Geopolitica - L'iran Dopo Le Sanzioni PDF

Vol.
R IV I S TA D EL L 'IS T I TUT O DI A LTI S TUD I I N GEO P OL I TI C A E S C I ENZE A USI L I ARI E

2
L’ I R A N D O P O L E S A N Z I O N I
LUG.-DIC.
2016
ENERGIA, GIOVANI, ISLAM, MODERNITÀ, E CRISI REGIONALE
A CURA DI – Raffaele Mauriello, Biancamaria Scarcia Amoretti CONTRIBUTI
DI – Lere Amusan, Benedetto Francesco Ballatore, Hassan Beheshtipour,
Alberto Bradanini, Valerio Larcher, Seyed Mohammad Marandi, Tuomo
Melasuo, Ebrahim Mohseni, Hamed Mousavi, Mohammad Ali Mousavi, Samuel
Oyewole, Antonino Pellitteri, Giuseppe Provenzano, Sarah Scio’
Vol.V, N˚2 – Luglio-Dicembre 2016
INDICE
EDITORIALE
Impero, shi‘ismo e iranismo: l’Iran dopo le sanzioni______________________7
Raffaele MauRIello & BIancaMaRIa ScaRcIa aMoRettI
L’IRAN DOPO LE SANZIONI:

ENERGIA, GIOVANI, ISLAM, MODERNITÀ, E CRISI REGIONALE
FOCUS
Did Sanctions Make Iran’s nuclear agreement with the P5+1 Possible?_____ 11
eBRahIM MohSenI
Wahhabi Militancy, the West and the Saudi-Iran Divide:
Moving Beyond the old Status Quo________________________________ 43
SeyeD M. MaRanDI & Raffaele MauRIello
energy Security in Iran: the Way forward in the Post-nuclear era_________ 73
GIuSePPe PRovenzano
economic Development in Post-Revolutionary Iran:
a State-in-Society approach_____________________________________ 97
haMeD MouSavI & MohaMMaD a. MouSavI
Iran’s Political culture, Internal Development,
and International environment after the end of Sanctions______________ 113
haSSan BeheShtIPouR & tuoMo MelaSuo
Giovani di Bam:
Storie di ordinaria vita quotidiana nella provincia di Kerman_____________131
SaRah ScIo’
./..
GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
I N D I? C E
PROSPETTIVE
Iran e Grande Medio oriente: tra intrecci regionali e grandi potenze_______155
alBeRto BRaDanInI
the Role of economic Diplomacy in Making Iran a Developed country___ 175
BeneDetto fRanceSco BallatoRe
Iran’s national Interests and the Geo-Strategic Imperative_______________ 209
leRe aMuSan & SaMuel oyeWole
RECENSIONI
Islam and International Relations: contributions to theory and Practice___ 227
antonIno PellItteRI
ORIZZONTI
la cartografia geopolitica negli atlanti Putzger del primo dopoguerra______ 233
valeRIo laRcheR

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
EDITORIALE
Impero, shi‘ismo e iranismo:

l’Iran dopo le sanzioni
Raffaele MauRIello, Ph.D. &
BIancaMaRIa ScaRcIa aMoRettI, PRof.
(1) University of Tehran, Faculty of World Studies,
Postdoctoral Research Fellow; International Relations
and Islamic Studies Research Cohort, Co-Founder
(2) Università di Roma “La Sapienza”, Professore
Emerito di Islamistica
l ’Iran viene generalmente presentato come la culla dell’eresia più

vistosa dell’ecumene islamica, lo shi‘ismo. non è così. lo shi‘ismo,
vale a dire quel ramo dell‘islam che trova il suo referente principale
nella discendenza di ‘ali, il quarto califfo, sia in termini politici/dinastici
che religiosi è fenomeno prevalentemente arabo. Infatti, la geografia re-
ligiosa shi‘ita ha i suoi centri più importanti in Iraq, najaf e Kerbela; luo-
ghi in cui è avvenuto lo scontro con il potere sunnita in carica nei primi
secoli dell‘islam. In Iran ci sono presenze shi‘ite che risalgono alle prime
conquiste dell’altipiano iranico, com’è il caso di Qom, ma lo shi‘ismo di-
venterà dominante in tempi relativamente recenti e per motivi politici.
Dal cinquecento in poi, cioè dall’inizio di quella che possiamo chiamare
modernità sia nel mondo occidentale che vicino orientale, l’evento cru-
ciale è l’avvento al potere di una dinastia che ha radici in una confrater-
nita sufi, la Safawiyya. Il nuovo regime adotta come suo credo lo shi‘ismo
e dà inizio alla conversione della quasi totalità del paese. lo shi‘ismo sa-
favide riprende spunti dalla devozione per i discendenti del cugino di
Muhammad e marito di sua figlia fatima, ‘ali, inaugurata in maniera im-
portante in Iran nel secolo precedente, dominato dalla figura di tamer-
lano il quale si considera spiritualmente e ideologicamente parte della
famiglia alide. Interessa in questa sede il fatto che la dinastia qui in og-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
EDITORIALE
L’IRAN DOPO LE SANZIONI: ENERGIA, GIOVANI, ISLAM, MODERNITÀ, E CRISI REGIONALE
getto si presenta come riformatrice bilmente parola che non può essere

e rivendica come suo carattere pri- cassata come ‘innovazione lingui-
mario la devozione alla famiglia stica’, qualunque sia il significato
del Profeta, come predica lo che le si può attribuire.
shi‘ismo. ciò a dire che la ben nota l’Iran in linea di principio ha
disputa per la successione al Pro- una sua identità specifica a prescin-
feta – che diventerà ratio della di- dere dal dato religioso. Il paese ha
visione della comunità fra sunniti una storia imperiale che non nasce
e shi‘iti – avviene in prima battuta con l’islam, ma che lo porta ad as-
in ambito arabo e che l’Iran è, fino similare esperienze diverse, ‘iraniz-
al cinquecento, nella sua stra- zandole’ e riportandole, in un
grande maggioranza sunnita, modo o nell’altro, al suo Dna che
segue le dinamiche del potere in legge la storia, la propria storia, in
carica a Baghdad, dove domina il una linea di continuità. tale con-
califfato sunnita, e diviene poi og- tinuità viene elaborata in maniera
getto di conquista da parte di di- diversa, ma il dato che non viene
nastie turche provenienti dall’asia mai messo in discussione è ap-
centrale, anch’esse per lo più sun- punto l’aspirazione del paese a
nite. Il dato che qui è da segnalare configurarsi come impero, come
è di natura cultural-politica: l’Iran dimostra tutta la sua storia anche
è sempre stato terra di conquista, recente. Il che è perfettamente lo-
8 ma il risultato finale è che esso ha
sempre inglobato l’altro, almeno
gico, ed è su questa base che le spe-
cifiche declinazioni del significato
in termini culturali. di impero vanno collocate. l’Iran
Si deve rimarcare che nel wa- è tra i primi paesi a essere sotto-
hhabismo, la forma di islam affer- messo dagli arabi nel corso delle
matasi nella Penisola araba con la guerre di conquista dei primi mu-
dinastia saudita – il nemico per ec- sulmani. Diventa protagonista cul-
cellenza dell’Iran –, la parola shi‘a turale della neonata civiltà islamica
è poco usata e, quando lo è, si tratta e delle terre che entrano nell’orbita
spesso di un espediente per dire dell’islam nel momento di espan-
Iran, usando una terminologia che sione. le conversioni permettono
metta in risalto in primis la nega- la formazione di un’entità cultu-
tività del fenomeno, il suo essere rale e politica prima ancora che
fuori dell’islam. Di qui, un’ulte- economica quale l’impero abba-
riore ambiguità nel definire lo side, entità che senza l’apporto ira-
shi‘ismo da parte del suo alter ego, nico non ci sarebbe stata. Qui il
il wahhabismo, termine che equi- discorso religioso diventa stru-
vale a dire Dinastia Saudita. non mento, o meglio, componente es-
a caso, se si spoglia una bibliografia senziale dell’identità imperiale e
wahhabita sul tema qui in oggetto, dell’integrità del paese, che è so-
anche l’aggettivo ‘imamita’ è tabù, stanzialmente sunnita. lo shi‘ismo
visto che ‘Imam’ è incontroverti- all’epoca è, infatti, praticato da una
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
EDITORIALE
IMPERO, SHI‘ISMO E IRANISMO: L’IRAN DOPO LE SANZIONI
minoranza della popolazione. Bi- comunità. tuttavia, il panorama

sognerà attendere il cinquecento ideologico, politico e religioso è
e l’avvento della dinastia Safavide, variegato. un esempio. Sia pure in
il cui fondatore, Isma‘il, impone lo maniera diversa a seconda dei con-
shi‘ismo come religione di stato. testi politici, lo zoroastrismo con-
lo shi‘ismo contempla una sorta tinua a essere rivendicato oggi, al-
di clero (gli ulama, gli interpreti meno da parte delle classi alte,
della religione) che non ha reale come espressione di iranicità indi-
contropartita nel sunnismo: una scutibile e riferimento identitario
cifra identitaria forte e protona- generalizzato, mentre la religiosità
zionale in senso moderno. nel shi‘ita resta la cornice entro cui tale
pensiero dominante in termini fenomeno si colloca; senza la ne-
ideologici, anche oggi lo shi‘ismo cessità di motivare nel dettaglio il
rappresenta la trascrizione islamica processo per cui, per esempio,
dell’iranicità come dato primario nello spirito popolare, una divinità
di quel processo che accoglie, senza femminile pre-islamica come ana-
traumi, ipotesi rivoluzionarie in hita, dea delle acque, trova riscon-
senso proprio. lo dimostrano bene tro nella figura di fatima, figlia del
le vicende degli ultimi decenni: Profeta Muhammad e moglie di
quelle, per l’appunto, che più ci suo cugino ‘ali: tramite per il pas-
interessano in questa sede e che ci saggio della luce profetica che ella
preme segnalare perché sembrano
continuare nel solco rivoluzionario
trasmette dal padre ai figli che suc-
cederanno ad ‘ali. lo shi‘ismo, che
9
che ha determinato la caduta dei nasce dalla sconfitta delle aspira-
Pahlavi, ma che ha avuto antece- zioni al potere dei discendenti di
denti importanti. Si pensi al fatto ‘ali, si struttura nel tempo come
che l’Iran conosce una Rivolu- cifra identitaria del paese attraverso
zione costituzionalista a inizio del la benevolenza della corte. esso
ventesimo secolo, con uno scarto poggia su un patrimonio culturale
temporale poco significativo ri- consolidato su cui vanno collocati
spetto a quanto succede in europa gli eventi rivoluzionari che hanno
e in america con l’emergere dei scandito la storia degli ultimi de-
vari nazionalismi. lo shi‘ismo, così cenni: una storia che si configura
come si propone in Iran, è cifra contemporaneamente come un Ri-
identitaria che evolve a seconda del sorgimento di antiche tradizioni e
contesto del momento. facilita la un ripensamento sul senso da dare
cosa il ruolo dei dotti, gli ulama: al termine tradizione quale conte-
una categoria di cui Khomeini in nitore di specifici percorsi di mo-
tempi relativamente recenti è stato dernizzazione; intesa, quest’ul-
modello esemplare. Sulla base della tima, come continuazione di una
conoscenza religiosa, questa si ar- storia plurisecolare e, insieme,
roga la prerogativa di rappresentare come sperimentazione di una let-
la continuità nella gestione della tura della modernità quale recu-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
EDITORIALE
pero di elementi identitari che lo

shi‘ismo rappresenta in quanto
contenitore culturale della tradi-
zione. come a dire che le proposte
di laicità degli iraniani oggi si pos-
sono interpretare non come rifiuto
dell’islam, nella sua forma shi‘ita,
ma piuttosto come una rilettura
rivoluzionaria dell’idea stessa di
religione: strumento di progresso
e base di un’identità che va oltre il
concetto di una semplice opposi-
zione al regime quando questo si
mostra inadeguato o nemico del-
l’ipotesi di un’ennesima rilettura
di che cosa possa essere in terra
d’islam il fenomeno religioso nel
suo complesso; la via maestra per
rivoluzionare l’esistente. l’incer-
tezza politica, che non è certo solo
dell’Iran, rende difficile fare pro-
10 nostici, ma impegna chi tenta di
radunare analisi che possano aiu-
tare a capire il momento odierno
a privilegiare il dato politico-cul-
turale, ipotizzando scenari possi-
bili di collaborazione con altri ap-
procci nell’individuazione di un
percorso che sfati quei miti assurdi
che influenzano pretestuosamente
l’opinione pubblica occidentale.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
L’IRAN DOPO LE SANZIONI
FOCUS
Did Sanctions Make Iran’s

