Kalaitzidis Church State Milan Final-Libre

FILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA
Il progetto Filosofia ed esperienza religiosa promosso dal

Dipartimento di Filosofia dellUniversit Cattolica del Sacro
Cuore e dal Servizio Nazionale per il progetto Culturale della
Conferenza Episcopale Italiana.
Comitato scientifico: Angela Ales Bello, Leonardo Allodi,
Francesco Botturi, Giuseppe Colombo, Adriano Fabris,
Massimo Marassi, Marco Paolinelli, Giacomo Samek Lodovici,
Paola Ricci Sindoni.
a cura di
EMANUELA FOGLIADINI
RELIGIONI,
LIBERT, POTERE
ATTI DEL CONVEGNO INTERNAZIONALE
FILOSOFICO-TEOLOGICO SULLA LIBERT RELIGIOSA
MILANO, UNIVERSIT CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE
E UNIVERSIT DEGLI STUDI
16-18 OTTOBRE 2013
RICERCHE | FILOSOFIA
VITA E PENSIERO
FILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA
Il Convegno Religioni, libert, potere stato organizzato dalla Diocesi di Milano, dal progetto Filosofia ed esperienza religiosa,
dallUniversit degli Studi di Milano e dalla Facolt teologica
dellItalia settentrionale.
Questo volume stato pubblicato con il contributo del Servizio

Nazionale per il progetto Culturale della Conferenza Episcopale
Italiana.
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2014 Vita e Pensiero - Largo A. Gemelli, 1 - 20123 Milano

ISBN 978-88-343-2840-8
INDICE
Prefazione di Emanuela Fogliadini
VII
Saluto del Magniico Rettore dellUniversit Cattolica

del Sacro Cuore
IX
Saluto di benvenuto di Giuseppe Colombo
XV
Introduzione di Sua Eminenza Card. Angelo Scola,

Arcivescovo di Milano
XXIII
prima sessione
La libert religiosa oggi
jean-louis tauran
Libert religiosa: una realt pluridimensionale
jos casanova
Religious Freedom: Models, Developments, Challenges
in our Global Age
bernardo cervellera
La libert religiosa a rischio
19
brian j. grim
A 21st Century Paradigm for Understanding Religious Freedom
27
seconda sessione
Religioni e Istituzioni pubbliche
pantelis kalaitzidis
Church and State in the Orthodox World. From the Byzantine
Symphonia and Nationalized Orthodoxy, to the Need
of Witnessing the Word of God in a Pluralistic Society
39
silvia scatena
Genesi e recezione della Dignitatis Humanae
75
VI
indice
alessandro ferrara
La Dichiarazione Dignitatis Humanae: un commento
87
francesco dagostino
La libert religiosa in un orizzonte post-secolare.
A partire dalla Dignitatis Humanae
99
terza sessione
Libert religiosa e cultura civile
debora spini
Chiesa libert potere: nuove frontiere della libert religiosa
107
adam b. seligman
Rights, Boundaries and the Challenge of Difference
115
john milbank
Truth, Liberty and Feeling
127
silvio ferrari
Societ civile, laicit dello Stato e libert di religione
143
quarta sessione
Cristianesimo e libert di credere
gabrio forti
Cristianesimo e libert di credere
161
stefano martelli
Cristianesimo e libert religiosa. Dinamiche socio-culturali
in un mondo globalizzato
165
francesco botturi
Fede e legame sociale
187
alberto cozzi
Rivelazione, pretesa di verit, relazione con laltro religioso
e non religioso
205
Conclusioni di Mons. Luca Bressan
225
PANTELIS KALAITzIDIS*
Church and State in the Orthodox World

From the Byzantine Symphonia and Nationalized
Orthodoxy, to the Need of Witnessing the Word
of God in a Pluralistic Society**
It is an exceptional privilege for me to have the possibility to speak of the
relationship between the church and the state in the Orthodox world, at
the occasion of this prestigious conference, which coincides with the 1.700
anniversary of the Edict of Milan, and thus to present my paper in the city
where the Edict was issued, and to refer to a tradition, the Christian Orthodox tradition, which is deeply marked by the Constantinean era.
What uniies the different cases of church-state relationship in the
Orthodox world, and allows us to examine them under the same label,
is not political orientations, constitutional prescriptions, or legal provisions, but cultural background, i.e. the common byzantine past, the
belonging to Byzance aprs Byzance, to recall the well-known Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga1. In fact, the Orthodox countries of the
Balkans, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, besides their distinct historical trajectories, they follow today different political, economic, and
geostrategic paths, while their common element remains mainly in the
byzantine past. With the exception of Russia, for many centuries they all
experienced Turkish rule and used to belong to the Ottoman Empire.
With the exception of Greece (and Cyprus), they passed through communism and belonged for decades, until 1989, to the Soviet Empire,
while others, like Serbia, had to wait until 2000 before being rid of their
communist regime. Some of these countries, like Greece, Romania,
*
Volos Academy for Theological Studies, Volos, Grecia.** The present paper is part
of a wider research on Church and State in the Orthodox World. I would like to
warmly thank the scientiic assistant in the Volos Academy for Theological Studies,
Ms. Sophia Kounavi for her gracious help during the preparation of this paper, and
Ms. Amal Dibo and Dr. Norman Russell for their reviewing the inal text. The completion of this paper was made possible thanks to a generous grant of the Center for
World Catholicism and Intercultural Theology at DePaul University, Chicago, IL, for
which as well as for my stay at the Center during the spring of 2014 as Senior Research
Scholar I should like to express my deep gratitude both to its Director, Professor William T. Cavanaugh, and to Professor Michael L. Budde.
1
Cf. N. Iorga, Byzantium after Byzantium, transl. into english by l. treptow, center
for Romanian Studies, oxford 2000.
40
Bulgaria, are now members of the Western alliance (nato), the main
adversary of which remains (orthodox) Russia. there are orthodox
countries which gradually joined the european Union (Greece in 1981,
cyprus in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), while others, like Serbia, are one step before accession, or aspiring to join (Ukraine). each of
the countries under discussion has a different level of integration into
the european acquis, a different level of respect for human rights, and
especially religious rights, and more broadly speaking a different level
of application of the principles of democracy and political liberalism,
freedom of expression, and respect for minorities.
thus, when we have to deal with church-state relations in the orthodox world, it is useful always to bear in mind that it is not about a
monolithic or uniied world, but of a great variety of types or models of
church-state relationship, ranging from established church to strict
separationism. a further dificulty, and even a paradox of our topic is
that, as Western standards are not always applicable to these countries,
it happens that legally speaking, the most secular country, with a strict
separationism model of church-state relationship like Russia, is more
authoritarian and much less democratic and liberal than for example
Greece, which relects an incomplete secular model, and has an establishment type of church-state relationship.
But despite all of these real or apparent differences and legal prescriptions, the common feature which lies behind all the types of church-state
relationship in the (eastern) orthodox world, is that of byzantine symphonia or synallelia, and the close relationship, to the point of identiication, between church and nation, orthodoxy and ethno-cultural identity.
the political ideal of symphonia draws its origin from the Byzantine political model and serves, especially in the orthodox context, to designate
the special relationship between church and state, as it refers to the loyal
and mutual cooperation between these two distinctive institutions for the
sake of the people, who are simultaneously members of the church and
subjects or citizens of the state. in fact, with very few exceptions, there is
not any approach or discussion on church-state relationship among theologians or church people, without referring to the model of symphonia
or synallelia. Furthermore, the minds of many politicians from orthodox countries, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum
and whether of a religious or a secular orientation2, are imbued with the
K. Ghodsee, Symphonic Secularism: Eastern Orthodoxy, Ethnic Identity and Religious Freedoms in Contemporary Bulgaria, anthropology of east europe Review, 27 (2009), pp.
227-252, analyzing the case of Bulgaria (but also of other orthodox countries) regarding church-state relations, speaks on Symphonic Secularism, referring to the
church and state in the orthodox world
41
same ideal, an ideal that alongside the reality of a national orthodoxy

identiies orthodoxy with every single orthodox nation or state and
understands the church in national terms. Such politicians, of course,
seek political gain for their party, practicing thus de facto a thinly veiled
instrumentalization of religion for the sake of political power.
in the present paper i will review in a irst step the different models
of church-state relationship in the (eastern) orthodox world, briely
explaining at the same time the historical background which shaped
this relationship; i will then attempt to connect these different models
to the byzantine symphonia and to provide a theological critique of
the theology of the empire and the realized eschatology as well as the
nationalized orthodoxy that support this political model; inally, in
the third and last part of this paper, i will offer a theological relection
inspired by the challenge of the public witness of orthodoxy in the context of a pluralistic society. Since the study of church-state relations in
the orthodox world refers primarily, and almost exclusively, to the countries where the majority religion is orthodoxy3, it is therefore obvious
that we cannot extend our research to the countries or regions in which
orthodoxy is a minority and seeks mainly legal recognition or respect
for religious and human rights (e.g. estonia, albania, turkey, near and
particular coexistence and interaction of modern secular elements with some religious vestiges from the orthodox past, cf. V.n. Makrides, Why are Orthodox Churches
Particularly Prone to Nationalization and even to Nationalism?, St. Vladimirs theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), p. 331.
3
With the notable exception of Finland in which the small in size orthodox church
(1,1% of the Finnish population) has a status of state-recognized religion (along with
the majority Finnish lutheran church). Following the Finnish model, the clergy of
the orthodox church of Finland (autonomous, under the jurisdiction of ecumenical
Patriarchate of constantinople) are remunerated and pensioned by the state, while
the orthodox pupils could have their own lesson on religion in state schools. For a
more detailed analysis of the church-state relations in Finland, and the place of the
orthodox church in the Finnish society, cf. a. (Father), The Finnish Orthodox Church,
in i. Bria (ed.), Martyria-Mission: The Witness of the Orthodox Churches Today, Geneva
Wcc 1980; P. arvola - t. Kallonen (eds.), 12 Windows on Orthodoxy in Finland, Publications committee for orthodox literature, Helsinki 2010, esp. pp. 77-86; H. Huttunen, Wittnessing in a secular situation: Relections on the Orthodox Church of Finland,
ortodoksia, 2002, 49, pp. 194-207; M. Heikkil - J. Knuutila - M. Scheinin, Etat
et Eglises en Finlande, in G. Robbers (d.), Etat et Eglises en Union europenne, deuxime
dition, en colloboration avec le Consortium europen pour ltude des relations Eglises-Etat,
nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2008, pp. 557-578 (http://www.uni-trier.
de/ileadmin/fb5/inst/ieVR/arbeitsmaterialien/Staatskirchenrecht/Staat_und_
Kirche_in_der_eU/texte_integral.pdf); t. laitila, The Finnish Orthodox Church, in
l.n. leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, abingdon, oxon-new York 2014, pp. 280-294.
42
Middle east, africa etc.)4. While in the irst part of my paper i try, so far
as possible, to provide sociological descriptions and historical information on the types of church-state relations in the orthodox world, my
primary source of inspiration remains theology, and in my approach i
hold the standpoint of an eastern orthodox theologian.
1. Different types of church-state relationship in the Orthodox world

