PROLEGOMENI ALLO STUDIO DELLE CAUSE

DELL’AGGRESSIONE RUSSA IN UCRAINA E DEL

COINVOLGIMENTO ITALIANO NEL CONFLITTO

La votazione della
Risoluzione ONU del 21
novembre 2014
nell’informazione italiana.
Fonti e documenti.
 PREMESSA

Il 17 novembre 2014, nel corso della sessantonovesima sessione dell’Assemblea Generale delle
Nazioni Unite, i delegati della Federazione Russa propongono una mozione (A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1)
al Third Committee (relativo ai Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues) per «Combattere la
glorificazione del nazismo, del neonazismo e di altre pratiche che contribuiscono ad alimentare le
contemporanee forme di razzismo, discriminazione razziale, xenofobia e relativa intolleranza».

Il 21 novembre 2014 la mozione viene messa ai voti ed approvata con 115 voti favorevoli e 3 contrari:
sono i voti di Stati Uniti, Canada e Ucraina.

I paesi astenuti sono 55, e corrispondono ai paesi membri dell’Unione Europea (Italia compresa, che
– per inciso – in quel periodo era presidente di turno dell’UE), ai restanti paesi della NATO e ai paesi
del Five Eyes – Accordo UKUSA (oggi in parte confluiti nell’AUKUS). La risoluzione entra in vigore
il 18 dicembre 2014 (A/RES/69/160).

Sono passati circa nove mesi dalla rivoluzione di Maidan, e la stampa internazionale è abbastanza
incuriosita dall’astensione dell’UE dalla votazione della risoluzione, in particolare per quanto
concerne le posizioni di Germania, Francia e Inghilterra (all’epoca ancora stato membro). Appare
tuttavia chiaro, tra i vari commentatori, la volontà degli alleati degli Stati Uniti di fare scudo intorno
all’Ucraina, contro la cui dirigenza era evidentemente rivolta la mozione presentata dalla Russia. In
Italia invece la notizia viene praticamente ignorata da tutti i media.

Nel corso degli anni successivi, a più riprese (2021 compreso) la Russia ripresenta ai voti la stessa
mozione, nel tentativo di allargare il novero dei paesi favorevoli, lamentando la persistenza delle
problematiche in oggetto nonostante le precedenti approvazioni da parte dell’Assemblea Generale. I
risultati saranno sempre gli stessi: risoluzioni approvate ma con il voto contrario di Usa e Ucrania e
paesi UE/NATO/AUKUS astenuti. Anche alle votazioni successive la stampa italiana non dà alcun
risalto.

Curiosamente, il Parlamento Europeo rimanda al testo di una di queste risoluzioni – pur non avendola
votata1 – in una Risoluzione del 25 ottobre 2018 sull’Aumento della violenza neofascista in Europa
(vedi Allegato 8).

1
Cfr. https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11879.doc.htm
Si riportano in questo dossier gli articoli apparsi nei media italiani in merito al voto del 21 novembre
2014; di quattro articoli – qui disposti in ordinine cronologico – solo uno è apparso nella versione
elettronica di un quotidiano nazionale (la Stampa). In aggiunta, si allega un articolo italiano sulla
votazione della risoluzione del 2020. Si allega anche l’esito dell’ultima votazione in ordine di tempo
(16 dicembre 2021).
I quattro testi principali sono integrati con i documenti e gli articoli, disposti in ordine cronologico,
cui fanno riferimento. Molti dei link riportati nel testo dei documenti non sono più attivi, si consiglia
l’uso della cache di archive.org per tentarne, eventualmente, una consultazione. Per lo stesso motivo,
la gran parte delle immagini a corredo degli articoli originali non è più recuperabile.

In allegato si riportano:
- Il testo del draft e della risoluzione del 2014 con relativa discussione e votazione
- Il Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine del 15 novembre 2014
- Il testo integrale dell’articolo di John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s
Fault dell’ottobre 2014 (citato nei documenti)
- Gli articoli di GlobalResearch del 2014 sul neonazismo ucraino (citati nei documenti)
- Un documento dell’Ass. Presidente RSV‐Unione Russa Veterani, indirizzato all’ANPI nel
2018, in cui si fa riferimento alla votazione del 21 novembre 2014
- La risoluzione del 16 dicembre 2020 (citata nell’articolo di Dinucci)
- La Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 25 ottobre 2018 sull'aumento della violenza
neofascista in Europa (2018/2869(RSP))
L’ONU condanna riabilitazione del nazismo. USA e Ucraina
contro, l’Europa si astiene
SinistrainEuropa - 23 novembre 2014
https://www.sinistraineuropa.it/europa/lonu-condanna-riabilitazione-del-nazismo-usa-e-ucraina-contro-leuropa-si-astiene/

Il 21 novembre l’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite ha approvato una mozione presentata dalla
Russia che condanna i tentativi di glorificazione dell’ideologia nazista e la conseguente negazione
dei crimini di guerra commessi dalla Germania nazista, Olocausto incluso.

La risoluzione rileva e condanna anche l’aumento di attacchi razzisti in tutto il mondo e propone di
applicare universalmente la Convenzione Internazionale sull’eliminazione di ogni forma di
Discriminazione Razziale, adottata in sede ONU nel 1969 ma mai realmente applicata dagli Stati
sottoscrittori. Le votazioni hanno registrato 115 voti favorevoli, 3 contrari e 55 astenuti. Ad opporsi
a questa risoluzione sono stati gli Stati Uniti, Canada e Ucraina, mentre le astensioni sono arrivate
principalmente dai paesi della UE (Italia inclusa) e alcuni paesi nordafricani.
Il passaggio della risoluzione che, pur non essendo mai citato, ha probabilmente dato adito a presunti
tentativi di strumentalizzazione da parte russa, è quello che sottolinea il pericoloso tentativo in atto
di “riabilitare” l’immagine dei nazisti dipingendoli come combattenti nazionalisti che scendono in
campo per il proprio Paese. Evidente il riferimento alla questione Ucraina, dove alcuni esponenti
dell’attuale Governo di Kiev, insediatosi, è bene ricordarlo, in seguito ad un colpo di Stato, praticano
sistematicamente una rivalutazione e celebrazione del nazismo, dei suoi valori e dei suoi personaggi,
uno fra tutti il celeberrimo Stepan Bandera (la foto che segue raffigura la gigantografia del
collaborazionista nazista ucraino posta all’ingresso del Municipio di Kiev).

La notizia, praticamente ignorata dai media italiani, è fortemente esplicativa del clima internazionale
odierno, dove le ragioni di realpolitik sovrastano ogni principio di natura etica, portando le
democrazie liberali ad astenersi o addirittura a votare contro, anche nelle dichiarazioni ufficiali, a
quegli stessi principi che dovrebbero essere a fondamento del proprio ordinamento.
A dimostrazione di come il clima internazionale stia cambiando rapidamente, basti pensare che una
risoluzione del tutto simile a questa presentata appena due anni fa dalla stessa Russia aveva raccolto
ben 130 voti favorevoli, 15 in più di oggi.
Che a livello internazionale si stiano serrando le fila lo si evince facilmente dalle dichiarazioni post
voto; il Ministro degli Esteri russo Lavrov ha dichiarato: “Il fatto che Usa, Canada e Ucraina abbiano
votato contro, mentre delegazioni di membri dell’Ue si sono astenuti è estremamente esecrabile“. “La
posizione dell’Ucraina è particolarmente allarmante. Uno può difficilmente capire come un Paese, il
cui popolo ha sofferto orrori sotto il nazismo e ha contribuito alla nostra comune vittoria contro di
esso, possa votare contro una risoluzione che condanna la sua glorificazione“.
Alla dichiarazione fatta dall’esponente di un Governo che di certo non è sempre stato in prima fila
nella lotta interna alla discriminazione e al neofascismo, ha seguito la dichiarazione, francamente
imbarazzante, del ministro degli Esteri ucraino Andrey Tsymbalyuk secondo il quale “l’Ucraina
condanna il nazismo ma non può approvare la risoluzione russa in quanto l’Ucraina ha sofferto anche
a causa dello stalinismo in passato“. Da parte del governo Obama nessuna dichiarazione da registrare.
L’Europa non rinnega più il nazismo
Contropiano – 23 novembre 2014
https://contropiano.org/editoriale/2014/11/23/l-europa-non-rinnega-piu-il-nazismo-027692

La decisione di non votare una risoluzione Onu di condanna del nazismo da parte dei paesi
dell’Unione Europea è un’autentica “svolta ideologica” nella storia del continente. Non è possibile
sottovalutare il peso di questa decisione, che immaginiamo avrà coinvolto tutti i primi ministri della
Ue, i capi di stato, i ministri degli esteri, a partire ovviamente dalla “signora Pesc”, Federica
Mogherini. C’è stato dunque un consenso unanime sulla scelta dell’astensione, pensata come un
compromesso tra la posizione estrema di Usa, Canada e Ucraina (contrari) e quella dei favorevoli
(tutto il resto del mondo).
Decisione infame ma notevole, visto che la risoluzione includeva anche la condanna di “ogni forma
di negazione dei crimini nazisti”, a cominciare naturalmente dall’Olocausto.
Dalle cancellerie europee si dirà – forse, come tardiva giustificazione – che questa risoluzione,
presentata dalla Russia, era poco più che una ripetizione di analoghe risoluzioni approvate
all’unanimità o quasi dall’Assemblea dell’Onu (già nel 2010 e nel 2012); e che, quindi, si trattava
stavolta solo di una furbesca mossa propagandistica del Cremlino per raccogliere una condanna
indiretta del nuovo regime ucraino, sorto dal golpe sponsorizzato da Stati Uniti e Unione Europea.
Possiamo senza sforzo convenire. Ma proprio questa motivazione rivela il peso tutto ideologico della
svolta pro-nazista della Ue, che con questo voto si sposta in blocco dal fronte democratico antinazista
e quello “neutrale”, ovvero indifferente. O peggio.
In pratica questa motivazione spiega che “il merito” non conta nulla (la condanna del nazismo), la
cosa più importante è contrastare l’avversario (la Russia) e sostenere l’alleato (l’Ucraina di
Poroshenko e Pravy Sektor).
Non ci sono dunque più valori di libertà da difendere, non c’è più il “male assoluto”? Diciamo che
con questo voto il concetto di “male assoluto”, storicamente e unitariamente identificato nel
nazifascismo, non possiede più dei contorni valoriali riconosciuti e riconoscibili da tutti; ma diventa
semplicemente l’etichetta da affibbiare al “nemico di turno”. L’integralismo islamico-sunnita
dell’Isis può essere nominato come il nuovo “male assoluto”, mentre i nazifascisti in carne-ossa-
spranghe-fucili – in qualsiasi paese alleato dell’Occidente – non lo sono più. Se per caso ci fossero
nei nazifascisti in un paese dichiarato “nemico” allora quello stigma potrebbe tornare nuovamente di
moda; ma solo per il campo nemico, non per “i nostri alleati”.
Questa svolta ha una lunga storia, che data ormai dall’inizio degli anni ’80. Durante tutto questo
periodo lo stigma nazista ha continuato ad essere usato, anche a sproposito, per indicare il nemico di
turno. Ricordiamo soltanto alcuni di questi “nuovi Hitler” che hanno costellato i discorsi dei
presidenti statunitensi e quindi anche le prime pagine dei media occidentali. Il derelitto Noriega,
agente Cia caduto in disgrazia e dittatore di Panama, è stato il primo ad avere avuto il dubbio onore
di essere etichettato in questo modo. Poi è diventato un riflesso condizionato e irriflesso della
propaganda, investendo Saddam Hussein (più volte, fino alla morte), Milosevic, Gheddafi, iraniani,
dittatorelli africani o asiatici; con qualche penoso quanto infame tentativo di estendere lo stigma
anche su rivoluzionari di sinistra (Chavez, per esempio), presto rientrato per manifesta insussistenza.
Questo voto di Stati Uniti e Unione Europea all’Onu mette perciò fine a una chiave retorica che ha
caratterizzato tutto il dopoguerra occidentale e dichiara la fine dell’unità (molto conflittuale,
naturalmente) del mondo nato dalla guerra contro il nazifascismo. Da oggi in poi “l’Occidente”
dichiara di prepararsi a combattere “l’Oriente” e quindi annulla al proprio interno i confini – non
sempre molto rigidi – entro cui erano stati rinchiusi i nazifascisti. C’è bisogno anche di topi e carogne,
di criminali e serial killer, se questo è l’obiettivo…
Ci sembra notevole che questa svolta avvenga sotto l’egida del “primo presidente afroamericano”
della storia. E’ una prova che “il mito della razza” era effettivamente solo un mito bastardo (“la razza
ce l’hanno i cani”, disse la più immensa testa del ‘900). E ci sembra notevole anche il fatto che sia
stata così repentina da spiazzare anche il principale alleato occidentale in Medio Oriente. Israele ha
infatto votato a favore della mozione russa; con tutta la buona volontà criminale del suo governo,
infatti, proprio non poteva votare contro o astenersi su una condanna dei killer dell’Olocausto.
Ci sembra altresì interessante (per essere notevoli ci vuole un po’ di statura) che questa svolta non
abbia ricevuto, fin qui, alcuna espressione critica da parte del primo presidente della Repubblica
proveniente dalle fila dell’ex Pci. Sempre sollecito ad esternare il proprio pensiero su ogni aspetto
dell’attualità politica, dovremmo interpretare il suo silenzio – se perpetuato – come assenso. Con tutte
le conseguenze del caso, anche sul piano della sua stessa legittimità costituzionale. Su Renzi e i suoi
ministri, invece, la Costituzione esprime già un giudizio implicito, anche se irriferibile…

Il mondo che va alla guerra non ha più bisogno delle vesti idologiche adottate – spesso a fatica e per
opportunismo – in tempi di “pace armata”. E l’anima più vera del nazismo – lo sterminio
industrializzato – è assolutamente “interna” alla logica del capitale. Quindi, può benissimo esser
tollerata. Potrebbe persino tornare utile, se non si troveranno soluzioni “liberal-democratiche” alla
crisi…
https://www.antimafiaduemila.com/rubriche/giulietto-chiesa/52584-quelli-che-non-condannano-il-nazismo.html

Quelli che non condannano il nazismo

GULIETTO CHIESA – Megachip, 24 novembre 2014

All’ONU la Russia propone una condanna del nazismo. Ucraina, USA e Canada votano contro.
L'Italia si astiene, assieme all'Europa. Capire dove si sta andando

Una commissione delle Nazioni Unite ha esaminato recentemente un documento di condanna della
glorificazione del nazismo.
Il voto finale ha prodotto questo risultato: 115 voti a favore, 55 astenuti, 3 voti contrari. I tre voti
contrari sono stati quelli di Ucraina, Stati Uniti e Canada. L'Italia - nella sua qualità di presidente di
turno dell'Unione Europea - ha dichiarato la propria astensione, trascinandosi dietro tutti i paesi
europei.
La dichiarazione di voto italiana merita di essere qui riportata in base al resoconto sintetico che ne ha
fatto lo stesso uffico stampa dell'ONU:

Spiegando il voto, ad avvenuta votazione, il rappresentante dell'Italia, che parlava a nome

dell'Unione Europea, ha detto che l'Unione è impegnata a combattere il razzismo, la
discriminazione razziale, la xenofobia e le correlate intolleranze, mediante sforzi generali a
livelli nazionali, regionali e internazionali. I singoli stati sono stati liberi di decidere il
contenuto del testo della risoluzione, tuttavia l'Unione ha avuto dubbi circa la sincerità del
testo, visto che il sostenitore principale della risoluzione ha violato i diritti umani.

Si noti che il rappresentante italiano ha evitato accuratamente di nominare il nazismo. E si capisce

bene perché, avendo l'Unione Europea stretti rapporti con un governo - quello ucraino - che include
forze apertamente inneggianti al nazismo. L'argomentazione usata è, del resto, non solo puerile, ma
completamente ridicola perfino sul piano diplomatico. Se il voto di una qualsivoglia risoluzione fosse
subordinato all'accertamento della buona fede del proponente, con ogni evidenza, non vi sarebbe
nessun voto possibile in nessun consesso internazionale. In questo caso il proponente era,
evidentemente, la Russia, non la potenza che tiene aperto il campo di prigionia di Guantánamo.
Impressionante lo schieramento dei tre voti contrari, con Stati Uniti e Canada principali e unici
sponsor dell'Ucraina.
E particolarmente pregnante la dichiarazione di voto del rappresentante ucraino. Il quale ha dichiarato
il voto contrario in questo modo:

Lo stalinismo (sic) ha ucciso molte persone nei Gulag, e ha condannato Stalin e Hitler come
criminali internazionali. Ha invitato la Federazione Russa a smetterla di glorificare e di
incrementare lo stalinismo. Per queste ragioni ha detto di non poter appoggiare il documento.
Ogni intolleranza va affrontata in modo equilibrato e appropriato. E' errato manipolare la
storia in favore della propria agenda politica. La Federazione Russa sta sostenendo gruppi
neo-nazisti e nazionalisti in Crimea. Annuncia il voto contrario dicendo che la risoluzione
contiene un messaggio errato.

Chiunque può trarre le sue conclusioni da queste dichiarazioni che coprono di vergogna, almeno
storicamente parlando, l'Occidente.
Ma, per provare vergogna, occorre conoscere i fatti. E i fatti resteranno sconosciuti ai più. Infatti
questa notizia, insieme ai particolari che qui abbiamo fornito, è stata ignorata da tutti i quotidiani
italiani e da tutte le televisioni italiane.

[Le citazioni di Chiesa vengono dal testo del dibattito pubblicato sul sito delle nazioni unite:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gashc4124.doc.htm ]
21 novembre 2014

[…] The Committee then took up a text on combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other
practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance (document A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1).
Speaking before the vote, the representative of Ukraine said Stalinism had killed many people in the
Gulag, condemning Hitler and Stalin alike as international criminals. Calling on the Russian
Federation to stop glorifying and feeding Stalinism, he said he could not support the draft text. Any
intolerance should be dealt with in an appropriate and balanced manner, he added. The
manipulation of history for one’s own political agenda was wrong, he said, noting that the Russian
Federation was supporting neo-Nazi groups and terrorist groups in Crimea. The proposed draft
resolution sent the wrong message, he added, saying he would vote against it.
A delegate of Belarus noted the growth of neo-Nazi movements that was occurring under the pretext
of freedom of speech. She then expressed her concern over the use of the Internet and social media
to propagate national superiority. As every fourth inhabitant of her country had died in the Second
World War, she reiterated the importance of the draft resolution, and encouraged Member States to
support it.
The representative of the Russian Federation, making a correction to the draft, said that in the text
distributed by the Secretariat, some words had been omitted in the second line of the last preambular
paragraph. The words were “over Nazism”, and should be included in the draft. He took the floor
again to ask who had requested a vote on this draft.
The Chair responded that it was the delegation of the United States.
Speaking in explanation of vote before vote, the representative of the United States said she had
joined other countries in expressing abhorrence for attempts to promote Nazi ideology, and
condemning all forms of religious or ethnic hatred. Her delegation was concerned about the overt
political motives that had driven the main sponsor of the current resolution. That Government had
employed those phrases in the current crisis in Ukraine. That was offensive and disrespectful to those
who had suffered at the hands of Nazi regimes. Therefore, the United States would vote against the
resolution.
The text was then approved by a record vote of 115 in favour, 3 against (Canada, Ukraine, United
States), with 55 abstentions.
Speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, the representative of Italy, speaking on behalf of the
European Union, said the Union was committed to fight against racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance with comprehensive efforts at national, regional and
international levels. While States were free to decide what to include in the draft text, he noted that
the Union was concerned about the sincerity of the text, as the main sponsor had violated the human
rights.
Also speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, the representative of Liechtenstein, speaking on
behalf of Iceland, Switzerland and her country, said they were against all sorts of extremist political
parties, movements and groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, as well as racist extremist
movements and ideologies. However, they had decided to abstain from voting.
Also explaining his country’s position after the vote, Equatorial Guinea’s representative said African
countries knew well about racism and apartheid. His delegation had voted in favour of the text, and
wanted all sorts of Nazi groups to be labelled as terrorists.
The representative of Norway stated that her delegation had aligned itself with the European Union
statement delivered on behalf of the representative of Italy.
I neo-Nazi imperversano in Ucraina, ma il Nazismo non è più
il “male assoluto” (per l’Occidente).
MARIA GRAZIA BRUZZONE – La Stampa, 30 Novembre 2014
https://www.lastampa.it/blogs/2014/11/30/news/i_neo-nazi_imperversano_in_ucraina_ma_il_nazismo_non_e_piu_il_male_assoluto_per_l_occidente_-2194506/

Una settimana fa l’assemblea generale dell’ONU ha approvato una mozione presentata dalla Russia
che condanna i tentativi di glorificazione dell’ideologia nazista e la conseguente negazione dei
crimini di guerra nazisti, compreso l’Olocausto. La risoluzione rileva e condanna anche l’aumento di
attacchi razzisti in tutto il mondo e propone di applicare la Convenzione Internazionale
sull’eliminazione di ogni forma di Discriminazione Razziale adottata in sede Onu nel 1969 ma mai
davvero messa in pratica.
I media italiani hanno quasi del tutto ignorato la notizia, che invece presenta aspetti interessanti,
sottolineati da blog alternativi (es qui1), anche nostrani (qui2 e qui3). Del resto parlano poco anche
delle atrocità che continuano ad essere compiute in Ucraina, come testimonia anche l’ultimo rapporto
ONU4.
Si dirà che la mozione ricalcava altre risoluzioni del genere approvate alle Nazioni Unite, anche
recentemente (2010, 2012). Si dirà che quest’ultima risoluzione era una furbesca mossa
propagandistica del Cremlino per raccogliere una condanna indiretta del nuovo governo ucraino, nato
da un "colpo di stato" sponsorizzato da Stati Uniti e avvallato dalla UE. Fatto sta che, se in altre
occasioni simili c’era stata l’unanimità o quasi, questa volta è andata diversamente.

1
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/11/u-s-among-3-countries-u-n-officially-backing-nazism-israel-parts-
company-germany-abstains.html (vedi articoli allegati).
2
https://www.sinistraineuropa.it/europa/lonu-condanna-riabilitazione-del-nazismo-usa-e-ucraina-contro-leuropa-si-
astiene/ (vedi sopra).
3
https://contropiano.org/editoriale/2014/11/23/l-europa-non-rinnega-piu-il-nazismo-027692 (vedi sopra).
4
Vedi Allegato 2.
I voti favorevoli sono stati 115, 3 i contrari, 55 gli astenuti. A votare contro sono stati USA, Canada
e Ucraina - è la prima novità. La seconda è che ad astenersi sono stati i paesi dell’Unione Europea
(ambigui e un po’ ipocriti, come spesso capita) più vari stati nordafricani. Astenuta anche la
Germania, mentre Israele non ha potuto negare il suo sì, associandosi al resto del mondo.
Una svolta ideologica. La sottolinea un blog italiano decisamente “di sinistra” [contropiano.org] che
osserva come in questa occasione il “merito” della mozione (la condanna del Nazismo) perda di peso,
non conti più. L’importante è contrastare l’avversario (la Russia) e sostenere l’alleato (l’Ucraina di
Poroshenko e Pravy Sektor). Un voto puramente “politico”, certo. Ma che rovescia un modo di
pensare radicato nella tradizione culturale occidentale e in particolare europea – ne sa qualcosa la
generazione cresciuta nel dopoguerra nel mito degli USA “salvatori” dell’Europa dal perfido
criminale Hitler gasatore di ebrei e minoranze (ma del ruolo decisivo della Russia nel fermare il Furer,
e dei 23 milioni di russi morti, tra militari e civili, poco si parlava e si parla).
Con questo voto il concetto di “male assoluto”, storicamente e unitariamente identificato nel
nazifascismo, non possiede più dei contorni valoriali riconosciuti e riconoscibili da tutti –
osserva il blog – ma diventa semplicemente l’etichetta da affibbiare al “nemico di turno”.
L’integralismo islamico-sunnita dell’Isis può essere nominato come il nuovo "male assoluto",
mentre i nazifascisti in carne-ossa-spranghe-fucili – in qualsiasi paese alleato dell’Occidente
– non lo sono più.
E’ una svolta che data ormai da decenni. Quanti “nuovi Hitler” sono stati additati, da Noriega a
Saddam Hussein, da Milosevich a Gheddafi? Fino allo stesso Putin negli ultimi mesi. Ma senza
ribaltare i termini della questione, senza negare esplicitamente il “male assoluto“ Nazista originario,
come fa invece il recente voto negativo all’ONU da parte di US, Canada e Ucraina.
Ucraina e neo-Nazisti. La svolta ideologica sarebbe il minor problema se neo-Nazisti in carne e ossa
venissero non solo tollerati ma addirittura utilizzati, finanziati, premiati con cariche parlamentari,
ministeriali e non solo. E’ quel che accade in Ucraina come, a un anno dalla cosiddetta “rivolta di
Maidan” e in coincidenza col voto all’ONU, documentano svariati post (diversi sul sito canadese
Global Research).
E’ accaduto del resto fin dall’inizio, quando fazioni di estrema destra ultranazionalista, con bandiere
e chiari simboli neo-Nazi, hanno giocato un ruolo decisivo nel “colpo di Stato” che ha rovesciato il
presidente Viktor Yanukovich (corrotto quanto si vuole ma regolarmente eletto) e dato vita al governo
di Arseniy Yatseniuk. Un copione scritto da tempo dal Dipartimento di Stato americano, è stato
ampiamente provato, contro la volontà degli europei che col presidente uscente avevano siglato un
accordo, rinnegato il giorno seguente dopo i furiosi, oscuri scontri di piazza nella notte tra polizia e
dimostranti fra i quali spiccavano le milizie del Settore Destro (Pravy Sektor) e misteriosi cecchini,
disordini che misero in fuga Yanukovich (Underblog qui5 e qui6 con link vari, e ancora qui7,
autorevole e decisivo).
Neo-Nazi in Ucraina al governo... Sono tanti, a dispetto della scarsissima affermazione del loro
partito. Farne un elenco è inevitabile (qui8).
Andry Parubiy. Segretario del Consiglio Ucraino di Difesa e Sicurezza Nazionale. Parubiy aveva
fondato il Partito Nazional Socialista dell’ Ucraina, formazione di estrema destra ultranazionalista e
neo-Nazista nata nel 1991 che, malgrado il nome cambiato in Svoboda(=libertà) siede in
parlamento(con soli 6 eletti invero) continuando a usare tranquillamente simboli e bandiere naziste e
a richiamarsi a a Stepan Bandera, il collaborazionista ucraino dell’Ovest schierato dalla parte di
Hitler, che era invece combattuto dagli Ucraini dell’Est alleati con l’Unione Sovietica di Stalin. Di
qui, e da ancor più antiche ostilità, l’odio feroce che oppone le due parti dell’Ucraina. Sarebbe utile
approfondire per meglio capire le posizioni.

Oleh Tyahnybok,leader di Svoboda, partito che siede in parlamento (Tyahnybok fotografato un anno
fa col futuro premier Yatseniuk insieme al senatore US John McCain e a Victoria Nuland, assistente
di John Kerry per Europa e Eurasia, falco Neocon nonché moglie di Robert Kagan, la vera architetta
del piano ucraino costato $5 miliardi, dichiarò lei stessa, di cui venne resa nota la telefonata in cui
mandava esplicitamente a farsi fottere gli europei.
Dmytro Yarosh, vice Segretario per la Sicurezza Nazionale. Leader di Pravy Sektor, sovrintende le
forze armate con Parubiy. Pravy Sektor include il gruppo di estrema destra Patrioti dell’Ucraina e i
paramilitari di UNA-UNSO (ne parliamo più avanti). Nelle loro insegne ci sono rune naziste,
svastiche e altri simboli nazi.
Oleksandr Sych, vice Primo Ministro. Sych è membro del partito Svoboda
Ihor Shvaika,ministro dell’Agricoltura, idem
Andriy Mokhnyk, ministro dell’Ecologia. Mokhnyk di Svoboda è vice leader.
…e in parlamento, capi dei battaglioni di milizie che seminano terrore nell’Est. Squadre di
volontari/mercenari che affiancano/surrogano esercito regolare di Kiev e Guardia Nazionale nella

5
https://www.lastampa.it/blogs/2014/05/22/news/ucraina-se-il-nuovo-corso-filo-occidente-include-l-ultradestra-neo-
nazista-br-1.37251588/ (vedi articoli allegati).
6
https://www.lastampa.it/blogs/2014/05/04/news/ucraina-i-miliardi-del-fmi-e-l-offensiva-nel-sud-est-br-1.37251596/
(vedi articoli allegati).
7
https://www.lastampa.it/Page/Id/2.1.66892747 (vedi articoli alegati).
8
https://www.globalresearch.ca/harper-government-embraces-nazism-canada-votes-against-un-resolution-condemning-
the-glorification-of-nazism/5416520
guerra etnica contro i cosiddetti “separatisti filo-Russi”. Sarebbero 34 o 50 e conterebbero varie
migliaia di militi, 7000 solo il Dniepr secondo AFP9.
Oleg Lyashko, capo del Radical Party che porta anche il suo nome, nonché del battaglione
“Shaktar”. Human Right Watch e Amnesty International ne hanno condannato le azioni nell’Est
Ucraina, ma pure sequestri di persona e torture nei confronti di suoi concorrenti (video qui). Global
Researchaggiunge accuse di stupri e di giovani volontari costretti a prostituirsi (video), sebbene
Lyashko, che era un candidato alla presidenza, sia considerato un politico in ascesa.
Sergey Melnichuk, comandante del battaglione “Aydar”dalle incerte sorti, deputato scelto da
Lyashko.
Andrij Teteruk, neo senatore e comandante del battaglione “Myotvorets” (= che porta la pace),
milizia di polizia che “restaura l’ordine negli insediamenti liberati, li ripulisce dai criminali e dalle
armi”, a suo dire. Tradotto: milizie punitive.
Semen Semenchenko, nuovo senatore anche lui, il suo battaglione “Donbass” è responsabile di molti
orrori contro i civili delll’Est.
Yuri Bereza, neo senatore, comanda il battaglione“Dniepr1” finanziato da Ihor Kolomoysky, il
potente oligarca banchiere 2° o 3° più ricco del paese, da poco nominato governatore di
Dniepropetrovsk. Kolomoysky, passaporto ucraino, cipriota e israeliano, avrebbe pianificato e
finanziato il massacro di Odessa in cui sono stati torturati, mutilati e infine bruciati 37 civili, 19 dei
quali ebrei. Il battaglione pullula di svastiche e mercenari Neo-Nazi. “Animali neonazisti”, li ha
bollati l’assistente dell’ Andrij Biletsky, capo dei gruppi neo-Nazisti Assemblea Social-Nazionale e
Patrioti dell’Ucraina è il fondatore e comandante del battaglione “Azov”, il più tristemente noto.
Responsabile di rapimenti, stupri, torture e assassini di civili nella regione del Donbass ma anche a
Mariupol dove è basato, fra i suoi emblemi oltre a rune e svastiche (viste in tv pare abbiano
impressionato molto i tedeschi, per il WashingtonPost sono romanticherie giovanili10) c’è il simbolo
occulto del Sole Nero usato dalle SS naziste.
Circa 500 uomini, “apertamente neo-Nazisti” li definì Foreign Policy in un pezzo di agosto dedicato
al battaglione11 (ma forse sono be di più), alla pari degli oltre 50 "battaglioni punitivi”, unità
paramilitari che combattono nell’Est. L’”identità europea” propugnata dall’ideologo Odnorozhenko
è molto diversa dal liberalismo americano ed europeo, osserva FP. Biletsky propugna apertamente la
superiorità Ariana. “La storica missione della nostra nazione in questo momento critico e guidare le

9
http://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-soldiers-government-were-coming-next-155843129.html
10
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-leaders-talk-peace-some-ukrainians-contemplate-guerrilla-
war/2014/09/12/4e36884e-aa74-40d6-8c61-8b6fe3ffd638_story.html
11
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/30/preparing_for_war_with_ukraine_s_fascist_defenders_of_freedom
Razze Bianche del mondo in una crociata finale per la loro sopravvivenza” ha detto al Telegraph
(ripreso da Consortiumnews in un post12 che linka i grandi media come NYTimes ecc, che finalmente
a settembre si accorgono dei neo-Nazi in Ucraina.
E sul loro sito si leggono frasi così: “Sfortunatamente oggi fra le genti Ucraine ci sono molti Russi
(per mentalità), ebrei, americani, europei dell’UE, Arabi, Cinesi e così via, ma non molti
specificamente Ucraini . Non è chiaro quanto tempo e quanti sforzi ci vorranno per sradicare questi
pericolosi virus dal nostro popolo”.
Conclude FP: “I pro-Russi dicono di combattere contro nazisti e fascisti , nel caso di Azov e altri
battaglioni queste accuse sono essenzialmente vere”.
Di sfuggita: qualche giorno fa il vicecomandante del battaglione “Azov” Vadim Troyan, è stato
nominato Capo della Polizia della Regione di Oblast dal ministro dell’Interno Arsen Avakov (che la
Russia chiede venga ricercato dall’Interpol per metodi di guerra proibiti, assassini e altri reati).
Da segnalare anche l’apparente processo di "nazificazione" in corso nelle scuole, come
testimoniato dal dal tweet del presidente Poroshenko sull’addestramento militare a lezione e
dall’immagine dei simboli nazisti in questa classe.

Eppure il governo US li aiuta e li finanzia. “Se solo il pubblico sapesse che il governo US aiuta
mostri del genere”, scrive Global Research13 raccontando di una delegazione Ucraina in arrivo a
Washington per reclamare altri soldi e aiuti militari. In realtà armi, anche letali, ne hanno appena
ricevute, in coincidenza con la recente visita a Kiev del vicepresidente Usa Joe Biden – come ha
rivelato il sito di hackers CyberBerkut che ha messo in rete elenchi e documenti originali (segnalato
qui14, in it.). Del resto un provvedimento per bloccare gli aiuti militari US all’Ucraina neo-Nazi,
presentato da un deputato dem, sarebbe stato bloccato15, sorprendentemente, dalla lobby israeliana.
La potente lobby ultranazionalista Ukrainian Congressional Committee of America (UCCA) sa come
attivarsi. Dal dopoguerra porta avanti la piattaforma di estrema destra dell’OUN (Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalist) compreso il culto del filo-Hitleriano Bandera e ha solidi canali nella destra
americana Neocon.

12
http://consortiumnews.com/2014/09/15/ukraines-romantic-nazi-storm-troopers/
13
http://www.globalresearch.ca/if-the-public-only-knew-us-aid-to-ukraine-monsters-atrocities-committed-by-ukraine-
national-guard-azov-battalion/5416136 (vedi Allegato 4).
14
https://www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews.php?idx=82&pg=9570 (vedi articoli allegati).
15
http://www.alternet.org/world/how-israel-lobby-protected-ukrainian-neo-nazis (vedi articoli allegati).
E se il partito Svoboda fosse solo il fronte elettorale di organizzazioni neo-Naziste e
ultranazionaliste non nuove, ben conosciute e appoggiate dalla stessa UCCA, come l’UNA-
UNSO? Se questi organizzazioni non fossero tanto espressione dell’opposizione ucraina quanto delle
forze segretamente utilizzate dalla NATO che usano l’Ucraina come base, e non da oggi? Se a giocare
un ruolo decisivo negli episodi di violenza che portarono al collasso del governo ucraino che era
uscito dalle elezioni fosse questa organizzazione militare neo-Nazista legata alla NATO?
Una tesi ardita, anche se ormai è difficile stupirsi di alcunché. A sostenerla, in un post del marzo
scorso rilanciato ora dal solitamente attendibile Global Research, è l’analista geopolitico F. William
Engdahl, basandosi anche su fonti personali tra i quali veterani dell’intelligence americana16.
Engdhal che scriveva a ridosso di quei primi eventi, ricostruiva l’accaduto, Yanukovich forzato a
fuggire come un criminale, accusato di aver rifiutato l’offerta di un ingresso dell’Ucraina nella UE
preferendo un accordo con la Russia che offriva il taglio di $15 miliardi di debiti ucraini e gas a prezzi
ridotti. Ricordava l’accordo di compromesso raggiunto con Yanukovich dai ministri degli Esteri di
Germania, Francia e Polonia – senza gli US, prova dei diversi punti di vista e metodi europei - la
telefonata in cui la Nuland spiegava al “suo” ambasciatore quale governo e quale coalizione volesse
a Kiev, col famoso “F..k the EU”, l’Europa si fotta, appunto.

E arriva al precipitare degli eventi, quel 22 febbraio, quando a piazza Indipendenza la polizia si ritirò
in preda al panico, sotto il fuoco incrociato dei cecchini.
Chi aveva schierato i cecchini? è la domanda finora senza risposta, si chiedeva l’autore. Secondo
fonti di veterani dell’intelligence US i cecchini arrivarono dall’organizzazione militare di ultra destra
conosciuta come Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’Self Defense (UNA-UNSO).
(Una sigla che abbiamo già incontrato in un altro post dove era vista ricadere sotto l’ala del Pravy
Sektor, il Settore Destro).
L’autore ricorda come il leader di UNA-UNSO Andrij Shkil dieci anni fa divenne il consigliere di
Julia Tymoshenko, appoggiata dagli US. Durante la “Rivoluzione Arancione” appoggiò il candidato
pro-NATO Yushenko contro il pro-Russia Yanukovich. Si dice anche che abbia legami stretti col
Partito Nazionale Democratico in Germania (NDP).

“Dalla dissoluzione dell’Unione Sovietica nel 1991 i membri dell’organizzazione para-militare

UNA-UNSO sono stati dietro ogni rivolta contro l’influenza Russa – afferma Engdahl. Il filo che
connette le violente campagne è sempre anti-Russia. L’organizzazione, secondo le fonti di veterani

16
Vedi Allegato 5.
dell’ intelligence americana, è parte di una GLADIO segreta della NATO, e non è un gruppo
nazionalista come quello che viene descritto dai media occidentali.
Secondo tali fonti UNA-UNSO avrebbe partecipato agli eventi Lituani nell’inverno 1991 (confermato
ufficialmente), al colpo di Stato Sovietico nell’estate 1991 (defenestrazione di Gorbaciov, ndr), nella
guerra anti Mosca di Abkhazia del ‘93, a quella in Cecenia, alla campagna organizzata dagli US in
Kosovo contro la Serbia, alla guerra in Georgia nel 2008. I para-militari dell’UNA-UNSO sarebbero
stati coinvolti in ogni guerra sporca della NATO nel post guerra fredda. Si tratta di pericolosi
mercenari usati ovunque sia per combattere guerre sporche sia per incastrare la Russia, perché
pretendono di essere forze speciali Russe (per Wikipedia nel ‘91 membri di UNA–UNSO avevano
servito nelle forze armate sovietiche).
Gli avvenimenti in Ucraina sono andati avanti secondo le linee suggerite da Engdhal (al governo
Arsenij Yatseniuk pilotato dagli US, forte ruolo di Svoboda), che chiudeva con una frase quasi
profetica.
“Il dramma non è affatto finito. In gioco c’è il futuro della Russia, le relazioni Europa /Russia e il
potere globale di Washington o almeno di quella fazione che a Washington vede ulteriori guerre
come primo strumento della politica”.
https://ilmanifesto.it/allonu-litalia-si-astiene-sul-nazismo

All’Onu l’Italia si astiene sul nazismo

MANLIO DINUCCI – il Manifesto, 24 novembre 2020

Il Terzo Comitato delle Nazioni Unite – incaricato delle questioni sociali, umanitarie e culturali – ha
approvato il 18 novembre la Risoluzione «Combattere la glorificazione del nazismo, neonazismo e
altre pratiche che contribuiscono ad alimentare le contemporanee forme di razzismo, discriminazione
razziale, xenofobia e relativa intolleranza» [vedi Allegato 7]. La Risoluzione, ricordando che «la
vittoria sul nazismo nella Seconda guerra mondiale contribuì alla creazione delle Nazioni Unite, al
fine di salvare le future generazioni dal flagello della guerra», lancia l’allarme per la diffusione di
movimenti neonazisti, razzisti e xenofobi in molte parti del mondo. Esprime «profonda
preoccupazione per la glorificazione, in qualsiasi forma, del nazismo, del neonazismo e degli ex
membri delle Waffen-SS».
Sottolinea quindi che «il neonazismo è qualcosa di più della glorificazione di un movimento del
passato: è un fenomeno contemporaneo». I movimenti neonazisti e altri analoghi «alimentano le
attuali forme di razzismo, discriminazione razziale, antisemitismo, islamofobia, cristianofobia e
relativa intolleranza». La Risoluzione chiama quindi gli Stati delle Nazioni Unite a intraprendere una
serie di misure per contrastare tale fenomeno. La Risoluzione, già adottata dall’Assemblea Generale
delle Nazioni Unite il 18 dicembre 2019, è stata approvata dal Terzo Comitato con 122 voti a favore,
tra cui quelli di due membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza, Russia e Cina. Due soli membri
delle Nazioni Unite hanno votato contro: Stati uniti (membro permanente del Consiglio di Sicurezza)
e Ucraina.
Sicuramente per una direttiva interna, gli altri 29 membri della Nato, tra cui l’Italia, si sono astenuti.
Lo stesso hanno fatto i 27 membri dell’Unione europea, 21 dei quali appartengono alla Nato. Tra i 53
astenuti vi sono anche Australia, Giappone e altri partner della Nato. Il significato politico di tale
votazione è chiaro: i membri e partner della Nato hanno boicottato la Risoluzione che, pur senza
nominarla, chiama in causa anzitutto l’Ucraina, i cui movimenti neonazisti sono stati e sono usati
dalla Nato a fini strategici. Vi sono ampie prove che squadre neonaziste sono state addestrate e
impiegate, sotto regia Usa/Nato, nel putsch di piazza Maidan nel 2014 e nell’attacco ai russi di
Ucraina per provocare, con il distacco della Crimea e il suo ritorno alla Russia, un nuovo confronto
in Europa analogo a quello della guerra fredda. Emblematico il ruolo del battaglione Azov, fondato
nel 2014 da Andriy Biletsky, il «Führer bianco» sostenitore della «purezza razziale della nazione
ucraina, che non deve mischiarsi a razze inferiori».
Dopo essersi distinto per la sua ferocia, l’Azov è stato trasformato in reggimento della Guardia
nazionale ucraina, dotato di carri rmati e artiglieria. Ciò che ha conservato è l’emblema, ricalcato da
quello delle SS Das Reich, e la formazione ideologica delle reclute modellata su quella nazista. Il
reggimento Azov è addestrato da istruttori Usa, trasferiti da Vicenza in Ucraina, affiancati da altri
della Nato.. L’Azov è non solo una unità militare, ma un movimento ideologico e politico. Biletsky
resta il capo carismatico in particolare per l’organizzazione giovanile, educata all’odio contro i russi
e addestrata militarmente. Contemporaneamente, vengono reclutati a Kiev neonazisti da tutta Europa,
Italia compresa. L’Ucraina è così divenuta il «vivaio» del rinascente nazismo nel cuore dell’Europa.
In tale quadro si inserisce l’astensione dell’Italia, anche nella votazione della Risoluzione
all’Assemblea Generale.
Il Parlamento acconsente, come quando nel 2017 ha firmato un memorandum d’intesa col presidente
del parlamento ucraino Andriy Parubiy, fondatore del Partito nazionalsociale ucraino, sul modello
nazionalsocialista hitleriano, capo delle squadre neonaziste responsabili di assassini e feroci pestaggi
di oppositori politici. Sarà lui a complimentarsi col governo italiano sul non-voto della Risoluzione
Onu sul nazismo, in linea con quanto ha dichiarato in televisione: «Il più grande uomo che ha praiicato
la democrazia diretta è stato Adolf Hitler».

[si allega qui la giustificazione ufficiale della US Mission alle Nazioni Unite in merito all’ennesimo voto contrario
alla versione della risoluzione di cui parla Dinucci, da https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-on-a-
resolution-on-the-glorification-of-nazism/ ]

Explanation of Vote on a Resolution on the Glorification of Nazism

Jason Mack
Counselor for Economic and Social Affairs
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
New York, New York
November 18, 2020

AS DELIVERED

Chair – The United States joins the world community in commemorating the 75th anniversary of the
end of the Second World War. We honor the valiant contributions and the heroism and sacrifice of
allied nations and their service members in the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. We also join the
international community in condemning the glorification of Nazism and all forms of racism,
xenophobia, discrimination, and intolerance. In fighting against the murderous tyranny of Nazism,
the United States also fought for the freedom, dignity and human rights of all – including our steadfast
commitment to freedom of expression.
Today, however, the United States must express opposition to this resolution, a document most
notable for its thinly veiled attempts to legitimize longstanding Russian disinformation narratives
denigrating neighboring nations under the cynical guise of halting Nazi glorification. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the constitutional right to freedom of speech and the
rights of peaceful assembly and association, including by avowed Nazis, whose hatred and
xenophobia are widely scorned by the American people. At the same time, we steadfastly defend the
constitutional rights of those who exercise their rights to combat intolerance and express strong
opposition to the odious Nazi creed and others espousing similar hatreds.
Despite consistently expressing our concerns with the Russian delegation and proposing revisions to
protect against unacceptable restrictions on freedom of expression, our recommendations, intended
to improve and strengthen this resolution, have been ignored. We discourage States from invoking
Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and Article 20
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in an attempt to either silence unwelcome
opinions or to excuse their failure to combat intolerance.
For these reasons, the United States has voted against each new version of this resolution since 2005
and is, again, compelled to vote “No” on this resolution, and calls on other States to do the same.

[il 12 novembre 2021 la risoluzione viene nuovamente proposta dal rappresentante del Ministero affari esteri russo,
Lukiantsev, con esplicita motivazione: https://russiaun.ru/en/news/3com12112021 – in coda l’esito della votazione]

Statement by Special Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

Russian Federation for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law
G.Lukiantsev in the Third Committee of the 76th Session of the UN General
Assembly at the time of adoption of draft resolution “Combating Glorification of
Nazism, neo-Nazism and Other Practices That Contribute to Fuelling
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance” (A/C.3/76/L.57/Rev.1)
12 novembre 2021

Mr. Chairman,
This year we mark an important milestone – 75 years since the Nuremberg Tribunal pronounced its
Judgement. The verdict of the Tribunal in 1946 legally consolidated victory over Nazism and once
and for all resolved the question of who represented the forces of good and who represented the forces
of evil during World War II. The verdict, together with the establishment of the UN, marked the
victory of the civilized world over National Socialism. It was the victory over racial supremacy and
human hatred. Never before have States, divided by ideological and political differences, become
united in the face of a common threat. The countries of the anti-Hitler coalition who called themselves
the United Nations set an example for us to follow while searching for common solutions to global
challenges.
The victory in World War II helped shape the contemporary system of promotion and protection
of human rights. Such international legal instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenants on Human Rights and, undoubtedly, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination were the reaction of the United Nations to the
crimes of Nazism and the policy of complete disregard for human dignity.
However, despite these obvious facts, we have once again witnessed attempts to deny our shared
history. The draft resolution touches upon common human rights issues that we have faced almost
every day. Moreover, since the adoption of a similar document last year the existing issues have
not only remained unresolved, but have continued to worsen in many aspects. Against the
backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, racist and xenophobic rhetoric has gained momentum
and calls to banish migrants and “foreign elements” have become louder.
And what is to be done about the wars waged against monuments to the fighters against Nazism and
fascism? And what about the annual marches of Nazi supporters? Why are torch marches honoring
active Nazi collaborators and accomplices to their crimes held every year in the center of Europe?
How can we describe the situation when new memorials are being unveiled to those who fought for
or collaborated with Hitler's Germany by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity? Why
symbols and emblems long associated with the victory over Nazism are being banned by a number
of countries instead of honoring the heroic liberators?
Mr. Chairman,
The co-sponsors of the draft resolution consider it totally unacceptable that those involved in the
crimes of Nazism, including white washing of the former SS and Waffen-SS members recognized as
criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal, should be glorified.
At the same time, those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition or collaborated with Nazis are
increasingly hailed as national heroes and heroes of national liberation movements. And this happens
in Europe of all places, Europe that has felt the effects of National Socialism as no one else has. The
same phenomenon is also observed in the countries occupied by Nazis during World War II whose
heroic peoples made a major contribution to the defeat of Nazism.
Conversely, there had been objections that it is not a violation of international obligations of States
to protect human rights, but quite the opposite – the practical implementation of the right to freedom
of peaceful assembly and expression.
We are convinced that it is not an example of political correctness or manifestation of the freedom of
speech, but an attempt to falsify and rewrite the history of World War II. However, we are not only
entitled, but we are obliged to be proud of that history. What we see is blatant cynicism and blasphemy
with respect to those who had freed the world from the horrors of National Socialism. Moreover,
these are criminally punishable acts, as stipulated in article 4 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

Mr. Chairman,
The co-sponsors are convinced that the adoption of the draft resolution with the broadest possible
support of Member States would contribute enormously to efforts aimed at eliminating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The adoption of the draft resolution is a duty not only towards those who had founded the United
Nations, but also towards the succeeding generations they had sought to forever save from the scourge
of war.
https://www.salon.com/2014/02/25/is_the_us_backing_neo_nazis_in_ukraine_partner/

Is the US backing neo-Nazis in Ukraine?

John McCain and other State Department members have troubling ties to the ultra-nationalist Svoboda party
Max Blumenthal, Salon, 25 febbraio 2014 (originariamente pubblicato su AlterNet)

As the Euromaidan protests in the Ukrainian capitol of Kiev culminated this week, displays of open
fascism and neo-Nazi extremism became too glaring to ignore. Since demonstrators filled the
downtown square to battle Ukrainian riot police and demand the ouster of the corruption-stained, pro-
Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, it has been filled with far-right streetfighting men pledging to
defend their country’s ethnic purity.
White supremacist banners and Confederate flags were draped inside Kiev’s occupied City Hall, and
demonstrators have hoisted Nazi SS and white power symbols over a toppled memorial to V.I. Lenin.
After Yanukovich fled his palatial estate by helicopter, EuroMaidan protesters destroyed a memorial
to Ukrainians who died battling German occupation during World War II. Sieg heil salutes and the
Nazi Wolfsangel symbol have become an increasingly common site in Maidan Square, and neo-Nazi
forces have established “autonomous zones” in and around Kiev.
An Anarchist group called AntiFascist Union Ukraine attempted to join the Euromaidan
demonstrations but found it difficult to avoid threats of violence and imprecations from the gangs of
neo-Nazis roving the square. “They called the Anarchists things like Jews, blacks, Communists,” one
of its members said. “There weren’t even any Communists, that was just an insult.”
“There are lots of Nationalists here, including Nazis,” the anti-fascist continued. “They came from
all over Ukraine, and they make up about 30% of protesters.”
One of the “Big Three” political parties behind the protests is the ultra-nationalist Svoboda, whose
leader, Oleh Tyahnybok, has called for the liberation of his country from the “Muscovite-Jewish
mafia.” After the 2010 conviction of the Nazi death camp guard John Demjanjuk for his supporting
role in the death of nearly 30,000 people at the Sobibor camp, Tyahnybok rushed to Germany to
declare him a hero who was “fighting for truth.” In the Ukrainian parliament, where Svoboda holds
an unprecedented 37 seats, Tyahnybok’s deputy Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn is fond of quoting Joseph
Goebbels – he has even founded a think tank originally called “the Joseph Goebbels Political
Research Center.” According to Per Anders Rudling, a leading academic expert on European neo-
fascism, the self-described “socialist nationalist” Mykhalchyshyn is the main link between Svoboda’s
official wing and neo-Nazi militias like Right Sector.
Right Sector is a shadowy syndicate of self-described “autonomous nationalists” identified by their
skinhead style of dress, ascetic lifestyle, and fascination with street violence. Armed with riot shields
and clubs, the group’s cadres have manned the front lines of the Euromaidan battles this month, filling
the air with their signature chant: “Ukraine above all!” In a recent Right Sector propaganda video
[embedded at the bottom of this article], the group promised to fight “against degeneration and
totalitarian liberalism, for traditional national morality and family values.” With Svoboda linked to a
constellation of international neo-fascist parties through the Alliance of European National
Movements, Right Sector is promising to lead its army of aimless, disillusioned young men on “a
great European Reconquest.”
Svoboda’s openly pro-Nazi politics have not deterred Senator John McCain from addressing a
EuroMaidan rally alongside Tyahnybok, nor did it prevent Assistant Secretary of State Victoria
Nuland from enjoying a friendly meeting with the Svoboda leader this February. Eager to fend off
accusations of anti-Semitism, the Svoboda leader recently hosted the Israeli Ambassador to Ukraine.
“I would like to ask Israelis to also respect our patriotic feelings,” Tyahnybok has
remarked. “Probably each party in the [Israeli] Knesset is nationalist. With God’s help, let it be this
way for us too.”
In a leaked phone conversation with Geoffrey Pyatt, the US ambassador to Ukraine, Nuland revealed
her wish for Tyahnybok to remain “on the outside,” but to consult with the US’s replacement for
Yanukovich, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, “four times a week.” At a December 5, 2013 US-Ukraine
Foundation Conference, Nuland boasted that the US had invested $5 billion to "build democratic
skills and institutions" in Ukraine, though she did not offer any details.
“The Euro-Maidan movement has come to embody the principles and values that are the cornerstones
for all free democracies,” Nuland proclaimed.
Two weeks later, 15,000 Svoboda members held a torchlight ceremony in the city of Lviv in honor
of Stepan Bandera, a World War II-era Nazi collaborator who led the pro-fascist Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B). Lviv has become the epicenter of neo-fascist activity in Ukraine,
with elected Svoboda officials waging a campaign to rename its airport after Bandera and successfully
changing the name of Peace Street to the name of the Nachtigall Battalion, an OUN-B wing that
participated directly in the Holocaust. “’Peace’ is a holdover from Soviet stereotypes,” a Svoboda
deputy explained.
Revered by Ukrainian nationalists as a legendary freedom fighter, Bandera’s real record was
ignominious at best. After participating in a campaign to assassinate Ukrainians who supported
accommodation with the Polish during the 1930’s, Bandera’s forces set themselves to ethnically
cleanse western Ukraine of Poles in 1943 and 1944. In the process, they killed over 90,000 Poles and
many Jews, whom Bandera’s top deputy and acting “Prime Minister,” Yaroslav Stetsko, were
determined to exterminate. Bandera held fast to fascist ideology in the years after the war, advocating
a totalitarian, ethnically pure Europe while his affiliated Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) carried
out a doomed armed struggle against the Soviet Union. The bloodbath he inspired ended when KGB
agents assassinated him in Munich in 1959.

The Right Connections

Many surviving OUN-B members fled to Western Europe and the United States – occasionally with
CIA help – where they quietly forged political alliances with right-wing elements. “You have to
understand, we are an underground organization. We have spent years quietly penetrating positions
of influence,” one member told journalist Russ Bellant, who documented the group’s resurgence in
the United States in his 1988 book, “Old Nazis, New Right, and the Republican Party.”
In Washington, the OUN-B reconstituted under the banner of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of
America (UCCA), an umbrella organization comprised of “complete OUN-B fronts,” according to
Bellant. By the mid-1980’s, the Reagan administration was honeycombed with UCCA members, with
the group’s chairman Lev Dobriansky, serving as ambassador to the Bahamas, and his daughter,
Paula, sitting on the National Security Council. Reagan personally welcomed Stetsko, the Banderist
leader who oversaw the massacre of 7000 Jews in Lviv, into the White House in 1983.
“Your struggle is our struggle,” Reagan told the former Nazi collaborator. “Your dream is our dream.”
When the Justice Department launched a crusade to capture and prosecute Nazi war criminals in
1985, UCCA snapped into action, lobbying Congress to halt the initiative. “The UCCA has also
played a leading role in opposing federal investigations of suspected Nazi war criminals since those
queries got underway in the late 1970’s,” Bellant wrote. “Some UCCA members have many reasons
to worry – reasons which began in the 1930’s.”
Still an active and influential lobbying force in Washington, the UCCA does not appear to have shed
its reverence for Banderist nationalism. In 2009, on the 50th anniversary of Bandera’s death, the
group proclaimed him “a symbol of strength and righteousness for his followers” who “continue[s]
to inspire Ukrainians today.” A year later, the group honored the 60th anniversary of the death of
Roman Shukhevych, the OUN-B commander of the Nachtigall Battalion that slaughtered Jews in
Lviv and Belarus, calling him a “hero” who “fought for honor, righteousness…”
Back in Ukraine in 2010, then-President Viktor Yushchenko awarded Bandera the title of “National
Hero of Ukraine,” marking the culmination of his efforts to manufacture an anti-Russian national
narrative that sanitized the OUN-B’s fascism. (Yuschenko’s wife, Katherine Chumachenko, was a
former Reagan administration official and ex-staffer at the right-wing Heritage Foundation). When
the European Parliament condemned Yushchenko's proclamation as an affront to "European values,"
the UCCA-affiliated Ukrainian World Congress reacted with outrage, accusing the EU of "another
attempt to rewrite Ukrainian history during WWII." On its website, the UCCA dismissed historical
accounts of Bandera's collaboration with the Nazis as "Soviet propaganda."
Following the demise of Yanukovich this month, the UCCA helped organize rallies in cities across
the US in support of the EuroMaidan protests. When several hundred demonstrators marchedthrough
downtown Chicago, some waved Ukrainian flags while others proudly flew the red and black banners
of the UPA and OUN-B. "USA supports Ukraine!" they chanted.

http://www.infowars.com/us-backed-neo-nazi-party-given-key-roles-in-ukrainian-government/

US-Backed Neo-Nazi Party given key roles in Ukrainian Government

Extremist group rewarded with power weeks after meeting with McCain & Nuland
PAUL JOSEPH WATSON, Infowars.com, 28 febbraio 2014

Confirmation that a US-backed neo-nazi party has been handed key positions within the newly
formed Ukrainian government illustrates the fact that the Euromaidan uprising was a contrived coup
d’etat and has very little to do with freedom and democracy.
Back in December, around the same time that top U.S. diplomat Victoria Nuland announced that the
United States had invested $5 billion dollars to help Ukrainians achieve a new form of
government, Senator John McCain met with Svoboda Party leader Oleh Tyahnybok, sharing the stage
with him at an event during which McCain gave the United States’ blessing for the opposition revolt.

US Senator John McCain meets with Svoboda Party leader Oleh Tyahnybok and newly installed Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
As recently as three weeks ago, Nuland met with both Tyahnybok and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who is
now Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister. In a leaked phone conversation, Nuland was caught red-
handed scheming to install Yatsenyuk in the government before President Viktor Yanukovych had
even fled Kiev.
The fact that both Tyahnybok and Yatsenyuk have been handed the reigns of power following the
ouster of President Yanukovych just weeks after Nuland afforded them Washington’s seal of approval
clearly reveals the United States’ central role in the overthrow of a democratically elected
government.
Yatsenyuk’s history as a banker makes him the perfect candidate to assume the role of technocrat
in selling Ukraine into IMF debt slavery. However, the Svoboda Party’s rise to prominence is even
more chilling given the organization’s clear links to extremist groups and anti-Semitism.

Top U.S. diplomat Victoria Nuland meets with Tyahnybok and Yatsenyuk weeks before they were handed power under Ukraine’s new US-
backed interim government.

Despite Svoboda’s neo-nazi connections, the party has been handed three key positions in the newly
formed government.
“These posts include the deputy prime minister and the heads of the agriculture and environmental
ministries. In addition to these positions, a Svoboda lawmaker was appointed the new prosecutor
general in the interim government,” reports the Daily Caller.
In backing Svoboda’s role in the coup, the United States, just as it backed extremists in Syria, is
throwing its weight behind one of the most notorious political parties in Europe.
Supporters of the party were pictured during the recent uprising in Ukraine wearing “wolfsangel”
armbands, the same logo used by Hitler’s Waffen SS and numerous neo-nazi factions worldwide.