Nuclear Agreement with the
P5+1 Possible?
eBRahIM MohSenI, Ph.D.
University of Tehran Center

for Public Opinion Research, Senior Analyst
ABSTRACT: In July 2015, after many years of intensive negotiations, Iran and the
P5+1 countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and
China) were finally able to reach a historic agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. As
part of the agreement, Iran agreed to certain restrictions on its nuclear program in
return for the lifting of sanctions on its economy. While it is commonly believed that
sanctions and the pain it had inflicted on the Iranian public were the main reason
why Iran agreed to restrain its nuclear program, multiple public opinion surveys con-
ducted in Iran since 2006 repudiate this claim and show that sanctions and the pain
they inflicted on the Iranian population was not the primary factor that made a com-
promise between Iran and the P5+1 possible. In fact, the data shows that if anything,
sanctions only prolonged the conflict by undermining the minimum level of trust that
was required for Iran and the P5+1 to reach a negotiated solution.
This paper first evaluates the general efficacy of sanctions as means of forcing nations
to adopt policies they would not otherwise adopt. The paper then identifies the role
public opinion plays in this process and evaluates the effect of sanctions on Iranian
public opinion in regards to Iran’s nuclear program. Finally, it investigates the shifts
in Iranian public attitudes that made the compromise possible.
KEYWORDS: IRANIAN PUBLIC OPINION, NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS, JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
(JCPOA)

V oV lo. lV. ,V ,N N˚ 2˚ 2 L uL gu.g- .D- iDci. c, . 2, 021061 6
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TRACK RECORD OF SANCTIONS
t he effectiveness of coercive diplomacy, the most prominent and

frequent manifestation of which has been economic sanctions,
has been evaluated extensively in the literature. Most scholars
concur that unilateral sanctions rarely produce the intended outcomes
(haass, 1998, p. 200). In fact, there seems to be a consensus that, rela-
tively speaking, even limited multilateral sanctions tend to be more effec-
tive than comprehensive unilateral sanctions (o’Sullivan, 2003, p. 300;
Bapat and Morgan, 2009). But in absolute terms, as George, hall, and
Simon (1971) have indicated, history has shown that it is quite difficult
to coerce an opponent to yield when the opponent’s perception of what
is being demanded is significant either in material and real terms and/or
in psychological and symbolic terms (p. 25). In fact, scholars generally
agree that sanctions have limited utility in compelling target states to
change their behaviors, particularly when they have a strong disinclina-
tion to do so (Galtung, 1967; Wallensteen, 1968; Doxey, 1972;
Schreiber, 1973; Knorr, 1977; Renwick, 1981; hufbauer, Schott, and el-
liott, 1990; Pape, 1997; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Pape, 1998;
Drury, 1998; haass, 1998; ang and Peksen, 2007; nincic, 2010).
12 for example, hufbauer, Schott, and elliot (hSe) (1990), who have
used a case study approach to conduct one of the most extensive study
of sanctions to this date, indicate that of all the 115 cases they have ex-
amined where sanctions were used by international bodies, the united
States, and other countries, only 34 percent «made [at least] a modest
contribution» to achieving the intended outcome and that sanctions
were even less likely to succeed when they were used to compel a target
to «change its policies in major ways» (p. 93). Reexamining the same
115 cases that were analyzed by hSe, however, Pape (1997) argues that
hSe are far too generous and concludes that in fact less than 5 percent
of those sanctions qualify as successful using hSe’s own standards.
While Pape’s (1997) finding could suggest that hSe’s research
method lacked objective reliability, since two studies using the same
methods and coding standards have arrived at vastly different results, it
could also be taken as an illustration of how difficult and subjective it is
to discern 1) the intended policy objective(s) in a particular sanction
episode and 2) the degree to which sanctions made at least a “modest
contribution” to the realization of the intended policy objective(s).
yet, perhaps what makes most studies on sanctions even less objective
is the definition and criteria used in evaluating the success of sanctions
in a particular episode. While the criteria used vary from study to study,
efficacy of sanctions have generally been evaluated in two distinct ways.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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DID SANCTIONS MADE IRAN’S NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH THE P5+1 POSSIBLE?
Some studies have evaluated the efficacy of sanctions based on the amount
of “pain” they manage to inflict by using economic indicators to gauge
the degree to which sanctions have negatively affected the economy of
the target (Baldwin, 1985, pp. 130-144; Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Rad-
cliff, 1997). Most other scholars, however, base their measure of success
on the degree to which they evaluate sanctions as having contributed to
the realization of stated or implicit policy objectives using the case study
approach (Wallensteen, 1968; Doxey, 1972; Schreiber, 1973; Knorr,
1977; hufbauer, Schott, and elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997; Morgan and
Schwebach, 1997; Pape, 1998; Drury, 1998; hart Jr., 2000; Drezner,
2003; ang and Peksen, 2007).
one ought to be very mindful of the evaluation criteria used in
such studies since what is and is not regarded as a success is heavily de-
pendent on the standard utilized to discern the cases of success. While it
is true that sanctions, particularly those that have multilateral backing,
do generally succeed in imposing extra costs on the target (hufbauer,
Schott, and elliott, 1990, p. 75), they have infrequently been able to in-
dependently induce the target to change its behavior in significant ways
(hufbauer, Schott, and elliott, 1990, p. 93). erefore, if success is de-
fined as a mere capacity to inflict pain, then sanctions, particularly those
that have the backing of the international community, do generally tend
to succeed. But if success is defined as achieving the intended policy
aims, unless infliction of pain was the policy aim, then sanctions, even
13
those that have the backing of the unSc, have a low likelihood of
success.
consequently, the scholars who evaluate sanction episodes based
on the degree to which sanctions manage to induce a change in the
policy or behavior of the target, do not generally judge them to be a
useful way of achieving such goals. e track record in that regard is
fairly clear. ose who do promote sanctions as a useful policy instrument,
tend to emphasize their effectiveness to impose costs on the target, their
symbolic utility, and/or their usefulness when used in conjunction with
other policy instruments (Baldwin, 1985, pp. 130-144; lindsay, 1986;
nossal, 1989; Dashti-Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 1997; addis, 2003).
But if the threat of sanctions and sanctions themselves have had

such low success rates and if they typically fail to bring about the intended
foreign policy outcomes, why then do policymakers so readily employ
sanctions to begin with? unfortunately, the literature on this issue is
very sparse and very few scholars have attended to this seeming paradox.
hSe (1990) have evaded this question all together and have «le to
others the arduous task of unearthing» the senders’ side of the story (p.
3). contemplating this question, Pahre (1998) suggests that considering
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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the costs of sanction to sender(s), if through sanctions policymakers are

not maximizing their chance in compelling the target country to change
its policies, those employing sanctions «must be maximizing some utility
other than change in the target country’s behavior.» Pahre (1998) con-
cludes that sanctions are employed because they tend to be more effective
in achieving other ends, which may be as valuable to the sender. he in-
dicates that while sanctions rarely succeed in forcing the target country
to yield, they may be more effective in deterring future “misbehaviors”
by other countries, maintaining particular international norms, and serv-
ing «political ends in the sender country.»
Kaempfer and lowenberg (1988) hold a position similar to that of
Pahre (1998) and argue that sanctions are employed not in the hope
that they may achieve their nominal objectives but «to serve the interests
of pressure groups within the sanctioning country.» While some of these
groups might derive specific benefits from the imposition of sanctions
(for example, producers of import-competing goods gain from a ban on
imports), others obtain utility directly from taking a moral stance against
the target country’s objectionable behavior. lindsay (1986) also agrees
and indicates that the low “success” rates that research associates with
sanctions is a result of researchers’ “naiveté” in assuming that the primary
goal of sanctions is to achieve compliance. lindsay (1986) argues that
14 while sanctions more than oen fail to bring about compliance, achieve
subversion, or deter the objectionable behaviors, they do succeed in car-
rying «international and domestic symbols,» which «explains why
states continue to employ sanctions.» Doxey (1980) also suggests that
economic sanctions primarily have domestic political utility and are not
really aimed at influencing the target (p. 101).
While in general it can be said that coercive diplomacy and sanctions
rarely achieve their intended policy objectives vis-à-vis a target, they
have played a central role in international politics since the end of the
Second World War. Indeed, coercive diplomacy is deceivingly attractive
in many ways. It is generally perceived that if it succeeds it can avert
wars and achieve policy objectives with minimal cost and, even when it
fails, it has at the minimum weakened the target and paved the way for
use of more forceful future actions.
yet, coercive diplomacy is at best a risky strategy with many pitfalls.
When it fails, as it oen does, the coercer will face the grim choice of ei-
ther backing down, and hence tarnishing his own reputation and credi-
bility, or enduring the costs of executing his threats, which oen-time is
higher than the expected gains. Moreover, coercive diplomacy can also
erode the trust between the coercer and the target needed for them to
achieve any negotiated solution to their problems, thereby prolonging
the conflict, which in turn both increases the costs of the conflict to
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both parties and hardens positions, making any form of peaceful resolu-
tion more difficult to achieve. coercive diplomacy is also a risky political
strategy, both domestically and internationally. While at first coercive
diplomacy might be the least costly action to take when the political en-
vironment requires “something” to be done, public and international at-
tention could, and oen does, shi away from the conflict before its res-
olution, leaving the coercer with a threat that must be backed-up with
dissipated domestic and/or international support. is is particularly
problematic when the execution of the threat made is at least somewhat
dependent on the actions of other coalition of players, whose «views re-
garding the importance of the objective may not be shared equally»
(hufbauer, Schott, elliott, and oegg, 2007, p. 171).
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
While much research has been conducted on the efficacy of sanc-

tions, only a few have analyzed sanctions from the vantage point of the
target and even fewer use survey data from the target country to evaluate
the impact of sanctions on the public’s support for the policy, behavior,
or the government that sanctions have sought to change. one might,
however, question the impact of public opinion on policymaking, par-
ticularly in contexts where citizen input into policymaking is limited,
and, as a result, see little utility in assessing the effect of sanctions on the
15
support or opposition of the public for the policy that sanctions aim to
change.
It must, nevertheless, be noted that the overarching rationale of
sanctions has indeed been that if sanctions cause enough pain «the cit-
izens in the target country will exert political pressure to force either a
change in the behavior of the authorities or their removal altogether»
(Weiss, cortright, lopez, and Minear, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, it has been
emphasized by the uS Government accountability office (Gao) in its
november 1994 report that «[I]f the targeted country has a domestic
opposition to the policies of the government in power, sanctions can
strengthen this opposition and improve the likelihood of a positive
political response to the sanctions.» It has also been noted that the bear-
ing public opinion has on the success odds of sanctions becomes partic-
ularly significant in instances where the issue at hand gains enough
salience to find its way into the public discourse of the target (Knecht
and Weatherford, 2006). Moreover, Genugten, and Groot (1999) indi-
cate that sanctions are most likely to fail if the coercer’s demands and
concerns are not shared by a significant constituency within the target
country and emphasize that sanctions are more effective if the demanded
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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change in the policy or conduct of a country’s decision-making elite is

voiced both by external and internal forces (pp. 145-146).
Many scholars believe that public opinion does in fact affect how
elites make decisions, even in countries that are not fully democratic.
Joseph nye (2010), for example, argues that in all systems of government,
even in autocracies, «public opinion affects elites by creating an enabling
or disabling environment for specific policy initiatives.» In other words,
the more the public is opposed to a particular policy, the more difficult
and politically costly the elites will find adopting that policy and vice
versa. is is by no means limited to liberal societies. Indeed, many com-
parative political scientists have argued that even autocratic governments
are dependent upon a certain threshold of public support to remain in
office.1 In fact, it could be well argued that while going against the flow
of public opinion might merely jeopardize the political careers of those
in office in liberal democracies, doing so would put in jeopardy the whole
political system in autocracies, making the costs of going against public
opinion even higher under autocratic settings. is is perhaps why most
autocratic regimes insist on exerting a strong control over mass media
and maintain a tight control over the flow of information into their re-
spective societies. at said, the Islamic Republic is not an autocracy
and the level of public participation in Iranian politics is quite extensive,
16 making an investigation of Iranian public attitudes toward their country’s
proliferation-sensitive activities even more important.
ere exists broad empirical support that the american public re-
sponds rationally to salient international events and that public opinion
does affect how policymakers in the uS respond to such events (Page
and Shapiro, 1983, 1992; Monroe, 1998; Stimson, Mackuen, and erikson,
1995). ere are also studies that suggest the same to be true in the con-
text of western democracies ( Jenkins-Smith et al, 2004). testing for the
existence of the same public opinion-public policy dynamic beyond the
context of western democracies, cale D. horne (2009) found that the
«existing theory on the determinants of public preferences on govern-
ment policy are salient» in other political contexts as well. In particular,
horne (2009) found that in Iran «[c]ore beliefs about the world, in
combination with domain specific beliefs and preferences, show strong
relationships to policy preferences across the range of issues examined.»
he concludes that Iran is not an exception to the general theory and
that decision-making in Iran is influenced by public opinion. erefore,
it seems even more crucial to investigate how sanctions influenced Iranian
public’s position with regards to Iran’s nuclear program as Iran and the
1 See for example: Geddes, 2003 and Weingast and Wittman, 2006.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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P5+1 countries were negotiating to find a solution to what had seemed

to become an intractable international security predicament.
EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRANIAN PUBLIC

