

The meaning of the scapegoat on Yom Kippur is a very difficult topic, as the Rambam hints by
using the word "secret (sod)." Nevertheless, it is clear that it is a process of kappara (atonement).
If atonement is part of the process of the return of the metzora, it is clear that there is something
for which he must atone. Being a metzora is a state which requires atonement. The obvious
candidate for atonement is sin, and in Yom Kippur that is clear (16,22 - "and the goat shall carry
all their sins to an uninhabited land"). That iswhy there is a confession of the kohen gadol over the
goat. In the case of the metzora, there is no obvious sin, and the Torah does not mention any such
sin, nor is there confession or semikha (pressing of hands). The bird itself is not a chatat (sin-
offering). Looking back to yoledet at the beginning of Tazria, we see that there too (12,7-8) the
Torah spoke of "atonement and purification." In fact, all the tmei'im of these two parshiot (tum'ot
hayotzot migufo) require kappara; in each case, it is written "vekippeir - vetaheir" (14,20; 14,53;
15,15; 15,30).

The Ramban identifies three distinct mentions of kappara in the case of the metzora, and comments
(14,18):

34
The lack of any EXPLICIT mention of sin in connection with metzora leads me to adopt the last
suggestion of the Ramban as the pshat here. The basic meaning of kappara is not forgiveness of
sin but redemption from a state that needs redemption. In our case, it is the estrangement described
above (which the Ramban hints at by writing that the 'kofer' will lead to his return to his tent).
Tum'a, at least tum'a that originates in the man's body itself, is a state that is akin to sin, or to
enslavement, which needs to be redeemed. One has been dragged down by forces inimical to
kedusha. Kappara replaces the old state with a new one.

The particular meaning of "sending" an animal to redeem, rather than the normal sacrifice, is, I
think, that in the normal case, by giving something to God, one redeems oneself. The gift atones
for and frees the person from guilt. In more severe cases, what is present in the man's inner state
contains an element that cannot be redeemed in itself, it is beyond redemption. It must be sent
away, unredeemed, so that what remains can be redeemed. In the case of Yom Kippur, the Torah
says explicitly that the sins are carried away by the goat. The Ramban suggests here as well that
the bird carries away the tum'a to the field. Only by sending part of the personality away, by
severing the corrupted part, can the rest be healed.

2. Live water and sprinkling (tahara)

The BLOOD of the slaughtered bird is added to "MAYIM CHAYIM" (spring water), then cedar
wood (ETZ EREZ), scarlet (SHNI TOLA'AT), and hyssop (EIZOV) (together with the live bird),
are dipped in and the kohen sprinkles ("VE-HIZA") it seven times on the purificant.

35
This obviously parallels the preparation of the para aduma, used to purify a tmei met. There, the
ASHES of the para aduma, burnt together with ETZ EREZ, SHNI TOLA'AT, AND EIZOV, are
added to MAYIM CHAYIM, and sprinkled on the tamei (Bemidbar 19). The outcome of the para
aduma ceremony is "tahara."

Hazaya (sprinkling), as opposed to immersion in a mikva, is called "chitui" by the

Torah (Bemidbar 19,12; 13; 19; 20 - yitchatta, chitei). The verb is used in modern Hebrew to mean
"to disinfect," which, I think, is not far off - it means to cleanse. ("lachato" [to sin] means to go
astray, to miss the mark. One whose aim is bad has "chata" the target. "Lichatei" [in pi'el] means
to pull something off target, meaning to remove a spot from where it is already). Immersion in a
mikva also symbolizes cleanliness, but without any effort - a person coming out of the mikva has
been renewed, returned, as it were, to an original state of cleanliness. (Jewish thought sees in the
mikva a remembrance of the original waters which covered the world at creation, or, alternatively,
of the waters of the womb). If the stain is a stubborn one, it needs to be ripped off, cleansed, with
not only water but with special additives (soap, as it were) and a special agent (the kohen), and
this is the purpose of haza'a. In any event, the outcome is (spiritual) cleanliness, a return to
primordial pristine existence.

3. Ears, fingers, and toes (chinuch)

On the EIGHTH day of the purification of the metzora (after spending SEVEN days OUTSIDE
HIS TENT), he brings a number of sacrifices (as do the zav, zava, nida, and yoledet). One of
them is an asham. The kohen takes the blood of the asham, and places some on the right earlobe,
right thumb, and right big toe of the metzora. He then does the same thing with oil (14,14-17).
Finally, he places some oil on the metzora's head.

The same thing was done to the kohanim (Aharon and his sons) as part of the inauguration of the
mishkan. During the SEVEN days of the milu'im, while Aharon and his sons stayed at the
ENTRANCE TO THE TENT, the blood of the second ram was placed on their right earlobes,
thumbs, and big toes, (Shemot 29,19-20; Vayikra 8,22-24 - they were also anointed with oil). This
ceremony is so unusual, that the similarity is all the more striking. As before, we do not have to
have a theory of the meaning of the details of this ceremony to understand the context. The

36
kohanim are being inducted into the service of God. The (holy) oil on their heads is a classic
inauguration ritual (as was done for kings), and apparently, the blood on their right limbs has
similar significance. The entire seven-day period is the inauguration procedure of the kohanim,
called milu'im (to fill - to fill them with new content), or chinuch (dedication, as in chanukat
hamizbeach).

Now the kohanim are embarking on a totally new role, separate from that of other Jews. The need
to be appointed and prepared for this task. The metzora, though, is returning to his normal state.
Apparently, being a normal Jew, after the state of tum'a, requires renewal of a dedication of the
person. Again, in the case of metzora, the corruption of tum'a is so great that the purification cannot
take place without this element, whereas for other tmei'im, including the tum'ot hayotzot migufam,
this result is achieved automatically. This nonetheless indicates the nature of tum'a in general
though. The tamei has lost the personal status, or at least had it significantly impugned, that made
him worthy and capable of serving God (on the yisrael level, as a kohen does on the kohen level).
While this status does not require a special ritual for normal Jews, once one has become tamei, at
least on the most severe level, it requires a special ceremony to bring it back. The status of serving
God is a special one, which does require a special preparation, even if in normal conditions it
apparently is achieved through being born Jewish.

4. Summation

We have identified three stages in the purification of a metzora: kappara, consisting of removing
part of the personality and rejecting it, letting it fly away, as it were; tahara, cleansing of what
remains, rejuvenating it; and chinuch, rededication to the service of God. Tum'a is a state which
prevents life and interferes with the relationship with living things, whether other men or God.