US-backed Svoboda supporters pictured during recent uprising wearing SS-style armbands.

While party officials have repeatedly made brazenly anti-Semitic statements over recent years,
perhaps the most shocking insight into the group’s ideology is the fact that one if its top members,
Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn, founded a think tank named the Joseph Goebbels Political Research Centre
as an homage to the Nazi propaganda minister.
“According to Per Anders Rudling, a leading academic expert on European neo-fascism, the self-
described “socialist nationalist” Mykhalchyshyn is the main link between Svoboda’s official wing
and neo-Nazi militias like Right Sector,” writes Salon’s Max Blumenthal.
The party itself denies that it is xenophobic or anti-Semitic, part of a re-branding effort designed to
increase its legitimacy which included ditching a Swastika-style symbol that was once the
organization’s main motif.
However, despite the clear documented ties that bind Svoboda to neo-nazi extremists, some quarters
of the US media have attempted to downplay their role in the Ukrainian uprising, with Time Magazine
ludicrously suggesting that, “Nowhere in Ukraine has the uprising involved neo-Nazi groups.” One
would suspect that if Tea Party supporters started wearing SS armbands, Time’s take on the issue
would be somewhat different.
Svoboda’s integral involvement in the Ukrainian uprising and their reward of several key positions
within the post-coup government underscores once again how the United States is willing to back
some of the most repulsive and dangerous organizations on the planet, so long as they are on board
with the long term goal of US hegemony and geopolitical domination.

Sieg heil? US-backed Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok.

https://www.lastampa.it/blogs/2014/05/04/news/ucraina-i-miliardi-del-fmi-e-l-offensiva-nel-sud-est-br-1.37251596/

Ucraina, i miliardi del FMI e l'offensiva nel Sud Est

Ultrà e mercenari a Odessa: video. Anche un italiano?
MARIA GRAZIA BRUZZONE, La Stampa, 4 maggio 2014

Rimbalzano sul web le notizie, le foto e i video del massacro di Odessa, dove 40 attivisti anti-Kiev
hanno perso la vita nell’incendio doloso della Casa dei Sindacati presa d’assalto. Da chi? Dai soldati
di Kiev o dalle milizie di Settore Destro, come sembra da testimonianze e video? Quel Pravy
Sektor ultranazionalista e ferocemente anti-russo già protagonista della rivolta di Maidan che non ha
mai dismesso le armi – come l’accordo di Ginevra imporrebbe a “tutti i gruppi armati” illegali.
“Tutti”, non solo gli attivisti filo-russi che occupano gli edifici governativi nel Sud Est del paese per
protestare contro il governo di Kiev, il cui primo atto è stato l’abolizione del russo come seconda
lingua.
Sul campo vi sarebbero anche mercenari di ogni genere, contractors americani della (ex)
Blackwater addirittura, come mostrerebbero queste foto e video (condizionale d’obbligo), “radicali”
senza divisa ma con giubbotti antiproiettile come il tizio corpulento filmato mentre spara verso la
Casa dei Sindacati di Odessa fra l’indifferenza della polizia. Perfino un italiano, in mimetica
invece, ripreso mentre parla nella nostra lingua con giornaliste na fotografica al collo.
E ancora, infiltrati “russi” arrivati dalla Transnistria, una regione della Moldava dove Mosca ha una
guarnigione - accusa Kiev, e scriveva sabato 3 anche il reporter del Guardian. E militi prezzolati da
funzionari che erano nel clan di Yanukovich - rilancia la Russia, negando le accuse. Mosca fa i nomi
di Serghiei Arbuzov e Oleksandr Klymendo già alleati dell’ex presidente. Ma Klymendo smentisce
e punta il dito sul governo di Kiev: “E’ il vero responsabile” dei fatti sanguinosi di Odessa, costati
anche 200 feriti.
Una clausola nascosta dietro il prestito del FMI? In questo bailamme di reciproche accuse, mentre
l’esercito ucraino va riconquistando il Sud-Est del paese, una notizia pubblicata da Zerohedge, blog
americano di finanza e dintorni sempre ben informato e attendibile, potrebbe fornire il capo di un filo
conduttore, collegando l’offensiva lanciata dal governo di Kiev e il conseguente precipitare degli
eventi, al “prestito” accordato all’Ucraina dal Fondo Monetario Internazionale la sera del 30 aprile,
dopo molte targiversazioni.
$17 miliardi in due anni, una prima tranche tra il 5 e l’8 maggio e subito $3,2 miliardi per evitare
l’imminente default.
“Gazprom, che vanta crediti miliardari per il gas, può essere pagata, l’Ucraina incassa un po’ di cash,
e la porta si apre affinché gli USA e l’UE possano esercitare la loro “influenza/controllo sulla nazione
divisa. Tutto a posto dunque, tranne una cosa:
SE IL GOVERNO UCRAINO PERDESSE IL CONTROLLO SULL’EST DEL PAESE, IL
SALVATAGGIO DA $17 MILIARDI DOVREBBE ESSERE RIDISEGNATO”.
“Il che, tradotto alla buona, sembra significare: andate alla guerra contro le forze pro-Russia (e
contro la Russia stessa se Putin vedesse i suoi compatrioti in difficoltà) o non avrete il vostro
denaro”.
Così ZeroHedge, al quale si devono anche stampatello e grassetto.
Inquietante ma plausibile, spiegherebbe l’accelerazione degli ultimi giorni. Senza il Sud affacciato
sul mar Nero ma soprattutto senza l’Est industriale (dove infatti hanno i loro business gli oligarchi)
l’Ucraina sarebbe una nazione monca. Soprattutto, le sarebbe impossibile ripagare i debiti.
E l’Occidente che adesso i debiti li “paga” sia pure via FMI (altri soldi arriveranno da Usa, poco
dall’UE), ora può dettare condizioni e l’Ucraina la vuol mantenere intera e senza interferenze.
Accusa la Russia di fomentare il separatismo e teme che Mosca voglia ripetere in altre regioni il
giochino del referendum (previsto l’11 maggio, prima delle elezioni presidenziali del 25) con
annessione a seguito, già attuato in Crimea.
Mosca nega recisamente ma appoggia l’idea di una federazione di regioni autonome, ed è un fatto
che gli attivisti separatisti/filo-Russi che hanno occupato qua e là all'Est edifici pubblici governativi
aspirano a fare delle loro regioni delle Repubbliche indipendenti. Anche a Odessa, nel Sud.
Il governo di Kiev “usa” le milizie ultranazionaliste? (1). Il governo filo Usa di Kiev del giovane
ex banchiere Arsenji Yatsenyuk non poteva non agire di conseguenza. Ma l’esercito ucraino non è
del tutto affidabile perché i soldati hanno il cuore tenero e talvolta non osano sparare contro i fratelli
che vanno incontro ai loro carri armati (ancoravenerdì è successo a Slavyansk dove gli abitanti
mostravano cartelli “Siamo gente pacifica”, sabato a Kramatorsk erano più arrabbiati e gridavano
“Tornatevene a Kiev”).
E allora – prima ipotesi - ecco il via libera agli squadroni Pravy Sektor, il braccio armato di Maidan,
già responsabile dell’epilogo sanguinoso della protesta che portò alla defenestrazione del peraltro
autoritario e corrotto presidente Yanukovic - per quanto regolarmente eletto - ignorando l’accordo
trovato il giorno prima, mediato da tre ministri europei.
O il Settore Destro è fuori controllo? (2) Potrebbe darsi però – seconda possibilità – che il Settore
Destro si muova ormai in autonomia, dopo i contrasti sempre più forti col governo di Kiev, raccontati
nei giorni scorsi da Lettera 43.
“Da settimane Pravy Sektor invoca il pugno di ferro del governo contro i “separatisti” e ora ha messo
in piedi il “battaglione del Donbass” per fronteggiare direttamente i gruppi di autonomisti filo-russi
– scriveva l’inviato a Kiev il 25 aprile.
…”Il 23 aprile Dmitri Yarosh, il leader di Pravy Sektor, aveva annunciato la formazione di un
commando di 800 guerriglieri per intervenire nelle zone al confine russo, dove erano ammassate
truppe di Mosca, mentre l’operazione contro i terroristi (i separatistianti-Kiev vengono chiamati
anche così , oltre che ribelli ), lanciata dal presidente ad interim Oleksand Turchinov (anche lui molto
amico degli Usa) procedeva a singhiozzo.
…“In realtà la Rada, il parlamento ucraino, dopo Ginevra aveva votato una mozione per il
disarmo dei paramilitari ultranazionalisti antirussi, però questi hanno fatto orecchie da mercante.
… Pravy Sektor ha ormai intrapreso una strada che più che correre sul filo della legalità si muove
lontano dalla cornice istituzionale.
…Yarosh, che si è candidato alle elezioni presidenziali del 25 maggio con un programma di
derussificazione del Paese dai tratti anti-oligarchici e secondo i sondaggi è accreditato di meno
dell’1,6- 2%, è in piena collisione con il ministero dell’Interno, guidato da Arsen Avakov, fedelissimo
di Yulia Tymoshenko. Un’ostilità che è diventata guerra aperta dopo la morte n circostanze ambigue
di Sasha il Bianco, coordinatore di Pravy Sektor nelle regioni occidentali.
“Inizialmente, durante la rivolta di Maidan contro Yanukovich e soprattutto nella fase finale, l’ala
paramilitare nazionalista è stata funzionale a quella che era allora l’opposizione moderata e ora è la
maggioranza di governo. Ma con il passare delle settimane Pravy Sektor si è rivelato ingestibile per
il nuovo establishment, che preferisce far credere che Yarosh sia poco più che una macchietta.
“Stesso atteggiamento tenuto dai partner occidentali, dimostratisi miopi già in precedenza, e in
contrasto netto con Mosca, che a sua volta ne esagera il profilo e le reali le potenzialità”, per
dimostrare il carattere eversivo, neonazista e antirusso del nuovo governo di Kiev.
“È certo comunque che i tentativi di integrazione coordinati a Kiev da Andrei Paruby , ex
comandante dei falchi di Maidan ora a capo del Consiglio di Sicurezza Nazionale (Csn), per tenere
in qualche modo sotto controllo il Settore di Destra sono finiti nel vuoto.
L’offerta di fondersi nella Guardia nazionale, dove sono state cooptate parte delle organizzazioni di
autodifesa nate sulla piazza dell’Indipendenza a Kiev e nei capoluoghi delle regioni dell’Ovest, è
stata rifiutata da Pravy Sektor, che ha mantenuto la sua autonomia al di fuori dell’architettura
istituzionale per giocare libero da ogni ruolo”. Fin qui Lettera 43.
Pravy Sektor gioca da solo? Non va dimenticato il manifesto ruolo di primo piano giocato dalla
diplomazia americana nel fomentare la rivolta di Maidan prima, poi del cambio della guardia a Kiev,
col sostegno determinante del partito di estrema destra nazionalista antirusso Svoboda, già Partito
Nazional Socialista Ucraino fascista e antisemita fondato da Parubiy, oggi guidato da Oleh
Tyahnnybok - fotografato nei mesi scorsi con esponenti Usa insieme all’attuale premier Yatsnenyuk.
Il 20 aprile a Kiev è arrivato il vice presidente americano Joe Biden, e il week end precedente era
stata la volta del capo della Cia John Brennan, forse per fornire consigli nella guerra di intelligence
"coperta" già in atto, come ipotizzava Forbes.
Il rimpallo di Usa e Russia e il rischio guerra civile incontrollata.
"Mosca deve togliere ogni sostegno ai separatisti", insiste ora Washington. "La responsabilità è tutta
di Kiev e dell’Occidente”, ribatte Mosca, mentre Kiev ammette “Siamo in guerra”. Una guerra civile.
Il rischio è che in Ucraina si trasformi in una sorta di Siria. Dove gli apprendisti stregoni che
pensavano di utilizzare al-Qaedisti e affini per sconfiggere il regime si sono ritrovati incapaci di
controllare i gruppi islamisti ultraradicali che hanno sostenuto. Come ha paradossalmente appena
riconosciuto a sorpresa – e non senza creare scalpore - Tony Blair, arrivando ad affermare che
davanti al dilagare dell’estremismo islamico antiliberale e anti occidentale un despota come Assad
è il male minore. Solo che l’Ucraina bene o male è un pezzo d’Europa. E i suoi cittadini, che nel Sud
Est sono in grande e grandissima parte russofoni magari vorrebbero solo vivere decentemente e non
essere tirati di qua e di là. Commentava un lettore: “Ci chiamano pro-Russia ma la maggior parte di
noi è solo pro-riforme e pro-federalizzazione. Non vogliamo unirci alla Russia, ma nemmeno essere
governati dall’Europa e dalla Nato”.

Post Scriptum. “Kiev e Mosca sono entrambe colpevoli, Odessa non dimenticherà”, dice
Alexabnìnder Lugansky, un veterano della guerra dell’Urss in Afghanistan, arrivato sabato mattina
davanti alla Casa dei Sindacati devastata dall'incendio doloso con tutte le sue medaglie (Guardian).
Gli attivisti filo russi morti a Odessa avevano addosso quasi tutti il nastro di S. Giorgio (Saint George
Ribbon,), già decorazione imperiale, ancora oggi uno dei più riconosciuti e rispettati simboli del valor
militare in Russa, collegato alla II Guerra Mondiale.
Odessa, oggi città di 1 milione di abitanti, è stata fondata sul mar Nero da Caterina la Grande nel
1794 e per più di un secolo fu il porto russo dei cereali. Occupata dall’esercito Romeno alleato dei
nazisti, ebbe 280.000 abitanti deportati, in gran parte ebrei, e decine di migliaia di gitani massacrati.
Venne liberata dall’Armata Rossa. In maggioranza russofona, è diventata parte dell’Ucraina nel 1991.

https://www.lastampa.it/blogs/2014/05/22/news/ucraina-se-il-nuovo-corso-filo-occidente-include-l-ultradestra-neo-nazista-br-1.37251588/

Ucraina: se il nuovo corso filo-Occidente include l'ultradestra neo-

Nazista.
MARIA GRAZIA BRUZZONE, La Stampa, 22 maggio 2014

L’ultimo scontro è quello all’ONU fra l’inviato ucraino e i russi – tutto verbale, per carità. In margine
alla riunione del Consiglio di Sicurezza, martedì scorso, l’ambasciatore ucraino alle nazioni unite
Yuriy Sergeyev ha incolpato l’ex URSS di aver fabbricato le accuse contro i nazionalisti ucraini
davanti al tribunale di Norimberga contro i crimini nazisti . “Offende la memoria di Russi, Ukraini,
Ebrei, Polacchi e cittadini di altre nazionalità vittime delle atrocità degli Ukraini sostenitori dei
Nazisti; ci sono un mucchio di prove, le forniremo a Sergeyev “, ha risposto il ministro degli Esteri
russo.
E’ una storia vecchia di oltre 70 anni ma sempre viva nella memoria di un paese dove nazionalismo
e Seconda Guerra Mondiale sono sempre rimasti temi divisivi, ammette lo stesso sito russo RT che
riporta il curioso episodio. Ed è tornata più che mai alla ribalta oggi che gli ultranazionalisti
neoNazisti e russofobi di Svoboda (Libertà) e di Pravy Sektor (Right Sector, Settore Destro o Ala
Destra), dopo aver guidato la protesta di Maidan hanno conquistato ruoli di primissimo piano nel
nuovo governo e controllano Forze Armate, Polizia, Giustizia e Sicurezza Nazionale. Abbastanza
da preoccupare la Russia, certo, ma forse anche l’Europa dove ci si accinge a votare fra qualche mese
e dove i partiti di destra estrema, più o meno rivestiti di panni rispettabili, stanno conquistano
posizioni tra gli euroscettici.
Al centro della disputa è la figura di Stepan Bandera leggendario combattente per la libertà e
l’indipendenza ucraina per i nazionalisti ucraini di cui sopra, ma collaboratore della Germania di
Hitler durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale con la quale si alleò in funzione anti sovietica pur di
conquistare l’indipendenza del suo paese. La sua organizzazione fascista OUN-B, contribuì
all’Olocausto facendo uccidere migliaia di Ebrei e Polacchi e dopo la guerra si batteva per un’Europa
totalitaria e etnicamente pura mentre un movimento affiliato portava avanti un fallimentare tentativo
di sollevazione contro l’URSS, tanto che Bandera (che secondo alcune fonti era diventato un agente
dell’MI6) alla fine venne fatto fuori dal KGB – scrive il sito progressista californiano Salon.com, in
un post (25/2/2014) intitolato “Gli Usa in Ucraina appoggiano i neo-Nazisti?”
E non è l’unico né il primo a esprimere perplessità e porsi interrogativi del genere - Vedi
il Guardian già il 22/1 (L’estrema destra ha infiltrato il movimento di protesta, che non riflette
tutti), TIME il 28/1 (La protesta di Kiev sequestrata da gruppi di estrema destra) e International
Business Times (19/2), e Business Insider, che linka persino il Jerusalem Post e Counterpunch.org
(vari post), fino ai più “alternativi” Infowars, Global Research e il sito di La Rouche ripreso in italiano
da Movisol e altri, per es qui.
Tanto più man mano che è venuto alla luce il coinvolgimento della politica americana nella
preparazione del push che ha detronizzato il premier Yanukovich che, per quanto il suo regime fosse
degenerato e corrotto, era pur sempre stato eletto dalla maggioranza degli ucraini - Vedi l’incontro,
già a dicembre, del senatore repubblicano John Mc Cain col leader di Svoboda Oleh Tyanhybok e
col futuro presidente l’ex banchiere Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Indicato poi esplicitamente a quel ruolo da
parte dell’assistente alla Segreteria di Stato, il “falco” Victoria Nuland, durante una telefonata
riservata con l’ambasciatore Usa a Kiev, nonché la foto insieme agli stessi personaggi di Nuland che
a dicembre a Washington aveva dichiarato che gli Usa avevano investito $ 5 miliardi nelle agitazioni
ucraini (qui le foto)
Salon aggiunge alla storia di Bandera una coda “americana” che spesso sfugge (si cita il libro del
giornalista Russ Bellant. Old nazi, New Right and the Repubblican Part, 1988).
“Nel dopoguerra molti sopravvissuti dell’OUN-B fuggirono in Europa Occidentale e negli Stati
Uniti, a volte con l’aiuto della CIA, dove fecero alleanze con gruppi di destra. A Washington questi
transfughi ricostituirono l’OUN-B sotto la sigla UCCA – Ukrainian Congress Committee of America,
in buoni rapporti coi Repubblicani (un banderista di spicco, Stetsko, che sovrintese al massacro di
7000 ebrei a Lviv venne ricevuto da Reagan alla Casa Bianca nel 1983). Tanto che quando il
Dipartimento di Giustizia lanciò una crociata per catturare e processare i criminali nazisti, l’UCCA
fece lobby inducendo il Congresso a bloccare l’iniziativa. Ed è ancora una lobby influente, né
nasconde la sua reverenza per il nazionalismo Banderista.”
Non lo nasconde neanche Svoboda, il partito che ha avuto un ruolo di leader nella protesta di Maidan
e il cui ingresso per la prima volta nel 2010 nel parlamento ucraino, con 36 seggi e il 10% dei voti
(soprattutto nelle regioni dell’estremo ovest di lingua ucraina, dove arriva al 40%) ha suscitato
dichiarazioni di sorpresa e preoccupazione da parte di leader europei e israeliani.

Due settimane dopo che Nuland aveva dichiarato che Euromaidan “incorpora i principi e i valori che
sono pietre miliari di ogni democrazia”, 15.000 membri di Svoboda hanno promosso a Lviv –
epicentro delle attività neofasciste in Ucraina - una manifestazione a lume di torce in onore di Bandera
a Lviv – epicentro delle attività neofasciste in Ucraina. Luogo dove si è voluto rinominare Piazza
della Pace - nome troppo sovietico - "Battaglione Nachtigall "in onore degli autori della carneficina
di ebrei a Lviv e in Bielorussia.
Il suo leader Oleh Tyahnybok non solo sostiene che contro la Russia “eterno nemico” dell’Ucraina
“la guerra è inevitabile,non solo è fautore di un nazionalismo etnico, ma ha una lunga storia di
dichiarazioni anti semite, compreso l’appello lanciato in parlamento nel 2004 lanciò per la liberazione
del suo paese “controllato dalla mafia Moscovita-Ebraica”, e se l’è presa anche con l’"Organized
Jewry" (organizzazione ebraica, traduciamo impropriamente) che domina i media e il governo” –
riferisce il citato International Business Times. Aggiungendo che in risposta alla retorica antisemita
di Svoboda il World Jewish Congress aveva chiesto di bandire il partito. Del resto il vice di
Tyahnybok, Yuriy Mykhalchyshyn ama citare il ministro della Propaganda di Hitler Joseph
Goebbels, che ammira al punto da aver dato il suo nome a un think tank che ha fondato.
Sarebbe il “social nazionalista” Mykhalchyshyn il collegamento fra Svoboda e le milizie neo-Naziste
raggruppate sotto l’ombrello del Pravy Sektor, vero protagonista sul campo della protesta di
Euromaidan. “ Un oscuro raggruppamento di nazionalisti autonomi riconoscibili dall’abbigliamento
da skineahds, via ascetica, fascinazione per le violenze di strada”, lo descrive Salon. E dalle fasce
gialle al braccio con rune nere, simboli celtici dell’ultradestra, più qualche svastika quando capita.
Laeder di spicco dell’Ala Destra e della rivolta di Kiev è Dmitry Yarosh già alla guida del Tryzub
(Tridente), che del Right Sector è diventato il cuore, comandante sul campo, con i suoi 2-3000 militi
venuti da tutta l’Ucraina, armati di scudi, mazze – e catene, pietre, bottiglie Molotov, persino
medievali catapulte, vantava lui stesso, intervistato da TIME un mese fa, rivelando per la prima
volta “l’arsenale letale accumulato" e dicendosi "pronto al conflitto armato".
E’ riapparso in piazza Indipendenza il 22 febbraio, il giorno dopo che la politica aveva raggiunto un
accordo, garantito dai ministri degli esteri di Polonia, Francia e Germania. Nel video postato da
RT arringa la piazza con cupi toni militareschi, in quello di Salon (vedi post) promette di combattere
“contro la degenerazione del liberalismo totalitario”, e di condurre le sue armate alla “riconquista
dell’Europa”. Secondo alcuni l’adesione al movimento pro Europa sarebbe solo strumentale.
Sulla pagina di Pravi Sektor del social network VKontacte il 1 marzo è apparso un appello al terrorista
ceceno Umarov a unirsi agli Ucraini, contro la Russia, così come gli Ucraini hanno aiutato i
Ceceni.. E Umarov non è uno qualsiasi, è il most wanted in Russia, accusato anche di attentati a civili
come quello a metro di Mosca, ma anche nella lista dell’ONU . Il movimento ha poi detto di essere
stato hackerato, racconta lo stesso post di RT che ne ha dato notizia.
Ebbene, Yarosh è l’autonominato vicepresidente del Consiglio per la Sicurezza e la
Difesa organo che ha il compito di sviluppare la politica d sicurezza nazionale sul fronte interno ed
estero.
Presidente è diventato Andriy Parubyic, coordinatore dei corpi di sicurezza volontaria della protesta.
Già protagonista della Rivoluzione Arancione del 2004, nel 1991 aveva fondato insieme a Tyanhybok
il Partito Nazional Socialista neonazista da cui poi è nato Svoboda mantenendo il motto ““one race,
one nation, one Fatherland”. Nel 2010 si è distinto per aver chiesto all’Europarlamento di
riconsiderare la sua reazione negativa alla proposta – presentata qualche tempo prima dal presidente
filo-occidentale Yushenko – di proclamare Stepan Bandera eroe nazionale dell’Ucraina.
Il nuovo governo provvisorio sotto la presidenza Yatsenyuk (del partito Fatherland) ha assegnato a
Svoboda e all’Ala Destra del Pavy Sektor vari ministeri e posti chiave che assicurerebbero loro il
controllo di Forze Armate, Polizia, Giustizia e Sicurezza Nazionale (vedi Global Research). E il
primo atto è stato l’abolizione del russo come seconda lingua ufficiale ucraina.
Non stupisce che gli ukraini del sud est e della Crimea, di lingua russa e filo russi, siano a loro volta
scesi in strada e abbiano preso le loro misure. Chiaramente spalleggiati dalla Russia di Putin che le
loro preoccupazioni condivide. Né stupiscono richieste affinché “Il nuovo governo rassicuri la
comunità ebraica”, come l’ HuffingtonPost Usa titola un post molto documentato. (E il leader di
Svoboda ha voluto recentemente incontrare dei rappresentanti di Israele, mentre militari dell'esercito
israeliano di origine ucraina, arrivati a Kiev per dare una mano - gli Elmetti Blu di Maidan - non
esitano a dire di aver seguito gli ordini di Svoboda, vedi qui l'agenzia JTA, con foto).
Ma le preoccupazioni vanno oltre la Russia e i rapporti con l’Occidente – come segnalava
International Business Times già a gennaio, prima delle violenze più gravi e del precipitare degli
eventi.
Il partito Svoboda è legato ad altri gruppi di estrema destra in Europa attraverso l’ Alliance of
European National Movements, fondata nel 2009, che comprende fra gli altri il BNP- British
National Party e Jobbik, il partito neofascista e anti-semita dell’Ungheria, la Fiamma Tricolore, il
National Front del Belgio, il National Democrats svedes più vari altri ultradestri di Lituania, Polonia,
Romania ecc. Ne faceva parte anche il Front National di Marine Le Pen che nel 2001, quando ha dato
al suo partito un aspetto più rispettabile ha lasciato l’Alleanza per l’European Alliance for Freedom
di cui fa capo anche l’UKIP inglese.
Che conseguenze può avere per l’Europa questo coagularsi di queste forze non solo euroscettiche ma
ultranazionaliste, razziste, anti immigrati, antiabortiste e via dicendo?
Cosa ne pensano gli europei e i loro rappresentanti politici dell’appoggio Occidentale a questi partiti
estremisti di destra in Ucraina? Cosa ne pensano i socialisti europei del Pse?
Qualche giorno fa all’Europarlamento Martin Schulz – che oltre a essere candidato del Pse è anche
presidente dell’assemblea europea – è apparso assai imbarazzato davanti alle domande provocatorie
di Natalia Vitrenko, riferiscono vari blog italiani (es qui).
L’economista ucraina, leader del Partito Socialista progressista Ucraino, il 25 gennaio scorso insieme
a rappresentanti di 29 partiti e organizzazioni ucraine aveva lanciato un appello al segretario
dell’ONU, ai dirigenti UE e agli Stati Uniti per fermare i saccheggi e l’incitamento alla guerra civile
da parte dei guerriglieri, e mettendo in guardia dal sostenere le loro azioni : “di fatto state proteggendo
e istigando i neonazisti e i neofascisti ucraini”.(vedi qui e qui in italiano)
Nei giorni scorsi faceva parte della delegazione del Partito Socialista Progressista a Bruxelles. “Il
mio partito viene attualmente perseguitato” ha detto Vitrenko, assieme a tutte le forze e gli individui
disapprovati dalle forze “neonaziste e terroriste” armate che controllano Maidan e il Parlamento. Gli
esponenti politici e le loro famiglie vengono minacciati, le sedi assaltate e bruciate. “Questi neonazisti
sono forse espressione dei valori europei?”, ha chiesto.
Schulz, visibilmente scosso, ha risposto che “stando alle mie informazioni, l’UE sta trattando con
tutte le parti, compresa Svoboda”. Prendo molto sul serio la sua denuncia e indagherò, ha detto il
Presidente del PE, dicendosi anche pronto a incontrare la Vitrenko separatamente.

https://www.lastampa.it/Page/Id/2.1.66892747

“La crisi ucraina è colpa dell’Occidente” - non di Putin. Così Foreign

Affairs.
MARIA GRAZIA BRUZZONE, La Stampa, 23 agosto 2014

Sull’ultimo numero di Foreign Affairs, si può leggere con una certa sorpresa un lungo articolo [vedi
Allegato 3] firmato John Mearsheimer, che offre un’analisi della crisi in Ucraina - e del pericoloso
confronto in atto fra Occidente e Russia - che contraddice la narrazione mainstream in Occidente.
“I leader di Stati Uniti ed Europa hanno sbagliato a tentare di far diventare l’Ucraina una roccaforte
Occidentale ai confini della Russia. Ora che le conseguenze sono sotto gli occhi di tutti sarebbe un
errore ancora più grande continuare in questa politica errata e illegittima” è la tesi dell’autore,
professore di Scienze Politiche all’università di Chicago.
La sorpresa è dovuta al fatto che Foreign Affairs è la rivista dell’influente Council on Foreign
Relations, storico organismo e think tank fondato a New York nel 1921 che da allora ha avuto nei
suoi ranghi dozzine di Segretari di Stato, direttori della CIA, banchieri, avvocati, professori, esponenti
di media: l’ élite dell’establishment americano. Con propaggini europee.
E infatti l’articolo è rimbalzato subito su vari blog, dai soliti Washington’s Blog e ZeroHedge a vari
altri (es qui, e qui) fino al sito ucraino (governativo) Kyivpost e a The Vineyard of the Saker , blog
multilingue apparentemente filo-russo. Che non si fa illusioni sul peso che può avere un punto di vista
del genere davanti al nuovo prevalere dei Neocon nell’amministrazione americana - sostiene. Ma
vediamo.

LA NARRAZIONE DOMINANTE NON E’ VERA.

“Secondo il giudizio prevalente in Occidente, la crisi Ucraina va imputata pressocché interamente
all’aggressione Russa. Il presidente Russo Vladimir Putin, è il ragionamento, ha annesso la Crimea
per un desiderio a lungo covato di resuscitare l’impero Sovietico, e potrebbe andare avanti col resto
dell’Ucraina, e con altri paesi dell’Est Europa. Da questo punto di vista la destituzione del presidente
Ucraino Yanukovich nel febbraio 2014 ha fornito a Putin un mero pretesto per ordinare alle forze
Russe di prendersi parte dell’Ucraina”.
Così esordisce il post. “Ma questo resoconto è sbagliato” – aggiunge.

LE RESPONSABILITA’. “ Gli Stati Uniti e i loro alleati Europei si dividono la gran parte della
responsabilità della crisi. La radice profonda è l’allargamento della NATO, elemento centrale di
una strategia più ampia per togliere l’Ucraina dall’orbita della Russia e integrarla nell’Occidente”.
“L’espansione dell’UE a Est e l’apporto decisivo dell’Occidente al movimento pro-democrazia in
Ucraina - cominciato con la Rivoluzione Arancione nel 2004 – sono anch’essi elementi critici. Da
metà degli anni ’90 i leader Russi si sono opposti in modo deciso all’allargamento della NATO e
negli anni recenti (dopo che i paesi baltici sono entrati nell’UE, ndr) hanno messo in chiaro che non
avrebbero assistito senza reagire alla trasformazione del loro vicino strategicamente più importante
in un bastione dell’Occidente”.
“Per Putin il rovesciamento illegale del presidente pro-Russia dell’Ucraina democraticamente eletto
- che ha giustamente definito un colpo di stato – è stato l’ultima goccia. Ha risposto prendendo la
Crimea, una penisola che temeva sarebbe diventata una base navale NATO, e lavorando per
destabilizzare l’Ucraina così da dissuaderla dal cercare di unirsi all’Occidente”.
“Le mosse di Putin non avrebbero dovuto essere una sorpresa. Dopo tutto l’Occidente era entrato nel
cortile della Russia e aveva minacciato il cuore dei suoi interessi strategici, un punto che Putin ha
ripetuto enfaticamente molte volte. Le élites di Stati Uniti ed Europa sono state colpite dagli eventi
solo perché hanno abbracciato una visione carente della politica internazionale. Tendono a credere
che la logica del realismo abbia poca rilevanza nel 21° secolo. ….

L’ INGEGNERIA SOCIALE. “Lo strumento finale dell’Occidente per staccare Kiev da Mosca è stato
lo sforzo per diffondere valori Occidentali e promuovere la democrazia in Ucraina e in altri stati post-
Sovietici, un piano che ha spesso comportato finanziare direttamente persone e organizzazioni.
Victoria Nuland,assistente del segretario di Stato americano per gli Affari Europei e Euroasiatici,
nel dicembre 2013 ha stimato che gli Usa abbiano investito più di $5miliardi dal 1991 per aiutare
l’Ucraina a ottenere “il futuro che le spetta”, ricorda Mearsheimer. E cita la fondazione National
Endowement for Democracy (NED), ingaggiata a questo scopo dal governo, che ha finanziato più
di 60 progetti per ”promuovere la società civile” e per sostenere le opposizioni dopo la vittoria
elettorale di Yanukovich.
“Quando i leader Russi osservano questa ingegneria sociale Occidentale in Ucraina temono che
il prossimo sarà il loro stesso paese”, scrive ancora il nostro, citando una frase ambigua del
presidente della NED, Carl Gershman. …

COME E’ ANDATA. IL RUOLO DI WASHINGTON. “Le tre politiche Occidentali – allargamento

della NATO, espansione dell’UE e promozione della democrazia – hanno aggiunto benzina al fuoco.
La scintilla è arrivata nel novembre 2013 quando il presidente Yanukivich respinse l’accordo
economico che stava negoziando con l’UE e decise di accettare invece la controfferta Russa di $15
miliardi.
La decisione innescò manifestazioni antigovernative che crebbero nei tre mesi successivi. Emissari
occidentali si precipitarono a Kiev per risolvere la crisi. Il 21 febbraio governo e opposizione (con la
mediazione di Germania Francia e Polonia ndr) raggiunsero un accordo che consentiva al presidente
di restare in sella fino alle nuove elezioni. Ma l’accordo fu messo da parte, il presidente fuggì in
Russia il giorno seguente. Il nuovo governo proclamato a Kiev era (è) pro-Occidente e anti-Russo
fino al midollo, e aveva 4 membri di rilievo che avrebbero potuto legittimamente essere etichettati
come neofascisti.
“Sebbene il coinvolgimento degli Stati Uniti non sia ancora emerso fino in fondo, è chiaro che dietro
il colpo di stato c’era Washington. Nuland e il senatore repubblicano John McCainparteciparono
a dimostrazioni e Geoffrey Pyatt, ambasciatore Usa in Ucraina, dopo il rovesciamento di Yanukovich
proclamò che era “una giornata storica”.
Come rivelò una telefonata intercettata, Nuland aveva perorato un cambio di regime e voleva che
diventasse primo ministro il politico Ucraino Arseniy Yatsenyiuk, come è accaduto (nella stessa
telefonata Nuland mandava al diavolo i leader europei – F..ck EU - evidentemente non proprio
d’accordo. E’ la versione che circolava sui blog, Underblog qui con foto linkate, e qui).
“Nessuna meraviglia che i Russi siano persuasi che l’Occidente abbia giocato un ruolo nella
destituzione di Yanukovich”.

LA REAZIONE DI PUTIN. “Le mosse di Putin sono facilmente comprensibili”, scrive il prof
Mearsheimer, e ricorda le vaste distese piatte attraversate dalle armate di Napoleone, della Germania
imperiale, della Germania Nazista, per dire che l’Ucraina ha sempre avuto una funzione di Stato-
cuscinetto di enorme importanza strategica per la Russia. “Nessun leader Russo tollererebbe che
un’alleanza militare nemico mortale di Mosca fino a tempi recenti si spingesse fino all’Ucraina. E
nessun leader Russo resterebbe inerte mentre l’Occidente aiuta a installare un governo determinato a
integrare l’Ucraina nell’Occidente”.
“Washington può non gradire queste posizione, ma dovrebbe capirne la logica. E’ Geopolitica di
primo livello: le grandi potenze sono sempre sensibili a potenziali minacce vicine al loro territorio.
… Immaginate l’ indignazione di Washington se la Cina costruisse una forte alleanza militare e
cercasse di includervi Canada e Messico.
“Logica a parte, i leader Russi hanno detto in molte occasioni alle loro controparti Occidentali che
considerano inaccettabile l’espansione della NATO in Georgia e Ucraina. …
“In una intervista del 1998 George Kennan (grande esperto americano di Russia) aveva predetto che
l’espansione della NATO avrebbe provocato una crisi, dopo di che coloro che proponevano
l’espansione avrebbero dichiarato ‘vi abbiamo sempre detto come sono i Russi’ così come oggi
additano Putin a grande colpevole”.

C’E’ UNA VIA D’USCITA: UN’UCRAINA NEUTRALE. “C’è una soluzione della crisi in Ucraina
– sebbene richieda che l’Occidente pensi a quel paese in un modo radicalmente nuovo. Gli Stati Uniti
e i loro alleati dovrebbero abbandonare i loro piani tesi a occidentalizzare l’Ucraina e proporsi invece
di farne un cuscinetto fra NATO e Russia, simile alla posizione dell’Austria durante la Guerra
Fredda. I leader Occidentali dovrebbero riconoscere che l’Ucraina vale così tanto per Putin che non
possono sostenere lì un regime anti-Russo. Con ciò non si vuol dire che un futuro governo Ucraino
dovrebbe essere pro-Russo e anti-NATO. Al contrario, l’obiettivo dovrebbe essere un’Ucraina
sovrana che non appartiene né al campo Russo né a quello Occidentale”.
Per raggiungere questo scopo Stati Uniti e alleati dovrebbero pubblicamente negare l’espansione dalla
NATo in Georgia e Ucraina (1); aiutare a forgiare un piano di economico di salvataggio per l’Ucraina,
insieme a UE, FMI, Russia e Usa (2); limitare considerevolmente i suoi sforzi di ingegneria sociale
in Ucraina: è tempo di finirla col sostegno a un’altra Rivoluzione Arancione. D’altra parte si dovrebbe
incoraggiare l’Ucraina a rispettare i diritti delle minoranze, specialmente dei cittadini che parlano
russo.

UNA SCELTA, PRIMA CHE SIA TARDI.“Stati Uniti e alleati Europei devono fare una scelta.
Possono continuare l’attuale politica, che esaspera le ostilità con la Russia e nel frattempo devasta
l’Ucraina – uno scenario in cui ciascuno uscirà perdente. Oppure possono girare le macchine e
lavorare per creare un’Ucraina prospera ma neutrale. Un approccio in cui entrambi sarebbero
vincitori. (L’autore glissa sulle conseguenze economiche nefaste per l’Europa che già cominciano a
manifestarsi, e tace sui rischi che il confronto Occidente/Russia si allarghi e degeneri in conflitto
aperto, ndr)
“Qualcuno potrà obiettare che cambiare politica è ormai tardi e danneggerebbe seriamente la
credibilità degli Stati Uniti nel mondo. Ci sarebbero certamente dei costi, ma i costi derivanti dal
continuare una strategia sbagliata sarebbero certo molto più alti. Inoltre gli altri paesi probabilmente
rispetterebbero uno Stato che impara dai suoi errori e alla fine sceglie una politica che affronta
efficacemente il problema”. Così l’articolo di Foreign Affairs.

CHE PESO PUO’ AVERE UN PUNTO DI VISTA DEL GENERE? The Seeker non è ottimista.
Spiega: “Mearsheimer è il portavoce di quel che si può definire ‘la vecchia guardia’ (del CFR),
persone che, gradualmente sostituite da Neo-con, hanno seguito Obama per essere poi ri-sostituite
un’altra volta quando i Neocon hanno abilmente preso Obama sotto il loro controllo. In altre parole
Mearsheimer parla per la parte dell’establishment sconfitta e risentita, sia pure ancora potente e
influente. L’articolo può servire come ballon d’essai con il resto dello “Stato profondo” degli Stati
Uniti, per vedere che reazioni suscita”.
Vedremo. Quel che è evidente a questo punto è che nell’amministrazione americana in realtà non
c’è un punto di vista unico come vien fatto apparire. E che il sito filo-Russo possa aver ragione
nell’additare il crescente peso dei Neo-con lo potrebbe dimostrare anche l'ultima crisi in Medio
Oriente, dietro cui stanno sempre più emergendo divergenze cruciali non recentissime ma fin qui
poco note. Ne parleremo in un prossimo post.

http://www.alternet.org/world/how-israel-lobby-protected-ukrainian-neo-nazis

How the Israel Lobby Protected Ukrainian Neo-Nazis

Rep. John Conyers wanted to block U.S. funding to neo-Nazis in Ukraine. But the ADL and Simon Wiesenthal
Center refused to help
MAX BLUMENTHAL, AlterNet, 18 novembre 2014

AlterNet has learned that an amendment to the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
that would have forbidden US assistance, training and weapons to neo-Nazis and other extremists in
Ukraine was kept out of the final bill by the Republican-led House Rules Committee. Introduced by
Democratic Representative John Conyers, the amendment was intended to help tamp down on violent
confrontations between Ukrainian forces and Russian separatists. (Full text of the amendment
embedded at the end of this article).
A USA Today/Pew poll conducted in April while the NDAA was being debated found that Americans
opposed by more than 2 to 1 providing the Ukrainian government with arms or other forms of military
assistance.
If passed, Conyers' amendment would have explicitly barred those found to have offered “praise or
glorification of Nazism or its collaborators, including through the use of white supremacist, neo-Nazi,
or other similar symbols” from receiving any form of support from the US Department of Defense.
The amendment was presented by congressional staffers to lobbyists from Anti-Defamation League
(ADL) and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, two of the country’s largest established Jewish pressure
groups. Despite their stated mission to combat anti-Semitism and violent extremism, the ADL and
Wiesenthal Center refused to support Jeffries and Conyers’ proposal.
According to Democratic sources in Congress, staffers from the ADL’s Washington office and the
Simon Wiesenthal Center rejected the amendment on the grounds that right-wing Ukrainian parties
like Svoboda with documented records of racist extremism had “moderated their rhetoric.” An ADL
lobbyist insisted that “the focus should be on Russia,” while the Wiesenthal Center pointed to
meetings between far-right political leaders in Ukraine and the Israeli embassy as evidence that
groups like Svoboda and Right Sector had shed their extremism.
The ADL’s Washington office and the Simon Wiesenthal Center did not respond to numerous
requests by email and telephone for comment.
Earlier this year, the ADL’s outgoing National Director Abraham Foxman noted Svoboda’s “history
of anti-Semitism and platform of ethnic nationalism” in a press release demanding the party renounce
its past glorification of Stepan Bandera, a World War Two-era Nazi collaborator who has become a
symbol of Ukrainian nationalism.
When the Ukrainian parliament failed to pass a bill this October honoring Bandera’s Ukrainian Rebel
Army, about 8000 supporters of Svoboda and the extremist Right Sector marched on the building,
attacking riot police with homemade weapons while waving Banderist flags and Svoboda banners.
The violent backlash was a reminder that the legend of Bandera would not die any time soon, and
that Foxman’s admonitions had fallen on deaf ears.
Svobodoa’s leader, Oleh Tyahnybok, once called for the liberation of his country from the
“Muscovite-Jewish mafia.” In 2010, following the conviction of the Nazi death camp guard John
Demjanjuk for his supporting role in the death of nearly 30,000 people at the Sobibor camp,
Tyahnybok flew to Germany to praise him as a hero who was “fighting for truth.”
Since the Euromaidan revolution, however, Svoboda has fought to rehabilitate its image. This has
meant meeting with Israeli Ambassador to Ukraine Reuven Din El and appealing to shared national
values. “I would like to ask Israelis to also respect our patriotic feelings,” Tyahnybok has remarked.
“Probably each party in the [Israeli] Knesset is nationalist. With God’s help, let it be this way for us
too.”
Right Sector, the radical right-wing movement that battled riot police during the latter stages of the
Euromaidan uprising, earned plaudits from the ADL’s Foxman when its leader arranged his
own meeting with Din El. “[Right Sector leader] Dmitry Yarosh stressed that Right Sector will oppose
all [racist] phenomena, especially anti-Semitism, with all legitimate means,” the Israeli embassy
declared.
The results of this month’s Ukrainian parliamentary elections were widely portrayed as a setback for
the ultra-nationalist right-wing, with Svoboda taking around 6 percent of the vote while Yarosh’s
Right Sector failed to qualify for seats. The outcome cheered the American Jewish Committee,
which declared that “Jews in most of Ukraine are heartened by the election results and even optimistic
about the country’s future.”
But the dismal showing by the traditional ultra-nationalist parties was hardly evidence of a diminished
right-wing. With President Petro Poroshenko leading the nationalists’ dream war in the East, Svoboda
and Right Sector lost the protest vote they had commanded during the heady years of insurrection.
As Anton Shekhovtsov, an expert on Europe’s radical right, explained, “in 2012, Svoboda was also
considered almost the only ‘patriotic’ party, but now all democratic parties are patriotic, so Svoboda
has lost its ‘monopoly’ on patriotism.”
During the national election campaign, Ukraine’s leading party, the People’s Front of neoliberal
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, was honeycombed with far-right militants. Andrei Parubiy, the
co-founder of the neo-Nazi-inspired Social National Party and former chief of the Maidan defense
committees, was among the extremists who won seats on the People’s Front ticket.
Besides Parubiy, the People’s Front included Andriy Biletsky, leader of the overtly Azov militia, an
overtly neo-Nazi fighting force that has been on the front lines of the battle against Russian separatists
in eastern Ukraine. Azov deputy commander Vadym Troyan joined him on the party’s electoral list,
rounding out a peculiar mix of khaki shirt clad fascists and buttoned-down neo-liberals.
Unlike Svoboda, these figures do not even feign moderation. “The historic mission of our nation in
this critical moment is to lead the White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival,”
Biletsky recently wrote. “A crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen.”
Azov fighters are united by their nostalgia for Nazi Germany and embrace of open fascism. Sporting
swastika tattoos, the battalion “flies a neo-Nazi symbol resembling a Swastika as its flag,” the New
York Times’ Andrew Kramer recently reported.
With the government in a state of flux, Azov is filling the void in the East. As Ukrainian
parliamentarian Gregory Nemira complained to reporter Anna Nemtsova in September, “The
president still has not appointed a chief of staff for the armed forces. He has not admitted we are in a
state of war, preferring to throw the battalions like Azov into the most dangerous combat zones, where
authorities would not have the courage to send regular troops.”
Azov is precisely the sort of neo-Nazi organization that Conyers’ NDAA amendment would have
deprived of US assistance. But when the congressman sought help from the ADL and the Wiesenthal
Center in moving the proposal forward, he was rebuked. The amendment died a quiet death and
Azov’s American supply line remains intact.

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/11/u-s-among-3-countries-u-n-officially-backing-nazism-israel-parts-company-germany-abstains.html

U.S. Among Only 3 Countries at U.N. Officially Backing Nazism &

Holocaust-Denial; Israel Parts Company from Them; Germany
Abstains
ERIC ZUESSE, Whashington’s blog, 24 novembre 2014
In a U.N. vote, on November 21st, only three countries — the United States, Ukraine, and Canada —
voted against a resolution to condemn racist facsism, or “nazism,” and to condemn denial of
Germany’s World War II Holocaust against primarily Jews.
This measure passed the General Assembly, on a vote of 115 in favor, 3 against, and 55 abstentions
(the abstentions were in order not to offend U.S. President Obama, who was opposed to the
resolution).
The measure had been presented to their General Assembly after a period of more than a decade of
rising “neo-Nazi” (i.e., racist-fascist) movements in Europe, including especially in Ukraine,
where two Ukrainian nazi parties were installed by the U.S. into high posts in Ukraine’s new
government, immediately after the democratically elected Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych
was overthrown in a violent coup in Kiev during February of this year. The entire Ukrainian ‘defense’
establishment was then immediately taken over by the leaders of these two nazi parties, which rabidly
hate ethnic Russians, and Ukraine is now led by the first — and so far, the only — nazi government
to take charge of any country after the end of WW II. Within less than a mere three months after the
coup, this new Government began an ethnic-cleansing program in Ukraine’s own ethnic-Russian
southeast, where around 90% of the residents had voted for the man who had been overthrown in the
coup — this was a campaign to isolate and exterminate those people, so that those voters could never
again participate in a Ukrainian national election. Unless those voters would be eliminated, these
nazis would be elected out of power — removed from office.
Ukraine voted no on this resolution because this new Ukrainian Government is the only nazi regime
in the world, and they are doing the standard nazi things, and so what they are doing is in violation
of numerous international laws, which are not being enforced, but which are re-asserted and re-
affirmed in this resolution, though Ukraine and the Ukrainian situation aren’t at all mentioned in the
resolution. The United States voted no on it, because the U.S. Government had placed them into
power. And Canada voted no on it because their far-right Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, has been
a virtually unquestioning supporter of all U.S. foreign-policy positions, and wants U.S. President
Barack Obama to approve construction of the Keystone XL pipeline to assist the Koch brothers and
other large oil giants to profitably transport and sell to Europe and around the world, tar-sands oil
from Canada’s landlocked Athabasca region.
Germany abstained from voting on this resolution because their leader, Chancellor Angela Merkel,
does not want to offend the U.S. President by voting for a resolution that the U.S. Government
strongly opposes; and also because, as today’s leader of the land where nazism started — in the first
nazi political party, the Nazi Party of Germany — she does not want Germany to vote against a
resolution that condemns Nazism. If Germany were to have voted against this anti-nazi resolution,
she would have faced a political firestorm at home. So, Germany abstained, in order not to offend
Obama on the one side, and her public on the other.

Key to understanding the vote on this resolution is knowing the relevant historical background, which
has largely to do with the world’s only nazi-led Government: today’s Ukraine. Consequently, the
remainder of this article will explore that issue in depth, so that this otherwise-incomprehensible U.N.
vote will become comprehensible.
According to the U.N.’s press-report on the votes occurring on November 21st, “Speaking before the
vote [on this resolution], the representative of Ukraine said Stalinism had killed many people in the
Gulag, condemning Hitler and Stalin alike as international criminals. Calling on the Russian
Federation to stop glorifying and feeding Stalinism, he said he could not support the draft text.”
Ukraine refused to condemn nazism, because the resolution did not call for a condemnation also of
Stalin, and of Russia. “Any intolerance should be dealt with in an appropriate and balanced manner,
he added.”
Samantha Power, the U.S. Representative at the U.N., gave as her reason for voting against the
resolution, its unacceptability to the Government of Ukraine. “Her delegation was concerned about
the overt political motives that had driven the main sponsor of the current resolution. That
Government had employed those phrases in the current crisis in Ukraine. That was offensive and
disrespectful to those who had suffered at the hands of Nazi regimes. Therefore, the United States
would vote against the resolution.” In other words: the U.S. opposed this resolution, supposedly,
because it was offensive to Ukraine, even though the very term “Ukraine,” and all other conceivable
references to Ukraine, were and are entirely absent from it. (Here is the entire resolution.) The world’s
only nazi Government, Ukraine, thus had an opportunity to condemn nazism, and chose not to not
vote on it, but to vote against it. And their sponsor, the United States, joined them in that. But which
was the master here, and which was the slave? Was the U.S. simply doing the will of the Ukrainian
Government? Or was the Ukrainian Government doing the will of the U.S. Government — the
Government that had installed it? Consider this:

THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

My prior article, “Meet Ukraine’s Master Mass-Murderer,” documented how U.S. President Barack
Obama — through his State Department and CIA and the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, and with funding
by U.S. and Ukrainian oligarchs — exploited the “Maidan” movement in Ukraine, to replace the
corrupt but democratically elected pro-Russian Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, by a rabidly
anti-Russian, racist-fascist and thoroughly corrupt regime, whose most powerful person is Dmitriy
Yarosh, who had founded and still leads one of Ukraine’s two racist-fascist, or “nazi,” armed political
parties, Right Sector, and who commands a dedicated personal army of 7,000 highly trained
“paramilitaries,” who not only terrorize and freely murder dissenting Ukrainians, but who even
publicly, and with equal impunity, threaten the nation’s figurehead President, Petro Poroshenko, to
keep him in line.
The present article will mainly describe Yarosh’s chief competitor for power, the thuggish Ukrainian-
Israeli-Swiss multibillionaire, Ihor Kolomoysky, who likewise commands a private Ukrainian army
of around 7,000 mercenaries, and likewise issues public threats to overthrow Poroshenko, if
Poroshenko fails to do his bidding. But first, here’s the story about

THE FIGUREHEAD LEADER — POROSHENKO:

It’s important to note that the figurehead, Poroshenko himself, is a corrupt billionaire oligarch, who,
like Kolomoysky and Yarosh, has long been working with the CIA and U.S. Ambassadors and
Presidents, in order to wrench Ukraine away from its historical alliance with Ukraine’s main
bordering nation, Russia. So, Ukraine’s figurehead is the man whom U.S. President Obama and
Republicans in Congress, and conservative congressional Democrats such as Senator Robert
Melendez of New Jersey, parade before the U.S. media and their essentially captive American
audience, as the face of ‘Ukrainian democracy,’ which is threatened by the ‘imperialistic designs’ of
Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin.
Putin, of course, doesn’t like America’s and the EU’s surrounding his nation by new NATO nations
(such as, perhaps, now Ukraine) which invite in U.S. military bases, and become next-door launching-
pads for U.S. nuclear missiles aimed against Russia. Putin is vilified in “the West,” as Washington
wants. The media pass along what the U.S. Government says. The American public doesn’t care
whether Russia is surrounded by hostile nuclear missiles, and whether ethnic Russians in Ukraine,
right next door to Russia, are being exterminated and driven out to become refugees in Russia. Putin
isn’t being feted in Washington, as Poroshenko is. Instead, the United States is on Poroshenko’s side,
against Putin’s side. In fact, U.S. President Obama, all congressional Republicans, and all
conservative Democrats, praise Poroshenko, and condemn Putin, as if Putin were surrounding the
U.S. with his military bases, instead of us surrounding his country with ours.
But, actually, Poroshenko is on America’s side: America isn’t on his side. Poroshenko has for a
decade been a bought U.S. agent, after having first achieved his wealth by serving Ukraine’s Russian-
appointed communist leaders, and then getting sweet inside deals on Harvard-designed
privatizations of what had formerly been Ukrainian state-owned properties, such as a shipyard, a
chocolate factory, and a TV station. But now, he’s ‘on America’s side.’
For America’s oligarchs, the Cold War never ended; it wasn’t really about communism versus
capitalism; it was instead about which nation’s oligarchy would be supreme over all other nations’
oligarchies. And, when the communist (Russia-allied) team went down, Poroshenko knew to take his
favors from them before, in 2004, selling himself out to the opposite (America-allied) team. And
that’s what he did.
As regards what type of man Poroshenko himself actually is, consider carefully the phone-
conversation between the top EU foreign-affairs official Catherine Ashton and her investigator in
Kiev Urmas Paet, on 25 February 2014, right after the coup. See the call’s transcript in the middle
of this, in italics, at the point where I’ve marked in brackets, “[So, Poroshenko himself knows that
his regime is based on a false-flag U.S.-controlled coup d’etat against his predecessor.]”. In other
words: by no later than 25 February 2014, Poroshenko already knew that this was a U.S.-backed coup
and not an action on the part of the Yanukovych Government. From at least that moment forward, he
was participating in, and keeping quiet about, treason to his country. He is a traitor to his nation.
That’s the type of man he is. (EU officials likewise knew about it, after this phone-conversation. But
they’re all quiet about it. Apparently, they, too, are on the take.)

UKRAINE’S MOST POWERFUL OLIGARCH — KOLOMOYSKY:

Britain’s Independent reported on 11 September 2013 (which was before the coup and so our ‘news’
media were reporting such things then), “Mr Kolomoisky had the reputation of being a ‘corporate
raider’, someone who attacked companies by destabilising management, driving down the share price
and grabbing control ‘without paying what the other shareholders would regard as a proper premium
for their shares’. Mr Kolomoisky had, the judge noted, a reputation of having sought to take control
of a company ‘at gunpoint’ in Ukraine. Even his main witness in the trial admitted that was his boss’s
image.”
Then, on 15 January 2014, barely a month before the coup, The Hill reported about Kolomoysky and
his sidekick Bogolyubov and about Kolomoysky’s huge bank, Privat, that, “In the takeover of the
Kremenchuk steel factory in 2006, Privat’s raid was literal, with Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov hiring
an army of thugs to descend upon the plant with baseball bats, gas and rubber[-bullet] pistols, iron
bars and chainsaws. Needless to say, Kremenchuk’s steel production was soon under Privat’s
control.”
Then, after the February coup, the great American independent journalist George Eliason, who
happens to live in Ukraine’s conflict-zone, reported on 23 June 2014, that, “When the Kolomoisky
mercenaries go into the shops it’s like a siege. They come twenty at a time circling the shop with their
weapons pointing at anyone walking by. They do not receive government supplies so they clean out
the stores, leaving little for residents.”
Then, Eliason added: “In reaction to the peace plan, Kolimoisky (banker, Jewish leader, oligarch
statesman of Ukraine) stated that he will not be governed by Poroshenko. He would continue military
operations until all the Moskal [ethnic Russians] are killed. Take him seriously: this is a guy that rips
down holocaust memorials (Crimea—before Maidan) and built luxury housing where the
crematorium stood. He organized and paid for the Odessa Trade Union House massacre and the
Mariupol massacre. He has challenged the legitimacy of Kiev and declared himself a separatist.
Should we tell president Obama?” (Obama says that the people who are being killed by his new
Ukrainian Government deserve to die because they’re separatists.)
In other words: Kolomoysky respects no law but his own.
Right after the coup, Kolomoysky was appointed by Obama’s team as the Governor of the
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, or region, on 2 March 2014.
AFP reported on October 31st, “Kolomoisky, one of Ukraine’s most controversial billionaires, funds
the paramilitary, which returns the favour in these troubled times by boosting the banking and
industrial tycoon’s personal security and political clout. All the signs are of a flourishing military
enterprise.” Kolomoysky’s henchman Yuriy Bereza was asked how many men are in the battalion,
and he answered, “Unofficially, it’s 7,000.” Bereza was threatening to overthrow the Poroshenko
Government if they didn’t kill or drive out enough ethnic Russians fast enough, and was asked how
much time Kolomoysky was intending to give Poroshenko. “We’re going to give them half a year.”
And then, if Kolomoysky still isn’t satisfied? “‘A coup,’ he said.”
I have previously written about Kolomoysky’s links to the Obama White House. Kolomoyskyi has
hired Joe Biden’s son, and another young man who is connected to John Kerry. Both could become
billionaires if the U.S. team kills and drives out enough people in the targeted regions, because Ihor
Kolomoysky’s company that hired them has claims to the fracking rights in much of the area the
Government is bombing. To Obama’s team, the residents there are trash, but the land is golden.

RESISTANCE TO OBAMA’S UKRAINIAN OPERATION:

Some members of the U.S. Congress are opposed to the U.S. supporting nazism in Ukraine. All are
Democrats. One, Rep. John Conyers of Michigan, introduced a bill against it, and the journalist Max
Blumenthal posted its text at Alternet, on November 18th. Headlining there, “How the Israel Lobby
Protected Ukrainian Neo-Nazis,” Blumenthal presented the “Failed Amendment barring US
assistance to Ukrainian neo-Nazis.” What killed it was the rabid anti-Russian sentiment at the Anti-
Defamation League, plus congressional Republicans, and the few conservative congressional
Democrats.
As that incident shows, anti-nazi sentiments can pass toothless measures at the United Nations, but
not meaningful measures in the U.S. Congress, where Obama’s campaign to vilify Russia resonates
strongly, especially amongst the U.S. Establishment.