OPINION
to evaluate the effect of sanctions on Iranian Public opinion toward

Iran’s nuclear program, this paper uses two nationally representative
probability sample surveys of Iranians, one conducted by Program on
International Policy attitudes (PIPa) between august 27 and September
10, 2009 (hereinaer, PIPa 2009), and the other conducted by university
of tehran center for Public opinion Research (utcPoR) between
March 3 to March 18, 2014 (hereinaer, utcPoR 2014). PIPa 2009
used an independent opinion research company, which relied on native
farsi speakers calling into Iran from a call center located in Istanbul, to
produce a sample size of n=1003. e margin of error for a sample of
that size is approximately ± 3.2%. utcPoR 2014 used its own call
center in tehran to produce a sample size of n=1216. e margin of
error for a sample of that size is approximately ± 2.8%. Both surveys in-
terviewed Iranian citizens over the age of 18.
e hypothesis being tested is whether or not the pain of sanctions
and the threat of its intensification were successful in persuading Iranians
to create an enabling environment for their policymakers to comply with
17
unSc demands, which required Iran to cease all of its nuclear enrich-
ment related activities.
Methodology
is section uses two econometric techniques to test the hypotheses

of this study. first, since the dependent variable of this study is binary –
with “success” (1) meaning a willingness to forgo enrichment and “failure”
(0) meaning an opposition to forgoing uranium enrichment – and since
the goal of this study is to test for the existence of a statistically significant
relationship between the independent variables and the respondents’
willingness to forgo enrichment (defined as success), a logit regression
model with robust standard errors was utilized. e logit estimation
technique allows for estimating a model that describes the relationship
between the independent variable(s) and a binary dependent variable
(hill and lewicki, 2007).
e second method used in this section is the average effect of
treatment on the treated method (att) – using the nearest-neighbor
Propensity Score Matching technique. In experiments, the group that
does not receive a treatment is referred to as the “control group” and the
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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group that does receive a treatment is referred to as the “treatment group”

and for an experiment to be valid, cases must be assigned randomly to
either of the groups and neither the cases nor the researchers should
know to which group each of the cases has been assigned. however, in
observational studies that lack the benefit of a random double blind as-
signment, the only way to make valid inferences about the effects of a
treatment is to balance the treatment and control groups across possible
confounding variables and to make the two groups as similar in as many
aspects to each other as possible. to do this, the propensity-score method
is used to «compare like with like by matching individuals on propensity
scores-summary scores based on observed variables» (firebaugh, 2008,
p. 147). and to the extent the observable variables that are used for
propensity score matching are correlated with possible unobservable
confounding factors, propensity score matching also reduces the potential
biases generated by unobservable confounding factors and allows one to
evaluate how those who are given the treatment differ from those who
have not been given the treatment as far as the dependent variable is
concerned.2
Since this section is primarily interested in the effect of sanctions
on the Iranian people’s willingness to forgo uranium enrichment, in ad-
dition to a logit regression analysis, the average effect of treatment on
18 the treated method (att) was also utilized. rough propensity score
matching, the sample’s of both surveys were divided in two groups and
the composition of the two groups were made almost identical to one
another across many demographic and attitudinal dimensions. e most
important difference between the two groups, however, was whether or
not they regarded sanctions as having a negative impact on Iran’s economy
and whether or not they thought sanctions against Iran would be in-
creased if Iran continued enriching uranium, the two main independent
variables of this study. en the two groups’ attitudes toward the de-
pendent variable of the study were evaluated to see if:
1. ose who think that sanctions are negatively impacting Iran’s
economy are more likely than those who do not think that sanc-
tions are negatively impacting Iran’s economy to believe that
Iran should forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that
would also li sanctions against Iran.
2. ose who think that sanctions against Iran would be increased
if Iran continued enriching uranium are more likely than those
who do not think that sanctions against Iran would be increased
if Iran continued enriching uranium to believe that Iran should
2 for a more detailed explanation of the method see Becker and Ichino, 2002.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that would also li

sanctions against Iran.
THE LOGIT REGRESSION MODEL
e dependent variable of this study is the willingness to forgo ura-

nium enrichment as part of a deal that would li all sanctions against
Iran, which is measured by an identical question in the two surveys.
Both PIPa 2009 and utcPoR 2014 ask Iranians «Would you favor
or oppose an agreement whereby the current sanctions against Iran would
be removed and Iran would continue its nuclear energy program, except
that it would agree not to enrich uranium?» In response, the respondents
could either indicate that they would favor such an agreement or say
that they would oppose such an agreement. ey were also able to say
«don’t know» or decline to answer. as the results of PIPa 2009 indi-
cates, when faced with this question, 32% of Iranians favored and 55%
of them opposed such a deal. also, 13% of the respondents either said
«don’t know» (10%) or declined to answer the question (3%). While
the results of utcPoR 2014 are somewhat similar to the results of
PIPa 2009, utcPoR 2014 does show a slight increase in the propor-
tion of Iranians who would oppose such a deal. In response to the very
same question, 62% of utcPoR 2014 respondents said that they would
oppose and 29% said that they would favor such an agreement. also,
19
9% of the respondents either said «don’t know» (6%) or refused to an-
swer the question (3%).
Q. Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current

sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran would continue its
nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich ura-
nium?
PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014
Would favor such an agreement 32 29
Would oppose such an agreement 55 62
Don’t know 10 6
Refused 3 3

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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using this question as a dependent variable, this section employs

the abovementioned two econometric methods to evaluate whether or
not the belief that sanctions are having a negative impact on Iran’s econ-
omy as well as the belief that sanctions would increase if Iran would
continue its enrichment activities did positively and significantly correlate
with the respondents’ willingness to favor forgoing uranium enrichment
in return for the liing of sanctions against Iran. erefore, the two hy-
pothesis of this study are:
H1: e pain of sanctions was positively associated with Iranian public

support for stopping Iran’s uranium enrichment activities.
H2: e threat of increased sanctions was positively associated with

Iranian public support for stopping Iran’s uranium enrichment activi-
ties.
H1 suggests a commonly held perception that the more painful

sanctions become, the more likely it is that the target will concede. is
assumption holds that the motivation to persist with an objectionable
policy would erode if sanctions could elevate the costs of that policy be-
20 yond its benefits (George, 1991, p. 11). to test this hypothesis, this study
uses an identical question in the two surveys. Both PIPa 2009 and utc-
PoR 2014 ask «as you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for
enriching uranium. to what degree would you say these sanctions have
had a negative impact on our country’s economic situation?» In response,
the results of PIPa 2009 show that 23% of Iranians said that sanctions
have «had a lot of negative impact,» 37% said sanctions have «had
some negative impact,» 15% said sanctions have «had only a little neg-
ative impact» and another 15% said sanctions have «had no negative
impact» on Iran’s economy. also, 10% of the respondents of PIPa 2009
either said «don’t know» (9%) or refused to answer this question (1%).
understandably, the results of utcPoR 2014, as compared to the
results of PIPa 2009, show a significant increase in the proportion of
Iranians who believe that sanctions are having a greatly negative impact
on Iran’s economy. In response to the same question, 42% of the respon-
dents of utcPoR 2014 said that sanctions have «had a lot of negative
impact,» 26% said sanctions have «had some negative impact,» 17%
said sanctions have «had only a little negative impact» and another 6%
said sanctions have «had no negative impact» on Iran’s economy. also,
9% of the respondents of PIPa 2009 either said «don’t know» (5%) or
refused to answer this question (4%).
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Q. as you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for enriching

uranium. to what degree would you say these sanctions have had a neg-
ative impact on our country’s situation?
Has had a lot of negative impact 23 47
Has had some negative impact 37 23
Has had only a little negative impact 15 19
Has had no negative impact 15 7
Don’t know 9 3
Refused 1 1
for the purpose of the evaluation of this study, this question is used
to split respondents in two groups: 1) those who think that sanctions
have had «at least some negative impact» on Iran’s economy and 2)
those who do not think so. using this question as one of the main inde-
pendent variables, this study is able to evaluate the effect of the perceived
pain of sanctions on the Iranian people’s willingness to forgo enrichment.
21
hence for H1 to be substantiated, the perceived pain of the sanctions
should be positively and significantly correlated with the dependent vari-
able of this study.
H2 is based on the commonly held assumption that «coercive diplo-

macy can succeed only if the opponent accepts as credible the threat of
punishment for noncompliance with the demands made upon him»
(George, hall, and Simon, 1971, p. 238). to test whether being credibly
fearful of increased sanctions has an effect on Iranian people’s attitudes
toward their country’s nuclear enrichment program, this study uses an
identical question in the two surveys as its second main independent
variable. Both PIPa 2009 and utcPoR 2014 ask «If Iran continues
its current nuclear program, including enriching uranium, how likely do
you think it is that the current sanctions against Iran will be increased?»
In response, the results of PIPa 2009 show that 35% of Iranians said
that sanctions will «definitely be increased,» 35% said sanctions will
«probably be increased,» 10% said sanctions will «probably not be in-
creased,» and 9% said sanctions will «definitely not be increased.»
also, 11% of the respondents to that survey either said «don’t know»
(9%) or refused to give an answer (2%). e respondents of utcPoR
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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2014, however, were slightly more doubtful that sanctions would increase,
with 25% saying sanctions will «definitely be increased,» 36% saying
sanctions will «probably be increased,» 17% saying sanctions will «prob-
ably not be increased,» and 11% saying sanctions will «definitely not
be increased,» in response to the very same question. also, 11% of the
respondents to that survey either said «don’t know» (10%) or refused
to give an answer (1%)
Q. If Iran continues its current nuclear program, including enriching

uranium, how likely do you think it is that the current sanctions against
Iran will be increased? Do you think they will:
Definitely be increased 35 25
Probably be increased 35 36
Probably not be increased 10 17
22 Definitely not be increased 9 11
Don’t know 9 10
Refused 2 1
for the purpose of the evaluation of this study, this question will be
used to divide the respondents into two groups: 1) those who expect
that sanctions against Iran would be increased if Iran does not comply
with the demands of unSc and 2) those who do not have such an ex-
pectation. for H2 to be substantiated, the expectation that sanctions
would be increased should be positively and significantly correlated with
the dependent variable of this study.
In addition to the two sanctions-related variables that are used as
the main independent variables in order to test for the validity of the
two hypotheses of this study, the models control the respondents’ confi-
dence in government, confidence in the united nations (un), attitudes
toward the uS, exposure to alternative sources of news and information,
as well as the respondents’ age, level of education, economic status, and
whether or not they have an Islamist approach to governance.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Results of the Logit Regression Model
as can be seen in the following table (table 1), the logit regression
model (with robust standard errors) using the data from PIPa 2009 and
utcPoR 2014 yields some very interesting results:
TABLE 1
Dependent: Agree to halt enrichment
Data Source PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014

Logit, r
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0870 0.1167
Hosmer-Lemeshow lack of fit test 0.2820 0.2424
Sanctions have negative impact 0.2548 (0.235) -0.0165 (0.862)

ctions
San-
Sanctions will increase 0.2968 (0.239) -0.0348 (0.679)
Satisfaction with system of Government 0.0327 (0.826) —
Confidence in June 2009 Election -0.1747 (0.152) —

Gov. Support
23
Confidence in Majlis (Parliament) — -0.1750 (0.144)
Confidence in President — -0.1107 (0.262)
Confidence in Judiciary — -0.1812 (0.175)

U.N.
Confidence in the UN 0.4758 (0.016)** 0.3339 (0.001)***
Favorability of the US Government 0.2089 (0.075)* 0.3239 (0.004)***

Attitudes Toward U.S.
Belief that the US aims to weaken and divide

0.3315 (0.002)*** —
Muslim World
Favor Negotiations with the US 0.1342 (0.124) —
Importance of having relations with the US — 0.1816 (0.049)**

Alternative
Follow VOA or BBC 0.1439 (0.533) -0.0376 (0.832)

News
Internet use -0.0903 (0.286) -0.0820 (0.231)
Has Islamists approach to governance -0.0199 (0.924) -0.2496 (0.186)

Demographics
Age -0.0037 (0.657) -0.0015 (0.297)
Education -0.1293 (0.023)** -0.0608 (0.048)**
Economic Status -0.1780 (0.173) 0.0966 (0.161)
*Significant at 0.1 level **Significant at 0.05 level ***Significant at 0.01 level

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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as table 1 illustrates, the logit regression models using data from