1.1. Greece
it is impossible to understand church-state relations in Greece, unless
we gain an elementary knowledge, of the history of Modern Greece,
of the historic and national role of the orthodox church in Greece.
in fact, in moments of exceptional historical urgency and need (such
as the ottoman occupation), the church, the only christian institution
to survive the turkish conquest, undertook the responsibility to ill the
political void, and to represent the orthodox christian (religious) nation (millet) before the Muslim ottoman Sultan. thus, by replacing its
main spiritual mission with a secular one and by concentrating on saving the orthodox nation and the Greek people, its language, existence, and political representation from destruction and islamization,
and from becoming turkish, the church progressively became (through
a complex historical process, beginning with the multi-ethnic orthodox
millet but ending up, under the impetus of the principle of nationalities,
with the formation of the Greek nation) the ark of Hellenism and an essential component of the modern Greek identity, while gradually it was
transformed from an advocate of the multi-ethnic christian oikoumene to
a propagandist for the national Greek idea5.
4
Given the limitation of time and space, it was not possible to include in the present
form of my paper the cases of Georgia, Moldavia, Montenegro and cyprus.
5
For the history of the adoption of the national ideology by the church of Greece,
cf. c. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece (1821-1852), cambridge
University Press, 1969; J. Petrou, Church and Politics in Greece 1750-1909, Kyriakidis,
thessaloniki 1992, especially pp. 141 ff. [in Greek]; a. Manitakis, The Relationship
between the Church and the Nation-State in the Wake of the Identity Card Conlict, nefeli,
athens 2000, pp. 21-56 [in Greek]. For a comparative study of this phenomenon in
the Balkan countries, see P. Kitromilidis, Imagined Communities and the Origins of
the National Question in the Balkans, in M. Blinkhorn - th. Veremis (eds.), Modern
Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, Sage-eliamep, london-athens 1990, especially pp.
51-60. From the very rich historical evidence on this process, cf. among others S.
anagnostopoulou, Asia Minor, 19th Century to 1919, The Greek Orthodox Communities,
From the Roum Millet to the Greek Nation, Hellenika Grammata, athens 1998 [in Greek];
43
as a result of the above historical factors, the orthodox church in

Greece enjoys the status of a national church. it has always had a vast presence and visibility in the national, cultural or political life of the country
even before the founding of modern Greek state (1830-1832), and throughout its historical path. it followed, in its own way, the great historical and
political events, and more generally the public life in Greece, while it has
not always avoided being involved in political debates and political games,
especially in siding with the conservative, and even with the far right parties. By being involved in the nations life, and by collaborating with those
exercising political power, the church wanted to pursue a long tradition
already begun under the Byzantine empire, and perpetuated during the
more than four centuries of ottoman rule, a tradition of harmony and
symbiosis, of symphonia of the church with the secular power.
one should bear in mind that the current Greek constitution (issued
in 1975, amended in 1986, 2001, and 2008), is a liberal one, and even
secular in many points. However it did not radically alter a church-state
relationship inspired both by the model of the byzantine symphonia,
and the German and nordic model of control of the state over religion.
it maintained, in the article 3, the reference to the eastern orthodox church of christ as the prevailing religion in Greece, although
this constitutional provision is interpreted almost unanimously in a nonnormative way, i.e. as based on statistical data, according to which orthodoxy is the religion of the majority of Greeks. in the same article
it is stated that the orthodox church of Greece, acknowledging our
lord Jesus christ as its head, is inseparably united in doctrine with the
Great church of christ in constantinople and with every other church
of christ of the same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the
holy apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. it is autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving Bishops and the
Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and assembled as speciied
by the Statutory charter of the church in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal tome of June 29, 1850 and the Synodal act of
September 4, 1928. in virtue of this article the orthodox church of
Greece is recognized as a public legal entity. the same status is also assigned for historical reasons to the Muslim minority of Western thrace,
in the nord-east of Greece, and to the Jewish religious community, while
all the other religious communities (the Roman catholic church and
ead., The terms Millet, Genos, Ethnos, Oikoumenikotita, Alytrotismos in Greek Historiography,
in The passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States, isis Press, istanbul 2003; d.
Stamatopoulos, Reform and Secularization: Towards a Reconstruction of the History of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19 th Century, alexandreia, athens 2003[in Greek].
44
the Protestant churches included) are either registered as private legal

associations or are still seeking legal recognition6.
the non-amendable article 131 of the constitution secures the inviolability of freedom of religious conscience, while at the same time (art.
132) it is clearly stated that all known religions shall be free and their
rites of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection
of the law, stipulating however the overall prohibition of proselytism.
it is quite evident that the close church-state relationship in Greece
is a logical extension of the relationship between religion and Greek
national identity. to borrow some elements of the political scientists
efie Fokas analysis, church-state linkages are embedded in Greek legislation and practice: the clergy of the Greek orthodox church (Goc)
are remunerated and pensioned by the state; but the same applies to
the mouftis of the Muslim minority; lessons on religion in state schools
continue mainly to relect oficial orthodox positions, although there is
a slow movement toward a more pluralistic, and more inclusive model
which is taking account of the Western christian, the Muslim and the
Jewish traditions; state holidays are compatible with the religious calendar; the Statutory charter of the church was passed by parliament,
as well as laws regulating the curricula and the inances of ecclesiastical seminaries and academies; icons are present in all court rooms and
school classes; the President, the Prime-minister, ministers and secretaries of the state, as well as deputies of the parliament are sworn into ofice
mainly by the archbishop of athens and all Greece (though alternatives are available); church and state leaders often jointly preside over
state functions and national holiday celebrations; and, until recently,
the opinion of orthodox bishops had to be sought for the issuing of licenses for the building of places of worship for minority faiths. efforts to
limit the privileges of the Goc have led to intense church-state conlict,
notably over church property ownership (ongoing at some level since
1987) and, more recently, over the states removal of reference to religious afiliation from national identity cards (in 2000). in such conlicts
the Goc, relying on the religion-national identity link and its mobilization potential, has tended to mobilize public opinion in its favor and to
thus limit politicians will to address such issues for fear of political cost.
Yet in the policy domain signiicant steps have been taken and the will to
change has been expressed by certain politicians7.
6
a recent project of law, not yet approved by the Parliament, it grants the status of sui
generis religious legal entity, to all the known religious comunities of the country.
7
e. Fokas, Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Secularization in Contemporary Europe
(with Special Reference to the Case of Greece, Religion, State and Society, 40 (2012),
45
on the basis of the above national role and mission of the church,
a whole ideological and political construction is created, which is very
problematic with regard both to genuine orthodox faith and to respect
for human rights and religious freedom. Because of the role played in
Greek history and in the survival of the Greek nation by the Greek orthodox church, the latter is considered to be the guardian and the guarantor of the national identity and continuity, accepting for itself the role
of the mother of the nation and the people.
today, one hundred and ninety years since the Greek Revolution
of 1821, the church in Greece seems unable to liberate itself from
the syndrome of identiication with the nation, and from its voluntary
instrumentalization for the sake of national purposes. it seems unable
to see its work, its teaching and preaching, and its mission in general
separated from the course of the nation; it seems unable to realize
that the boundaries of the church are no longer identiied with the
boundaries of the nation. and whenever the Greek state moves toward adapting to the new international reality and moves timidly in a
direction that could lead to its divorce from the church, the latter protests by pointing to the past and to its contribution to the struggles
of the nation, in order to keep alive its co-dependence and absolute
relationship to it. and as the Greek state as a result of the broader
realignment of globalization and multiculturalism gradually de-nationalizes, the church re -nationalizes more and more, feeling unsafe
pp. 405-406. For the wider on-going discussion on the burning issue of church-state
relationship in Greece, cf. among others, n. alivizatos, A New Role for the Greek
Church?, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 17.1 (1999), pp. 23-40; a. Polis, Greece:
A Problematic Secular State, in d. christopoulos, Legal Issues for Religious Minorities
in Greece, alexandria, athens 1999 [in Greek]; n.P. diamantouros, Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post Authoritarian Greece, athens 2000 [in Greek]; c.K.
Papasthatis, Church and State in Greece in 2000, european Journal for church and
State Research, 8 (2001), pp. 95-117; P. dimitropoulos, State and Church [in Greece]:
A Dificult Relationship, Kritiki Publications, athens 2001 [in Greek]; Y. Stavrakakis,
Politics and Religion: On the Politicization of Greek Church Discourse, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 21.2 (2003), pp. 153-181; G.th. Mavrogordatos, Orthodoxy
and Nationalism in Greece, in J.t.S. Madeley - z. enyedi (eds.), Church and State in
Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality, Frank cass Publishers, london 2003,
pp. 113-131; Lanne canonique (special issue on les cultes et letat en Grce. les
identits religieuses dans la Rpublique hellnique), 45 (2003), pp. 123-338; e.H.
Prodromou, Negotiating Pluralism and Specifying Modernity in Greece: Reading ChurchState Relations in the Christodoulos Period, Social compass, 51.4 (2004), pp. 471-485;
P.d. nikolopoulos, Church-State Separation: Legal Concerns and Recommendations, ant.
n. Sakkoulas Publications, athens 2006 [in Greek]; e. Karagiannis, Secularism in
Context: The Relations between the Greek State and the Church of Greece in Crisis, archives
of european Sociology, 50 (2009), pp. 133-167.
46
and uncertain without its special relationship with the state and its
absolute relationship with the nation8.
1.2. Russia
it is time now to turn to the Russian case and see what is the relationship
between church and state in this country, which is the most populous and
powerful in the orthodox world. as it is well known, orthodoxy did play
a key role in the emergence and consolidation of the Russian nation and
culture. the baptism of the Rus was not only a very signiicant religious
event, but had also important cultural, political, and geostrategic consequences. Kiev was proud to be the new constantinople, and Moscow
wanted to be the third Rome, while during the whole period of the
Moscow Principality and even the tsarist empire, the byzantine model
was an ideal to be attained in many domains of public life9. the churchstate relationship could not be an exception to this; on the contrary, it
was an element of crucial importance for this politico-religious vision.
church and state, the patriarch and the tsar, by working together, were
reproducing the byzantine ideal of symphonia, an ideal partly damaged
with the suppression of the Patriarchate and the subsequent submission
of the Russian church to the State operated by Peter the Great, but completely abolished only later, during the communist period.
the end of the antireligious and anti-christian communist regime in
1990-91 did not automatically mean the return to the previous churchstate relationship model. the Russian orthodox church (Roc) retrieved its freedom, and began to develop its catechetical and educational work, as well as new missionary activities, but did not regain its
status of a state religion, despite its growing visibility and inluence in
the public sphere.
the separation of church and state was maintained, as post-communist Russia was supposed to be a secular state10. article 14 of the 1993
8
cf. P. Kalaitzidis, The Temptation of Judas: Church and National Identities, the
Greek orthodox theological Review, 47 (2002), pp. 363-364; P. Kalaitzidis - n.
asproulis, Greek Religious Nationalism and the Challenges of Evangelization, Forgiveness,
and Reconciliation, in S. asfaw - a. chehadeh - M.Gh. Simion (eds.), Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives, Wcc Publications, Geneva 2012, p. 78.
9
cf. B. louri, Russian Christianity, in K. Parry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to
Eastern Christianity, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, Ma/oxford 2010, pp. 207-208.
10
For what follows, cf. M. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty
and Two Models of Orthodoxy, Religion, State and Society, 29.3 (2001), pp. 155-161;
V.l. Hesli - e. erdem - W. Reisinger - a. Miller, The Patriarch and the President:
Religion and Political Choice in Russia, demokratizatsiya, 7.1 (1999), pp. 47 ff; P.l.
47
constitution states that the Russian Federation shall be a secular state.

no religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion.
Religious associations shall be separated from the state, and shall be
equal before the law, while article 28 stipulates religious freedom and
pluralism: everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience,
the freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or
together with any other religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely
choose, possess and disseminate religious and other views and act according to them. article 19 prohibits discrimination on the basis of religious
belief, whereas article 29 prohibits propaganda advocating religious superiority or social tension. this general prohibition on propaganda nevertheless, often left room for the government to subjectively determine
restrictions against certain religious groups. Furthermore, the principle
of religious pluralism supported by the constitution is considerably restricted on the legislation level, since according to the 1997 law, only
those groups that had existed in Russia for ifteen years (prior to 1997)
can register and obtain various rights and privileges. this stipulation
means that only religious groups established in Russia before the 1917
Revolution receive certain rights and privileges, because new religious
groups originating during perestroika in the late 1980s do not qualify.
the same law gives oficials the authority to ban religious groups and
thereby prohibit all of the activities of a religious community. Following
the passage of the law, groups that failed to reregister by december 31,
2000, became subject to legal dissolution (often translated as liquidation), i.e. deprivation of juridical status.
it is important to know how the Russian government came to this
point11:
in June 1997, a draft law on Freedom of conscience and Religious associations introduces the recognition of the orthodox churchs
unique contribution to Russia, while it names four religions in its preamble: orthodoxy, islam, Buddhism and Judaism. it moreover identiies orthodoxy as inseparable part of the all-Russian historical, spiritual and cultural heritage, restricting at the same time the rights of the
other religions.
Glanzer - K. Petrenko, Religion and Education in Post-communist Russia: Russias
Evolving Church-State Relations, Journal of church and State, 49.1 (Winter 2007),
pp. 53-73; e. almnt - H.c. oster, Religious Education in Great Britain, Sweden and
Russia. Presentations, Problem Inventories and Commentaries, Peter Project, Religion
and Religious education, no 1, University electronic Press, 2000, pp. 92-98.
11
cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty and Two Models of
Orthodoxy, pp. 157-159. cf. Hesli - erdem - Reisinger - Miller, The Patriarch and the
President: Religion and Political Choice in Russia, pp. 44, 48-49.
48
in July 1997, President Yeltsin vetoed the law because it infringed

human rights and freedoms as spelled out in the Russian constitution,
and establishes inequality among different faiths.
in September 1997, Yeltsins council of cooperation with Religious
associations announced the reworked documents could proceed to the
duma, which inally passed the law (19th September 1997). the inal
version broadens the special role of orthodoxy to include christianity
in general. it also limited equality before the law only to those religious
groups which had gained standing in the old USSR.
thus, despite or beyond constitutional or legal prescriptions, the reality is that orthodoxy is de facto the State religion in Russia. there are
many unwritten laws and practices which run in parallel with the oficial law and the legislative framework, rendering the latter arbitrary. it
seems that in Russia unwritten laws are very important for everyday life
as well as for social and even political life. according to these unwritten
laws, which are somewhere connected to the lack of democratic culture
and tradition, and to the authoritarian understanding of political power,
Russia is an orthodox State, and orthodoxy is de facto the state-church.
as orthodox intellectual alexei Bodrov, the Rector of St. andrews Biblical theological institute, points out:
an additional problem is that an authoritative state needs an authoritative
church. So, given the problems of our society along with the role of the state,
there is no surprise with the recent campaign launched by the Russian orthodox church leadership against human rights, which are considered a foreign
(Western) concept. there is a profound anti-Western attitude. dialogue easteast (for example, orthodox-Muslim) is much easier than dialogue east-West
(for example, orthodox-catholic or Protestant). theology is not an issue here.
in Russia, religion is widely used in politics at all levels (even though Russia is a
profoundly secular country with very low levels of active church goers). While
it is clear that the orthodox truth cannot be used as an ideology, or even as a
political instrument, ironically orthodoxy has become a new state ideology. Because orthodoxy is regarded as part of the national tradition and culture, the
orthodox church becomes de facto the state church. Political Orthodoxy is strong
and inluential in its very conservative form and has nothing to do with theology
or spirituality. it is not a religion, it is an ideology. Recent sociological surveys
indicate that about 20% of orthodox do not believe in God, and so 13-15% of
the people are orthodox non-believers, but they can certainly inluence politics. orthodox groups and movements are numerous and different, and all of
them display nationalistic, anti-Western and antidemocratic attitudes.12
12
a. Bodrov, Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Military, in asfaw
- chehadeh - Simion (eds.), Just Peace: Orthodox Perspectives, pp. 44-45. cf. a. Verkhovsky, Political Orthodoxy: Religions Involvement in the Identity Formation Process, St
49
in recent years, religious freedom is furthermore seriously affected not

only by legal restrictions and prescriptions, but also by the concept of
canonical territory, introduced by the Roc, and supported by the Russian State. From theological and ecclesiological point of view, the concept of canonical territory, as Metropolitan Hilarion alfeyev reminds
us, had initially a geographical dimension, and was closely bound to a
state, and more precisely to an empire (Byzantine, ottoman, tsarist),
deining thus the boundaries of ecclesiastical territories, in connection
with civil territorial divisions established by secular authorities13. But
while the concept of canonical territory was traditionally associated
with state power and dominion, what is in fact new in contemporary Russian perceptions of canonical territory, is its close association with national identity, and the extension of the former with a so-called cultural
canonical territory, which means that the initially geographical concept
of canonical territory ceases to be based upon geographical criteria
and has now been transformed into an ethno-cultural one, which means
that it has been extended in every place all around the world where the
faithful of the Roc are living or residing, as becomes clear from the
Rocs statements on membership or extension of jurisdiction. canonical territory serves therefore both, a) to ensure the integrity of Russias
national and cultural area, and b) to prevent foreign (to the Russian
spiritual tradition) religions to enter this ethno-cultural area.
as it is stated from the outset of the Putin administration, in the 2000
National Security Concept,
assurance of the Russian Federations national security also includes protecting the cultural and spiritual-moral legacy and the historical traditions and
standards of public life, and preserving the cultural heritage of all Russias
peoples. there must be a state policy to maintain the populations spiritual
and moral welfare, prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base
instincts, and counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations
and missionaries14.
Vladimirs theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 525-540.

13
B.H. alfeyev, One City, One Bishop, One Church, part i, in http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles6/HilariononeBishop.php; and part ii, in http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles6/HilariononeBishop2.php.
14
cf. d.P. Payne, Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign
Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?, Journal of church and State, 2010, pp. 2-3
(available at: https://www.academia.edu/603701/Spiritual_Security_the_Russian_
orthodox_church_and_the_Russian_Foreign_Ministry_collaboration_or_cooptation), where the reference to the website for the 2000 Russian national Security
concept, available at http://www. russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.
50
But following Fr. daniel P. Paynes analysis, the spiritual understanding of

national security saw already its beginnings in the pursuit of the 1997 law
on Freedom of conscience and on Religious associations, which brought
to an end the brief period of religious freedom that Russia experienced following the 1990 law on Freedom of Worship. this spiritual understanding
of national security is also becoming clear when considering Metropolitan
Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrads (now Patriarch Kirill) comments and
interventions about the problem of proselytism facing the Roc15.
the idea which progressively arose was that these foreign missionaries were actually covert foreign intelligence intrusions, gathering information about Russian policies and strategic activities16. Meanwhile Putin from his side stated that, in the dialogue with other Sister-churches,
the Russian orthodox church has always defended and hopefully will
continue to defend the national and spiritual identity of Russians17.
this special mission assigned to the Roc met the aspirations and ethnocultural vision of the latter itself, as these are described in the following
statement by Patriarch Kirill:
there are parishes and monasteries of the Russian orthodox church in many
countries. they not only unite Russians, but also the natives of other countries in
the canonical space of the Moscow Patriarchate, speciically the citizens of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. all those people ind themselves drawn to the faith of
their ancestors, their people, to orthodoxy, when they land in foreign countries.
the church communities seek to unite orthodox christians so that they can,
together, get stronger in the faith, pray and partake of the Sacraments. Moreover,
our parishes fulill a cultural mission. they are an important link between their
Motherland and the people living far away from their native country18.
15
See Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Gospel and Culture, in J. Witte
Jr. - M. Bourdeaux (eds.), Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War for Souls,
orbis Book, Maryknoll 1999, pp. 66-76, and Payne, Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?, pp. 3 ff.
16
cf. Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 3, and J. anderson, Putin and the Russian Orthodox
Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?, Journal of international affairs, 61.1 (2007), p. 194.
17
in his response to the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia,
Russian Orthodox Church to work for Russian Identity-Putin, interfax, February 3, 2009;
available at http://www.interfax-religion.com and Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 4.
18
Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations, diplomat 173.9 (2008),
p. 14, and Payne, Spiritual Security, p. 6. For a further discussion on the issue of canonical territory see Payne, Spiritual Security, pp. 10-15; id., Nationalism and the Local
Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conlict in the Orthodox Commonwealth, in Nationalities
Papers, vol. 35.5, november 2007, pp. 834-837; d. Jackson, Canonical Territory and
National Security: Patriarch, President, and Proselytism in the Russian Federation, Baptistic
theologies 2.2, autumn, 2010, pp. 59-81; Heiko overmeyer, The Argument over
51
Furthermore, a number of trends can only worry even more those who
are sensitive not only to christian faith, but also to religious freedom and
more generally to human rights, including the recent, after the election
of Patriarch Kirill, almost complete identiication of the Russian orthodox church with the Russian State, its voluntary instrumentalization for
the sake of the Russian national idea and identity, its promotion as part
of the public order; the transformation of the former into an ideological
arm of the latter and of the Putin regime, to the point of continuously
supporting and giving religious justiication to the multiple wars in the
caucasus; the continuous efforts of this regime to retrieve all the Russian churches or institutions in Western europe which used to belong to
the Russian church before the 1917 Revolution or were founded in the
Russian diaspora after the Revolution; and last, but not least, the recent
reinforcement of the concept of Spiritual Security, and the related
legislation on non Governmental organizations, and the obligation of
these organizations to be registered in a separate register labeled Foreign agents (a legislation which began already to affect the independent religious and theological institutions)19.
an extremely alarming example of what i am trying to present is what
was said on the occasion of the celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the
nuclear Weapon Shield of Russia. i will borrow again information from
alexei Bodrovs presentation: President Vladimir Putin commented
then that both the traditional confessions in the Russian Federation
and the nuclear shield of Russia are those constituencies that strengthen
the Russian state and provide the necessary conditions for internal and
external security of the country. egor Kholmogorov, a publicist, has expressed this attitude in very candid terms: in order to remain orthodox, Russia must be a powerful nuclear state, and in order to remain a
powerful nuclear state, Russia must be orthodox20.
it is clear to us that behind what it is described above lies the ethnoreligious narrative of Russian orthodoxy and the vision of the third
Canonical Territory an Insoluble Territorial Conlict Between the Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches?, concilium, issue 2, 2007 (land conlicts, land Utopias, edited
by M.t. Wacker and e.M. Wainwright, ScM Press, london), pp. 37-46.
19
on the issues raised above, cf. among others, d. Uzlaner, The Pussy Riot Case and
the Peculiarities of Russian Post-Secularism, translation by April French, State, Religion
and church, 1.1 (2014), pp. 23-58; id., The Pussy Riot Case and the Peculiarities of
Russian Post-Secularism, in e.a. diamantopoulou - l.l. christians (eds.), Orthodox
Christianity and Human Rights in Europe: Theology, Law and Religion in Interaction, Peter
lang, Brussels (forthcoming); cf. Verkhovsky, Political Orthodoxy: Religions Involvement in the Identity Formation Process.
20
Bodrov, Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Military, p. 47.
52
Rome, i.e. the illusory dream to resurrect or to imitate the byzantine