I have tried to take a complicated and arcane ritual and make some sense out of it. I will be the
first to admit that I have not explained ANY of the details themselves - finding parallels merely
moves the question over to the next area. Why cedar wood, why right earlobes, why birds - I
haven't even begun to answer these questions. What I have done is tried to understand the role
these things play in the Torah, and this can be done by finding other places where they appear. To
understand the meaning of each item, why they are appropriate to the role they play, one can look

37
in any of the commentators or the midrashim, which are rich in explanations and ideas. (For
instance, to start at the beginning, see Rashi 14,3, and especially the Ramban, for an explanation
of the meaning of birds here. The Abrabenel has a detailed explanation of all the aspects of the
ritual).

Points and questions:

1. One more ritual performed on the metzora was to shave all of his body hair (14,8). The nearest parallel is the shaving of the

Leviim (Bemidbar 8,7), thoughthe language is not particularly similar. What function does this possibly serve?

2. Bemidbar 5,1-4 commands the exclusion of Tmei met, zav, and metzora from the "machaneh." From the verse, it is impossible

to realize that in fact each of these tmei'im is excluded from a different machaneh, which serves to assimilate all three cases into

one. Tmei'im in general are excluded. In parashat Tazria, there is a special command for the metzora to be "out of the machaneh;"

the parallel command for yoledet speaks of not coming to the mikdash. Here (despite what I wrote in the shiur, which is correct in

the final analysis), metzora is a different sort of exclusion than other tmei'im. How could this be explained?

3. The Ramban (14,4, towards the end) referring to the erez, eizov, and shni tola'at, writes, "The metzora, the house with a nega,

and tmei met are similar, and all of them are after the pattern of Pesach Mitzrayim." The Ramban is referring to the fact that in

Mitzrayim, the Jews placed the blood of the pesach on the doorposts with an eizov (Shemot 12,22 - but notice, no erez and no shni

tola'at). What do you think is the connection that the Ramban sees?

4. In all the parallel cases we traced in the shiur, there are also differences (e.g., goats-birds, desert-field, ashes-blood, seven-eight,

etc.). List them and see if you can explain them.

38
 Why is a full haircut part of the Metzora's purification process?11
Part of the purification process of a Metzora is a full haircut (Vayikra 14:9).

‫ְוָהָיה ַביּוֹם ַהְשִּׁביִﬠי ְיַגַלּח ֶאת־ָכּל־ְשָׂﬠרוֹ ֶאת־ר ֹאשׁוֹ ְוֶאת־ְזָקנוֹ ְוֵאת ַגֹּבּת ֵﬠיָניו ְוֶאת־ָכּל־ְשָׂﬠרוֹ ְיַגֵלַּח ְוִכֶבּס ֶאת־ְבָּגָדיו‬
‫ְו ָרַחץ ֶאת־ְבָּשׂרוֹ ַבַּמּ ִים ְוָטֵהר׃‬

On the seventh day he shall shave off all his hair—of head, beard, and eyebrows.

When he has shaved off all his hair, he shall wash his clothes and bathe his body in water; then
he shall be clean.

Although there are plenty other peculiar parts of this purification process (red wool, hyssop, cedar,
etc.), why does the Metzora's tahara specifically include a massive haircut? It seems more similar
to the inauguration of the Levi'im or the final sacrifice of the Nazir, who seem to stand at the
opposite spectrum of this individual who is considered an Av HaTumah.

The Sefer Hachinuch in mitzva 174 writes:

11
https://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/121694/why-is-a-full-haircut-part-of-the-metzoras-purification-process

39
 ‫ קצת מן הטעם שאמרנו למעלה )מצוה קעג( במים כדי שיראה האדם כאלו היום נברא והיום‬.‫משרשי המצוה‬
‫מתחיל שערו לצמח ויחדש מעשיו לטוב‬,

A partial explanation of the root of this mitzva is that as a person emerges from his state of
uncleanliness of a metzora, he should view himself as if he is reborn and only today his hair
begins to grow and that he should renew his ways for good. In a similar vein the levites shaved
upon their inauguration because it’s as if they were being reborn into the service of G-d.

Lessons From Leprosy

Abukspa writes:12

‫והיה ביום השביעי יגלח את כל שערו את ראשו ואת זקנו ואת גבת עיניו ואת כל שערו יגלח וכבס את בגדיו ורחץ את‬
‫בשרו במים וטהר‬

And it shall be on the seventh day, he shall shave off all his hair: his head, his beard, his
eyebrows, and all his hair shall he shave off; he shall immerse his clothing and immerse his
flesh in water and become pure (Vayikra 14:9).

12
https://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/dvar-torah-metzora-lessons-from-leprosy

40
The punishment and purification process of the metzora not only help atone for the sins that bring
about tzaraas, but also teach us many lessons along the way.

Although as part of the purification process the metzora must shave all his hair, the pasuk
enumerates three specific places: head, beard, eyebrows. The Kli Yakar explains how these three
locations allude to three of the causes of tzaraas: gassus haruach (arrogance), lashon hara (evil
speech), and tzarus ha’ayin (selfishness/ greed). (See Arachin 16a.) The hair on the head hints at
an arrogant person who walks around with his head held high, belittling, and looking down upon
others. The hair on the beard, which is around the mouth, hints at the sin of lashon hara, speaking
ill of others. The eyebrows, situated above the eyes, hint at the sin of tzarus ha’ayin, narrowness
of the eye, which presents as an unwillingness to share with others. When the metzora shaves off
these types of hair, he atones for the sins committed with the associated body parts and receives a
reminder of the cause of his malady.

The Meshech Chochmah stresses an aspect of the metzora’s punishment and its attendant lesson:
“Badad yeisheiv mi’chutz la’machaneh moshavo — He shall stay in isolation; his dwelling shall
be outside the camp” (Vayikra 13:46). A tzar ayin, selfish and stingy person, doesn’t want to share
with others or think about their needs, thereby causing those others to distance themselves from
him. Middah k’neged middah, he must now dwell apart and in total isolation.

The Meshech Chochmah adds that this also accounts for the halachah (Yoma 41b) of a wealthy
person who brings the less expensive korban of a pauper. In most cases, he fulfills his obligation
— except in the case of a metzora. Were a wealthy metzora to bring the cheaper korban, he would
not be yotzei. If the cause of the tzaraas is tzarus ha’ayin, then if he is rich enough to afford a more
expensive korban but instead brings the korban appropriate for an indigent person, that is an
indication that he has not yet repented from his sin of tzarus ha’ayin and is not yet ready to gain
atonement.

The Ben Ish Chai teaches us three additional lessons, this time from the three steps of the metzora’s
purification process: washing his clothing, shaving his hair, and immersing in a mikveh. When
washing a soiled garment, the initial washing removes the largest amount of dirt. Yet subsequent
washings may be necessary to remove a deeply embedded stain. Even after a second or third
washing, some scrubbing may still be necessary to remove the roshem, the impression left by the
original dirt.