PIPa 2009 as well as utcPoR 2014 do not provide support for H1 or
H2 of this study. as the model indicates, all else held constant, neither
the perceived pain of sanctions nor the perceived likelihood of increased
sanctions were significantly predictive of the respondents’ willingness
(or lack thereof ) to forgo uranium enrichment. e model, however,
does suggest a significant positive relationship between the respondents’
degree of confidence in the un and their willingness to forgo uranium
enrichment. Indeed, increased confidence in the un does positively and
significantly predict a willingness to negotiate away Iran’s uranium en-
richment capabilities. also, perhaps more interestingly, the model does
support the idea that attitudes toward the uS do predict Iranian people’s
willingness to forgo uranium enrichment. as expected, holding all other
variables constant, increased favorability of the uS is positively and sig-
nificantly predictive of the Iranian public’s willingness to turn their back
on Iran’s uranium enrichment program.
e results of the logit regression analysis did not provide support
for any other commonly held views regarding the determinants of Iranian
public’s attitudes toward their country’s uranium enrichment program.
variables relating to the respondents’ degree of support for various Iranian
institutions did not significantly predict the dependent variable. also,
24 the model does not support the suggestion that people’s support for
Iran’s enrichment program is a function of where they get their news
from. following the news programs of voa (voice of america) and
BBc and increased usage of the internet were not significantly predictive
of the dependent variable. among demographic variables, the models
using data from PIPa 2009 as well as utcPoR 2014 do find education
to be negatively and significantly predictive of the dependent variable.
e more educated the respondents were, the less likely they were to
agree to forgo uranium enrichment.
THE ATT-PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING METHOD
e dependent variable for the att analysis is also the willingness

to forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that would li all sanctions
against Iran, which is measured by an identical question in the two sur-
veys. as was indicated, both PIPa 2009 and utcPoR 2014 ask
«Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current sanctions
against Iran would be removed and Iran would continue its nuclear
energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich uranium?» In
response, the respondents could either indicate that they would favor
such an agreement or say that they would oppose such an agreement.
ey were also able to say «don’t know» or decline to answer.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e two main independent variables of the logit model presented

above are used as treatment variables in the att analysis. hence, like
the logit model, the two hypotheses of the att analysis are:
H1: ose who were made to believe that sanctions have a negative im-
pact on Iran’s economy were more likely than those who did not hold
that opinion to support Iran forgoing uranium enrichment.
H2: ose who were made to believe that sanctions against Iran would
increase if Iran continued enriching uranium were more likely than
those who did not hold that opinion to support Iran forgoing uranium
enrichment.
to conduct an att analysis, control and treatment groups need to

become balanced in as many ways as possible so that the two groups
would become similar to each other in aspects designated by the balancing
variables, with the treatment variable remaining as the “only” difference
between the two. for the att analysis using PIPa 2009 data, the treat-
ment and control groups were balanced using the respondents’ confidence
in June 2009 presidential elections, confidence in the un, attitude
toward the uS government, perceptions about uS goals vis-à-vis the
Muslim world, attitudes toward negotiating with the uS, having or not
having an Islamists approach to governance, exposure to voa and BBc,
25
level of internet usage, age, level of education, and economic status. like-
wise, for the att analysis using utcPoR 2014 data, the treatment
and control groups were balanced using the respondents’ confidence in
Majlis (Parliament), confidence in the President, confidence in the Judi-
ciary, confidence in united nations, attitudes toward the uS and Iran-
uS relations, exposure to voa or BBc, level of Internet use, having or
not having an Islamists approach to governance, age, level of education,
and economic status.
Results of the ATT-Propensity Score Matching Method
e results obtained through the att method corroborate the re-

sults of the logit regression models presented earlier. aer balancing the
treatment and control groups using a multitude of balancing variables,
the att method, based on both the data from PIPa 2009 as well as
utcPoR 2014, could not support H1, and did not support the hy-
pothesis that those who were made to believe that sanctions have a neg-
ative impact on Iran’s economy were more likely than those who did not
hold that opinion to support Iran forgoing uranium enrichment:
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Treatment: Pain of Sanctions
N-CONTROLLED
T-STATISTICS
STD. ERROR
N-TREATED
ATT VALUE
P-VALUE
DATA
PIPA
415 133 0.074 0.060 1.227 0.22
2009
UTCPOR
702 171 -0.006 0.062 -0.099 0.92
2014
att estimation with nearest neighbor Matching method.
also, aer balancing the treatment and control groups using the
abovementioned variables, the att method, based on both the data
from PIPa 2009 as well as utcPoR 2014, could not support H2, and
26 did not support the hypothesis that those who were made to believe
that sanctions against Iran would increase if Iran continued enriching
uranium were more likely than those who did not hold that opinion to
support Iran forgoing uranium enrichment.
Treatment: Threat of Sanctions

N-CONTROLLED
T-STATISTICS
STD. ERROR
N-TREATED
ATT VALUE
P-VALUE
DATA
PIPA
500 100 .096 .061 1.572 0.12
2009
UTCPOR
598 204 0.017 0.048 0.348 0.73
2014
att estimation with nearest neighbor Matching method.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
THE SHIFTS IN IRANIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES
unlike most other sanction episodes, Iranian public opinion re-

garding Iran’s nuclear program has been evaluated through a series of
surveys conducted by various research organization through various
methods. all of these surveys show that an overwhelming majority of
Iranians continued to support Iran’s civilian nuclear program, despite
uS and unSc sanctions against Iran.
27

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
as the logit regressions as well as the analysis using the att method
showed, the level of support was not negatively affected by sanctions
and remained roughly constant despite increasing sanctions against Iran.
It is important to note, however, that this was not because sanctions
were not been debilitating. Indeed, a strong majority of Iranians consis-
tently indicated that sanctions had a negative impact on Iran’s economy.
28

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e results shown by WorldPublicopinion.org3 (WPo) and utc-

PoR are corroborated by Gallup as well. using call centers located
outside of Iran, Gallup has asked Iranians about Iranian people’s attitudes
toward sanctions and their nuclear program. on several occasions, Gallup
has asked Iranians «e united nations, the uS, and Western europe
continue to impose sanctions on Iran. Do you think these sanctions have
hurt the livelihood of Iranians a great deal, somewhat, or not at all?» In
response to Gallup’s most recent survey, which was conducted between
May 24 and June 6, 2013, a solid majority (62%) of Iranians indicate
that the sanctions were hurting the livelihood of Iranians «a great deal,»
28% said that sanctions were «somewhat» hurting the livelihood of
Iranians, and only 7% said that sanctions were «not at all» hurting the
livelihood of Iranians.
29
3 WorldPublicopinion.org is an international collaborative project which was ini-

tiated and is managed by the Program on International Policy attitudes (PIPa).

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
all available surveys, however, indicate that, despite recognizing the

severe negative impact of the sanctions on Iran’s economy and the liveli-
hood of the Iranian people and despite believing that sanctions against
Iran would increase if Iran did not suspend enriching uranium and did
not curtail its nuclear program, the Iranian people opposed their gov-
ernment suspending uranium enrichment and believed that Iran «should
continue to develop nuclear power despite the scale of sanctions against
Iran» (loschky, 2013). Since 2006, WPo and utcPoR have asked
the Iranian public «Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby
all current sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran would con-
tinue its nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich
uranium?» In response to the most recent survey conducted by utc-
PoR, 62% of Iranians indicated that they would oppose such a deal,
while only 29% of them said they would favor such a deal.
30

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
again, Gallup surveys corroborate the findings of WPo and utc-

PoR. on several occasions, Gallup has asked Iranians «Given the scale
of sanctions against Iran, do you think Iran should continue to develop
its nuclear power capabilities, or not?» In response to Gallup’s most re-
cent survey, which was conducted between May 24 and June 6, 2013, a
solid majority (68%) of Iranians said «yes,» Iran should continue to
develop its nuclear power capabilities. While Gallup does not say what
percent of Iranians said «no,» in the survey that was conducted in June
2013, when Gallup asked the very same question in January 2013, 63%
of Iranians said «yes, continue» 17% of Iranians said «no, do not con-
tinue,» and 19% of the respondents either said «don’t know» or refused
to answer the question.
31

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
While, as was shown above, sanctions were not effective in eroding

Iranian public support for Iran’s nuclear program and fuel cycle activities,
they did erode the standing of the sanctioning countries and institutions
in Iran. as the uS pushed sanctions through the unSc and as it adopted
more stringent sanctions against Iran, Iranians have developed stronger
negative feelings toward the uS. Survey data from a variety of sources
indicate that Iranians had stronger negative feelings toward the uS in
2014 than they did in 2002.
32

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e Iranian public’s confidence in the un had also taken a hit. ac-

cording to utcPoR 2014, while 74% of Iranians had little confidence
(27%) or no confidence at all (47%) in the un, only 23% had some
(17%) or a lot of confidence (6%) in the united nations. as it is obvious,
the primary reason why the uS and un were viewed so negatively in
Iran is because the Iranian people hold them, and not the government
of Iran, responsible for the sanctions that have negatively affected their
livelihood. according to a Gallup survey of the Iranian people, which
was conducted between May 24 and June 6, 2013, while two-thirds
(67%) of Iranians hold the uS (46%), Israel (9%), Western european
countries (6%), and the un (6%) most responsible for the sanctions
against Iran, only 13% of Iranians hold the Iranian government respon-
sible.
33

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
as was shown previously, attitudes toward the uS and the un were

positively correlated with the Iranian people’s willingness to suspend
Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities. In other words, all else held constant,
as Iranians developed more favorable feelings toward the united States
and became more trusting of the un, they became more willing to favor
a deal that would have required Iran to suspend uranium enrichment in
return for liing of the sanctions. But the opposite was also true. Indeed,
as Iranians lost their confidence in the un and developed more negative
feelings toward the uS, the likelihood of them agreeing to any deal that
would have placed Iran-specific limitations on Iran’s nuclear program
decreased. us, to the degree that the uS and unSc sanctions made
Iranians more negative toward the uS and the un, they simply eroded
the possibility of the Iranian people creating the enabling environment
for their policymakers to accept Iran-specific limitations on Iran’s nuclear
program and its fuel cycle activities.
It is important here to clarify a common misconception that has
surfaced since President Rouhani’s election in June 2013. Many in the
West have heralded President Rouhani’s election as a collective action
that was instigated by uS and unSc sanctions against Iran. Just as an
example, President obama in his remarks at the 10th annual Saban
34 forum hosted by the Brookings Institution on December 7, 2013, as-

serted that it was «precisely because of the international sanctions and
the coalition that we were able to build internationally that the Iranian
people responded by saying, we need a new direction in how we interact
with the international community and how we deal with this sanctions
regime. and that’s what brought President Rouhani to power.»
ere is, however, little evidence in support of such claims and most
available evidence point to the other direction. In fact, it could be well
argued that it was not until President Rouhani reassured the Iranian
public that he was not going to suspend Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle activities
as he had done in 2003 and not until he convinced the Iranian people
that the 2003-2005 suspensions were part of an intelligent scheme to al-
low Iran to master the entirety of the fuel cycle technology, that Iranian
people started to seriously consider Rouhani’s bid for presidency.
utcPoR surveys conducted before and aer the election show
that support for Rouhani did not galvanize until about four days prior
to Iran’s June 14, 2013, presidential election, even though almost the
entirety of all uS and unSc sanctions on Iran were well in place long
before presidential campaigns began in Iran around the end of March,
2013. hence, something besides the sanctions must have been responsible
for Rouhani’s surge during the last days of Iran’s presidential election
campaigns.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Indeed, President Rouhani used all of his major campaign programs

to win back Iranian people’s confidence regarding his attitudes toward
the nuclear program, a confidence that was in question due to Rouhani’s
role in the 2003-2005 nuclear suspension. Just as an example, in response
to the Iranian State tv channel 2 reporter’s question on May 27, 2013,
regarding Rouhani’s role in the 2003-2005 suspensions, Rouhani charged
35
back saying that the suspension was tactically necessary and that «we
completed the nuclear technology … [and by agreeing to the suspensions]
we … provided the opportunity for our nuclear scientists … to complete
Iran’s nuclear [fuel cycle] technology.»
But it was not until the last tv debate among presidential candidates
centering on national security issues that people became convinced that
Rouhani was not a “sellout.” Rouhani had used every opportunity to
convince the public that he was not going to turn his back on Iran’s nu-
clear program and that he was going to use his diplomatic skills to have
the program and avoid sanctions at the same time. But it was not until
ali akbar velayati, another presidential candidate who is also the chief
counsel to the Supreme leader on International affairs and who was
considered to be an opponent of Rouhani, charged against Saeed Jalili,
who was Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator under President ahmadinejad,
during the third debate accusing him of missing opportunities to resolve
the nuclear dispute, that Rouhani’s claims became more widely accepted.
e third presidential election debate, which took place on June 7,
2013, changed a public perception that had inhibited the Iranian people
from trusting Rouhani and his foreign policy approach. less than a
month prior to the June 7, 2013, debate, according to utcPoR election
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
surveys, a solid majority (59%) of Iranians were of the opinion that the
only way Iran could avoid sanction was to suspend its nuclear enrichment
program and only 31% believed that it was possible – as Rouhani was
promising – for Iran to avoid sanctions without having to suspend nuclear
enrichment. e majority belief that it was not possible to avoid sanctions
without forgoing enrichment had prevented people from trusting
Rouhani and his foreign policy approach. When velayati made statements
during the third presidential debate that corroborated Rouhani’s claims,
the public perception regarding this issue underwent a fundamental
change. In response to the same question aer the June 7, 2013, presi-
dential debate, only 36% of Iranians believed that sanctions could not
be avoided unless Iran stopped its enrichment activity and a plurality
(48%) accepted Rouhani’s position that it was possible for Iran to enrich
uranium and avoid sanctions at the same time. In less than a month aer
Rouhani’s election as Iran’s President, the proportion of Iranians who
were of the belief that through skillful diplomacy it was possible to free
Iran from international sanctions without having to relinquish Iran’s
right to peaceful nuclear activity, including uranium enrichment for
peaceful purposes, had gone up to 63%.
hence, from the third debate onward, people started to more seri-
36 ously consider Rouhani. It is no wonder that it is precisely aer the third