symphonia, as well as a very complex and problematic relationship to
Western modernity, insofar as the Russian churchs involvement in politics, and its privileged relation to the state, is seeking de-secularization
of the society, understood as a partial return to the pre-modern, presecular state, and not at de-secularization, deined as a social process
characteristic of a modern secular society21.
1.3. Ukraine
the example of Ukraine represents a unique case of church-state relations in the orthodox world. an orthodox country with a long history
full of weighty symbolisms, host to the baptism of the Rus and to Kievian christianity, as a result of its historical adventures, Ukraine is maybe
the only great orthodox nation without either an established or statechurch (de facto or de jure), or any type of formal or informal model of
symphonia. the reason for this has to do primarily with the multiple
schisms, the splintering and fragmentation in many, and often rival, orthodox jurisdictions as well as with the presence and activity, for 400
years now, of the Greek catholic church attached to the Pope of Rome
since the Union of Brest-litovsk in 1596. if the creation of the latter is
due both to the decay of the orthodox hierarchy of that time in Ruthenia and Western Ukraine, and to Roman expansionism at the expense of
the orthodox, the multiplicity of the orthodox churches and jurisdictions is certainly linked to the long struggle for independence from Russia of the Ukrainian orthodox and their will to afirm, through a distinctive ecclesiastical entity, their oppressed national identity. i cannot recall
here the extremely complex and long history of the different jurisdictions and the successive schisms that penetrated Ukrainian orthodoxy.
this is not my intention and my point in this paper. i will restrict myself
to the present situation, in order to facilitate the understanding of the
wider framework of church-state relations in Ukraine, and the absence
of any model of symphonia from Ukrainian political and public life.
Until 1990 Ukraine had one major christian church, the Russian
orthodox church22. But after the liberalization of the Soviet regime
21
cf. Verkhovsky, Political Orthodoxy: Religions Involvement in the Identity Formation Process, p. 525. For further discussion cf. W.l. daniel - P.l. Berger - c. Marsh
(eds.), Perspectives on Church-State Relations in Russia, J.M. dawson institute of churchState Studies, Baylor University 2008.
22
For what follows cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of Religious Liberty
and Two Models of Orthodoxy, pp. 161-165; n.e. denysenko, Fractured Orthodoxy in
Ukraine and Politics: The Impact of Patriarch Kyrills Russian World, logos: a Journal
53
at the end of the 80s with glasnost and perestroika, the new law on religious freedom and the Ukrainian independence that was gained,
thanks to the referendum of december 1991, defections began from
that church and those emerged who had been practicing their faith
clandestinely were hereafter able to created alternative ecclesiastical
bodies. as a result, from 1990 to 1993, except for the Former Russian
church-autonomous Ukrainian orthodox church under the Moscow
Patriarchate, which remained the biggest ecclesiastical entity and the
only recognized by the communion of the orthodox churches worldwide, three more large church organizations emerged in Ukraine (and
many others of a smaller size!): the Ukrainian orthodox church-Patriarchate of Kiev; the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church; and
the Ukrainian Greek catholic church (in communion with the Pope
of Rome).
the newly established independent Ukrainian state showed a clear
will to be religiously neutral and to respect religious pluralism and freedom, following in this point Western european standard. despite the
failed attempt of its irst elected president (ex-communist) leonid Kravchuk, to establish (with the assistance of Metropolitan Filaret denisenko of the Ukrainian orthodox church-Patriarchate of Kiev, defrocked
by Moscow) a national or state religion, not by banning others but by
strongly favoring one, Ukraine was eventually able, especially during
president Kuchmas administration (1994 onwards), to preserve its multi-religious character. according to a 1993 survey, 44% of the Ukrainian
population declared themselves religious, 33% undecided, 18% not religious, and 5% atheists. the majority of those who said that they were
religious (64%) classiied themselves as orthodox. in 1994 Ukraine was
host to real religious pluralism (17,600 oficially registered religious
of eastern christian Studies, 54.1-2 (2013), pp. 33-67; J. casanova, Between Nation
and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism in Independent Ukraine, in R.W.
Hefner (ed.), Democratic Civility: The History and Cross-cultural Possibility of a Modern
Political Ideal, transaction Publishers, new Brunswick, nJ london 1998, pp. 203-228;
id., Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism and Democratic Construction in Ukraine, in
B.R. Rubin - J. Snyder (eds.), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conlict and State-Building,
London and New York, Routledge, london 1998, pp. 81-103; o. zaiets, Overview of
Church-State Relations in Ukraine in 2011, in http://risu.org.ua/article_blog_code.
php?id=46917&name=analytic&_lang=en&; Church-State Relations in Ukraine as of 2013
(Round-table discussion), in http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/news.php?news_
id=417; a.c. Hovorun, On Maidan, in http://byzypriest.com/?p=81; id., Christians in
Ukraine: Ecumenism in the Trenches, in Catholic World Report, available at: http://insightscoop.typepad.com/2004/2014/03/christians-in-ukraine-ecumenism-in-the-trenches-the-conlict-between-the-state-and-the-society-in-ukraine-has-led-to-a-signi.html.
54
communities, from 65 different religious groups)23. With the election of

leonid Kuchma as president of Ukraine, in July 1994, efforts to create a
national church were abandoned, while with the Statement on the understanding of the religious situation in Ukraine (august 1995), Kuchmas government priority was given to engage various religious leaders
in constructive dialogue, and to assure religious neutrality of the state.
in october 1995 Kuchmas government reestablished the council for
Religious affairs (which was abolished since its main task during the
Soviet period was the control of religious life and organizations), with
the express purpose this time of encouraging dialogue among religious
denominations. His head, Minister anatol Koval, furthermore identiied
three speciic tasks as his duties (February 1996): a) to guarantee the
separation of church and state; b) to support all religious organizations;
and c) to avoid all forms of religious intolerance or special status. in
June 1996 the same government voted in the new constitution, which
in article 35 guarantees religious freedom and freedom of conscience,
and establishes in addition the all-Ukrainian council of churches and
Religious organizations (today under the responsibility of the Ministry
of culture), which would advise the government on religious matters,
and institutionalize cooperation and peaceful co-existence among the
multiple religious communities of the country24.
during the irst two decades of the 21st century, not without setbacks, Ukraine has continued to pay attention to issues of religious
freedom, especially a) to those related to the current law of freedom
of conscience and religious organizations, including the procedure
for registering religious organizations seeking legal status; b) to the
all-Ukrainian council of churches and Religious organizations (aUccRo) which is the most effective forum of reconciliation and cooperation between different religious groups in Ukraine and which is been
now concerned to prevent any developments that could negatively affect religious freedom in Ukraine; c) to the visas for foreign religious
workers, the tariffs for utilities for religious organizations, and the status of foreign religious organizations ecc.
23
casanova (Between Nation and Civil Society: Ethnolinguistic and Religious Pluralism
in Independent Ukraine, p. 215), will maintain about this pluralism that of all european societies, Ukraine is the one most likely to approximate the american model.
indeed, Ukraine has already gone through the irst incipient stages of religious denominationalism to an extent unsual in europe. this in my view augurs very well for
the success of civil society in Ukraine. cf. id., Ethno-linguistic and Religious Pluralism
and Democratic Construction in Ukraine, p. 90.
24
For this brief historical overview cf. tataryn, Russia and Ukraine: Two Models of
Religious Liberty and Two Models of Orthodoxy, pp. 161-165.
55
the todays Ukrainian religious landscape keeps its diversity, since

none of the churches could claim to be the prevailing one or the dominant religious community of the country. according to Fr. cyril Hovoruns presentation25 (largely accepted by all the analysts), the largest
christian community is the Ukrainian orthodox church (Uoc) under
the Moscow Patriarchate, the only Ukrainian church recognized by the
fellowship of the orthodox churches worldwide. according to the oficial statistics, in January 2013 it had 12,485 registered communities,
whereas for the last 22 years the Primate of this church was Metropolitan of Kiev Volodymyr Sabodan, who in recent months resigned because
of the serious deterioration of his health condition. By the Synodal decision of the Uoc (February 24), Metropolitan onufry was elected as
Locum Tenens of the Kievian See.
the second largest church is the Patriarchate of Kiev (Uoc-KP),
which was founded in 1992 (with the encouragement of the President
of the country at that time leonid Kravchuk) by the former exarch of
Ukraine Filaret denisenko, who was defrocked, for this, by the Moscow
Patriarchate. according to the statistics, this church counted 4,536 registered communities.
according to the same statistics, the third largest christian church
is the Ukrainian Greek-catholic church (UGcc), a catholic church sui
iuris, which follows the eastern/byzantine rite. this church counted
3,734 registered communities, mostly in the western Ukrainian region
of Galicia. it nevertheless developed a distinct social teaching and has a
powerful voice recognized throughout the whole country.
the Ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church (Uaoc) is the fourth
largest church of the country with 1,205 registered communities. With a
long and complex history, and with many transformations and reversals,
it originates from the Ukrainian autocephalous movement that started in
1918, then moved into the emigration, mostly canada and the US, and after Ukraine became independent, returned to its motherland as a Uaoc.
according to the oficial data, there is also smaller Ukrainian
churches, including the Roman catholic church with 919 communities, as well as different religious groups, including Jewish and Muslim
communities.
the recent dramatic events in Ukraine, and the subsequent political
change will certainly lead to changes and reversals at the religious level
25
Christians in Ukraine: Ecumenism in the Trenches, in Catholic World Report, available