Even after communism in Russia ended, America’s oligarchs (including even Democratic ones, such
as George Soros, and Pierre Omidyar) still loathe Russians, and aren’t at all shy about using foreign
nazis in order to do the dirty-work of mass-murdering them, where and when they can.

https://www.lantidiplomatico.it/dettnews.php?idx=82&pg=9570

Documenti segreti Usa sull’Ucraina dimostrano massicci aiuti militari

ai golpisti di Kiev
Pubblicati dagli hackers CyberBerkut. Secondo Paul Craig Roberts gli Usa utilizzano gli ucraini contro la
Russia
L’Antidiplomatico, 26 novembre 2014

Stati Uniti e NATO, sprezzanti più che mai, continuano ad accusare la Russia di armare i ribelli
in Ucraina orientale, mentre occultano i loro miseri piani. Tuttavia la verità viene a galla prima o
poi. Infatti, il gruppo di hackers ucraino CyberBerkut ha avuto accesso ai documenti del Dipartimento
di Stato degli Stati Uniti relativi agli aiuti militari al governo golpista di Kiev. La fornitura di armi è
stata approvata dal presidente Obama.
I materiali rinvenuti sono stati pubblicati sul sito web dei pirati informatici.
Le informazioni segrete sono state memorizzate sul telefono cellulare di un funzionario che lavora
per il vicepresidente americano Joseph Biden.
"Il documento è firmato dal presidente Usa, Barack Obama, e dal segretario di Stato, John Kerry.
Gli Stati Uniti somministreranno all’esercito ucraino tre radar del valore di circa 400.000 dollari. Di
questo ha più volte parlato con orgoglio Piotr Poroshenko", rivela CyberBerkut.
Questi tipi di radar intercettano proiettili di artiglieria sparati da una o più armi, mortai, obici e
lanciarazzi e analizzano le traiettorie determinando la posizione dell'arma che ha sparato.
Inoltre, secondo i documenti ottenuti, Washington fornirà a Kiev armi letali, tra cui "400 unità
di fucili da cecchino, 2.000 unità di fucili d'assalto, 720 lanciagranate a mano, quasi 200 mortai e più
di 70.000 mine, 150 'stringers', 420 missili anticarro".
Il 21 novembre nel corso di una regolare visita in Ucraina di Joseph Biden, gli hacker CyberBerkut
hanno 'violato' diversi siti web degli organismi statali dell’Ucraina, così come la pagina del
Procuratore Generale e del Presidente Piotr Poroshenk. CyberBerkut è un gruppo di hacker che sta
lottando contro l'arbitrarietà delle autorità ucraine.
Secondo l'ex sottosegretario al Tesoro degli Stati Uniti, Paul Craig Roberts, Washington ha
deciso di armare l'Ucraina per condurre un nuovo assalto militare contro i russi nelle province di
Donetsk e Lugansk.
Un funzionario del Ministero degli Affari Esteri della Russia, Alexander Lukashevich, ha condannato
l’invio degli armamenti letali a Kiev come una chiara violazione degli accordi di Ginevra che
ridurrebbe le possibilità di trovare una soluzione politica al conflitto ucraino, scrive il politologo Paul
Craig Roberts nel suo nuovo articolo per il sito infowars.com. "Lo scopo di Washington è quello di
usare i poveri ucraini contro la Russia. Tanto più si accentua il conflitto, tanto più Washington sarà
felice", sottolinea Craig Roberts.
"Il popolo americano non ha idea che Washington stia sul punto di iniziare una nuova guerra
pericolosa", spiega il politologo. " Gli Stati Uniti intendono eliminare la Russia, che limita il potere
di Washington, dice ancora il consigliere dell'ex presidente Ronald Reagan. "L'arroganza di
Washington sta costringendo la Russia a fare una scelta difficile: vassallaggio o la guerra," conclude.
Intanto Barack Obama fa sapere che Hillary Clinton sarebbe una "candidata formidabile" alla
presidenza degli Usa. Una cosa è certa: chiunque sarà il presidente degli Stati Uniti, continuerà
intensificare le ostilità verso la Russia considerato come un nemico geopolitico, secondo gli
esperti.
Questi sono alcuni dei documenti trapelati firmati da Obama, John Kerry e il Dipartimento di Stato:
 Allegato 1

United Nations A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1

General Assembly Distr.: Limited
17 November 2014

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Third Committee
Agenda item 66 (a)
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance

Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Burkina Faso,

Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua,
the Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sri Lanka,
the Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, United Republic of Tanzania,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Viet Nam: revised draft resolution

Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other

practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 3
and other relevant human rights instruments,
Recalling the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2004/16
of 16 April 2004 4 and 2005/5 of 14 April 2005 5 and relevant Human Rights Council
resolutions, in particular resolutions 7/34 of 28 March 2008, 6 18/15 of 29 September
2011 7 and 21/33 of 28 September 2012, 8 as well as General Assembly resolutions
60/143 of 16 December 2005, 61/147 of 19 December 2006, 62/142 of 18 December
__________________
1 Resolution 217 A (III).
2 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
4 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2004, Supplement No. 3 (E/2004/23),
chap. II, sect. A.
5 Ibid., 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigenda (E/2005/23 and Corr.1 and 2), chap. II, sect. A.
6 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53),
chap. II.
7 Ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 53A and corrigendum (A/66/53/Add.1 and Corr.1),
chap. II.
8 Ibid., Sixty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 53A (A/67/53/Add.1), chap. II.

14-64994 (E) 191114

*1464994*
A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1

2007, 63/162 of 18 December 2008, 64/147 of 18 December 2009, 65/199 of

21 December 2010, 66/143 of 19 December 2011, 67/154 of 20 December 2012 and
68/150 of 18 December 2013 on this issue and its resolutions 61/149 of
19 December 2006, 62/220 of 22 December 2007, 63/242 of 24 December 2008,
64/148 of 18 December 2009, 65/240 of 24 December 2010, 66/144 of 19 December
2011, 67/155 of 20 December 2012 and 68/151 of 18 December 2013, entitled
“Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action”,
Acknowledging other important initiatives of the General Assembly aimed at
raising awareness about the suffering of victims of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including in the historical perspective, in
particular regarding commemoration of the victims of slavery and the transatlantic
slave trade,
Recalling the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the
Tribunal, which recognized as criminal, inter alia, the SS organization and all its
integral parts, including the Waffen SS, through its officially accepted members
implicated in or with knowledge of the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity connected with the Second World War, as well as other relevant
provisions of the Charter and the Judgement,
Recalling also the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on 8 September 2001, 9 in
particular paragraph 2 of the Declaration and paragraph 86 of the Programme of
Action, as well as the relevant provisions of the outcome document of the Durban
Review Conference of 24 April 2009, 10 in particular paragraphs 11 and 54,
Alarmed, in this regard, at the spread in many parts of the world of various
extremist political parties, movements and groups, including neo -Nazis and
skinhead groups, as well as racist extremist movements and ideologies,
Deeply concerned by all recent manifestations of violence and terrorism
incited by violent nationalism, racism, xenophobia and related intolerance,
Recalling that in 2015 the international community will celebrate the
seventieth anniversary of victory in the Second World War, and looking forward in
this regard to the initiative to hold a special solemn meeting at the sixty -ninth
session of the General Assembly,
1. Reaffirms the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration 9 and of the
outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, 10 in which States condemned
the persistence and resurgence of neo-Nazism, neo-Fascism and violent nationalist
ideologies based on racial and national prejudice and stated that those phenomena
could never be justified in any instance or in any circumstances;
2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related

__________________
9 See A/CONF.189/12 and Corr.1, chap. I.
10 See A/CONF.211/8, chap. I.

2/7 14-64994
 A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1

intolerance, prepared in accordance with the request contained in General Assembly

resolution 68/150; 11
3. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and his Office for their efforts to fight racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including the maintenance by the Office of the
database on practical means to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance;
4. Expresses deep concern about the glorification, in any form, of the Nazi
movement, neo-Nazism and former members of the Waffen SS organization,
including by erecting monuments and memorials and holding public demonstrations
in the name of the glorification of the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo
Nazism, as well as by declaring or attempting to declare such members and those
who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi
movement participants in national liberation movements;
5. Calls for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 3
and encourages those States parties that have not yet done so to consider making the
declaration under its article 14, thus providing the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination with the competence to receive and consider communications
from individuals or groups of individuals within their jurisdiction claiming to be
victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set forth in the
Convention;
6. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that “any
commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related organizations,
whether official or unofficial, should be prohibited by States”, 12 and stresses in this
regard that it is important that States take measures, in accordance with international
human rights law, to counteract any celebration of the Nazi SS organization and all
its integral parts, including the Waffen SS;
7. Expresses concern about recurring attempts to desecrate or demolish
monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought against Nazism during the
Second World War, as well as to unlawfully exhume or remove the remains of such
persons, and in this regard urges States to fully comply with their relevant
obligations, inter alia, under article 34 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949; 13
8. Notes with concern the increase in the number of racist incidents
worldwide, including the rise of skinhead groups, which have been responsible for
many of these incidents, as well as the resurgence of racist and xenophobic violence
targeting, inter alia, persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities;
9. Reaffirms that such acts may be qualified to fall within the scope of the
Convention, that they may not be justified when they fall outside the scope of the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association as well as the rights to
freedom of expression and that they may fall within the scope of article 20 of the
__________________
11 A/69/334.
12 Ibid., para. 75.
13 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

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A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 and may be subject to certain
restrictions, as set out in articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant;
10. Condemns without reservation any denial or attempt to deny the Holocaust;
11. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the active preservation of
those Holocaust sites that served as Nazi death camps, concentration and forced
labour camps and prisons, as well as his encouragement of States to take measures,
including legislative, law enforcement and educational measures , to put an end to all
forms of Holocaust denial;
12. Calls upon States to continue to take adequate steps, including through
national legislation, in accordance with international human rights law, aimed at the
prevention of hate speech and incitement to violence against persons belonging to
vulnerable groups;
13. Expresses deep concern about attempts at commercial advertising aimed
at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed during the Second World War by the Nazi regime;
14. Stresses that the practices described above do injustice to the memory of
the countless victims of crimes against humanity committed in the Second World
War, in particular those committed by the SS organization and by those who fo ught
against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi movement, and may
negatively influence children and young people, and that failure by States to
effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of States
Members of the United Nations under its Charter, including those related to the
purposes and principles of the Organization;
15. Also stresses that such practices fuel contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and con tribute to the
spread and multiplication of various extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and in this regard calls for
increased vigilance;
16. Expresses concern that the human rights and democratic challenges
posed by extremist political parties, movements and groups are universal and no
country is immune to them;
17. Emphasizes the need to take the measures necessary to put an end to the
practices described above, and calls upon States to take more e ffective measures in
accordance with international human rights law to combat those phenomena and
extremist movements, which pose a real threat to democratic values;
18. Encourages States to adopt further measures to provide training for the
police and other law enforcement bodies on the ideologies of extremist political
parties, movements and groups whose advocacy constitutes incitement to racist and
xenophobic violence, to strengthen their capacity to address racist and xenophobic
crimes, to fulfil their responsibility of bringing to justice the perpetrators of such
crimes and to combat impunity;
19. Notes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur regarding the
responsibility of political leaders and parties in relation to messages that incite
racial discrimination or xenophobia;

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20. Expresses concern that ethnic profiling and police violence against
vulnerable groups discourage victims from seeking redress owing to distrust of the
legal system, and in this regard encourages States to improve diversit y within law
enforcement agencies and impose appropriate sanctions against those within the
public service found guilty of racially motivated violence or of using hate speech;
21. Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to introduce into
national criminal law a provision according to which committing an offence with
racist or xenophobic motivations or aims constitutes an aggravating circumstance,
allowing for enhanced penalties, and encourages those States whose legislation does
not contain such provisions to consider that recommendation;
22. Underlines that the roots of extremism are multifaceted and must be
addressed through adequate measures such as education, awareness -raising and the
promotion of dialogue, and in this regard recommends the increase of measures to
raise awareness among young people of the dangers of the ideologies and activities
of extremist political parties, movements and groups;
23. Reaffirms, in this regard, the particular importance of all forms of
education, including human rights education, as a complement to legislative
measures, as outlined by the Special Rapporteur;
24. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur presented at
the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in which he emphasized the
importance of history classes in teaching the dramatic events and human suffering
which arose out of the adoption of ideologies such as Nazism and Fascism; 14
25. Stresses the importance of other positive measures and initiatives aimed
at bringing communities together and providing them with space for genuine
dialogue, such as round tables, working groups and seminars, including training
seminars for State agents and media professionals, as well as awareness -raising
activities, especially those initiated by civil society representatives, which require
continued State support;
26. Calls upon States to continue to invest in education, in both conventional
and non-conventional curricula, inter alia, in order to transform attitudes and correct
ideas of racial hierarchies and superiority promoted by extremist political parties,
movements and groups and counter their negative influence;
27. Underlines the positive role that relevant United Nations entities and
programmes, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, can play in the aforementioned areas;
28. Reaffirms article 4 of the Convention, according to which States parties
to that instrument condemn all propaganda and all organizations that are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or that attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to that end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1
and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
__________________
14 A/64/295, para. 104.

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of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist
activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and organized and all
other propaganda activities, that promote and incite racial discrimination, and sha ll
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable
by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination;
29. Also reaffirms that, as underlined in paragraph 13 of the outcome
document of the Durban Review Conference, any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
should be prohibited by law, that all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, or incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts, shall be declared offences punishable by law, in
accordance with the international obligations of States, and that these prohibitions
are consistent with freedom of opinion and expression;
30. Recognizes the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information, including through the Internet, can play in combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
31. Expresses concern about the use of the Internet to propagate racism,
racial hatred, xenophobia, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and in this
regard calls upon States parties to the Covenant to implement fully articles 19 and
20 thereof, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression and outline the
grounds on which the exercise of this right can be legitimat ely restricted;
32. Recognizes the need to promote the use of new information and
communications technologies, including the Internet, to contribute to the fight
against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
33. Also recognizes the positive role that the media can play in combating
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, promoting a
culture of tolerance and representing the diversity of a multicultural society;
34. Encourages States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to use all
opportunities, including those provided by the Internet and social media, to counter,
in accordance with international human rights law, the dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred and to promote the values of equality,
non-discrimination, diversity and democracy;
35. Encourages those States that have made reservations to article 4 of the
Convention to give serious consideration to withdrawing such reservations as a
matter of priority, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur;
36. Notes the importance of strengthening cooperation at the regional and
international levels with the aim of countering all manifestations of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in particular regarding issues
raised in the present resolution;
37. Stresses the importance of cooperating closely with civil society and
international and regional human rights mechanisms in order to counter effectively
all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, as well as extremist political parties, movements and groups, including

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neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other similar extremist ideological movements
that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
38. Encourages States parties to the Convention to ensure that their legislation
incorporates the provisions of the Convention, including those of article 4;
39. Encourages States to adopt the legislation necessary to combat racism
while ensuring that the definition of racial discrimination set out therein complies
with article 1 of the Convention;
40. Recalls that any legislative or constitutional measures adopted with a
view to countering extremist political parties, movements and gr oups, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and similar extremist ideological movements should
be in conformity with the relevant international human rights norms, in particular
articles 4 and 5 of the Convention and articles 19 to 22 of the Covenant;
41. Also recalls the request of the Commission on Human Rights, in its
resolution 2005/5, 5 that the Special Rapporteur continue to reflect on this issue,
make relevant recommendations in his future reports and seek and take into account
in this regard the views of Governments and non-governmental organizations;
42. Encourages States to consider including in their reports for the universal
periodic review and to relevant treaty bodies information on the steps taken to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including
with the aim of implementing the provisions of the present resolution;
43. Requests the Special Rapporteur to prepare, for submission to the
General Assembly at its seventieth session and to the Human Rights Co uncil at its
twenty-ninth session, reports on the implementation of the present resolution, in
particular regarding paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 24 and 25 above, based on the
views collected in accordance with the request of the Commission, as recalled i n
paragraph 42 above;
44. Expresses its appreciation to those Governments that have provided
information to the Special Rapporteur in the course of the preparation of his reports
to the General Assembly;
45. Stresses that such information is important for the sharing of experiences
and best practices in the fight against extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other extremist ideological
movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance;
46. Encourages Governments and non-governmental organizations to
cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur in the exercise of the tasks outlined in
paragraph 42 above;
47. Encourages Governments, non-governmental organizations and relevant
actors to disseminate, as widely as possible, information regarding the contents of
and the principles outlined in the present resolution, including through the media,
but not limited to it;
48. Decides to remain seized of the issue.

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Allegato alla risoluzione A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1 : esito del voto
 United Nations A/69/486
General Assembly Distr.: General
9 December 2014

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 66

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia

and related intolerance
Report of the Third Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Ervin Nina (Albania)

I. Introduction
1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 19 September 2014, the General Assembly, on
the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of
its sixty-ninth session the item entitled:
“Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance:
“(a) Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance;
“(b) Comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action”
and to allocate it to the Third Committee.
2. The Third Committee held a general discussion on the item jointly with item
67, entitled “Right of peoples to self-determination”, at its 37th to 39th meetings, on
3 and 4 November 2014, and considered proposals and took action on the item at its
43rd, 44th, 48th to 50th and 55th meetings, on 11, 13, 19, 21 and 26 November. An
account of the Committee’s discussion is contained in the relevant summary records
(A/C.3/69/SR.37-39, 43-44, 48-50 and 55).
3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following
documents:

14-66751 (E) 111214

*1466751*
A/69/486

Item 66 (a)
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on its eighty -
third and eighty-fourth sessions (A/69/18)
Report of the Secretary-General on the financial situation of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (A/69/328)
Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ( A/69/329)
Report of the Secretary-General on the global efforts for the total elimination of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the
comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action (A/69/354)
Progress report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
realignment of work and name of the Anti-Discrimination Unit (A/69/186)
Report of the Chair of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Desce nt
(A/69/318)
Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance (A/69/334)
Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance on combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow -up to the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action (A/69/340)
4. At the 37th meeting, on 3 November, the Chief of the Intergovernmental and
Outreach Section of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights in New York made an introductory statement and responded to the
questions and comments of the representatives of Morocco and Brazil (see
A/C.3/69/SR.37).
5. At the same meeting, the Chair of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination made an introductory statement and engaged in an interactive
dialogue with the representatives of Slovenia, Brazil, South Africa and Rwanda (see
A/C.3/69/SR.37).
6. Also at the same meeting, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance made an
introductory statement and engaged in an interactive dialogue with the
representatives of Brazil, Israel, the European Union, Armenia, Morocco, Nigeria
and South Africa (see A/C.3/69/SR.37).
7. At the same meeting, the Chair of the Working Group on People of African
Descent also made an introductory statement and engaged in an interactive dialogue
with the representatives of Brazil, South Africa, the European Union, Morocco and
Nigeria (see A/C.3/69/SR.37).

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II. Consideration of proposals

A. Draft resolutions A/C.3/69/L.56 and Rev.1

8. At the 43rd meeting, on 11 November, the representative of the Russian

Federation, on behalf of Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State
of), Burkina Faso, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Equatorial
Guinea, Guinea, India, Kyrgyzstan, Namibia, Nicaragua, the Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab
Republic, Turkmenistan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of), introduced a draft resolution entitled “Combating
glorification of Nazism and other practices that contribut e to fuelling contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance ”
(A/C.3/69/L.56). Subsequently, Brazil and Myanmar joined in sponsoring the draft
resolution.
9. At its 49th meeting, on 21 November, the Committee had before it a revised
draft resolution (A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1) submitted by the sponsors of draft resolution
A/C.3/69/L.56 and Côte d’Ivoire, Kazakhstan and Viet Nam.
10. At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation announced
that Algeria, Angola, Burundi, China, the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Mauritania, Morocco, Tajikistan, Uganda,
Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.
11. Also at the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation orally
corrected the draft resolution.
12. Also at the same meeting, the representatives of Ukraine and Belarus made
statements (see A/C.3/69/SR.49).
13. At the 50th meeting, on 21 November, the representative of the Russian
Federation, on behalf of the sponsors of draft resoluti on A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1, made
a statement and orally revised the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution
by adding the words “over Nazism” after the word “victory”.
14. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.3/69/L.56/Rev.1, as orally corrected and revised, by a recorded vote of 115 to
3, with 55 abstentions (see para. 26, draft resolution I). The voting was as foll ows:
In favour: 1
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
__________________
1 The delegation of the Sudan subsequently indicated that, had it been present, it would have
voted in favour.

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Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,

Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar,
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.
Against:
Canada, Ukraine, United States of America.
Abstaining:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Sudan,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yemen.
15. Also at the 50th meeting, a statement was made before the vote by the
representative of the United States of America; statements were made after the vote
by the representatives of Italy (on behalf of the European Union), Liechtenstein (on
behalf also of Iceland and Switzerland), Equatorial Guinea and Norway (see
A/C.3/69/SR.50).

B. Draft resolution A/C.3/69/L.57

16. At the 43rd meeting, on 11 November, the representative of Belgium, on

behalf of Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerla nd, Turkey,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of), introduced a draft resolution entitled “International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ”
(A/C.3/69/L.57). Subsequently, Albania, Andorra, India, Israel, Monaco, Panama
and San Marino joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.
17. At the 48th meeting, on 19 November, the representative of Slovenia orally
revised the draft resolution by replacing the word “welcomes” with the words “takes
note of” in the first, second and third operative paragraphs and announced that
Belarus, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, the
Republic of Moldova and Timor-Leste had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.
Subsequently, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Equatorial
Guinea, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,

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Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Montenegro, New Zealand, Palau,

the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Tunisia, Ukraine and the United States of America also joined in sponsoring the
draft resolution, as orally revised.
18. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally
revised (see para. 26, draft resolution II).

C. Draft resolution A/C.3/69/L.59

19. At the 44th meeting, on 13 November, the representative of the Plurinational

State of Bolivia, on behalf of the States members of the United Nations that are
members of the Group of 77 and China, introduced a draft resolution entitled “A
global call for concrete action for the total elimination of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the co mprehensive
implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action” (A/C.3/69/L.59), which read:
“The General Assembly,
“Recalling all its previous resolutions on the comprehensive follow-up to
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance and the effective implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference, and
in this regard underlining the imperative need for their full and effective
implementation,
“Stressing that the outcome of the World Conference against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance has the same
status as the outcomes of all the major United Nations conferences, summits
and special sessions in the human rights and social fields, and that the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action remains the only instructive outcome of
the World Conference, which prescribes comprehensive measures for
combating all the scourges of racism and adequate remedies for victims,
“Recalling the three Decades for Action to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination previously declared by the General Assembly, and regretting
that the Programmes of Action for those Decades were not fully implemented
and that their objectives are yet to be attained,
“Reiterating that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights and have the potential to contribute constructively to the development
and well-being of their societies, and that any doctrine of racial superiority is
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous and
must be rejected, together with theories that attempt to determine the existence
of separate human races,
“Underlining the intensity, magnitude and organized nature of slavery
and the slave trade, including the transatlantic slave trade, and the associated
historical injustices, as well as the untold suffering caused by colonialism and
apartheid, and that Africans and people of African descent, Asians and people
of Asian descent and indigenous peoples continue to be victims of the
cascading effects of those legacies,

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“Emphasizing that, despite efforts in this regard, millions of human

beings continue to be victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance, including their contemporary manifestations, some of
which take violent forms,
“Welcoming the efforts made by civil society in support of the follow-up
mechanisms in the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action,
“Recalling the appointment of the five independent eminent experts on
16 June 2003 by the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 56/266 of 27 March 2002, with the mandate to follow up o n the
implementation of the provisions of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action and to make appropriate recommendations thereon, and in this regard
underlining the cardinal role played and still to be played by those independent
eminent experts in mobilizing global political will for concrete action for the
total elimination of all the scourges of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance,
“Underlining the primacy of the political will, international cooperation
and adequate funding at the national, regional and international levels needed
to address all forms and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance for the successful implementation of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action,
“Recalling its resolution 2142 (XXI) of 26 October 1966, by which the
General Assembly proclaimed 21 March as the International Day for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
“Recalling also its resolution 62/122 of 17 December 2007, in which it
designated 25 March as an annual International Day of Remembrance of the
Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade,
“Looking forward to the commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of
the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action,
“Recognizing and affirming that the global fight against racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and all their abhorrent and
contemporary forms and manifestations is a matter of priority for the
international community,
“Underlining, in the above context, the imperative need to end posturing
about racism, and calling upon all States to resolutely end impunity for acts of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and to face
the everyday realities and challenges of these scourges,

“I
“International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination
“1. Reaffirms the paramount importance of universal adherence to and
full and effective implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the General
Assembly in its resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965, in addressing
the scourges of racism and racial discrimination;

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“2. Calls upon States that have not done so to consider acceding to the
Convention;
“3. Underlines, in the above context, that the provisions of the
Convention do not respond effectively to contemporary manifestations of
racial discrimination, in particular in relation to xenophobia and related
intolerance, which is recognized as the rationale behind the convening of the
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance in 2001;
“4. Takes note of the acknowledgement by the Human Rights Council
and its subsidiary structures of the existence of both procedural and
substantive gaps in the aforementioned Convention, which must be filled as a
matter of urgency, necessity and priority;
“5. Invites the Human Rights Council, in conjunction with its Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, in the execution of its mandate, to continue to elaborate
complementary standards in order to fill existing gaps in the Convention, in
the form of new normative standards aimed at combating all forms of
contemporary and resurgent racism, and in this regard, areas such as
xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and incitement to national or ethnic
and religious hatred that have been identified as constituting substantive gaps;

“II
“International Decade for People of African Descent
“6. Welcomes the proclamation of the International Decade for People
of African Descent, as contained in its resolution 68/237 of 23 December
2013, and looks forward to the celebratory launch of the Decade on
10 December 2014;
“7. Also welcomes the agreement achieved by consensus that the
programme of activities for the implementation of the International Decade
will be based on the full and effective implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action;
“8. Decides to adopt the programme of action for the International
Decade as a broad framework with parameters guiding the activities for the
implementation, at all levels, of the International Decade;
“9. Commends the constructive role played by non-governmental
organizations in participating in the Durban follow-up mechanisms and the
Human Rights Council, which has greatly contributed to the development of
the programme of activities and the preparations for the International Decade;
“10. Underlines the need for the International Decade to have seminal
stages for effective implementation at the international level, including a
midterm review and a successor programme, as well as a final assessment of
the International Decade, to take place within the framework of a high -level
international event;
“11. Requests the Human Rights Council, through the Chair of the
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, to present a report

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on the work of the Working Group to the General Assembly, and in this regard
invites the Chair of the Working Group to engage in an interactive dialogue
with the Assembly under the item entitled ‘Elimination of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ at its sixty-ninth session;

“III
“Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
“12. Welcomes the positive response by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights to the requests made by the Human Rights
Council, in its resolution 6/22 of 8 September 2007, and by the General
Assembly, in its resolution 68/151 of 18 December 2013, to realign the work
and the name of the erstwhile Anti-Discrimination Unit in the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and also welcomes its
renaming as the Anti-Racial Discrimination Unit, and the realignment of its
operational activities to focus exclusively on racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, as defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Durban Declaration;
“13. Also welcomes the inclusion of the historic and landmark World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance of 2001 among the 20 major achievements of the Office of the
High Commissioner since the adoption of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action;
“14. Requests the Secretary-General and the Office of the High
Commissioner to provide the resources necessary for the effective fulfilment
of the mandates of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the
Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, the group of
independent eminent experts on the implementation of the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action and the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of
Complementary Standards;

“IV
“Group of independent eminent experts on the implementation of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
“15. Requests the Secretary-General, pursuant to its resolution 68/151,
to revitalize and reactivate the operational activities of the group of
independent eminent experts;
“16. Reiterates its invitation to the Human Rights Council, pursuant to
operative paragraph 16 of its resolution 68/151, to ensure the visibility,
effective participation and optimal utilization of the vast knowledge and
experience of the group of independent eminent experts within its subsidiary
structures charged with the mandate of and responsibility for the
comprehensive follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the effective
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, and in
this regard requests the Council to submit a progress report to the General
Assembly at its seventieth session;

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“V
“Trust Fund for the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat
Racism and Racial Discrimination
“17. Recalls the establishment by the Secretary-General, in 1973, of the
Trust Fund for the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism
and Racial Discrimination as a funding mechanism that has been utilized for
the implementation of the activities of the three Decades for Action to Comba t
Racism and Racial Discrimination declared by the General Assembly, and in
this regard appreciates the fact that the Trust Fund has also been utilized for
the subsequent programmes and operational activities transcending the three
Decades;
“18. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General
Assembly at its seventieth session on the implementation of operative
paragraph 18 of its resolution 68/151, regarding progress in revitalizing the
Trust Fund for the purpose of ensuring the successful implementation of the
activities of the International Decade for People of African Descent and
enhancing the effectiveness of the comprehensive follow-up to the World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action;
“19. Strongly appeals to all Governments, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations and individuals as well as other donors in a
position to do so to contribute generously to the Trust Fund for the Programme
for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and to
that end requests the Secretary-General to continue to undertake appropriate
contacts and initiatives to encourage contributions;

“VI
“Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
“20. Takes note of the reports of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and rela ted
intolerance, and encourages the Special Rapporteur, within his mandate, to
continue focusing on the issues of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance and incitement to hatred, which impede peaceful
coexistence and harmony within societies, and to present reports in this regard
to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly;
“21. Reiterates the invitation to the Special Rapporteur to consider
examining national models of mechanisms that measure racial equality and
their added value in the eradication of racial discrimination and to report on
such challenges, successes and best practices in his next report;
“VII
“Follow-up and implementation activities
“22. Reiterates its request to the Human Rights Council to develop and
adopt a multi-year programme of activities to provide for the renewed and
strengthened outreach activities needed to inform and mobilize the global
public in support of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and to

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strengthen awareness of the contribution it has made in the struggle against

racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
“23. Calls upon the Human Rights Council to commence preparations
for the commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption o f the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, including through the
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action;
“24. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly
at its seventieth session a report on the implementation of the present
resolution;
“25. Requests the President of the General Assembly and the President
of the Human Rights Council to continue convening special meetings of the
Assembly and the Council during the commemoration of the International Day
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, with the appropriate focus and
themes, and to hold a debate on the state of racial discrimination worldwide,
with the participation of the Secretary-General and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, encouraging the participation of eminent
personalities active in the field of racial discrimination, Member States and
civil society organizations in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, respectively;
“26. Decides to remain seized of this priority matter at its seventieth
session under the item entitled ‘Elimination of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance’.”
20. At the 55th meeting, on 26 November, the representative of the Plurinational
State of Bolivia, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, made a statement and read
out numerous revisions to draft resolution A/C.3/69/L.59. Subsequently, the Russian
Federation joined in sponsoring the draft resolution, as orally revised.
21. At the same meeting, South Africa withdrew as a sponsor of the draft
resolution, as orally revised, and the representative of South Africa pro posed an oral
amendment to operative paragraph 8, reading:
“Decides to adopt the programme of action for the International Decade
for People of African Descent annexed to this resolution, as a broad
framework with the parameters guiding the activities for the implementation at
all levels of the International Decade for People of African Descent”.
22. Also at the same meeting, following informal consultations, the representative
of South Africa withdrew the proposed oral amendment and stated that South Af rica
would again sponsor the draft resolution.
23. Also at its 55th meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution
A/C.3/69/L.59, as orally revised, by a recorded vote of 121 to 9, with 42 abstentions
(see para. 26, draft resolution III). The voting was as follows:
In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,

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Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Against:
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Marshall Islands,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.
Abstaining:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldov a, Romania,
San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine.
24. At the same meeting, statements were made before the vote by the
representatives of Israel and Italy (on behalf of the European Union); statements
were made after the vote by the representatives of Switzerland (on behalf also of
Iceland, Liechtenstein, New Zealand and Norway) and the United States of America
(see A/C.3/69/SR.55).

D. Draft decision proposed by the Chair

25. At its 55th meeting, on 26 November, on the proposal of the Chair, the
Committee decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it take note of the
following documents submitted under sub-item 66 (a):
(a) Progress report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
realignment of work and name of the Anti-Discrimination Unit (A/69/186);
(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the global efforts for the total
elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and
the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action (A/69/354) (see para. 27).

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III. Recommendations of the Third Committee

26. The Third Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of
the following draft resolutions:

Draft resolution I
Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other
practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 3
and other relevant human rights instruments,
Recalling the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2004/16
of 16 April 2004 4 and 2005/5 of 14 April 2005 5 and relevant Human Rights Council
resolutions, in particular resolutions 7/34 of 28 March 2008, 6 18/15 of
29 September 2011 7 and 21/33 of 28 September 2012, 8 as well as General Assembly
resolutions 60/143 of 16 December 2005, 61/147 of 19 December 2006, 62/142 of
18 December 2007, 63/162 of 18 December 2008, 64/147 of 18 December 2009,
65/199 of 21 December 2010, 66/143 of 19 December 2011, 67/154 of 20 December
2012 and 68/150 of 18 December 2013 on this issue and its resolutions 61/149 of
19 December 2006, 62/220 of 22 December 2007, 63/242 of 24 December 2008,
64/148 of 18 December 2009, 65/240 of 24 December 2010, 66/144 of 19 December
2011, 67/155 of 20 December 2012 and 68/151 of 18 December 2013, entitled
“Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow -up to
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action”,
Acknowledging other important initiatives of the General Assembly aimed at
raising awareness about the suffering of victims of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including in the historical perspective, in
particular regarding commemoration of the victims of slavery and the transatlantic
slave trade,
Recalling the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the
Tribunal, which recognized as criminal, inter alia, the SS organization and all its
integral parts, including the Waffen SS, through its officially accepted members
__________________
1 Resolution 217 A (III).
2 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
4 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2004, Supplement No. 3 (E/2004/23),
chap. II, sect. A.
5 Ibid., 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigenda (E/2005/23 and Corr.1 and 2), chap. II, sect. A.
6 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53),
chap. II.
7 Ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 53A and corrigendum (A/66/53/Add.1 and Corr.1),
chap. II.
8 Ibid., Sixty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 53A (A/67/53/Add.1), chap. II.

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implicated in or with knowledge of the commission of war crimes and crimes

against humanity connected with the Second World War, as well as other relevant
provisions of the Charter and the Judgement,
Recalling also the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on 8 September 2001, 9 in
particular paragraph 2 of the Declaration and paragraph 86 of the Programme of
Action, as well as the relevant provisions of the outcome document of the Durban
Review Conference of 24 April 2009, 10 in particular paragraphs 11 and 54,
Alarmed, in this regard, at the spread in many parts of the world of various
extremist political parties, movements and groups, including neo -Nazis and
skinhead groups, as well as racist extremist movements and ideologies,
Deeply concerned by all recent manifestations of violence and terrorism
incited by violent nationalism, racism, xenophobia and related intolerance,
Recalling that in 2015 the international community will celebrate the
seventieth anniversary of victory over Nazism in the Second World War, and
looking forward in this regard to the initiative to hold a special solemn meeting at
the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly,
1. Reaffirms the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration 9 and of the
outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, 10 in which States condemned
the persistence and resurgence of neo-Nazism, neo-Fascism and violent nationalist
ideologies based on racial and national prejudice and stated that those phenomena
could never be justified in any instance or in any circumstances;
2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xe nophobia and related
intolerance, prepared in accordance with the request contained in General Assembly
resolution 68/150; 11
3. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and his Office for their efforts to fight racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including the maintenance by the Office of the
database on practical means to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance;
4. Expresses deep concern about the glorification, in any form, of the Nazi
movement, neo-Nazism and former members of the Waffen SS organization,
including by erecting monuments and memorials and holding public demonstrations
in the name of the glorification of the Nazi past, the Nazi moveme nt and
neo-Nazism, as well as by declaring or attempting to declare such members and
those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi
movement participants in national liberation movements;
5. Calls for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 3
and encourages those States parties that have not yet done so to consider making the
__________________
9 See A/CONF.189/12 and Corr.1, chap. I.
10 See A/CONF.211/8, chap. I.
11 A/69/334.

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declaration under its article 14, thus providing the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination with the competence to receive and consider communications
from individuals or groups of individuals within their jurisdiction claiming to be
victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set forth in the
Convention;
6. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that “any
commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related organizations,
whether official or unofficial, should be prohibited by State s”, 12 and stresses in this
regard that it is important that States take measures, in accordance with international
human rights law, to counteract any celebration of the Nazi SS organization and all
its integral parts, including the Waffen SS;
7. Expresses concern about recurring attempts to desecrate or demolish
monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought against Nazism during the
Second World War, as well as to unlawfully exhume or remove the remains of such
persons, and in this regard urges States to fully comply with their relevant
obligations, inter alia, under article 34 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949; 13
8. Notes with concern the increase in the number of racist incidents
worldwide, including the rise of skinhead groups, which have been responsible for
many of these incidents, as well as the resurgence of racist and xenophobic violence
targeting, inter alia, persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities;
9. Reaffirms that such acts may be qualified to fall within the scope of the
Convention, that they may not be justified when they fall outside the scope of the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association as well as the rights to
freedom of expression and that they may fall within the scope of article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 and may be subject to certain
restrictions, as set out in articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant;
10. Condemns without reservation any denial or attempt to deny the
Holocaust;
11. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the active preservation of
those Holocaust sites that served as Nazi death camps, concentration and forced
labour camps and prisons, as well as his encouragement of States to take measures,
including legislative, law enforcement and educational measures, to put an end to all
forms of Holocaust denial;
12. Calls upon States to continue to take adequate steps, including through
national legislation, in accordance with international human right s law, aimed at the
prevention of hate speech and incitement to violence against persons belonging to
vulnerable groups;
13. Expresses deep concern about attempts at commercial advertising aimed
at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed during the Second World War by the Nazi regime;

__________________
12 Ibid., para. 75.
13 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

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14. Stresses that the practices described above do injustice to the memory of
the countless victims of crimes against humanity committed in the Second World
War, in particular those committed by the SS organization and by those who fought
against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi movement, and may
negatively influence children and young people, and that failure by States to
effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of States
Members of the United Nations under its Charter, including those related to the
purposes and principles of the Organization;
15. Also stresses that such practices fuel contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and contribute to the
spread and multiplication of various extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and in this regard calls for
increased vigilance;
16. Expresses concern that the human rights and democratic challenges
posed by extremist political parties, movements and groups are universal and no
country is immune to them;
17. Emphasizes the need to take the measures necessary to put an end to the
practices described above, and calls upon States to take more effective measures in
accordance with international human rights law to combat those phenomena and
extremist movements, which pose a real threat to democratic values;
18. Encourages States to adopt further measures to provide training for the
police and other law enforcement bodies on the ideologies of extremist political
parties, movements and groups whose advocacy constitutes incitement to racist and
xenophobic violence, to strengthen their capacity to address racist and xenophobic
crimes, to fulfil their responsibility of bringing to justice the perpetrators of such
crimes and to combat impunity;
19. Notes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur regarding the
responsibility of political leaders and parties in relation to messages that incite
racial discrimination or xenophobia;
20. Expresses concern that ethnic profiling and police violence against
vulnerable groups discourage victims from seeking redress owing to distrust of the
legal system, and in this regard encourages States to improve diversity within law
enforcement agencies and impose appropriate sanctions against those within the
public service found guilty of racially motivated violence or of using hate speech;
21. Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to introduce into
national criminal law a provision according to which committing an offence with
racist or xenophobic motivations or aims constitutes an aggravating circumstance,
allowing for enhanced penalties, and encourages those States whose legislation does
not contain such provisions to consider that recommendation;
22. Underlines that the roots of extremism are multifaceted and must be
addressed through adequate measures such as education, awareness -raising and the
promotion of dialogue, and in this regard recommends the increase of measures to
raise awareness among young people of the dangers of the ideologies and activities
of extremist political parties, movements and groups;

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23. Reaffirms, in this regard, the particular importance of all forms of

education, including human rights education, as a complement to legislative
measures, as outlined by the Special Rapporteur;
24. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur presented at
the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in which he emphasized the
importance of history classes in teaching the dramatic events and human suffering
which arose out of the adoption of ideologies such as Nazism and Fascism; 14
25. Stresses the importance of other positive measures and initiatives aimed
at bringing communities together and providing them with space for genuine
dialogue, such as round tables, working groups and seminars, including training
seminars for State agents and media professionals, as well as awareness-raising
activities, especially those initiated by civil society representatives, which require
continued State support;
26. Calls upon States to continue to invest in education, in both conventional
and non-conventional curricula, inter alia, in order to transform attitudes and correct
ideas of racial hierarchies and superiority promoted by extremist political parties,
movements and groups and counter their negative influence;
27. Underlines the positive role that relevant United Nations entities and
programmes, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, can play in the aforementioned areas;
28. Reaffirms article 4 of the Convention, according to which States parties
to that instrument condemn all propaganda and all organizations that are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or that attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to that end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1
and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against an y race or group of
persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance
to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and organized and all
other propaganda activities, that promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable
by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination;
29. Also reaffirms that, as underlined in paragraph 13 of the outcome
document of the Durban Review Conference, any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
should be prohibited by law, that all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, or incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
__________________
14 A/64/295, para. 104.

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violence or incitement to such acts, shall be declared offences punishable by law, in

accordance with the international obligations of States, and that these prohibitions
are consistent with freedom of opinion and expression;
30. Recognizes the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information, including through the Internet, can play in combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
31. Expresses concern about the use of the Internet to propagate racism,
racial hatred, xenophobia, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and in this
regard calls upon States parties to the Covenant to implement fully articles 19 and
20 thereof, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression and outline t he
grounds on which the exercise of this right can be legitimately restricted;
32. Recognizes the need to promote the use of new information and
communications technologies, including the Internet, to contribute to the fight
against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
33. Also recognizes the positive role that the media can play in combating
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, promoting a
culture of tolerance and representing the diversity of a multicultural society;
34. Encourages States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to use all
opportunities, including those provided by the Internet and social media, to counter,
in accordance with international human rights law, the disseminat ion of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred and to promote the values of equality,
non-discrimination, diversity and democracy;
35. Encourages those States that have made reservations to article 4 of the
Convention to give serious consideration to withdrawing such reservations as a
matter of priority, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur;
36. Notes the importance of strengthening cooperation at the regional and
international levels with the aim of countering all manifestations of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in particular regarding issues
raised in the present resolution;
37. Stresses the importance of cooperating closely with civil society and
international and regional human rights mechanisms in order to cou nter effectively
all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, as well as extremist political parties, movements and groups, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other similar extremist ideological movemen ts
that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
38. Encourages States parties to the Convention to ensure that their
legislation incorporates the provisions of the Convention, including those of
article 4;
39. Encourages States to adopt the legislation necessary to combat racism
while ensuring that the definition of racial discrimination set out therein complies
with article 1 of the Convention;
40. Recalls that any legislative or constitutional measures adopted with a
view to countering extremist political parties, movements and groups, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and similar extremist ideological movements

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should be in conformity with the relevant international human rights norms, in

particular articles 4 and 5 of the Convention and articles 19 to 22 of the Covenant;
41. Also recalls the request of the Commission on Human Rights, in its
resolution 2005/5, 5 that the Special Rapporteur continue to reflect on this issue,
make relevant recommendations in his future reports and seek and take into account
in this regard the views of Governments and non-governmental organizations;
42. Encourages States to consider including in their reports for the universal
periodic review and to relevant treaty bodies informatio n on the steps taken to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including
with the aim of implementing the provisions of the present resolution;
43. Requests the Special Rapporteur to prepare, for submission to the
General Assembly at its seventieth session and to the Human Rights Council at its
twenty-ninth session, reports on the implementation of the present resolution, in
particular regarding paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 24 and 25 above, based on the
views collected in accordance with the request of the Commission, as recalled in
paragraph 41 above;
44. Expresses its appreciation to those Governments that have provided
information to the Special Rapporteur in the course of the preparation of his reports
to the General Assembly;
45. Stresses that such information is important for the sharing of experiences
and best practices in the fight against extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other extremist ideological
movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance;
46. Encourages Governments and non-governmental organizations to
cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur in the exercise of the tasks outlined in
paragraph 43 above;
47. Encourages Governments, non-governmental organizations and relevant
actors to disseminate, as widely as possible, information regarding the contents of
and the principles outlined in the present resolution, including through the media,
but not limited to it;
48. Decides to remain seized of the issue.

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Draft resolution II
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 67/156 of 20 December 2012,
Recalling also its resolution 68/268 of 9 April 2014 on strengthening and
enhancing the effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system,
1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General 1 on the status of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination; 2
2. Also takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the financial
situation of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 3 and invites
the Secretary-General to follow up with States parties that are in arrears, as
articulated in the report, to fulfil their outstanding financial obligations under article
8, paragraph 6, of the Convention;
3. Further takes note of the reports of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination on its eighty-first and eighty-second 4 and its eighty-third and
eighty-fourth 5 sessions;
4. Reiterates, in the run-up to the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the
Convention, its call for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the
Convention by all States parties to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination;
5. Invites the Chair of the Committee to present an oral report on the work
of the Committee and to engage in an interactive dialogue with the General
Assembly at its seventy-first session under the item entitled “Elimination of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance ”;
6. Decides to consider, at its seventy-first session, under the item entitled
“Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenop hobia and related intolerance”,
the reports of the Committee on its eighty-fifth and eighty-sixth and its eighty-
seventh and eighty-eighth sessions, the report of the Secretary-General on the
financial situation of the Committee, should the financial situa tion of the Committee
change, and the report of the Secretary-General on the status of the Convention.

__________________
1 A/69/329.
2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
3 A/69/328.
4 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/68/18).
5 Ibid., Sixty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/69/18).

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Draft resolution III

A global call for concrete action for the total elimination of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the
comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action

The General Assembly,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the comprehensive follow-up to the
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference, 1 and in this regard
underlining the imperative need for their full and effective implementati on,
Stressing that the outcome of the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance has the same status as the
outcomes of all the major United Nations conferences, summits and special sessions
in the human rights and social fields, and that the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action remains a solid basis and the only instructive outcome of the
World Conference, which prescribes comprehensive measures for combating all the
scourges of racism and adequate remedies for victims,
Recalling the three Decades for Action to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination previously declared by the General Assembly, and regretting that the
Programmes of Action for those Decades were not fully implemented and that their
objectives are yet to be attained,
Reiterating that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights
and have the potential to contribute constructively to the development and well -
being of their societies, and that any doctrine of racial superiority is scientifically
false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous and must be rejected,
together with theories that attempt to determine the existence of separate human
races,
Underlining the intensity, magnitude and organized nature of slavery and the
slave trade, including the transatlantic slave trade, and the associated historical
injustices, as well as the untold suffering caused by colonialism and apartheid, and
that Africans and people of African descent, Asians and people of Asian d escent and
indigenous peoples continue to be victims of the cascading effects of those legacies,
Acknowledging the efforts and initiatives undertaken by States to prohibit
racial discrimination and racial segregation and to engender the full enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights,
Emphasizing that, despite efforts in this regard, millions of human beings
continue to be victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, including their contemporary forms and manifestations, some of which
manifest in violent forms,
Welcoming the efforts made by civil society in support of the follow-up
mechanisms in the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action,
__________________
1 See A/CONF.189/12 and Corr.1, chap. I.

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Recalling the appointment of the five independent eminent experts on 16 June

2003 by the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 56/266 of
27 March 2002, with the mandate to follow up on the implementation of the
provisions of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and to make
appropriate recommendations thereon, and in this regard underlining the role played
and still to be played by those independent eminent experts in mobilizing global
political will for concrete action for the total elimi nation of all the scourges of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,
Underlining the primacy of the political will, international cooperation and
adequate funding at the national, regional and international levels needed to add ress
all forms and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance for the successful implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action,
Recalling its resolution 2142 (XXI) of 26 October 1966, by which it
proclaimed 21 March as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination,
Recalling also its resolution 62/122 of 17 December 2007, in which it
designated 25 March as an annual International Day of Remembrance of the Victims
of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade,
Recalling further the suffering of the victims of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, and the need to honour their memory,
Noting that 2016 will mark the fifteenth anniversary of the Durba n Declaration
and Programme of Action, and looking forward to its commemoration,
Recognizing and affirming that the global fight against racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and all their abhorrent and
contemporary forms and manifestations is a matter of priority for the international
community,

I
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
1. Reaffirms the paramount importance of universal adherence to and the
full and effective implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 adopted by the General
Assembly in its resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965, in addressing the
scourges of racism and racial discrimination;
2. Calls upon States that have not done so to consider acceding to the
Convention, and States parties to make the declaration under article 14 of the
Convention, as a matter of urgency;
3. Underlines, in the above context, that the provisions of the Conventio n
do not respond effectively to contemporary manifestations of racial discrimination,
in particular in relation to xenophobia and related intolerance, which is recognized
as the rationale behind the convening of the World Conference against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in 2001;

__________________
2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.

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4. Takes note of the acknowledgement by the Human Rights Council and its
subsidiary structures of the existence of both procedural and substantive gaps in the
aforementioned Convention, which must be filled as a matter of urgency, necessity
and priority;
5. Invites the Human Rights Council, in conjunction with its Ad Hoc
Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in the
execution of its mandate, to continue to elaborate complementary standards in order
to fill existing gaps in the Convention, in the form of new normative standards
aimed at combating all forms of contemporary and resurgent racism, and in this
regard, areas such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and incitement to
national or ethnic and religious hatred that have been identified as constituting
substantive gaps;

II
International Decade for People of African Descent
6. Welcomes the proclamation of the International Decade for People of
African Descent, as contained in its resolution 68/237 of 23 December 2013, and
looks forward to the celebratory launch of the Decade on 10 December 2014;
7. Also welcomes the adoption of the programme of activities for the
implementation of the International Decade for People of African Descent; 3
8. Requests the Human Rights Council, through the Chair of the Working
Group of Experts on People of African Descent, to submit a report on t he work of
the Working Group to the General Assembly, and in this regard invites the Chair of
the Working Group to engage in an interactive dialogue with the Assembly under
the item entitled “Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance” at its seventieth session;

III
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
9. Welcomes the positive response by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights to the requests made by the Human Rights
Council, in its resolution 6/22 of 8 September 2007, 4 and by the General Assembly,
in its resolution 68/151 of 18 December 2013, to realign the work and the name of
the erstwhile Anti-Discrimination Unit in the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, and also welcomes its renaming as the Anti -
Racial Discrimination Section, and the realignment of its operational activities to
focus exclusively on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, as defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Durban Declaration;
10. Also welcomes the inclusion of the historic and landmark World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance of 2001 among the 20 major achievements of the Office of the High

__________________
3 Resolution 69/16, annex.
4 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53),
chap. I, sect. A.

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Commissioner since the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of

Action in 1993; 5
11. Requests the Secretary-General and the Office of the High Commissioner
to provide the resources necessary for the effective fulfilment of the mandates of the
Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action, the Working Group of Experts on People of
African Descent, the group of independent eminent experts on the implementation
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and the Ad Hoc Committee on
the Elaboration of Complementary Standards;

IV
Group of independent eminent experts on the implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action
12. Reiterates its requests to the Secretary-General, pursuant to its resolution
68/151, to revitalize and reactivate the operational activities of the group of
independent eminent experts;
13. Reiterates its invitation to the Human Rights Council, pursuant to
paragraph 16 of its resolution 68/151, to ensure the visibility, effective participation
and optimal utilization of the vast knowledge and experience of the group of
independent eminent experts within its subsidiary structures charged with the
mandate of and responsibility for the comprehensive follow-up to the World
Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance and the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action, and in this regard requests the Council to submit a pr ogress
report to the General Assembly at its seventieth session;

V
Trust Fund for the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and
Racial Discrimination
14. Recalls the establishment by the Secretary-General, in 1973, of the Trust
Fund for the Programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial
Discrimination as a funding mechanism that has been utilized for the
implementation of the activities of the three Decades for Action to Combat Racism
and Racial Discrimination declared by the General Assembly, and in this regard
appreciates the fact that the Trust Fund has also been utilized for the subsequent
programmes and operational activities transcending the three Decades;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to include, in his report on the
implementation of the present resolution to the Assembly at its seventieth session, a
section outlining the progress in the implementation of paragraph 18 of its
resolution 68/151, regarding the revitalization of the Trust Fund for the purpose o f
ensuring the successful implementation of the activities of the International Decade
for People of African Descent and enhancing the effectiveness of the comprehensive
follow-up to the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance and the effective implementation of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action;

__________________
5 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.

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16. Strongly appeals to all Governments, intergovernmental and

non-governmental organizations and individuals as well as other donors in a
position to do so to contribute generously to the Trust Fund for the Programme for
the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and to that end
requests the Secretary-General to continue to undertake appropriate contacts and
initiatives to encourage contributions;

VI
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance
17. Takes note of the reports of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, 6 and
encourages the Special Rapporteur, within his mandate, to continue to focus on the
issues of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and
incitement to hatred, which impede peaceful coexistence and harmony within
societies, and to submit reports in this regard to the Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly;
18. Reiterates the invitation to the Special Rapporteur to consider examining
national models of mechanisms that measure racial equality and their added value in
the eradication of racial discrimination and to report on such challenges, successes
and best practices in his next report;

VII
Follow-up and implementation activities
19. Reiterates its request to the Human Rights Council to develop and adopt
a multi-year programme of activities to provide for the renewed and strengthened
outreach activities needed to inform and mobilize the global public in support of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and to strengthen aware ness of the
contribution that it has made in the struggle against racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance;
20. Calls upon the Human Rights Council to commence preparations for the
commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action, including through the Intergovernmental
Working Group on the Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action;
21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its
seventieth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;
22. Requests the President of the General Assembly and the President of the
Human Rights Council to continue convening annual commemorative meetings of
the Assembly and the Council during the commemoration of the International Day
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, with the appropriate focus and themes,
and to hold a debate on the state of racial discrimination worldwide, with the
participation of the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, and in this context encourages the participation of eminent
personalities active in the field of racial discrimination, Member States and civil

__________________
6 A/69/334 and A/69/340.

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society organizations in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Assembly and
the Council, respectively;
23. Decides to remain seized of this priority matter at its seventieth session
under the item entitled “Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance”.

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27. The Third Committee also recommends to the General Assembly the adoption
of the following draft decision:

Documents considered by the General Assembly in connection

with the elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance

The General Assembly takes note of the following documents submitted under
the item entitled “Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance”:
(a) Progress report of the United Nations High Commissio ner for Human
Rights on the realignment of work and name of the Anti-Discrimination Unit; 1
(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the global efforts for the total
elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and
the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action. 2

__________________
1 A/69/186.
2 A/69/354.

26/26 14-66751
 United Nations A /69/PV.73
General Assembly
asdf Sixty-ninth session

73rd plenary meeting

Official Records

Thursday, 18 December 2014, 10 a.m.