The same is true, says the Ben Ish Chai, when washing the spiritual fabric of our soul. Sin soils
and sullies our neshamah, often necessitating a repeated washing. Counterintuitively, however, to
remove the filth of a gross and blatant sin, all that may be needed is an initial first washing; the
magnitude of the sin makes the viduy and teshuvah genuine and heartfelt.

Yet then there are the subtle sins, the ones that are hardly considered such, by nature of their
commonality or frequency. These aveiros, which are often trampled upon, can leave a roshem even
after the first round of teshuvah. This is because the “second-nature” aspect of these sins lessens
the sincerity of the initial teshuvah. Often, in order to fully remove these sins, additional work and
effort are called for, since the yetzer hara fools us into believing that they are not really sins at all.

41
Just as cloth garments may require more than one washing, the fabric of our soul should be afforded
no less care.

The lesson from shaving the hair, writes the Ben Ish Chai, is based on a story (Midrash Tanchuma,
Tazria 8): A Kohen who used to look at negaim, blemishes, and diagnose them, was unable to
sufficiently provide for his family and wanted to leave Eretz Yisrael to search for better prospects.

When he explained the situation to his wife, he said to her, “Let me teach you the laws of negaim
so you can take over for me while I am gone.” He taught her, “HaKadosh Baruch Hu created each
hair with its own follicle, which fortifies that hair. When the follicle dries up, the hair dies, which
can be an indication of tzaraas.” His wife immediately countered, “If Hashem created every hair
with its own follicle for nourishment, of course He can provide livelihood for you, a human being,
and your children who are dependent on you.” Therefore, she did not allow him to leave Eretz
Yisrael.

The lesson to be taken from this, writes the Ben Ish Chai, is that one should not worry or become
concerned over his financial future, but should trust in Hashem, Who can sustain every human
being. This should also relieve a person of the fear that another person will take what is rightfully
his, a fear that constitutes one of the greatest sources of stress and disease. Chazal (Yoma 38b) tell
us, “Ein adam noge’a be’muchan la’chaveiro…afilu ki’melo nima — One person cannot touch
what is prepared for his friend…even the extent of a blade of hair.” The analogy of hair is used,
says the Ben Ish Chai, because it is hair that shows us this lesson. Although the hairs on a person’s
head stand side by side, none infringe on the other; each has its own source of nourishment.
Certainly the same is true with man and his fellow.

A similar lesson can be learned from the Gemara (Bava Basra 16a), where Iyov questioned his
suffering and his lot in life, asking Hashem if perhaps He confused his name, ‫איוב‬, with ‫אויב‬, enemy,
for Iyov felt as if he was suffering needlessly. HaKadosh Baruch Hu responded, “I have created
many hairs on a person, and for each hair I created its own follicle through which the hair is
sustained, so that two hairs should not draw from one follicle. Were this to happen, they would
impair a man’s vision.

Now, if I do not confuse one follicle with another, would I confuse ‫ איוב‬with ‫ ”?אויב‬By simply
studying the design of a human hair, we can understand how Hashem is exact in all He does and
how He doesn’t err in regard to any punishment, tzaraas included.

The third lesson of the Ben Ish Chai is based on the metzora’s immersion in a mikveh. Like water
that naturally flows downward, a baal teshuvah must be brokenhearted and humbled by the sins
he has committed. This is the key to having one’s teshuvah accepted by Hashem: “Zivchei Elokim
ruach nishbarah leiv nishbar ve’nidkeh Elokim lo sivzeh — The sacrifices G-d desires are a broken
spirit; a heart broken and humbled, G-d, You will not despise” (Tehillim 51:19).

The lesson from the Ben Ish Chai in connection with shaving the hair may also relate to the metzora
himself. The most common cause of tzaraas is lashon hara. This sin is very often the result of
jealousy and resentment, where one views another’s success as an infringement on his own. When

42
I see someone else get the promotion I wanted, this may trigger worries about my own source of
parnassah, leading me to belittle him and his abilities to succeed in the more demanding position.

Similarly, after seeing my neighbor driving the latest model sports car, I may, out of resentment,
say negative and unflattering things about him. In both cases, my own insecurities about money
lead me to belittle the other person. Like the Yiddish saying I once heard, “Vehn freit zich ah
kleiner? Vehn ehr zeit ah kleiner fuhn zich — When is a small person happy? When he sees
someone smaller than himself.”

The freshly shaven head of the metzora teaches otherwise. There are thousands of hairs on a
person’s head, all seemingly intermingled. Not seeing the scalp and the individual hairs, one may
think that they all share a common source, with one taking vital nutrients from the other. It can
seem like a “dog-eat-dog” world, and that all are wrestling for the same prize. Such thoughts can
elicit jealousy, and subsequently lashon hora. But by shaving the hair and exposing the truth, such
feelings will fall away. Just as every hair has its own follicle from which it grows and is sustained,
and no hair infringes on the supply of another, so, too, no human being infringes on the rank or
livelihood of another.

Petty resentments and vile lashon hora can be kept at bay by the simple lesson of a blade of hair.

Reb Eliezer writes:

When it comes to the sacrifice take two birds a live one and a dead one, an aizov, a cedar tree and
a red ribbon. The speech is compared to the chirping of the birds. Bad speach can come from gaiva,
cedar tree or being in the pits, giving up, an aizov where neither extreme is good. Whichever
contributed to it is a sin a red ribbon. So we slaughter one of the birds adding the above to it to kill
of the bad speach, dunk the live one into the mixture and let it go on the field being sure tnat now
he will protect himself from bad speach. The mixture is placed on his thumb where the five fingers
are against the five senses as explained by the Rabbenu Bachaya at the end of Patashas Tzav. The
thumb is against the mouth, speach. We place it on the ear lobe to avoid listening to it. We also
place it on the big toe not to walk to bad places which encourages bad speach. The right one is in
control.

43
 Metzora: Shave for the Brave

Anita Silvert writes:13

“On the seventh day, he shall shave off all his hair” (Lev. 17:9)

This is Leviticus, so this instruction is given after someone has been in an “impure” state and
needs to move to a “pure” state. Impure/pure
tamei/tahor/impure/pure. Disease/health/disease/health.

There’s a whole ritual for the leper, the one who needs to be separated from the camp, so he can
be cleansed, cured, brought back into the community. And it involves shaving all his hair
off. Torah may have thought that the priest could diagnose, treat, and cure disease but some
diseases don’t work that way. Some just grab you and separate you and never give you back. Like
cancer.