at: http://insightscoop.typepad.com/2004/2014/03/christians-in-ukraine-ecumenism-in-the-trenches-the-conlict-between-the-state-and-the-society-in-ukraine-has-ledto-a-signi.html.
56
also, especially since all the religious communities, the Ukrainian orthodox church (Uoc) under the Moscow Patriarchate included, were
involved to a lesser or greater degree in the uprising in favor of the
pro-european perspective. it is still too early to know or even to predict
what these changes and reversals will be as things are changing rapidly
and constantly, especially if the Russian aggressiveness increases. Up to
now, thanks to its history and tradition of multi-religious, multi-racial,
and multi-lingual co-existence, Ukraine has followed a different, more
tolerant and more pluralistic path in matters of religious pluralism and
freedom, than its powerful neighbor, i.e. Russia. However, Ukrainian
christian communities, despite their differences were not exempt from
their almost exclusive attachment to the state and to the ideal of the
byzantine symphonia. Following the penetrating analysis of Fr. cyril Hovorun (from the Ukrainian orthodox church under the Moscow Patriarchate) on the spiritual importance of the Maidan uprising,
Historically, the christian church both in the east and the west had primarily
a bilateral relationship with what we call the public and political sphere and
which is also known under the Greek word politeia. namely, this relationship
existed almost exclusively between the church and the state. Relatively recently
the churches began to realize that these two dimensions: church and state are
insuficient. there exists a third self-suficient dimension the society which
is also important for the church. []
the orthodox church in the Russian empire developed its relations with society
in a different way, which better resembled the church in Byzantium. this means
that the relationship between the church and society was overshadowed by the
relationship between the church and the state. in the Soviet Union, the church
failed to develop distinct relations with the society. [] after the state had marginalized the church, the latter did nothing but wait in a ghetto until it would
regain recognition. When this has eventually come to pass after the collapse of
the communist regime, the church promptly started to rebuild its relations with
the state instead of connecting with the society. Partially this can be explained
by the fact that the post-Soviet society for a long time did not realize its distinctiveness from the state. []
the Maidan pushed the churches to rise above the status quo that dominated
their relationship with the state for years, and to take the side of the society in its
struggle with the violent regime. now the churches need to make a step further
and to judge the regime honestly. it is irresponsible for them to hide behind
the reduced interpretation of the Scriptural statement that all authority comes
from God (Rom 1, 13). []
now the churches that want to follow the example of the saints have an opportunity to articulate what the majority of the Ukrainian people have clearly
understood, even though these peoples did not study moral theology in the
theological seminaries and academies. they nevertheless clearly see that the
present Ukrainian regime is not christian even though it demonstrates an in-
57
clination to the religious cult. its christianity is a simulacrum. it has a form, but
not the content. it has no christian morality in it. this regime does not treat the
others as their brothers and sisters. []
the churches now have an opportunity to recognize that they often serve as
mediators between God and the criminals, who want to protect themselves from
God. the churches receive commission for their mediation. Where does this
mediation lead? it leads to legitimization of corruption and to its sacralization. indeed, corruption in our society has become sacred. the Maidan gives
the churches an opportunity to change this status quo and to refuse to fulill
this mediating role, which only serves to legitimize corruption, social injustice,
abuse of power, etc. []
it is time for the Ukrainian churches to reach for the moral achievements of the
society which is rapidly evolving on the basis of values that the church should
have upheld. it is time to revise the relationships with the state. it is time to build
relationships with the people. and to learn from them to value and to struggle
for dignity, honesty, and humanity26.
1.4. Romania
despite its latin language and culture, Romania is one of the Balkan
countries most rooted in the byzantine tradition. it is not by chance
that the Byzance aprs Byzance idea was proposed by a Romanian
historian, i.e. nicolae iorga. at the same time, precisely because of its
latin cultural roots, Romania is very open to Western inluences, while
its political and intellectual lite aspire to be considered as part of the
Western cultural and political system. thanks to its inluentially large
size (the majority of Romanias population, i.e. 16,367,267, or 85.9%,
according to the 2011 census data, belongs to the orthodox church),
and to its formative role in the shaping of the Modern national Romanian identity, the Romanian orthodox church did play, and continues
to play, a very important role in politics as well as in the formation of
public opinion and in society. the current church-state relationship in
Romania relects this ambiguity, i.e. this oscillation between the model
of the Byzantine symphonia and Western style liberal democracy27.
26
a.c. Hovorun, On Maidan, in http://byzypriest.com/?p=81.

i draw information on church-state relations in Romania from the following papers and books: l. Stan - l. turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Europe, oxford University Press, new York 2011, pp. 134-149; id., Religion and Politics in
Romania: Between Restrained Pluralism and Orthodox Establishment?, available at: http://
www.academia.edu/1657581/Religion_and_Politics_in_Romania_-_Between_Restrained_Pluralism_and_orthodox_establishment#; id., Secularization or Twin Tolerations? Redeining Church-State Relations in Post-Communism, in a. Kilp - a. Saumts
(eds.), Religion and Politics in Multicultural Europe: Perspectives and Challenges, national
27
58
there is no special place or role reserved for the orthodox church

in the post-communist 1991 Romanian constitution (in force until
today, with some particular amendments, not related however to matters of religion), nor any mention of any type of established religion,
despite the growing efforts of the Romanian orthodox church, to be
constitutionally recognized as such, and to regain somehow the place it
enjoyed before communist regime, i.e. the position of national church
thanks to its sheer numbers, and its historical contribution to the state
and nation-building process as the mother of the nation. on the contrary, the 1991 constitution clearly establishes, in article 291, freedom
of conscience, of thinking, and of religious beliefs, and guarantees the
assistance of the state in matters of protection of religious freedom,
while in article 295, it is stressed that religious communities are independent from the State.
if the Romanian constitution still maintains at least a formal neutrality with respect to any religion or non-religious convictions, the
case is not the same with the 2006 law on religious freedom and the
general status of denominations, which in many regards is considered
to establish a privileged status for the orthodox church, both de jure
and de facto. While this law in article 1, explicitly guarantees freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion of all citizens, and in article 9
declares the equality of all religions and ideologies (even atheistic)
before the state, it is however quick to point out in article 72, , the
important role of the Romanian orthodox church and that of other
denominations as recognized by the national history of Romania and
in life of Romanian society.
this law coined a new concept, that of the church-state partnership, which theoretically was open to all recognized denominations.
to this end it introduces also a two-tiered recognition system for the
religious denominations, and a quite strict registration process, which
did create several complaints especially on behalf of minority religious
groups. it seems that this law establishes strict registration requirements,
like the extremely high membership threshold (0.1% of the population,
defense college, tartu, estonia 2009, pp. 172-193; l.n. leustean, Orthodoxy and
Political Myths in Balkan National Identities, national identities, 10 (2008), pp. 421432; J. conovici, Concepts of Church-State Relations in Romania: Beyond Symphonia and
the Privileged Orthodox Church, paper available at: http://www.units.miamioh.edu/
havighurstcenter/conferences/documents/Religion%20 YRc/conovici-Beyondsymphonia.pdf; e. Fokas, Limitations to Religious Freedom in Majority Orthodox Countries, in e.a. diamantopoulou - l. christians (eds.), Orthodox Christianity and Human Rights in Europe: Theology, Law and Religion in Interaction, Peter lang, Brussels
(forthcoming, courtesy of the author).
59
approx. 22,000 people), and the long waiting period (sometimes up to

12 years!). By the application of these criteria, only 18 denominations
met the requirements and are recognized by the Romanian authorities.
the same law stipulates that the state will support and facilitate religious assistance to hospitals, prisons, orphanages and nursing homes, and
introduces at the same time the principle of proportionality of state support in the distribution of institutional, legal and inancial advantages allowing for a de facto dominance of the orthodox church in several areas.
in fact, since the law entails fairly extensive inancial support to religious
groups, on a proportional basis to their number of members, it is not
dificult to understand that by default a huge percentage goes to the orthodox church. a last eloquent example is the signiicant inancial state
support of the highly criticized (even within the theological circles of the
Romanian orthodox church) ambitious project of the new Patriarchal
cathedral in Bucharest. currently, the Romanian state provides the funds
necessary for paying the salaries of priests, as well as for expenses related
to lay church personnel. the same applies also to all state-recognized
religious communities in Romania. the state funds, additionally, all the
expenses of orthodox and non-orthodox university theological faculties
and ecclesiastical seminaries, including teachers and professors salaries.
a crucial element of the church-state relationship is the issue of Religious education, which is de facto compulsory, and mainly orthodox
and catechetical in nature, giving, however, the possibility to the other
religious communities of the country to organize a class on their own
faith or confession for their children. However, the speciic conditions
required by the law for the Religious education class of the non-orthodox communities (10-child threshold minimum for other-faith classes),
is the reason for which the precise legislation is viewed as profoundly
anti-minority by the religious communities concerned, since it is dificult to reach that number in small towns.
an integral part of the church-state relationship in Romania is inally the legal prescriptions assigned to the Secretariat of State for Religious affairs: it issues an opinion on the registration application of
religious communities, as well as on withdrawal of recognition status.
For minority groups and secular intellectuals the State Secretarys role
is particularly problematic because, in practice, this person is always an
orthodox theologian.
the greatest challenge related to the church-state relations in Romania is that of the pluralism and the real, and not only formal, acceptance
of religious otherness in the midst of a more or less religiously homogenous country. the orthodox church (and its theology) could help the
Romanian state and society to move further in its direction if it would
be able to free itself from the past and out-of-date model of symphonia,
60
and from the permanent temptations of religious nationalism, and aggressive provincialism. Unfortunately, the voluntary instrumentalization
of the Romanian church for the sake of the state and the nation; the
insistence of the dominant ecclesiastical discourse, and particularly of
Patriarch daniel, to the role of the Romanian orthodox church as the
mother of the nation; the emergence and further development of a peculiar version of a cultural canonical territory which the Romanian
church, in imitating in this point the example of the Russian orthodox
church, tries to apply to its diaspora, and many other alarming signs do
not allow us to be optimistic in this regard28.
1.5. Serbia
in the particular context deined not only by the traditional role of the
Serbian orthodox church (Soc) as the main identity marker of the
Serbian orthodox people, but also by the tragic events related to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the discussion on the issue of church-state relationship and religious freedom in the Republic of Serbia is of a particular signiicance. it seems that the terrible experience of the hybrid
totalitarian phenomenon of national communism operated by Milosevic, did affect negatively the always sensitive issues of religious matters,
but did indirectly help Serbia to move forward to a better interreligious
and ecumenical understanding, and to make some signiicant steps in
the direction of a fairly liberal legislation on religious freedom.
according to the 2006 constitution, Serbia is a secular state, implementing the separation of church and state29. article 43 of the constitu28
For further readings on church and state in Romania see, l. Stan - l. turcescu,
Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, oxford University Press, new York
2007; o. Gillet, Religion et nationalisme. Lidologie de lEglise orthodoxe roumaine sous
le rgime communiste, ditions de lUniversit de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 1997; Lanne
canonique, special issue on les cultes et ltat en Roumanie, 45 (2003), pp. 9-120;
c. Schifirnet, Orthodoxy, Church, State, and National Identity in the Context of Tendential Modernity, Journal for the Study of Religions and ideologies, vol. 12, issue 34
(Spring 2013), pp. 173-208.
29
i draw information on church-state relations in Serbia from the following papers
and books: a. ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in Serbia,
Religion, State and Society, 33.4, december 2005, pp. 273-313; M. Blagojevic,
Current religious changes in Serbia and Desecularization, Filozoija/drustvo, 3 (2006),
pp. 239-253; i. Midic, The Orthodox Catechism: Guidelines for the Teachers in Elementary
and High Schools, institute for textbooks and teaching Resources, Belgrade 2003, pp.
6, 20-36 [in Serbian]; R. Yovic, History of the Religious Education in Serbia, in S. GasicPavisic - S. Sevkusic (eds.), Religious Education in the Schools of Belgrade, cathecetical
institute-theological Faculty of Belgrade, Belgrade 2011, pp. 78-89 [in Serbian].
61
tion guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion. it