New York

President: Mr. Kutesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Uganda)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Mendonça e “Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations,
Moura (Portugal), Vice-President, took the Chair. is unjustifiable, regardless of its motivation
and wherever, whenever and by whomever it is
The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. committed. I call on the international community
to redouble its efforts in the fight against the
Terrorist attack on school in Pakistan scourge of terrorism. The perpetrators of these acts
should be brought to justice, and I call on Member
The Acting President: Before proceeding to the
States, in accordance with their obligations under
items on our agenda, I should like, on behalf of the
international law, to cooperate and support the
General Assembly, to express my sincere compassion
efforts of the Government of Pakistan in this
and deepest sympathy to the Government and people
regard.”
of Pakistan following the horrific terrorist attack at a
school in Peshawar.
Reports of the Third Committee
On behalf of the President of the General Assembly,
The Acting President: The General Assembly will
I wish to deliver the following statement:
consider the reports of the Third Committee on agenda
“I condemn, in the strongest terms, the items 26, 27, 61, 63 to 68, 105, 106, 118 and 133.
horrific terrorist act that took place at the school in
I request the Rapporteur of the Third Committee,
Peshawar, Pakistan, on 16 December 2014, causing
Mr. Ervin Nina of Albania, to introduce in one
numerous deaths and injuries, the majority of which
intervention the reports of the Committee.
were among children. I also condemn other recent
terror attacks around the world. Mr. Nina (Albania), Rapporteur of the Third
Committee: It is a great honour and privilege for me
“I extend my deepest sympathy and condolences
to introduce to the General Assembly the reports of
to the victims of that heinous act, their families
the Third Committee submitted under the agenda
and the people and Government of Pakistan.
items allocated to it by the General Assembly, namely,
The United Nations General Assembly stands
items 26, 27, 61, 63 to 68, 105, 106, 118 and 133. The
in solidarity with the people and Government of
reports, contained in documents A/69/480 to A/69/942,
Pakistan in this difficult moment. I wish also to
include the texts of draft resolutions and decisions
stress the importance of ensuring the right of every
recommended to the General Assembly for adoption.
child to have access to education in a safe learning
For the convenience of delegations, the Secretariat
environment.
has issued document A/C.3/69/INF/1, which contains

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches
delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only.
They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
(verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
14-70272 (E)
*1470272*
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014

a checklist of actions taken on the draft proposals Under agenda item 68 (a), entitled “Promotion and
contained in the reports before the Assembly. protection of human rights: Implementation of human
rights instruments”, the Third Committee wishes
Under agenda item 26, including sub-items (a) to
to advise the General Assembly that no action was
(d), entitled “Social development”, the Third Committee
required under the item.
recommends, in paragraph 37 of document A/69/480,
the adoption of six draft resolutions. Under agenda item 68 (b), entitled “Promotion and
protection of human rights: Human rights questions,
Under agenda item 27, including sub-items (a)
including alternative approaches for improving the
and (b), entitled “Advancement of women”, the Third
effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
Committee recommends, in paragraph 34 of document
freedoms”, the Third Committee recommends, in
A/69/481, the adoption of five draft resolutions and, in
paragraph 156 of document A/69/488/Add.2, the
paragraph 35, the adoption of one draft decision.
adoption of 22 draft resolutions.
Under agenda item 61, entitled “Report of the United
Under agenda item 68 (c), entitled “Promotion and
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, questions
protection of human rights: Human rights situations
relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons
and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives”,
and humanitarian questions”, the Third Committee
the Third Committee recommends, in paragraph 36 of
recommends, in paragraph 17 of document A/69/482,
document A/69/488/Add.3, the adoption of four draft
the adoption of three draft resolutions.
resolutions.
Under agenda item 63, entitled “Report of the
It is my understanding that the Assembly will
Human Rights Council”, the Third Committee
defer its consideration of draft resolution III, entitled
recommends, in paragraph 12 of document A/69/483,
“Situation of human rights in Myanmar”, until such
the adoption of one draft resolution.
time that it has before it the pertinent report of the Fifth
Under agenda item 64, entitled “Promotion Committee.
and protection of the rights of children”, the Third
Under agenda item 68 (d), entitled “Promotion
Committee recommends, in paragraph 29 of document
and protection of human rights: Comprehensive
A/69/484, the adoption of three draft resolutions and, in
implementation of and follow-up to the Vienna
paragraph 30, the adoption of one draft decision.
Declaration and Programme of Action”, the Third
Under agenda item 65, entitled “Rights of indigenous Committee wishes to advise the Assembly that no
peoples”, the Third Committee recommends, in action was required under the item.
paragraph 12 of document A/69/485, the adoption of
Under agenda item 105, entitled “Crime
one draft resolution.
prevention and criminal justice”, the Third Committee
Under agenda item 66, entitled “Elimination of recommends, in paragraph 41 of document A/69/489,
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related the adoption of nine draft resolutions and, in paragraph
intolerance”, the Third Committee recommends, in 42, the adoption of one draft decision.
paragraph 26 of document A/69/486, the adoption
Under agenda item 106, entitled “International
of three draft resolutions and, in paragraph 27, the
drug control”, the Third Committee recommends, in
adoption of one draft decision.
paragraph 15 of document A/69/490, the adoption of
Under agenda item 67, entitled “Right of peoples to two draft resolutions and, in paragraph 16, the adoption
self-determination”, the Third Committee recommends, of one draft decision.
in paragraph 18 of document A/69/487, the adoption of
Under agenda item 118, entitled “Revitalization
three draft resolutions.
of the work of the General Assembly”, the Third
Under agenda item 68, entitled “Promotion and Committee recommends, in paragraph 6 of document
protection of human rights”, the Third Committee A/69/491, the adoption of one draft decision.
recommends, in paragraph 5 of document A/69/488, the
Finally, under agenda item 133, entitled “Programme
adoption of one draft decision.
planning”, the Third Committee wishes to advise the

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Assembly, in document A/69/492, that no action was
required under the item.
I want to take this opportunity to thank my fellow
Bureau members, in particular, the Chair of the
Committee, Mrs. Sofia Mesquita Borges, Permanent
Representative of Timor-Leste, and the Vice-Chairs,
Mr. Kurt Davis of Jamaica, Mr. Pierre Faye of Senegal
and Ms. Johanna Nilsson of Sweden, as well as the
Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Moncef Khane, and
his team for their support and friendship in the efficient
management of the proceedings of the Third Committee
and for ensuring its timely conclusion.
In conclusion, I should like to respectfully commend
the reports of the Third Committee to the plenary of the
General Assembly for its consideration.
The Acting President: I thank Mr. Ervin Nina,
Rapporteur of the Third Committee.
If there is no proposal under rule 66 of the rules
of procedure, I shall take it that the General Assembly
decides not to discuss the reports of the Third Committee
that are before the Assembly today.
It was so decided.
The Acting President: Statements will therefore
be limited to explanations of vote or position. The
positions of delegations regarding the recommendations
of the Third Committee have been made clear in the
Committee and are reflected in the relevant official
records.
May I remind members that, under paragraph 7 of
decision 34/401, the General Assembly agreed that
“When the same draft resolution is considered
in a Main Committee and in plenary meeting, a
delegation should, as far as possible, explain its
vote only once, i.e., either in the Committee or in
plenary meeting, unless that delegation’s vote in
plenary meeting is different from its vote in the
Committee.”
May I further remind delegations that, also in
accordance with decision 34/401, explanations of vote
or position are limited to 10 minutes and should be
made by delegations from their seats.
Before we begin to take action on the recommendations
contained in the reports of the Committee, I should like
to advise representatives that we are going to proceed
to take decisions in the same manner as was done in
the Committee, unless the Secretariat is notified to the
14-702723/31
contrary in advance. This means that where recorded
votes were taken, we will do the same. I should also
hope that we will proceed to adopt without a vote those
recommendations that were adopted without a vote in
the Committee.
Before proceeding further, I would like to draw
the attention of members to a note by the Secretariat,
entitled “List of proposals contained in the reports
of the Third Committee”, which has been circulated,
in English only, as document A/C.3/69/INF/1. This
note has been distributed desk-to-desk as a reference
guide for action on draft resolutions and decisions
recommended by the Committee in its reports.
In this connection, members will find, in column
four of the note, the symbols of the draft resolutions
or decisions of the Committee, with the corresponding
symbols of the reports for action in the plenary in
column two of the same note. For reports containing
multiple recommendations, the draft resolution or
decision number is contained in column three of the
note.
Furthermore, members are reminded that additional
sponsors are no longer accepted now that draft
resolutions and decisions have been adopted by the
Committee. Any clarification about sponsorship should
be addressed to the Secretary of the Committee.
Agenda item 26
Social development (continued)
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/480)
The Acting President: The Assembly now has
before it six draft resolutions recommended by the
Third Committee in paragraph 37 of its report. We will
now take a decision on draft resolutions I to VI, one by
one.
Draft resolution I is entitled “Literacy for life:
shaping future agendas”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do likewise?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/141).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Realizing the Millennium Development Goals
and other internationally agreed development goals for
persons with disabilities towards 2015 and beyond”.
The Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the
Assembly wishes to do likewise?
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/142).
The Acting President: Draft resolution III is
entitled “Implementation of the outcome of the World
Summit for Social Development and of the twenty-
fourth special session of the General Assembly”. The
Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the
Assembly wishes to do likewise?
Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
69/143).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IV is
entitled “Celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the
International Year of the Family”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do
the same?
Draft resolution IV was adopted (resolution 69/144).
The Acting President: Draft resolution V is entitled
“World Youth Skills Day”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do the same?
Draft resolution V was adopted (resolution 69/145).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VI is
entitled “Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on
Ageing”. The Third Committee adopted it. May I take
it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution VI was adopted (resolution
69/146).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 26 and its sub-items (a)
to (d)?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 27
Advancement of women
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/481)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it five draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 34 of its report and a draft
decision recommended by the Committee in paragraph
35 of the same report.
We will now take a decision on draft resolutions I
to V and the draft decision, one by one.
4/31
We first turn to draft resolution I, entitled
“Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms
of violence against women and girls”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/147).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Intensification of efforts to end obstetric
fistula”. The Third Committee adopted it. May I take it
that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/148).
The Acting President: Draft resolution III is
entitled “Trafficking in women and girls”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
69/149).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IV is
entitled “Intensifying global efforts for the elimination
of female genital mutilations”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do likewise?
Draft resolution IV was adopted (resolution 69/150).
The Acting President: Draft resolution V is entitled
“Follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women
and full implementation of the Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action and the outcome of the twenty-third
special session of the General Assembly”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do likewise?
Draft resolution V was adopted (resolution 69/151).
The Acting President: We shall now turn to
paragraph 35 of the report to take action on the draft
decision entitled “Report considered by the General
Assembly in connection with the advancement of
women”. May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly
to adopt the draft decision as recommended by the
Third Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/531).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is the
wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of
agenda item 27 and its sub-items (a) and (b)?
It was so decided.
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Agenda item 61
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees
and displaced persons and humanitarian questions
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/482)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it three draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 17 of its report.
We will now take a decision on draft resolutions I
to III, one by one.
Draft resolution I is entitled “Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do likewise?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/152).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is entitled
“Enlargement of the Executive Committee of the
Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees”. The Third Committee adopted it. May I
take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/153).
The Acting President: Draft resolution III is
entitled “Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced
persons in Africa”. The Third Committee adopted it.
May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
69/154).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 61?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 63 (continued)
Report of the Human Rights Council
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/483)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it a draft resolution recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 12 of its report. We will now
take a decision on the draft resolution. A recorded vote
has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
14-702725/31
In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic
of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Belarus, Israel
Abstaining:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland,
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, decision recommended by the Committee in paragraph
United States of America 30 of the same report. We will now take a decision on
draft resolutions I, II and II and on the draft decision,
The draft resolution was adopted by 125 votes to 2,
one by one.
with 56 abstentions (resolution 69/155).
Draft resolution I is entitled “Child, early and
[Subsequently, the delegation of Uzbekistan informed
forced marriage”. The Third Committee adopted it.
the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]
May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?
The Acting President: I now give the floor to
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/156).
the representative of Kuwait, who wishes to speak in
explanation of vote after the voting. The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Rights of the child”. The Third Committee
Mrs. AlMuzaini (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic):
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
I would like to make a statement on agenda item 63,
do the same?
“Report of the Human Rights Council”, on behalf of
the member countries of the Gulf States. I would Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/157).
like to thank the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for
The Acting President: Draft resolution III is
introducing, on behalf of the African States, resolution
entitled “Protecting children from bullying”. The Third
69/155, which the Third Committee adopted by a vote
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
on 23 November and which reviews the resolutions and
wishes to do the same?
decisions of the Human Rights Council for this year
and makes recommendations to the General Assembly. Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
Considering that the Human Rights Council is the 69/158).
primary body concerned with human rights protection
The Acting President: We shall now turn to
and international humanitarian law around the world,
paragraph 30 of the report to take action on the draft
we voted in favour of the resolution in the Third
decision entitled “Reports considered by the General
Committee.
Assembly in connection with the question of the
At the same time, however, we have expressed promotion and protection of the rights of children”. May
some reservations regarding Human Rights Council I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to adopt the
resolution 27/32, on human rights and gender identity, draft decision recommended by the Third Committee?
adopted at the Council’s twenty-seventh session. Our
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/532).
countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates
and Kuwait, would like to express their concern that The Acting President: May I take it that it is
some States are trying to impose their viewpoint on the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
the subject, which has nothing to do with humanitarian consideration of agenda item 64?
law, and which does not take into consideration the
It was so decided.
religious, social and cultural background of a number
of countries and societies. I would like this statement to
Agenda item 65 (continued)
be part of the record of this meeting.
Rights of indigenous peoples
The Acting President: The Assembly has thus
concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item Report of the Third Committee (A/69/485)
63.
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it a draft resolution recommended by the Third
Agenda item 64 (continued)
Committee in paragraph 12 of its report. We will now
Promotion and protection of the rights of children take a decision on the draft resolution. The Third
Committee adopted the draft resolution. May I take it
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/484)
that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
The draft resolution was adopted (resolution
it three draft resolutions recommended by the Third
69/159).
Committee in paragraph 29 of its report, and a draft

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The Acting President: May I take it that it is Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe,
consideration of agenda item 65? Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
It was so decided.
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Agenda item 66 (continued)
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
xenophobia and related intolerance Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam,
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/486)
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
The Acting President: The Assembly has before it
Against:
three draft resolutions recommended by the Committee
Canada, Palau, Ukraine, United States of America
in paragraph 26 of its report, and one draft decision
recommended by the Committee in paragraph 27 of Abstaining:
the same report. We will now take a decision on draft Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
resolutions I, II and III and on the draft decision, one Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
by one. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
We turn first to draft resolution I, entitled
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
“Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary
Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal,
and related intolerance”. A recorded vote has been
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
requested.
Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
A recorded vote was taken. Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Turkey,
In favour:
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Ireland
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Draft resolution I was adopted by 133 votes to 4,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State with 51 abstentions (resolution 69/160).
of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
entitled “International Convention on the Elimination
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
of All Forms of Discrimination”. The Third Committee
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of
likewise?
Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/161).
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
The Acting President: Draft III is entitled “A
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
global call for concrete action for the total elimination
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan,
intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
of Action.” A recorded vote has been requested.
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, A recorded vote was taken.
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
In favour:
Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation,

14-702727/31
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte
d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet
Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America
Abstaining:
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tonga,
Ukraine
8/31
Draft resolution III was adopted by 134 votes to 10,
with 42 abstentions (resolution 69/162).
[Subsequently, the delegation of Malta informed
the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]
The Acting President: We shall now turn to
paragraph 27 of the report (A/69/486) to take action on
the draft decision entitled “Documents considered by the
General Assembly in connection with the elimination
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance”. May I take it that it is the wish
of the General Assembly to adopt the draft decision as
recommended by the Third Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/533).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 66?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 67
Right of peoples to self-determination
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/487)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it three draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 18 of its report. We will now
take a decision on draft resolutions I to III, one by one.
Draft resolution I is entitled “Use of mercenaries
as a means of violating human rights and impeding the
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”.
A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State
of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
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India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet
Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America
Abstaining:
Chad, Fiji, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Switzerland,
Tonga
Draft resolution I was adopted by 130 votes to 52,
with 7 abstentions (resolution 69/163).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Universal realization of the right of peoples to
self-determination”. The Third Committee adopted it.
May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/164).
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
resolution III, entitled “The right of the Palestinian
14-702729/31
people to self-determination”. A recorded vote has been
requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet
Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
Against:
Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, United States
of America
Abstaining:
Cameroon, Paraguay, South Sudan, Tonga
Draft resolution III was adopted by 180 votes to 7,
with 4 abstentions (resolution 69/165).
[Subsequently, the delegation of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia informed the
Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 68?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 68
Promotion and protection of human rights
(a) Implementation of human rights instruments
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/488/Add.1)
The Acting President: May I take it that the
General Assembly wishes to take note of the report of
the Third Committee?
It was so decided.
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of sub-item (a) of agenda item 68?
It was so decided.
(b) Human rights questions, including alternative
approaches for improving the effective enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/488/Add.2)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it 22 draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 156 of its report entitled
“Human rights questions, including alternative
approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms”, issued as
document A/69/488/Add.2.
I invite delegations wishing to explain their vote
before the vote on any or all of the 22 draft resolutions
10/31
I to XXII contained in document A/69/488/Add.2 to do
so now.
Mr. Al-Mouallimi (Saudi Arabia) (spoke in
Arabic): At the outset, my delegation would like to
express its thanks and appreciation to the delegations
of Brazil and Germany for their great efforts in
facilitating negotiations on draft resolution I, entitled
“The right to privacy in the digital age” (see A/69/488/
Add.2). We believe that taking security and safety
measures and internal policies, and ensuring the right
to privacy in the digital age, is the prerogative of each
State as it tries to protect its citizens. The Internet does
not recognize boundaries or geographical limitations.
International coordination as a part of the right of
privacy is therefore important, although so far there
has been no established framework for regulating such
coordination and cooperation. As national measures
and policies are not sufficient to protect this kind of
privacy, the delegation of Saudi Arabia believes it
necessary to create an international mechanism under
United Nations auspices to develop international
policies and regulations on the use and monitoring of
the Internet.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states that it is everyone’s
right to express themselves. While the freedom of
expression may be guaranteed, it also presupposes
responsibilities and duties related to mutual respect,
reputation, international safety and security, health
and international ethics. That is why my country
strives to ensure the privacy of its citizens in the use
of the Internet and allows for freedom of expression
and access to services without discrimination among
different groups or individuals. The responsibility
to establish controls and limits for certain groups or
individuals is the sovereign right of the State as it
implements national legislation.
My delegation welcomes the efforts of the
Government of Brazil in hosting the Global
Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet
Governance, held in São Paulo in April, in which we
participated actively alongside other States parties. We
note, however, that the conclusions of the Meeting made
light of the conclusions drawn at other international
conferences held on the subject. The World Summit on
the Information Society, which addressed the issue of
access to important information in the digital age, was
held in two stages, first in Geneva in 2003 and then in
Tunis in 2005. The conclusions called for mechanisms
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to consider questions of general international policy on
the Internet, including privacy, with a comprehensive
and integrated approach that would take into account
the various roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders
cited under paragraph 35 of the programme of work.
Moreover, the conclusions of the conference did not
take into account the viewpoints and suggestions of
States, and as a result no consensus was achieved at
the last conference, given the diverse approaches and
diverging viewpoints.
Therefore, in the informal negotiations my
delegation asked that we not refer to the São Paulo
conference, given that the preparatory committee for
São Paulo was not transparent and had not taken into
account the viewpoints of States and stakeholders. Its
meetings were neither transparent nor convened within
the United Nations framework. For these reasons,
we cannot genuinely commit ourselves to accepting
the tenth preambular paragraph, which refers to the
São Paulo Meeting. Reference should be made to this
conference in the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, the General Assembly or the Human Rights
Council.
My delegation would like these reservations to be
reflected in the Third Committee’s final report.
Mr. Manongi (United Republic of Tanzania): I
am taking the floor in relation to agenda item 68 (b)
and draft resolution V (see A/69/488/Add.2), regarding
International Albinism Awareness Day.
Too often, we have reminded ourselves in the
General Assembly and the Organization of the need to
be purposeful in our efforts and actions. The challenges
facing people living with albinism are numerous and
serious and require concrete action. Regrettably, the
draft resolution before the Assembly offers little of
the tangible support that people living with albinism
need and deserve. There are diverse challenges facing
people with albinism, ranging from medical to social
to educational. These ought to be recognized and
addressed.
As a country with a considerable population of
citizens affected with albinism, the United Republic of
Tanzania sought a draft resolution that could be acted
on, which we believe would have better served to address
those challenges. A merely declaratory draft resolution,
such as the one before the Assembly, is useful but falls
far too short in making a substantial contribution to the
scope and magnitude of the challenge. It was in that
regard that the United Republic of Tanzania sought to
put the draft resolution to a vote, and because of the
limitations inherent in the draft resolution we will
again abstain in the voting on it and urge others to do
the same.
The Acting President: We will now take a decision
on draft resolutions I to XXII, one by one. After all the
decisions have been taken, representatives will again
have the opportunity to explain their vote.
We turn first to draft resolution I, entitled “The right
to privacy in the digital age”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do the same?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/166).
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
resolution II, entitled “Protection of migrants”. The
Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the
Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/167).
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
resolution III, entitled “The role of the Ombudsman,
mediator and other national human rights institutions
in the promotion and protection of human rights”. The
Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the
Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
69/168).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IV is
entitled “International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution IV was adopted (resolution 69/169).
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
resolution V, entitled “International Albinism
Awareness Day”. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State
of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei

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Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, [Subsequently, the delegation of Tunisia informed
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in
African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, favour.]
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus,
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
Czech Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of
resolution VI, entitled “United Nations Human Rights
Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Training and Documentation Centre for South-West
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Asia and the Arab Region”. A recorded vote has been
Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon,
requested.
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, A recorded vote was taken.
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India,
In favour:
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland,
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia,
Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize,
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde,
Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar,
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati,
Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,
Yemen
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Against: Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
None Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Abstaining:
Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the
Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Saint
Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino,
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Draft resolution V was adopted by 171 votes to Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
none, with 16 abstentions (resolution 69/170). Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,

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Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania,
United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet
Nam, Yemen, Zambia
Against:
Syrian Arab Republic
Abstaining:
Rwanda, South Africa, Zimbabwe
Draft resolution VI was adopted by 182 votes to 1,
with 3 abstentions (resolution 69/171).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VII is
entitled “Human rights in the administration of justice”.
The Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the
Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution VII was adopted (resolution
69/172).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VIII
is entitled “Globalization and its impact on the full
enjoyment of all human rights”. A recorded vote has
been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State
of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo,
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
14-7027213/31
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian
Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa,
Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America
Abstaining:
Central African Republic
Draft resolution VIII was adopted by 135 votes to
53, with 1 abstention (resolution 69/173).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IX is
entitled “Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping,
stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence
and violence against persons, based on religion or
belief”. The Third Committee adopted it. May I take it
that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution IX was adopted (resolution 69/174).
The Acting President: Draft resolution X is
entitled “Freedom of religion or belief”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution X was adopted (resolution 69/175).
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014

The Acting President: Draft resolution XI is (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro,
entitled “Promotion of peace as a vital requirement Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,
for the full enjoyment of all human rights by all”. A Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
recorded vote has been requested. Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
A recorded vote was taken.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
In favour: Ireland, United States of America
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Abstaining:
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Singapore, Tonga
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational Draft resolution XI was adopted by 134 votes to 53,
State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, with 2 abstentions (resolution 69/176).
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia,
The Acting President: We now turn to draft
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
resolution XII, entitled “The right to food”. The Third
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica,
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic
wishes to do the same?
of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Draft resolution XII was adopted (resolution
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 69/177).
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
The Acting President: Draft resolution XIII is
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
entitled “Promotion of a democratic and equitable
Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
international order”. A recorded vote has been
Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
requested.
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, A recorded vote was taken.
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
In favour:
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon,
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia,
and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles,
Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab
of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia,
Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,
Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Against: Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,

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Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America
Abstaining:
Armenia, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Samoa
Draft resolution XIII was adopted by 129 votes to
53, with 6 abstentions (resolution 69/178).
The Acting President: Draft resolution XIV is
entitled “Enhancement of international cooperation
in the field of human rights”. The Third Committee
adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do the same?
Draft resolution XIV was adopted (resolution
69/179).
The Acting President: Draft resolution XV
is entitled “Human rights and unilateral coercive
measures”. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
14-7027215/31
Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros,
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Against:
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia
(Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America
Abstaining:
Chad
Draft resolution XV was adopted by 134 votes to
53, with one abstention (resolution 69/180).
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014

The Acting President: Draft resolution XVI is Abstaining:

entitled “The right to development”. A recorded vote Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
has been requested. Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Latvia,
A recorded vote was taken.
Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
In favour: Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Romania, Samoa, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria,
Draft resolution XVI was adopted by 156 votes to 5,
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
with 26 abstentions (resolution 69/181).
Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia
(Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, [Subsequently, the delegation of Brunei Darussalam
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote
Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African in favour.]
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
The Acting President: Draft resolution XVII
Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba,
is entitled “Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
Cyprus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
executions”. A recorded vote has been requested.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, A recorded vote was taken.
El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
In favour:
Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece,
Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
(Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia,
Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein,
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lebanon,
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives,
Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts
Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico,
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe,
Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Suriname, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint
Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia,
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia,
Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay,
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian
Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago,
Against: Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United
Canada, Israel, Palau, United Kingdom of Great Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela
America (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam

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Against: The Acting President: Draft resolution XXI is

None entitled “Moratorium on the use of the death penalty”.
A recorded vote has been requested.
Abstaining:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, A recorded vote was taken.
Bangladesh, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam,
In favour:
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, China, Comoros,
Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina,
Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of),
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina
Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada,
Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus,
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau,
Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Yemen,
Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Draft resolution XVII was adopted by 122 votes to Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique,
none, with 66 abstentions (resolution 69/182). Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
[Subsequently, the delegations of Grenada and the
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova,
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia informed
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San
the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles,
favour.]
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South
The Acting President: Draft resolution XVIII Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Suriname, Sweden,
is entitled “Human rights and extreme poverty”. The Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav
Third Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Assembly wishes to do the same? Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Draft resolution XVIII was adopted (resolution
Ireland, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela
69/183).
(Bolivarian Republic of)
The Acting President: Draft resolution XIX is
Against:
entitled “Missing persons”. The Third Committee
Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
adopted it. May I take it that the General Assembly
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Brunei
wishes to do the same?
Darussalam, China, Democratic People’s Republic
Draft resolution XIX was adopted (resolution of Korea, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Grenada,
69/184). Guyana, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq,
Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Oman,
The Acting President: Draft resolution XX is
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Kitts
entitled “The safety of journalists and the issue of
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
impunity”. The Third Committee adopted it. May I take
Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan,
it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago,
Draft resolution XX was adopted (resolution Yemen, Zimbabwe
69/185)

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Abstaining:
Bahrain, Belarus, Cameroon, Comoros, Cuba,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon,
Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Korea,
Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Tonga, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia
Draft resolution XXI was adopted by 117 votes to
37, with 34 abstentions (resolution 69/187).
[Subsequently, the delegation of the United States
of America informed the Secretariat that it had
intended to vote against.]
The Acting President: Draft resolution XXII is
entitled “Migrant children and adolescents”. The Third
Committee adopted it. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution XXII was adopted (resolution
69/187)
May I take it that it that it is the wish of the General
Assembly to conclude its consideration of sub-item (b)
of agenda item 68?
It was so decided.
(c) Human rights situations and reports of special
rapporteurs and representatives
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/488/Add.3)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it four draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 36 of its report.
Before proceeding further, I should like to inform
members that action on draft resolution III, entitled
“Situation of human rights in Myanmar”, is postponed
to a later date to allow time for the review of its
programme budget implications by the Fifth Committee.
The Assembly will take action on draft resolution III
as soon as the report of the Fifth Committee on its
programme budget implications is available.
I shall now give the floor to representatives who
wish to speak in explanation of vote or position on draft
resolutions I, II or IV before we take action on the draft
resolutions.
18/31
Mr. Al-Musharakh (United Arab Emirates) (spoke
in Arabic): The United Arab Emirates is one of the
principal authors of the draft resolution on the situation
of human rights in Syria. We believe that we must put
an end to the tragedy that the Syrian Arab people, our
brothers, have endured for almost four years of the worst
possible abuses and violations of human rights. There
have been arbitrary killings and detentions. Civilians
have been used as targets and thousands of people have
been displaced, including women and children. The
conflict in Syria has also produced many incidents of
sexual violence and other major crimes against human
rights, which have led to other crimes against humanity
being perpetrated by the parties to the conflict in Syria,
in clear and flagrant violation of international law and
international humanitarian law. We therefore urge all
Member States to vote in favour of the draft resolution.
Mr. Ja’afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in
Arabic): My delegation wishes to speak in explanation
of vote before the voting on draft resolution II, entitled
“Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic”.
The subject of the draft resolution is not, as a
previous speaker just stated, human rights in the Syrian
Arab Republic. What provokes indignation and irony
is the fact that it is the Saudi and Qatari regimes that
are introducing a draft resolution criticizing the human
rights situation in Syria. It is a surprising paradox, for
several reasons, but, since we have limited time, I will
confine myself to citing two significant paradoxes.
First, hundreds of reports and communications
have revealed the degree to which those regimes
have fomented violence and introduced international
terrorism into Syria and created obstacles to a political
solution. Not content with arming and financing
terrorist groups and giving them support through the
media, they have established military training camps
for terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Turkey.
According to recent American reporting, including in
the Washington Post of 18 November,
“the Saudi State and its religious establishment
have for decades fuelled sectarian animosities
across the region, [which] only further entrenches
divisions and hostilities that have fuelled the rise of
extremist Islamic groups and the regional sectarian
war”.
I could also quote dozens of reports from Western
organizations, including one by the Foundation for
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Defense of Democracies, entitled “Qatar and Terror
Finance: Part I: Negligence”, which documents Qatari
organizations’ support for terrorism, citing money-
laundering and cases where terrorists are supplied
with official documents or identity papers related to
terrorism. The Qatari regime has channelled tens of
millions of dollars through financing networks to
Al-Qaida and Taliban combatants and to extremists
and Salafists in the Syrian opposition. Qatar is thus
the instigator of a foreign policy that far exceeds the
country’s actual influence and importance.
Secondly, the representatives of the Saudi and
Qatari regimes, including in paragraph 24 of the draft
resolution, are asking for the establishment in Syria of
“a civil, democratic and pluralistic State, with the full
and effective participation of women” — to which I
direct the Assembly’s attention — “and where there is
no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic,
religious, linguistic, gender or any other grounds”. The
legitimate question this raises is how Saudi Arabia and
Qatar are implementing those legitimate requests for
the benefit of their own peoples, who groan under the
yoke of traditional sheikhdoms and to this day have
never heard a word about constitutions or parliaments.
Their religious authorities and skeikhdoms are
ashamed of the women in their societies. What about
the rights of women in Saudi Arabia? What about their
full and effective participation? There are thousands of
documented examples of discrimination against women
by the Saudi regime. They are deprived of their rights;
they are imprisoned and have their identity papers
confiscated if they dare to drive a car or ride a bicycle.
Today, the Saudi authorities took arbitrary action in
the case of a Saudi girl who disguised herself as a man
so she could watch a soccer game. Is that not gender
discrimination?
The Saudi regime’s criminal practices against
women also affect the Syrian female minors living in
refugee camps in neighbouring countries. We have all
heard about sexual jihad, the maltreatment of women,
rape and forced marriage, all crimes driven by the
fall of the petrodollar sheiks that have become the
shameful and absurd subject of films and Hollywood
screenplays. We are talking about facts that are
described and documented in United Nations reports.
The Saudi Minister of the Interior — an institution that
represents the Saudi regime — went so far as to issue
a decree legitimizing the trade in minor female Syrian
orphans who lost their parents in the Syrian conflict.
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I have information showing that the Saudi Minister of
the Interior authorized the Lebanese board of guardians
to allow minor, female Syrian refugees to marry
without registering the marriages. These countries are
therefore encouraging adultery while they claim to be
representing Islam.
We talk about a civil, democratic and pluralistic
State — that is what the draft resolution says, at any
rate — but are the Saudi and Qatari regimes putting
those principles into practice? They call for pluralism
and respect for human rights, but human rights include
the right to vote. The facts show, however, that the
Saudi and the Qatari regimes do not even understand
the meaning of a democratic vote. Power is transferred
via succession through murders. I could also cite the
resolution that calls for an end to all sectarianism and
violence, but we all know that there are a number of
Saudi laws that deprive women of all their rights. There
are also Saudi laws that discriminate based on the
colour of one’s skin, race and religion.
Over the past three years, the sponsoring countries
of draft resolution II have given evidence of their
bias. They have made no positive comments about the
efforts being made by the Government of Syria. Those
countries have not recognized the danger that exists
from terrorism in the Syrian Arab Republic. They have
played a role in supporting terrorism in Iraq and Syria.
Those countries have used petrodollars to further their
own goals. They are spread throughout the world,
including Australia and Canada. They have bought
weapons from various countries around the world.
They have bought off regimes. Qatar even bought the
World Cup in 2022. Everyone is aware of this. They
have bought off everyone and everything. But do not
let your voices and your consciences be bought as
well, because the voice of the Syrian people cannot be
bought. It should also be borne in mind that terrorist
armed groups will sooner or later be knocking at the
door of those countries.
A recorded vote has been requested on draft
resolution II. I would urge all Member States to
reconsider their positions and vote against it.
Mr. An Myong Hun (Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea): My delegation would like to state its position
on draft resolution I, entitled “Situation of human
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”,
as contained in document A/69/488/Add.3, which was
submitted by the European Union (EU) and Japan.
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
My delegation totally rejects this draft resolution
because it has nothing to do with the promotion and
protection of human rights, but is the product of a
political plot and confrontation against the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. The European Union
and Japan drafted the draft resolution on the basis of
a fabricated report of the Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (A/HRC/25/63), whose members have never been
in my country. Let me once again make it clear that
the report of the Commission of Inquiry is a document
born of a political plot and has no basic attributes or
credibility to be recognized as a General Assembly
document, as it is based on the fabricated testimonies
of a handful of defectors who committed crimes and
fled their homeland.
We have consistently maintained our position
of countering confrontation and giving priority to
dialogue and cooperation in the field of human rights,
and we have also clarified our willingness to engage
in broad-ranging constructive dialogue. However, the
European Union and Japan completely blocked all
possibilities of cooperation in the field of human rights,
including a visit to the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea by a Special Rapporteur and a human rights
dialogue between the EU and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, by forcibly pushing the adoption of
the draft resolution, which does not reflect the reality
on the ground. Consequently, the European Union and
Japan themselves disclosed that their real intention in
submitting a draft resolution was not for the genuine
promotion and protection of human rights, but purely
as an act of subservience and sycophancy in support
of the hostile policy of the United States against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to overthrow
our political and social system.
If countries sponsoring draft resolution I are really
interested in the promotion and protection of human
rights, they should address the issue of the grave
human rights violations being committed in Western
countries, such as the recently revealed Central
Intelligence Agency’s crimes of torture committed
by the United States in the most brutal and shocking
manner. My delegation remains consistent with regard
to its principled position of holding a dialogue on
cooperation in the field of human rights. However, this
delegation will not tolerate any attempt to abuse human
rights issues as a tool for overthrowing our social
system.
20/31
Once again, my delegation emphasizes that
we strongly reject all the country-specific draft
resolutions — not only draft resolution I against my
country, but also draft resolutions on the situation of
human right in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian
Arab Republic and Myanmar. My delegation firmly
believes that all countries will vote against the draft
resolution sponsored by the EU and Japan, in line with
the principles and universally accepted position to
oppose politicization, selectivity and double standards
over human rights.
Mr. Dehghani (Islamic Republic of Iran): The draft
resolution on which the General Assembly will take
action on today that is sponsored by Canada — whose
behaviour in the field of human rights in the past
several years has been contradictory, particularly its
position on the recent massacre in Gaza committed by
the Israeli regime — clearly shows that it pursues only
a specific political agenda. In that regard, the issue of
human rights has been turned into a tool to advance its
agenda. Draft resolution IV is political, prejudicial and
unbalanced. It ignores the fact that Iran is a vibrant,
animated and pluralistic society with a broad spectrum
of political tendencies and corresponding media
outlets, coupled with the full spectrum of cultures and
subcultures representing different communities and
social layers, as well as multiple ethnic and religious
groups. The draft resolution also fails to acknowledge
the positive human rights developments in Iranian
society in recent times, especially since the beginning
of the new Government’s tenure.
The sponsors of the draft resolution also ignore the
constant readiness of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to cooperate with United Nations human
rights mechanisms. Iran has already demonstrated its
seriousness in working with the Universal Periodic
Review mechanism, both in terms of reporting and in
implementing the recommendations that Iran received
from Member States. It should be clear by now that an
approach based on country-specific resolutions and
mandates, such as reflected in the draft resolution
before us today, is counterproductive and undermines
the effective work of the United Nations human rights
system. It can only create a venue for those who have
political agendas against particular countries, rather
than promote human rights across the world.
In view of what I have said here, there should be
no doubt that these country-specific draft resolutions
and mandates increase distrust, damage the credibility
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of the United Nations, strengthen arguments about the
biased nature of this approach and make cooperation
with the United Nations human rights mechanism
difficult. The Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran has always shown its readiness to take a serious
and results-oriented approach to human rights based on
mutual respect and an equal footing.
At a time when many parts of our region are
burning in the fire of extremism and radicalism, mainly
due to the ill-conceived policies of certain countries,
and while the threats posed by extremist forces are
global in nature and require a unified global response,
short-sighted politically motivated vendettas such as
the one embodied in draft resolution IV are in fact
counterproductive and pointless.
I would therefore like to ask for a recorded
vote on draft resolution IV, in order to provide an
opportunity to all Member States, including the
members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, who have
already registered their opposition to this ill-conceived
approach, to preserve the dignity and credibility of
the United Nations human rights mechanisms. I hope
that the delegations here will choose the right path by
voting against this draft resolution. It is on the basis of
that approach that we have always voted against similar
resolutions introduced in the Assembly, including on
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria and
other countries.
Mrs. Moreno Guerra (Cuba) (spoke in Spanish):
Cuba has traditionally maintained a principled position
against country-specific draft resolutions that aim to
condemn developing countries based on politically
motivated reasons that have nothing to do with defending
human rights and that contribute nothing to that cause.
These toxic and selective practices of politicization
and applying double standards in the consideration of
situations of human rights were the reason that led to
the discrediting and dissolution of the Human Rights
Commission. The establishment of the Human Rights
Council and its Universal Periodic Review mechanism
offer the possibility to consider situations of human
rights issues in all countries on an equal footing, based
on genuine and constructive dialogue.
Cuba would like to reiterate that international
cooperation based on the principles of objectivity,
unconditionality, impartiality and non-selectivity is
the only way to effectively promote and protect all
human rights. Unfortunately, that is not the goal being
14-7027221/31
pursued today with the draft resolutions against these
countries, which are clearly and undoubtedly politically
motivated.
With regard to the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, a dangerous precedent has been established
that violates the rights of sovereignty and self-
determination of States in referring the issue to the
Security Council and, subsequently, to the International
Criminal Court. That has a significant negative impact
in that it irresponsibly promotes punishment and
sanctions on the basis of allegations that have not been
proved on the ground. We reiterate that these actions
are contradictory to the atmosphere of cooperation
and dialogue that is needed in order to strengthen an
international system in which all are respected on an
equal footing, independently of their wealth or power.
Cuba has roundly opposed country-specific draft
resolutions, both in the Third Committee and in the
Human Rights Council. In that spirit, we will continue
to vote against draft resolutions on the human rights
situations in friendly countries, and to disassociate
ourselves from the consensus on draft resolutions that
are not normally subject to a vote.
We would like to indicate that opposition to
these selective and politicized draft resolutions do
not prejudge in any way the resolution of the pending
issues mentioned in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution,
which require a fair and honourable solution with the
agreement of all stakeholders.
Ms. Mansouri (Algeria): My delegation would like
to explain its position before the Assembly takes action
on the draft resolutions on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (draft
resolution I), the Syrian Arab Republic (draft resolution
II) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (draft resolution
IV), as contained in the report of the Third Committee
(A/69/488/Add.3).
My delegation regrets the continued selectivity,
double standards, politicization and proliferation
of country-specific draft resolutions, as previously
highlighted during the ministerial meeting of the
Non-Aligned Movement held in Algiers in May. My
delegation strongly believes that differences on human
rights issues should be resolved through constructive
dialogue, and not through confrontational, politically
motivated action. Indeed, practice has demonstrated
that country-specific draft resolutions have not
contributed to the improvement of human rights
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
situations. They only jeopardize trust and provoke
confrontation among Member States by ignoring the
principle of impartiality, which should govern human
rights situations and mechanisms.
The Assembly should adopt a new cooperative
approach to the consideration of human rights in those
countries that enables the establishment of dialogue
and the development of technical cooperation between
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and the countries concerned in a
transparent, fair and equal manner. Moreover, the
Universal Periodic Review mechanism should be
considered as the primary tool for considering human
rights issues, and such discussions should take place
in an atmosphere of constructive dialogue within the
Human Rights Council. The continued submission of
selective draft resolutions that target specific countries
is a violation of the principle of universality and
objectivity and undermines the mandate of the Human
Rights Council. For those reasons, my delegation will
abstain in the voting on all country-specific draft
resolutions.
Mr. Aisi (Papua New Guinea): I would make this
brief statement in relation to my delegation’s position
on draft resolution IV, with regard to the situation of
human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
As part of the outcome of the World Summit in
2005, we all agreed to the establishment of the Human
Rights Council. We continue to agree with the notion
that the Human Rights Council has underpinned
and will continue to underpin the development of
human rights. Indeed, the Universal Periodic Review
process has played an important role in catalysing
and strengthening the important idea of human rights
around the world. In addition, we believe the special
procedures mechanism continues to strengthen the
human rights process. Special Rapporteurs appointed
to deal with various human rights issues have, in the
main, delivered on their mandates.
Papua New Guinea has had three separate Special
Rapporteurs visit and report on gender-based violence,
torture and, recently, on extrajudicial killings. We have
not agreed with every aspect of the reports that have
been presented, but we have welcomed the scrutiny
and the opportunity to interact on these matters as
they relate to Papua New Guinea. Indeed, like other
countries, we have human rights issues.
22/31
We have also called for all countries to invite
Special Rapporteurs to visit in order to properly
carry out their respective mandates. In this case, we
respectfully call on Iran and any other countries that
refuse to do so to allow Special Rapporteurs to visit in
order to properly report on their respective mandates. It
is with this call and hope in mind that we will abstain
today in the voting on draft resolution relating to the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Acting President: We will now take decisions
on draft resolutions I, II and IV, one by one.
We turn first to draft resolution I, entitled “Situation
of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea”. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,
El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lebanon,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated
States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino,
Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste,
Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Uruguay, Vanuatu
Against:
Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China,
Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
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Ecuador, Egypt, Gambia, Iran (Islamic Republic
of), Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar,
Oman, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Syrian Arab Republic, Uzbekistan, Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zimbabwe
Abstaining:
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda,
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Guinea, Guyana, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho,
Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Republic
of Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia
Draft resolution I was adopted by 116 votes to 20,
with 53 abstentions (resolution 69/188).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab
Republic”. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia,
Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia,
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary,
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia,
Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of),
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman,
Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu,
Yemen
Against:
Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China,
Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Ecuador, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua,
Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of),
Zimbabwe
Abstaining:
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Chad,
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El
Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Guyana, India,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Mali, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, South
Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Zambia
Draft resolution II was adopted by 127 votes to 13,
with 48 abstentions (resolution 69/189).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IV is
entitled “Situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran”. A recorded vote has been requested.
A recorded vote was taken.
In favour:
Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cabo
Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,

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Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, The Acting President: I shall now give the floor
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Marshall to delegations that wish to speak in explanation of vote
Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), following the voting.
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Mr. An Mayong Hun (Democratic People’s Republic
Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People’s
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Republic of Korea would like to express its thanks to
Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, San
those delegations that voted against resolution 69/188.
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Seychelles,
My delegation again fully rejects this forcibly adopted
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan,
resolution against my country. The resolution proves
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav
once again that the United States and its followers are
Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Trinidad
ever more viciously resorting to their plot to defame our
and Tobago, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of
image and destroy our ideology and system under the
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States
pretext of human rights. In the light of the increasingly
of America, Vanuatu
dangerous human rights campaigns undertaken by
Against: hostile forces against the Democratic People’s Republic
Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, of Korea, we will keep in our hearts the pride and
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei honour of the socialist system, which was chosen as
Darussalam, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Comoros, being consolidated and developed by our people, and
Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, we will work to the utmost to defend it.
Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Iran
Mr. Zamora Rivas (El Salvador) (spoke in
(Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Kazakhstan, Lebanon,
Spanish): El Salvador would like to explain its vote on
Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Russian
resolution 69/188, entitled “Situation of human rights in
Federation, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, El Salvador abstained in the voting at the time
Zimbabwe the resolution was adopted in the Third Committee.
We would like to express our agreement with the text
Abstaining:
that was originally presented, with the exception of
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain,
paragraph 8 for constitutional and legal reasons that
Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
do not allow our country to support the paragraph’s
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the
language. Accordingly, El Salvador supported
Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
the proposed amendment contained in document
Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada,
A/C.3/69/L.63, which aimed to delete paragraph 8. The
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Jamaica,
amendment, which was not adopted, sought to substitute
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s
for paragraph 8 language calling for rapprochement and
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia,
dialogue on human rights issues. Given the outcome
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia,
of the voting on the amendment and on the text as a
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal,
whole today, which includes the second part of the
Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
amendment that was not adopted by the Committee,
Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
and given the fact that the sponsor countries decided to
Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
include in the text aspects on openness to dialogue, El
Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname,
Salvador decided to change its position and to vote in
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, United
favour of the resolution, despite the fact that paragraph
Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania,
8 was retained.
Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia
Nevertheless, for the record, El Salvador would
Draft resolution IV was adopted by 83 votes to 35,
like to state that with regard to operative paragraph
with 68 abstentions (resolution 69/190).
8, and despite the fact that it has voted in favour of
the resolution on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, El Salvador

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is currently not a State party to the Rome Statute, and
by extension to the International Criminal Court. That
is why our vote in favour of this resolution should
not be considered as our country’s recognition of the
jurisdiction of this international tribunal as stated in
paragraph 8.
Ms. Murillo (Costa Rica) (spoke in Spanish): I
would like to make a general statement following the
adoption of these country-specific resolutions.
Our concern about the human rights situation in
the specific countries referred to in the resolutions
submitted for consideration in the plenary today
led us to vote in favour of all three resolutions. In
addition, we maintain our principled position that all
country-specific situations should be assessed on their
respective merits — including, in this case, steps taken
by countries to improve their human rights situations.
Nevertheless, my country reiterates that the Human
Rights Council has the main mandate on this issue.
We should therefore support the Council and give it a
prominent role on the issues before us today. The Human
Rights Council has the necessary tools at its disposal
to consider specific cases that are cause for concern to
the international community — situations that, owing
to their seriousness, require country-specific attention,
such as special procedures. That is why my country
believes that addressing country-specific situations
should take place in the Human Rights Council. We
therefore did not join the resolutions as sponsors in the
Third Committee.
We acknowledge that the Universal Periodic
Review mechanism provides the appropriate means to
consider human rights situations based on transparent,
reliable and objective information. Strengthening
the mechanism will help to further strengthen the
Human Rights Council as the main body of the United
Nations for the promotion and protection of human
rights throughout the world without any distinction.
Nevertheless, that should not distract us from our
responsibility to express ourselves about situations
that are of critical importance for fundamental rights,
wherever they occur in the world, or from considering
country-specific situations when necessary.
Costa Rica believes that constructive dialogue
and cooperation, including cooperation with special
procedures and other human rights mechanisms and
open invitations to visit countries, should continue
to serve as the path towards effectively promoting
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and protecting human rights. We call on all States to
commit truly to that effort.
Mr. Wickramarachchige (Sri Lanka): Sri Lanka
wishes to make the following statement following
the voting on resolution 69/188, entitled “Situation of
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea”.
Sri Lanka voted against this resolution. Our
vote does not in any way demonstrate disregard for
the promotion or protection of human rights. On
the contrary, Sri Lanka remains committed to the
advancement of human rights, and concerned about
the alleged human rights situation in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. We urge the Government to
take mesures to respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Sri Lanka vehemently condemns all acts of
abduction and expresses deep concern about the safety
of those victims.
Sri Lanka believes that country-specific resolutions
designed to name and shame are not the appropriate
means to address or advance human rights. When this
resolution was considered in the Third Committee,
Sri Lanka voted in favour of the proposal presented
by Cuba to replace the current paragraphs 7 and 8
with provisions that would enable the adoption of a
cooperative approach. However, the proposal failed to
receive the necessary support in the Committee. The
current paragraphs 7 and 8 require that the Commission
of Inquiry report on the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea be submitted to the Security Council. They
also encourage the Council to consider referring the
situation to the International Criminal Court. That is
an unacceptable approach, especially as the country
concerned has indicated its willingness to engage,
and even to accept the visit of a Special Rapporteur.
Sri Lanka categorically rejects that proposition in the
resolution, which places the onus on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to address alleged human
rights violations.
For those reasons, having abstained in the past, Sri
Lanka was compelled to vote against this resolution.
The Acting President: We have heard the last
speaker in explanation of vote following the voting.
The General Assembly has thus concluded this
stage of its consideration of sub-item (c) of agenda item
68.
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
(d) Comprehensive implementation of and follow-
up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/488/Add.4)
The Acting President: May I take it that the
Assembly decides to take note of the report of the Third
Committee?
It was so decided.
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of sub-item (d) of agenda item 68?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 68 (continued)
Promotion and protection of human rights
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/488)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before it
a draft decision recommended by the Third Committee
in paragraph 5 of its report. We will now take action on
the draft decision entitled “Documents considered by
the General Assembly in connection with the question
of the promotion and protection of human rights”.
May I take it that the Assembly wishes to adopt
the draft decision as recommended by the Third
Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/536).
The Acting President: The General Assembly has
thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda
item 68.
Agenda item 105
Crime prevention and criminal justice
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/489)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it nine draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 41 of its report (A/69/489),
and a draft decision recommended by the Committee in
paragraph 42 of the same report.
We will now take a decision on draft resolutions I
to IX and on the draft decision, one by one.
Draft resolution I is entitled “Follow-up to the
Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention
26/31
and Criminal Justice and preparations for the Thirteenth
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution I. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do likewise?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/191).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution II. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do the same?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/192).
The Acting President: Draft resolution III is
entitled “International cooperation in criminal matters”.
The Third Committee adopted draft resolution III. May
I take it that the Assembly wishes to do likewise?
Draft resolution III was adopted (resolution
69/193).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IV is
entitled “United Nations Model Strategies and Practical
Measures on the Elimination of Violence against
Children in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice”. The Third Committee adopted draft resolution
IV. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to do the
same?
Draft resolution IV was adopted (resolution 69/194).
The Acting President: Draft resolution V is entitled
“Rule of law, crime prevention and criminal justice in
the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015”.
The Third Committee adopted draft resolution V. May I
take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution V was adopted (resolution 69/195).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VI is
entitled “International Guidelines for Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to
Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related
Offences”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution VI. May I take it that the Assembly wishes
to do likewise?
Draft resolution VI was adopted (resolution
69/196).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VII is
entitled “Strengthening the United Nations crime
prevention and criminal justice programme, in
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particular its technical cooperation capacity”. The
Third Committee adopted draft resolution VII. May I
take it that the Assembly wishes to do the same?
Draft resolution VII was adopted (resolution
69/197).
The Acting President: Draft resolution VIII is
entitled “United Nations African Institute for the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders”.
The Third Committee adopted draft resolution VIII.
May I take it that it is the Assembly wishes to do
likewise?
Draft resolution VIII was adopted (resolution
69/198).
The Acting President: Draft resolution IX is
entitled “Preventing and combating corrupt practices
and the transfer of proceeds of corruption, facilitating
asset recovery and returning such assets to legitimate
owners, in particular to countries of origin, in
accordance with the United Nations Convention against
Corruption”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution IX. May I take it that the Assembly wishes
to do the same?
Draft resolution IX was adopted (resolution 69/199).
The Acting President: We shall now turn to
paragraph 42 of the report (A/69/489) to take action on
the draft decision entitled “Reports considered by the
General Assembly in connection with the question of
crime prevention and criminal justice”. May I take it
that it is the wish of the Assembly to adopt the draft
decision, as recommended by the Third Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/537).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 105?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 106
International drug control
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/490)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before
it two draft resolutions recommended by the Third
Committee in paragraph 15 of its report (A/69/490),
and a draft decision recommended by the Committee in
paragraph 16 of the same report.
We will now take a decision on draft resolutions I
and II and on the draft decision, one by one.
Draft resolution I is entitled “Special session of
the General Assembly on the world drug problem to
be held in 2016”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution I. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
do likewise?
Draft resolution I was adopted (resolution 69/200).
The Acting President: Draft resolution II is
entitled “International cooperation against the world
drug problem”. The Third Committee adopted draft
resolution II. May I take it that the Assembly wishes to
the same?
Draft resolution II was adopted (resolution 69/201).
The Acting President: We shall now turn to
paragraph 16 of the report to take action on the
draft decision entitled “Report considered by the
General Assembly in connection with the question of
international drug control”. May I take it that it is the
wish of the Assembly to adopt the draft decision as
recommended by the Third Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (resolution 69/538).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 106?
It is so decided.
Agenda item 118
Revitalization of the work of the General Assembly
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/491)
The Acting President: The Assembly has before it
a draft decision recommended by the Third Committee
in paragraph 6 of its report. We will now take action
on the draft decision entitled “Programme of work of
the Third Committee for the seventieth session of the
General Assembly”.
May I take it that the Assembly wishes to adopt
the draft decision as recommended by the Third
Committee?
The draft decision was adopted (decision 69/539).
The Acting President: The General Assembly has
thus concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda
item 118.

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A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
Agenda item 133
Programme planning
Report of the Third Committee (A/69/492)
May I take it that the General Assembly wishes to
take note of the report of the Third Committee?
It was so decided.
The Acting President: The Assembly has thus
concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item
133.
On behalf of the General Assembly, I would like
to thank Her Excellency Mrs. Sofia Mesquita-Borges,
Permanent Representative of Timor-Leste to the United
Nations and Chairperson of the Third Committee, the
members of the Bureau, the Secretary of the Committee,
as well as representatives for a job very well done.
The General Assembly has thus concluded its
consideration of all the reports of the Third Committee
before it today, with the exception of document
A/69/488/Add.3, concerning draft resolution III. As I
noted earlier, the Assembly will take action on that draft
resolution as soon as the report of the Fifth Committee
on its programme budget implications is available.
Agenda item 15
The role of the United Nations in promoting a new
global human order
Report of the Secretary-General (A/69/410)
Draft resolution (A/69/L.45)
The Acting President: I now give the floor to the
representative of Guyana to introduce draft resolution
A/69/L.45.
Mr. Talbot (Guyana): On behalf of the sponsors, I
have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/69/L.45
entitled “The role of the United Nations in promoting a
new global human order”.
I thank the Secretary-General for his report
(A/69/410) on this theme. The report responds to
resolution 67/230 and discusses the progress in achieving
more equitable human well-being, with particular
attention to the objectives of eradicating poverty,
expanding productive employment, promoting gender
equality and social integration, and promoting growth
with equity in the global development agenda. Those
objectives have been reflected in the internationally
28/31
agreed development goals, including the Millennium
Development Goals, which have been a milestone in
both national and global development efforts. They
also have had a profound bearing on the priorities of
the post-2015 development agenda.
The initiative of a new global human order is
fundamentally concerned with the promotion of
equitable and inclusive improvements in human well-
being and in establishing a cooperative and integrated
global approach to achieving that in a fair and balanced
manner. The pursuit of this people-centred agenda
faces a key challenge in the growing inequality within
and among countries. Addressing this challenge, and
the likely consequences thereof for the advancement
of human development, must be a critical focus of the
attention of the international community as we seek to
design a post-2015 development framework.
The world has seen much social and economic
progress since the 1995 World Summit for Social
Development and the 2000 Millennium Summit. Of
particular note is the achievement of Millennium
Development Goal 1 five years ahead of schedule,
resulting in the halving of the 1990 poverty rate
by 2015. In 1990, almost half of the population in
developing countries lived on less than $1.25 per day.
That rate dropped to 22 per cent by 2010, reducing
the number of people living in extreme poverty by
700 million. However, the pattern of progress is highly
uneven. The poverty milestone has not yet been met
in much of Africa and South Asia. And more than
1 billion people worldwide still live in extreme poverty,
while many more experience hunger and are vulnerable
to environmental and price shocks. Undernutrition
remains one of the most serious but least addressed
public health challenges in the world. Nearly one third
of children in developing countries are underweight or
stunted, and undernutrition contributes to one third of
all child deaths.
The report of the Secretary-General also highlights
the importance of full employment and decent work
for all for ensuring fair and balanced progress in the
improvement of human well-being. According to The
Millennium Development Goals Report 2014, vulnerable
employment accounted for 56 per cent of all employment
in developing regions, as compared to 10 per cent in
developed regions. In 2013, global economic growth
slowed to its lowest rate since 2009. The weak and
uneven global economic recovery continued to take its
toll on labour markets, particularly in the developing
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world. That was reflected, inter alia, in limited progress
in the reduction of low-quality employment, which has
been widespread in most developing countries. Given
the importance of employment for poverty reduction,
job creation and decent work should occupy a central
place in national poverty-reduction strategies.
The report notes that gender equality and broader
social integration remain integral to bringing about
a new global human order. Indeed, gender equality
and the empowerment of women is a precondition for
advancing development and reducing poverty. However,
despite solid evidence demonstrating the centrality
of the empowerment of women to poverty reduction,
gender equality remains an unfulfilled promise. As
outlined in the report of the Secretary-General, gender
mainstreaming is crucial to the achievement of gender
equality, equity and social justice. The commitment to
promote gender equality and empower women signals
a global recognition that this is both an important
development goal in its own right and a key to the
success of all other development goals.
The draft resolution before us today takes account
of those and other factors that together have profound
implications for the promotion of a new global
human order and for enhancing the status of people
everywhere. Among its several provisions, in the
preambular section the draft resolution recognizes that
the well-being of people and the full development of
their potential is pivotal to sustainable development. It
expresses concern about the persistent and considerable
disparities between rich and poor, both within and
among countries, and about the adverse implications of
those disparities for the promotion of human well-being
and development throughout the world. It further takes
account of the significance of inequality in the global
development agenda, and the importance of continued
efforts to strive for inclusive and equitable development
approaches to overcome poverty and inequality.
In its operative section, the draft resolution takes
note of the report of the Secretary-General, including
its recommendations for promoting a new global
human order. It further takes note with appreciation
of the convening of the informal thematic debate by
the President of the General Assembly, on 8 July 2013,
to address the issue of inequality. The call for such a
debate was included in the precursor resolution 67/230.
The draft resolution further emphasizes the
importance of efforts to address all aspects and
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dimensions of inequality and calls upon Member States
to pursue ambitious efforts to address inequality.
Finally, in the report requested of the Secretary-General,
emphasis is placed on the need to highlight the efforts
of the United Nations system to reduce inequality and
promote human development globally, in particular in
the context of the post-2015 development agenda.
Let me conclude as I began, on a note of thanks: to
delegations that participated in the consultations on the
draft for their constructive engagement, to all sponsors
for their valuable support and to the members of my own
team for their able stewardship of the consultations.
I am pleased to commend this draft resolution to
the Assembly for adoption by consensus.
The Acting President: Before proceeding further
and in view of the desire of members to dispose of this
item expeditiously, I should now like to consult the
Assembly with a view to proceeding immediately to
consider draft resolution A/69/L.45. In that connection,
since the draft resolution has only just been circulated
this morning, it would be necessary to waive the
relevant provision of rule 78 of the rules of procedure,
which reads as follows:
“As a general rule, no proposal shall be discussed
or put to the vote at any meeting of the General
Assembly unless copies of it have been circulated
to all delegations not later than the day preceding
the meeting.”
Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the
Assembly agrees with this proposal.
It was so decided.
The Acting President: We shall now proceed to
consider draft resolution A/69/L.45. The Assembly
will now take a decision on draft resolution A/69/L.45,
entitled “The role of the United Nations in promoting a
new global human order”.
I give the floor to the representative of the
Secretariat.
Mr. Botnaru (Department for General Assembly
and Conference Management): I should like to announce
that, since the submission of draft resolution A/69/L.45,
in addition to those delegations listed in the document,
the following countries have become sponsors:
Algeria, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Cambodia, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
A/69/PV.73 18/12/2014
Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Mexico, Panama, the
Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Solomon Islands
and Uruguay.
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the Assembly to adopt draft resolution
A/69/L.45?
Draft resolution A/69/L.45 was adopted (resolution
69/202).
The Acting President: May I take it that it is
the wish of the General Assembly to conclude its
consideration of agenda item 15?
It was so decided.
Agenda item 144
Administration of justice at the United Nations
Report of the Fifth Committee (A/69/664)
The Acting President: If there is no proposal under
rule 66 of the rules of procedure, I shall take it that the
General Assembly decides not to discuss the report of
the Fifth Committee that is before the Assembly today.
It was so decided.
The Acting President: The Assembly will now
take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by
the Fifth Committee in paragraph 6 of its report.
The Fifth Committee adopted the draft resolution,
entitled “Administration of justice at the United
Nations”, without a vote. May I take it that the Assembly
wishes to do the same?
The draft resolution was adopted (resolution
69/203).
The Acting President: The Assembly has thus
concluded this stage of its consideration of agenda item
144.
I shall now give the floor to delegations that wish
to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I should like
to remind delegations that statements in the exercise
of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the
first intervention and to five minutes for the second
intervention and should be made by delegations from
their seats.
Mr. Al-Mouallimi (Saudi Arabia) (spoke in
Arabic): I would like to reply to the statement made
by the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Republic.
30/31
I would first like to thank all members who voted
in favour of resolution 69/189.
It is clear that the representative of the Syrian
Arab Republic has great respect for Saudi Arabia,
given his comments about the human rights situation
in our country. He spoke for a full 10 minutes without
mentioning a single element in the resolution on
repeated and constant violations of human rights and
violations of the rights of women, children and the
elderly in the various regions of Syria. Such thumbing of
one’s nose at human rights in Syria has led to the deaths
of more than 200,000 people and the displacement of
millions within and outside of Syria. We know that
hundreds of thousands of Syrians are starving. We
know that arbitrary detentions of citizens and Syrian
nationals in their country have taken place. In spite of
all that, our colleague the representative of Syria took
it upon himself to audaciously talk about human rights
situations in other countries.
He did not mention the issue of inherited power.
He forgot to note that Bashar Al-Assad inherited the
position of Head of State from his father and that the
Constitution was changed in 10 minutes. Instead,
he spoke about human rights in other countries for
10 minutes. He did not talk about the Head of State
who took power even though he was not of a sufficient
age to do so. He based himself on press and newspaper
reports, but forgot to say that the resolution is based on
United Nations reports and on clear evidence gathered
by the Organization. The Syrian representative spoke
about the offensive and racist techniques used by
Hollywood of defaming and distorting the image of
Arabs everywhere, but his goal was to twist the reality
of Arabs and of human rights.
In conclusion, he continued with his arbitrary
accusations, even against United Nations staff. In that
regard, I would like to ask the Secretary-General that
the representative of Syria be held accountable for the
statements he made with regard to the allegations that in
actual fact insulted and demeaned the United Nations.
Resolution 69/189 is a manifestation of international
solidarity with the patient and suffering Syrian people,
who have been victims of terrorism at the hands of
the Government of Syria and other terrorist groups
throughout the world. I think this is an eloquent reply
to the statement made by Syria.
Ms. Al-Thani (Qatar) (spoke in Arabic): It is
extremely regrettable to hear once again unfounded
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and inaccurate accusations being levelled by the Syrian Finance, which I recommend members Google and
regime against my country and against all countries that read. There one can see the scandalous extent to which
support the Syrian people. This is a futile attempt to Qatar has financed terrorism.
divert the attention of Member States from the flagrant
Fourthly, we referred to one of the paragraphs of
violations of human rights that have been committed
resolution 69/189, presented by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
by the regime in the Syrian Arab Republic, violations
their allies. Paragraph 24 calls for the establishment of
that have been highlighted in various United Nations
a democratic and pluralist State. That does not apply
reports. The result of the voting on resolution 69/189,
to Qatar or Saudi Arabia. With regard to the demand
concerning the human rights situation in that country,
for the active participation of women in Syria, in Syria
which we were very proud to co-sponsor, attests to
women participate in all walks of life, while in Qatar
the indignation of Member States with regard to the
and Saudi Arabia they do not.
humanitarian and legal violations perpetrated by the
Syrian regime against its people. In Syria there is no sectarianism and no
discrimination based on language, ethnicity, origin or
To conclude, I would like to reiterate before the
religion. Those are facts proven not to be the case in
international community that we will continue to
Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
support the legitimate demands of the people of the
Syrian Arab Republic. We take this opportunity to To summarize, we deplore the fact that on a number
thank all Member States that voted in favour of the of occasions the representatives of Qatar and Saudi
resolution. Arabia have claimed that they constantly support the
people of Syria. We say to them one again that the
Ms. Alsaleh (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in
people of Syria do not want their help and support and
Arabic): I apologize for taking the floor once again in
do not need the weapons, financing or terrorism that
connection with the same agenda item. However, we
they offer. As the Ambassador of Syria has stated,
have to respond after hearing the statements made just
those countries will need to be held accountable by the
now by the Permanent Representatives of Saudi Arabia
Syrian people for the role they have played since the
and Qatar. I will try to be brief.
beginning of the crisis and in subsequent events.
First, as the representative of Saudi Arabia said,
In conclusion, the Permanent Representative of
we like Saudi Arabia and are passionate about his
Saudi Arabia said that the representative of Syria was
people as well as our own people. The representative
talking about other States. If the representative of
of Saudi Arabia said that the Syrian representative
Syria did talk a bit about Saudi Arabia, what about the
had made baseless allegations against them. First, we
representative of Saudi Arabia himself, who talks with
have evidence of the setting up of terrorist training
just as much if not more boldness, while in his country
camps in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. There are documents
there are even more human rights violations than in my
that prove that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and
country?
Qatar, working with the United States, have in fact
acknowledged establishing terrorist camps. Finally, I would like to repeat something already
stated. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have enough funds to
Secondly, The Washington Post has published a
buy the conscience of people. They have bought the
report. And it is true that we refer to media reports,
conscience of regimes and of States Members of the
mainly Western sources, in particular United States
United Nations. I am repeating what the representative
media reports, because they are often the impartial
of Syria said. However, they have not been unable to
sources that show the reality of what is happening with
buy the voice or conscience of the people of Syria. They
respect to financing, arming and training terrorists in
have instead bought terrorist forces, which will one day
Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
come knocking at their doors.
Thirdly, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.
has published a report entitled Qatar and Terror