Last night I witnessed “Shave for the Brave” at the 2014 Central Conference of American Rabbis
(CCAR), the Reform movement’s professional rabbinic association. For those who don’t know,
there was a little boy named Sam. Superman Sam. Sam Sommer, and his parents are Phyllis and
Michael Sommer. He had David, Yael and Solly as siblings. And he had thousands of us who
took his story into our hearts. Sam got sick. Sam lost his hair. Sam had to stay separated. But
them Sam died, and no kind of burnt offerings would change that.

Last night there was a different kind of offering. Last night, rabbis from all over the country shaved
their heads, not to cure Sam, but to help put an end to that kind of sadness for other families. Those

13
https://anitasilvert.wordpress.com/2014/04/02/metzora-shave-for-the-brave/

44
brave men and women offered up their hair to raise the money to keep the research going to find
the answers to the painful puzzle that is childhood cancer.

I stood and bore witness to that moment. There was joy. There was sadness. There was love.
There was support and there was hope. There was loss and there was laughter. Pictures were
taken and thousands watched the live stream. There were over 50 newly-bald, suddenly cold heads
on the last morning of the conference. And there were over $500,000 more dollars in the coffers
of St. Baldricks Foundation that will fund years of research in pediatric cancer.

Metzora teaches us there is a way to take what is tamei/impure and make it tahor/pure. Phyllis and
Michael Sommer took Sam’s story and made us look. They wouldn’t let us look away. And they
found a way to take what was unfathomably tamei and find some purity in it. You can still
help. Go to the foundation’s website and do what you can.

In Sam’s name, in Sam’s memory, in Sam’s honor….thank you.

Shaving One’s Hair—Purification and Reconnection

R. Yaakov Bieler writes:14

14
https://rayanotyaakov.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/5765-metzora.pdf

45
Parshat Metzora 5765 When the unfortunate individual smitten with “Tzora’at” (the affliction
described in Parshiot Tazria and Metzora affecting people, clothing, furniture and houses, that
results in first quarantine and then either destruction of inanimate objects or ostracism from the
encampment for the duration of the condition for human beings), is finally declared ritually pure,
one of the more curious prerequisites by which the individual ends his/her exile and rejoins the
community is the shaving (as opposed to natural loss via old-age or illness) of body hair.

The recognition that the removal of a good deal of body hair (2) is not exclusively a function of
someone recovering from a spiritual/physical disease, (3) but may have broader positive symbolic
significance is raised when a Levi being sanctified for community service has to undergo similar
removal of hair..

R. Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, in more of an essay than commentary at the conclusion of VaYikra
13, in addition to demonstrating that “Tzora’at” ought not to be identified with leprosy, and what
the various stages of the disease may signify, attempts to offer an approach that would account for
these two contexts of a requirement to remove one’s hair prior to attaining a new status, either
reentering the community from which one has been previously banished (the “Metzora”), or being
accorded a new public role within the communal structure of the Jewish people (the Levi).

R. Hirsch understands Devarim 24:8-9 as serving as the jumping off point for reflecting upon the
significance of the “Tzora’at” phenomenon as a whole.

46
“Take heed in the plague of ‘Tzora’at’ and observe diligently and do according to all that the
Kohanim, the Levi’im teach you, as I have commanded them, you shall observe to do. Remember
what the Lord your God did to Miriam on the way, during your exodus from Egypt.” Although the
story of Miriam’s slandering Moshe in BaMidbar 12 could be understood as an isolated incident,
whereby an individual on a high spiritual level is subject to a relatively extreme (4) Heavenly
Rebuke for engaging in an ostensibly petty attack on her younger brother, (5) the recalling of the
incident in Devarim in stark association with ALL occurrences of “Tzora’at”, serves to
universalize what Miriam does and what happens to her as a result of her actions. The Tora requires
us to conclude that whether the victim of “Tzora’at” be important or of minor significance in terms
of his/her spiritual standing and communal accomplishments, certain actions will result in
conditions that can affect not only one’s property, (6) but also his/her person to the point where
social banishment will result for as long as the condition is not declared cured by a Kohen. R.
Hirsch summarizes the primary sources of Jewish tradition in which the causes of “Tzora’at” are
enumerated:

47
R. Hirsch contends that already during quarantine, (11) the preliminary stage that precedes
permanent exile, the afflicted individual has time to reflect upon the types of anti-social and
destructive behavior in which s/he may have been engaging, specifically because he has been
totally deprived of the opportunity to interact with others and thereby be tempted to once again
engage in sinful behavior.

But why should a person who lacks social graces and empathy for his/her fellow be beset
specifically by diseases of skin and hair, as opposed to some other sort of calamity or personal
setback? The commentator offers the following almost metaphysical hypothesis: The skin is the
aspect of the body by which an individual senses everything in existence outside of him/herself,
e.g., we recognize textures by means of our tactile sense, environmental temperature as well as
humidity and precipitation are detected by our skin’s reaction to meteorological conditions, threats
to our physical wellbeing are sensed when we experience pain as a result of a blow or corrosive
material, etc.

What applies physiologically to the skin can also be understood metaphorically. We are the poorer
when we are not open to that which takes place around us, and rather than watch and value others
as exemplars of “Middot” (ethical attributes) and humane behavior, reflect self-absorption
resulting in general insensitivity to others. Not only should we constantly try to learn from the
positive examples of those who inhabit our surroundings, but it is also important that we be positive
pro-active contributors and models for general society and our fellow human beings.
Consequently, should our skin become tainted as a result of Divine Fiat, it constitutes an objective
message to us that there is a “moral unhealthiness” in the manner by which we are comprehending
and relating to the outside world.

If we have been contributing only strife, contention, and pettiness in our interactions with those
around us, engaging in the types of behaviors listed above in the four primary sources summarizing
what engenders “Tzora’at”, as opposed to the Heavenly Preference for our relating to others by
means of goodness, ethical behavior, and truth and justice, then the intermediary between the
individual and the outside world, the skin, will be supernaturally afflicted leading to social
ostracism until such time as a significant attitude change for the better takes place.

This brings R. Hirsch to human hair: its own contamination by “Tzora’at” (13) and the need to
remove bodily hair when one reaches the point of ritual purification. In the commentator’s view,
hair is essentially a protective cover extending from the individual, that rather than sensing and

48
processing the stimuli from the outside world, as does the skin, instead serves as a manifestation
of one’s internal reality, as well as a barrier between a person’s external environment and his
internal identity. Hair insulates the skin against the cold and mitigates the pain of a blow that would
otherwise land upon an unprotected patch of skin.