debate that we see Rouhani’s numbers going up. It must be said that
Rouhani’s numbers did not only go up solely because of his promise to
continue with the nuclear program. obviously there were many other
domestic reasons. Rouhani’s demonstrated ability to work across Iran’s
political divides, for example, made him a very formidable candidate for
a public that was tired of constant political gridlocks during the presi-
dencies of both Khatami and ahmadinejad. But despite his attractiveness,
people could not trust him until they became convinced that he had not
turned his back on Iran’s nuclear program during the 2003-2005 period.
once that barrier was lied, Rouhani’s other impressive characteristics
and credentials began to attract supporters and he was finally able to at-
tract 50% of almost all segments of Iran’s population.
CONCLUSION
is paper sought to measure the effects of sanctions on the Iranian

public’s willingness to comply with unSc resolutions, which demand
Iran to verifiably suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. It
was argued that it does matter how sanctions had affected the position
of the Iranian people on this issue since the policies of the Islamic Re-
public are at least somewhat influenced by the Iranian public opinion.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e analyses provided in this paper found that both the perceived

pain of sanctions and the perceived likelihood of future sanctions had
no significant effect on the likelihood of Iranians supporting a deal under
which «sanctions against Iran would be removed and Iran would con-
tinue its nuclear energy program, except that it would agree not to enrich
uranium.» e two factors, however, that did have the intended effect
on the Iranian public’s position with respect to Iran’s nuclear program,
i.e. greater confidence in the un and better attitudes toward the uS,
were both undermined by uS and unSc sanctions, making any com-
promise even more difficult.
also, contrary to what some have claimed, President Rouhani’s elec-
tion did not materialize because Iranian people wanted to relinquish
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program. to the contrary, Iranian people
were not willing to seriously consider Rouhani’s various attractive char-
acteristics until they became reassured that he was not going to abandon
Iran’s nuclear program. for this very reason, from day one of the presi-
dential campaigns, Rouhani persistently promised people that he was
going to both advance Iran’s nuclear program and rid Iran of international
sanctions, something very few people thought was possible. yet, when
velayati, who was both a political opponent of Rouhani and is the
Supreme leader’s chief consultant on international affairs, placed much
of the blame for the sanctions that had befallen Iran on Jalili’s ill negoti-
ation tactics, people became more receptive of Rouhani’s message and
37
became willing to give Rouhani a chance to prove his case.
It is important to also note that the negotiations would have likely
failed, as they had in the past, had the P5+1 countries maintained their
position that Iran should suspend all of its enrichment related activities,
including research and development. is was an Iranian redline, strongly
supported by Iranian public opinion, that no Iranian leader could have
crossed, regardless of the intensity of sanctions. a review of all past ne-
gotiations between Iran and, initially, the eu3, and, finally, the P5+1,
indicates that the deal that was secured in July 2015 could have been
readily secured at any time since the full scope of Iran’s nuclear program
came to surface in 2002, had Iran’s negotiating partners accepted Iran to
engage in nuclear enrichment on its own soil.
While the findings of this paper might run counter to the prevalent
perceptions in some circles, they only highlight what the literature on
sanctions has been saying all along. as early as 1967, Galtung, who ex-
amined the first ever unSc sanction that was placed on Rhodesia (pre-
sent day zimbabwe), maintained that sanctions push the population of
the target states to rally behind their leaders and increase «the political
integration» within the target, solidifying the leaders’ resistance to pres-
sure. Similarly, Weintraub (1982) asserts that «the more public an at-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
tempt on coercion, the less likely is the attempt to succeed» because

such attempts would make the public more intransigent which in turn
would «increase the pressures on the target state’s policymakers to resist
the coercive measures» (p. 19). Genugten and Groot also claim the re-
lationship between economic decline and nationalism to be well known.
ey argue that large-scale sanctions are more likely to push the «pop-
ulation to rally behind their leader and resist external pressure»
(Genugten and Groot, 1999, p. 124). Bolks and al-Sowayel (2000) have
similarly maintained that states under sanctions are more likely to «have
greater internal cohesion and ability to ignore the impact of sanctions.»
furthermore, this study also corroborates Joseph nye’s (2004) assertion
that if the uS and, for all intent and purposes, the un become very un-
popular in a country under sanctions, its «political leaders are unlikely
to make concessions to help us» because conceding to them would be
perceived as a political kiss of death. conversely, as this paper suggests,
when the uS and the un were able to win some level of Iranian people’s
confidence by accepting nuclear enrichment on Iran’s soil, the Iranian
people created the enabling environment for their policymakers to be-
come more accommodating.
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42

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Wahhabi Militancy, the West and

the Saudi-Iran Divide: Moving
Beyond the Old Status Quo
SeyeD M. MaRanDI, Ph.D. & Raffaele MauRIello, Ph.D.
(1) University of Tehran, Faculty of World Studies,

Associate Professor (2) University of Tehran, Faculty
of World Studies, Postdoctoral Research Fellow; In-
ternational Relations and Islamic Studies Research
Cohort (Co-IRIS), Co-Founder
ABSTRACT: This essay argues for Iran’s importance as a partner in the fight against
jihadi-takfiri terrorism and, in this respect, it has the outline of a policy brief, based
on a rich array of evidence. It addresses the unleashing of Wahhabi-driven jihadi-
takfiri violence in North Africa and Southwest Asia followed to the so-called Arab
Spring, which has had dire consequences on the populations of Libya, Syria, Iraq and
Yemen, but has also been witnessed on the streets of cities around the world such as
Paris, Brussels, Tunis, Beirut, Istanbul, Kabul, Jakarta, San Bernardino and Orlando.
It does so from the perspective of the new status quo and re-balancing of power in the
region brought about on the one hand by the dire consequences of the Spring/Awak-
ening and on the other by the signing (14 July 2015) and implementation (16 January
2016) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the P5+1. The latter, the essay argues, is a promising sign of the increasing
awareness in the West of the need to move beyond faulty security perceptions about
Iran and the old Wahhabi-guaranteed status quo in the region. Iran has in effect been
the single force that has blocked the emerging threat of Wahhabi militantism and so-
called Islamic State (IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) from Baghdad to Damascus – and arguably
from Beirut to Sanaa – and it is therefore an unavoidable partner for anyone sincerely
interested in degrading and ultimately destroying ISIS, in the long run putting an
end to the decades-long unholy alliance for regional dominance between the West and
Saudi Arabia.
KEYWORDS: WAHHABISM, SAUDI ARABIA, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
M ore than five years have passed since the beginning of the so-
called arab Spring or Islamic awakening. e apparent result
has been a sharp increase in the suffering of arab populations
and a number of failed states in the region, notably libya and yemen. a
report released in December 2015 by the Dubai-based arab Strategy
forum calculated the cost of the Spring/awakening in more than 1.34
million casualties, 14.389 million refugees, and the total loss of $833.7
billion1.
however, the most enduring result of the genuinely popular demands
for dignity, greater freedom, transparency, accountability, job opportu-
nities and representative governance is probably the unleashing of ji-
hadi-takfiri2 violence on a global scale. is has had particularly dire
consequences on the populations of libya, Syria, Iraq and yemen, but
has also been witnessed on the streets of cities around the world such as
Paris, Brussels, tunis, Istanbul, Kabul, Jakarta, San Bernardino and or-
lando.
When the uprisings began, they were largely opposed – and in a
very few cases selectively endorsed – by western powers, preoccupied
with maintaining the status quo in the region. however, as argued by
Kenneth M. Pollack, the recent developments in north africa and South-
west asia are of such a magnitude that the u.S. – and more generally the
44 West – can no longer simply try to maintain the status quo3.
In coordination with the West, a more important, pernicious role
was being played by the energy-rich arab rentier states of the Persian
Gulf, preoccupied with economically and militarily defending the status
quo in the Gulf and the stability of other arab monarchies ( Jordan and
Morocco). Simultaneously, such states were fully involved in creating
havoc in countries such as libya, Syria, Iraq and yemen with different
aims such as tipping the regional balance of power in favor of the anti-
Resistance front (i.e. against the front represented by Iran, Syria, lebanon
and seemingly Iraq), strengthening the hand of Israel and arab monarchy
regimes, and controlling more oil resources (libya). as regards the West,
not many people now remember that over christmas 2010, while people
were protesting in the streets of tunis, french foreign minister Michèle
alliot-Marie was spending her holiday in the country with her partner,
Partick ollier, a government minister in charge of relations with Parlia-
1 Cost of Arab Spring Estimated at $833bn, “emirates247”, 15 December 2015,

https://goo.gl/SBep2M
2 Kuffar means infidels. Takfir is the pronouncement of unbelief against someone
and takfiri refers to those who declare a person to be a kafer.
3 Kenneth M. Pollack, Fight or Flight: America’s Choice in the Middle East, “foreign
affairs”, March/april 2016, https://goo.gl/MnQzJd.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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WAHHABI MILITANCY, THE WEST AND THE SAUDI-IRAN DIVIDE
ment. enjoying free jet rides offered by a local businessman closely con-
nected to the family of tunisian president zine el abidine Ben ali, she
was later to offer french security forces to the autocrat to help him put
down the democratic popular protests4.
Moreover, something very similar occurred when street protests
erupted in egypt, when British Prime Minister tony Blair, following a
luxury family holiday on the Red Sea offered by hosni Mubarak5, de-
scribed the egyptian autocrat as courageous and a force for good6 while,
on the other shore of the atlantic, u.S. vice President Joe Biden main-
tained that Mubarak was not a dictator and that therefore there was no
need for him to step down7.
In the case of the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Saudi and
emirati military intervention in Bahrain on March 2011 to suppress
pro-democracy and civil society-based protests8 could be considered a
low-profile attempt to preserve the status quo9 as could the Gcc-medi-
ated transition in yemen from President ali abdullah Saleh to vice
President abd Rabbuh Mansur hadi via a single presidential candidate
and a yes or no voting option. on the other hand, the recent Saudi-led
military intervention in the country following the success of the houthi-
led popular uprising and their takeover of Sanaa and large swathes of
the country represents a high peak of military activity.
roughout these events, the family-run arab regimes of the Persian 45
Gulf have shown a deep commitment to the selective defense of the
status quo in their “neighborhood.” hence they supported the dispatch
to Bahrain in 2011 of a Saudi-led military force to quell the local popular
uprising while embracing change vis-à-vis unfriendly states, namely Pres-
ident Bashar al-assad in Syria and colonel Gaddafi in libya. at the
same time, they were also trying to derail state-building in post-Saddam
Iraq at any cost.
4 edward cody, Sarkozy Fires Foreign Minister Over Vacation at Tunisian Resort,
“the Washington Post”, 27 february 2011, https://goo.gl/fPG5to.
5 Michael clarke, Blair Accused Over His Family’s Free Egyptian Holiday, “Daily
Mail”, 1 february 2011, https://goo.gl/cn4u53.
6 chris McGreal, Tony Blair: Mubarak is ‘immensely courageous and a force for good’,
“the Guardian”, 1 february 2011, https://goo.gl/9hiruy.
7 Dan Murphy, Joe Biden Says Egypt’s Mubarak No Dictator, He Shouldn’t
Step Down, “the christian Science Monitor”, 27 January 2011,
https://goo.gl/oueclc.
8 zainab al-Khawaja, Bahrain, A Brutal Ally, “the new york times”, 25 December
2012, https://goo.gl/QJ4kKh.
9 Kelly Mcevers, Yemen Election: One Person, One Vote, One Candidate, “nPR”, 21
february 2012, https://goo.gl/tIG3Ds.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
In a few cases, there have been disagreements between arab pro-