also states that every person has the right to manifest his/her religion or
religious beliefs in worship, observance, practice and teaching, in private
or in community, while article 44 states that all churches and religious communities are equal and separated from the state. according to the same
constitution, the Soc does not enjoy any special rights over those of others, despite the fact that it is accorded more visibility in some public events
because of its historic role. the great religious feasts of the Soc are, however, recognized as state holidays (according to the Julian calendar), while
members of other religions are guaranteed the right to celebrate their own
religious holidays. the clerics of the Soc are not paid by the state; every
priest needs to support himself inancially. Serbian public television does
not broadcast religious services or emissions of the Soc nor of other religious communities or groups. churches or religious communities can run
their own radio stations according to the general rules of the state, if they
are able to support them inancially. there is no such thing as religious tV.
the Soc runs a local radio station (only for Belgrade), whereas the Roman
catholic church has its own radio station in Serbia too.
But despite these positive constitutional prescriptions there are still
some cases in which the law on religion discriminates among religious
groups and requires minority groups, including those that were previously recognized, to reregister and through a burdensome procedure to
attain or retain their status as recognized religious groups30. in addition,
despite the fact that in Serbia all religious communities are considered
equal according to the law, in practice, however, the Serbian orthodox
church (which is by far the majority religious community of the country with 84.5% of the Serbians)31 seems to enjoy a special status and to
receive some preferential consideration as the church of the Serbian nation and has been given media and other support32. Following the anal-
30
according to ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in Serbia,
p. 275, the preamble of the draft law [sc. of 2001] enumerated seven so-called historical religious communities: the most important of these was the Serbian orthodox church, followed by the islamic community, the Roman catholic church, the
Jewish community, the evangelical christian churches of the augsburg confession,
and the Reformed christian church. these religious communities were recognized
for their longstanding contribution to society, and were selected because each one
of them possessed a special agreement with the state before the Second World War.
31
according to the oficial statistics of 2011, in Serbia there are members of Soc
84.5%, Muslims 3.1%, Protestants 0.99%, Roman catholics 4.97%, Jews 0.008%, see:
www.popis2011.stat.rs
32
See for evidence ilic, On the Road towards Religious Pluralism? Church and State in
Serbia, p. 285.
62
ysis by angela ilic, the lack of regulation regarding the legal position of
religious communities in the country has left a vacuum, which has been
to the advantage of the Serbian orthodox church. although the church
no longer enjoys the status of an established religion, it has nonetheless de facto taken up the role of an indispensable national church. this
is because religious and national identities are intertwined within the
Serbian orthodox church; the belief is prevalent that all Serbs are (or
should be) orthodox33.
the old demons of nationalism that used to haunt both the Serbian state and the Soc, are for sure connected to this kind of sacralized
ethno-religious exclusivism, instrumental in the explosion of the ethnic
conlicts and wars in the former Yugoslavia34. However, for the last ten
years there are many encouraging examples of theological renewal, acceptance of the otherness, ecumenical and inter-religious cooperation,
and compliance with the european acquis on behalf of the Soc and the
other religious communities of the country, that give the impression,
and the hope, that Serbia, without losing its attachment to its spiritual
tradition, is slowly moving toward a religious pluralism model, and a
genuine religious freedom, tolerance, and coexistence.
Perhaps the best example of this quite new interreligious and ecumenical understanding and cooperation among different religious communities in Serbia, and of the respect of religious freedom on behalf of
the state, is the consensus reached, not without problems since there
have been many reactions from the secular side, to reintroduce Religious
education into Serbian schools in 200135. Religious education has been
reestablished in Serbian public schools ifty years after being canceled,
33
Ibidem.
cf. V. Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, oxford University Press, oxford 2002; c. Mylonas, Serbian Orthodox Fundamentals: The Quest for
an Eternal Identity, central european University Press, Budapest-new York 2003.
35
according R. drezgic, Religion, Politics and Gender in the Context of Nation-State Formation: The Case of Serbia, third World Quarterly, 31.6, (2010), pp. 961-964, the
reestablishment of religious education in public schools represents a turning point
in the church-state relationship in Serbia, opening up space for religion and religious institutions to enter all the pores of social life, while it demonstrates a shift
from instrumental pious nationalism toward a model of religious nationalism
which occurred after Milosevic was removed from power. Following the perspective
of this Serbian scholar, the integration of religious education into the public school
system, in addition to being inconsistent with the principle of separation between
the church and the state has had many other negative implications, some of them
gender-speciic, since popular religious literature often contains an explicit conservative, and even reactionary, model of orthodox womanhood, belonging to
pre-modern and anti-modern conceptions of womanhood.
34
63
allowing the seven traditional religious communities to have their own

confessional teaching. the Serbian orthodox church, even though it is
the major religious denomination, insisted during the dialogue with government that all other denominations should have their own Religious
education, respecting diversity and multiculturalism in Serbia. as has
been pointed out by the young orthodox Serbian theologian dr. Rastko
Yovic, this has been a major step toward better understanding between
many different religious groups in Serbia. in that sense, according to the
pre-eminent Serbian orthodox bishop ignatije Midic, Religious education, even though it is confessional, discovers and examines a christian
heritage that is common to Roman catholics and the many Protestants
that live in Serbia. also, according to the same bishop, in its holistic and
more comprehensive attitude toward the world and life, the Religious
education of the orthodox church in Serbia is not only compatible with
other christian confessions, but also with other religions, providing solid
ground for meeting these differences in a search for a common goal. after more than 10 years of Religious education in Serbian schools, the Soc
was preparing some changes in its curriculum during 2013. the change
should achieve two goals: to express and explain ecumenical dimensions
of orthodoxy and, at the same time, to raise tolerant citizens.
1.6. Bulgaria
as in the majority of cases of the former communist countries, Bulgaria
remained a secular state, while the Bulgarian orthodox church (Boc),
the most important religious community of the country (according to statistical data from the mid-1990s, 87% of the population of Bulgaria claim
to be orthodox christians), did not completely recover the state religion
status it enjoyed before the imposition of the communist regime. nevertheless, taking into account the crucial role of the Boc in the preservation
of Bulgarian into identity and culture, especially during the long period
of turkish occupation, and the diachronic prevailing position of the Boc
as relected in Bulgarian society, the 1991 constitution (amended in 2003,
2005, 2006 and 2007) points out the historic role of the traditional eastern
orthodox Religion in the life of the Bulgarian people, whilst irmly proclaiming in article 6 the complete equality of all religious denominations
under the law36. thus, the article 13 of 1991 constitution declares the
36
For what follows, cf. P. Petkoff, Church-State Relations under the Bulgarian Denominations Act 2002: Religious Pluralism and Established Church, Religion, State and Society,
33.4, december 2005; id., Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Jurisprudence of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, Religion, State and Society, 36.3, September 2008, pp.
64
practicing of any religion to be unrestricted, and conirms the separation

of the state and the religious to be communities, while at the same time
granting the Boc the status of the traditional religion in the Republic of
Bulgaria. article 37 makes it clear that the state will favor tolerance and
cooperation between believers of different denominations, and between
believers and non-believers, without allowing however freedom of conscience and religion to be practiced to the detriment of national security,
public order, public health and morality.
it is worth noting that, in deining the identity of the Boc, constitutional legislators use theological terms as well as terms taken from canon
law and administrative law. thus:
the Boc is described as part of the one Holy catholic and apostolic church;
it is autocephalous having the status of a Patriarchate;
it is the legal successor of the Bulgarian exarchate;
its governing body is described as a Holy Synod, chaired by the
Patriarch, who is also metropolitan of Soia.
the above arrangement clearly follows the example of the Hellenic
constitution of 1975 (amended in 1986, 2001, and 2008) and the place
the latter ascribes to the eastern orthodox church.
Following the prescriptions of the post-communist constitution, on
20 december 2002 the Bulgarian Parliament passed a new Religious
denominations act. Until 2002, the denominations act of 1949 was
205-223; id., Religion and the Secular State in Bulgaria, in J. Martinez-torrn - W.c.
durham Jr. (eds.), Religion and the Secular State. Interim National Reports Issued for
the Occasion of the XVIII th International Congress of Comparative Law, Washington, dc,
July 2010, Provo, Ut, international center for law and Religion Studies, Brigham
Young University, 2010, pp. 145-182; V. Kostov, Religious freedom and Church-State relations in Post-Communist Bulgarian Society. Missiological implications, Phd, Fuller theological Seminary, School of intercultural Studies, 2009; i.z. dimitrov, The Orthodox
Church in Bulgaria Today, the Greek orthodox theological Review, 45 (2000),
pp. 491-511; id., La Chiesa ortodossa nella societ bulgara contemporanea, in LOrtodossia
nella nuova Europa. Dinamiche storiche e prospettive, torino 2003, pp. 285-302; id., Legal
Settlement of the Relations Between the State and Religions in Bulgaria Today, in Legal Aspects
of Religious Freedom. International Conference, 15-18 September 2008, ljubljana 2008,
pp. 305-309; id., La dificile transizione in Bulgaria, la nuova europa. Rivista internazionale di cultura, novembre 2009, 6, pp. 58-64; id., Bulgarian Christianity, in K.
Perry (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, Wiley-Blackwell Publications, Malden, Ma/oxford 2010, pp. 47-72; t. Sabev, The Orthodox Church of Bulgaria
in the Twentieth Century, in c. chaillot (ed.), The Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe in
the Twentieth Century, Peter lang, oxford-Bern 2011; Stan - turcescu, Church, State,
and Democracy in Expanding Europe, pp. 17-34; Fokas, Limitations to Religious Freedom in
Majority Orthodox Countries.
65
the main legal framework regulating religious freedom in Bulgaria,

but in interfered in religious affairs, and de facto controlled the life of
the Boc, the islamic community, and other religious groups. the legal
framework of the new 2002 law on religion aims at cultivating religious
pluralism and tolerance, but does not avoid in article 101 a privileged
treatment of the Boc, because of its historic role in the life of the Bulgarian people:
eastern orthodoxy is the traditional denomination in the Republic of Bulgaria.
it has played a historic role in Bulgarias statehood and has current meaning in
its political life. its spokesperson and representative is the autocephalous Bulgarian orthodox church, which, under the name Patriarchy, is the successor of
Bulgarias exarchate. [] it is led by the Holy Synod and is represented by the
Bulgarian Patriarch who is the Metropolitan of Soia.
the Boc is recognized in the same article 10 of this law as a legal per-
son ex lege and is thus exempted from the registration process, while
other religious groups need to register at the central (Soia city court),
and the local level (provincial capital cities court). the registration regime is now fairly liberal and over 100 groups are registered. Still, religious minorities have qualms about the law, due to the preferential and
privileged treatment of the Boc, the role maintained for the executive
branch (i.e. the directorate of Religious affairs, which issues an opinion on each registration application), and the violations of religious
freedoms at the local level (towns rather than in the capital cities).
the Boc has the possibility to broadcast its religious ceremonies
through the second channel of public television. legitimacy is also given
to the Boc to perform a public role at oficial holidays and state ceremonies.
despite this special treatment of the Boc on behalf of the Bulgarian state, orthodox clerics are paid not by the state, but by the Holy
Synod or their parishes. Paradoxically also, Religious education in public schools is constantly and persistently a matter of dispute between the
Bulgarian Ministry of education (and the rest of political parties, since it
seems that there is a political consensus on this refusal across the lines)
and the Boc which complains that the Ministry violates the religious
rights of the pupils and their families by its persistent refusal to reintroduce compulsory religious instruction in the curricula37.
37
Stan - turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Europe, pp. 29-32, in
their account of the debate over religious instruction, offer a quite different picture
on this issue suggesting the possibility for the Boc and the other religious communities to have an optional religious class in the public schools.
66
as in every country with a majority or prevailing church, genuine