This approach can also be applied to the Nazirite (BaMidbar 6:5) whose requirement to grow his
hair long is a symbol of his withdrawal from the world. And he too at the end of his “Nezirut”
shaves his head (Ibid., 6:18) to signify his reentry into an interactive community. Developing the
analogy further to reflect the interaction between skin and hair in terms of how we learn and grow,
it could be easily demonstrated that an individual’s values and beliefs can be understood to be
made up of a confluence of inside and outside influences, “nurture” vs. “nature”.

On the one hand, it is possible that outside trends, general culture, and the people that represent
them are inspiring and affirming. In such a case, it is important to be significantly open to such
influences in order to actualize one’s potential in accordance with the models and stimulating
positive ideas that inhabit the outside world = “healthy skin”. However, there are also times when
one is required to mount defenses by asserting closely held personal values and beliefs contrary to
prevailing social mores that will protect him/her from destructive assumptions and outlooks that
happen to be informing general civilization = “healthy hair”.

Typically, each person is confronted from without with a mixture of ideas and principles, both
good and bad, and must determine how to sort through them, which to accept and internalize, and
which to reject and immunize oneself against; where must the individual follow his/her personal
instincts and sensibilities, and where must s/he defer to the conceptualizations and attitudes that
are abroad.

Instead of the individual asserting his own understandings of propriety in the face of what is taking
place in general society, sometimes his/her own selfexpression, as manifested in hair, further
supports evil and negativity. Apparently, social influences have been internalized to such an extent,
that the individual now becomes a representative of the very mindset that s/he should have
vigorously opposed.

Since s/he demonstrates belief in the assumptions of the world that he should have been quick to
reject, hair is no longer a barrier, but rather a statement of acceptance, assimilation, and readiness
to participate in society’s negative trends and behaviors. Consequently, just as these questionable
personal values have to be altered for the good so that the “Tzora’at” can be cured, the hair that
represented the individual’s past commitment to such negative values, must also be completely
sheared off as part of this process.

49
Although the absence of present-day cases of “Tzora’at” (17) render the Tora’s description and R.
Hirsch’s interpretation of the phenomena and its antidote moot and theoretical at best, it seems to
me that this is not the case with respect to the dedication of the Levi and his need to remove his
hair, described in BaMidbar 8:7. …

According to R. Hirsch, the “Metzora” and the as yet undedicated Levi—or anyone else who has
not undertaken serious communal responsibility—share a preoccupation with self and a lack of
concern with those outside of their immediate respective circles. Of course, the “Metzora” has
crossed the line, and in addition to thinking primarily of him/herself, s/he has acted immorally and
cruelly to others. However, the difference between him/her and the Levi could be one of degree
rather than kind, and if the Levi is left to his own devices, he could very well end up not only with
similar attitudes, but even guilty of similar transgressions towards his non-Levi co-religionists.
Nadav and Avihu, Levi’im of high standing, are castigated in Pesikta D’Rav Kahana 26:9 for,
among other things, not marrying because they felt that all of the women that they knew were
beneath them in terms of status. (19)

Consequently, preoccupation with self must radically end for the communal servant, and the
removal of the hair barrier symbolizes such a transformation in attitude.

Ironically, we often advise those who engage in communal work that a necessity for not “burning
out” is a “thick skin”, i.e., the readiness to refuse to take to heart at least some of the unkind things
that members of the community that one is serving may say when they are unable to get their way.
It would appear to be good advice, particularly in light of the myriad anecdotes that can be given
demonstrating how difficult it is to try to please a demanding group of passionate individuals.
Furthermore, providing such services to the community at large may require one to pay less
attention to one’s own interests as well as those of his/her family and friends.

50
Yet, R. Hirsch cautions us by means of his symbolic explanation of both the removal of the
“Metzora”’s hair as well as the hair of the Levi and the resulting exposure of their total selves to
the community and its needs. It appears that there is no choice other than heightening our
vulnerability to the slings and arrows of those that we are trying most to help and guide, while an
overly developed concern to protect our own aspirations and responsibilities, could ultimately
stand in our way and prevent us from truly achieving the ideal of (Avot 6:6) “Noseh B’Ohl Im
Chaveiro” (sharing the burden of what one’s fellow has to bear). Shabbat Shalom, and let us expose
our “skins” and our hearts to our fellow in need, make his/her concerns ours, and contribute to
peace and perfection throughout our community.

(1) VaYikra 13:29, 38 state that “Tzora’at” can equally affect both men and women. Furthermore, the paradigm for the association
between “Tzora’at” and “Lashon HaRa” (evil speech) is Miriam in BaMidbar 12. Consequently, if the Tora includes the shaving
of the BEARD among the parts of the body where hair must be removed at the time of the purification of the “Metzora”, it is
assumed that rather than being a term intended to exclude women from not only this process, but perhaps the entire category of
“Tzora’at”, the word is simply an example, and will come into play only when referring to a specific gender and his purification.

(2) According to RaShI on 14:9, the requirement to shave off body hair applies only to collections of hair (as opposed to random
hairs here and there) that are ordinarily visible (as opposed to hair that might grow within various bodily orifices).

(3) “Tzora’at” appears to be a physical phenomenon that has spiritual roots. It most approximates psychosomatic phenomena that
are also reflected in Yaakov’s limp after struggling with what according to “ChaZaL” was an angel, and the “Sota”’s dying after
drinking the bitter waters in the event that she had indeed been unfaithful to her husband and was intimate with the man who her
husband has suspected.
(4) Nadav and Avihu did die after all when they were judged to be in violation with God’s Standards, so Miriam merely getting
“Tzora’at” for seven days is certainly a lesser form of censure.

(5) For a different treatment of Miriam’s transgression, see www.kmsynagogue.org/KiTetze1.html

(6) Tzora’at affecting clothing and furniture: VaYikra 13:47 ff.; affecting homes: Ibid., 14:34 ff..

(7) While a literal understanding of this phrase connotes murder, the term is also used metaphorically to apply to embarrassing
someone in public, making him/her blush, and consequently causing blood to leave one part of the body and concentrate in another.

(8) See VaYikra 14:4 ff. .

(9) R. Hirsch notes that the Midrash calls attention to specific parts of the sinner’s body, i.e., his/her eyes, tongue, hands, heart,
feet, and contends that they are being utilized for bad rather than good.

(10) The paradigm of Motzee Shem Ra with regard to a “Chatan” saying about his wife that she has been unfaithful to him during
the period of “Eirusin”—see Devarim 22:13- 19..

(11) e.g., VaYikra 13:26..

(12) The Pentateuch translated and explained by R. S.R. Hirsch, Vol. 3 Leviticus, Part 1, Judaica Press, Gateshead, England, 1976,
p. 362.

(13) VaYikra 13:29 ff.

(14) Hirsch p. 363.

(15) Hirsch p. 374.