western regimes (plus turkey and Israel) and the West and among the
former themselves, notably as regards egypt and, to a lesser extent,
tunisia; with Saudi arabia (and Israel) complaining to the West about
its weakness in supporting Mubarak and Ben ali and, on the contrary,
complaining to Qatar and turkey about their support for the Muslim
Brotherhood.
e position of turkey and Qatar in relation to the Spring/awak-
ening events has indeed been more complex. In the case of turkey, how-
ever, its foreign policy choices have arguably been a failure10. turkey’s
support for ISIS, al Qaeda and other militant groups, together with its
open war with the Kurds of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in
turkey and Iraq and with the People’s Protection units11 (yPG) in Syria,
has led to the rise of extremism and ethnic conflict inside the country it-
self12, engendering a crisis that led to a failed coup attempt on 15 July
2016 which will have enduring negative consequences on the country’s
economy, institutions and political life.
Moreover, it is disheartening that when jihadists waging war against
Syria first made their appearance, turkey, a member of the north atlantic
treaty organization (nato), offered the fighters the use of its border
46 region with Syria as a strategically vital entry point and supply route
thus allowing them to grow in power13. In fact, turkey’s behavior might
be interpreted as an indication of the central role played by nato in
the rise of ISIS. is is strongly suggested by the publication by Judicial
Watch of a partly declassified secret august 2012 document of the De-
fense Intelligence agency (DIa) showing that the u.S. military intelli-
10 Jonathan Schanzer and Merve tahiroglu, Ankara’s Failure: How Turkey Lost the
Arab Spring, “foreign affairs”, 25 January 2016, https://goo.gl/cpgnGe.
11 It should be noted that the yPG are viewed by turkey as an extension of the PKK
but are supported by the u.S. in the fight against ISIS.
12 David lepeska, Turkey Is Sinking into the Quagmire of Syria, “al Jazeera”, 18 fe-
bruary 2016, https://goo.gl/0aJ02e. the PKK is a rebel group that has been fi-
ghting the turkish government since the 1980s, calling for an independent Kurdish
state or for more autonomy within turkey. See Turkey v Syria’s Kurds v Islamic
State, “BBc”, 19 february 2016, https://goo.gl/sh8yuI.
13 anthony faiola and Souad Mekhennet, In Turkey, a Late Crackdown on Islamist
Fighters, “the Washington Post”, 12 august 2014, https://goo.gl/oewha3. ac-
cording to reports, the weapons were bought by Qatar in libya and in eastern eu-
rope and then flown to turkey, where the local intelligence services were instru-
mental in delivering them across the border and into Syria. See Roula Khalaf and
abigail fielding-Smith, How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution, “fi-
nancial times”, 17 May 2013, https://goo.gl/cnMfao.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
gence had “predicted” the rise of ISIS14. e role of turkey in favoring

this rise has been of such significance that King abdullah of Jordan ac-
cused the country of manufacturing and using radical Islamists as an in-
tegral part of its foreign policy, even with regard to europe15. as with
turkey, Qatar saw the outbreak of the Spring/awakening not as a chal-
lenge to be contained but rather as an opportunity to be seized16, acting
as a cheerleader of the uprisings even when this meant alienating its
Gcc partners17. and, in the case of turkey, the rise and fall of the
Muslim Brotherhood, in particular in egypt, has meant that Qatar’s pol-
icy choices have not been very successful; and indeed in the long run
they were damaging even for its most famous so power tool, the al
Jazeera network18.
But to go back to Saudi arabia, as pointed out by Iran’s foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad zarif, the potential for reduced tensions be-
tween the u.S. and Iran has had as an involuntary consequence the
passage from simple anxiety to real panic in the house of Saud. e
royal family has been incapable of accepting the role of Iran as a major
player in the area19 and was «determined to drag the entire region into
confrontation»20. all these events have loomed under the spectrum of
47
14 catherine herridge, Military Intel Predicted Rise of ISIS in 2012, Detailed
Arms Shipments From Benghazi to Syria, “fox news”, 18 May 2015,
https://goo.gl/pmPac5. nato involvement in supporting al Qaeda, Salafists
and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was confirmed by lt. Gen. Michael t.
flynn, former director of the DIa. See later on in this article.
15 David hearst, Jordan’s King Accuses Turkey of Sending Terrorists to Europe, “Middle
east eye”, 25 March 2016, https://goo.gl/tb74Mu. King abdullah also corrobo-
rated the accusation that turkey was buying oil from ISIS, an accusation most
notably leveled against turkey by Russia’s Putin and confirmed also by the Israeli
defense minister, Moshe yaalon.
16 Kristian coates ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, oxford university Press,
new york, 2014.
17 Ian Black, Arab States Withdraw Ambassadors From Qatar in Protest at “Interference”,
“the Guardian”, 5 March 2014, https://goo.gl/wb6fwM.
18 James M. Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia,
“Middle east online”, 8 September 2013, https://goo.gl/t4lQok
19 Mick Krever, Iran: Saudi Arabia is ‘Panicking,’ The 2 Countries Can Coexist,
“cnn”, 20 January 2016, https://goo.gl/mD2hvh.
20 Mohammad Javad zarif, Saudi Arabia’s Reckless Extremism, “the new york times”,
10 January 2016, https://goo.gl/teu15j and carol e. B. choksy and Jamsheed K.
choksy, The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad, “World affairs”,
May/June 2015, https://goo.gl/3w3Qwx

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
the spread of Saudi and Gulf-financed militant Wahhabism21 throughout

the globe and of its deadly consequences22.
In this framework, this essay argues for Iran’s importance as a partner
in the fight against jihadi-takfiri terrorism and, in this respect, it has the
character of a policy brief, presenting a rich array of empirical data.
PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO IN YEMEN: FEEDING AL QAEDA

AND BLACKWATER-STYLE MERCENARIES
When popular protests erupted in yemen and mass killings of anti-

regime protesters in the capital Sanaa took place23, Saudi arabia and
Gcc countries were adamant about preserving the status quo, that is
the country’s unrepresentative, corrupt and inefficient regime. as a re-
sponse to the genuine popular protests, Saudi arabia, the Gulf monarchies
and the West came together to make sure that democratic and civil
society demands remained unanswered. e Saudi-led Gcc organized
a smooth transfer of power from President ali abdallah Saleh to vice
President abd Rabbuh Mansur hadi through a “democratic” and inter-
nationally recognized “election” in february 2012 which featured a single
person on the ballot. e result was more popular protest, the formation
48 of an alliance between the houthis and former president abdallah Saleh,

the largely peaceful take-over of the capital on 21 September 201424 and
21 those who claim to be following the tradition established by Ibn ‘abd al-Wahhab
have referred to their doctrine by several terms, chiefly al-da‘wa al-islamiyya, al-
tariqa al-Muhammadiyya and al-tariqa al-salafiyya. Moreover, those following
this tradition also claim to be followers of hanbalism, one of the four schools of
law of the Sunni tradition. More generally, the terms used to refer to this tradition
are Wahhabims (wahhabiyya) and Salafism (salafiyya). We opted for Wahhabism,
convinced that most closely captures the doctrinal specificities of those who
identify with the tradition established by Muhammad ibn ‘abd al-Wahhab and
the political ideology of Saudi arabia since its very birth as a state up to current
days. for a discussion of this terminology, see nabil Mouline, The Clerics of Islam:
Religious Authority and Political Power in Saudi Arabia, yale university Press,
new haven & london, 2014, pp. 8-11.
22 Mohammad Javad zarif, Saudi Arabia’s Reckless Extremism, “the new york times”,
10 January 2016, https://goo.gl/uGzotl, and c. e. B. choksy and J. K. choksy,
The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad, “World affairs”, May/June
2015, https://goo.gl/Q36lzP.
23 Yemen Opposition Activists Clash With Police, “al Jazeera”, 19 March 2011,
https://goo.gl/e1oWfG.
24 Khalil harb, Houtis Take Sanaa but Refrain from Coup, “al Monitor”, 22 September
2014, https://goo.gl/j0qWyr, translation of an article appeared in the lebanese
arabic daily “as-Safir”, https://goo.gl/DjRuqh.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
the signing of the Peace and national Partnership agreement on the

same day25. Subsequently, hadi stepped down, escaping from Sanaa first
to aden and then to Riyadh. following this a full blown civil war began
aer Saudi arabia embarked on a large scale military offensive against
yemen.
e “international community” (i.e. the u.S. and its allies) considers
hadi as yemen’s legitimate president, and gave support when he formally
invited foreign powers to bomb and invade the country whilst in Riyadh,
notwithstanding a series of evidences to the contrary: hadi was the sole
candidate in the february 2012 election and he was elected as president
for a transitional period of two years (which expired in february 2014);
his performance as president was extremely poor26; he resigned from his
position in January 2014; once he escaped to aden following his con-
finement to house arrest, he had to flee the country because of the lack
of popular support. Riyadh quickly responded to hadi’s invitation to go
to war with yemen by putting together a coalition part of whose foot-
soldiers are made up of colombian, Panamanian, Salvadoran, chilean,
Sudanese, australian, British, etc., Blackwater-style contractors27 directed
by British military advisers helping them drop British, american and
french bombs on yemeni targets including civilians28.
In yemen, Saudi arabia – and the coalition it leads – has been work-
ing with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah Party – despite having
declared the party a terrorist organization in March 201429 – and along-
49
25 ali Ibrahim al-Moshki, Peace and National Partnership Agreement Signed, “yemen
times”, 23 September 2014, https://goo.gl/te20tn.
26 ali Saeed, President Hadi: Ineffective and Illegitimate, “yemen times”, 4 november
2014, https://goo.gl/vwtpwy.
27 There is a lot more behind the reported “Blackwater” deaths in Yemen, “al Bawaba”,
14 December 2015, https://goo.gl/RKsvWq; emily B. hager and Mark Mazzetti,
Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight, 25 november
2015, https://goo.gl/J2yqy7; Dogs of War: British mercenary reported killed in Ye-
men, 11 December 2015, https://goo.gl/Majaia; and leith fadel, Blackwater
Group Abandons Taiz Front in West Yemen: Reports, “al-Masadr al-‘arabi”, 16 fe-
bruary 2016, https://goo.gl/mesxfS.
28 owen Jones, Britain is at War with Yemen. So Why Does Nobody Know About It?,
“the Guardian”, 28 January 2016, https://goo.gl/dfhB2M. under Prime Minister
David cameron, Britain has sold the Saudis nearly £6bn worth of arms so far ( Ja-
nuary 2016). Since the latter began their bombing campaign in yemen, Britain
has signed off more than 100 arms licenses. Saudi Eager to Sign Tens of Billions in
Deals with France, Says French Foreign Minister, “RfI”, 5 May 2015,
https://goo.gl/vRK3Xs.
29 Saudi Changed Stance Towards Yemen’s Islah: Egyptian Diplomat, “Middle east
eye”, 24 March 2015, https://goo.gl/opumBo.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
side al Qaeda30. nevertheless it is not clear whether Saudi arabia will be

able to re-take Sanaa from the houthi-led movement and re-impose a
Saudi client government in the capital. e Kingdom already finds itself
in a quandary having built up forces which are made up of segments of
the fragmented Southern Movement, which while opposing the houthis
is also seeking support for the independence of South yemen31 – which
was paradoxically forcibly reunified with the north through the assistance
of Saudi arabia and the united arab emirates (uae). Moreover, the
Saudis are cooperating with various jihadi militants and even elements
within al Qaeda in the arabian Peninsula (aQaP), which has in the
past made clear its intention to topple the Saudi family (and has been
identified by the obama administration as the greatest terrorist threat
to the national security of the u.S.). is group claimed responsibility
for the January 2015 charlie hebdo terrorist attack in Paris32. In addition
to this, Saudi arabia’s aggressive foreign policy is increasingly playing
against the Kingdom itself inside its own borders, as indicated by the se-
cessionist ahrar al-najran Movement, a direct off-shoot of the Saudi
adventure in yemen33. finally, the significant financial burden and loss
of military prestige already evident in the outcome of the invasion only
add to the dangerous times Saudi arabia will be facing in the near fu-
50 ture34.
from the Iranian perspective, the Saudi-led aggression against yemen
is about silencing the legitimate aspirations of the yemeni people to
good participatory governance and independence; it is not about op-
posing an alleged project of regional domination by the Islamic Republic.
Moreover, Iranians believe that Saudi arabia launched the operation
Decisive Storm against yemen at the most sensitive phase of the nuclear
negotiations in lausanne between Iran and the P5+1, with the aim of
preventing the successful outcome of the talks.
30 Yemen Conflict: Al-Qaeda Joins Coalition Battle for Taiz, “BBc”, 22 february
2016, https://goo.gl/xohePp.
31 James Brandon and nicholas a. heras, Saudi Arabia May Lose Finances and
Military Prestige in Yemeni Quagmire, “asia news”, 10 July 2015,
https://goo.gl/njh56e.
32 Giorgio cafiero and Daniel Wagner, Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda Unite in Yemen,
“foreign Policy Journal”, 23 September 2015, https://goo.gl/nnkS5n.
33 Salman Rafi, How Saudi Arabia’s Aggressive Foreign Policy Is Playing Against Itself,
“asia times”, 2 october 2015, https://goo.gl/X8Mboq.
34 J. Brandon and n. a. heras, Saudi Arabia May Lose Finances and Military Prestige
in Yemeni Quagmire, “asia news”, 10 July 2015, https://goo.gl/xbeBf3.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA:

COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND CONTRASTING INTERESTS
While yemen represents the paradigm of the West going along with
Saudi arabia and the Gulf monarchies’ useless attempt to preserve the
status quo, the events linked to the Spring/awakening in egypt and
tunisia have shown signs of conflict in the alliance between the West,
Saudi arabia, the Gcc, arab monarchies and, depending on the cir-
cumstances, turkey and Israel.
once the u.S. realized the extent of the popular protests in tunisia
and egypt, they quickly withdrew their support from hosni Mubarak
and Ben ali in the hope of maintaining the status quo under the guidance
of different western-friendly leaders. is move was however very un-
welcome in Saudi arabia and Israel. Moreover, they also disagreed with
turkey and Qatar over their support for the Muslim Brotherhood in
egypt and all over north africa. is disagreement became extremely
acute when Saudi arabia almost single-handedly supported egypt’s mil-
itary overthrow of the democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi
in July 2013, apparently confronting the u.S. and europe with a fait ac-
compli. e spectacular and live-televised rise and fall of the Brotherhood
in egypt created long-lasting resentment between turkey’s aKP and
Qatar’s ruling family on the one hand and Saudi arabia and the uae
51
(and Israel) on the other. It le deep scars as well as an increasing sense
of anxiety in both Saudi arabia, where it led to important changes at
the head of the ruling monarchy35, and in turkey, where it arguably con-
tributed to the increasing authoritarian posture of aKP leader erdogan.
DERAILING STATE-BUILDING IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ: THE