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 United Nations A/RES/69/160

Distr.: General
General Assembly 5 February 2015

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 66 (a)

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2014

[on the report of the Third Committee (A/69/486)]

69/160. Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other

practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination3
and other relevant human rights instruments,
Recalling the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2004/16
of 16 April 20044 and 2005/5 of 14 April 20055 and relevant Human Rights Council
resolutions, in particular resolutions 7/34 of 28 March 2008, 6 18/15 of
29 September 20117 and 21/33 of 28 September 2012,8 as well as General Assembly
resolutions 60/143 of 16 December 2005, 61/147 of 19 December 2006, 62/142 of
18 December 2007, 63/162 of 18 December 2008, 64/147 of 18 December 2009,
65/199 of 21 December 2010, 66/143 of 19 December 2011, 67/154 of 20 December
2012 and 68/150 of 18 December 2013 on this issue and its resolutions 61/149 of
19 December 2006, 62/220 of 22 December 2007, 63/242 of 24 December 2008,
64/148 of 18 December 2009, 65/240 of 24 December 2010, 66/144 of 19 December
2011, 67/155 of 20 December 2012 and 68/151 of 18 December 2013, entitled
“Global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action”,

_______________
1
Resolution 217 A (III).
2
See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
4
See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2004, Supplement No. 3 (E/2004/23), chap. II,
sect. A.
5
Ibid., 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigenda (E/2005/23 and Corr.1 and 2), chap. II, sect. A.
6
See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53), chap. II.
7
Ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 53A and corrigendum (A/66/53/Add.1 and Corr.1), chap. II.
8
Ibid., Sixty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 53A (A/67/53/Add.1), chap. II.
14-67609 (E)
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 Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling
A/RES/69/160 contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Acknowledging other important initiatives of the General Assembly aimed at

raising awareness about the suffering of victims of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including in the historical perspective, in
particular regarding commemoration of the victims of slavery and the transatlantic
slave trade,
Recalling the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the
Tribunal, which recognized as criminal, inter alia, the SS organization and all its
integral parts, including the Waffen SS, through its officially accepted members
implicated in or with knowledge of the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity connected with the Second World War, as well as other relevant
provisions of the Charter and the Judgement,
Recalling also the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on 8 September 2001, 9 in
particular paragraph 2 of the Declaration and paragraph 86 of the Programme of
Action, as well as the relevant provisions of the outcome document of the Durban
Review Conference of 24 April 2009,10 in particular paragraphs 11 and 54,
Alarmed, in this regard, at the spread in many parts of the world of various
extremist political parties, movements and groups, including neo-Nazis and
skinhead groups, as well as racist extremist movements and ideologies,
Deeply concerned by all recent manifestations of violence and terrorism
incited by violent nationalism, racism, xenophobia and related intolerance,
Recalling that in 2015 the international community will celebrate the
seventieth anniversary of victory over Nazism in the Second World War, and
looking forward in this regard to the initiative to hold a special solemn meeting at
the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly,
1. Reaffirms the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration9 and of the
outcome document of the Durban Review Conference,10 in which States condemned
the persistence and resurgence of neo-Nazism, neo-Fascism and violent nationalist
ideologies based on racial and national prejudice and stated that those phenomena
could never be justified in any instance or in any circumstances;
2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, prepared in accordance with the request contained in General Assembly
resolution 68/150;11
3. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and his Office for their efforts to fight racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including the maintenance by the Office of the
database on practical means to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance;
4. Expresses deep concern about the glorification, in any form, of the Nazi
movement, neo-Nazism and former members of the Waffen SS organization,
including by erecting monuments and memorials and holding public demonstrations

_______________
9
See A/CONF.189/12 and Corr.1, chap. I.
10
See A/CONF.211/8, chap. I.
11
A/69/334.

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in the name of the glorification of the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and
neo-Nazism, as well as by declaring or attempting to declare such members and
those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi
movement participants in national liberation movements;
5. Calls for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,3
and encourages those States parties that have not yet done so to consider making the
declaration under its article 14, thus providing the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination with the competence to receive and consider communications
from individuals or groups of individuals within their jurisdiction claiming to be
victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set forth in the
Convention;
6. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that “any
commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related organizations,
whether official or unofficial, should be prohibited by States”,12 and stresses in this
regard that it is important that States take measures, in accordance with international
human rights law, to counteract any celebration of the Nazi SS organization and all
its integral parts, including the Waffen SS;
7. Expresses concern about recurring attempts to desecrate or demolish
monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought against Nazism during the
Second World War, as well as to unlawfully exhume or remove the remains of such
persons, and in this regard urges States to fully comply with their relevant
obligations, inter alia, under article 34 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949;13
8. Notes with concern the increase in the number of racist incidents
worldwide, including the rise of skinhead groups, which have been responsible for
many of these incidents, as well as the resurgence of racist and xenophobic violence
targeting, inter alia, persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities;
9. Reaffirms that such acts may be qualified to fall within the scope of the
Convention, that they may not be justified when they fall outside the scope of the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association as well as the rights to
freedom of expression and that they may fall within the scope of article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2 and may be subject to certain
restrictions, as set out in articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant;
10. Condemns without reservation any denial or attempt to deny the
Holocaust;
11. Welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the active preservation of
those Holocaust sites that served as Nazi death camps, concentration and forced
labour camps and prisons, as well as his encouragement of States to take measures,
including legislative, law enforcement and educational measures, to put an end to all
forms of Holocaust denial;
12. Calls upon States to continue to take adequate steps, including through
national legislation, in accordance with international human rights law, aimed at the

_______________
12
Ibid., para. 75.
13
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

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prevention of hate speech and incitement to violence against persons belonging to

vulnerable groups;
13. Expresses deep concern about attempts at commercial advertising aimed
at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed during the Second World War by the Nazi regime;
14. Stresses that the practices described above do injustice to the memory of
the countless victims of crimes against humanity committed in the Second World
War, in particular those committed by the SS organization and by those who fought
against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi movement, and may
negatively influence children and young people, and that failure by States to
effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of States
Members of the United Nations under its Charter, including those related to the
purposes and principles of the Organization;
15. Also stresses that such practices fuel contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and contribute to the
spread and multiplication of various extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and in this regard calls for
increased vigilance;
16. Expresses concern that the human rights and democratic challenges
posed by extremist political parties, movements and groups are universal and no
country is immune to them;
17. Emphasizes the need to take the measures necessary to put an end to the
practices described above, and calls upon States to take more effective measures in
accordance with international human rights law to combat those phenomena and
extremist movements, which pose a real threat to democratic values;
18. Encourages States to adopt further measures to provide training for the
police and other law enforcement bodies on the ideologies of extremist political
parties, movements and groups whose advocacy constitutes incitement to racist and
xenophobic violence, to strengthen their capacity to address racist and xenophobic
crimes, to fulfil their responsibility of bringing to justice the perpetrators of such
crimes and to combat impunity;
19. Notes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur regarding the
responsibility of political leaders and parties in relation to messages that incite
racial discrimination or xenophobia;
20. Expresses concern that ethnic profiling and police violence against
vulnerable groups discourage victims from seeking redress owing to distrust of the
legal system, and in this regard encourages States to improve diversity within law
enforcement agencies and impose appropriate sanctions against those within the
public service found guilty of racially motivated violence or of using hate speech;
21. Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to introduce into
national criminal law a provision according to which committing an offence with
racist or xenophobic motivations or aims constitutes an aggravating circumstance,
allowing for enhanced penalties, and encourages those States whose legislation does
not contain such provisions to consider that recommendation;
22. Underlines that the roots of extremism are multifaceted and must be
addressed through adequate measures such as education, awareness-raising and the
promotion of dialogue, and in this regard recommends the increase of measures to

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raise awareness among young people of the dangers of the ideologies and activities
of extremist political parties, movements and groups;
23. Reaffirms, in this regard, the particular importance of all forms of
education, including human rights education, as a complement to legislative
measures, as outlined by the Special Rapporteur;
24. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur presented at
the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in which he emphasized the
importance of history classes in teaching the dramatic events and human suffering
which arose out of the adoption of ideologies such as Nazism and Fascism;14
25. Stresses the importance of other positive measures and initiatives aimed
at bringing communities together and providing them with space for genuine
dialogue, such as round tables, working groups and seminars, including training
seminars for State agents and media professionals, as well as awareness-raising
activities, especially those initiated by civil society representatives, which require
continued State support;
26. Calls upon States to continue to invest in education, in both conventional
and non-conventional curricula, inter alia, in order to transform attitudes and correct
ideas of racial hierarchies and superiority promoted by extremist political parties,
movements and groups and counter their negative influence;
27. Underlines the positive role that relevant United Nations entities and
programmes, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, can play in the aforementioned areas;
28. Reaffirms article 4 of the Convention, according to which States parties
to that instrument condemn all propaganda and all organizations that are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or that attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to that end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1
and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist
activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and organized and all
other propaganda activities, that promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable
by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or
local, to promote or incite racial discrimination;
29. Also reaffirms that, as underlined in paragraph 13 of the outcome
document of the Durban Review Conference, any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence

_______________
14
A/64/295, para. 104.

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 Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling
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should be prohibited by law, that all dissemination of ideas based on racial

superiority or hatred, or incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of
violence or incitement to such acts, shall be declared offences punishable by law, in
accordance with the international obligations of States, and that these prohibitions
are consistent with freedom of opinion and expression;
30. Recognizes the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information, including through the Internet, can play in combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
31. Expresses concern about the use of the Internet to propagate racism,
racial hatred, xenophobia, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and in this
regard calls upon States parties to the Covenant to implement fully articles 19 and
20 thereof, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression and outline the
grounds on which the exercise of this right can be legitimately restricted;
32. Recognizes the need to promote the use of new information and
communications technologies, including the Internet, to contribute to the fight
against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
33. Also recognizes the positive role that the media can play in combating
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, promoting a
culture of tolerance and representing the diversity of a multicultural society;
34. Encourages States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to use all
opportunities, including those provided by the Internet and social media, to counter,
in accordance with international human rights law, the dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred and to promote the values of equality,
non-discrimination, diversity and democracy;
35. Encourages those States that have made reservations to article 4 of the
Convention to give serious consideration to withdrawing such reservations as a
matter of priority, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur;
36. Notes the importance of strengthening cooperation at the regional and
international levels with the aim of countering all manifestations of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in particular regarding issues
raised in the present resolution;
37. Stresses the importance of cooperating closely with civil society and
international and regional human rights mechanisms in order to counter effectively
all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, as well as extremist political parties, movements and groups, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other similar extremist ideological movements
that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
38. Encourages States parties to the Convention to ensure that their
legislation incorporates the provisions of the Convention, including those of
article 4;
39. Encourages States to adopt the legislation necessary to combat racism
while ensuring that the definition of racial discrimination set out therein complies
with article 1 of the Convention;
40. Recalls that any legislative or constitutional measures adopted with a
view to countering extremist political parties, movements and groups, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and similar extremist ideological movements should

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be in conformity with the relevant international human rights norms, in particular

articles 4 and 5 of the Convention and articles 19 to 22 of the Covenant;
41. Also recalls the request of the Commission on Human Rights, in its
resolution 2005/5,5 that the Special Rapporteur continue to reflect on this issue,
make relevant recommendations in his future reports and seek and take into account
in this regard the views of Governments and non-governmental organizations;
42. Encourages States to consider including in their reports for the universal
periodic review and to relevant treaty bodies information on the steps taken to
combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including
with the aim of implementing the provisions of the present resolution;
43. Requests the Special Rapporteur to prepare, for submission to the
General Assembly at its seventieth session and to the Human Rights Council at its
twenty-ninth session, reports on the implementation of the present resolution, in
particular regarding paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14, 24 and 25 above, based on the
views collected in accordance with the request of the Commission, as recalled in
paragraph 41 above;
44. Expresses its appreciation to those Governments that have provided
information to the Special Rapporteur in the course of the preparation of his reports
to the General Assembly;
45. Stresses that such information is important for the sharing of experiences
and best practices in the fight against extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other extremist ideological
movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance;
46. Encourages Governments and non-governmental organizations to
cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur in the exercise of the tasks outlined in
paragraph 43 above;
47. Encourages Governments, non-governmental organizations and relevant
actors to disseminate, as widely as possible, information regarding the contents of
and the principles outlined in the present resolution, including through the media,
but not limited to it;
48. Decides to remain seized of the issue.

73rd plenary meeting

18 December 2014

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Allegato 2

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner

for Human Rights

Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine

15 November 2014
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY 7
A. Missing persons and the identification of their remains 8
B. Deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance 10
C. Torture and ill-treatment 12
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY,
RELIGION OR BELIEF 14
A. Freedom of expression 14
B. Freedom of peaceful assembly 16
C. Freedom of religion or belief 17
IV. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 17
A. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 17
B. Right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing,
housing, water and sanitation) 19
C. Right to property 19
D. Right to work and favourable working conditions 19
E. Right to social security 20
F. Right to education 21
G. Groups facing discrimination 21
V. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 23
VI. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 24
VII. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS 25
A. Women affected by the hostilities in the east 25
B. Participation and representation of women 27
VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND ABUSES 27
A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east 27
B. Investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa 29
C. Investigations into crimes committed during the Maidan protests 30
D. Administration of justice 31
IX. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 32
A. Constitutional reform 32
B. Lustration 33
C. Corruption 36
D. Reform of the judiciary 37
E. Office of the Prosecutor 37
F. Criminal proceedings in absentia 38
G. Legislation in follow up to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 39
H. Law on Internally Displaced Persons 39
 I. Human rights strategy 40
J. Police reform 40
X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA 41
A. Civil and political rights 41
B. Economic and social rights 46
C. The rights of indigenous peoples 47
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. This is the seventh report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, based on the work of the United
Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). It covers the period from 17
September to 31 October 2014.
2. There were major developments during the reporting period that significantly impacted
on the human rights situation.
3. Despite the ceasefire, which entered into force on 5 September, hostilities in the east and
related human rights violations and abuses continued. On 19 September, in Minsk, the Trilateral
Contact Group1, with political representatives of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’2, and the self-proclaimed ‘Luhansk people’s republic’3 agreed on a Memorandum to
implement ‘the Peace Plan of the President of Ukraine and the initiatives of the President of the
Russian Federation’. Despite the announcement of ‘silent regimes’4 by the Ukrainian
Government (on 5 and 7 October) and by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ (on 11 October),
violations of the ceasefire were reported by the Ukrainian security forces and the armed groups.
Fighting was particularly severe around the Donetsk airport, Debaltseve and Mariupol (Donetsk
region), and Shchastia (Luhansk region), causing casualties among civilians, military servicemen
and members of the armed groups. On average 13 people were killed every day between 6
September and 31 October. Since the beginning of the hostilities in mid-April until 31 October,
at least 4,042 people were killed and 9,350 were wounded in the conflict affected area of eastern
Ukraine5.
4. There are credible reports from different sources, including the OSCE Observer Mission,
that hundreds of people in military-style clothing have been observed crossing the two border
crossing points of Gukovo and Donetsk in both directions6. The Ukrainian Government and
some civic groups report the delivery of weapons from the Russian Federation to the eastern
regions. On 19 September and 31 October, two further convoys were sent by the Russian
Federation to territory under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’. As on the previous occasions, the convoys crossed at the Izvaryne border
crossing point without the authorisation of Ukraine, and were not inspected.
5. In the territories under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk
people’s republic’ there continues to be a total breakdown in law and order, and a lack of any
human rights protection for the population under their control. In addition, parallel governance
structures are being set up, with so-called ‘ministries’, as well as legislative and administrative
procedures being established. Both ‘republics’ announced plans to hold ‘presidential and
parliamentary elections’ on 2 November, outside the legal framework of Ukraine 7. There were
strong objections to these initiatives from the Government of Ukraine, some Member States and
international organisations, including the United Nations.

1
The Group is composed of senior representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and of the OSCE
Chairperson-in-Office.
2
Hereafter referred to as ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
3
Hereafter referred to as the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
4
During which armed hostilities and shelling should cease in the conflict zone.
5
This is a very conservative estimate by the HRMMU and WHO based on available official data. Both believe that
the casualties have been under reported, and that their actual numbers are considerably higher.
6
From 24 September to 31 October 2014, the OSCE Observer Mission at Russian checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk
has reported 2,751 persons in military-style clothing crossing the border in both directions at the two
aforementioned border crossing points.
7
Further observations on these ‘elections’ will be documented in the eighth HRMMU report.

4
6. In territories under the control of both ‘republics’ 8, cases of serious human rights abuses
by the armed groups continued to be reported, including torture, arbitrary and incommunicado
detention, summary executions, forced labour, sexual violence, as well as the destruction and
illegal seizure of property. These violations are of a systematic nature and may amount to crimes
against humanity.
7. On 23 September, reports of the discovery of alleged mass graves near the village of
Nyzhnia Krynka not far from Donetsk city (Donetsk region) received much attention. One grave
contained five bodies; two further graves found on the territory ‘Komunarska’ No. 22 mine
contained two bodies each. The bodies in the first grave were identified as members of the
armed groups, killed in action. With regard to the four bodies found in the two graves, there are
allegations of forensic evidence of a summary execution, according to the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. The Ukrainian Government has denied the involvement of its security forces in the
allegations of summary executions. On 26 September, the National Security and Defence
Council announced the continuation of investigations into the alleged ‘mass crimes’ committed
against civilians by the armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, including an
investigation into the three ‘mass graves’ found in July in the town of Sloviansk (Donetsk
region).
8. The reports on the use of cluster munitions in the hostilities in both urban and rural areas
are a matter of concern. Due to their wide radius and indiscriminate impact, their use in areas
with a civilian presence would constitute a violation of international humanitarian law and may
amount to a war crime. The Government has denied the use of cluster munitions. Reports on the
use of cluster munitions, as well as those of indiscriminate shelling, need to be investigated
promptly and thoroughly.
9. The exchange of persons deprived of their liberty, as foreseen by the Minsk Protocol,
was largely non-transparent. The Government of Ukraine claimed that by 20 October, 1,509
people had been released by the armed groups. Priority was given to military personnel, while an
unknown number of civilians continued to remain in the captivity of the armed groups. There
were worrying reports of individuals being included in the exchange process by the Ukrainian
authorities who had not been involved in the conflict: some were already in detention facilities;
others were deprived of their liberty for the purpose of exchange.
10. There have also been allegations by victims and their relatives, as well as civil society
representatives of secret and illegal places of detention being operated by the armed groups, as
well as some being maintained by some volunteer battalions outside of judicial oversight. The
HRMMU continued to receive credible reports of persons deprived of their liberty being
subjected to torture and ill-treatment while being illegally held or detained by either the armed
groups or by Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and some volunteer battalions.
11. Procedural rights of detainees are of concern. Some volunteer battalions continued to
arrest people and detain them incommunicado, with many cases amounting to ‘enforced
disappearance’. For those who appear before the judiciary there have been many due process
concerns from the moment of their arrest, with systematic violations of the relevant national
legislation and fair trial guarantees, provided in international norms and standards.
12. The overall number of IDPs increased from 275,489 as of 18 September to 436,444 on
29 October according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. Of these 417,410 people have
come from the conflict affected areas, including 62,306 and 29,727 people who are now in the
8
The territory under the control of the two ‘republics’ is approximately 16,400 square km, about one-third of the
territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the two major cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. It is estimated
that approximately 3.1 million people live on this territory. Some armed groups operating on the territory do not see
themselves as being under the control of either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
such as the self-proclaimed ‘Stakhanov Republic’ in the Luhansk region.

5
Government controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions respectively; as well as
19,034 IDPs from Crimea. IDPs who were living in summer camps or sanatoria have had to
move to warmer shelters. In the absence of a countrywide assistance programme, relocation
efforts have depended on local resources and approaches. Given that they are mainly dependent
on unsustainable assistance from civil society, IDPs are faced with legal barriers to access
employment and social welfare benefits. Some families have returned home to conflict-affected
areas, encouraged by the ceasefire but also due to scarce resources in their host communities.
While some remain, others just visit.
13. The situation in Crimea, the status of which is prescribed by General Assembly
resolution 68/262, is marked by reports of increasing human rights violations and protection
challenges, especially for minority and indigenous groups and those in a position of
vulnerability, for example the growing number of enforced disappearances of Crimean Tatars.
14. The so-called authorities in Crimea continued to conduct raids actively searching for
weapons and religious literature, with a focus on literature considered to be of an extremist
nature. These overwhelmingly target Crimean Tatar properties.
15. The space for freedom of expression in Crimea has further shrunk due to the activities of
the so-called authorities, in particular with the disruption to the work of more media outlets,
including that of Avdet (the weekly Mejlis newspaper), and the Crimean Tatar ATR television
channel.
16. There has been no significant progress in the investigations of crimes committed during
the Maidan protests, except for limited progress in the investigation into mass killing of
protesters by officers of the former Berkut police unit, with three former officers having been
accused of killing 39 protesters on 20 February 2014. On 25 September, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MoIA) announced the completion of the pre-trial investigation into the 2 May violence
in the centre of Odesa. Twenty-four suspects have been named as either organising or
participating in the disorder; and nine people are on a wanted list. The investigation into the
violence and fire in, and around, the Trade Union building is reportedly in its final stage.
17. The parliamentary elections of 26 October resulted in political parties with pro-reform
and pro-European agendas (Petro Poroshenko Block, the People’s Front and the Self-Reliance
Party) gaining the majority of votes. These parties are in discussions over forming a coalition
Government. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ denied, as for
the May 2014 Presidential elections, all those living in these eastern territories under their
control their right to vote by preventing the elections from being held.9 In order to vote, residents
of Crimea had to cross to mainland Ukraine, which limited their participation in the election due
to the distance, cost and difficulties in crossing the administrative boundary line, as well as due
to fears of possible repercussions.
18. The armed conflict in the eastern regions continued to negatively affect the economic
situation in Ukraine and access to, and the quality provision of, basic services. GDP dropped by
4.6 per cent compared to the previous year. Inflation reached 102.9 per cent in the first nine
months of 2014. Unemployment increased to a level of 8.4% as of 1 October, 2014. Growing
numbers of IDPs and wounded decreased the accessibility to healthcare services not only in the
conflict areas, but also in adjacent regions. Overall in the country, one of the most pressing
concerns relates to the threat of the interrupted treatment as of 1 January 2015 of more than
59,448 HIV-positive and approximately 11,600 multi-drug resistant tuberculosis patients in all
9
It is estimated that between 50-60 per cent of registered voters in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were not able
to participate in the 26 October parliamentary elections, either because their residence was in areas controlled by the
armed groups, or because they were displaced or refugees, and so if they voted, it was not in their domiciled
location. From Crimea, only 2,800 residents voted, which is 0.2 per cent of the pre-March 2014 total of registered
voters in the peninsula.

6
regions, due to the non-completed tenders for the purchase of needed live-saving medication.
19. On a positive note, parliament adopted legislation that should introduce reform in the rule
of law area and for the protection of human rights. This includes reform of the Office of the
Prosecutor and the introduction of an anti-corruption package.
20. On 20 October, the law on IDPs was adopted by parliament and is to be signed by the
President. It should guarantee specific rights, provide access to low-cost housing loans, and
simplify the procedures for access to various economic and social rights. On 1 October, the
Cabinet of Ministers adopted two resolutions establishing regulations for the registration and
assistance of internally displaced persons. Parliament adopted a law providing special status to
certain territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including more powers to local
authorities as foreseen in the Minsk Protocol.
21. More laws were adopted or came into force, including the law on lustration, which seek
to ban from public office some State employees who had worked under the administration of the
former President Yanukovych, which could affect up to one million people.
22. On 15 October, President Poroshenko signed a Decree tasking the Government to
elaborate a national human rights strategy for Ukraine by 1 January 2015. At the end of October
the Government tasked the Ministry of Justice, with the support of the Ombudsman’s Office, to
elaborate a draft strategy by 1 December. The HRMMU is working with the UN Country Team
and the Council of Europe to support the Government and the Ombudsperson towards the
elaboration of the strategy.
23. In addition, on 25 September, President Poroshenko presented his ‘Strategy 2020’,
promising that Ukraine would apply for European Union membership by 2020. The strategy
foresees more than 60 reforms in that context, prioritising the fight against corruption,
decentralization and energy independence, as well as the modernisation of the judiciary and the
defence system.

II. RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, SECURITY AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

Hostilities
24. Following the 5 September ceasefire agreement, fighting between the Ukrainian armed
forces and various armed groups continued almost on a daily basis due to breaches of the
ceasefire. The main flashpoints were: the Donetsk airport and the surrounding northwest suburbs
of the city; the Ukrainian-controlled Debaltseve salient (Donetsk region) which intersects the
main road and rail links between the Donetsk and Luhansk; the town of Shchastia (Luhansk
region); and the area around Smile (Luhansk region) along the south bank of the river Siverskyi
Donets, which the armed groups captured on 28 October after the Ukrainian military withdrew.
After the announcement of a so-called ‘silence regime’ (for example, “cease of armed hostilities
and shelling”) by the Ukrainian Government, on 5 and 7 October, and by the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ on 11 October, the intensity of hostilities somewhat decreased, especially by the time
of the parliamentary elections. According to the Ukrainian Government, since 5 September, its
armed forces were shelled and attacked more than 2,000 times by the armed groups.
Use of explosive weapons in populated areas - Indiscriminate shelling
25. Before, as well as after, the announcement of a ‘silence regime’, residential areas
continued to be indiscriminately shelled by various artillery and multiple launch rocket systems
(MLRS) throughout the whole reporting period. This led to military and civilian casualties
Targeting of military positions occurred in the immediate vicinity of residential areas, but areas
which were not located near military positions were also shelled, particularly in the city of

7
Donetsk.
26. The reported use of cluster munitions in fighting between Ukrainian forces and the armed
groups in more than 12 urban and rural locations in early October is of concern10. The use of
cluster munitions in populated areas violates the laws of war due to the indiscriminate nature of
the weapon and may amount to war crimes. It is imperative that such reports be investigated
promptly and thoroughly, as well as the reports of indiscriminate shelling of residential areas by
conventional weapons.
27. The Government of Ukraine continued to blame the armed groups for the use of heavy
weapons in populated areas, notably for the following incidents: the 29 September shelling of
the town of Popasna (Donetsk region), which killed four civilians; the 1 October rocketing of the
centre of Donetsk, which hit a bus and a bus stop, killing six civilians and wounding 25; the
rocketing of a school, on the same day, which killed two civilians and wounded five; and the 2
October shelling near the ICRC office in Donetsk, which killed an ICRC administrator. On 14
October, the village of Sartana (north-east of Mariupol in the Donetsk region) was reportedly
shelled with mortars and a MLRS ‘Grad’. According to the Mariupol city council, shells hit a
funeral procession, killing seven civilians and wounding 18. According to the Ukrainian army, a
Ukrainian checkpoint 1 km away from the village was the supposed target. On 10 October, the
Government of Ukraine accused armed groups of targeting an ambulance near the village of
Shyroke (Donetsk region) which killed two medical personnel and a patient 11. The Government
of Ukraine attributed some attacks on the populated areas to armed groups that report neither to
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ nor to the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
28. The armed groups have declined any responsibility for the aforementioned incidents and
other instances where residential areas were shelled, blaming the Ukrainian armed forces. For
instance, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ claims that the Ukrainian army killed four civilians in
Kuibyshevskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Donetsk city by shelling.
29. Since the start of the ceasefire, between 6 September and 31 October, at least 718 deaths
were reported12. Among them, at least 84 women were killed by indiscriminate shelling in
Donetsk region13. The share of women among casualties reported by medical establishments of
Donetsk region remained at the same level as during the peak of hostilities in August
(approximately 15%). Between 9 September and 28 October, the number of children killed in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions increased by 28%, from 28 to 36 deaths, whilst the number of
wounded increased by 82%, from 56 to 102 cases.

A. Missing persons and the identification of their remains

30. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that between 5 September and 1

10
Ukraine: widespread use of cluster munitions, Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2014.
11
The ambulance was to deliver a wounded civilian from a territory controlled by the Ukrainian Government to a
hospital in Donetsk.
12
Some of the individuals may have been killed prior to the period under review with data recorded at a later stage.
Thus, between mid-April and 31 October, a total of at least 4,042 people have been killed and 9,350 wounded in the
conflict area of eastern Ukraine. This is a conservative estimate by the HRMMU and the World Health Organization
(WHO) based on the available official data and the actual numbers of fatalities may be much higher. These numbers
include casualties within the Ukrainian armed forces (at least 1,167 killed and 3,808 wounded) as reported by the
National Security and Defence Council, the Prosecutor-General, the Chief Military Prosecutor and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs; civilians and elements of the armed groups reported without distinction by civil medical
establishments and local administrations: at least 1,719 killed (including 22 children) and 2,797 wounded (including
64 children) in the Donetsk region, and at least 858 killed (including 14 children) and 2,745 wounded (including 38
children) in the Luhansk region; the 298 passengers of flight MH17.
13
The breakdown of statistics is not available for the Luhansk region as there have been no reports to the WHO by
medical establishments from the region.

8
October its Inter-agency Centre for Assistance in Release of Captives, Hostages and Search of
Missing Persons had received 2,600 requests for the search of military personnel and civilians
from individuals and families. On 3 October, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ head of the
‘commission on issues of prisoners of war and refugees’ reported that at least 1,300 people
(members of the armed groups and civilians) were recorded as missing.
31. There may be some duplications in the lists of missing persons maintained by the
Government of Ukraine and by the armed groups as relatives of some missing people may have
filed applications both to the Inter-agency Centre at the SBU and to the ‘commission on issues of
prisoners of war and refugees’. The Government of Ukraine, the armed groups, NGOs and local
communities have intensified their efforts to search and collect the unburied remains of those
killed in hostilities. Additionally, there have been exhumations of ad hoc graves so as to
establish the identities of those found and to hand over their bodies to relatives.
32. Between 3 September and 11 October, members of an NGO, the People’s Memory
Union, reported finding and exhuming the remains of over 150 Ukrainian servicemen and two
civilians in Donetsk region (the bodies were subsequently taken to the territory controlled by the
Government of Ukraine). Of 31 ad hoc graves exhumed by the Union in Donetsk region, 11
contained two or more bodies with the largest one containing 12 bodies.
On 1 October, the first deputy head of the Main Investigative Department of the MoIA stated
that more than 1,000 bodies had been found in the territory of Donbas, with the identity of more
than 200 determined. On 29 September, the ‘deputy prime minister’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ reported that about 400 unidentified bodies were awaiting forensic examination in
Donetsk and other towns of the region. In this regard, more systematic efforts have been initiated
by the Government of Ukraine and the armed groups to identify the bodies delivered to the
forensic offices, including through proper documentation and DNA sampling, before burial.
33. On 25 September, an adviser to the SBU Head stated that “on the territories freed from
terrorists, law enforcement officials continue to find newer and newer burials of those who were
tortured to death by the punitive organs of the so called ‘people’s republics’. Thanks to local
residents, we establish locations of these burials and carry out exhumation of bodies”.
34. On 26 September, the National Security and Defence Council announced that law
enforcement agencies “continued to investigate mass crimes against civilians perpetrated by the
armed groups in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions”. It claimed that three “mass graves” had
been found in the town of Sloviansk, and that bodies had been exhumed and were awaiting
official forensic examination. Twelve people had reportedly been identified. According to the
Council, these people perished in the first half of June, when the town was controlled by the
armed groups. On 2 October, a grave with three bodies (one female and two male) was found in
the town of Mykolaivka (Sloviansk district). According to the acting press secretary of Sloviansk
police department, “efforts to identify illegal graves on the territory of local cemeteries
continue”.
Allegations of mass graves
35. On 23 September, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ announced the discovery of graves in
the vicinity of the village Nyzhnia Krynka, 35 km north east of Donetsk. These graves were
initially described by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ as graves or ‘fraternal graves’, but later
referred to as ‘mass graves’14.
36. One of these graves (located near the entrance to the village) contained five bodies. Two

14
There is no internationally agreed definition of ‘mass grave’. The former United Nations Rapporteur on extra-
judicial, summary or arbitrary execution, Bacre Ndiaye, defined mass graves as locations where three or more
victims of extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions were buried, not having died in combat or armed
confrontations (1991). This definition was used by the UN tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia.

9
further graves discovered on the territory of the ‘Komunarska’ No 22’ mine contained two
bodies each. People whose bodies were found in the first grave were identified as members of
the armed groups, reportedly killed in action. Currently to the knowledge of the HRMMU, there
are no allegations that they were summarily executed. As regards to the four people from the two
graves near the mine, according to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’, there allegedly exists
forensic evidence that they could have faced a summary execution. On 15 October, an HRMMU
team visited the three grave locations, and interviewed relatives of two people whose bodies
were reportedly identified, having been exhumed from one of the two graves where those buried
could have faced a summary execution. Their testimonies indicate that these people may have
previously been detained by Ukrainian forces. This has been denied by the Ukrainian
Government. The alleged summary execution of four people found in the graves near
‘Komunarska No 22’ mine needs to be investigated, and all measures should be taken for the
preservation of evidence.
37. On 3 October, an adviser to the SBU Head presented a map marking the location of
“concentration camps, torture sites of punitive bodies of terrorist organisations, places of torture
and executions of local population”. According to him, the map is based on the testimonies of
witnesses received through an SBU hotline, and the locations were “verified by satellite photos,
intercepted telephone calls between members of the armed groups, SBU intelligence data, and
by testimonies of detained and arrested perpetrators”.
38. The map lists five places where ‘local residents were tortured, killed and buried’ by the
armed groups: ‘five bodies in a pit in Nyzhnia Krynka’ (it is not clear whether this is the same
grave as the one mentioned below; ‘mass graves’ in Sloviansk (described above); ‘numerous
hastily made graves close to fighters’ camp near the Izium-Sloviansk highway’; and ‘the burial
of 30 civilians in Telmanivskyi district’.
39. The requests of the HRMMU to the SBU to provide additional details concerning these
cases have so far not been met. The HRMMU was only informed that criminal cases had been
initiated and an investigation was being carried out.

B. Deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance15

By the armed groups
40. On 8 October, the head of the ‘commission on issues of prisoners of war and refugees’ of
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ publicly declared that “about 600 Ukrainians” were held by the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’. The number of people held by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ and
by other armed groups is not known.
41. According to the SBU, as of 30 September, there were at least 21 new ad hoc places of
detention set up since the conflict started in the areas controlled by the armed groups (in the
cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as Horlivka, Makiivka and Shakhtarsk). In addition, the
‘minister of internal affairs’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’16, claims that it controls all penal
colonies, pre-trial detention centres and temporary detention facilities which existed before the
hostilities started in its territory. However, there are also places of detention managed by the
‘military police’ subordinated to the ‘ministry of defence’, and some managed by the ‘ministry
of state security’. There are also numerous detention facilities, which are reportedly maintained

15
The arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law (Article 2 of the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance).
16
The information was given to HRMMU in a meeting on 12 October in Donetsk.

10
by various armed groups operating under the auspices of either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’
or the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, as well as ad hoc detention facilities that are operated by
armed groups not under the control of either of the aforementioned ‘republics’.
42. On 6 October, an unknown group of people reportedly abducted the warden of Penal
Colony № 82, in Selidove (Donetsk region), from his home in Donetsk. On 11 October, it
became known that, on 29 September, a civil activist and deputy of Novoazovsk district council
(Donetsk region) who provided assistance and accommodation to IDPs, was taken by armed
men. He had previously also been deprived of his liberty on 29-30 August by the armed groups,
and taken to a forest where he was forced to dig his own grave, but later released. His current
whereabouts are unknown.
43. On 8 October, the HRMMU was informed about the deprivation of liberty of the head of
the Independent Miners’ Trade Union of the Kalinin mine, and of his two sons. Allegedly, on 6
October, his private apartment was stormed by eight armed men who introduced themselves as
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ police. They reportedly claimed having received a complaint
that an “enemy of the republic” was living in the apartment, and that they had to detain him to
“clarify circumstances”. When contacted by his wife, neither the local ‘police department’ where
he and his sons were supposedly taken, nor the ‘state security committee’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ had any information about the individual.
By the Government of Ukraine
44. The Ukrainian law enforcement agencies continued to detain people in relation to the
hostilities in the east, particularly on the grounds of terrorism and separatism. The number of
those detained is constantly in flux due to detainees being released and new detentions, including
in the context of the exchanges as foreseen under the Minsk Agreement. The SBU declared that
as of 17 October, it was carrying out about 1,500 investigations cases with the aforementioned
allegations although the number of people in detention is unknown. On 7 October, an adviser to
the Minister of Internal Affairs reported that MoIA servicemen in the Luhansk region had put 99
persons under arrest or home arrest for suspicion of ‘crimes related to terrorism and separatism’.
45. There continue to be allegations that the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and
volunteer battalions maintain secret and illegal detention facilities outside of judicial oversight
with reports of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances. An illustrative example is the
case of a man who was suspected of organizing riots which led to the seizure of the Kharkiv
Regional State Administration in March. On 26 April, he was arrested and kept in a pre-trial
detention facility in Poltava. He was to be released on 12 September, upon a decision of the
Kyivskyi District Court but according to his lawyer, he was immediately detained by the SBU
without any order. The next day, the MoIA posted on his Facebook page that the man was
placed in an “SBU isolation facility”. On 17 September, his lawyer filed a complaint to the
investigative judge in the Kyivskyi District Court17. In an official answer to the court, the SBU
denied that the man was in its custody. However, the HRMMU was informed by a credible
source received on 18 September that the man was being held in a secret SBU facility in
Kharkiv. The HRMMU inquiries to the SBU and the prosecutor’s office have not produced any
results.
46. The HRMMU has also been following the case of a professor in Kharkiv – a well-known
opponent to Ukraine’s association with the European Union – who was arrested by the SBU
during the night of 29 to 30 June. After spending two and a half months in pre-trial detention in
Poltava, he was supposed to be released on bail, but his whereabouts have remained unknown

17
In accordance with article 206 of the Criminal Procedure Code: ‘Each investigating judge of the Court within the
territorial jurisdiction of which a person o is held in custody has the right to pass a resolution which obliges any
organ of State power or service person to ensure observance of the rights of such persons’.

11
since 18 September.
47. On 2 October, a deputy of the Luhansk Regional Council 18 was reportedly taken by
soldiers of the 24th Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion Aidar in Sievierodonetsk (Luhansk
region). The MoIA reported that two battalion members transferred the man to Kyiv reportedly
in accordance with an earlier agreement with the Luhansk regional department of the SBU. On 3
October, following a report of the deprivation of his liberty made by his wife to law enforcement
agencies, the Aidar soldiers were apprehended by the police in Kyiv. The office of the Military
Prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation under article 146 (Illegal deprivation of liberty) of
the Criminal Code. The whereabouts of this individual remain unknown.
Exchanges of persons deprived of their liberty
48. Between 5 September and 31 October, about 20 exchanges of persons deprived of their
liberty, as part of the Minsk Protocols, were reported by various Ukrainian officials and/or civil
initiatives, with 400 to 420 people (predominantly members of the Ukrainian military) released
by the armed groups. There are no official figures as to how many have been released by the
Government of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the SBU reports that from 5 September to 20 October,
1,509 people have been released by the armed groups. The SBU reported having secured the
release of 822 people, including 628 soldiers or police officers of various formations and 194
civilians, including five journalists. The number of people released by the Government of
Ukraine is not known.
49. Some credible reports question the voluntary nature of the exchanges, which has not
always been observed, with some detainees following their exchange reporting that they were
forced to participate in the process. For example, the HRMMU received information that on 25
September, some ‘pro-federalism’ detainees held in the pre-trial detention facility in Odesa were
forced by the SBU to participate in detainee exchanges. At that time they were notified that the
criminal charges against them were dropped. Although they were warned unofficially by the
SBU that if they did return to Odesa they would again face prosecution. On 16 October, the
HRMMU was informed by the relatives and lawyers of the detainees, that having been
exchanged, criminal proceedings had indeed been reopened against them.

C. Torture and ill-treatment

50. During the reporting period, the HRMMU continued to receive reports of torture and ill-
treatment by the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and volunteer battalions and by the armed
groups, including beating, death threats, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and lack of
access to medical assistance. Some detainees who had been selected by the Government of
Ukraine to be released, under the Minsk agreements, reported spending several days in detention
without food and water.
By the armed groups
51. A serviceman of the 24th Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion Aidar, released by
armed groups on 27 September, after being wounded and detained in an ambush on 26
September, reported being beaten and that his right arm marked with a tattoo of the Ukrainian
coat of arms and ‘Glory to Ukraine’, was cut off with an axe.
52. On 24 October, the HRMMU interviewed a man who had been detained for 48 days by
the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ for ‘espionage’, and was released on 27 September. At a
detention facility managed by the ‘ministry of state security’ (a former plant of isolation
materials), the man reported seeing several dozens of people, most of whom were beaten. He
reported that there was no separation between men and women; that detainees were poorly fed;

18
He had recently been the ‘deputy minister of health’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.

12
with limited or no access to water; humiliating sanitation arrangements; extremely limited access
to medical care; and no opportunity to communicate with relatives. A further HRMMU
interview with a Donetsk resident how had been detained on 6 August by an armed group
because of his ‘anti-governmental propaganda subversive activities’, revealed that he was taken
to the former Donetsk regional SBU building. There he was heavily beaten, for two days, with
wooden bats and rubber sticks, and threatened to be shot. His abductors allegedly started cutting
off his ear. He was reportedly kept in a very small cell with three Ukrainian servicemen, and
then transferred to another place where he was beaten again and then imprisoned in an iron box
already containing one man, with little capacity to even hold one person. They were left there for
a day under the sun, which caused him to lose consciousness. After the detainees began banging
the box, they were eventually let out for a short while, received pain killing injections and given
some water, but were later put back in the box again. They were subsequently taken to a garage,
handcuffed and beaten for 10 days.
By the Ukrainian forces
53. On 6 October, the HRMMU contacted the Head of the National Preventive Mechanism
(NPM) with regard to the allegations of ill-treatment of detainees by the Ukrainian authorities in
the pre-trial detention facility (SIZO) №18, located in Starobilsk (Luhansk region). Further to an
inspection, the NPM reported on 10 October that it could not confirm the allegations but it had
found that some detainees bore signs of physical abuse on the arrival to the SIZO, as recorded by
SIZO officials.
54. On 13 October, the HRMMU interviewed a resident of Debaltseve (Donetsk region) who
claimed that when with the armed groups, he was involved in building and guarding checkpoints
and roadblocks. On 16 September, he was allegedly detained at home by Ukrainian servicemen
of the 25th Territorial Defence Battalion ‘Kyivska Rus’ and was reportedly kicked repeatedly. He
was then taken to the Debaltseve department of the MoIA, where he was allegedly interrogated
and beaten for three days, and urged to tell where weapons, ammunition and supporters of the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ were located. He was suffocated with a plastic bag; he was hanged
from an opened door and pulled by a rope tied to his hands on his back; he was also beaten on
the head with a rubber hammer. He was threatened to be taken back to the Kyivska Rus battalion
to be shot dead. After two weeks, he was transferred to the Izium department of MoIA, where he
was again beaten on his back with wooden sticks for a couple of hours. At the end of September,
he was the subject of a detainee exchange.
55. On 14 October, the HRMMU interviewed a resident of Krasnoarmiisk (Donetsk region)
who claimed that he never participated in armed hostilities and only manned an unarmed anti-
Maidan checkpoint. On 5 August, some military servicemen pulled him out of his car and took
him to a location in Krasnoarmiisk, where he was y kept in a basement. He was accused of
operating checkpoints with weapons, and of ‘engagement in terrorism’. He was beaten, and
death threats towards his family were made. The servicemen reportedly wore balaclavas,
camouflage, with Ukrainian flags and the inscription Donbas on their chevrons. He was later
transferred to an official detention facility after his detention was sanctioned by a court. On 17
September, he was put in a cell where 15-25 persons were detained. They were allegedly ordered
to crawl to another cell, while on each side of the corridor guards and operatives were standing
and beating them with clubs. On 28 September, the detainee was the subject of a detainee
exchange.

13
III. FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY, RELIGION OR
BELIEF
A. Freedom of expression
56. In the period covered in this report, violations of freedom of expression continued. The
number of reported incidents involving media workers in conflict affected area has decreased
compared to previous months; nevertheless the working conditions of media professionals in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain dire due to security concerns. Instances of intimidation of
journalists became more frequent in other regions of Ukraine during the Parliamentary elections
campaign.
Safety of journalists and media workers in the conflict affected area
57. As of 31 October, the HRMMU was aware of at least six more journalists and media
workers that remain held by armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’: a local journalist
and a public relations specialist of the Stakhanov town council, captured on 31 July; a journalist
of the Kharkiv-based magazine Ukrainian Space and his aide, captured at a check point on 15
August; an editor-in-chief of internet-based outlet Politics 2.0, captured on 28 July, in Luhansk
region; and a journalist of a pro-Russian newspaper Donetskii Kriazh who went missing on 1
August and was last seen in the office of the Commandant of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ in
Horlivka.
58. During the period covered by this report, five journalists who had been held by armed
groups were released. On 25 September, a blogger of Ukrainian Truth was released after 48 days
of being held by an armed group of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. On 30 September, a
freelance journalist of the Vesti newspaper and the Reporter magazine, together with a free-lance
photojournalist, who had been held by the armed groups since 22 September, were released in
Sverdlovsk, Luhansk region. On 6 October, a journalist of Espreso TV was released after 38
days of detention by an armed group in Makiivka, Donetsk region. He was reportedly ill-treated
and forced to give a false testimony on camera about the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He was later
forced to make video reports as a pre-condition for his release, under the supervision of members
of the Don Cossack unit that was holding him. On 11 October, a freelance journalist from the
Lviv-based agency ZIK had been released after he had been held by armed groups in Luhansk
region since 23 July, along with a group of priests with whom he was travelling to report on their
missionary work in the conflict area. All were held in the basement of the Luhansk State
Administration for more than two months and severely beaten. On 27 October, a local civic
activist and blogger captured on 22 September by armed groups of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’, was released during a detainee exchange.
59. There have been cases of detention of journalists by Ukrainian forces. On 12 October, the
HRMMU interviewed a Russian photographer of the New York Times, who was reportedly
beaten up by servicemen of the Ukrainian army or of the National Guard on 4 October. He and a
journalist for Deutsche Presse-Agentur were detained at a Ukrainian checkpoint in Mariynka
(Donetsk Region) for taking a picture of a Ukrainian tank. Both journalists were ordered to get
out of the car and forced to lie on the ground for half an hour, while their documents were
checked. Both were beaten. They were then escorted to a camp, where their documents were
checked again. After the arrival of SBU officials, the New York Times journalist was allowed to
pass through the checkpoint, but was asked to sign a paper that he had no complaints. The other
journalist did not have proper accreditation and was escorted by the SBU to a hotel. He
reportedly managed to reach Donetsk on 6 October.
60. On 26 September, during a meeting with the OSCE Representative on freedom of the
media in Vienna, representatives of media organisations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation

14
released a joint statement, condemning incidents of killing, beating and detention of journalists
in the conflict-affected areas. They also agreed to ‘continue … cooperation and to undertake the
necessary efforts regarding matters such as the safety of journalists, the development of
professional media and de-escalation of the conflict in Ukraine’. Such efforts are welcome as
disinformation presented in the media has contributed to deepen tensions within society
61. In addition to international human rights law, in the context of armed conflict also
international humanitarian law provides protection for journalists. In armed conflict, journalists
are entitled to all the protections afforded to all other civilians. Journalists will lose this
protection if they directly participate in hostilities for as long as they take direct part. It is
therefore prohibited to target journalists who carry out their lawful professional activities.
Attacks, harassment and intimidation of journalists
62. During the Parliamentary election campaign, some journalists, mainly those dealing with
authorities and political issues, were attacked, harassed and threatened in some parts of the
country. Some incidents seemed to be an attempt to restrict freedom of expression, particularly
regarding corruption issues or what is perceived as a pro-Russian stance – with arbitrary judicial
and administrative measures targeting individual journalists, editors and heads of media
companies. Others were individual acts of violence against journalists and media workers.
63. On 23 September, a Kyiv-based journalist for the programme Our Money and her family
were threatened by a man who demanded the non-airing of a video report about one of the
deputies of the Office of the General Prosecutor, suspected of embezzlement. The police have
opened an investigation into the incident.
64. On 1 October, the general director of the Odesa-based TV Channel Seven reported being
threatened by two unknown young men demanding a change to the editorial policy. The general
director noted that over the last couple of months the channel had been preparing and
broadcasting programmes aimed at combatting corruption, extortion, and bribery. It was also the
only local channel that refused to broadcast any political advertisements, but which provided
free-of-charge space for interviews and debates involving authorities at all levels.
65. On 21 October, the editor of the Odesa website ‘INFO-centre’ – and member of the
Journalists Union of Ukraine – was arrested by the SBU on the street. Immediately after, his
house was searched, and he was brought to the SBU on the grounds that files related to the
‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ were found in his home. His
lawyer was informed about the arrest the following day. On 23 October, he was placed in
custody for two months as a measure of restraint, accused of complicity with terrorist
organizations and concealment of a crime, based on electronic files related to his journalist
activities. On 31 October, the court prolonged the journalist’s custody until 23 December.
66. On 24 October, the MoIA Main Investigation Department searched the offices of three
media companies in the context of an investigation into “funding actions aimed at overthrowing
the constitutional order or seizing State power). The MoIA stated that it had established that the
companies had violated the decision of the District Administrative Court, which banned
broadcasting of Russian TV channels in Ukraine, and that they had “used the funds received
from the sale of advertising time on the specified channels to fund terrorist groups in Ukraine”.
Based on a court decision, the accounts of the companies were blocked, whilst the financial
documents and some technical equipment were seized.
67. On 23 September, unknown persons in camouflage attacked the editor of the magazine
Political Critique and severely beat him in the centre of Kyiv, accusing him of separatism.
68. On 6 October, five men wearing uniforms of the Territorial Defence Battalion Donbas
came to the office of the Internet and TV provider LLC Matrix in Krasnoarmiisk. They
reportedly instructed everybody to kneel, whilst one of them struck the senior office manager

15
with a rifle, accusing him of collaboration with pro-Russian armed groups by broadcasting
Russian TV channels. All office equipment and documentation was seized and taken away.
According to the Press Office of the Krasnoarmiisk City Police Department, an investigation
was opened into the incident. On 8 October, the deputy commander of the Donbas Battalion
stated that all equipment and documentation had been returned, and that the serviceman who had
acted aggressively was “punished”.
69. On Parliamentary Election Day, 26 October, the NGO Institute of Mass Information
registered nine instances of obstruction of journalists’ professional activity, mainly in southern
regions of Ukraine. They included physical threats and intimidation of journalists and their
crews, as well as preventing their access to, and filming of, polling stations.

B. Freedom of peaceful assembly

70. On 26 September, the Kharkiv State Administration and a local court banned a ‘peace
march’ planned by the Communist party on the following day, arguing that this measure sought
to ‘ensure safety ‘due to notifications about alleged provocations of conflict’. Despite this ban,
the rally took place and activists were detained.
71. On 28 September, a large crowd of ‘pro-unity’ protestors was able to gather in Freedom
Square in Kharkiv and tore down the statue of Lenin. Several clashes occurred on 29 September
between rival groups of activists but the police did not appear at the scene.
72. As a general rule, neither a perceived or potential risk of public disorder, nor the
presence of a hostile audience should justify the banning of peaceful assembly.19 It is preferable
to detain and prosecute people later for any outbreak of violence, rather than impose prior
restraints on an assembly based upon the possibility of violence. At the end of September, in a
new development, protests emerged in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions controlled by the
armed groups. Citizens of Stahanov, Antratsyt, and Rovenky (Luhansk region) on 14 September,
22 September, and 27 September respectively, demanded that the Government of Ukraine
address the issue of pensions as armed groups were not able to provide such payments. On 12
October, in Donetsk, activists protested against the upcoming elections of self-proclaimed ‘top
officials’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
73. The armed groups responded to some of these movements with acts of intimidation. For
example, on 5 October, in Sverdlovsk (Luhansk region) during a protest to demand payments of
salaries and other social payment by the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’, armed supporters of the
‘republic’ tried to prevent the gathering by shooting at people, injuring three citizens. Similarly,
on 22 October in Brianka (Luhansk region), armed supporters of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
prevented pensioners who had not received pensions for four months from rallying by shooting
in the air.
74. The protest in Kyiv on 13 October of uniformed National Guard conscripts demanding
their demobilisation (they had been mobilised beyond their terms of initial conscription or had
later been remobilised). In case this demand could not be met, they asked to be paid their due
cash benefits and to be provided with winter clothing. The demands of the conscripts were
transmitted to the President. The Office of the General Prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings
against the organisers of the protest for absence without leave. Servicemen in 10 other locations
supported the protest.

19
See the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Makhmudov v. Russia. See also Report of the Special
Report of the Special Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association, Maina Kiai, A/HRC/20/27, para.25.

16
 C. Freedom of religion or belief
75. There have been increasing reports of violations of freedom of religion or belief in the
areas controlled by the armed groups. All faith traditions, except for the Orthodox Church of the
Moscow Patriarchate, appear to be targeted by the armed groups through the persecution and
detention of clergy members and believers, as well as the seizure of church property.
76. Thus, on 27 September, armed men abducted a Protestant pastor of the Seventh-day
Adventist church in Horlivka, Donetsk region, reportedly stating that “this is Orthodox land and
there is no place for various sects”. The pastor was released on 16 October.
77. On 23 September, the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church announced on its website
that from the beginning of April until September, seven Baptist church buildings had been seized
by the armed supporters of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
78. On 4 October, armed Don Cossacks seized the Holy Trinity Cathedral (Orthodox Church
of Kyiv Patriarchate) in Luhansk and gave the clergy one hour to “get out”, declaring that the
Church would be used as their dormitory.
79. On 18 September, the Metropolitan of Luhansk and Alchevsk, Mytrofan, issued an
official statement claiming that the local Orthodox clergy had nothing to do with the forcible
seizure of religious buildings, which was exclusively the initiative of the armed groups. He
stated that diocese bishops disapproved of such actions and would not accept any buildings
belonging to Baptists or any other confessions that had been seized by the armed groups and
offered to his denomination for use.

IV. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

80. The hostilities continue to severely affect the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural
rights. In the first nine months of 2014 prices increased by 16.2 per cent, utility rates by 24.3 per
cent on average, whilst the average salary increased by 4.9 per cent20. The situation of the
approximately 5.221 million people living in the conflict and post conflict affected areas is
particularly difficult due to the considerable breakdown and disruption of the economic
infrastructure and social services. The availability of healthcare in those areas is increasingly
limited, with particularly serious consequences for the most vulnerable people.

A. Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health

81. The hostilities have exposed some more systemic problems in the healthcare system
affecting patients across the country. One of the most pressing concerns relates to the threat of
interrupted treatment of HIV-positive and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis patients in all regions
as of 1 January 2015, due to the non-completed tenders for the purchase of the live-saving
medication22. As of 31 October, only 25 per cent of the required amount of medication had been
purchased. Now even if the tenders are finalised shortly, the medications may be delivered only
in April 2015. The National Council on Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS prevention has already
requested the Global Fund to provide treatment for the first three months of 2015; however civil
society service providers are greatly concerned that the life-saving medication will not be
delivered in time. The absence of treatment will directly affect 59,448 HIV-positive patients and

20
According to the data of the State Statistics service released on 31 October.
21
As of 31 October according to the Situation Report No.18, of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs.
22
This year the Ministry of Health of Ukraine has not completed tenders for procuring life-saving medications for
more than five months. For this, the Minister has been suspended from his position in September.

17
approximately 11,600 multidrug resistant tuberculosis patients. Ukraine is a country with high
HIV as well as multi-drug resistant tuberculosis burden23. Thus discontinuation of treatment is
life-threatening for more than 70,000 patients and may lead to the uncontrolled spread of
epidemics. Provision of essential medicines is one of the core obligations of the State to ensure
the satisfaction of the minimum essential level of the right to health 24. While some disruption
may be unavoidable, the conflict may not be used to justify long delays or large scale disruption
in the provision of essential drugs.
Access to healthcare in the conflict affected area
82. Access to healthcare services in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, especially in areas
controlled by armed groups, remained limited. At least 45 hospitals out of 601 medical
establishments in Donetsk and Luhansk regions are destroyed or damaged and many other are
partially functioning or not operational. Access to specialized care, including for non-
communicable diseases, diabetes, cancer, palliative care, maternal and new-born care and safe
blood transfusion, is significantly limited due to a lack of staff and medications. Specialized care
is concentrated in Luhansk and Donetsk cities, which are now controlled by armed groups, and
hence not at present accessible for residents in the two regions, particularly those in towns
controlled by Ukrainian Government. Shifting the provision of such care to other hospitals is
complicated and resources-consuming. Whilst local antiretroviral therapy-sites25 and the regional
tuberculosis (TB) dispensary in Luhansk are non-operational, the Donetsk and Luhansk regional
AIDS centres are providing limited services. However, the provision of tests for timely diagnosis
of HIV is critical, for those who are entitled to this service free of charge: pregnant women,
blood donors, individuals with positive results of first tests, and children under 18 months born
from HIV positive mothers. In addition, residents of the conflict-affected areas report on the lack
of medications available for purchase in pharmacies, especially for heart diseases and high blood
pressure, sedatives, and antiviral treatment.
83. Although many medical professionals have left the conflict affected area, most hospitals
still seem staffed by some doctors and nurses. In the areas controlled by armed groups, a
shortage of paramedics26 is reported. This is likely to have an impact on the quality of services
provided as such personnel play an important role in the post-surgery recovery of patients. As
reported by local doctors to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and WHO, one of the main
concerns in the conflict affected area is the increasing lack of medical supplies including
anaesthetic, vaccination, insulin, consumables, solutions, surgical instruments and equipment,
TB, HIV and cancer drugs, and reagents for haemodialysis.
84. The growing numbers of IDPs, wounded and disabled, are also putting additional
pressure on hospitals across Ukraine, leading to limited access and low quality of healthcare,
including rehabilitation. On 29 October, the HRMMU has received reports that, in several
instances, ambulances refused to drive to collective accommodation for IDPs due to the lack of
fuel. Also, many have access to doctors, some cannot obtain specialized care, and many are
unable to buy the medicines prescribed 27. There are also constraints in accessing dental care,
which is mainly provided by private dental clinics and are paid out-of-pocket. This has a
particularly negative effect on groups in a position of vulnerability, such as people living in
poverty, older persons, and some IDPs.