(16) The derivation for requiring a Kohen to do the shaving of the Metzora appears in Sifra Metzora, Parsha 1; Yalkut Shimoni,
Parshat Metzora #559: From where do we know that the slaughter of the birds and the sprinkling of the blood of the bird and his
shaving should be carried out by a Kohen? The Tora teaches, (VaYikra 14:2) “This is the law of the ‘Metzora’ on the day of his/her
purification, and s/he will be brought to the KOHEN.”

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(17) Based upon RaMBaM’s comment in Mishna Tora, Hilchot Teruma 7:9 that a “Kohen Meyuchas” (a Kohen whose lineage can
be traced all the way back to Aharon HaKohen) is required to declare a “Metzora” ritually pure, RaDVaZ contends that since we
have no such Kohen among us, therefore the Parsha of “Metzora” cannot be in presently in effect.

(18) Hirsch, Vol. 4, Numbers, p. 129.

(19) See www.kmsynagogue.org/Tetzave.html for further development of this theme. .

Miriam Shut Out From the Camp (detail), James Tissot, c. 1896-1902

The Tzaraʿat Paradox

Why is partially infected skin impure but fully infected skin pure? Mary Douglas’ insight into

the polluting power of anomalies helps us make sense of this counterintuitive rule.

Prof. Albert I. Baumgarten writes:15

15
https://www.thetorah.com/article/the-tzaraat-paradox

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The rules of the skin condition called tzaraʿat begin with a series of descriptions of the signs that
indicate its presence, such as swelling, rash, and white discoloration. The person is then to
approach a priest who will decide on its status depending on its exact appearance:

Within the rules of tzaraʿat, one case is especially puzzling.

The Purity/Impurity See-Saw

What happens if all the person’s skin turns entirely white and scaley, with no healthy skin left?
Counterintuitively, the text states that such a person is considered pure:

What happens if some of this person’s skin turns back to normal? Again counterintuitively, the
text says such a person should be declared impure:

53
In case the point isn’t clear, the text continues with what happens if the healthy-looking flesh again
turns white:

This law is especially strange: Why should a person who is entirely covered by scaley, white skin
be declared pure while someone partially covered with such skin be declared impure?[3]

In explicating this provision, the Mishnah (Negaim 8:4) declares that, at least in theory, this see-
saw of purity/impurity can be endless, ‫“ אפילו מאה פעמים‬even a hundred times.”[4] The Mishnah is
speaking theoretically, of course, but it highlights the strangeness of this law. Why should a small
patch of healthy skin have such a paradoxical effect?[5]

If tzaraʿat is a source of severe impurity then the person whose whole body is covered
by tzaraʿat should be the most impure, yet somehow the Torah declares that person pure. The same
point can be made in reverse: The appearance of raw flesh on a person covered with tzaraʿat would
suggest that the affliction is waning, and the person is healing, and yet, upon its appearance, the
priest declares the person impure. Then, if the raw flesh turns white again, which would imply the
infection is getting worse again, the priest declares the person pure.

The rule seems entirely counterintuitive.

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A Sign of Healing

Classical commentaries struggled to explain this rule.

For example, Abraham ibn Ezra (1089–1167) suggests that it is a sign that the illness is in its final
stage:

R. Jacob ben Asher (1269–1343), known as the Baal HaTurim (“Author of the Turim,” an
important work on Jewish law), offers a similar explanation in his long commentary:

These answers, however, only explain the difference between having a small amount of affected
skin and being entirely covered. They do not explain why a small patch of healthy skin that exists
or develops on a person covered in tzaraʿat should be considered a sign of impurity. Is the
appearance of healthy skin somehow a sign of illness?

Is There a Medical Model for Tzaraʿat?

The rule highlighted above is an extreme example of an overall problem scholars have with
the tzaraʿat rules, namely that they don’t seem to be describing a real disease.[7] Modern medicine,
at least, is unable to identify the condition.

55
While still teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, Jacob Milgrom, the well-known
biblical scholar, and expert on all matters Priestly, invited a respected Bay area dermatologist, Dr.
Martin Engel, to address his seminar. Engel was explicit: the symptoms described in Leviticus 13
do not correspond with any known disease.[8]

Moreover, Leviticus 13–14 never explains its cause or suggests any specific
treatment. Tzaraʿat apparently comes and goes of its own accord.[9] The priest’s job was confined
to confirming its presence or absence by official declaration and participating in the ritual that
followed its disappearance. As Milgrom concluded, “The enigma of ṣāra’at cannot be resolved by
medical science.... These rules are grounded not in medicine but in ritual.”[10]

If tzaraʿat is a matter of ritual, as Milgrom argued, it seems appropriate to look for enlightenment
from the work of Dame Mary Douglas (1921–2007), whose classic work, Purity, and Danger: An
Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 1966) is the source of inspiration for
numerous scholarly analyses on ritual in Priestly law.[11]

Dame Mary Douglas: Anthropology in Bible

56
Douglas came to biblical studies from anthropology, but once she decided to apply her thinking to
biblical ritual, she was determined to do work that would be taken seriously by experts in the field.
Accordingly, she learned Biblical Hebrew,[12] engaged in intensive discussion with biblical
scholars, in particular with Jacob Milgrom,[13] and published extensively on the Bible.[14]

Purity and Danger were Douglas’s foray into biblical studies, and it presented several universalist
theories. Reflecting back some twenty years later, Douglas conceded some of the criticisms that
had been made against her earlier work,[15] noting that friends told her that Purity and Danger were
“obscure, intuitive, and ill prepared. They were right.”[16] Douglas acknowledged that, like many
anthropologists, she was finding it difficult to pass from explanations appropriate to particular
regions to universal abstractions. What held good and enlightening for one set of data in one time
and place was inappropriate to another.[17]

Nevertheless, many of the insights in Douglas’ work, even if not universal, still prove helpful in
understanding biblical texts and practices. In this case, I would like to use her insight into negative
responses on anomaly to explain the all-white-is-pure rule.