BIRTH OF ISIS
according to Mohsen Milani,
preventing the consolidation of a tehran-friendly government in

Baghdad by all means necessary was and remains Riyadh’s top strategic
goal36.
35 frank Gardner, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Marks Year of Change, “BBc”,
22 January 2016, https://goo.gl/ozcJzo, and f. Gregory Gause III, Saudi Arabia’s
Game of Thrones, “foreign affairs”, 2 february 2015, https://goo.gl/ninXle.
36 Mohsen Milani, Saudi Arabia’s Desperate Measures, “foreign affairs”, 10 January
2016, https://goo.gl/udzfli.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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and indeed, following the u.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the toppling
of Saddam hussein in 2003, major funding for weapons from Saudi
arabia and arab countries in the Persian Gulf began flowing into the
hands of al Qaeda in Iraq (aQI) and militants affiliated to this group
with the open aim of derailing state-building and eventually toppling
the new u.S.-established Shi‘a-led political order in Iraq37; which in the
long run led to the rise of ISIS38.
is was particularly ironic both because – unlike Iran – the Saudis
and Gcc countries officially supported the u.S.-led invasion of Iraq
and through these measures were effectively trying to undermine the
presence in the region of their foremost guarantor of national military
security, the u.S. Moreover, although the rise of ISIS in Iraq (and Syria)
has been a blessing for Saudi arabia’s strategy of derailing state-building
in post-Saddam Iraq, it also represents a potential danger for the King-
dom, because ISIS has the Janus-faced quality of being at the same time
anti-Shiite and anti-Iran but also of seeking to establish a caliphate whose
ideal heartland would be Saudi arabia, without the al Saud39.
Indeed, referring to his experience as a former commander of British
forces in Iraq, in 2014 former British assistant chief of the Defense
52 Staff General Jonathan Shaw denounced Saudi arabia (and Qatar) for
being primarily responsible for the funding and spread of the culture
and creed of militant Wahhabism that represents the ideological basis
of ISIS. he also pointed out that ISIS views both countries as corrupt
and has vowed to topple the respective regimes40.
although at the beginning the Iraqi government refrained from
openly denouncing Saudi arabia and Gulf arab countries, in 2014 the
then Prime Minister nuri al-Maliki publicly declared that the Saudis
37 Saudis Reportedly Funding Iraqi Sunni Insurgents, “uSa today”, 12 august 2006,
https://goo.gl/PzWd0z.
38 Patrick cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution,
up. ed., verso, london and new york, 2015, and fawaz a. Gerges, ISIS: A History,
Princeton university Press, Princeton and oxford, 2016.
39 M. Milani, Saudi Arabia’s Desperate Measures, cit.
40 David Blair, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ‘Have Ignited Time Bomb By Funding Global
Spread of Radical Islam, “the telegraph”, 04 october 2014, https://goo.gl/ey90tn.
Qatar officially subscribes to Wahhabism and adheres to hanbalism, therefore
being with Saudi arabia the only other country whose population is officially
Wahhabi. however, it has built very close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and
its foreign policy has in different occasions collided with that of Saudi arabia.
See James M. Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia,
“Middle east online”, 8 September 2013, https://goo.gl/fxvggx.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
and Qatar were supporting militant groups in Iraq and had in effect de-
clared war on his country41.
on the contrary, Iraqis are well aware that Iranians have been vital
in preventing both the capital of Iraq, Baghdad, and the capital of the
Iraqi Kurdish autonomous Region, erbil from falling into the hands of
ISIS. In this respect, although the u.S. portrays itself as the savior of
Iraqi Kurds, as declared by President Massud Barzani, Iranians were the
first to provide weapons and equipment to the collapsing autonomous
Kurdish region when ISIS militants were approaching42.
SELECTIVE SUPPORT FOR CHANGE IN LIBYA: CONTROLLING

OIL RESOURCES, AND PROVIDING A SAFE HAVEN FOR
WAHHABI MILITANTS
While Western powers and Gulf monarchies, with the exception of

Qatar (and turkey), were intent on preserving the status quo or at least
controlling outcomes with face-change in tunisia and egypt, they were
also fully operational in creating havoc in the two most important non-
western-friendly arab countries, libya and Syria.
Since the very beginning of the popular protests in libya, the coali-
tion between Western powers and arab monarchies promoted, financed,
armed and recognized the self-appointed Benghazi-based national tran-
sition council as libya’s sole legitimate representative. With the help of 53
france and Britain, the obama administration rapidly put together and
led a nato military intervention in libya without consulting the u.S.
congress43. is happened despite the fact that the militant opposition
featured among its members al Qaeda operatives, such as abdelhakim
Belhaj, former emir of the al Qaeda-linked libyan Islamic fighting
Group44. Belhaj and other Qatari-sponsored45 Wahhabi militants met
western officials and were to become the vehicle of “democratic” change
41 Saudi Arabia and Qatar in ‘War on Iraq’: Maliki, “Dawn”, 9 March 2014,
https://goo.gl/iMkR52.
42 Iran Provided Weapons to Iraq’s Kurds: Barzani, “yahoo news”, 26 august 2014,
https://goo.gl/4sGGlo.
43 In spring 2016, obama admitted that the intervention in libya didn’t work, but
blamed everyone but himself for everything that went wrong. See Jeffrey Goldberg,
The Obama Doctrine, “the atlantic”, april 2016, https://goo.gl/RPde3a.
44 the rebranding of Belhaj has gone so far that he is now considered a major inter-
locutor of Western chancelleries. See Isabelle Mandraud, Du djihad aux urnes : Le
parcours singulier d’Abdelhakim Belhadj, Stock, Paris, 2013.
45 David Roberts, Behind Qatar’s Intervention in Libya: Why Was Doha Such
a Strong Supporter of the Rebels, “foreign affairs”, 28 September 2011
https://goo.gl/1zPX0v.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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in libya; a method effectively used decades earlier in afghanistan, which

inevitably brought about very similar and foreseeable outcomes. is
questionable Western policy had several predictable dramatic conse-
quences which led to: the collapse of the state apparatus and feeble civil
society; the descent of the country into chaos and lawlessness; its de
facto division into three regions (tripolitania, cyrenaica, fezzan); and
the takeover of some areas by Islamist organizations46. all of which
helped the spread of Wahhabism and its jihadi-takfiri violence, making
the country a safe haven for ISIS militants47. later Belhaj was to play a
role in the transfer of weapons, money, and fighters from libyan to
Syrian rebels organized in 2012 by the cIa and MI648. In this framework,
turkey also played a key role, facilitating a meeting in Istanbul between
Belhaj, then head of the tripoli Military council, and the leaders of the
so-called free Syrian army (fSa)49. In addition to the link between
turkey, Qatar, the u.S. and Britain and their coordinated role in creating
havoc in libya and Syria through a former al Qaeda leader, what is de-
scribed here also reveals once more that the so-called “moderate” fSa
was in fact associated with Wahhabi extremist militants from the very
beginning of the Syrian civil war, as early as november 2011.
at the end of april 2016, libya was a failed state and had three
54 governments (libya Dawn, operation Dignity, and Government of na-
tional accord), with most of the country controlled by local militias
and a small area under the control of ISIS50. e Government of national
accord is un-backed, aer a un-brokered agreement was reached in
late 2015 following the november 2015 terrorist attacks on Paris. a
unity government known as the Presidency council was established
under the leadership of Prime Minister fayez Sarraj. however, the unity
government was only able to set up its headquarters outside of tripoli in
46 this scenario had been foreseen with dramatic accuracy as early as february 2011
by Saif al-Islam, the son of the former libyan autocrat. Mustafa fetouri, Five Years
On, Predictions By Gadhafi’s Son Come True, “al Monitor”, 28 february 2016,
https://goo.gl/zc9S3t.
47 Libya a massive safe haven for ISIS now, U.N. warns, “cBS news”, 1 December
2015, https://goo.gl/PhnkW8, and Suliman ali zway, Kareem fahim and eric
Schmitt, In Libya, U.S. Courts Unreliable Allies to Counter ISIS, “new york times”,
18 January 2016, https://goo.gl/Ia3kcn.
48 Seymour M. hersh, The Red Line and the Rat Line, “london Review of Books”,
17 april 2014, https://goo.gl/gthMMz.
49 Ruth Sherlock, Leading Libyan Islamist Met Free Syrian Army Opposition Group,
“the telegraph”, 27 november 2011, https://goo.gl/Ksuuun.
50 Failed State: Can a Unity Government Succeed in Divided Libya?, “Spiegel online
International”, 20 april 2016, https://goo.gl/K3bhQc.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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the heavily-guarded abu Sitta naval base in March 201651. It is worth

mentioning that Serraj’s government is supported, among others, by ab-
delhakim Belhaj52.
SELECTIVE SUPPORT FOR CHANGE IN SYRIA: TRYING AND

FAILING TO CRUSH THE RESISTANCE FRONT AND CREATE A
TALIBAN-STYLE EMIRATE
e most tragic consequences of the desperate effort to tilt the re-

gional balance of power against Iran and the so-called Resistance front
was to play out in Syria, where the West and arab monarchies support
for regime change offered the perfect battle ground for takfiri militants.
e u.S. interest in regime change in Syria using “rebel forces”, «to help
Israel deal with Iran’s growing nuclear capability» was publicly exposed
with the release by Wikileaks in early 2016 of an email written by former
Secretary of State hillary clinton53. however, as pointed out by alastair
crooke as early as summer 2011, the mainspring of armed violence
against the Syrian government stemmed not from Syria itself but from
the Wahhabi thinking of the Sunni jihadi-takfiri trend developed par-
ticularly by abu Musab al-zarqawi in Iraq and transported into Syria
via the return of jihadi “veterans”54. contrary to the Spring or awakening
narrative, crooke located a precursor to the events unfolding in Syria in
the battle that took place in 2007 between the lebanese army and Sunni
55
militants of diverse nationalities in the Palestinian refugee camp of naher
al-Bared in northern lebanon. ese militants had previously fought in
Iraq and later infiltrated the camp to the extent of marrying into Pales-
tinian families living there. In that single confrontation, 168 lebanese
army personnel lay dead and the refugee camp in ruins.
Proof of western support for jihadi-takfiri militantism was also
shown by the increasing signs and then official announcement by Israel
51 Libya Country Profile, “BBc”, updated 20 april 2016, https://goo.gl/8xczvv.

52 Pietro Batacchi, La Libia verso la somalizzazione?, “Rivista Italiana di Difesa”, 21
april 2016, https://goo.gl/eyfa5D.
53 New Iran and Syria 2.Doc, “Wikileaks”, https://goo.gl/WPhi1w. See also Clinton
Email: Assad Must Be Toppled to Protect Israel, “Sputnik International”, 23 March
2016, https://goo.gl/hkk2Ba.
54 alastair crooke, Unfolding the Syrian Paradox, “asia times”, 15 July 2011,
https://goo.gl/xh3ano. In this respect, see also Joby Warrick, Black Flags: The
Rise of ISIS, “Doubleday”, new york, 2015, who, through a character-driven ac-
count based on a reconstruction of abu Musab al-zarqawi’s biography, traces the
strain of militant Islam behind ISIS back in Iraq, afghanistan and Jordan, relating
it to strategic mistakes made by both Bush and obama.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
of its active involvement in the Syrian war and support for a victory of al
Qaeda rebels over President al-assad, as put bluntly by Michael oren,
Israel’s ambassador to the united States,
We always wanted Bashar assad to go, we always preferred the bad

guys who weren’t backed by Iran to the bad guys who were backed by
Iran55.
In this respect, al-assad has repeatedly denounced Israel as being

the air force of al-Qaeda56 and we moreover know that Israel treats
wounded al-nusra fighters in its hospitals57.
In Syria, the u.S., arab monarchies and turkey (which oversaw the
program) played a key role in the rise of ISIS and al Qaeda affiliated or
inspired groups such as the al-nusra front, Jund al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam
and ahrar al-Sham just months aer the beginning of the Syrian civil
war, providing these groups, their affiliates and allies with military aid
through airlis of arms and equipment to turkish and, to a lesser extent,
Jordanian airports. is has been confirmed since at least 3 January 2012
but probably began on a smaller scale much earlier58. In the case of
turkey, its role in the rise of ISIS was so prominent that an article ap-
56 peared in e Washington Post in august 2014 underlined how, before