23
WHO Tuberculosis profile, Ukraine (http://www.who.int/gho/countries/ukr/country_profiles/en/).
24
CESCR General Comment on the right to health, paragraph 43.
25
Located in Krasnyi Liman, Shakhtarsk, Snizhne in Donetsk region.
26
According to the regular surveys of WHO in the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ there are only 30 cent of non-
professional medical staff available.
27
Due to the absence of the system of medical insurance and limited financing of hospitals, most medications, even
prescribed, are not available free of charge.

18
 B. Right to an adequate standard of living (including food, clothing, housing, water
and sanitation)
85. As of 31 October, 36 settlements in Donetsk region remained without electricity as a
result of the continued fighting. Electricity was only partially available in Mariinka, Avdiivka,
Donetsk and Horlivka. Information about the situation in Luhansk region was not available. In
the last days of October, there were reports of more frequent shelling of electric power stations
in Schastia, Luhansk and Donetsk cities, which depending on the circumstances may constitute a
violation of International Humanitarian Law.
86. Access to water in Donetsk and Luhansk regions has been improving, although water
utility companies continued to face difficulties in inspecting and repairing pipelines due to
insecurity in many places. The majority of the regions still had only a partial flow of water and,
in some areas people were digging shallow wells to cope with the shortage. As of 31 October, 29
settlements in the Donetsk region had limited access to water supply.
87. Humanitarian aid delivery in September slightly improved in the conflict-affected area.
Due to an ongoing shortage of cash, residents in the areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions
under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ have
continuing fears of being unable to buy the limited food and commodities that are available.
Residents of five towns (Kirovske, Pervomaisk, Avdiivka, Stanytsia Luhanska and Stakhanov)
reported a shortage of food, especially cereals, dairy, meat and fish products. Hygiene items
were reported to be lacking in Novotoshkivske, Stanytsia Luhanska, Pervomaisk, Avdiivka and
Yunokomunarivsk.

C. Right to property
88. The HRMMU continued to receive reports about illegal seizure of property in the areas
controlled by armed groups. On 30 September, the spokesman of the Information Centre stated
that the armed groups of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ organised the sale of about 100 cars stolen
from local residents or dealerships and had been forcing local residents of Lutugino to sell their
homes for as little as USD 100 to USD 1,000.
89. On 28 October, the HRMMU learned that private entrepreneurs and those trading on
local food markets had to ‘urgently’ re-register with the so-called ‘ministry of revenues and
duties’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and pay taxes in order to further carry out their
activities. Earlier in October, it was reported that entrepreneurs in Rovenky and Antratsyt towns
(Luhansk region), were required respectively, to either pay a specific sum, or pay a 20 % tax on
profits to support the armed groups. On 28 October, the self-proclaimed ‘Ataman of Antratsyt
District of the Great Don Cossacks Army Major-General’ stated that entrepreneurs should now
maintain at their own expense the Cossack units, which reportedly took control of the Krasnyi
Luch (Luhansk region). Due to the absence of law-enforcement in the areas controlled by the
armed groups, the residents are left without any real means to protect their rights. All of these
demands amount to extortion.

D. Right to work and favourable working conditions

90. Unemployment is growing in Ukraine. As of 27 October, there were 1.7 million

19
unemployed28 (8.4 per cent of economically active population) including 1,147,425 who were
officially registered as such. The largest number of unemployed was registered in the Donetsk
region29 (87,097 persons) and in the regions with the highest influx of IDPs, namely
Dnipropetrovsk (81,875 persons), Kharkiv (70,752), Lviv (62,547) and Zaporizhzhia (62,179).
Women accounted for 57.6 per cent of registered unemployed.
91. As of 29 October, wage arrears amounted to UAH 1.9 billion (approximately USD 148
million) 30 across Ukraine. The highest rates of unpaid salaries were registered in Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kyiv and Kharkiv regions. In some regions, particularly in the south, the illegal
practice of sending teachers on unpaid leave was identified by respective authorities. For
example, in Kherson region, the teachers were proposed to go on unpaid leave for 5 or 10
working days due to the lack of funding for wages. The non-payment of salaries is an acute issue
in those areas controlled by the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’,
especially for teachers and doctors. Until August, the Government of Ukraine attempted to
transfer money to those areas. In some medical establishments, workers received payments for
August and September, while in others, for example in Shakhtarsk and Torez, employees have
not received their salaries since July. In September, the ‘leadership’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ made attempts to pay salaries, however there is no specific data as to how many people
received the payments.
92. The HRMMU continued to receive worrying reports about abuses of the right to work
and favourable working conditions in the east. The medical and educational institutions
continued to be subordinated to the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’
in areas under their control, leading to numerous violations. Medical employees and teachers in
several towns controlled by armed groups were dismissed without being duly informed about the
reasons: the employees of the Luhansk City Hospital № 9 were forced to write letters of
resignation and sign papers pledging their loyalty to the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ should they
wish to continue working at the hospital.
93. The HRMMU was informed that in September and October, armed groups forced
medical personnel of medical institutions to terminate their labour contracts and to sign new
ones with ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. Those unwilling to do
so were threatened with dismissal.
Reprisals
94. On 17 October, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs stated that 17,000 police officers
had been dismissed in Luhansk and Donetsk regions for ‘failure to comply with the oath,
obeying the enemy, or merely for being supported [sic i.e. paid] while waiting to see what would
happen’. A number of dismissed officers interviewed by the HRMMU consider this decision to
be a punishment for not abandoning their posts and continuing to fulfil their law enforcement
duties in the absence of direction from the central authorities, when they found themselves in
areas controlled by the armed groups.

E. Right to social security

95. Due to the suspended work of the State Treasury and the breakdown of banking system
in the areas controlled by armed groups, the delivery of social benefits remained limited in the
settlements controlled by armed groups. The payment arrears to citizens in these areas amounted
to UAH 6.6 billion (approx. USD 508 million) 31. As of 31 October, most residents had not

28
According to the data released by the State Statistics Service on 27 and 31 October.
29
In the 6th OHCHR report, the HRMMU noted that enterprises and business had to close due to security situation.
30
According to the data of the State Statistics Service, released on 29 October.
31
According to the Ministry of Social Policy, as of 24 October.

20
received benefits for more than three months, which is particularly difficult for older persons and
persons with disabilities.
96. The Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine has developed simplified procedures to enable
residents of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of armed groups to access their
benefits, but according to the regulations, social benefits can only be received by in the areas
under control of the Government. The HRMMU learned that some social workers in the
territories controlled by armed groups have organized schemes, unlawfully charging retirees
money (UAH 300 per person) for processing their applications to receive pensions from Ukraine
on a bank card, and to organize trips for retirees to the Government-controlled towns to submit
such applications in person.
97. Reportedly, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ has commenced disbursing social benefits in
the territory it controls. But people have to submit application forms to claim their benefits and
must present a passport, and a photo. Such social benefits have been disbursed reportedly
varying between UAH 900 and 1800 (approximately USD 69 and 138). But they have not been
systematic and have not reached all those who are entitled to social benefits.

F. Right to education
98. The Administration of big cities continues facing difficulties to accommodate children in
pre-school facilities; for example, in Kyiv 8,000 children were left without a place in
kindergarten, in Odesa 10,000 are waiting for placement 32. The Ministry of Education and
Science reported that no problems occurred with accommodation of children in the schools, even
in the areas with the highest influx of IDPs. However funding to cover the salaries of additional
staff was lacking dramatically.
99. Across Ukraine, access to education facilities in remote areas remained complicated, as
many school buses remained mobilized for the military operation in the east 33. This especially
affects children in rural areas. In the territories controlled by the armed groups, schooling is
limited, mainly due to the destruction of buildings and insecurity. On 10 October, the ‘minister
of education’ of ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ stated that on the territory controlled by the
‘republic’, 85 educational buildings, 26 kindergartens and 51 schools had been damaged or
destroyed. In Donetsk city, 48 out of 150 secondary schools and 54 out of 185 kindergartens
were reportedly damaged. As of 13 October, in Luhansk city, 5 out of 60 schools had been
destroyed completely and 43 had been damaged. Out of 63 kindergartens, 38 had been damaged.
The overall number of children, who still had no access to secondary education in both regions,
remained unknown34.
100. In these areas, the curricula have been altered to exclude the teaching of Ukrainian
language and history, which makes it problematic to obtain State school diplomas. This also
violates the cultural rights of Ukrainian speaking children.

G. Groups facing discrimination

Roma
101. Roma NGOs continued to report about difficulties faced by members of their community
face seeking to access social services or employment. The main underlying reason seems to be a
32
Lack of places in the kindergartens will also have a negative impact on women’s economic situation and their
right to work.
33
In paragraph 130 of the 6th OHCHR report, the HRMMU stated about such problems in Kherson, Mykolaiv,
Volyn and Rivne regions.
34
As of 16 September, the number of children who were not able to resume their studies on 1 September was
260,000 children; primarily in the territories controlled by armed groups.

21
lack of education and absence of identity documents. It is particularly the case for Roma IDPs.
Insufficient outreach activities, lack of coordination among volunteer initiatives, limited
awareness among the Roma concerning available assistance and lack of documents, exacerbates
their vulnerability.
People living with HIV/AIDS
102. On 14 October, UNAIDS and UNODC raised concerns about reckless disclosure of the
status of people with HIV/AIDS in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as medical records have often
become available to non-medical staff while hospitals are being seized by armed groups.
103. On 10 October, the NGO All-Ukrainian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS
confirmed to the HRMMU that most people living with HIV and former drug users had left the
region due to fear of persecution, as well as the lack of available services.
Persons deprived of their liberty
104. The HRMMU regularly receives reports from civil society organisations regarding the
situation of people deprived of their liberty in areas controlled by armed groups. As of 31
October, approximately 15,000 people reportedly remained in detention facilities in the conflict
affected area. Most of them are reportedly at the point of starvation, as humanitarian aid rarely
reaches them due to the insecurity.
LGBTI
105. The prevalence of negative stereotypes vis-à-vis LGBTI remains quite high. For
example, on 22 September, an NGO from Lviv informed the HRMMU that it had recently
exposed a social network that requested users to share information about LGBTI members, sex
workers and drug dealers in the town and to vote as to whether such people should be attacked
and beaten. The NGO also reported a case of police officers collecting information about LGBTI
persons and extorting UAH 3,000 (approx. USD 230) from each, threatening to otherwise reveal
their sexual orientation to their family and friends. The LGBTI community is often reluctant to
report threats and violations of their rights.
106. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about the safety of the LGBTI community in the
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ a law 35 was passed, which
criminalizes homosexuality with a prison term of two to five years.
Trafficking in persons
107. The armed hostilities, the deterioration of the economic situation, including growing
unemployment, significant wage arrears, and the large numbers of IDPs create an environment
that is propitious to increased trafficking in human beings. The International Organization for
Migration (IOM) in Ukraine reported about the identification of 642 victims of trafficking (282
women and 360 men) in January-September 2014 throughout Ukraine, which is fewer than the
number reported by IOM in the respective period of last year. This, however, may indicate gaps
in the identification mechanism of victims, as the responsible ministries, as well as key NGOs,
have concentrated their efforts on addressing other immediate and acute issues arising from the
conflict.
108. The HRMMU welcomes the steps undertaken by the Government of Ukraine to prevent
trafficking in human beings from the conflict affected area. For example, the creation of a
working group under the Ministry of Social Policy to draft a new national action plan aimed to
protect civilians, including against the risks of trafficking; as well as the strengthened control
over the movement of children out of the country, given the numerous attempts of illegal
movement of orphans and children deprived of parental care who have not reached the age of 16

35
‘Law on the protection of Christian values of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ from the negative influence of the
customs of hostile states such as Ukraine, the European Union, Canada and the USA’.

22
abroad, especially to the territory of the Russian Federation.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

109. According to legislation36, voters can directly vote both for one national deputy under the
majority system and for a party list of candidates under the proportional system. However,
voting under the majority system requires a permanent residence in Ukraine. Some IDPs from
Crimea and those who left their electoral districts due to the hostilities in the eastern regions, and
conscripts or soldiers and volunteers located out of their home areas, faced difficulties in
exercising their right to vote, particularly under the majority system. The Central Electoral
Commission (CEC) facilitated a special procedure to allow IDPs to vote at least for the party
lists under the proportional system, IDPs from Donetsk and Luhansk regions 37 and from
Crimea38 could apply to any office of the State Register of Voters to change their place of voting
with their valid internal passports.
110. The Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea informed Crimean residents wishing to vote at the parliamentary elections that they
needed to register at a local polling station no later than 20 October. Crimean residents were to
produce an internal passport showing that they came from Crimea. According to the CEC 2,864
IDPs from Crimea, 21,704 IDPs from Donetsk region and 11,119 IDPs from Luhansk region
changed their voting places before the parliamentary elections. Approximately 80 per cent of
servicemen were able to vote on Election Day according to the National Security and Defence
Council (NCSD).
111. On 25 September, the CEC closed the deadline for applications of candidates wishing to
stand in the parliamentary elections. Twenty-nine political parties contested 225 seats in
proportional voting for party lists and 3,321 candidates contested 198 out of the 225 remaining
seats, under the majority electoral system. Fifteen seats from the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions controlled by the armed groups and the 12 seats for Crimea remain vacant according to
the law39. It was possible to hold elections in 12 out of 21 single-mandate electoral districts in
Donetsk region and in 5 out of 11 single-mandate electoral districts in Luhansk region. On 10
October, the Chairman of parliament announced the possibility of holding by-elections within
those single-mandate electoral districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under the control of
armed groups as well as in Crimea. As the election campaign became more active, the public
lustration campaign (see Chapter on Administration of Justice) against allegedly corrupt officials
became more aggressive, with some actions targeting some parliamentary candidates. The
HRMMU received at least 20 reports of attacks (not lustration-related) against candidates or
parliamentary deputies, which resulted in injuries. Violence was also reported against political
party campaign workers, their relatives, and electoral workers and monitors, as well as
destruction of or damage to party offices, and of promotional material in public places.
112. On 23 October, a law aimed at strengthening penalties for violations of electoral rights,

36
Law as of 17 November 2011 ‘On elections of national deputies in Ukraine’.
37
Resolution as of 7 October No. 1529 ‘On questions of temporary change of voting place by voters whose address
belongs to the territory of Donetsk or Luhansk regions for the period of holding of early parliamentary elections in
Ukraine on 26 October 2014’.
38
On 29 April, the CEC adopted Resolution No. 415 that allows changing an address of voting without changing
the place of registration for residents of the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol where SRVs are not functioning.
39
The Law of 15 April 2014 No. 1207-VII On Ensuring Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and Legal Regime on the
Temporary Occupied Territory of Ukraine’.

23
including for bribery of voters entered into force40. On 30 October, the MoIA stated that 300
criminal cases had been registered for breaching the electoral process, including 71 (until 21
October) for bribery of voters41.
On Election Day incidents were few and isolated. According to the MoIA, there were 19 cases of
temporary disruption of voting with bomb and mine threats at polling stations, including seven
incidents in the Mykolaiv Region; voting was resumed after the police conducted security
checks. Incidents reported on Election Day included cases of: bribery of votes42; attacks in
Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk region) or threats to members of the election commissions in
Rubizhne and Sieverodonetsk (Luhansk region); abduction of a member of an election
commission in Volnovakha (Donetsk region); provocation of violence at polling stations; and
interference in the vote counting. The OSCE/ODIHR led International Election Observation
Mission, in its preliminary findings, stated that “in most of the country Election Day proceeded
calmly, with few disturbances. Voting and counting were transparent and assessed positively
overall.”

VI. SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

113. Despite the proclaimed ceasefire an average of more than 2,000 new IDPs registered
each day during the reporting period as people continued to flee the hostilities. The overall
number of IDPs increased thus from 275,489 as of 18 September to 436,444 on 29 October,
according to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. This includes 417,410 people coming
from the east, and 19,034 IDPs from Crimea.
114. According to UNHCR, as of 24 October, the overall number of people who had fled the
conflict affected areas to other states since April reached 454,339 people 387,355 of them went
to the Russian Federation.
Returnees
115. On 24 October, the OSCE SMM has observed that at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo
and Donetsk [sic] (in the Rostov Region of the Russian Federation) there has been a clear
reverse flow of people back to the eastern regions of Ukraine for the last two months since the
ceasefire agreement.
116. According to the Minister of Social Policy, as of 26 October, approximately 135,000
people had returned to their homes on territories back under the control of the Government of
Ukraine.
117. IDPs have been also returning to the territories controlled by the armed groups. Some go
back temporarily to visit relatives, inspect property or take items. Others return because they
have been unable to find a job or shelter, or for fear that their property will be confiscated by
either the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ or ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.
Accommodation
118. With the onset of autumn, IDPs who were living in summer camps or sanatoria have had
to move to warmer shelter. According to statistics from the Government of Ukraine, fewer than
1,500 IDPs remained in non-winterized shelters as of the middle of October; but this number

40
The law ‘on amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding strengthening of penalties for violations of
electoral rights of citizens’.
41
The largest numbers of such cases was reported in Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, Donetsk
regions and Kyiv city.
42
The cases of bribery or attempted bribery of voters mostly occurred in Kyiv city and region, Kharkiv and Odesa
regions.

24
only includes IDPs who have registered and not others who may be living in various forms of
private shelters like those run by religious organizations, some of which may not be suitable for
winter conditions.
119. On 1 October, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted Resolutions No 505 and No 509
establishing regulations for the registration of, and financial assistance to, IDPs. According to
resolution No 509, the Ministry of Social Policy will be responsible for the registration of IDPs,
and will maintain a centralized database on the profile and specific needs of the IDPs. This
should help better identify needs for IDPs, and plan and coordinate the response.
120. According to resolution No 505 IDPs will be eligible for monthly financial assistance as
long as they fulfil certain conditions, including the requirement for adults to actively seek
employment. The assistance will be UAH 884 (approximately 68 USD) per month for
individuals not able to work (for example, children, elderly, disabled persons), and UAH 442
(approximately 34 USD) per month for working-age adults. The assistance is limited to six
months and is intended to help families pay for housing.
121. The registration process started on 15 October and according to the Ministry of Social
Policy, as of 26 October more than 70,000 IDPs were registered, more than 35,000 families had
applied for financial assistance and 19,000 started receiving it.
Employment
122. Despite significant attempts undertaken by the State Employment Bureau (SEB) 43 IDPs
continued to face barriers to finding employment and receiving unemployment benefits. In order
to receive unemployment benefits, IDPs need to provide the SEB with their employment record
books (a system inherited from the Soviet Union). However, these are normally retained by the
employer. IDPs, having fled the conflict-affected areas, have often not taken their employment
record books, and are consequently not eligible to obtain unemployment benefits. The SEB
accepts letters of resignation as formal evidence of unemployment for IDPs, which allows them
to receive the benefits.
123. In addition, some IDPs have complained of facing discrimination, with claims that they
are usually offered worse working conditions than normal, and expected to work for a lower
salary due to the lack of other options.
Financial assistance to IDPs
124. Many IDPs owe loans for cars or homes, which they are not in a position to reimburse.
Parliament partially sought to address this issue through the adoption of legislation to excuse
interest payments on outstanding loans 44. This law would decrease the risks of IDPs losing their
homes due to foreclosure.

VII. WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Women affected by the hostilities in the east
125. Women may be particularly affected by the short and long-term effects of the hostilities
in the eastern regions. This is due to a number of factors including: gender inequality, their status
in society, and the lack of structures to protect them.
Displaced women
126. Women comprise two thirds of the IDPs in Ukraine. Women continue fleeing with

43
The SEB is under the Ministry of Social Policy, which keeps a record of all job vacancies in Ukraine.
44
Law of Ukraine on Temporary Measures for a Period of Anti-Terrorist Operation as entered into force on 15
October 2014.

25
children, elderly or relatives with disabilities, without male relatives. Thus, they often carry a
heavy burden of caring for others and trying to make decisions about the future. Many women
report45 feeling overwhelmed by the magnitude of their daily tasks. Their general problem is a
lack of support from the State or local authorities and unemployment. Some of them managed to
find a job but none of those who are registered in Donetsk and Luhansk regions could obtain
legal employment.
Sexual and gender-based violence
127. The HRMMU continued to receive allegations of sexual and gender-based violence in
the eastern regions.
128. On 13 October, the HRMMU interviewed a woman from Donetsk, who was “arrested” in
May for violating a curfew by the ‘Vostok Battalion’. She was intimidated, forced into a car and
brought to a place, which, she thought, was a police department seized by the armed groups. She
was beaten with metal sticks for three hours, suspected of being a Ukrainian sniper because of
callosities on her fingers, and released the next day. The woman referred to being raped by
several men from the ‘Vostok Battalion’.
129. The HRMMU spoke with other women who were detained by armed groups or
Ukrainian forces and who stated that while not physically abused, they were often threatened
with rape and in some cases forced to undress. For example, on 14 October, the HRMMU
interviewed an activist of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ activist and medical volunteer, who
was detained by Ukrainian forces in July along with four other persons. She reported that she
and another female detainee were regularly threatened with rape, and were once ordered to
undress and interrogated while standing naked and blindfolded. They were later transported to
the Kharkiv SBU, and one of the women reported being slapped on the back of her head several
times during interrogation. On 2 August she was subject of a detainee exchange, after being
asked to sign an undated protocol of detention.
130. On 14 October, an NGO informed the HRMMU that a couple was detained by armed
groups at an opioid-replacement-therapy site on the grounds of being former drug users. While
the man was forced to dig trenches, the woman was reportedly forced to cook meals for
members of a ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ unit and provide sexual services to them. Both were
later released.
131. On 15 October, the ‘authorities’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ informed the
HRMMU of two cases of alleged rape. In Torez, a member of an armed group reportedly
kidnapped a local female resident, raped her and at the same time placed a grenade in her mouth.
Members of the local armed group reportedly caught and detained the perpetrator; the ‘General
Prosecutor’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ has opened a criminal case. The second case of
rape reportedly took place in Dokuchaivsk (Donetsk Region) while it was under the control of
Ukrainian armed forces. Ukrainian policemen reportedly detained the suspect, and placed him in
a pre-trial detention, but he was released when the Ukrainian troops retreated from Dokuchaivsk.
The ‘police’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ claimed its ‘officers’ have detained the
perpetrator, and have opened a criminal case after the victims’ relatives filed a complaint.
132. On 23 September, it was reported that a member of a ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ armed
group raped a 22-year old girl. He was later subjected to public humiliation by his commanders
as punishment. On 25 October, in Alchevsk (Luhansk region) the ‘Phantom Brigade’ organised
‘the first people’s trial’, which considered two cases of sexual violence. In the first case, a 37-
year old man, also a member of an armed group was accused of raping a 15-year old girl on 12
September. In the second case, a man was accused of raping a 20-year old girl on 27

45
Such reports are received by the UNHCR and NGOs and volunteer initiatives that provide services to IDPs.

26
September 46. The ‘trial’ was filmed and clearly did not meet any fair trial standards. The death
penalty was pronounced in both cases. Following a vote of the 340 residents who had gathered,
the first perpetrator was allowed to “go to the front-line to pay his guilt with blood”. While the
second was sentenced to death. It is not known whether the death penalty has been implemented.
During this ‘trial’, the commander of the ‘Phantom Brigade’, presiding over the proceedings,
made some derogatory comments regarding women and stated that ‘from now on any woman
seen in a cafe or bar will be immediately detained’, adding that women should sit at home (see
Chapter VIII, section D Administration of Justice).

B. Participation and representation of women

133. The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees equal rights between men and women, including
in public and political life. This is further protected by the Law on Ensuring Equal Rights and
Opportunities of Women and Men. However, the level of women’s representation in political
and public life remains low.
134. The Ministry of Social Policy reported that due to austerity measures, in 2014 only 10
per cent of the required state contribution was allocated for the implementation of the two State
programmes On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men until 2016 and
Support of the Family until 2016.
135. The demand of civil society to introduce gender quotas was only partially implemented
in the amendments to the Law on Political Parties in Ukraine. Article 8 of the Law, since 1
February 2014, obliged all political parties to amend their statutes to ensure that at least 30 per
cent of their candidates on their election lists are women; though the majority of political parties
have not complied with this requirement 47.
136. Women comprised around a quarter of the candidates on party lists. Women are
represented the least in the following political parties: Svoboda (14 per cent), Civic Position (12
per cent), Right Sector (9 per cent), Vidrodzhennia (8 per cent) and Congress of Ukrainian
nationalists (0 per cent). Among majoritarian candidates, women accounted for only 13 per cent.
A key reason for this, according to the IEOM observers, was the difficulty women candidates
faced in securing funding for their campaigns. Women were well-represented at the District
election committees, where they accounted for 54 per cent of all members and held many senior
positions48. In the Central Election Commission, five of the 15 members, including one of the
two deputy chairpersons and the secretary, were women. Issues of equal participation of men
and women in elections and the country’s political life more broadly, were generally not part of
the campaign and did not feature prominently in most candidate or party programmes.

VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES

A. Accountability for human rights violations and abuses in the east
Command responsibility
137. As of 28 October, the Office of the Military Prosecutor had opened three criminal
investigations into inaction of the military authorities concerning the failure of the command of
the Voluntary Territorial Defence Battalion ‘Aidar’ to prevent and stop the crimes committed by

46
See the administration of justice section of this report for more details on this trial.
47
The data was presented on 7 October during the press-conference in frames of the USAID-supported project
Gender monitoring of the 2014 elections, which is implemented by the NGO Women’s Consortium of Ukraine.
48
These included 99 committees chaired by women, with 107 female deputy chairpersons and 144 secretaries.

27
its subordinates, and to notify law enforcement regarding such crimes.
138. On 15 October, the SBU announced that a criminal investigation had been opened
against both the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ for ‘crimes
against peace and security of mankind’. 49 The SBU is to investigate cases of inhuman treatment
of civilians and captured military servicemen, notably torture, forced labour and looting of
national treasures in the captured territories.
Military prosecutions
139. Only three criminal proceedings for violence against the population in the areas of
hostilities50 were opened by the Office of the Military Prosecutor as of 18 September. The
current status of these proceedings is unclear, as according to the Office of the Military
Prosecutor, it has not conducted investigations into these crimes as of 27 October.
140. In response to reports of violations committed by Ukrainian volunteer battalions, the
Minister of Internal Affairs announced on 16 October that the Voluntary Special Police Patrol
Battalion ‘Shakhtarsk’ had been disbanded due to multiple cases of looting committed by 50 out
of its 300 members.
141. On 21 October, servicemen of the Voluntary Special Police Patrol Battalion
‘Slobozhanshchina’ filed an open submission to the head of Kharkiv Regional Department of the
MoIA and to the Prosecutor’s Office in relation to violence, looting, intimidation of servicemen,
and other acts allegedly committed by their commander.
Investigations into the use of explosive weapons in populated areas
142. According to the MoIA, from 1 August to 26 October, more than 300 criminal
proceedings were opened into indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in Donetsk region. The
Ministry claims that all necessary investigative actions have been taken, but that has been
hampered by the hostilities and lack of access to the territories controlled by the armed groups.
143. On 4 October, the HRMMU was informed that the Office of the Military Prosecutor of
the Southern Region had initiated a criminal investigation under terrorism charges into the
shelling of residential areas in Debaltseve (Donetsk region).
Investigations into detention by the armed groups
144. As more people have been released by the armed groups, the HRMMU is concerned that
some of these people have not been interviewed by the law enforcement agencies, which may
lead to a failure to collect all necessary information and evidence to ensure accountability for
crimes committed.
Case of Nadiia Savchenko
145. The HRMMU is following the case of Nadiia Savchenko, a Ukrainian servicewoman and
newly elected member of Parliament, who was reportedly captured on 17 June and moved to
Voronezh in the Russian Federation,. She was then moved to pre-trial detention centre in
Moscow. Ms Savchenko is charged with killing two Russian journalists in Ukraine, while on
duty. On 27 October, Basmannyi District Court of Moscow ruled in a closed hearing to hold Ms
Savchenko in custody until 13 February 2015. On 30 October, on the basis of an allegedly
compulsory psychiatric examination, Ms Savchenko was declared sane. The investigation into
her case will therefore proceed.
146. On 29 October, Ms Savchenko’s lawyer informed that she had recognized Ihor
Plotnitskyi, the head of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ as one of those involved in her
abduction. Mr Plotnitskiy is a former commander of the ‘Zaria Battalion’ and a ‘minister of

49
Chapter 20 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
50
It was not clear which particular charges they faced apart from violence. Article 433 of the Criminal Code of
Ukraine, also encompasses illegal destruction and taking of property as well as robbery against local population.

28
defence’ of ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ whom Ms Savchenko mentioned in her 17 July appeal
to the Consul General of Ukraine, after she was moved to the Russian Federation51. As a result,
on 30 October, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine has notified Ihor Plotnitskyi and
Aleksandr Popov (a Russian Federation citizen who was allegedly involved in the attack on the
‘Aidar’ battalion that resulted in Ms Savchenko’s detention) of being suspects in committing
crimes under article 146, part 3 (illegal deprivation of liberty), article 258, part 2 (terrorist act),
and article 332, part 3 (illegal conveying of persons through the state border of Ukraine) of the
Criminal Code.
Case of Nelia Shtepa
147. The HRMMU is also concerned over new developments in the case of the former mayor
of Sloviansk, Nelia Shtepa, who was previously found in pre-trial investigation to be an
accessory to the trespassing of the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, resulting in
death of people. On 8 October, Ms Shtepa was presented an amended notice of suspicion, saying
that she was also suspected of membership in a terrorist organisation – the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’. Ms Shtepa had also been held in detention for more than two months by that same
‘Donetsk people’s republic’.
148. On 31 October, the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's office submitted an indictment to the
court, accusing Ms Shtepa of calls to change the boundaries of Ukraine, assisting in the conduct
of a so-called 'referendum’ on the separation of the Donetsk region from Ukraine, and setting the
stage for activities of terrorist groups and organisations. The maximum sanction for such crimes
is life sentence.
149. Ms Shtepa has informed the HRMMU that she was attacked and beaten while in the
bathroom of the Office of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor. She immediately complained of the
assault but was threatened with a lawsuit for slander. She was examined by the doctor at the pre-
trial detention facility she is being held in, who observed and documented a number of bruises
on her thighs and forearms. The HRMMU visited Ms Shtepa in detention and observed and
documented the bruises on her body as a result of the alleged ill-treatment.
150. According to the Office of the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor, the pre-trial investigation is
completed and it is expected that the case materials will be submitted to court for consideration
in the near future.

B. Investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa

151. The MoIA investigation into the 2 May violence in Odesa has been split into several
criminal proceedings: on mass disorder in the city centre, on the mass disorder at the Trade
Unions building (the Kulikovo Pole square), and against the single ‘pro-unity’ activist charged
with murder.
152. While the investigations into the second and third criminal proceeding are on-going, the
investigation into the mass disorder in the city centre was completed on 24 September. 24 ‘pro-
federalism’ supporters were charged with mass disorder, and 9 suspects were put on a wanted
list. The MoIA expects the court trial to commence in early November.
153. Further, the SBU has started its own investigation on five criminal cases, in relation to
the 2 May violence, but due to the secrecy of investigation, it is reluctant to provide any
information.

51
Yet in her appeal to the Consul General of Ukraine in the Russian Federation of 17 July, Ms. Nadiia Savchenko
stated that she was taken prisoner by the armed groups of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ on 17 June and was
attended by inter alia a man who introduced himself as a commander of the 'Zaria Battalion' and ‘minister of
defence’ of the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’.

29
154. On 17 October, the local media disclosed phone transcripts from the Odesa fire brigade
registered on 2 May, which may constitute evidence of negligent behaviour on the part of the
firemen. Numerous emergency phone calls reporting the fire at Kulikovo Pole, including from
police officers, appeared not to have been fully addressed. However, there has so far been no
investigation of this element. The Independent Commission investigating the 2 May violence
reiterated that the results of the official investigation process cannot be deemed reliable. In
particular, it objects to the fact that the forensic examinations were conducted by the municipal
forensic bureau, which is not a governmental institution as required by Ukrainian legislation. It
also noted that according to experts who received copies of the autopsies, the post mortem
examinations had not been properly conducted in terms of quantitative and qualitative samples
of the deceased people. This concern is all the more serious as all bodies have been buried or
incinerated.
155. Following research, some members of the Independent Commission consider that the 2
May violence was planned by all parties for political purposes: the Regional State
Administration – to disperse the ‘pro-federalism’ tent camp; the MoIA – to disperse the camp
with the help of football fans in order to avoid responsibility; the ‘pro-unity’ movement – to
disperse the ‘pro-federalism’ tent camp and show the strength and unity of local ‘pro-unity’
forces; and the ‘pro-federalism’ movement - to obtain evidence of the impartial attitude of the
local authorities by exposing the intimidation of the ‘pro-unity’ movement and the violation of
their rights (freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of speech). However, those in the
Independent Commission who hold this opinion believe that the plan to disperse the ‘pro-
federalism’ tent camp at Kulikovo Pole square went out of control, with none of the parties
expecting such grave consequences.
156. On 29 October, the Main Investigations Directorate of the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation opened a criminal case against members of ‘the Right Sector, Maidan Self-
defence, as well as Ukrainian football fans and some officials of the Ukrainian MoIA, as well as
the SBU’ for attempts to commit, murder and torture under the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation, against a Russian citizen.
157. According to the Directorate’s statement, a Russian citizen was apprehended on 2 May
by the Odesa city department of the MoIA near the Trade Union Building. He was later
interrogated by the SBU, notified of suspicion in participating in mass disorder and placed in
custody as a measure of restraint. It reported serious violations by Ukrainian law enforcement
officials, including ill-treatment, failure to provide a translator (being a Russian-speaker he did
not understand the contents of the procedural documents drafted in Ukrainian), and refusal to
grant him official victim status (having been exposed to carbon monoxide in the Trade Unions
building instead of being treated as a victim he was perceived as a suspect). The lawyer stressed
that the law enforcement agencies and the court had shown a negative and biased attitude
towards his client based on his Russian citizenship.

C. Investigations into crimes committed during the Maidan protests

158. The HRMMU is particularly concerned about a lack of significant progress into
investigations of crimes committed during the Maidan protests. Three major criminal
proceedings have resulted from these events: an investigation into forceful dispersal of protesters
on 30 November 2013; investigations into mass killings of protesters on 19-21 January and 18-
20 February; and an investigation into the killings of police officers on 18-20 February.
However, so far the only result in these high profile cases was the outcome of the investigation
into mass killing of protesters by members of the Berkut officers. The Office of the Prosecutor
General found grounds to believe that three former members of the unit committed killings of 39
protesters on 20 February 2014 and noted that the main obstacle to the effective investigation

30
was the impossibility of locating most of the suspects, many of whom had fled Ukraine. In such
a case, the Criminal Procedure Code provides that criminal proceedings be suspended until the
suspects are tracked down.
Investigations into mass killings of protesters (January and February 2014)
159. There is a risk that very few individuals will be brought to justice for their role in the
mass killings of demonstrators in January and February 2014, especially among those in
positions of command. This probability has been strengthened with the news of the apparent
escape of the former Berkut commander.
160. The commander, one of only three suspects identified and detained for the killing of 39
demonstrators at Instytutska Street on 20 February, was placed under house arrest on 19
September. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General this allowed him to escape and to
presumably flee Ukraine52. The decision of the Pecherskyi District Court (in Kyiv) to change the
commander’s measure of restraint from custodial detention to house arrest is now under scrutiny.
According to the Criminal Procedure Code, an investigating judge enjoys great discretion in
deciding on this issue. However, according to the Office of the Prosecutor General, this is not
the usual practice and judges are normally extremely cautious when it comes to such grave
crimes. The judge has been notified that she is now under suspicion of rendering a knowingly
unjust decision. Results of a pre-trial investigation into this will be soon submitted to the court.
A further high-profile case from the night of 18 to 19 February may also reveal shortcomings in
the Kyiv courts to adequately handle the Maidan cases. This involves the killing of a journalist
by a group of Titushky (thugs hired by the then authorities to disperse demonstrators) and the
infliction of bodily harm to two other people. On 15 October, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court
of Kyiv in a closed judicial session released from detention the only suspect located so far. The
six other suspects have been put on an international wanted list. The victims and activists believe
that the accused is now free to escape following the example of the Berkut commander, thus
creating another example of impunity.
161. In the meantime, the Office of the Prosecutor General has been conducting investigations
into other crimes committed by the law enforcement officers during Maidan protests. On 17
October, a high-profile case of bodily harm and humiliation inflicted to a Maidan demonstrator
was sent to the Pecherskyi District Court (of Kyiv) with an indictment against an officer of the
MoIA internal troops. He is accused of not stopping the attack against the demonstrator. This is
already the fourth law enforcement officer brought to account for committing this act.
Investigations into killings of law enforcement officers on 18 and 20 February 2014
162. An investigation into the murder of 13 police officers and MoIA interior troops, and
injuries to some 600 law enforcement officers on 18 - 20 February in Kyiv is on-going. The
HRMMU is concerned that the Law on Prevention of Persecution and Punishment of Individuals
in Respect of Events which have Taken Place during Peaceful Assemblies 53, passed immediately
after former President Yanukovych fled, may block this investigation. According to Article 3 of
this Law “all criminal proceedings, opened in respect of crimes, envisaged in Article 1 of this
Law, in which no person was notified of suspicion, shall be closed” and “all individuals who
have committed a large number of crimes, including murder and attempted murder of police
officers due to their activities, shall be exempted from criminal responsibility”.

D. Administration of justice

52
Although, according to the MoIA, there is no data that he has legally crossed the border of Ukraine.
53
Law of Ukraine on prevention of persecution and punishment of individuals in respect of events which have taken
place during peaceful assemblies, and recognising the repeal of certain laws of Ukraine, as adopted by the
Parliament on 21 February 2014.

31
 Establishment of parallel structures
163. In the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ and ‘Luhansk people’s republic’ various armed groups
have performed quasi-judicial functions: issuing arbitrary sentences, deciding on the detentions
of civilians and members of the armed groups on charges of looting, desertion, drinking, and
other alleged acts. Detention by the armed groups is often accompanied by ‘correctional labour’,
and physical punishment. Armed groups have also established ad hoc martial tribunals as was
the case in Sloviansk in May-June, rendering death sentences against their own members and
civilians suspected of activities directed against the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’. A ‘resolution
on field courts’ apparently adopted on 17 August by the ‘supreme council’ of the ‘Donetsk
people’s republic’ provided for the establishment of field and martial courts. So far, the
HRMMU has received no information on the existence of such bodies.
164. The ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ is also reportedly in the process of establishing its own
‘judiciary system’, with two key officials already appointed. On 23 September, the former
‘prosecutor general’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was appointed as ‘head’ of the ‘supreme
court’ and a ‘minister of justice’ of the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ was also appointed. On 10
October, the ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ invited all eligible candidates with a background in law
to apply for the vacant positions in its ‘supreme court’.
165. In areas controlled by the Government of Ukraine, the HRMMU was presented with
numerous due process violations, both in civil and administrative cases. Public authorities and
courts sometimes justified non-compliance with international human rights standards by the
“actual state of war” in the country. The HRMMU is also concerned with the neglect of
procedural rights of detainees. In the Odesa region in particular, the HRMMU collected evidence
of systematic violations of the Criminal Procedure Code, which should lead to the immediate
release of the detainee (for example, the late presentation of a written notice of suspicion and/or
violation of the terms of detention, apprehension and house search without the order of an
investigating judge or a court). However, during the court hearings judges have tended to
systematically ignore these violations, which in turn constitute a violation of fair trial standards.

IX. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

166. On 25 September, President Poroshenko presented his ’Strategy for the Sustainable
Development of Ukraine - 2020’, a roadmap enabling the country to apply for EU membership
by that date. The strategy foresees over 60 legislative and institutional reforms, prioritising
fighting corruption, decentralizing government and energy independence, and modernising the
judiciary and defence system. Legislative developments during the reporting period touched
upon some key reform aspects of this Strategy, notably the fight against corruption and the
powers of the Office of the Prosecutor General. In addition, the President also created a Council
for Judicial Reform and tasked the government to elaborate a national human rights strategy.
167. The popular demand for lustration voiced during the Maidan protests resulted in a law
that would ban public office primarily for some State employees who worked within the
administration of the former President Yanukovych. A separate lustration procedure applies to
judges. Parliament also passed a law allowing absentee trials, which could be applied to former
President Yanukovych and government officials who fled the country. While the issue of
decentralization has not been addressed by parliament, the Venice Commission published an
opinion on draft constitutional amendments dealing partly with it.

A. Constitutional reform
168. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has reviewed the draft law amending

32
the Constitution of Ukraine, as submitted by President Poroshenko to Parliament on 2 July 2014.
It delivered an Opinion on 27 October. One of the positive aspects noted by the Commission is
that the draft eliminates the power of the Prosecutor’s Office to supervise respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and observance of laws by the authorities. These powers are,
according to the Commission, a ‘reminiscence of the old system of the Soviet prokuratura’.
169. Advances, according to the Venice Commission, also concern decentralization of powers
towards more local self-governance. The draft proposed that regional and district councils
independently elect their own executive bodies and that State administration at the regional and
district level be removed. New levels of territorial units are defined; the principle of subsidiarity
is introduced; planning powers and taxes go to the community. A new provision empowers
villages, settlements, cities, districts and regional councils to provide a special status for the
Russian language and other languages of national minorities.
170. The Venice Commission also recommended improvements. It found that some
competencies under the draft law gave the President significant power or overlapped with
governmental functions and could be a source of conflict. The President would be able to
appoint and dismiss certain key state officials without the involvement of any other State organs.
In addition, his representatives in the regions and districts would be able not only to supervise
compliance by local self-government bodies with the law and constitutional principles but also
to ensure coordination of the inter-action between the central government authorities. Further,
the principle of financial support by the State for local self-government is not given clear
constitutional entrenchment and the amendments do not address reform of the judiciary. In
respect of the new provision on the special status of Russian and other minority languages, the
Venice Commission notes that it ‘raises issues of harmonization’ with relevant international
norms and standards and statutory guarantees for the use of languages ‘irrespective of the
support of more than 50% of the local government council’. Finally, the Commission notes that
Ukrainian civil society has neither been informed nor consulted on the amendments, which
should be prepared in an inclusive manner and submitted to public discussion.

B. Lustration 54
Lustration of government
171. A law ‘On the Purification of Government’ aimed at subjecting officials who performed
State or local self-government functions to a screening procedure entered into force on 16
October. The intention behind the law was to revive people's trust in the authorities and respond
to demands expressed during the Maidan protests to address past human rights violations and
curb corruption in various levels of power.
172. Article 1.1 of the law states that ‘Purification of government (lustration) shall be the
prohibition set by the Law or by court decision for some individuals to hold certain positions in
state authorities and local self-government bodies’. It is to be applied to people who
implemented or contributed to measures aimed at “usurpation of power” by former President
Yanukovych, undermining national security or violating human rights and freedoms.
173. The law provides for ex-officio prohibition of holding office for a period of 10 years after
the law comes into force for people who occupied for at least one year between 25 February

54
Lustration (from Latin lustration - ‘purification by sacrifice’) is an evaluation and examination process used in
order to eliminate abusive and corruptive officials through due procedure. To define lustration very broadly, it is a
measure barring officials of a former regime from positions of public influence in a country after a change of
government.

33
2010 and 22 February 2014, a number of high level positions enumerated in the law 55. It also
provides for a five year ex-officio prohibition from holding office for those who occupied
positions during the same period in the judiciary and law enforcement spheres and who, through
their actions or omissions, enabled human rights violations or threatened national security56.
174. In addition, several categories of public officials will be subjected to screening regarding
the reliability of data on their property and its value as indicated in the declaration of assets, and
income submitted for the tax year obtained from legal sources.
175. The vetting envisioned under one of the forms indicated above could apply to tens of
thousands of people who held certain positions or executed decisions in various official
capacities at central, regional and local levels.
176. According to the law, the Ministry of Justice shall be the body authorized to carry out the
vetting procedure. It shall elaborate and submit for approval to the Cabinet of Ministers a list of
bodies and the procedure and plans of vetting for each state authority and local self-government
body where those to be inspected currently work. The body conducting the vetting sends the
vetting opinion to the head of the institution, whose terms of reference include dismissal for the
person subject to vetting from the position. The vetting opinion can be appealed to court. In case
the unreliability of the data reviewed on property and income is traced during the inspection, the
vetting body sends a copy of the vetting opinion to the Ministry of Justice for official publication
on the web-site of the Ministry of Justice and for recording of the person in the Unified State
Register. The official who fails to pass the screening or did not agree to it shall be dismissed by
the inspection body and prohibited to hold the post for 10 years after dismissal. An advisory
body of the Ministry of Justice for lustration issues, including representatives of the mass media
and the public, will also be established in order to guarantee independent monitoring and control
over the process.
177. On the same day the law entered into force, the Government started applying it. The first
decisions applied to 39 individuals who will have to leave high level civil servant positions. The
President's administration and the Ministry of Defence also announced that they had started
vetting their employees under the new law.
178. Since the start of implementation of the law there have been a number of complaints
about its application, particularly regarding the dismissal of those who are pregnant or are on
paternity leave.
179. Several provisions of the law are questionable from the point of view of their compliance

55
The list of prohibitions covers several hundred positions in the State, as well as regional and local administrations.
They include the President, Prime Minister, first Vice Prime Minister, Vice Prime Minister, Ministers, heads of
central bodies of executive authority who are not members of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Governor of the National
Bank of Ukraine, chairs of all state committees, commissions, directorates and funds, the Prosecutor General of
Ukraine and agencies related to the prosecutor’s office, the heads of all law enforcement agencies and military
institutions, tax and customs institutions, members of judicial institutions, heads and deputy heads of regional,
district and city administrations. The prohibition also applies to persons who were elected and worked in
supervisory functions in the Communist Party of the USSR, of Ukraine and other republics of the former USSR, or
were staff members or secret agents of the KGB.
56
The five year prohibition to hold office for positions to which lustration applies concerns judges, public
prosecution and law enforcement officials who permitted detention, passed guilty verdicts, or implemented
measures aimed at prosecution of persons to whom amnesty has been applied under the amendments to the Law ‘On
Amnesty in Ukraine Concerning Full Rehabilitation of Political Prisoner’ of 27 February 2014. It also includes all
public officials who implemented measures aimed at power usurpation, undermining national security and
infringing human rights, as established by a court decision as well as any official concerning whom it has been
established by court decision that he collaborated with the secret services of other countries, implemented measures
undermining national security, defence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, or called for violation thereof, and led to
the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms as determined by a decision of the European Court of
Human Rights.

34
with international standards. The vetting grounds are overly broad in scope and establish a
principle of collective responsibility, which is contrary to international human rights law and
Recommendation 7568 of the Council of Europe57. This recommendation contains Guidelines to
ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative measures comply with the requirements of
a State based on the rule of law.
180. The Guidelines also indicate that lustration should be administered by ‘a specifically
created independent commission of distinguished citizens nominated by the head of State and
approved by parliament’58. However, the law gives responsibility for carrying out lustration to a
multiplicity of public government bodies under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The law
also prohibits the possibility to maintain or obtain positions for those whose past work has
violated the right to peaceful assembly or curtailed the right to life, as proven by court. Return to
government service would, in some cases, be banned for 10 years while the Guidelines state that
disqualification based on lustration should not exceed five years. Finally, prohibition from
holding office on the sole basis of having occupied certain functions, rather than as a
consequence of a proven violation or abuse can be viewed as contravening the presumption of
innocence59.
Lustration of judges
181. On 24 September and 24 October, the temporary special commission on the Inspection of
Judges, which was established according to the Law on Restoration of Trust in the Judicial
System, conducted its first public hearings. Pursuant to its mandate, it examined cases involving
12 judges60 who considered civil, administrative or criminal cases regarding defendants who had
participated in the Maidan protests. Several plaintiffs or lawyers representing them were in
attendance. All were given the opportunity to make statements. The commission found that eight
judges were guilty of a ‘violation of oath’ due to their decisions which the commission viewed
as: politically motivated, in violation of procedural rules, or made on the basis of falsified
materials. Two judges were found to have taken decisions which, while not constituting
violations of oath, were considered as deserving disciplinary sanctions. One judge was acquitted
and consideration of one case was postponed upon the request of the plaintiff. In its decisions 61
the commission mentioned violations of national and international legal acts and the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights.
182. The commission is not competent to decide on sanctions and its decisions are advisory in
nature. Thus, cases involving findings about violations of oath were submitted to the High
Council of Justice and those where disciplinary measures are recommended were addressed to
the High Qualification Commission of Judges. However, none of these institutions currently
function, as their members were dismissed by the same law that established the temporary
special commission on the inspection of judges. The HRMMU will continue following the work
of the Commission.
So-called ‘public lustration’
183. The HRMMU is concerned about an increased number of acts of ‘public lustration’ 62,
57
See also PACE Res. 1096 (1996), paras. 11-12.
58
See also Rule of Law Tool for Post Conflict States, ‘Vetting: An operational Framework’ also requesting a
specially created mechanism in the form of a commission.
59
See PACE Res. 1096 (1996), para. 12; ECtHR decision of 30 May 2006, Matyjek v. Poland, app. No. 38184/03,
paras. 48 et sec; decision of 24 October 2006, Bobek v. Poland, app. No. 68761/01, para.2.
60
The cases regarded ten judges in Kyiv and two in Dnipropetrovsk.
61
Most cases involved decisions limiting the right to take part in protests or applying measures of restraint in the
form of pre-trial detention.
62
Public lustration or the ‘rubbish container challenge’ came to the fore during the month. Under the slogan “that
‘rubbish’ should be in rubbish containers” it aims to publicly lustrate (i.e. purify) state and regional authorities of
corrupt officials and politicians, or those who served under the former President Yanukovych. This has usually

35
and other actions by groups of people deciding to take justice into their own hands 63, which
circumvents the law, placing public officials perceived to be involved in corrupt activities in
rubbish containers, and at times forcing them to resign from their positions.

C. Corruption
Anti-corruption legislation
184. On 14 October, the Parliament passed a package of laws aimed at uprooting the country’s
deeply embedded corruption. The legislation was drafted in cooperation with anti-corruption
organizations, including Transparency International, which in 2013 ranked Ukraine among the
30 world’s most corrupt nations (144 out of 177). The laws, signed by the President, have
different dates of entry into force.
185. The package foresees the creation of a State anti-corruption bureau 64, competent to
conduct investigations of crimes believed to have been committed by high level public officials,
including judges and prosecutors. After an investigation, the bureau will be able to file cases in
court through specially trained prosecutors to be appointed by the Office of the Prosecutor
General and responsible to the head of the anti-corruption bureau. The law creating the anti-
corruption bureau will enter into force on 25 January 2015.
186. Another law65 aims at revealing company ownership by requiring disclosure of all
information about the actual owners of commercial entities and real estate registered in Ukraine,
and creates a public register of assets. A mandatory e-declaration of income and expenditures of
all public officials is introduced66 and a National commission on preventing corruption is
created, with responsibilities that include, in particular, checks on the lifestyle and declarations
of officials. The law creating the national commission on the prevention of corruption will
become applicable on 26 April 2015.
187. Further a law67 creates conditions for implementing international recommendations on
combatting money laundering and the financing of terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and another law provides for a three-year National Anti-corruption Strategy68,
defining Ukraine’s objectives, policy and tools in the fight against corruption until 2017. The
law containing the new anti-corruption strategy came into force on 26 October.
188. The adoption of the anti-corruption package should improve Ukraine’s ability to fight
corruption. It provides new instruments to identify and investigate corruption practices. It
enables enhanced transparency and public information about the owners or beneficiaries of
assets and properties. It creates specialized anti-corruption bodies, such as the anti-corruption
bureau and the commission for prevention of corruption. Civil society will be able to exercise
‘civil control’ of the new anti-corruption agencies by monitoring their work and assessing their

involved a mob forcing a particular civil servant into a rubbish container. The actions appear to be led by the Right
Sector political party and the ‘Automaidan’ activist group, but other parties and groups have also since conducted
their own public lustration events. In certain cases where victim refused to be ‘dumped’, they were beaten. The most
emblematic cases are beating of members of the parliament Yurii Miroshnychenko on 17 September in Kyiv and
Nestor Shufrych in Odesa on 30 September. There have been numerous events of public lustration in Odesa.
63
Within the reporting period the ‘Right Sector’ of Odesa and Kherson also attacked up to ten private shops
allegedly involved in drug trafficking. In most cases, the sales assistants were publicly humiliated and tied to trees.
64
Law No. 1698-VII‘on national anti-corruption bureau’.
65
Law 1701-VII ‘on amendments to several legislative acts of Ukraine on determining ultimate beneficiaries of
legal persons and public figures’.
66
Law No. 1700-VII ‘on preventing corruption’.
67
Law No. 50671702-VII ‘on prevention and fighting legalization (laundering) of incomes received illegally,
financing of terrorism and financing the spread of weapons of mass destruction’.
68
Law No. 1699-VII ‘on the principles of state anti-corruption policy in Ukraine (anti-corruption strategy) for 2014-
2017’.

36
performance. The new three year anti-corruption strategy contains, for the first time, a clear set
of success indicators and performance measurements.
189. While all these novelties constitute clear advances, they are not a panacea. The new legal
framework will have to be accompanied by a genuine political commitment to implement it.
Corruption investigations of high-level officials conducted by the anti-corruption bureau may
turn out to be effective, but the decision on their outcomes remains with the courts, which at
times in the past have lacked independence and integrity. The police and the prosecutor’s office
continue to be responsible for investigating corruption cases involving non-senior public
officials, despite very limited success in the past. Eradicating corruption is also inextricably
linked to improving the functioning of other institutions. This includes amendments to the legal
framework governing public procurement procedures and reforming the public administration
and civil service. In all these areas, progress still remains to be made.
National Council on Anti-Corruption Policy
190. On the same day that Parliament adopted the anti-corruption legislation, President
Poroshenko signed a Decree ‘On the National Council on Anti-Corruption Policy’ (NCACP).
This new body placed under the authority of the President replaces the National Anti-Corruption
Committee, which was established in 2010 but never became operational. The role of the
NCACP will be to analyse the situation of corruption in Ukraine, as well as to coordinate and
monitor state anti-corruption policy, including the implementation of the national anti-corruption
strategy and Ukraine’s international anti-corruption obligations. The NCACP will consist of 17
members, 9 of whom will be from civil society.
191. The creation of an independent anti-corruption body with monitoring functions was a
long-standing requirement of international anti-corruption institutions (such as the Council of
Europe’s anti-corruption monitoring body: the GRECO). Ukraine had been urged to establish a
body distinct from the law enforcement bodies, with the responsibility of overseeing the
implementation of national anti-corruption strategies and related action plans, as well as
proposing new strategies and measures against corruption. Such a body should be given the
necessary level of independence to perform an effective monitoring function. While the 2010
anti-corruption committee had been given appropriate functions, its composition reflected a very
low representation of civil society, which cast doubt about the level of independence of the
commission. The composition of the NCACP appears to have addressed this concern.

D. Reform of the judiciary

192. On 16 October, President Poroshenko issued a decree establishing the Council for
Judicial Reforms pursuant to his Strategy for Sustainable Development ‘Ukraine – 2020’. The
task of this consultative body is to prepare and submit to the President a draft strategy on
reforming the judiciary, the administration of justice and legal institutions. This is to be done by
the President-appointed Coordinator of the Council within three months, following the
appointment of the other Council members who include the heads of appropriate central
government bodies and judicial institutions, the Prosecutor General, representatives of legal and
scientific institutions, NGOs and international organizations. The Decree abolishes the Working
Group on Judicial Reforms established in 2010.

E. Office of the Prosecutor

193. On 14 October, the Parliament adopted a Law on the Office of the Prosecutor General.
The law eliminates prosecutorial functions with regard to the supervision of the observance and
application of the laws, the so-called nadzor (‘general supervision’). It contains amendments in
respect to the recruitment of prosecutors, their appointment for administrative positions and

37
hierarchical and disciplinary measures and procedures. The main body of the prosecutorial
authorities is the National Conference of Prosecutors. It is to address issues related to the internal
activities of the Prosecution Service and to appoint members of its qualification and disciplinary
commissions, which, in turn, will carry out the functions of selecting candidates for vacant posts
and disciplinary proceedings. This law will enter into force on 25 April 2015. However, a few
provisions, including those eliminating the ‘general supervision’ function of the Prosecution
became effective on 26 October.
194. While in previous amendments Parliament had considerably limited the overly broad
powers of the Prosecution Service not related to the criminal justice process, this new law
appears to take into account most of the remaining international recommendations regarding the
attributes, internal organization and guarantees for an independent functioning of Office of the
Prosecutor General. In particular, a key concern addressed regards the general supervisory
powers (nadzor) of the Office of the Prosecutor General related to the observance and
application of laws. This function used to give the Office extensive ability to interfere with the
interests and activities of private individuals and organizations. This capacity was compounded
by the entitlement of the Prosecutor General and other public prosecutors to participate in the
proceedings of the Parliament, boards of ministries, central executive agencies, local councils
and other administrative bodies. These powers and rights ran counter to the separation of powers
and posed a threat to rights and freedoms.
195. The new law, however, maintains a function relating to the representation of the interests
of the individual and the State in court that go beyond the criminal justice sphere. This ability to
represent the interests of citizens is problematic because it confers the right to participate in any
legal proceedings where such interests are seen to arise regardless of the wishes of the
individual. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General is also mandated to act in pursuit of the State
interest, which does not necessarily coincide with the interests of the individual being
represented.

F. Criminal proceedings in absentia

196. On 7 October, the Parliament adopted a draft law on criminal proceedings in absentia69
for persons who are accused of crimes and have fled the country. The law entered into force on
31 October. The intention behind this law was to create the legal conditions to try the former
President of Ukraine and other high level officials who left the country, and to recover the vast
assets they are accused of having usurped. The law allows for proceedings in absentia to be
opened for defendants who seek to avoid court hearings, but with the presence of their lawyer
for the following crimes: overthrow of the constitutional order, violation of the territorial
integrity or its financing, high treason, attempt against the life of a statesman, sabotage,
espionage, murder, murder committed as a crime of passion, murder in excess of necessary
defence, and a list of corruption crimes.
197. In its General Comment № 32, the United Nations Human Rights Committee declared
that proceedings in the absence of the accused ‘may in some circumstances be permissible in the
interest of the proper administration of justice’, and added that these circumstances emerge when
the accused persons, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to
exercise their right to be present. In international judicial practice, trial in absentia is usually
avoided. Article 63 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that
such trials are permitted only where the defendant is removed from the proceedings on the

69
The draft law ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Procedure of Ukraine regarding
Inevitability of Punishment for Certain Crimes against the Fundamentals of National and Public Security and
Corruption-Related Crimes’.

38
grounds that he has repeatedly and continually disrupted them. In the current document the
grounds for prosecution in the absence of the accused are very wide, making the frequent use of
this procedure a real possibility. The provisions stipulated to inform the accused in a timely
manner of a court hearing, as well as to request attendance, are not in line with international
norms and standards, as they do not provided adequate procedures to inform the accused in a
timely manner of the date and place of the trial.