Impurity of Anomalies

In Leviticus as Literature (p. 185), Douglas observes that the biblical authors focus on the “ebb
and flow” of the disease as opposed to a cure, and that “Leviticus is not at all inclined to search
out causes of disaster or attribute blame. These chapters have other objectives.”[18]

In Purity and Danger, Douglas lays out one of these objectives: to deal with the problem of
anomalies. Anomalies, she argued, by definition, resist classification and produce discomfort in
the mind of the classifier.[19]

While Douglas did not apply this insight to the specific law of the person with all white
skin,[20] Gilbert Lewis (1939–2020), a medical anthropologist from the University of Cambridge,
suggested this is the key to making sense of the paradox.[21]

57
Anomalies on the Skin: Gilbert Lewis

A famous observation attributed to Lord Chesterfield is that dirt was matter out of place. An egg
on the plate is breakfast; the same egg on the floor is dirt. Douglas argued that in the Priestly
system of the Torah, anomalies are out of place and thereby deemed impure.[22] She writes:

Gilbert Lewis took this general notion and applied it to the rules of tzaraʿat (which he translates,
following the King James version, as “leprosy”), and brings up the problem of the totally affected
person:

To fill out Lewis’s point: Purity is present when there are no anomalies, when there is order, where
nothing is out of place.[26] Therefore, contrary to our own preconceptions, the person who is
completely covered with tzaraʿat is pure; nothing is out of place even if that uniform place and
order, regrettably, is tzaraʿat. If some healthy skin returns, however, s/he is now in a mixed
anomalous state and is impure; order is lost.

58
Postscript: Allegorical Interpretation

The very strangeness of the all-white-is-pure provision inspired some classical commentators to
seek out a deeper meaning. The Babylonian Talmud, for instance, suggests an eschatological
reading (b. Sanhedrin 97a):

The heretics in this case are the Christians who now control the Empire and who are identified
(derogatively, of course) with tzaraʿat. Paradoxically, what would seem like their ultimate
triumph, when the whole world is converted to Christianity, will also be the moment of their
downfall, for that is when the Messiah will come. The universal tzaraʿat of Christianity will result
in purity.

A second allegorical interpretation appears in The Advancement of Learning by the English

philosopher Francis Bacon (1561–1626). He quotes an unnamed rabbi[27] who offered a moral
analogy based on these verses, arguing that people who are a little bit righteous are worse than
people who are entirely evil:

While this cannot be taken as the meaning of the law, it highlights the intuitive appeal of the
paradox.

59
Footnotes

1. NJPS with modifications. The verses that follow describe inspections of the skin affliction and further determinations

of its nature. If it does not resolve within one week, a second week of isolation is required (v. 5). After the second

week, if the skin condition has receded or not spread, the person is considered clean, but if the condition has spread, or

if it should spread in the future, the priest will declare the afflicted to be unclean (v. 6–8).

2. The translation here is from Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary,

AB3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 769, with minor modifications.

3. To complicate matters even more, as Milgrom noted, “Ostensibly, this statement that complete whiteness is a symptom

of purity flies in the face of various scriptural attestations that ṣāra’at is kaššeleg, ‘like snow’ (Moses’ hand, Exod 4:6;

Miriam, Num 12:9; Gehazi 2 Kgs 5:27).” Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 786. Milgrom offered a weak answer, marked by

explicit rhetorical hesitation, that “it may well be that the comparison with snow is not because of its whiteness but

because of its flakiness.”

4.

.‫ שבפריחתן טהרו טמא – כשיחזרו טמאים‬,‫כל פריחת ראשי איברים‬

Whenever, by reason of the spreading [of the white skin] to the ends of the members (such that the person is completely

covered), they have pronounced clean they that were unclean—if the spreading recedes, they become again unclean.

.‫ אפילו מאה פעמים‬,‫ נתגלו – טמא‬,‫ נתכסו – טהור‬:‫ שבחזירתן טמאו טהור‬,‫כל חזירת ראשי איברים‬

Whenever, by reason of the receding [of the white skin] from the ends of the members (such that the person is no

longer completely covered), they have pronounced unclean him that was clean, if they again become covered he

becomes clean, and if they again become uncovered he becomes unclean, even a hundred times.

5. It also brings up practical questions: Just what is the metzora (person infected with tzaraʿat) to do during those

interludes when s/he is covered by scales and has been pronounced pure, but may soon be impure again? Is s/he still

obliged to dress disheveled, cover his mustache, live outside the camp, and constantly announce his or her impure state

60
 as prescribed in Lev 13:45-46? Is the ceremony of Lev. 14 then in order? Or is it only appropriate when the condition

has vanished?

6. This opinion was also adopted by Rosenmüller (quoted in Shadal) and by Shadal. Milgrom references both ibn Ezra

and R. Jacob ben Asher, after suggesting other such approaches:

Healing has occurred by desquamation; the scaly crust peels off, leaving white beneath (G.R. Driver 1963: 576a). It is a

sign of exfoliative dermatitis (Hulse 1975:95)…

7. The gospels, however, tell us that Jesus healed “lepers” (Mark 1:40-45//Matt 8:1-14//Luke 5:12-16)

8. See Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 817–818.

9. This was not the case in other instances of tzaraʿat in the Bible. For example, in 2 Kings 5, Elisha tells Naʿaman to dip

in the Jordan River seven times in order to get rid of his tzaraʿat. In Numbers 12, Moses prays to YHWH to have

Miriam’s tzaraʿat removed, and the prayer is granted. Note, however, that these cures are presented as being miracles

from God; there was no cure by human medical or quasi-medical agency. This sharply contrasts with Mesopotamian

practice. Compare the anointment with human semen for seven days as a treatment for Saḫaršubbû as described in,

Yitzhaq Feder, “Tzaraʿat in Light of its Mesopotamian Parallels,” TheTorah (2017).

10. Milgrom, Leviticus 1–16, 817–818. While I favor this view, it is not universally accepted. The opposite approach is

taken by Yitzhaq Feder of Haifa University, in several articles. Feder’s key suggestion is that the ancients did not

separate infection and defilement as clearly as we might. Both could be contagious, susceptible to transmission, and

subject to quarantine to prevent their spread. Feder favors understanding pollution as embodied rationality based on an

emotional intuitive response, a visceral sense of disgust for decay and waste matter. Yitzaq Feder, “The Polemic

Regarding Skin Disease in 4QMMT,” DSD 19 (2012): 55–70; idem, “Contagion and Cognition: Bodily Experience and

the Conceptualization of Pollution (Tumʾah) in the Hebrew Bible,” JNES 72 (2013): 151–167; idem, “Tzaraʿat in Light

of its Mesopotamian Parallels,” TheTorah (2017); idem, “Tumʾah: Ritual Impurity or Fear of Contagious

Disease,” TheTorah (2019); idem, “Coronavirus: What Can we Learn from the Bible and the ANE,” TheTorah (2020).

11. For Biblical studies, the book stimulated a renewed interest in purity laws, as was acknowledged even by Douglas’s

critics. M. Tracy Lemos considered Douglas one of her intellectual heroes for crossing academic boundaries, beginning

in Purity and Danger, and continuing into her later work, even if Lemos found that Douglas, like all heroes, had a

tragic flaw: She was not sufficiently aware that the different methods she introduced contradicted each other.