religious pluralism is to a great extent dependent on the readiness of
that church to accept the reality of pluralistic societies as well as on
its openness to ecumenical of rapprochement and inter-religious cooperation. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian orthodox church seems to
be quite the reverse of ecumenically open and eager to cooperate at
the inter-religious level, and instead of dialogue with (post-)modernity
and the challenges of pluralism, is more and more inclined to fundamentalism and the spirit of introversion. it is hoped, however, that
the election of the new Patriarch neoit at the head of the Boc will
bring it back to the main ecumenical organizations (World council
of churches, council of european churches) from which it withdrew
in 1998, and will enable it to engage anew in the path of dialogue and
theological and ecclesial renewal38.
38
For further reading on church and state relations in Bulgaria cf. J.l. Hopkins,
The Bulgarian Orthodox Church: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Evolving Relationship
between Church, Nation and State in Bulgaria, columbia University Press, Boulder, co/
new York 2009. For further discussion on church-state relations in orthodox countries, the Byzantine and imperial heritage of symphonia, as well as a comparative
analysis which bring together the related issues of the domination of the state over
the church and the democratic deicit of these countries, the national churches
phenomenon, and the mixture of ethno-religious identities, cf. n.K. cvosdev, Emperors and Elections: Reconciling the Orthodox Tradition with Modern Politics, Huntington
troitsa Books, new York 2000; id., An Examination of Church-State Relations in the Byzantine and Russian Empires with an Emphasis on Ideology and Models of Interaction, the
edwin Mellen Press, lewiston, new York 2001; P. Ramet, Autocephality and National
Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction, in id. (ed.),
Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, duke University Press, durham, nc 1988; B.J. Groen, Nationalism and Reconciliation: Orthodoxy in the Balkans,
Religion, State and Society, 26 (1998), pp. 111-128; e. Pope, Ecumenism, Religious
Freedom, and National Church Controversy in Romania, in a.R. de luca - P.d. Quinlan
(eds.), Romania, Culture and Nationalism: A Tribute to Radu Florescu, University Presses
of california, Berkeley 1999; V. clark, Why Angels Fall: A Journey through Orthodox
Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo, St. Martin Press, new York 2000; V. Roudometof,
Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes,
Sociology of Religion, 69 (2008), pp. 67-91; S. zrincak, Church, State and Society
in Post-Communist Europe, in J. Barbalet - a. Possamai - B.S. turner (eds.), Religion
and the State. A Comparative Sociology, anthem Press, london 2011, pp. 157-182; d.
Kalkandjieva, A Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy:
Concepts, Models, and Principles, Journal of church and State, 53 (2011), pp. 587614; l.n. leustean, Orthodoxy and Political Myths in Balkan National Identities, national identities, 10 (2008), pp. 421-432; id. (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in
the Twenty-First Century, Routledge, abingdon, oxon-new York 2014; a. Krawchuk
- t. Bremer (eds.), Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identities and Otherness: Values, SelfRelection, Dialogue, Palgrave MacMillan, new York 2014.
67
2. Church and State in the Shadow of Byzantium and of National

Orthodoxy: The Theology of the Empire and Realized Eschatology 39
as i suggested at the beginning of this paper, what unites these otherwise
different cases of church-state relationship in the orthodox world, is the
heritage of Byzantine symphonia, alongside the reality of national orthodoxy, i.e. the identiication of orthodoxy with every single orthodox nation or state, and the understanding of the church in national
terms. i have already, in previous sections of this paper, commented on
the problematic aspects of national orthodoxy. let us now turn to the
theological presuppositions of the idea of byzantine symphonia, which
among the orthodox both of the traditional settings and the diaspora
continue to incarnate the ideal political system, and therefore to enjoy a
high degree of acceptance and theological appreciation40.
Byzantine secularized degree of political eschatology, and the association of the earthly empire with the Kingdom of God has its roots in
theology, and even in liturgical texts. according to the relevant analysis
of the great orthodox theologian and historian Fr. John Meyendorff,
the great dream of Byzantine civilization was a universal christian society administered by the emperor and spiritually guided by the church. this idea obviously
combined Roman and christian universalisms in one single socio-political program. it was also based upon the theological presuppositions concerning man []:
man, by nature, is God-centered in all aspects of his life, and he is responsible for
the fate of the entire creation. as long as christianity was persecuted, this Biblical
assertion could be nothing more than an article of faith, to be realized at the end
of history and anticipated in the sacraments. With the conversion of constantine,
however, it suddenly appeared as a concrete and reachable goal. the original enthusiasm with which the christian church accepted imperial protection was never
corrected by any systematic relection on the nature and role of the state or of secular societies in the life of fallen humanity. there lies the tragedy of the Byzantine
system: it assumed that the state, as such, could become intrinsically christian41.
39
in this part of my paper i rely on the analyses i offered in my book, Orthodoxy and
Political Theology, in Doxa & Praxis: Exploring Orthodox Theology series, Wcc Publications, Geneva 2012.
40
See for instance, V. Yannopoulos, Relations de lEglise et de ltat selon les critres de la
tradition orthodoxe, in Eglise et Etat en Europe, les etudes thologiques de chambsy,
n. 11, chambsy, les editions du centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat cumnique, Genve 1996, pp. 153-170 [in Greek]; and J.a. McGuckin, The Orthodox Church: An Introduction to its History, Doctrine, and Spiritual Culture, Blackwell, Malden, Ma/oxford
2008, pp. 380-384.
41
J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes, 2nd edition
with revisions, Fordham University Press, new York 1979, p. 213.
68
But liturgical texts also, like as the well-known hymn in the second tone
from the orthodox christmas Vespers service (attributed to the nun cassiani), give a theological vision to a Byzantine secularized political eschatology, and the association of the earthly empire with the Kingdom of
God which it operates by linking democracy with polytheism on the one
hand, and monarchy, with monotheism and christianity on the other.
one can clearly see here the structural analogy between theological and
political concepts, to recall the now classic analysis on political theology of the conservative Roman catholic German philosopher of law carl
Schmitt42. thus, according to the orthodox christmas Vespers hymn:
When augustus reigned alone on the earth, the many kingdoms of mankind
came to an end; and when you became man from the pure Virgin, the many
gods of idolatry were destroyed; the cities of the world passed under one single rule; and the nations came to believe in one single Godhead; the peoples
were enrolled by decree of caesar; we the faithful were enrolled in the name
of the Godhead, when you became man, o our God. Great is your mercy,
lord; glory to you!43
We now know, following the work of many respected historians and

theologians (for example, Francis dvornik, Gerhard Podskalsky, HansGeorg Beck, Hlne ahrweiler, Gilbert dagron, Georges Florovsky,
John Meyendorff, Savas agourides), that the Byzantines believed that
their state and their society were the materialization of the kingdom
of God on earth. Runciman states this quite explicitly at the outset
of his classic study The Byzantine Theocracy, which he describes as an
attempt to give an account of an empire whose constitution[]was
based on a clear religious conviction: that it was the earthly copy of
the Kingdom of Heaven44. Historians, political scientists, theologians, and other scholars seem to agree on tracing back this theology of the empire, this theological justiication of monarchy, irst to
eusebius of caesarea, and to his works Ecclesiastical History, and the
Life of Constantine, and then to the Byzantine emperor Justinian and to
the politico-theological vision articulated around the two crucial concepts, emperor and the priest, as expressed in his Novellae, his major
legal work, of which the Sixth Novella is very characteristic:
42
For a more detailed analysis of Schmitt political theology, and its theological
critique, cf. Kalaitzidis, Orthodoxy and Political Theology, pp. 15-25.
43
english translation by a. ephrem (lash) at: http://www.anastasis.org.uk/25decves.
htm.
44
S. Runciman, Byzantine Theocracy, cambridge University Press, cambridge-new
York 1977, p. 1.
69
there are two greatest gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from
on high: the priesthood and the imperial dignity. the irst serves divine things,
the second directs and administers human affairs; both, however, proceed from
the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such
a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for the
[imperial] welfare that they constantly implore God. For if the priesthood is
in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors
administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general
harmony will result, and whatever is beneicial will be bestowed upon the human race45.
in the words of Fr. John Meyendorff commenting on this key text for
the Byzantine concept of symphonia, what emerges from Justinians
Novellae; is that in the thought of Justinian, the symphony between
divine things and human affairs was based upon the incarnation,
which united the divine and human natures, so that the person of christ
is the unique source of the two the civil and ecclesiastical hierarchies.
the fundamental mistake of this approach, Meyendorff continues, was
to assume that the ideal humanity which was manifested, through the
incarnation, in the person of Jesus christ could also ind an adequate
manifestation in the Roman empire. Byzantine theocratic thought was,
in fact, based upon a form of realized eschatology, as if the Kingdom of
God had already appeared in power and as if the empire were the manifestation of this power in the world and in history46. in this seamless
political-theological vision, the emperor stood in the place of christ,
and his kingdom was a relection of its heavenly counterpart. as the
Greek Professor Savas agourides notes, the Byzantine state, particularly
from the Justinianic era forward, following as it does along the lines of
Jewish apocalyptic literature [] sees itself as the inal actualization of
45
For the text of the Novella see Corpus juris civilis, ed. Rudolfus Scoell, Berlin 1928,
iii, pp. 35-36. For the english translation see J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, p.
213. cf. the now classic studies by F. dvornik, Early Cristian and Byzantine Political Philosophy: Origins and Background, v. i-ii, dubarton oaks center for Byzantine Studies,
trustees for Harvard University, Washington, dc 1966; G. dagron, Empereur et prtre.
Etude sur le csaropapisme byzantin, Gallimard, Paris 1996. cf. also J. Meyendorff,
Justinian, the Empire, and the Church, dombarton oaks Papers, 22 (1968), pp. 45-60;
cf. also c. Pitsakis, La Synalllia principe fondamental des rapports entre lEglise et lEtat.
Idologie et pratique byzantines et transformations contemporaines, Kanon, 1991, 10, pp.
17-35; H.J. Magoulas, Byzantine Christianity: Emperor, Church and the West, Rand Mcnally & company, chicago 1970.
46
Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, pp. 213-214. the crucial theme which needs further discussion is that of the connection of the emperor and imperial function with
the person of christ, the High Priest, and the Kingdom of God.
70
christian hope, as the eschatological prelude to the kingdom of God47.