G. Legislation in follow up to the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014

198. On 16 September, Parliament passed two laws pursuant to the Minsk Protocol of 5
September.
The Amnesty Law
199. The draft law on ‘the prevention or punishment of participants in events on the territory
of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ cancels criminal and administrative liability for acts committed
by ‘armed formations’ from 22 February 2014 until when the law enters into force, although it
lists a number of crimes to which amnesty will not be extended 70. It should be noted, however,
that the law does not explicitly include torture and other ill-treatment in the list of exceptions,
which means that such acts could be amnestied. This must be avoided as it would contravene
the prohibition under international law of amnesties for international crimes and other gross
violations of human rights. The acts of all those suspected of having committed or ordered these
acts must be investigated, perpetrators must be brought to justice, and victims should be given
full reparation. The law is to be signed by the President.
The Law on Special Status
200. The other law passed on 16 September and which entered into force on 18 October is the
Law ‘On the Special Procedure of Local Self-Government in Some Districts of Donetsk and
Luhansk Regions’, which is to be in force for three years. The law provides for local authorities
to facilitate the use of Russian and other languages in public life and for local elections to take
place on 7 December 2014. The law provides for powers for the local authorities greater than
those enjoyed by other local authorities in Ukraine. In particular, they will have the right to take
part in the appointment of heads of courts and prosecution offices at local level. The special
status allows for the creation of voluntary people’s police, accountable to the local authorities.
The law provides for specific financing to be allocated to these areas, without the possibility to
diminish this financing, even in case of amendments to the State budget. The territory enjoying
special status will be able to establish closer cooperation with administrative and territorial units
of the Russian Federation on the basis of treaties on trans-border cooperation.

H. Law on Internally Displaced Persons

201. On 20 October, the Parliament passed a law “On ensuring the rights and freedoms of
internally displaced persons”. It has yet to be signed by the President. The law establishes a
unified IDP database, simplifies residence registration and voting rights, prohibits
discrimination, protects the rights of IDPs with disabilities and obliges the state to provide free
temporary accommodation for 6 months (although the IDPs need to pay for utility fees). It also

70
These include: ‘crimes against life and health (murders and infliction of serious bodily harm); sexual crimes;
hostage taking; human trafficking; banditry; smuggling; acts of terrorism; violation of graves, burial places, or
corpses; attacks against the life of a law enforcement officer, a judge, an official or a citizen performing his/her
public duty, a defence attorney, or a foreign state representative; threats or violence against a public official or a
citizen who performs his/her public duty, internationally protected persons and institutions in connection with their
activity related to the administration of justice; genocide; and persons who committed a crime connected with the
crash of the ‘Malaysia Airlines’ flight MH17”.

39
makes provisions to return home voluntarily and access to social housing or home loans on
favourable terms for those who wish to settle elsewhere. Another positive initiative concerning
IDPs was the adoption of amendments71 to the Tax Code of Ukraine exempting IDPs of income
tax payment for charitable aid received for the purchase of drug costs, medical items and
supplies, and technical and other means of rehabilitation, among others.
202. The new legislation generally conforms to international legal standards, in particular the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. It should be noted, however, that
the law does not provide for an on-line registration system for IDPs, which makes the process
unnecessarily burdensome and time-consuming. In addition, internally displaced stateless
persons as well as foreigners legally residing in Ukraine who have been displaced are not
covered by the provisions of this law. This contravenes earlier resolutions of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine on registration of IDPs and on monthly targeted financial support to IDPs,
both of which apply to stateless and foreign IDPs legally residing in the country. This
contradiction will need to be clarified. Another aspect of these resolutions is that they apply to
people coming from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as well as the 'anti-terrorist operation
area’. On 30 October, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine defined a list of territories that are
comprised in the ‘anti-terrorist operation area’. The list encompasses territories of the Luhansk
and Donetsk regions, but also some districts, towns and villages in the neighbouring Kharkiv
region. Thus, it would appear that people from territories that have not been directly affected by
the fighting in the east could be eligible to be recognized as IDPs. Finally, considering that two
thirds of the IDP population are women, specific attention should be devoted to ensure their
specific needs and fundamental rights, including access to quality healthcare, the provision,
where required, of social security, food, water and sanitation, as well as access to justice.

I. Human rights strategy

203. On 15 October, President Poroshenko signed a Decree tasking the Government to
elaborate a draft national human rights strategy for Ukraine by 1 January 2015. The document is
to be prepared with the participation of state and local authorities, civil society and international
experts on the basis of international experience.
204. The elaboration of a national human rights strategy could ensure greater prominence and
attention to the promotion and protection of human rights in the country.

J. Police reform
205. On 22 October, the Minister of Internal Affairs organized a conference to inform about
his proposals for police reform. They include: renaming the militia (the current name) as the
police; reducing the number of police officers according to United Nations defined standards
(from 376 officers to 222 officers per 100,000 people); authorising the MoIA to only conduct
the functions of law enforcement, protection of territorial integrity, civil protection, fire and
rescue, migration control and protection of the state border; merging of certain departments;
terminating separate special police units and instead setting up unified rapid response units;
establishing a municipal police accountable to local self-government bodies and the MoIA;
demilitarisating the police by keeping ‘officers in uniform’ only for practical law enforcement
functions; and re-assessing of staff through the use of the lustration law.
206. Following the conference, the Cabinet of Ministers held a meeting where several
provisions of the police reform concept were adopted as decrees 72. The next steps are to
71
In force since 26 September 2014.
72
The first decree concerns termination of several departments of the police, such as the General Department on
Combating Organized Crimes, the veterinary police and the transport police. The second decree concerns

40
implement the adopted decrees and to draft an act on the general structure and quantity of staff
in the MoIA.

X. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA

207. The situation in Crimea was marked by the continued implementation of the policy
aimed at integrating the peninsula into the legal and political system of the Russian Federation
and by persistent acts of intimidation targeting the Crimean Tatars, as well as those who opposed
the March ‘referendum’ or were critical of the de facto ‘authorities’. As a result, the number of
people leaving Crimea is constantly increasing.
208. On 23 September, the ‘Crimean prosecutor general’ posted a statement mentioning that
all actions aimed at the non-recognition of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation will be
prosecuted. The position of the United Nations on the status of Crimea and Sevastopol is guided
by General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the Territorial Integrity of
Ukraine, which calls on all states and international organizations “not to recognize any alteration
of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol”.
209. Key developments in the period included a new wave of disappearances of Crimean
Tatars. Vivid disquiet over this led to the establishment by the de facto ‘authorities’ of a ‘contact
group’ to tackle the issue of missing people and other instances of human rights violations
against Crimean Tatars. Furthermore, following months of intrusive searches (supposedly to
fight extremism) affecting dozens of properties and other facilities owned mostly by Crimean
Tatars, a ‘moratorium’ on police raids, was announced by the de facto ‘authorities’.
Nevertheless, the Mejlis 73 continued to be seen as an illegal organization and had to leave its
premises in Simferopol. In general, freedom of expression in Crimea remains stifled as a result
of actions seeking to influence media content.
210. On 27 October the report by Nils Muižnieks, Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, was made public following his mission to Kyiv, Moscow and Crimea from 7 to
12 September 2014. This was the first in situ assessment by an international organisation of the
human rights situation in Crimea since March 2014. Mr. Muižnieks noted that more resolve is
needed in investigating all cases of serious violations of human rights that have occurred in
Crimea since February 2014, including recent abductions. The Commissioner expressed concern
about groups rendered vulnerable by events unfolding in the region, including Crimean Tatars,
ethnic Ukrainians and all those who have refused Russian citizenship. He also stressed the
urgent need to ensure “free and unconditional access of international humanitarian and human
rights organizations to Crimea” as well as “unimpeded international monitoring”.

A. Civil and political rights

Rule of law
211. On 29 September, a Moscow city Court extended the detention until 11 January 2015 of
the Ukrainian citizen and film maker Oleg Sentsov, arrested in Simferopol (Crimea) in May
2014 and accused by the FSB under terrorism charges. On 13 October, the same Court upheld
the ban on Mr Sentsov’s lawyer from commenting on his criminal case. Mr Sentsov’s defence
considers these actions to be a violation of his rights. He also informed that his client’s name has
recently been placed on a list of suspected terrorists and extremists on the web-site of the

identification of police officers by placing special badges on uniform, and the last decree concerns ceasing certain
administrative functions for the traffic police, for example the issuance of driver’s license, and so forth.
73
Crimean Tatar Assembly.

41
Russian Federal Financial Monitoring Service, under number 2,460 in the section ‘Private
persons – Russian citizens’. The prosecution asserts that Mr Sentsov ‘automatically’ became a
Russian national as he did not formally and in person indicate his wish to retain Ukrainian
citizenship.
Impunity for human rights violations
212. Between 27 September and 31 October, five Crimean Tatars disappeared in unclear
circumstances. One of them, Edem Asanov, who went missing on 29 September, was later found
hanged in a deserted sanatorium in the city of Evpatoria. Other disappearances include two
Crimean Tatars cousins, Islyam Dzhepparov and Dzhevdet Islyamov, who are relatives of a
former Mejlis member and were abducted on 27 September by unknown men in military
uniform in the town of Belogorsk. In October, two more Crimean Tatars from Simferopol went
missing on 3 and 23 October respectively.
213. On 1 October, the so-called ‘prime minister’ of Crimea, Sergei Aksionov, met with
relatives of the two cousins abducted on 27 September and pledged to create a ‘contact group’ to
investigate cases of abduction as well as other incidents involving Crimean Tatars.
214. On 14 October, the first meeting of the ‘contact group’ was chaired by Mr. Aksionov and
the deputy head of the Crimean branch of the Russian Federation Investigation Department for
especially serious crimes. Five relatives of victims attended. Information was provided on
actions undertaken in relation to both recent and earlier disappearances, including the cases of
two other Crimean Tatars, Timur Shaimardanov and Seiran Zinedinov, who disappeared in late
May. Both were members of a pro-Ukrainian group – ‘Ukrainian House’ and went missing a few
days after another group member, Leonid Korzh, also disappeared. Regarding Shaimardanov and
Zinedinov, where no witnesses were found, the Crimean police opened criminal proceedings
under article 105 (murder) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In the cases of
Dzhepparov and Islyamov, where some witnesses claim to have seen the two being pushed into a
car, criminal proceedings were initiated under article 126 (abduction). The investigations,
initially conducted by the Crimean police, were subsequently transferred to the Russian
Federation Investigation Department. During the meeting, it was decided that this Department
would similarly take over the investigation concerning the case of enforced disappearance of 3
October. The ‘prime minister’ stated he was interested in an objective investigation of all
criminal acts and invited the contact group to closely cooperate with the investigation bodies.
215. The establishment of the contact group, coupled with the direct involvement of Russian
Federation investigative organs and the presence of relatives of the disappeared, are important
developments. Investigating all disappearances both before and after the March ‘referendum’ is
a duty of the de facto authorities. The HRMMU is aware of nine cases of disappearances and
two deaths74 since early March 2014. It would appear that some investigations have not taken
place while others were inconclusive, a situation which supports impunity and creates tensions.
The HRMMU sent a letter urging the de facto authorities to provide information on the state of
the investigations regarding all disappearances and deaths in Crimea since March 2014,
including those that have not been reviewed during the first meeting of the contact group.
216. Civil society groups and some witnesses claim that the so-called ‘Crimean self-defence’
was directly involved in most cases of abductions, deaths and other human rights abuses in the
past six months. Its members supported the takeover of public buildings in the peninsula in late
February and early March 2014 and are said to have been responsible for multiple human rights
abuses during and after that period, including torture and ill-treatment. However, the de facto

74
In addition to Edem Asanov who was found hanged on 6 October, another Crimean Tatar, Reshat Ametov, had
been found dead, on 16 March, in the village of Zemlyanichne apparently with signs of torture. See HRMMU report
of 15 April, pp. 20-21

42
authorities have always treated these groups with respect due to their active opposition to the
Ukrainian authorities and support to the March ‘referendum’.
217. Further, on 11 June, the so-called ‘parliament of Crimea’ passed a law which resulted in
the integration of the ‘self-defence’ into a ‘people’s militia’, with powers to assist the police in
keeping law and order. More recently, on 2 October, a draft law was submitted by the de facto
authorities of Crimea to the Parliament of the Russian Federation proposing to amnesty
‘militants’ and members of the ‘self-defence forces’ in Crimea. According to the draft, the
actions of the ‘self-defence forces’ and ‘militants’ committed between 27 February 2014 and 1
January 2015, including those which caused physical and moral damage, should be
acknowledged as having been ‘of extreme necessity’. The amnesty should also cover suspects,
defendants and those convicted in criminal cases. Excluded from the amnesty would be actions
committed for financial gain, as well as other self-serving motives75. It should be noted that it
contravenes the prohibition under international law of amnesties for international crimes and
other gross violations of human rights. The acts of all those suspected of having committed or
who ordered such crimes or violations must be investigated, perpetrators must be brought to
justice, and victims should be enabled full reparation.
Actions targeting Crimean Tatar institutions and their supporters
218. On 16 September, FSB officers and the police searched the houses of two Mejlis
officials, seizing notebooks, computers and hard drives. Later that day, they conducted an 11-
hour search of the Mejlis building in Simferopol. Mejlis session protocols were seized, as well as
religious books, computers, hard discs, and some personal belongings of Mustafa Jemiliev, the
former head of the Mejlis. On 17 September, a court writ was served on the charitable
organization Crimea Fund which owns the Mejlis building, giving it 24 hours to evacuate the
building. The document prohibits the charity from carrying out its powers as owner of the
building and six other premises. On 19 September, the Mejlis members left the building. On 29
September, the Central District Court of Simferopol upheld a request of the Crimean
‘Prosecutor’s Office’ to exclude Mustafa Jemiliev from the founders of the Crimea Fund.
219. The Mejlis opposed the March ‘referendum’ and has repeatedly criticized human rights
violations committed in Crimea since that time. Its supporters consider the actions of the
Crimean de facto authorities to be part of a concerted effort to undermine the authority and
influence of this institution among the Crimean Tatar community. On 22 September, in an
interview to a Russian media, ‘prime minister’ Aksionov stated that the Mejlis had no legal
existence as it was not properly registered under Russian law.
220. On 22 October, the Crimean ‘police’ arrested Tair Smedlyaev, brother of Zair
Smedlyaev, the head of the Kurultai’s election committee. The Kurultai is the parliament of the
Crimean Tatars. Tair Smedlyaev was accused of violating article 318 (violence against police
officer) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation during the 3 May action in Armyansk,
when Crimean Tatars gathered in support of Mr Jemilev’s attempts to enter the Crimea76. On 24
October, a Simferopol Court in a closed session ordered the two month pre-trial detention for Mr
Smedlyaev as a measure of restraint.
Actions targeting possession and dissemination of ‘extremist’ literature
221. The Crimean authorities continued actively searching for weapons, guns and religious
literature. Dozens of raids reportedly took place since August, focusing on literature considered
75
On 16 October, during a press conference in Moscow, the so-called Crimean ‘prime minister’ Sergei Aksionov
said that if the amnesty bill was not passed over 100,000 members of the ‘Crimean Self-Defence’ could be judged
and sentenced on the basis of the current legislation.
76
The protest involved thousands of Crimean Tatars gathering at the Crimean administrative border with the
mainland, to meet Crimean Tartar leader Mustafa Jemilev, who earlier had been banned by the Crimean
‘authorities’ from entry to Crimea because of his alleged ‘extremist activity’.

43
to be of an extremist nature, as listed on a federal list of extremist materials. While the searches
have overwhelmingly concentrated on Crimean Tatar properties - mosques, madrassas (Islamic
religious school), schools, libraries and private homes - there have also been reports of raids on
Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls.
222. Possession or distribution of ‘extremist material’ is punishable under article 20.29 of the
Administrative Code of the Russian Federation77 with a fine or imprisonment of up to 15 days
and confiscation of banned literature. For example, on 26 August, the Dzhankoi District Court
fined with RUB 2,000 (approximately USD 50) one of the deputy heads of the Crimean Muftiyat
in charge of education issues after the police raided a madrassa he oversaw in the settlement of
Azovskoe and seized religious literature. On 7 October, a librarian of a boarding school in the
village of Tankovoe (Bakhchisaray district) was fined RUB 1,000 (approximately USD 25)
because the school library contained three books from a collection of sermons by a Turkish
Muslim theologian, and one Jehovah’s Witnesses booklet. About a dozen other cases have been
opened under article 20.29 between August and October 2014 and most have led to fines being
imposed.
223. The Crimea ‘ministry of education, science and youth’ is participating in the campaign to
remove extremist religious literature and other banned books. In a letter dated 12 September, the
ministry ‘orders the administrations of educational organizations to conduct […] an analysis and
audit of literature present in libraries and educational premises on the subject of the presence of
materials on the Federal List, with the aim of its removal and destruction’.
224. Confronted with mounting criticism from the Crimean Tatar community 78, the de facto
‘authorities’ have attempted to lower tensions. On 13 October, whilst meeting 150 Crimean
Tatars, including the head of the Muftiyat, who returned from the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca,
‘prime minister’ Sergei Aksionov announced a three month moratorium indicating that no
punishments for possessing such literature would be imposed during that time. Furthermore, in
an interview given to a Russian news agency on the following day, ‘prime minister’ Aksionov
stated that the de facto authorities would conduct “educational work” among Muslims in
cooperation with the Mufiyat during the moratorium and that the media would publish a list of
materials whose possession was prohibited.
225. The HRMMU is not aware of instructions having been issued to law enforcement organs
to halt raids and prosecutions until January 2015. However, the moratorium appears to be
respected. Furthermore, on 21 October, in one case involving a schoolteacher from Belogorsk,
the ‘supreme court’ of Crimea cancelled a District Court decision of 16 September, which had
found the schoolteacher guilty under article 20.29 of the Administrative Code of the Russian
Federation. She allegedly ‘repented’ and, instead of a fine, was given a ‘verbal warning’.
Freedom of expression
226. The space for free media in Crimea continued to shrink. The latest media outlet whose
activities were disrupted by actions of the de facto ‘authorities’ was the weekly Mejlis
newspaper, Avdet. On 17 September, Avdet editor was given an official warning by the FSB for
‘actions that might incite extremist activities’. A day earlier, the paper’s offices in Simferopol
were searched and on 18 September the FSB forced all tenants, including Avdet's staff, to vacate
the premises. In June and July, the editor had received written and oral ‘warnings’ related to the
newspaper’s reporting. Avdet continues to regularly publish but from different premises. The

77
This article punishes the "mass distribution" of items on the Federal List, as well as their "production or
possession for the purposes of mass distribution".
78
The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights visited Crimea on 10-11 September and heard
complaints from many Muslims about raids. He reported to local officials that he regarded these raids as
“disproportionate and excessive”.

44
editor in chief of the Crimean Tatar ATR television channel informed the HRMMU that a letter
from a Russian Federation media supervisory body to the Russian MoIA claimed that ATR was
disseminating false rumours about repression on an ethnic and religious basis and promoting
extremism. ATR was subsequently instructed by the police to show all documentation and a list
of employees. Like Avdet, ATR continues operating, but with the understanding that the channel
could be subject to legal or administrative actions should the content of its programmes be
deemed by the de facto ‘authorities’ to question that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation.
227. In an apparent attempt to limit freedom of expression, Nadir Bekirov, the head of the
Fund for Research and Support of the Indigenous Peoples of Crimea, was attacked in Crimea on
19 September. He was travelling to New York to take part in the UN General Assembly World
Conference on Indigenous Peoples. On his way to catch a train to Kyiv, a minivan blocked the
road and four masked men pulled him out of the car. He was beaten up and his passport and
mobile phone stolen. The Crimean police are investigating the incident.
228. On 30 September, the Crimean ‘vice-minister of internal policy, information and
communications’ informed that starting from 1 January 2015, the Russian Federation Service for
Supervision in the Sphere of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media will
apply sanctions to any of the Crimean mass media which conducts a ‘provocative policy’. An
example given was the Crimean on-line news agency Crimean Events, which publishes pro-
Ukrainian articles.
229. On 1 October, six editors and journalists of Crimean Tatar programmes on the Crimean
State TV and Radio Company Krym were dismissed from their posts due to ‘restructuring’.
According to the former chief editor, the authorities in Crimea appointed a new editor, who
announced the enrolment of new staff in order to change the content of the Crimean Tatar
programs.
Freedom of movement
230. The HRMMU travelled to Chongar, a crossing point on the administrative boundary line
between the region of Kherson and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and spoke to
representatives of the State Border Service of Ukraine. According to the information obtained on
the rules governing the entry of vehicles and passengers from Crimea into mainland Ukraine,
holders of Russian passports issued in Crimea and cars with Crimea-issued Russian license
plates are not allowed to cross the boundary line. Additionally a foreigner will not be allowed to
enter mainland Ukraine from Crimea because access to Ukraine can only be from a recognized
State border crossing.
231. An average of 300 vehicles circulate daily between Crimea and mainland Ukraine on
both sides and about three to five persons per day are denied entry into mainland Ukraine due to
one of the reasons cited above. However, the HRMMU learned from reliable sources that there
were also instances of Ukrainian nationals prevented from entering mainland Ukraine from
Crimea. This is in violation of the law “On Guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens and
on the legal regime on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine”, which provides that
‘Citizens of Ukraine have the right to free and unimpeded access to the temporarily occupied
territory and exit from it through the control points of entry and exit upon presentation of a
document confirming the identity and citizenship of Ukraine’ 79. This may also constitute a
violation of the right to enter one’s own country, as provided for in article 12(4) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
IDPs
232. According to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, 19,056 IDPs (including 5328
children) from Crimea and Sevastopol were registered in mainland Ukraine on 31 October.
79
See Article 10 of the law.

45
233. The HRMMU met with Natalia Popovych, the Permanent Representative of the President
of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Her office informs IDPs and Crimean
residents about their rights and entitlements and provides advice and support in legal, civil or
administrative matters as required. As of 1 October, Ms. Popovych’s office had received 312
requests, mostly on employment issues and the issuing of identification documents, including
passports. Other claims include education, property, pensions, banking deposits, and various
social benefits and entitlements. The Permanent Representative initiated the establishment of a
consultative council, made up of representatives of 13 civil society organizations, mainly from
Kherson region to discuss IDP issues and agree on joint solutions.
Persons deprived of their liberty
234. As of 10 September there were 2,671 inmates from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
serving sentences in various institutions throughout Ukraine. Of that number, 287 have
expressed the wish to return to Crimea after having served their prison term, but 56 did not have
identification documents enabling them to travel. A penitentiary institution in Kherson claims it
assists inmates with obtaining Ukrainian passports. However, an NGO in the region which
assists former prisoners maintained that they often leave prison with nothing but a document
confirming their discharge. They have no place to go to and, for those wishing to return to
Crimea, no possibility to travel. In this situation, they often become homeless.

B. Economic and social rights

Property rights
235. Using various pretexts, the self-proclaimed local authorities in Crimea and Sevastopol
continued to conduct actions amounting to forcible seizure of private property from individuals
or companies maintaining links to Ukraine. On 25 September, the public company Ukrtelecom
JSC informed that unknown persons had seized its premises and equipment. Employees’ access
was restricted, while the director was handed over a decree from the Sevastopol authorities
announcing that he was discharged from office.
236. Between 18 September and 9 October, the ‘state council’ of Crimea nationalized over 20
facilities, including health resorts, pensions and hotels, owned by the entrepreneur and Governor
of Dnipropetrovsk, Ihor Kolomoiskyi.
237. On 23 October, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine announced that Ukrainian
investigatory authorities had initiated criminal cases against judges, law enforcements officials
and Crimean executive service employees who had violated Ukrainian citizens’ rights in Crimea
and were involved in expropriations. A law adopted by the Crimean ‘Parliament’ on 31 July
2014 regulating property and land relations bans Ukrainian citizens, including those Crimean
residents who rejected Russian citizenship from using agricultural land which they own. They
are required to sell their land plots to Russian citizens only or to Russian legal entities.
According to Russian legislation, agricultural land includes horticultural, market-gardening and
dacha (cottage) cooperatives, as well as lands of former collective farms which were divided
between village residents and former workers of the collective farms.
Right to education
238. According to information obtained on 21 October from Ms. Natalya Popovich, the
Permanent Representative of the Ukrainian President in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
out of the 600 secondary schools in the peninsula, only 20 teach Ukrainian language and
literature three hours per week. Teachers of Ukrainian language and literature have been forced
either to retrain on their own account or to resign. In the last six months, the number of high
schools teaching Ukrainian has dropped from 96 to 12. According to Ms. Popovich, this would
be explained by a cessation of funding to schools that refused to join the newly created Crimean

46
Federal University.

C. The rights of indigenous peoples

239. The HRMMU travelled to Novooleksiivka (Kherson region), a town of 10,000
inhabitants of whom almost 4,000 are ethnic Crimean Tatars. The head of the regional Mejlis in
Kherson, Asan Aliev, explained that the greatest danger faced by the Crimean Tatar community
on the mainland was assimilation. Over 90% of the Crimean Tatars allegedly do not speak their
native language and communicate in Russian. There are two schools where the Crimean Tatar
language is taught, but only for two hours per week.
240. Several Crimean Tatars mentioned to the HRMMU that they considered themselves to be
an indigenous nation, entitled to recognition by law and to specific rights, such as the right to
have its own self-government institutions. They noted that the law on national minorities
adopted in 1992 did not provide for such recognition and that Ukraine did not have a law on
indigenous peoples. They expressed the hope that the new parliament elected on 26 October
would be more open to the adoption of legal measures confirming the status of the Crimean
Tatars as an indigenous people, which is a category recognized by the Constitution of Ukraine.

XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

241. A peaceful solution must be found to end the fighting and violence in the eastern regions,
to save lives and to prevent further hardship for those people living in the conflict affected area
and in the neighbouring regions. With the tenuous respect for the ceasefire and the Minsk
Protocols, people continue to be killed, and violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law persist. The situation in the conflict affected area is becoming
increasingly entrenched, with the total breakdown of law and order and the emergence of
parallel governance systems in the territories under the control of the ‘Donetsk people’s
republic’ and the ‘Luhansk people’s republic’. The continuing presence of a large amount of
sophisticated weaponry, as well as foreign fighters that include servicemen from the Russian
Federation, directly affects the human rights situation in the east of Ukraine. Guaranteeing the
protection of those who live within the conflict affected area must be of the highest priority, so
too the control and respect of the Ukrainian borders with the Russian Federation.
242. The impact of the hostilities on the whole of Ukraine, the economic downturn and the
potential energy crisis require timely and dedicated attention, to heal divisions within families
and communities, and to ensure that all human rights concerns are addressed. Accountability and
an end to impunity are at the core of ensuring peace, reconciliation and long term recovery.
Violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international
humanitarian law must be investigated and, where there is evidence of crimes, the perpetrators
brought to justice.
243. The situation for those living in Crimea, the status of which is prescribed by General
Assembly resolution 68/262, remains of particular concern with increasing violations occurring
for vulnerable and minority groups, including intrusive searches of mainly Crimean Tatar
properties. New cases of enforced disappearances are a matter of great concern and could further
fuel mistrust and increase tensions.
244. The root causes of the Maidan protests were the systematic and structural curtailment of
human rights and widespread corruption. As peace is pursued, Ukraine should be commended
for the steps already undertaken as outlined in this report, yet it must continue to meaningfully

47
reform its governance and legislative system to effectively enable the change that will promote
and guarantee human rights protection.
245. Recommendations made in the OHCHR reports published since April 2014 that have not
yet been acted upon or implemented remain valid and are reiterated. In addition, OHCHR calls
upon all parties to implement the following recommendations:

To all parties involved in the hostilities in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
a) Immediately release all persons illegally or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.
b) Guarantee transparency regarding the release of detainees, and prevention of
abductions, enforced disappearances, trafficking in persons and other human rights
violations and abuses.
c) Ensure the treatment with due respect and dignity of the bodies and remains of people
killed as a result of hostilities. Free and safe access to the areas where such bodies and
remains can be found must be provided to collect them and ensure their identification
and a dignified and decent burial, and return them to their families.
d) Increase efforts to search for missing people, ensure unfettered access by independent
experts and preserve evidence of possible mass graves.

To the Government of Ukraine

e) Investigate promptly and systematically allegations of summary, extra-judicial or
arbitrary executions in the conflict zone, and take all measures to ensure the
preservation of evidence.
f) All allegations of sexual and gender-based violence must be promptly investigated,
perpetrators held accountable and victims provided with an effective remedy, as well as
the required help and support.
g) Close all secret and ad hoc detention facilities and ensure that detainees are kept only in
officially recognised and supervised places of detention, and that all their rights are
fully respected.
h) Guarantee that all detainees can communicate with and be visited by their families,
have access to doctors and legal counsels. Lawyers must have access to the information
concerning: 1) the authority that ordered the detention; 2) the date, time and place
where the person was arrested and admitted to the detention place; 3) the authority
responsible for supervising the detention place; 4) the whereabouts of the detainee,
including, in the event of a transfer to another detention place, the destination and the
authority responsible for the transfer; 5) the date, time and place of release; and 6)
elements relating to the state of health of the detainee.
i) Urge the expedient signature and implementation of the law on IDPs.
j) Initiate wide public consultations to ensure that the law on lustration fully complies
with the relevant international norms and standards and provides adequate guarantees
against human rights violations affecting those concerned by this procedure.
k) Urge that the draft law ‘on the prevention or punishment of participants in events on the
territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’ is further amended in line with international
norms and standards, and to clearly prevent acts of torture and ill-treatment committed
by armed groups from being subject to amnesty, before being signed into law.
l) Call on all the authorities to support the drafting of a national human rights strategy for
Ukraine by 1 January 2015.

48
To the self-proclaimed authorities of Crimea and the de facto governing authority of the
Russian Federation
m) Urge the ‘contact group’ to make progress on investigations of cases of disappearances
and deaths and ensure that perpetrators of crimes are held to account.
n) Reconsider the legislative initiative to grant amnesty to the ‘Crimean self-defence’
group and reiterate that all allegations of gross human rights violations and abuses must
be investigated, their perpetrators identified and punished and their victims duly
compensated.
o) Put an end to selective searches of facilities and the confiscation of property belonging
mostly to Crimean Tatars.
p) Promote inter-ethnic harmony, and put an end to intimidation and persecution.
q) Promote and protect freedom of expression, guaranteeing full and non-discriminatory
access to information for all.

49
Allegato 3

Why the Ukraine Crisis Is

the West’s Fault
The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin
John J. Mearsheimer

A
ccording to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine
crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, an-
nexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet
empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as
other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pre-
text for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.
But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies
share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trou-
ble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to
move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At
the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of
the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Or-
ange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid-
1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement
and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand
by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western
bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically
elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a
“coup”—was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a pen-
insula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to desta-
bilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West.
Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the
West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago.

September/October 2014 1
John J. Mearsheimer

strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly.

Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events
only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics.
They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in
the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free
on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic in-
terdependence, and democracy.
But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows
that realpolitik remains relevant—and states that ignore it do so at
their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting
to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now
that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater
mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.

THE WESTERN AFFRONT

As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S.
forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they
thought would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their
Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any larger and assumed
that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton ad-
ministration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it
began pushing for NATO to expand.
The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in
2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slo-
vakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. Dur-
ing NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for
example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign
of what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Fed-
eration’s borders. . . . The flame of war could burst out across the
whole of Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to de-
rail NATO’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not look so
threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with
Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries.
Then NATO began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in
Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine.
The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France
and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antago-
nize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the

2 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but
it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine
and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO.”
Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compro-
mise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said,
“Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strate-
gic mistake which would have most se-
rious consequences for pan-European
security.” Putin maintained that admit-
U.S. and European leaders
ting those two countries to NATO would blundered in attempting to
represent a “direct threat” to Russia. turn Ukraine into a
One Russian newspaper reported that Western stronghold on
Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very
transparently hinted that if Ukraine Russia’s border.
was accepted into NATO, it would cease
to exist.”
Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled
any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia
and Ukraine from joining NATO. Georgian President Mikheil Saa-
kashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into
NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two sepa-
ratist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep
Georgia weak and divided—and out of NATO. After fighting broke out
between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists,
Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow
had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, NATO never pub-
licly abandoned its goal of bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the al-
liance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward, with
Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.
The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled
its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in
such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy.
Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their
country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced
from office, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU
of trying to create a “sphere of influence” in eastern Europe. In the
eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO
expansion.
The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been

September/October 2014 3
John J. Mearsheimer

its efforts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine

and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-
Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. as-
sistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated
in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5
billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As
part of that effort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National
Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded
more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine,
and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the
biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election
in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and
so it stepped up its efforts to support the opposition and strengthen
the country’s democratic institutions.
When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in
Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears
are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The
Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the
demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin represents.”
He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself
on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

CREATING A CRISIS
The West’s triple package of policies—NATO enlargement, EU expan-
sion, and democracy promotion—added fuel to a fire waiting to ig-
nite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a
major economic deal he had been negotiating with the EU and decided
to accept a $15 billion Russian counteroffer instead. That decision
gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the
following three months and that by mid-February had led to the
deaths of some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly
flew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and
the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power
until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Ya-
nukovych fled to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev
was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four
high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists.
Although the full extent of U.S. involvement has not yet come to
light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and Repub-

4 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

lican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demon-

strations, and Geoffrey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine,
proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the his-
tory books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had
advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Ar-
seniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government,
which he did. No wonder Russians of all persuasions think the West
played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster.
For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had ar-
rived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take
Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into
Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands of
Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port
of Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Rus-
sians compose roughly 60 percent of its population. Most of them
wanted out of Ukraine.
Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev
to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it
clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he
would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep.
Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic sup-
port to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing
the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the
Ukrainian border, threatening to invade if the government cracks
down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price of the natural
gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports.
Putin is playing hardball.

THE DIAGNOSIS
Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse of flat
land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany
all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a buffer state of
enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would
tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until re-
cently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly
by while the West helped install a government there that was deter-
mined to integrate Ukraine into the West.
Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should under-
stand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are

September/October 2014 5
John J. Mearsheimer

always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After

all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying
military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on
its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington if China built an im-
pressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in
it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts
on many occasions that they consider
NATO expansion into Georgia and
Imagine the outrage if Ukraine unacceptable, along with any
China built an impressive effort to turn those countries against
military alliance and tried Russia—a message that the 2008 Rus-
to include Canada and sian-Georgian war also made crystal
clear.
Mexico in it. Officials from the United States and
its European allies contend that they
tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should under-
stand that NATO has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually
denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alli-
ance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new mem-
ber states. In 2002, it even created a body called the NATO-Russia
Council in an effort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia,
the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new
missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least ini-
tially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none of these
measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to NATO
enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Rus-
sians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a
threat to them.
To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to
understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a
major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the
Clinton administration began advocating NATO expansion. Pundits
advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but
there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émi-
grés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly
supported expansion, because they wanted NATO to protect such coun-
tries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy
because they thought Russia still needed to be contained.
But most realists opposed expansion, in the belief that a declining

6 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional econ-

omy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that en-
largement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in
eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this
perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved
the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually
react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I think
it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one
was threatening anyone else.”
Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including
many key members of the Clinton administration. They believed that
the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international
politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist
logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the
“indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put
it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a
threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire conti-
nent look like western Europe.
And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democ-
racy in the countries of eastern Europe, increase economic interde-
pendence among them, and embed them in international institutions.
Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little diffi-
culty convincing their European allies to support NATO enlargement.
After all, given the EU’s past achievements, Europeans were even
more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer
mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace
in Europe.
So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about
European security during the first decade of this century that even as
the alliance adopted an open-door policy of growth, NATO expansion
faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted
dogma among U.S. officials. In March, for example, President Barack
Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeat-
edly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those
ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view
of power.” Secretary of State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea
crisis reflected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty-
first century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading an-
other country on completely trumped-up pretext.”

September/October 2014 7
John J. Mearsheimer

In essence, the two sides have been operating with different play-
books: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting ac-
cording to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have
been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result
is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major
crisis over Ukraine.

BLAME GAME
In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that NATO expansion
would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents of expansion would
“say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As if on
cue, most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in
the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times,
German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational,
telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no
doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that
he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a first-class strate-
gist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him
on foreign policy.
Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise
of the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Rus-
sia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken
Crimea, is now testing the waters to see if the time is right to conquer
Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave ag-
gressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some
in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and strik-
ing any kind of deal with him would repeat the mistake of Munich.
Thus, NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia be-
fore it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe.
This argument falls apart on close inspection. If Putin were com-
mitted to creating a greater Russia, signs of his intentions would al-
most certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually
no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other
territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who sup-
ported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia was
about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by
complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to
Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed
Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind.

8 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

Besides, even if it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily

conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country.
Roughly 15 million people—one-third of Ukraine’s population—live
between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Rus-
sian border. An overwhelming majority of those people want to re-
main part of Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation.
Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs of turn-
ing into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance of pacifying
all of Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly
occupation; its weak economy would suffer even more in the face of
the resulting sanctions.
But even if Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an
impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to success-
fully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S.
experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq,
and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military
occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to
subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response
to events there has been defensive, not offensive.

A WAY OUT
Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behav-
ior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsur-
prising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their
existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggres-
sion. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the ta-
ble,” neither the United States nor its NATO allies are prepared to use
force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic
sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection
in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the EU put in place
their third round of limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level in-
dividuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-pro-
file banks, energy companies, and defense firms. They also threatened
to unleash another, tougher round of sanctions, aimed at whole sec-
tors of the Russian economy.
Such measures will have little effect. Harsh sanctions are likely off
the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany,
have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and
cause serious economic damage within the EU. But even if the United

September/October 2014 9
John J. Mearsheimer

States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would
probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries
will absorb enormous amounts of punishment in order to protect their
core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents
an exception to this rule.
Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that
precipitated the crisis in the first place. In April, U.S. Vice President
Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a
second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by
the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did
not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the
White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with
the Ukrainian government.
The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership.
In March, José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commis-
sion, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a
duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as
close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and
Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fate-
fully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO
members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would re-
main open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained
from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over
NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s sec-
retary-general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various
measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as
command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders
have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the
crisis will only make a bad situation worse.
There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however—although it
would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally
new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan
to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral buffer be-
tween NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold
War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so
much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there.
This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have
to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a
sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western

10 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

camp.
To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly
rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West
should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded
jointly by the EU, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the
United States—a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its
interest in having a prosperous and
stable Ukraine on its western flank.
And the West should considerably limit
The United States and its
its social-engineering efforts inside allies should abandon their
Ukraine. It is time to put an end to plan to westernize Ukraine
Western support for another Orange and instead aim to make it
Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and
European leaders should encourage a neutral buffer.
Ukraine to respect minority rights, es-
pecially the language rights of its Russian speakers.
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late
date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There
would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a mis-
guided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries
are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately
devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That
option is clearly open to the United States.
One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine
whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent
Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to
think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might of-
ten makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights
such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful
states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to
form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War?
The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think
the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s inter-
est to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing
with its more powerful neighbor.
Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine
has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that
the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these
requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate

September/October 2014 11
John J. Mearsheimer

Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, espe-

cially if its defense is not a vital interest for them. Indulging the
dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it
will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people.
Of course, some analysts might concede that NATO handled rela-
tions with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia consti-
tutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time—and
that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present pol-
icy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power,
and it will only get weaker with time. Even if Russia were a rising
power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine
into NATO. The reason is simple: the United States and its European
allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their
unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It
would therefore be the height of folly to create a new NATO member
that the other members have no intention of defending. NATO has
expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would
never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent
power play shows that granting Ukraine NATO membership could put
Russia and the West on a collision course.
Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western
relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Rus-
sia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through
Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize
the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all
three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin
who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal un-
der which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby
avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The
United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising
China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and
Beijing closer together.
The United States and its European allies now face a choice on
Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacer-
bate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process—a
scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch
gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that
does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations
with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.∂

12 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
Allegato 4

If the Public only Knew – US Aid to Ukraine

Monsters. Atrocities Committed by Ukraine National
Guard Azov Battalion

By George Eliason Region: Russia and FSU

Global Research, November 25, 2014 Theme: Crimes against Humanity, Police
Ukraine War State & Civil Rights, US NATO War Agenda
In-depth Report: UKRAINE REPORT

Within a few days the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is going to meet with Ukraine’s
best and brightest. They are coming to ask for money, weapons, and start lobbying for
direct intervention. The thought that the halls of the US Congress can be sullied with this
kind of people treading on its floors is beyond my imagination. You don’t need to care about
Ukraine on this issue. American moral authority and the well being (electability) of some
good Congressmen that only hear the propaganda might be at stake. Please take the time
to read through and if this is not acceptable tell your Senator why.

A few days ago Vadim Troyan, a Battalion Azov deputy commander was appointed Kiev
Oblast(Region) Police Chief. Azov Battalion is one of the punisher battalions responsible for
rape, kidnapping, and murder of civilians across Donbass. Vadim Troyan has earned some of
Ukraine’s highest medals in the process.

At their base city of Mariupol just during the month of October 2014 the police department
had to report over 200 rapes committed by Azov and the Ukrainian National Guard in a
public meeting held at the city police department. According to local residents in Mariupol
which is a city of over 500,000; people are constantly going missing.

Young girls are being dragged away in broad daylight and some are never seen again. Azov
battalion is taking men off the street that are never returned. In the last week of October
twenty people were reported missing.

|1
What is Azov Battalion

Interviewed Azov soldier admits torture on video english subs

Interviewed by Foreign Policy Magazine, Azov Battalion describe themselves as

“people with a European identity fighting with Sovietness. But the ‘European
identity’ to which Oleg Odnorozhenko (Azov ideologist) aspires is one
estranged from mainstream European and American liberalism. The Azov
Battalion, whose emblem also includes the ‘Black Sun’ occult symbol used by
the Nazi SS, was founded by Andriy Biletsky, head of the neo-Nazi groups
Social-National Assembly and Patriots of Ukraine.”

Maidan Democrats? Meet the New Nazi Government

Biletsky is also Arseni Yatsenyuk’s choice as a parliamentarian

in Ukraine’s National Rada (Senate). In fact, all the supposedly democratic Euro-Maidan
leaders have chosen radical neo nazi representatives for Senate seats. Biletsky has sworn
he will drive a vote on Ukraine’s nuclear status. If successful, Ukraine will strive to develop
nuclear arms. Sergey Melnichuk (battalion commander Aydar) was Oleg Lyashko’s choice for
a Rada seat.

|2
In the interview with Foreign Policy, the Azov commander Biletsky (now Ukrainian Senator)
states:

“Unfortunately, among the Ukrainian people today there are a lot of ‘Russians’
(by their mentality, not their blood), ‘kikes,’ ‘Americans,’ ‘Europeans’ (of the
democratic-liberal European Union), ‘Arabs,’ ‘Chinese’ and so forth, but there is
not much specifically Ukrainian…It’s unclear how much time and effort will be
needed to eradicate these dangerous viruses from our people.”

The battalion’s political platform supports the system of government devised by the
Ukrainian nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s.

Really look at the description of a “Russian” and see if there is anything familiar
here. American democracy is no different to them than Donbas people. This point needs to
hit home in light of what they are doing.

Andrey Teeter

Andrey Teteruk the Commander of Myrotvorets (peacemaker) is also one of Yatsenyuks

choices that is taking a Senate seat.

Andrei Teteruk who ran for lawmaker on People’s Front election list plans to
attend parliamentary plenary meetings with weapons. “I hope I will not use it,”
Teteruk said.

Myrotvorets (peacemaker battalion) is another punisher battalion. In Teteruk’s

own words “ Peacemaker” is a police battalion. “Our task is to restore order in
liberated settlements, clean from criminals, weapons. We did a good job in
Dzerzhinsk; performed police functions, investigated, who supported
separatists in the city.”

“I’m against solving problems by using weapons. With all that I’m a military
man, run a military unit, but I was in Kosovo and saw the conflicts that were
solved with weapons, it led to the fact that entire villages were cut out, from
the oldest to the youngest. The war makes dirty both sides.”

Although honesty is a respectable quality every person in Donbass has been branded a
separatist. Teteruk’s job as a punisher battalion commander is no different than the last part
of his quote- to destroy entire villages from the oldest to the youngest.

Yuri Berea

Yuri Bereza is the Commander of Ihor Kolomoisky’s Dneipr 1. You guessed it Yuri Bereza is
also now a Senator. What makes this clown a great pick for Maidan leaders to get behind is:

“Today, we are ready not just to defend [Ukraine], but to invade the Russian
Federation, break into it with reconnaissance detachments and sabotage
groups,” said Bereza.

Although I didn’t mention him by name I wrote about Bereza’s most notable
accomplishment to date. In a hacked correspondence reacting to the remains
of 37 civilians found in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukrainian Rada, Deputy Oleg Pankevich
questions Igor Kolomoisky’s sanity. Kolomoisky, one of the leading Jewish
|3
 leaders in Europe, has his own Dnipr Battalion in the Donbass war.

According to Kolimoisky’s assistant Boris Filatov, they are just Neo-nazi

animals. Kolomoisky’s Dnipr battalion is replete with swastikas and Neo-nazi
mercenaries from Ukraineand other countries. Among his more notable
accomplishments, Kolimoisky funded and planned the Odessa Trade House
Massacre last spring. Kolomoisky has a new Nazi problem. Of the 37 civilians
that were found tortured, mutilated and killed in this instance, 19 were Jewish.
Thats why Pankevich called it a mini-holocaust.

Yuri Bereza is a new Ukrainian Senator who now has medals for torture and murder of
innocent people.

Semen Semenchenko

I have written extensively about Sementchenko’s Donbass Battalion. Sementchenko is also

a new Ukrainian Senator. His battalion accused him of running when the fighting started.
When they were under attack he refused to deliver weapons his men did not have. He told
his deputy commander to leave because” they are just meat anyway.” Semenchenko’s
battalion has been responsible for a lot of horror done to civilians in Donbass. This man is an
animal.

UCCA Lobbying

The ultra-nationalist Ukrainian Congressional Committee of America (UCCA) has been

lobbying the US Congress to give weapons to Ukraine. The men listed above are the
representatives the Diaspora community chose as representative of their ideal of a
Ukrainian nationalist in the mold of Stepan Bandera.

The United Nations (UN) recently released a report on the human rights situation in
Ukraine, accusing the volunteer battalions of violating international humanitarian laws.

The date they chose falls on Ukraine Day celebrations to insure they get the turnout needed
to show the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that these men deserve American dollars,
weapons, and training.

This excerpt is from nationalist volunteer effort:

|4
 “As I’m sure you know, these three Magiare not only our lovely commanders of
the volunteer battalions Donbas, Myrotvorets, and Dnipro-1, they are also
newly-baked parliamentarians from Samopomich and Narodny Front. And they
are in DC this week to meet with congressmen and military officials and talk
about how to defend Ukraine. At this very moment, Russia is training a 30 000
army in the occupied eastern territories and stuffing the region with its
weapons, and Semenchenko asks for OUR HELP!”

“Remember, Ukraine is not only defending itself, but also peace in Europe, and
the alliance between the US and its biggest friend, Europe, as well as
international law.”

Considering that they want the US to attack Russia, should we thank them now or later?

What else does the Ukrainian emigres want from the US Congress?

Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Voldymyr Ogrizko on Shuster Live (largest

Ukrainian talk show): “‘Americans must be willing to die for Ukraine, because
the former Soviet republic, fighting with Russia, defends the values of the
Western world. And they are willing to die in Iraq or Afghanistan? If they are
really talking about their values, they must be willing to die in Ukraine. Today
we protect their valuables. This and our values. We protect their lives and their
blood ,( He is talking about America )’ – said Ogryzko. He expressed the hope
that the results of the elections in the US will bring Ukraine support.”

What Else Should the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Know?

Recently on the Ukrainian investigative program Groshi. which I was shocked to learn was
still on the air after the coup did a program on prostitution in the Ukrainian army.

At first blush, I would agree that doesn’t sound like much except the commanders are
forcing conscripts to act as prostitutes. The commanders are collecting 600 hryvna per
outing and supposedly giving the conscript the equivalent of $4. Bear in mind that the
conscript cannot refuse the order.

The conscript age in Ukraine is now 16 years old. Other soldiers or officers have their choice
between a boy or a girl, man or woman. How is this not sanctioned rape within the armed
forces? Will the US Congress support this?

To make matters worse for Kiev this backs up a story that would otherwise go unreported
and therefore not investigated.

Oleg Lyashko Allegedly Rapes Young Soldier

|5
A young soldier from the punisher battalion Shaktar (Miner) has tried to testify on video that
the leader of the Radical Party of Ukraine, Rada MP, presidential runner up, and probably
future president of Ukraine, tied, beat, and raped him. The website ukraina.ru carried the
story. According to him he joined Shaktar to serve the motherland and the promise of good
money. His work detail was logistics in the unit and keeping records.

The “Miner” cleansing Battalion soldier talked about how he was beaten and raped by the
leader of the Radical Partyof Ukraine Oleg Lyashko. This was written on the website
ukraina.ru. According to his story they tied him up and started gang raping him. He was
given to Oleg Lyashko and Andrew Lozovoy who were looking for young boys.

In light of the Groshi story which ran on Ukrainian TV this needs to be investigated. This is
the clip that was broadcast on Ukrainian TV.

Life in Mariupol under Azov Battalion

Sergey

In September a Mariupol resident “Sergey”wrote:

“I don’t want to go to war, but I will go if my family is harmed. I didn’t go to

Referendum in May because I didn’t think it was that serious. I saw what
Ukrainian Army did to Mariupol citizens on the 9 of May. I used to work back
then. People with Ukrainian flags and stripes on their sleeves opened a fire on
defenseless people. The people they shot were mostly elderly. This was at the
Memorial Day to commemorate Mariupol’s Liberation from the Nazis.

“People began to run and hide where it was possible. Some of them ducked in
the shops and a nearby hairdressing salon. In the city center the worst
shooting occurred. I helped people to get to the hospital for free without any
hesitation. I did five trips to the hospital and back. My car was full of blood. But
that didn’t matter to me then. Now I hope that I saved some peoples lives.

“In spite of all this I didn’t go to the Referendum. I wanted to live in Novorossia,
but I don’t know anyone who I can trust really. For several years I worked as a
taxi driver, now I don’t. It is entirely dangerous. I am talking not only about
losing your car, it is a common practice for soldiers to take away cars they like
for their own use. If I am not mistaken, it is legal now. I am calling it dangerous
because you can be shot, blown up or you can witness a crime the Ukrainian
Army commits and killed for it. In July in the morning I was taking two young
men from Melekino to Mariupol, and we were stopped at a blockpost by very
rude young Ukrainian speaking soldiers.

“They asked to show us our passports. My passengers didn’t have any

documents on them. So they were taken out of the car and soldiers beat them
with the butts of their rifles. The soldiers shouted at those men and abased
them. They made them get on their knees and threatened to kill them. I was
left in the car. After about 20 minutes the soldiers let my passengers go. They
promised to kill them next time if they did not have documents. Another time I
saw one young woman that was grabbed out of her car. She was stopped at
the Volodarskiy blockpost. She was about 25 or so. She was in jeans shorts and
a sexy T-shirt. Soldiers began to flirt with her, invite her for a cup of coffee, but
she refused and they grabbed her and threw her into a black car. I don’t know
what happened later, but I can imagine.”

|6
 Ann, 42 years old in Mariupol said:

“I am shocked because of all those things which are happening. This war broke
my life. I was looking forward to the referendum very much. I was happy to go
there to vote for our freedom from this crazy country “Ukraine”. I realized after
watching what was happening in Slavyansk in April and here in Mariupol on the
9th of May that fascist (Kiev)government wouldn’t let us go without bloodshed.

“I thought I was ready morally for war, but no, I couldn’t even imagine the
horror of the ATO. We have to live, work, and study surrounded by heavy
weapons.

“I remember one day when my 13-years old daughter was at school and I was
at work. The skirmishes and firing began in the city. At the same time my
daughter was supposed to come home, and I thought I would die while I didn’t
hear her voice and she could tell me that she was ok.

“She saw a lot of armed people who shouted at several people to get on the
ground. One of them was a woman. They pointed their guns at those people
and all people near the soldiers. The traffic was blocked so my daughter came
back home on foot. That happened in front of the tram station. After that I
didn’t allow my daughter to go to school for days. I was afraid that she could
be killed in one of those military operations. There are a lot of them now as
because our town is occupied by Ukrainian mercenaries (Azov is has a foreign
mercenary component). There are many more operations and these actions
are more dangerous, bloody, and unprincipled.

“Battali
ons like “Azov” are especially fierce and brutal. They kill people, ruin their
houses, steal everything from household appliances to clothes and jewelery.
We don’t go out in the evenings. The streets are almost empty. I am afraid
even at home because soldiers can break into citizens’ houses at any time they
want. They have permission to do it from the Ukrainian government.

“I lost my job. I worked as a dermatologist and cosmetologist in one salon. Now

it is closed and I don’t know how I will live with my daughter.

“Every day we see new units of APCs, tanks, and trucks loaded with soldiers in
the town. We hear different gossip about bombing. Every day we prepare
ourselves to die. It’s the worst nightmare. But I hope that it will be the end of
this mess.”

Should Congress Support This?

Should the US Senate give a penny of American money to support these degenerates? When
you understand the fact that the Ukrainian emigre community considers the men heroes
that see you as Moskal? The UCCA taught these men their ideology. Most of the Senators
and Congressmen that support nationalist Ukraine or listen to the ultra-nationalist UCCA
lobby are not aware of what is going on. If you care about your congressman you need to let
them know before they vote.

The money they appropriate will go directly into the murder of innocent people, torture, and
rape.

The original source of this article is Ukraine War

|7
Copyright © George Eliason, Ukraine War, 2014

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www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the
copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance
a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those
who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted
material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.
For media inquiries: publications@globalresearch.ca

|8
Allegato 5

Ukraine: Secretive Neo-Nazi Military Organization

Involved in Euromaidan Sniper Shootings

By F. William Engdahl Region: Europe, Russia and FSU

Global Research, November 22, 2014 Theme: Police State & Civil Rights
21st Century Wire and Global Research In-depth Report: UKRAINE REPORT

Yanoukovitch, ousted president of Ukraine

This article –which recounts the events of the November Euromaidan 2013 Sniper Shootings
was first published in March 2014

The events in Ukraine since November 2013 are so astonishing as almost to defy belief.An
legitimately-elected (said by all international monitors) Ukrainian President, Viktor
Yanukovich, has been driven from office, forced to flee as a war criminal after more than
three months of violent protest and terrorist killings by so-called opposition.

His “crime” according to protest leaders was that he rejected an EU offer of a vaguely-
defined associate EU membership that offered little to Ukraine in favor of a concrete deal
with Russia that gave immediate €15 billion debt relief and a huge reduction in Russian gas
import prices. Washington at that point went into high gear and the result today is
catastrophe.

A secretive neo-nazi military organization reported linked to NATO played a decisive role in
targeted sniper attacks and violence that led to the collapse of the elected government.

But the West is not finished with destroying Ukraine. Now comes the IMF with severe
conditionalities as prerequisite to any Western financial help.

After the famous leaked phone call of US Assistant Secretary of

State Victoria Nuland (photo, left) with the US Ambassador in Kiev, where she discussed the
details of who she wanted in a new coalition government in Kiev, and where she rejected

|1
the EU solutions with her “Fuck the EU” comment,[1] the EU went it alone. Germany’s
Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposed that he and his French counterpart,
Laurent Fabius, fly to Kiev and try to reach a resolution of the violence before escalation.
Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski was asked to join. The talks in Kiev included the
EU delegation, Yanukovich, the three opposition leaders and a Russian representative. The
USA was not invited.[2]

The EU intervention without Washington was extraordinary and reveals the deeping division
between the two in recent months. In effect it was the EU saying to the US State
Department, “F*** the US,” we will end this ourselves.

After hard talks, all major parties including the majority of protesters, agreed to new
presidential elections in December, return to the 2004 Constitution and release of Julia
Tymoshenko from prison. The compromise appeared to end the months long chaos and give
a way out for all major players.

The diplomatic compromise lasted less than twelve hours. Then all hell broke loose.

Snipers began shooting into the crowd on February 22 in Maidan or Independence Square.
Panic ensued and riot police retreated in panic according to eyewitnesses. The opposition
leader Vitali Klitschko withdrew from the deal, no reason given. Yanukovich fled Kiev.[3]

The question unanswered until now is who deployed the snipers? According to veteran US
intelligence sources, the snipers came from an ultra-right-wing military organization known
as Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO).

IMAGE: Members of UNA-UNSO marching in Lviv.

Strange Ukraine ‘Nationalists’

The leader of UNA-UNSO, Andriy Shkil, ten years ago became an adviser to Julia
Tymoshenko. UNA-UNSO, during the US-instigated 2003-2004 “Orange Revolution”, backed
pro-NATO candidate Viktor Yushchenko against his pro-Russian opponent, Yanukovich. UNA-

|2
UNSO members provided security for the supporters of Yushchenko and Julia Tymoshenko
on Independence Square in Kiev in 2003-4.[4]

UNA-UNSO is also reported to have close ties to the German National Democratic Party
(NDP). [5]

Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 the crack-para-military UNA-UNSO
members have been behind every revolt against Russian influence. The one connecting
thread in their violent campaigns is always anti-Russia. The organization, according to
veteran US intelligence sources, is part of a secret NATO “GLADIO” organization, and not a
Ukraine nationalist group as portrayed in western media. [6]

According to these sources, UNA-UNSO have been involved (confirmed officially) in the
Lithuanian events in the Winter of 1991, the Soviet Coup d’etat in Summer 1991, the war for
the Pridnister Republic 1992, the anti-Moscow Abkhazia War 1993, the Chechen War, the
US-organized Kosovo Campaign Against the Serbs, and the August 8 2008 war in Georgia.
According to these reports, UNA-UNSO para-military have been involved in every NATO dirty
war in the post-cold war period, always fighting on behalf of NATO. “These people are the
dangerous mercenaries used all over the world to fight NATO’s dirty war, and to frame
Russia because this group pretends to be Russian special forces. THESE ARE THE BAD GUYS,
forget about the window dressing nationalists, these are the men behind the sniper rifles,”
these sources insist. [7]

If true that UNA-UNSO is not “Ukrainian” opposition, but rather a highly secret NATO force
using Ukraine as base, it would suggest that the EU peace compromise with the moderates
was likely sabotaged by the one major player excluded from the Kiev 21 February
diplomatic talks—Victoria Nuland’s State Department.[8] Both Nuland and right-wing
Republican US Senator John McCain have had contact with the leader of the Ukrainian
opposition Svoboda Party, whose leader is openly anti-semitic and defends the deeds of a
World War II Ukrainian SS-Galicia Division head.[9] The party was registered in 1995, initially
calling itself the “Social National Party of Ukraine” and using a swastika style logo. Svoboda
is the electoral front for neo-nazi organizations in Ukraine such as UNA-UNSO.[10]

One further indication that Nuland’s hand is shaping latest Ukraine events is the fact that
the new Ukrainian Parliament is expected to nominate Nuland’s choice, Arseny Yatsenyuk,
from Tymoshenko’s party, to be interim head of the new Cabinet.

Whatever the final truth, clear is that Washington has prepared a new economic rape of
Ukraine using its control over the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

IMF plunder of Ukraine Crown Jewels

Now that the “opposition” has driven a duly-elected president into exile somewhere
unknown, and dissolved the national riot police, Berkut, Washington has demanded that
Ukraine submit to onerous IMF conditionalities.

In negotiations last October, the IMF demanded that Ukraine double prices for gas and
electricity to industry and homes, that they lift a ban on private sale of Ukraine’s rich
agriculture lands, make a major overhaul of their economic holdings, devalue the currency,
slash state funds for school children and the elderly to “balance the budget.” In return
Ukraine would get a paltry $4 billion.

|3
Before the ouster of the Moscow-leaning Yanukovich government last week, Moscow was
prepared to buy some $15 billion of Ukraine debt and to slash its gas prices by fully one-
third. Now, understandably, Russia is unlikely to give that support. The economic
cooperation between Ukraine and Moscow was something Washington was determined to
sabotage at all costs.