Nevertheless, Lemos summarized the significance of Purity and Danger as “attesting to its generative role for the study

of the Israelite cult, an area which in the past two or three decades has finally received the attention it deserves—and

much of the thanks for this goes to Douglas.” See M. Tracy Lemos, “The Universal and the Particular: Mary Douglas

61
 and the Politics of Impurity,” Journal of Religion 89.2 (2009): 236–251. See also Feder, “Contagion and Cognition,”

153–155.

12. Mary Douglas, “Why I Have to Learn Hebrew: The Doctrine of Sanctification,” in The Comity and Grace of Method:

Essays in Honor of Edmund F. Perry, ed. Thomas Ryba, George D. Bond, and Herman Tull (Evanston, IL:

Northwestern University Press, 2004), 147–165.

13. On Douglas and Milgrom, see Albert I. Baumgarten, “The Preface to the Hebrew Edition of Purity and

Danger,” Religion and Society 11 (2020): 42 [n. 18].

14. Mary Douglas, In the Wilderness: The Doctrine of Defilement in the Book of Numbers (Sheffield: JSOT Press,

1993); eadem, Leviticus as Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); eadem, Jacob’s Tears: The Priestly

Work of Reconciliation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For a discussion of how she approached Leviticus,

see Gary Rendsburg, “Leviticus as Literary Tabernacle,” TheTorah (2018).

15. Most notably, Melford Spiro, “Review, Purity and Danger,” American Anthropologist 70, no. 2 (1968): 391–393. See

further Baumgarten, “Preface,” 30–44.

16. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), x. Undercutting the claim for

a universal rejection of anomalies, some thirty years after Purity and Danger, Douglas recognized: “the empirical fact

that some societies persist very well without strongly bounded cognitive categories and some tolerate anomaly more

easily than others.” Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (London: Routledge, 1996), ix–x. For

the various ways in which Douglas reworked her ideas about purity/impurity and especially her analysis of the

“Abominations of Leviticus,” the permitted and forbidden sources of animal food, the most famous and widely

reprinted section of Purity and Danger, see Baumgarten, “Preface,” 30–44.

17. Douglas was one of the many victims of this pattern in the discipline of anthropology, which was noted by Louis

Dumont (1911–1998), summing up extensive research on family, filiation, and marriage. Louis Dumont, Introduction à

deux théories d’anthroplogie sociale: Groupes de filiation et alliance de mariage (Paris : La Haye, 1971), 119.

Nevertheless, writing elsewhere, Dumont did not relinquish the search for universals: “Anthropology, by the

understanding it gradually affords of widely different societies and cultures, gives proof of the unity of

mankind (emphasis mine).” Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications, trans. M.

Sainsbury, L. Dumont, and B. Gulati (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 2. Dumont added that “in

sociological studies the universal can only be attained through the particular characteristics, different in each case, of

each type of society” (ibid., 3).

18. For tzaraʿat, one of these objectives, she argued, was to free biblical religion of control by demons, who were invoked

as the cause of risk prone situations in the surrounding religions, Mesopotamia in particular: “Medical learning of the

62
 Mesopotamian sages was focused on charms and spells and potions to cure victims of attacks from these sources”

(Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 189). All this, as Tracy Lemos noted, is unfortunately heavily apologetic and smacks

of an attempt to compare biblical religion favorably with its contemporaries at all costs. (Lemos, “Universal and the

Particular,” 243–247.) Jonathan Z. Smith rightly warned that too much of what is claimed as unique in some traditions

is the result of theological bias, arguments to uphold the superiority of a particular religious tradition in contrast with its

contemporary peers. Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions

of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

19. Baumgarten, “Preface,” 36.

20. She had a different explanation about the symbolism of whiteness: “According to Leviticus the whiteness indicates

remission, the eruptions have stopped, and the skin is white” (Douglas, Leviticus as Literature, 183. She also discussed

this problem in her extended discussion of Leviticus, delivered as lectures in Jerusalem in 1996). As Douglas treats this

like a real disease, she was inevitably bothered by other biblical accounts, according to which Miriam turned white or

Elisha’s servant turned white when they were punished with “leprosy” (Num 2:10; 2 Kgs 5:27), Douglas argued that

biblical “leprosy” covered “various skin diseases grouped together in various stages,” and offered several possibilities,

including skin cancer, psoriasis, tropical ulcers, yaws, plague, smallpox, mumps, chicken-pox, measles and Hansen’s

disease. Such an explanation, however, can be characterized as shooting as many arrows as possible at the target in the

hope that one or the other, or in some combination and at different points in time, might hit the bullseye. To my mind,

Milgrom’s claim is more apt: The symptoms fit no known disease.

21. Gilbert Lewis, “A Lesson from Leviticus: Leprosy,” Man, N. S., 22, 4 (Dec. 1987): 593–612. I thank Harvey Goldberg

for the reference to Lewis.

22. This notion also sheds light on some of the most paradoxical Biblical and Rabbinic cases of things considered

pure/impure. Albert I. Baumgarten, “Sacred Scriptures Defile the Hands,” Journal of Jewish Studies 67 (2016): 46–67.

23. Douglas, Purity, and Danger, 39-40.

24. Ibid., 39–40

25. Lewis, “Lesson from Leviticus,” 607.

26. In presenting these ideas in public, a number of years ago, a colleague and friend, Professor Howard Cedar of the

Hebrew University Faculty of Medicine, commented that in the terminology of Chemistry, a “pure” substance is one

that is not mixed with anything else.

27. The “learned Rabbin” upon whom Bacon usually relied in The Advancement of Learning has been identified as Don

Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508). Lewis S. Feuer, “Francis S. Bacon and the Jews: Who Was the Jew in the ‘New

Atlantis,’?” Jewish Historical Studies 29 (1982–1986): 1–25 [p. 6]. However, I should note that in correspondence with

63
 Eric Lawee (e-mail of October 11, 2020; followed by e-mail of February 1, 2021) he wrote that he was unaware of this

interpretation in the work of Abravanel.

28. Quoted in, Lewis, “A Lesson from Leviticus: Leprosy,” 608.

Francis Bacon (1561–1626)

Francis Bacon served as attorney general and Lord Chancellor of England, resigning amid
charges of corruption. His more valuable work was philosophical. Bacon took up Aristotelian
ideas, arguing for an empirical, inductive approach, known as the scientific method, which is the
foundation of modern scientific inquiry.

Francis Bacon and the Jews: Who was the Jew in the "New
Atlantis"?

64
LEWIS S. FEUER writes:16

16
Jewish Historical Studies , 1982-1986, Vol. 29 (1982-1986), pp. 1-25

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References:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29779806.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab941d144ba7c581db8ddeeb51a1c8ebf&ab_segmen
ts=&origin=

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