in this perspective, we are clearly facing a peculiar form of realized eschatology (of a political or secular sort) which seems to have largely lost
the tension between the already and the not yet, that is, between the
irst and the second coming of christ, his resurrection and the expectation of our own resurrection and the recapitulation of history, which will
signal our personal incorruptibility and the end of the reign of death.
christians are aliens and exiles (1 Pt 2:11), moving continuously toward the eschaton, in accordance with the biblical injunction to be in
the world, but not of the world. again what we lose, as orthodox christians, is our focus on and our orientation toward the anticipated new
world, from which the present takes its identity and hypostasis, its meaning and its purpose. in the light, then, of this absence of biblical eschatology and active anticipation and openness toward the future, even the
second coming of christ itself is reduced to a mere conirmation that
the kingdom of God has already been realized with Byzantium. Hence
we are faced here with a peculiar political theology, a political eschatology, or an eschatological ideology concerning the state.
thus, realized eschatology, and identiication of the true and genuine faith with Byzantium, tsarist Russia or with one of the Balkan monarchies is, in fact, the permanent temptation of historical orthodoxy
insofar as it annuls the paradoxical dialectics between history and eschatology as well as the eschatological expectation of the Kingdom of God
and the openness of history.
in the perspective encapsulated by The Epistle to Diognetus, a classic,
late 2nd century christian text with a strong eschatological character, it is
important for us to understand that, in the ecclesial way of life, no change
or progress is imposed from the outside. the christian virtues or characteristics cannot be legislated in a worldly way, as if they were the goals
of some political agenda or obligations according to some code of conventional morality. Rather, they arise voluntarily as the natural concomitant of the re-orientation of existence in the light of the Kingdom, as a
natural consequence of conscious participation in the ecclesial/eucharistic life and of progress in the spiritual life. according to The Epistle to
Diognetus, the lives of christians are such that they have no need for laws.
christian life, when it is genuine, leads inevitably to transcendence of
47
Savas agourides, The Roots of the Great Idea, in agourides, Theology and Society
in Dialogue, artos zoes, athens 1999, pp. 16-17 [in Greek]; cf. id., Religious Eschatology and State Ideology in the Byzantine Tradition, the Post-Byzantine Era, and the Modern Greek State, in agourides, Theology and Current Issues, artos zoes, athens 1966,
pp. 53-54 [in Greek].
71
the ego and the spirit of authoritarianism, to the abrogation of the law
and authority, to a unique christian eschatological anarchism. all this,
however, pertains to christians, those who choose as their rule of life the
scandal of the cross and the foolishness of the Resurrection, those who
live in a state of in between, who base their whole existence on the
eschaton and the anticipated new world, from which the present takes its
identity and hypostasis, its meaning and its purpose. thus, any attempt
to impose through political means biblical, ecclesiastical, or ascetical
standards on public life, and indeed on citizens who are not or who do
not desire to become christians, is incomprehensible. christian ethics
are anarchical because they are eschatological and cross-centered, and
because they are following the example of Jesus christ ascetical ethics of the voluntary surrender of the ego and individual self-suficiency,
power, and authority. Hence, for the church any entanglement with
power, any attempt to establish a christian state, and any daydream of
returning to an ideal theocratic christian society or empire, constitute
an aberration, distortion, and contradiction in terms.
When the church forgets this, when its eschatological vision the vision of the Kingdom of God is usurped by the temptation to be vindicated within history and to identify with one form or one period of history
(which is deemed christian), then the church reverts from a symbol of
the eschaton, a foretaste of the Kingdom of love and freedom, to an institutionalized and authoritarian organization. then the Kingdom of God
is conceived in terms of the political forms of the past and is identiied
with the vision of a christian ecumene and Byzantine theocracy, which
results in an authoritarian understanding of the Kingdom realized within
history. the church no longer draws its hypostasis from the eschaton but
rather from history, and instead of a foretaste of the Kingdom, the church
declares itself to be the worldly Kingdom48. the church is transformed
from a community that is open to the future and its challenges, into one
that yearns for the past and its political forms. it no longer yearns for the
eschaton, the Kingdom of God, and the coming lord, but instead for a
return to a christian empire and Byzantine theocracy a theocracy
which, just as in ancient israel or ancient Rome, blurs the line between
the worldly and the religious spheres, between the realms of caesar and
God, and about which Fr. Georges Florovsky, probably the most distinguished orthodox theologian of the twentieth century, leveled such a
devastating critique which we, however, try to ignore:
48
cf. the excellent analysis by dimitris arkadas in Power and the Church: Political Aspects of Eschatological Ecclesiology, Synaxi, issue 79, 2001, pp. 89-97, from which we
have borrowed some of the preceding discussion.
72
the Holy empire of the Middle ages was an obvious failure, both in its Western and its eastern forms. it was at once an utopia and a compromise. the old
world was still continuing under the christian guise. Yet it did not continue
unchanged. the impact of the christian faith was conspicuous and profound
in all walks of life. the faith of the Middle ages was a courageous faith, and
the hope was impatient. People really did believe that this world could be
christened and converted, not only that it was forgiven. there was a irm
belief in the possibility of an ultimate renewal of the entire historical existence.
in this conviction all historical tasks have been undertaken. there was always a
double danger involved in the endeavor: to mistake partial achievements for ultimate ones, or to be satisied with relative achievements, since the ultimate goal
was not attainable. it is here that the spirit of compromise is rooted[] the
story of Byzantium was an adventure in christian politics. it was an unsuccessful
and probably an unfortunate experiment. Yet it should be judged on its own
terms[] Byzantium had failed, grievously failed, to establish an unambiguous
and adequate relationship between the church and the larger commonwealth.
it did not succeed in unlocking the gate of the Paradise lost. Yet nobody else
has succeeded, either. the gate is still locked. the Byzantine key was not a right
one. So were all other keys, too. and probably there is no earthly or historical
key for that ultimate lock. there is but an eschatological key, the true Key of
David. Yet Byzantium was for centuries wrestling, with fervent commitment and
dedication, with a real problem49.
3. The Challenges of the Pluralistic Society, and the Public Witness

of Church and Theology
it is not possible to really address the crucial issue of church-state relation in the orthodox world without being aware of the challenges
of secularization, and the still pending encounter of orthodoxy with
modernity and post-modernity. as eastern christians we more or less
have in mind the effects of secularization in Western christianity, but
we do not really make an attempt to relect on and consider the possible effects of secularization on eastern orthodoxy, preferring the
complacent certainty of an orthodox impermeability to it. if we spare
a moment, however, to look at the relevant academic discussion and
to compare it with our empirical observations, we will then realize that
we are not immune from secularization, which is (or will be) an issue
for eastern orthodoxy too. as the Greek-american political scientist
efie Fokas maintains:
49
G. Florovksy, Antinomies of Christian History, in Christianity and Culture, volume ii

in the Collected Works of G. Florovsky, nordland, Belmont, Ma 1974, pp. 97, 77, 99-100.
cf. id., Christianity and Civilization, in Christianity and Culture, p. 130.
73
While differences in secularization across a notional eastWest divide are widely

accepted (and somewhat obvious), there is a conspicuous divergence in scholarly perspectives on what the future holds in this domain. Speciically, a question
remains as to whether eastern (orthodox) europe will continue to be unsecular or differently secular, or whether it will secularize in time and speciically under the inluence of Western europe. david Martin, for example, sees christian
orthodoxy as resistant to secularization which comes to it from Western europe
and from the european Union (eU) in particular. Speciicities in the historical
evolution of the relationship between religion and nation and between church
and state in orthodox contexts lead, according to Martin, to a different type
of secularization. From a different perspective, Peter Berger predicts the orthodox worlds impending secularization, via integration into european institutions. Berger considers that Western european secularization is a powerful
force which spreads eastwards with the ambit of the eU. according to Berger
orthodoxy is unable to provide immunity against this development50.
of course this is not the place to debate and to discuss this major problem for the years to come. i hope it has become clear from my previous
analyses that the answer cannot be found either on the side of the Byzantine symphonia or on the side of nationalized orthodoxy and the orthodox Statism. Besides, the christian life, according to the example set
by abraham51, is one of continual movement and journey, including the
elements of estrangement and migration, of exodus, and diaspora, and
even of voluntary exile. a christian is one who moves toward, not one
who remains within, as the French philosopher Regis debray has observed52. it seems to me that this whole ideology of national orthodoxy
as well as the analogous theories and mythologies of the Greeks as the
new chosen people of God, Holy Russia being the third Rome,
the Slavophile movement, the medieval christian kingdom of Serbia, the
Serbian people as the servant people of God, antiochian uniqueness
and arabhood, the latin character of Romanian orthodoxy, etc. do
nothing but intensify the sense of geographical conditioning and isolation, our collective cultural narcissism and intellectual self-suficiency,
while also promoting a metaphysical essentialist view of an ethno-cultural identity that is unsusceptible to change within time and history, and
which has come to be equated with the identity of the church.
For the orthodox church, however, the adoption of an ecumenical ecclesiastical discourse, free from the continuous references to the
50
e. Fokas, Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Secularization in Contemporary Europe (with
Special Reference to the Case of Greece), Religion, State and Society, 40 (2012), p. 396.
51
See Genesis, chapter 12.
52
R. debray, Dieu, un itinraire, odile Jacob Poches, Paris 2003, pp. 195-196.
74
nation and to the outward forms of the constantinian era, is not just a
demand for genuineness, authenticity and faithfulness to the orthodox
tradition; it is also an absolutely indispensable and urgent prerequisite,
and an inviolate condition for the church, in order for it to participate
in the century in which we live and not to ind an easy and safe shelter
in the past. Without this element, no true or lasting revelation of God
in creation and history can exist, the church cannot pray, dialogue, or
struggle for the life of the world, nor can any real discourse take place
regarding catechesis or the eucharistic and eschatological consciousness of the people of God.
the orthodox churchs irst and foremost concern in the present
context cannot be to preserve at all costs the christian or orthodox
character of the state, nor the utopian and seductive illusion of a christian society or a christian civilization. it must instead engender the
call to repentance, humankinds preparation to receive the preaching
about the Kingdom of God, a creative, spiritual fruitfulness, and the
christ-centered healthiness of christian communities. thus, the orthodox church in traditionally orthodox countries, instead of engaging
in a struggle for internal spiritual renewal and reformation, wastes its
resources and its energy on imposing its presence and activities in the
public sphere, not in the context of an open society, but of yearning for
a traditional, closed society. as long as this paradox stands, the theological voice of the church will continue to operate in a daydream and will
probably remain an illusion, while its political engagement will likely
be limited to medieval/pre-modern models of intervention, rather than
witness, solidarity, and justice.
From the orthodox point of view, at least, we think that the key to
answering the issues raised in the previous sections of this paper is to
be found in eschatology, which is related to the dialectic between the
present and the future, the already and the not yet, which pervades
the churchs sojourn in the world. eschatology introduces, furthermore,
an attitude toward life that maintains a distance from the structures of
the world, a refusal to settle down and identify oneself with the world
and history, without however any trace of disdain for the world and history or any light from them. For eschatology also entails repentance
for the past, as well as faith in and openness toward the future and the
inal outcome of history, while at the same time pointing to a permanent
suspension of any inal and established meaning within history, to constant doubt and radical criticism of the meaning of all institutions, and
implying instead the notion of movement without end, unceasingly and
constantly gaining in richness.

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FILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA

Il progetto Filosofia ed esperienza religiosa promosso dal

FILOSOFIA ED ESPERIENZA RELIGIOSA

Questo volume stato pubblicato con il contributo del Servizio

2014 Vita e Pensiero - Largo A. Gemelli, 1 - 20123 Milano

Prefazione di Emanuela Fogliadini

Saluto del Magniico Rettore dellUniversit Cattolica

Saluto di benvenuto di Giuseppe Colombo

Introduzione di Sua Eminenza Card. Angelo Scola,

Conclusioni di Mons. Luca Bressan

Church and State in the Orthodox World

church and state in the orthodox world

same ideal, an ideal that alongside the reality of a national orthodoxy

1. Different types of church-state relationship in the Orthodox world

church and state in the orthodox world

as a result of the above historical factors, the orthodox church in

the Protestant churches included) are either registered as private legal

church and state in the orthodox world

church and state in the orthodox world

constitution states that the Russian Federation shall be a secular state.

in July 1997, President Yeltsin vetoed the law because it infringed

church and state in the orthodox world

in recent years, religious freedom is furthermore seriously affected not

Vladimirs theological Quarterly, 57 (2013), pp. 525-540.

But following Fr. daniel P. Paynes analysis, the spiritual understanding of

church and state in the orthodox world

Rome, i.e. the illusory dream to resurrect or to imitate the byzantine

church and state in the orthodox world

communities, from 65 different religious groups)23. With the election of

church and state in the orthodox world

the todays Ukrainian religious landscape keeps its diversity, since

Christians in Ukraine: Ecumenism in the Trenches, in Catholic World Report, available

church and state in the orthodox world

a.c. Hovorun, On Maidan, in http://byzypriest.com/?p=81.

there is no special place or role reserved for the orthodox church

church and state in the orthodox world

approx. 22,000 people), and the long waiting period (sometimes up to

church and state in the orthodox world

tion guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, beliefs and religion. it

church and state in the orthodox world

allowing the seven traditional religious communities to have their own

practicing of any religion to be unrestricted, and conirms the separation

church and state in the orthodox world

the main legal framework regulating religious freedom in Bulgaria,

as in every country with a majority or prevailing church, genuine

church and state in the orthodox world

2. Church and State in the Shadow of Byzantium and of National

We now know, following the work of many respected historians and

church and state in the orthodox world

christian hope, as the eschatological prelude to the kingdom of God47.

church and state in the orthodox world

3. The Challenges of the Pluralistic Society, and the Public Witness

G. Florovksy, Antinomies of Christian History, in Christianity and Culture, volume ii

church and state in the orthodox world

While differences in secularization across a notional eastWest divide are widely

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