This drama is far from over. The stakes involve the very future of Russia, the EU-Russian
relations, and the global power of Washington, or at least that faction in Washington that
sees further wars as the prime instrument of policy.

Writer F. William Engdahl is a geopolitical analyst and the author of “Full Spectrum
Dominance: Totalitarian Democracy in the New World Order”.

Notes

[1] F. William Engdahl, US-Außenministerium in flagranti über Regimewechsel in der Ukraine ertappt,
Kopp Online.de, February 8, 2014, accessed in
http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/enthuellungen/f-william-engdahl/us-aussenministerium-in-fl
agranti-ueber-regimewechsel-in-der-ukraine-ertappt.html

[2] Bertrand Benoit, Laurence Norman and Stephen Fidler , European Ministers Brokered Ukraine
Political Compromise: German, French, Polish Foreign Ministers Flew to Kiev, The Wall Street Journal,
February 21, 2014, accessed in
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303636404579397351862903542?mg=reno
64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB100014240527023036364045793973518
62903542.html

[3] Jessica Best, Ukraine protests Snipers firing live rounds at demonstrators as fresh violence erupts
despite truce, The Mirror UK, February 20, 2014, accessed in
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-protests-snipers-firing-live-3164828

[4] Aleksandar Vasovic , Far right group flexes during Ukraine revolution, Associated Press, January
3, 2005, Accessed in
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20050103&slug=ukraine03

[5] Wikipedia, Ukrainian National Assembly Ukrainian National Self Defence, Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia, accessed in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_National_Assembly_%E2%80%93_Ukrainian_National_Self_Def
ence

[6] Source report, Who Has Ukraine Weapons, February 27, 2014, private to author.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Max Blumenthal, Is the US backing neo-Nazis in Ukraine?, AlterNet February 25, 2014, accessed
in

|4
 http://www.salon.com/2014/02/25/is_the_us_backing_neo_nazis_in_ukraine_partner/

[9] Channel 4 News, Far right group at heart of Ukraine protests meet US senator, 16 December
2013, accessed in

http://www.channel4.com/news/ukraine-mccain-far-right-svoboda-anti-semitic-protests

The original source of this article is 21st Century Wire and Global Research
Copyright © F. William Engdahl, 21st Century Wire and Global Research, 2014

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Articles by: F. William Engdahl

Disclaimer: The contents of this article are of sole responsibility of the author(s). The Centre for Research on Globalization will
not be responsible for any inaccurate or incorrect statement in this article. The Centre of Research on Globalization grants
permission to cross-post Global Research articles on community internet sites as long the source and copyright are
acknowledged together with a hyperlink to the original Global Research article. For publication of Global Research articles in
print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: publications@globalresearch.ca
www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the
copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance
a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those
who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted
material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.
For media inquiries: publications@globalresearch.ca

|5
Allegato 6 (dal sito dell'ANPI: https://www.anpi.it/media/uploads/files/2018/12/RUSSIA.pdf )
RUSSIA 
Nikolai Ivanovich ROYANOV 
Ass. Presidente RSV‐Unione Russa Veterani  
 
  
Signore e signori,  
Cari compagni antifascisti,  
A nome dei membri della Organizzazione non governativa russa dei Veterani, l’Unione dei Veterani Russi, 
vorrei  salutare  calorosamente  e  cordialmente  gli  organizzatori  ed  i  partecipanti  alla  Conferenza 
antifascista  a  Roma!  Vorrei  estendere  un  ringraziamento  speciale  alla  Segreteria  Nazionale 
dell'Associazione dei partigiani italiani per portare avanti le tradizioni antifasciste romane. 
 
I veterani antifascisti apprezzano la memoria dei congressi e conferenze a Roma.  
 
Il congresso paneuropeo dei veterani di guerra e combattenti della Resistenza italiana ha avuto luogo a 
Roma nell'autunno 1977. E vale la pena notare che prese in considerazione il parere della gamma di 
organizzazioni che furono invitate a quel congresso e anche coloro che si schierarono con la Germania 
nella  guerra,  ma  dopo  la  sua  sconfitta  erano  pronti  a  collaborare  per  il  bene  della  pace  in  Europa.  Il 
congresso  romano  si  svolse  sotto  lo  slogan  "per  la  pace,  la  sicurezza,  e  amicizia!".  La  delegazione 
sovietica  era  guidata  da  PI  Batov,  Presidente  del  Comitato  dei  veterani  di  guerra  sovietici,  Generale 
dell'Esercito.    
La  Conferenza  mondiale  dei  Veterani  tenutasi  a  Roma  nell'ottobre  1979  è  diventata  un  evento 
significativo nella storia del movimento dei veterani internazionali. La questione del disarmo fu il tema 
principale  di  tale  conferenza.  I  partecipanti  alla  Conferenza  riuscirono  a  elaborare  e  ad  adottare 
all'unanimità il documento "Per i governi e le nazioni del mondo" che è passato alla storia come L'Appello 
romano. Questo testo è stato anche consegnato ai capi degli stati e dei governi ed al Segretario generale 
dell'ONU. E 'diventato il programma per la lotta dell'associazione mondiale dei veterani per il disarmo e 
la pace permanente per gli anni a venire. 
AP  Maresev  pronunciò  un  grande  discorso  a  nome  della  delegazione  sovietica  durante  il  Congresso 
Europeo dei veterani e membri della resistenza che ebbe luogo a Firenze nel mese di aprile del 1986. Il 
messaggio principale fu la richiesta di completa cessazione dei test nucleari, per la conservazione e il 
consolidamento della pace. La maggior parte dei partecipanti alla conferenza, come qualsiasi persone 
di buon senso sulla Terra sostenne ardentemente quel messaggio. Che si rifletteva nelle risoluzioni della 
conferenza.  
I successivi forum internazionali, tra cui quelle tenute a Mosca, Minsk, Volgograd, e Brest sono diventati 
pietre miliari nel consolidamento dei veterani di guerra e membri della resistenza nella loro lotta contro 
la minaccia di guerra. 
Vorrei anche sottolineare che per un lungo periodo la FIR fu guidata dal rappresentante degli antifascisti 
italiani, il senatore italiano Arialdo Banfi.   
Sosteniamo le proposte antifasciste italiane per combinare le forze al fine di opporci alla crescita costante 
dei partiti di destra in tutti i paesi d'Europa e nel mondo occidentale. Tali forze reazionarie minacciano 
di  riportare  la  storia  a  quei  secoli  bui  che  pensavamo  fossero  svaniti  per  sempre:  secoli  di  fascismo, 
nazismo, razzismo e intolleranza. La lotta contro questi tumori maligni deve essere il punto principale 
1 

 
per le nostre organizzazioni antifasciste. Questo dev'essere il nostro debito verso i nostri padri e nonni 
che  hanno  sacrificato  la  propria  vita  combattendo  contro  il  fascismo  e  il  nazismo  prima  e  durante  la 
seconda guerra mondiale così come durante la grande guerra patriottica (1941‐45). 
I  veterani  russi  sostengono  anche  il  Documento  Milanese  fatto  il  1°  luglio  2018  dai  capi  dei  comitati 
internazionali  degli  ex  campi  di  concentramento  nazisti.  Anche  noi  siamo  disturbati  dal  fatto  che  la 
risoluzione delle Nazioni Unite del 21 novembre 2014, sulla glorificazione del nazismo e altre pratiche 
che contribuiscono a alimentare forme contemporanee di razzismo, discriminazione razziale, xenofobia 
e intolleranza connessa, non sia stata adottata perché tre membri dell'ONU hanno votato contro di essa 
e 55 si sono astenuti (tra cui membri dell'Unione europea). 
Ora,  i  veterani  russi,  consolidati  sulla  base  dell'esperienza  condivisa  della  lotta  contro  il  fascismo,  si 
interessano di questioni di pace, di diritti umani politici e sociali e di democrazia. Insieme agli antifascisti 
della generazione attuale, agiamo contro il neonazismo, l'antisemitismo, il razzismo, il terrorismo e le 
sue  fonti  sociali  (possiamo  vedere  la  minaccia  della  loro  rinascita  osservando  l'attuale  ondata  di 
risorgente neonazismo negli Stati baltici, Bulgaria, Grecia, Ucraina e altri paesi). È ovvio che solo unendo 
i nostri sforzi possiamo far cambiare le cose rispetto alla decisione dei problemi più difficili. Al contrario, 
qualsiasi passo unilaterale a dispetto delle disposizioni dell'ONU non solo scoraggia il raggiungimento 
del  risultato  auspicato,  ma  aumenta  anche  il  caos  e  l'insicurezza,  crea  condizioni  per  risorgere  del 
nazismo e neonazismo in un certo numero di paesi. I soldati sovietici insieme ai loro fratelli in arme dalla 
coalizione anti‐Hitler hanno messo la loro firma sulla sentenza di condanna del nazismo ed al fascismo 
al Reichstag 74 anni fa. Il Tribunale internazionale di Norimberga ha confermato che quella sentenza era 
legale.  
Ma pur sconfiggendo un certo numero di conquistatori, che si consideravano superuomini, condannando 
il fascismo come un'ideologia e uno strumento di odio politico, non abbiamo distrutto le sue radici. Esso 
torna sotto i riflettori ed in più cerca di riconquistare il potere. Anche nelle ex repubbliche sovietiche i 
fascisti  sopravvissuti  e  i  loro  successori  hanno  un  terreno  fertile.  Coloro  che  sono  venuti  al  potere  a 
seguito del colpo di stato dei militari in Ucraina si dichiarano ardenti nazisti e neofascisti verso le persone 
del sud‐est e dell'Ucraina che non sono d'accordo con la loro politica.  
Il  palese  nazionalismo  e  neonazismo  che  è  stato  nutrito  per  23  anni  a  livello  di  paese  in  Ucraina  e 
incoraggiato da alcuni gruppi provenienti dagli Stati Uniti e paesi dell'UE stanno sbocciando. Coloro che 
sono stati giudicati come criminali durante il processo di Norimberga sono ora "eroi nazionali ucraini". 
In Estonia, si valuta positivamente il ruolo dei campi di concentramento e dei ghetti, del lavoro forzato 
delle  nazioni  oppresse  a  beneficio  della  Germania  durante  la  seconda  guerra  mondiale,  dando  un 
sostegno schietto all'ideologia nazista e fascista e chiedendo insistentemente di dimenticare i risultati 
della  grande  guerra  patriottica  del  1941  –  1945.  Le  marce  degli  uomini  delle  SS  sono  sostenute  e 
organizzate dalle autorità nei paesi baltici; a loro sono innalzati monumenti; le strade e le piazze sono 
chiamate in loro onore. Non è raro per molti paesi europei.  
Questo è il motivo per cui i veterani di guerra, la comunità dei veterani d'Europa e di altri paesi, che 
hanno  sopportato  tutto  il  carico  della  guerra,  il  consolidamento,  e  l'unione  dei  loro  sforzi  nella  lotta 
contro la rinascita del nazismo e neonazismo è un bisogno obiettivo e una parte integrante della lotta 
per pace e sicurezza delle Nazioni.  
Allo  stesso  tempo,  diamo  voce  a  una  speranza  che  i  veterani  dell'Europa  e  di  altri  paesi  si  guardino 
coraggiosamente e dicano ad alta voce la loro parola contro la recrudescenza del nazismo e del fascismo, 

2 

 
la sua espressione politica e ideologica, perché cessino le marce sotto le bandiere SS nei paesi baltici, e 
l'influenza diretta sulla politica neofascista dei gruppi paramilitari in Ucraina.  
Molte organizzazioni di veterani di guerra degli alleati suggeriscono di unire gli sforzi dei veterani, il loro 
consolidamento a livello internazionale. La situazione attuale confronta le organizzazioni di veterani con 
un vero bisogno di vedere e riconoscere l'origine del neonazismo e le sue metamorfosi.  
I moderni neofascismi e neonazismi assumono nuove forme, ma la loro essenza è sempre la stessa: la 
superiorità degli uni agli altri. Oggi, il neonazismo non è solo fatto dai successori dei nazisti, non solo i 
radicalismi religiosi, ma anche l'ingerenza unilaterale nella politica degli Stati sovrani, il terrore liberale 
con il pretesto di "diritti umani", e la distruzione dei valori tradizionali, morali, della famiglia.  
Il fascismo significa il rafforzamento delle tendenze militariste nella politica globale. Le forze che mirano 
alla  guerra  esistevano  un  centinaio  di  anni  fa,  quando  si  gettò  benzina  sul  fuoco  della  prima  guerra 
mondiale, esistevano 80 anni fa, quando hanno portato Hitler al potere, sostenendo l'ideologia fascista 
e facendo esplodere il mondo con la seconda guerra mondiale. Esse esistono ancora ora.  
 
Una parola sull'associazione degli antifascisti del mondo, l'organizzazione antifascista fondata in Slovenia 
nel 2015 ottobre, e guidata da tit Turnsek. Le organizzazioni antifasciste e veterane provenienti dalla 
Russia,  le  ex  repubbliche  della  Jugoslavia  (Bosnia  ed  Erzegovina,  Croazia,  Macedonia,  Montenegro, 
Serbia e Slovenia) hanno partecipato alla conferenza della Fondazione. Quasi tutti i rappresentanti hanno 
sottolineato il rafforzamento della ricomparsa delle tendenze fasciste in Europa e nei loro paesi. Notando 
che la ragione principale di questo è l'impoverimento delle persone. La distorsione della storia in molti 
paesi  europei  è  diventata  anche  la  caratteristica  comune  della  situazione  attuale.  Il  terrorismo 
internazionale al giorno d'oggi non è altro che un'altra versione del fascismo e tutte le organizzazioni 
antifasciste  devono  prendere  provvedimenti  contro  di  essa.  L'obiettivo  principale  ora  è  quello  di 
consolidare, come è stato fatto durante la seconda guerra mondiale, quando la coalizione antifascista 
contro Hitler fu creata.  
L'Associazione ha portato avanti alcune attività, ci sono alcuni punti luminosi nelle sue attività, ma ci 
sono alcuni punti deboli. Il numero dei membri dell'Associazione non aumenta, si organizzano poche 
attività coinvolgenti antifascisti provenienti da diversi paesi europei.  
Spero che la nostra Conferenza Antifascista a Roma dia un nuovo slancio al consolidamento degli sforzi 
dei veterani di guerra, antifascisti membri della resistenza, prigionieri dei campi di concentramento e 
ghetti, partigiani e membri del movimento clandestino nella lotta contro il neofascismo e il fascismo per 
la pace e la sicurezza delle nazioni.  
Vi auguro ogni successo nella gestione delle organizzazioni nazionali dei veterani, si tratta di una cosa 
così nobile da fare! Grazie agli organizzatori di questa conferenza antifascista, in particolare ai leader 
ANPI e il suo capo la signora Carla Nespolo. 
Grazie per la sua cortese attenzione. 
 

3 

 
Allegato 7

United Nations A/RES/75/169

General Assembly Distr.: General
23 December 2020

Seventy-fifth session
Agenda item 70 (a)
Elimination of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance: elimination of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and
related intolerance

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly

on 16 December 2020
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/75/476, para. 23)]

75/169. Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other

practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

The General Assembly,

Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 3
and other relevant human rights instruments,
Recalling the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2004/16
of 16 April 2004 4 and 2005/5 of 14 April 2005 5 and relevant Human Rights Council
resolutions, in particular resolutions 7/34 of 28 March 2008, 6 18/15 of 29 September
2011 7 and 21/33 of 28 September 2012, 8 as well as General Assembly resolutions
60/143 of 16 December 2005, 61/147 of 19 December 2006, 62/142 of 18 December
2007, 63/162 of 18 December 2008, 64/147 of 18 December 2009, 65/199 of
__________________
1
Resolution 217 A (III).
2
See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
3
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
4
See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2004, Supplement No. 3 (E/2004/23),
chap. II, sect. A.
5
Ibid., 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigenda (E/2005/23, E/2005/23/Corr.1 and
E/2005/23/Corr.2), chap. II, sect. A.
6
See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53),
chap. II.
7
Ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 53A and corrigendum (A/66/53/Add.1 and
A/66/53/Add.1/Corr.1), chap. II.
8
Ibid., Sixty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 53A (A/67/53/Add.1), chap. II.

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21 December 2010, 66/143 of 19 December 2011, 67/154 of 20 December 2012,

68/150 of 18 December 2013, 69/160 of 18 December 2014, 70/139 of 17 December
2015, 71/179 of 19 December 2016, 72/156 of 19 December 2017, 73/157 of
17 December 2018 and 74/136 of 18 December 2019 on this issue, and its resolutions
61/149 of 19 December 2006, 62/220 of 22 December 2007, 63/242 of 24 December
2008, 64/148 of 18 December 2009, 65/240 of 24 December 2010, 66/144 of
19 December 2011, 67/155 of 20 December 2012, 68/151 of 18 December 2013,
69/162 of 18 December 2014, 70/140 of 17 December 2015, 71/181 of 19 December
2016, 72/157 of 19 December 2017, 73/262 of 22 December 2018 and 74/137 of
18 December 2019, entitled “A global call for concrete action for the total elimination
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the
comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action”,
Acknowledging other important initiatives of the General Assembly aime d at
raising awareness about the suffering of victims of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance and forms of discrimination, including in the
historical perspective, in particular regarding commemoration of the victims of
slavery and the transatlantic slave trade,
Recalling the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the Judgment of the
Tribunal which recognized as criminal, inter alia, the SS organization and its integral
parts, including the Waffen SS, through its officially acc epted members implicated in
or with knowledge of the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity
connected with the Second World War, as well as other relevant provisions of the
Charter and the Judgment,
Mindful of the horrors of the Second World War, and stressing in this regard that
the victory over Nazism in the Second World War contributed to the establishment of
the conditions for the creation of the United Nations, designed to prevent future wars
and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
Recalling that, in 2020, the international community celebrates the seventy-fifth
anniversary of victory over Nazism in the Second World War, and looking forward in
this regard to the holding of a special solemn meeting of the General Assembly,
Recalling also that the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly coincides
with the seventy-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the adoption of its Charter,
Noting that neo-Nazism is more than just the glorification of a past movement,
it is a contemporary phenomenon with strong vested interests in racial inequality and
an investment in gaining broad support for its false claims of racial superiority,
Recalling the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on 8 September 2001, 9 in particular paragraph 2
of the Declaration and paragraphs 84 to 86 of the Programme of Action, as well as
the relevant provisions of the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference
of 24 April 2009, 10 in particular paragraphs 11, 13 and 54,
Alarmed at the spread in many parts of the world of various extremist political
parties, movements, ideologies and groups of a racist or xenophobic character,
including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and at the fact that this trend has resulted

__________________
9
See A/CONF.189/12 and A/CONF.189/12/Corr.1, chap. I.
10
See A/CONF.211/8, chap. I.

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in the implementation of discriminatory measures and policies at the local or national

level,
Noting with concern that, even where neo-Nazis or extremists do not formally
participate in government, the presence therein of extreme right-wing ideologues can
have the effect of injecting into governance and political discourse the same
ideologies that make neo-Nazism and extremism so dangerous,
Alarmed at music lyrics and video games that advocate racial hatred and incite
discrimination, hostility or violence,
Concerned by the use of Internet platforms by groups that advocate hatred to
plan, fundraise and circulate information about public events aimed at promoting
racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, such as rallies, demonstrations and acts
of violence,
Mindful of the role that the Internet can play in promoting equality, inclusion
and non-discrimination,
Seriously concerned that neo-Nazi groups, as well as other groups and
individuals espousing ideologies of hatred, have increasingly targeted susceptible
individuals, mainly children and youth, by means of specifically tailored websites
with the aim of their indoctrination and recruitment,
Deeply concerned by all recent manifestations of violence and terrorism incited
by violent nationalism, racism, antisemitism, Islamophobia, Christianophobia,
Afrophobia, xenophobia and related intolerance, including during sports events,
Recognizing with deep concern the continued alarming increase in instances of
discrimination, intolerance and extremist violence motivated by antisemitism,
Islamophobia and Christianophobia and prejudices against persons of other ethnic
origins, religions and beliefs,
Underlining the existing lack of uniformity of norms regarding protected speech
and expression and prohibited racial discrimination and advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,
Noting with concern, in this regard, that the variation in national standards
prohibiting hate speech may provide safe havens for neo-Nazi, extremist, violent
nationalist, xenophobic or racist speech owing to the fact that many neo -Nazi and
relevant extremist groups of a racist or xenophobic character operate transnationally
by relying on Internet service providers or social media platforms,
Stressing that the purpose of addressing hate speech is not to limit or prohibit
freedom of speech, but to prevent incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence,
which shall be prohibited by law,
Expressing its concern about the use of digital technologies by neo-Nazis and
other extremist and hate groups to disseminate their ideology, while recognizing that
digital technologies are of great importance for the enjoyment of human rights and
for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,
1. Reaffirms the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and of the
outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, in which States condemned
the persistence and resurgence of neo-Nazism, neo-Fascism and violent nationalist
ideologies based on racial and national prejudice and stated that those phenomena
could never be justified in any instance or in any circumstances;
2. Recalls the provisions of the Durban Declaration and of the outcome
document of the Durban Review Conference, in which States recognized the positive
contribution that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, in partic ular by

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the media and new technologies, including the Internet, and full respect for the
freedom to seek, receive and impart information can make to the fight against racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
3. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Human Rights Council on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, prepared in accordance with the request
contained in its resolution 74/136; 11
4. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and her Office for their efforts to fight racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance, including the m aintenance by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of the database on practical
means to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
5. Expresses deep concern about the glorification, in any form, of the Nazi
movement, neo-Nazism and former members of the Waffen SS organization,
including by erecting monuments and memorials, holding public demonstrations in
the name of the glorification of the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo -Nazism,
declaring or attempting to declare such members and those who fought against the
anti-Hitler coalition, collaborated with the Nazi movement and committed war crimes
and crimes against humanity participants in national liberation movements, as well as
by the renaming of streets glorifying them;
6. Calls for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
and urges those States parties that have not yet done so to consi der making the
declaration under its article 14, thus providing the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination with the competence to receive and consider communications
from individuals or groups of individuals within their jurisdiction claimin g to be
victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set forth in the Convention;
7. Urges States to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination by all
appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, while ensuring
that the definition of racial discrimination set out therein complies with article 1 of
the Convention;
8. Encourages those States that have made reservations to article 4 of the
Convention to give serious consideration to withdrawing such reservations as a matter
of priority, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur;
9. Acknowledges that discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion
in all its forms and manifestations, including neo-Nazism, Islamophobia,
Christianophobia and antisemitism, is a threat to social cohesion, not just to those
racial and ethnic groups that are their direct target;
10. Recalls that any legislative or constitutional measures adopted with a view
to countering extremist political parties, movements, ideologies and groups of a racist
or xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups and similar
extremist ideological movements, should be in conformity with the relevant
international human rights obligations, in particular articles 4 and 5 of the Convention
and articles 19 to 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
11. Encourages States parties to the Convention to take appropriate measures
to ensure that their legislation is in accordance with their obligations under the
Convention, including those under article 4;

__________________
11
A/75/329.

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12. Stresses that the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and
association are important in supporting the fight against racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance worldwide;
13. Emphasizes once more the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that
“any commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related
organizations, whether official or unofficial, should be prohibited” by States, 12 also
emphasizes that such manifestations do injustice to the memory of the countless
victims of the Second World War and negatively influence children and young people,
and stresses in this regard that it is important that States take measures, in accordance
with international human rights law, to counteract any celebration of the Nazi SS
organization and all its integral parts, including the Waffen S S, and that failure by
States to effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of
States Members of the United Nations under its Charter;
14. Expresses deep concern about increased frequency of attempts and
activities intended to desecrate or demolish monuments erected in remembrance of
those who fought against Nazism during the Second World War, as well as to
unlawfully exhume or remove the remains of such persons, and in this regard urges
States to fully comply with their relevant obligations, inter alia, under article 34 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 13
15. Firmly condemns incidents that glorify and promote Nazism, such as acts
involving pro-Nazi graffiti and paintings, including on monuments dedicated to
victims of the Second World War;
16. Expresses alarm over the use by neo-Nazi groups, as well as other
extremist groups and individuals espousing ideologies of hatred, of information
technologies, the Internet and social media to recruit new members, especially
targeting children and young people, and to disseminate and to amplify their hate-
filled messages, while recognizing that the Internet can also be used to counteract
these groups and their activities;
17. Notes with concern the significant number of racist incidents worldwide,
including the rise of skinhead groups, which have been responsible for many of these
incidents, as well as the resurgence of racist and xenophobic violence targeting,
inter alia, persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,
or on any other grounds, including arson attacks on houses and vandalization of and
violence in schools and places of worship and cemeteries;
18. Reaffirms that such acts may, in certain circumstances, be qualified as
falling within the scope of the Convention, that they may not be justifiable as
exercises of freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of
expression and that they will often fall within the scope of article 20 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and may be subject to certain
restrictions, as set out in articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant;
19. Encourages States to take appropriate concrete measures, including
legislative and educational ones, in accordance with their international human rights
obligations, in order to prevent revisionism in respect of the Second World War and
the denial of the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the
Second World War;

__________________
12
A/72/291, para. 79.
13
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.

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20. Calls upon States to take active measures to ensure that education systems
develop the necessary content to provide accurate accounts of history, as well as
promote tolerance and other international human rights principles;
21. Takes note of the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that education
that seeks to undercut the racist effects of nationalist populism should include
accurate and representative accounts of national history that give voice to racial and
ethnic diversity and that expose the untruths of those who attempt to write ethnic
groups out of national histories and identities in order to sustain ethnonationalist
myths of racially or ethnically “pure” nations; 14
22. Condemns without reservation any denial of or attempt to deny the
Holocaust, as well as any manifestation of religious intolerance, incitement,
harassment or violence against persons or communities, on the basis of ethnic origin
or religious belief;
23. Affirms its deep commitment to the duty of remembrance, and welcomes
the call of the Special Rapporteur for the active preservation of those Holocaust sites
that served as Nazi death camps, concentration and forced labour camps and prisons,
as well as his encouragement to States to take measures, including legislative, law
enforcement and educational measures, to put an end to all forms of Holocaust
denial; 15
24. Takes note of the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur that revisionism
and attempts to falsify history may, in certain circumstances, fall under the prohibition
of hate speech under article 4 (a) of the Convention, which States are required to
declare as offences punishable by law, 16 and that neo-Nazi recruitment attempting to
mainstream extreme ideologies or racial, ethnic or religious hatred and intolerance
may fall under article 4 (b) of the Convention;
25. Calls upon States to continue to take all appropriate measures aimed at
preventing and countering hate speech, including on the Internet, and incitement to
violence against persons in vulnerable situations, including the organization of
meetings and violent protests, fundraising and engagement in other ac tivities;
26. Expresses serious concern regarding attempts to prohibit, at the legislative
level, symbols associated in States with the victory over Nazism;
27. Expresses deep concern about attempts at commercial advertising aimed
at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed during the Second World War by the Nazi regime;
28. Stresses the need to respect the memory and that the practices described
above do injustice to the memory of the countless victims of crimes against humanity
committed in the Second World War, in particular those committed by the SS
organization and by those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition and
collaborated with the Nazi movement, and may negatively influence children and
young people, and that failure by States to effectively address such practices is
incompatible with the obligations of States Members of the United Nations under its
Charter, including those related to the purposes and principles of the Organization;
29. Also stresses that all such practices may fuel contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, antisemitism, Islamophobia, Christianophobia,
xenophobia and related intolerance and contribute to the spread and multiplication of
various extremist political parties, movements and groups of a racist or xenophobic

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14
A/73/305 and A/73/305/Corr.1, para. 56.
15
A/72/291, para. 91.
16
A/HRC/38/53, para. 15.

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character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and in this regard calls for
increased vigilance;
30. Expresses concern that the human rights and democratic challenges posed
by extremist political parties, movements and groups are universal and no country is
immune to them;
31. Emphasizes the need to take appropriate measures necessary to counter the
practices described above, and calls upon States and all other stakeholders to take
more effective measures in accordance with international human rights law to
prevent, counter and combat those phenomena and extremist movements of a racist
or xenophobic character, which pose a real threat to democratic values, and to increase
their vigilance and be proactive in strengthening their efforts to recognize and
effectively address those challenges;
32. Underlines the importance of data and statistics on racist and xenophobic
crimes for identifying the types of offences committed, the profiles of victi ms and of
perpetrators and whether the latter are affiliated with extremist movements or groups,
thus enhancing better understanding of the phenomenon and identifying effective
measures to address such racist and xenophobic crimes, and recalls in this rega rd the
commitments made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 17 on data,
monitoring and accountability, including collecting data disaggregated by
characteristics relevant in national contexts;
33. Encourages States to adopt further measures to support training for the
police and other law enforcement bodies on the ideologies of extremist political
parties, movements and groups whose advocacy constitutes incitement to racist and
xenophobic violence, to strengthen their capacity to address racist and xenophobic
crimes, to fulfil their responsibility for bringing to justice the perpetrators of such
crimes and to combat impunity;
34. Expresses deep concern about the increased number of seats occupied by
representatives of extremist parties of a racist or xenophobic character in a number of
national and local parliaments, and emphasizes in this regard the need for all
democratic political parties to base their programmes and activities on respect for
human rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule of law and good governance and to
condemn all messages disseminating ideas that are based on racial superiority or
hatred and that have the objective of fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
35. Takes note of the concern of the Special Rapporteur regarding the
resurgence of neo-Nazism in contemporary times and growing support for and
acceptance of neo-Nazism and related ideology in an increasing number of
countries; 18
36. Notes with appreciation, in this regard, the call of the Special Rapporteur
upon political leaders and parties to strongly condemn incitement to racial
discrimination or xenophobia, to promote tolerance and respect and to refrain from
forming coalitions with extremist parties of a racist or xenophobic character; 19
37. Welcomes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to continue to take
steps through national legislation, in accordance with international human rights law,
aimed at preventing hate speech and incitement to violence, to withdraw support –
financial and otherwise – from political parties and other organizations that engage in

__________________
17
Resolution 70/1.
18
A/HRC/38/53, para. 16.
19
A/72/291, para. 83.

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neo-Nazi or other hate speech and to take steps to dismantle responsible organizations
where such hate speech aims, or can reasonably be expected, to incite violence; 20
38. Encourages States to improve diversity within law enforcement agencies,
and urges them to take all appropriate measures to facilitate the filing of complaints
about and to impose appropriate sanctions against those within the public service
found to have committed racially motivated violence or to have used hate speech;
39. Expresses deep concern about the increase in reported cases of racist,
antisemitic, Islamophobic, Arabophobic, Afrophobic and xenophobic manifestations
during sports events, including those committed by extremist groups of a rac ist or
xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and calls upon
States, international organizations, sports federations and other relevant stakeholders
to strengthen measures to address such incidents, while also welcoming the steps th at
many States, sports federations and clubs have taken to eliminate racism at sporting
events, including through sport practised without discrimination of any kind and in
the Olympic spirit, which require human understanding, tolerance, inclusion, fair pl ay
and solidarity;
40. Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to introduce into
national criminal law a provision according to which committing an offence with
racist or xenophobic motivations or aims constitutes an aggravating circumstance,
allowing for enhanced penalties, 21 and encourages those States whose legislation does
not contain such provisions to consider that recommendation;
41. Notes measures taken by States to prevent discrimination against, in
particular but not limited to, persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and
linguistic minorities, people of African descent, Roma, migrants, refugees and asylum
seekers, and to ensure their integration into society, urges States to ensure the full and
effective implementation of legal, policy and institutional measures protecting these
individuals and groups, including women and girls, and recommends that States
effectively guarantee to everyone, without discrimination of any kind, their human
rights, including those related to safety and security, access to justice, adequate
reparation and appropriate information about their rights, and pursue prosecution and
adequate punishment, as appropriate, of those responsible for racist and xenophobic
crimes against them, including the possibility of seeking reparation or satisfaction for
damages suffered as a result of such crimes;
42. Underlines that the roots of extremism are multifaceted and must be
addressed through adequate measures such as education, awareness-raising and the
promotion of dialogue, and in this regard recommends the increase of measures to
raise awareness among young people of the dangers of the ideologies and activities
of extremist political parties, movements and groups;
43. Reaffirms, in this regard, the particular importance of all forms of
education, including human rights education, as a complement to legislative
measures, and calls upon States to continue to invest in education, in both
conventional and non-conventional curricula, inter alia, in order to transform attitudes
and counteract ideas of racial hierarchies and superiority, and counter their negative
influence, and to promote the values of non-discrimination, equality and respect for
all, as outlined by the Special Rapporteur;
44. Recognizes the paramount role of education in promoting human rights
and fundamental freedoms and combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance, especially in promoting the principles of tolerance,
__________________
20
A/HRC/38/53, para. 35 (c).
21
A/69/334, para. 81.

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non-discrimination, inclusion and respect for ethnic, religious and cultural diversity
and preventing the spread of extremist racist and xenophobic movements and ideas;
45. Strongly condemns the use of educational material and rhetoric in
educational settings, which promulgate racism, discrimination, hatred and violence
on the basis of ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief;
46. Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur presented at
the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in which he emphasized the
importance of history classes in teaching the dramatic events and human suffering
which arose out of the adoption of ideologies such as Nazism and Fascism; 22
47. Stresses the importance of other positive measures and initiatives aimed at
bringing communities together and providing them with space for genuine dialogue,
such as round tables, working groups and seminars, including training seminars for
State agents and media professionals, as well as awareness-raising activities,
especially those initiated by civil society representatives, which require continued
State support;
48. Underlines the positive role that relevant United Nations entities and
programmes, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, can play in the aforementioned areas;
49. Reaffirms article 4 of the Convention, according to which States parties
condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theo ries of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights
expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist
activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all
other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by
law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local,
to promote or incite racial discrimination;
50. Also reaffirms that, as underlined in paragraph 13 of the outcome
document of the Durban Review Conference, any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
should be prohibited by law, that all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority
or hatred, or incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or
incitement to such acts, shall be declared offences punishable by law, in accordance
with the international obligations of States, and that these prohibitions are consistent
with freedom of opinion and expression;
51. Notes the launch by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Strategy
and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which can play its part in addressing hate speech

__________________
22
A/64/295, para. 104.

20-17343 9/11
 Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices
that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial
A/RES/75/169 discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

around the world while upholding freedom of opinion and expression, in

collaboration with Governments, civil society, the private sector and other partners;
52. Recognizes the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, as well as full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information, including through the Internet, can play in combating racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
53. Calls upon States to strengthen freedom of expression, which can play a
crucial role in promoting democracy and combating racist and xenophobic ideologies
based on racial superiority;
54. Also calls upon States, who have the primary responsibility to counter
discrimination and hate speech, and all relevant actors, including political and
religious leaders, to promote inclusion and unity in response to the coronavirus
disease (COVID-19) pandemic, and to prevent, speak out and take strong action
against racism, xenophobia, hate speech, violence, discrimination and stigmatization;
55. Expresses concern about the increased use of digital technologies to
promote and disseminate racism, racial hatred, xenophobia, racial dis crimination and
related intolerance, and in this regard calls upon States parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to counter the dissemination of the
above-mentioned ideas while respecting their obligations under articles 19 and 20 of
the Covenant, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression and outline the
grounds on which the exercise of this right can be legitimately restricted;
56. Recognizes the need to promote the use of new information and
communications technologies, including the Internet, to contribute to the fight against
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
57. Also recognizes the positive role that the media can play in combating
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, promoting a culture
of tolerance and inclusion and representing the diversity of a multicultural society;
58. Encourages States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to use all
opportunities, including those provided by the Inter net and social media, to counter,
in accordance with international human rights law, the dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred and to promote the values of equality,
non-discrimination, diversity and democracy;
59. Encourages national human rights institutions, where they exist, to
develop appropriate programmes to promote tolerance, inclusion and respect for all
and to collect relevant information in this regard;
60. Notes the importance of strengthening cooperation at the regional and
international levels with the aim of countering all manifestations of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in particular regarding issues
raised in the present resolution;
61. Stresses the importance of cooperating closely with civil society and
international and regional human rights mechanisms in order to counter effectively
all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance, as well as extremist political parties, movements and grou ps, including
neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other similar extremist ideological movements
that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
62. Recalls the request of the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution
2005/5, that the Special Rapporteur continue to reflect on this issue, make relevant
recommendations in future reports and seek and take into account in this regard the
views of Governments and non-governmental organizations;

10/11 20-17343
Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices
that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance A/RES/75/169

63. Invites States to consider including in their reports for the universal
periodic review and their reports to relevant treaty bodies information on the steps
taken to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,
including with the aim of implementing the provisions of the present resolution;
64. Requests the Special Rapporteur to prepare, for submission to the General
Assembly at its seventy-sixth session and to the Human Rights Council at its forty-
seventh session, reports on the implementation of the present resolution, and
encourages the Special Rapporteur to pay specific attention to paragraphs 5, 11, 13,
14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 27, 44 and 46 above, based on the views collected in accordance
with the request of the Commission, as recalled in paragraph 62 abo ve;
65. Expresses its appreciation to those Governments and non-governmental
organizations that have submitted information to the Special Rapporteur in the course
of the preparation of her report to the General Assembly;
66. Encourages States and non-governmental organizations to cooperate with
the Special Rapporteur, including by providing information on developments with
regard to the issues raised in the present resolution in order to contribute to the
preparation of future reports to the General Assem bly;
67. Stresses that such information is important for the sharing of experiences
and best practices in the fight against extremist political parties, movements and
groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other extremist ideological
movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance;
68. Encourages Governments to invest more resources in building and sharing
knowledge on successful positive measures to prevent and counter racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance that go beyond sanctioning
violations once they have occurred, including the provision of remedies to victims of
relevant violations;
69. Encourages Governments, non-governmental organizations and relevant
actors to disseminate, as widely as possible, information regarding the contents of
and the principles outlined in the present resolution, including through the media, but
not limited to it;
70. Decides to remain seized of the issue.

46th plenary meeting

16 December 2020

20-17343 11/11
 Parlamento europeo
2014-2019

TESTI APPROVATI

Allegato 8

P8_TA(2018)0428

Aumento della violenza neofascista in Europa

Risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 25 ottobre 2018 sull'aumento della violenza
neofascista in Europa (2018/2869(RSP))

Il Parlamento europeo,

– vista la Dichiarazione universale dei diritti dell'uomo,

– vista la relazione del 9 maggio 2017 del relatore speciale delle Nazioni Unite sulle
forme attuali di razzismo, discriminazione razziale, xenofobia e intolleranza;

– vista la risoluzione 71/179 dell'Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite del 19 dicembre
2016 sulla lotta contro la glorificazione del nazismo, il neonazismo e altre pratiche che
contribuiscono ad alimentare le forme attuali di razzismo, discriminazione razziale,
xenofobia e relativa intolleranza,

– vista la Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in particolare l'articolo 14 e il

Protocollo n. 12,

– vista la Convenzione internazionale sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di

discriminazione razziale,

– vista la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea,

– visti gli articoli 2, 3, 6 e 7 del trattato sull'Unione europea (TUE),

– vista la direttiva 2000/43/CE del Consiglio, del 29 giugno 20001, che attua il principio
della parità di trattamento fra le persone indipendentemente dalla razza e dall'origine
etnica (direttiva sulla parità di trattamento indipendentemente dalla razza),

– vista la decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI del Consiglio, del 28 novembre 2008, sulla
lotta contro talune forme ed espressioni di razzismo e xenofobia mediante il diritto
penale2,

– vista la direttiva 2012/29/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre
2012, che istituisce norme minime in materia di diritti, assistenza e protezione delle

1 GU L 180 del 19.7.2000, pag. 22.

2 GU L 328 del 6.12.2008, pag. 55.
 vittime di reato1,

– visto il regolamento (UE, Euratom) n. 1141/2014 del Parlamento europeo e del

Consiglio, del 22 ottobre 2014, relativo allo statuto e al finanziamento dei partiti politici
europei e delle fondazioni politiche europee2,

– vista l'istituzione, nel giugno 2016, del Gruppo ad alto livello dell'Unione europea sulla
lotta contro il razzismo, la xenofobia e altre forme di intolleranza,

– vista la risoluzione del Consiglio d'Europa del 30 settembre 2014 sulla lotta contro le
manifestazioni del neonazismo e dell'estremismo di destra,

– visto il codice di buone pratiche dell'UE sulla disinformazione,

– visto il codice di condotta per contrastare l'illecito incitamento all'odio online,

– visto l'articolo 123, paragrafi 2 e 4, del suo regolamento,

A. considerando che, come sancito dall'articolo 2 TUE, l'Unione si fonda sui valori del
rispetto della dignità umana, della libertà, della democrazia, dell'uguaglianza, dello
Stato di diritto e del rispetto dei diritti umani, compresi i diritti delle persone
appartenenti a minoranze; che tali valori sono comuni a tutti gli Stati membri;

B. considerando che la mancanza di un'azione seria nei confronti dei gruppi neofascisti e
neonazisti ha consentito il verificarsi dell'attuale impennata xenofoba in Europa;

C. considerando che i gruppi e i partiti politici apertamente neofascisti, neonazisti, razzisti

e xenofobi incitano all'odio e alla violenza nella società, ricordandoci di quello che sono
stati capaci di fare in passato;

D. considerando che la diffusione della retorica dell'odio online conduce spesso a un

aumento della violenza, tra l'altro da parte di gruppi neofascisti;

E. considerando che gruppi neofascisti hanno tolto la vita a migliaia di persone di ogni
tipo, come rifugiati e immigrati, appartenenti a minoranze etniche e religiose, persone
LGBTQI, difensori dei diritti umani, attivisti, politici e membri delle forze di polizia;

F. considerando che gruppi neofascisti fanno uso e abuso dei nostri strumenti democratici
per diffondere odio e violenza;

G. considerando che, come riferito da Europol, il Commissario europeo per la sicurezza,

Sir Julian King, intervenendo nel corso di un evento svoltosi il 22 marzo 2017 a
commemorazione degli attentati avvenuti a Bruxelles nel 2016, ha sottolineato la
crescente minaccia dell'estremismo violento di destra, affermando di non conoscere
nessuno Stato membro dell'UE che non sia colpito in qualche modo dal fenomeno,
citando in particolare il massacro del 2011 in Norvegia, l'assassinio della deputata
britannica Jo Cox e gli attacchi ai centri di asilo e alle moschee di tutta Europa, per
evidenziare quanto, ha avvertito, costituisce una minaccia "meno segnalata" per la
sicurezza; che i gruppi neofascisti e neonazisti si manifestano in varie forme; che la
maggior parte di questi gruppi esclude dalla società determinati individui o gruppi; che

1 GU L 315 del 14.11.2012, pag. 57.

2 GU L 317 del 4.11.2014, pag. 1.
 queste organizzazioni usano spesso un linguaggio aggressivo nei confronti dei gruppi
minoritari e cercano di giustificarsi invocando il principio della libertà di parola; che il
diritto alla libertà di parola non è assoluto;

H. considerando che l'articolo 30 della Dichiarazione universale dei diritti dell'uomo

stabilisce chiaramente che nulla in detta dichiarazione "può essere interpretato nel senso
di implicare un diritto di un qualsiasi Stato, gruppo o persona di esercitare un'attività o
di compiere un atto mirante alla distruzione di alcuno dei diritti e delle libertà in essa
enunciati";

I. considerando che la Convenzione internazionale sull'eliminazione di ogni forma di

discriminazione razziale afferma che gli Stati contraenti condannano ogni propaganda e
organizzazione che si ispiri a concetti e a teorie basate sulla superiorità di una razza o di
un gruppo di individui di un certo colore o di una certa origine etnica;

J. considerando che la promozione del fascismo è bandita in diversi Stati membri in

conformità delle rispettive legislazioni nazionali;

K. considerando che la relazione TESAT 2018 di Europol indica che il numero di persone
arrestate per reati di estremismo di destra è quasi raddoppiato nel 2017;

L. considerando che il 22 luglio 2011 sono state uccise 77 persone e altre 151 sono rimaste
ferite negli attentati avvenuti in Norvegia;

M. considerando che il 16 giugno 2016 Jo Cox, deputata al Parlamento britannico, è stata

brutalmente assassinata a Birstall, Regno Unito;

N. considerando che, secondo la relazione TESAT 2018 di Europol, nel 2017 nel Regno
Unito si sono registrati cinque attacchi terroristici sventati, falliti o realizzati attribuiti a
individui di estrema destra1;

O. considerando che il 21 settembre 2018, Eleonora Forenza, deputata al Parlamento

europeo, e il suo assistente Antonio Perillo sono stati aggrediti dopo una dimostrazione
antifascista tenutasi a Bari, Italia;

P. considerando che i servizi segreti francesi hanno espresso preoccupazione per il numero
crescente di membri delle forze armate e delle forze dell'ordine che si uniscono a gruppi
violenti di estrema destra2;

Q. considerando che la commissione europea contro il razzismo e l'intolleranza (ECRI),

istituita dal Consiglio d'Europa, in una relazione pubblicata il 15 maggio 20183 ha
manifestato allarme per l'aumento dell'estremismo di destra e del neofascismo in
Croazia;

R. considerando che in Polonia, durante una manifestazione nel novembre 2017, in una
piazza pubblica della città meridionale di Katowice, membri del movimento polacco di
estrema destra ONR (Campo nazional-radicale) hanno appeso a delle forche fittizie le

1 https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-
terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018
2 https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/090418/forces-de-l-ordre-liees-l-ultra-droite-
violente-la-dgsi-s-inquiete?onglet=full
3 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
 immagini di sei deputati al Parlamento europeo, difensori della tolleranza, dello Stato di
diritto e di altri valori europei; che è ancora in corso un'indagine, ma che finora non è
stata avanzata alcuna accusa contro nessuno dei sospetti, nonostante l'evento sia stato
riportato da numerosi media, anche mediante riprese video;

S. considerando che nel novembre 2017, in occasione della Festa dell'indipendenza della
Polonia, organizzazioni di estrema destra hanno indetto una grande manifestazione a
Varsavia, che ha riunito oltre 60 000 persone; che i manifestanti brandivano striscioni
xenofobi con slogan come "Europa bianca di nazioni fraterne", tra cui alcuni
raffiguranti la "falanga", un simbolo fascista degli anni Trenta dello scorso secolo;

T. considerando che in Grecia è ancora in corso il processo al partito neonazista Alba

dorata, che, tra i reati imputatigli, incluso il tentato omicidio, è accusato di essere
un'organizzazione criminale e dell'assassinio di Pavlos Fyssas;

U. considerando che il 21 settembre 2018 l'attivista LGBTQI Zak Kostopoulos è stato

brutalmente assassinato nel centro di Atene; che uno degli imputati avrebbe legami con
forze di estrema destra; che è necessaria un'indagine completa affinché i responsabili
dei suoi maltrattamenti e della sua morte possano essere assicurati alla giustizia;

V. considerando che un cittadino italiano è stato condannato a 12 anni di carcere per avere
sparato a sei migranti africani, ferendoli, in un attacco a sfondo razziale nella città di
Macerata, nell'Italia centrale;

W. considerando che sette membri di una ronda paramilitare di estrema destra, arrestati a
Chemnitz a metà settembre 2018 per disturbi all'ordine pubblico, sono stati
recentemente citati in giudizio perché sospettati di aver costituito un'organizzazione
terroristica che si fa chiamare "Revolution Chemnitz"; che, secondo i procuratori
federali, gli investigatori hanno aggravato i capi d'imputazione da "attività criminose" a
"reati di stampo terroristico" dopo aver analizzato le comunicazioni interne del gruppo;

X. considerando che il 7 dicembre 2017, in Francia, cinque membri del movimento

Génération Identitaire sono stati condannati per incitamento all'odio razziale e
religioso; che persone legate a gruppi di estrema destra, tra cui Action Française,
stavano pianificando un attacco terroristico contro alcuni politici e alcune moschee
francesi durante le elezioni presidenziali del 2017; che il 24 giugno 2018 dieci membri
del gruppo di estrema destra Action des Forces Opérationnelles (AFO) sono stati
arrestati per aver pianificato una serie di attacchi contro membri della comunità
musulmana; che il 14 settembre 2018 due ex skinhead sono stati giudicati colpevoli
dell'assassinio di Clément Méric, un giovane studente e attivista antifascista ucciso nel
giugno 2013;

Y. considerando che in Spagna 12 membri dell'organizzazione neonazista Hogar Social

Madrid sono attualmente sotto inchiesta per incitamento all'odio; che alcuni membri dei
gruppi fascisti spagnoli Falange, Alianza Nacional e Democracia Nacional sono stati
arrestati e condannati dalla Corte suprema spagnola dopo aver attaccato il Centro
culturale Blanquerna di Madrid durante le celebrazioni della Giornata nazionale della
Catalogna nel 2013; che nel 2016 l'ONG antirazzista SOS Racismo ha documentato 309
casi di violenza xenofoba; che, dopo aver denunciato questi casi, il presidente
dell'organizzazione ha ricevuto minacce di morte e ha condannato la mancanza di
meccanismi efficaci per denunciare siffatti crimini;
Z. considerando che 19 persone sono state accusate dalla Fondazione Francisco Franco,
un'organizzazione che glorifica la dittatura e i suoi crimini, e dalla famiglia Franco di
diversi reati che potrebbero essere punibili con 13 anni di prigione dopo aver compiuto
un'azione pacifica e simbolica che ha comportato lo srotolamento di due grandi
striscioni dal maniero di Pazo de Meirás, chiedendo alle autorità pubbliche di
intervenire affinché questa proprietà sia devoluta al popolo galiziano;

AA. considerando che il Congresso dei deputati spagnolo ha adottato una mozione per
spostare le spoglie di Francisco Franco dalla sua tomba sita nel monumento ai caduti,
noto come Valle dei Caduti, luogo di pellegrinaggio per l'estrema destra; che tutti i
simboli o monumenti rimanenti che esaltano la rivolta militare, la guerra civile e la
dittatura di Franco dovrebbero essere di fatto rimossi e quelli che non possono essere
rimossi dovrebbero essere sottoposti alla contestualizzazione e alla reinterpretazione
necessarie, affinché possano contribuire alla sensibilizzazione dell'opinione pubblica e
alla memoria storica;

AB. considerando che il Movimento neonazista di resistenza nordica (NMR) organizza

regolarmente manifestazioni in tutta la Scandinavia, cantando slogan e sventolando le
bandiere bianche e verdi dell'organizzazione; che diversi membri dell'NMR sono stati
condannati per aver compiuto violenti attacchi contro civili e contro la polizia; che i
numerosi incendi dolosi appiccati a centri di accoglienza per i rifugiati hanno indotto il
governo svedese a nascondere, nel 2015, l'ubicazione degli edifici destinati a ospitare i
rifugiati;

AC. considerando che il 16 marzo di ogni anno migliaia di persone si riuniscono a Riga per
la Giornata della legione lettone per onorare i lettoni che hanno militato nelle Waffen-
SS;

AD. considerando che, dall'inizio del 2018, il C14 e altri gruppi di estrema destra in Ucraina,
come la Milizia nazionale affiliata al movimento Azov, il Settore destro, il Karpatska
Sich e altri, hanno attaccato a più riprese gruppi Rom nonché manifestazioni
antifasciste, riunioni di consigli comunali, un evento ospitato da Amnesty International,
mostre d'arte, eventi LGBTQI nonché attivisti per i diritti delle donne e ambientalisti;

1. condanna e deplora vivamente gli attacchi terroristici, gli assassinii, la violenza

psicologica, le aggressioni fisiche violente e le marce delle organizzazioni neofasciste e
neonaziste che hanno avuto luogo in vari Stati membri dell'UE;

2. è profondamente preoccupato per la crescente normalizzazione del fascismo, del

razzismo, della xenofobia e di altre forme di intolleranza nell'Unione europea ed è
turbato dalle notizie di collusione di leader politici, partiti politici e forze dell'ordine con
neofascisti e neonazisti in alcuni Stati membri;

3. è particolarmente preoccupato per la violenza neofascista che colpisce la società nel suo
insieme ed è rivolta a particolari minoranze come neri europei/persone di origine
africana, ebrei, musulmani, rom, cittadini di paesi terzi, persone LGBTI e disabili;

4. condanna con fermezza tutti gli attacchi violenti da parte di gruppi neofascisti ai danni
di politici e membri di partiti politici denunciati in alcuni Stati membri e in particolare
la recente aggressione da parte di squadre fasciste di CasaPound contro Eleonora
Forenza, deputata al Parlamento europeo, il suo assistente Antonio Perillo e altri che
hanno partecipato a una manifestazione antifascista e antirazzista il 21 settembre 2018 a
 Bari, Italia;

5. è seriamente preoccupato per l'impunità con la quale agiscono i gruppi neofascisti e

neonazisti in alcuni Stati membri e sottolinea che questo senso di impunità è uno dei
motivi che spiegano l'allarmante aumento delle azioni violente da parte di certe
organizzazioni di estrema destra;

6. prende atto della preoccupante tendenza dei gruppi neofascisti e neonazisti a utilizzare i
social media e Internet per organizzare e pianificare strategie in tutta l'Unione europea;

7. deplora il fatto che in alcuni Stati membri le emittenti radiotelevisive pubbliche siano
diventate un canale di propaganda al servizio di un solo partito politico, propaganda che
spesso esclude l'opposizione e i gruppi minoritari dalla società e incita persino alla
violenza;

8. ricorda che l'ideologia fascista e l'intolleranza sono sempre associate a un attacco alla
democrazia stessa;

9. chiede agli Stati membri di condannare e punire con fermezza i crimini generati
dall'odio, la retorica dell'odio e la ricerca di capri espiatori da parte di politici e
funzionari pubblici a tutti i livelli e su tutti i tipi di media, in quanto normalizzano
direttamente e rafforzano l'odio e la violenza nella società;

10. invita gli Stati membri ad adottare ulteriori misure per prevenire, condannare e
contrastare la retorica dell'odio e i reati generati dall'odio;

11. invita la Commissione, gli Stati membri e le società di social media a contrastare la
diffusione del razzismo, del fascismo e della xenofobia su Internet in collaborazione con
le pertinenti organizzazioni della società civile a livello nazionale e internazionale;

12. invita gli Stati membri a indagare e perseguire i reati generati dall'odio e a condividere
le migliori pratiche per individuare e indagare tali reati, compresi quelli motivati
specificamente dalle varie forme di xenofobia;

13. invita gli Stati membri a prevedere e fornire un sostegno adeguato per le vittime di reati
di stampo razzista o xenofobo e di reati di odio e la protezione di tutti i testimoni contro
i responsabili dei reati;

14. chiede agli Stati membri di istituire, in seno alle forze di polizia, unità per contrastare i
reati generati dall'odio; invita le forze di polizia a garantire che il proprio personale non
compia alcun tipo di atto razzista, xenofobo o discriminatorio e che qualsiasi atto del
genere sia oggetto di indagini e i loro autori siano tradotti in giustizia;

15. esorta la Commissione a lanciare un appello alle organizzazioni della società civile
affinché monitorino e denuncino la retorica dell'odio e i reati generati dall'odio negli
Stati membri;

16. sostiene, elogia e chiede la protezione dei gruppi nelle comunità locali e delle
organizzazioni della società civile che combattono il fascismo, il razzismo, la xenofobia
e altre forme di intolleranza;

17. chiede un consolidamento della legislazione UE in materia di lotta contro la

discriminazione, compresi il recepimento e l'attuazione della legislazione vigente e
 l'adozione di nuove leggi, fra cui la direttiva sulla parità di trattamento;

18. ricorda che la decisione quadro 2008/913/GAI del Consiglio sulla lotta contro talune
forme ed espressioni di razzismo e xenofobia mediante il diritto penale, il cui termine di
attuazione era fissato per novembre 2010, fornisce una base giuridica per l'imposizione
di sanzioni alle persone giuridiche che incitano pubblicamente alla violenza o all'odio
nei confronti di un gruppo minoritario, come l'esclusione da agevolazioni pubbliche,
l'interdizione dall'esercizio di attività commerciali, il collocamento sotto sorveglianza
giudiziaria e provvedimenti di liquidazione giudiziaria;

19. sollecita la Commissione ad aggiornare la sua relazione del 2014 sull'attuazione della
succitata decisione quadro del Consiglio e ad avviare procedimenti di infrazione contro
gli Stati membri che non si sono conformati alle disposizioni della decisione;

20. esorta gli Stati membri ad assicurare la loro conformità alle disposizioni della decisione
quadro del Consiglio, a contrastare le organizzazioni che incitano all'odio e alla violenza
negli spazi pubblici e online e a vietare di fatto i gruppi neofascisti e neonazisti e
qualsiasi altra fondazione o associazione che esalta e glorifica il nazismo e il fascismo,
nel rispetto dell'ordinamento giuridico e delle giurisdizioni nazionali;

21. chiede una piena e tempestiva cooperazione tra le agenzie di contrasto, le agenzie di
intelligence, la magistratura e le organizzazioni della società civile nella lotta contro il
fascismo, il razzismo, la xenofobia e altre forme di intolleranza;

22. invita gli Stati membri a seguire le raccomandazioni del Consiglio d'Europa sulla lotta
contro le manifestazioni del neonazismo e dell'estremismo di destra;

23. invita gli Stati membri a predisporre una formazione interna obbligatoria, ispirata ai
diritti umani e in un'ottica di servizio, destinata agli agenti delle forze dell'ordine e ai
funzionari dell'ordinamento giudiziario a tutti i livelli;

24. invita gli Stati membri a concentrarsi sulla prevenzione attraverso l'istruzione, la
sensibilizzazione e lo scambio di migliori pratiche;

25. invita gli Stati membri e le federazioni sportive nazionali, e in particolare le società di
calcio, a contrastare il flagello del razzismo, del fascismo e della xenofobia negli stadi e
nella cultura sportiva, condannando e punendo i responsabili e promuovendo attività
educative positive rivolte ai giovani tifosi in collaborazione con le scuole e le
organizzazioni della società civile interessate;

26. incoraggia gli Stati membri a predisporre una formazione per coloro che lavorano
nell'emittenza radiotelevisiva pubblica e nei mezzi d'informazione, per sensibilizzarli in
merito alle sfide e alle discriminazioni cui sono esposte le vittime dei gruppi neofascisti
e neonazisti;

27. invita gli Stati membri ad attuare programmi nazionali che aiutino gli aderenti a gruppi
neofascisti e neonazisti violenti a uscirne; sottolinea che tali programmi dovrebbero
andare ben oltre gli interventi individuali e dovrebbero comportare un sostegno a lungo
termine per coloro che hanno difficoltà a trovare un impiego, a trasferirsi e a sviluppare
nuove e sicure reti sociali;

28. sottolinea che la conoscenza della storia costituisce uno dei presupposti per prevenire
questi crimini in futuro e svolge un importante ruolo di formazione delle giovani
 generazioni;

29. invita gli Stati membri a condannare e a contrastare ogni forma di negazione
dell'Olocausto, tra cui la banalizzazione e la minimizzazione dei crimini dei nazisti e dei
loro collaboratori; evidenzia che la verità sull'Olocausto non deve essere banalizzata
dalla narrazione politica e mediatica;

30. sollecita una cultura comune della memoria che respinga i crimini fascisti del passato; è
profondamente preoccupato per il fatto che le giovani generazioni, in Europa e altrove,
dimostrano sempre minore interesse per la storia del fascismo e, di conseguenza,
corrono il rischio di diventare indifferenti alle nuove minacce;

31. incoraggia gli Stati membri a promuovere l'istruzione attraverso la cultura tradizionale
sulla diversità della nostra società e sulla nostra storia comune, comprese le atrocità
della Seconda guerra mondiale, come l'Olocausto, e la sistematica deumanizzazione
delle sue vittime in atto da alcuni anni;

32. incarica il suo Presidente di trasmettere la presente risoluzione al Consiglio, alla

Commissione, ai governi e ai parlamenti degli Stati membri, al Consiglio d'Europa,
all'Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa e alle Nazioni Unite.