taking over Mosul and re-branding themselves as Islamic State (IS), the
jihadists treated the turkish town of Reyhanli near the Syrian border
«as their own personal shopping mall,» with turkey treating wounded
jihadists of both ISIS and the al-nusra front in its hospitals59. In the
case of Saudi arabia and Qatar, Wahhabi-founded satellite television
channels such as Safa tv (Saudi arabia), Wesal tv (Saudi arabia), al
Jazeera (Qatar) and al arabiya (owned by Saudi arabia but based in
Dubai) were from the very beginning of the “revolution” advancing both
the narrative of unprovoked massive repression by a regime refusing re-
forms and of the Syrian army disintegrating under the ethical pressure
55 Dan Williams, In Public Shift, Israel Calls for Assad’s Fall, “Reuters”, 17 September
2013, https://goo.gl/B5DmQK.
56 Kim Sengupta, Syria Civil War: Assad Regime Accuses Israel of Being ‘al-Qaeda’s
Air Force’ As Conflict Edges Closer to Shared Border, “Independent”, 22 January
2016, https://goo.gl/oov375.
57 yaroslav trofimov, Al Qaeda a Lesser Evil? Syria War Pulls U.S., Israel Apart, “the
Wall Street Journal”, 12 March 2015, https://goo.gl/h0mll0.
58 c. J. chivers and eric Schmitt, Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid
From C.I.A., “the new york times”, 24 March 2013, https://goo.gl/JqyBts.
59 anthony faiola and Souad Mekhennet, In Turkey, a Late Crackdown on Islamist
Fighters, cit.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
faced by allegedly having to unjustifiably kill its own countrymen60. is

was done by broadcasting anonymous un-verified video footages and
“eyewitness” accounts of this repression. at the same time they were also
hosting Wahhabi religious scholars giving televised fatwas about raising
the banner of the ouster of the Shi‘a, alawites, christian, and Druze in
order to restore the Sunni ascendancy in the country. together with this
they sanctioned the permissibility of slaughtering «a third of Syrians so
the other two-thirds may live» (i.e. the entire alawi community plus all
other religious minorities)61. is does not mean government forces were
innocent, but it provides a highly distorted picture of the events. is
mise-en-scène took place while al Qaeda jihadi-takfiri militants were per-
petrating mass killings of civilians with suicide car bombs as early as De-
cember 201162 and the “freedom fighters” of the western-backed fSa
were burning and desecrating Shi‘a religious buildings and carrying out
acts of extreme violence such as beheading children and Syrian soldiers
as early as november 201263 and even committing acts of cannibalism
and relating the bravado to western journalists64.
from a global, international perspective, when on December 2012
the so called “friends of Syria” met for the first time, the number of
countries represented was one hundred and fourteen.65 When they met
60 In the case of new outlets such as Safa tv and Wesal tv, these moreover promoted
57
sectarian killings. Sam Dagher, Arab Media Clash Over Syria, “the Wall Street
Journal”, 24 March 2012, https://goo.gl/S6ab6c. also relevant is the case of the
influential Sunni religious scholar yusuf al-Qaradawi, Syria Conflict: Cleric Qara-
dawi Urges Sunnis to Join Rebels, “BBc”, 1 June 2013, https://goo.gl/caJWnn.
Moreover, we also know that, in its efforts to bring down the al-assad government,
al Jazeera collaborated with the u.S. and at least in one known instance was
enlisted by a major american multinational technology company, Google, to act
as vehicle of anti-government propaganda. Doug Bolton, Google Planned to Help
Syrian Rebels Bring Down Assad Regime, Leaked Hillary Clinton Email Claim,
“Independent”, 23 March 2016, https://goo.gl/tnnzke. Western media outlets
also were instrumental in the spread of anti-Syrian government narratives, see
Sharmine narwani, How Narratives Killed the Syrian People, “Russia today”, 23
March 2016, https://goo.gl/1I48MX.
61 alastair crooke, Unfolding the Syrian Paradox, cit.
62 Kareem fahim, Syria Blames Al Qaeda After Bombs Kill Dozens in Damascus,
“International new york times”, 23 December 2011, https://goo.gl/47Iczd.
63 Patrick cockburn, Syria: The Descent into Holy War, “Independent”, 16 December
2012, https://goo.gl/4jjSyh.
64 Paul Wood, Face-to-Face With Abu Sakkar, Syria’s ‘Heart-Eating Cannibal’, “BBc”,
5 July 2013, https://goo.gl/ulSJfd.
65 Friends of Syria Recognize Opposition Coalition As Legitimate Representative of
Syrian People, “Xinhua”, 12 December 2012, hhttps://goo.gl/B7glcK.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
four months later, the number had dropped to eleven66: Russia, china
and other BRIcS members, in particular, had soon realized that the ex-
tremist organizations operating in Syria with the support of the u.S.,
europe, Gulf arab countries and turkey posed a serious threat to global
peace and security as well as their own national security67. nevertheless,
we had to wait until the second half of 2014 for the u.S. government to
become more conscious of the dangers of the rise of ISIS, or at least to
openly admit its many errors. In october 2014, during a speech at har-
vard university’s Kennedy School of Government, u.S. vice President
Joe Biden admitted that since the beginning there had not been any
«moderate middle» in the civil war and that «our allies in the region
were our largest problem in Syria»68; i.e. the main problem was that the
armed Islamist jihadi-takfiri opposition was not moderate and its sponsors
and supporters, chiefly Saudi arabia, turkey and the emirates, were ac-
tively promoting extremism.
In the case of Syria, Iran has repeatedly pointed out that only diplo-
macy and a political solution through intra-Syrian dialogue can end the
crisis69. Its support for a political solution has been open and consistent
since the early developments of the conflict, when the Islamic Republic
supported the plan elaborated by the first u.n. special envoy for Syria,
Kofi annan70. In this respect, we should remember that annan quit his
58 position as international peace envoy because of his frustration at «fin-
ger-pointing and name-calling» at the u.n. Security council71. Indeed,
according to ali akbar Salehi (Iran’s foreign Minister at that time), it
was the americans, in addition to certain european and arab countries,
who prevented annan from implementing the plan72. arguably, this
happened on the basis of the faulty assumption that the armed opposition
would soon and easily steamroller its way to Damascus. Iran was moreover
66 tulin Daloglu, Friends of Syria Deliver Nothing New, “al Monitor”, 21 april 2013,
https://goo.gl/tyqwzj.
67 Sharmine narwani, BRICS Summit Draws Clear Red Lines on Syria, Iran, “the
BRIcS Post”, 03 april 2013, https://goo.gl/eqw1Mu.
68 adam taylor, Behind Biden’s Gaffe Lie Real Concerns About Allies’ Role in Rise of
the Islamic State, “the Washington Post”, 6 october 2014, https://goo.gl/2jyDj0.
69 Iran FM Zarif: Diplomacy Only Solution to Syria War, “al alam”, 04 february
2016, https://goo.gl/cl8iyQ. Iran, EU Urge Political Solution to Syria Crisis,
“Kayhan”, 13 october 2015, https://goo.gl/muBd0v, and Paul antonopoulos,
Iranian Adviser: Only Political Solution Will End War in Syria, “al-Masdar al-
‘arabi”, 5 february 2016, https://goo.gl/ng2mjS.
70 S. Isayev and t. Jafarov, Iranian Foreign Minister: Kofi Annan’s Plan on Syria to
Remain, “trend news agency”, 3 august 2012, https://goo.gl/hveqs0.
71 Ibidem.
72 Ibid.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
openly critical of the violence perpetrated against peaceful protesters by

elements within the Syrian security forces, but it was also aware of the
fact that since the beginning of the civil war there had been armed groups
firing upon both security forces and civilians, as pointed out by a report
compiled by the head of the arab league 300-strong observer mission
to Syria conducted between 24 December 2011 and 18 January 201273.
Interestingly enough – and with reference to what has been pointed out
earlier as regards the broadcasting of anonymous un-verified video
footages and eyewitness accounts by major Wahhabi-founded media
outlets – the report also found that there were many parties falsely re-
porting the occurrence of explosions and violence in several locations
that the observers verified to be unsubstantiated. Moreover, Iran was
and is convinced of the simple fact that President al-assad had and still
continues to have significant popular support. Despite the official political
position of the u.S. government, this assumption is shared by one of
most seasoned u.S. foreign policy advisors, zbigniew Brezinski, who
admitted that President al-assad does not simply have more support
than any single group of the opposition, but of all the opposition groups
combined74. Indeed, this is a key element in understanding why the
Syrian army did not defect75. More important, and contrary to widespread
misinformation, the core of this army is Sunni, not alawi or Shi‘a76. e
assumption that al-assad has significant popular support among the Syr-
ian population appears also to be backed by some independent and reli-
59
able poll data77. More generally, Iran believes that the fact that the Syrian
73 Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the
Period From 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012, https://goo.gl/xjvhol.
a report compiled by the “International crisis Group” several months later con-
firmed the jihadi/fundamentalist character of this armed opposition, Tentative
Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, “Middle east Report”, no. 131, (12 oc-
tober 2012), https://goo.gl/o6xdq4.
74 Brzezinski: Assad Has More Support Than Any Group Opposing Him, “c-Span”,
21 January 2015, https://goo.gl/p0ucMr.
75 Kamal alam, Why Assad’s Army Has Not Defected, “the national Interest”, 12
february 2016, https://goo.gl/cPyvyp.
76 K. alam, Why Assad’s Army Has Not Defected, cit.
77 according to a survey conducted by oRB International in late 2015, 47% of
Syrians believed President Bashar al-assad had a positive influence in Syria, com-
pared to 35% for the free Syrian army (fSa) and 26% for the Syrian opposition
coalition. See Dina al-Shilbee, Freedom vs. Security: Syrians Continue to be Divided
Over Priorities, “al arabiya”, 16 March 2016, https://goo.gl/PbSpra. another
poll on Syria conducted at the beginning of the Syrian crisis by youGov Siraj and
commissioned by the Doha Debates (funded by the Qatar foundation) showed
that 55% of Syrians wanted al-assad to stay. See Jonathan Steele, Most Syrians

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
government has managed to survive against all odds, facing a very strong
coalition of western and arab antagonists (in addition to turkey and Is-
rael), clearly indicates that al-assad enjoys significant support among a
significant portion of the Syrian population.
SAUDI ARABIA: THE CRADLE OF WAHHABI AND TAKFIRI-

JIHADI IDEOLOGY
Wahhabism lies at the heart of Saudi arabia’s doctrinal makeup and

historical origins78, to the extent that the Wahhabi religious establishment
sees the destinies of al Saud and Wahhabism as intertwined79. e hand
in glove relationship between Wahhabism and Saudi arabia has not
been limited to the homeland, but has also characterized Saudi foreign
policy80. a major so power vehicle for this collaboration has been Wah-
habi “academic” proselytizing, in particular with the establishment in
1961 of the Islamic university of Medina, whose regulations call for 75
per cent of its students to be foreigners81. other cultural institutions
that have played an important role in spreading Wahhabism are the
World Muslim league82 and the World assembly of Muslim youth
(1972), both established with the aim of dispatching Saudi-sponsored
Wahhabi proselytizers all over the world.
60 e pivotal idea of Wahhabism is that those Muslims who disagree
with the definition of Islam made by Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab
(1703-1792), the founder of Wahhabism, are not simply misguided
Muslims or sinners, but infidels; that is, outside Islam altogether83. two
central tenets of this idea are the concepts of shirk (idolatry), the view
that any statement or act indicating devotion to a being other than God
is tantamount to idolatry, and takfir, branding other Muslims as idolaters
Back President Assad, But You’d Never Know from Western Media, “the Guardian”,
17 January 2012, https://goo.gl/9wu0Rk. extensive pool data on Syrian are
clearly unavailable, given the extreme difficulty of conducting surveys in a war-
torn country.
78 alastair crooke, You Cant’s Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of
Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia, “the World Post”, 27 august 2014,
https://goo.gl/wl7Xxc.
79 David commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, I.B. tauris, london
and new york, 2006, p. 112.
80 Ibidem.
81 Ivi, pp. 112 and 126.
82 established the following year (1962), this organization was pivotal in organizing
and funding the Pakistan-based jihadi fight waged against the Soviets in afghani-
stan. Ivi, pp. 174-175.
83 Ibidem.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
and the obligation to wage war against them and shed their blood taking
their possessions, wives and daughters as war booty84. another tenet is
the rejection of the belief that particularly righteous individuals can in-
tercede with God on behalf of believers and the consequent absolute
prohibition of intercessionary practices, such as praying at graves and
shrines and the obligation to eliminate all physical structures associated
with these practices85.
according to fouad al-Ibrahim, in the areas under ISIS control the
writings of Ibn abd al-Wahhab are distributed and taught in the religious
classes held by the organization86. is information appeared to be con-
firmed by Sheikh adel al-Kalbani, former friday prayer imam at Mecca’s
Grand Mosque, who, speaking about the roots of ISIS to the MBc
channel, affirmed that:
We [the Wahhabi] follow the same thought [as IS] but apply it in a
refined way. ey draw their ideas from what is written in our own
books, from our own principles87.
and indeed, ISIS militants have strictly applied all the tenets of
Wahhabism delineated above, in particular by destroying structures as-
sociated with intercessionary practices: be they ancient christian monas-
teries88, mosques containing prophets’ tombs89, Sufi and Shi‘a shrines90,
or even the graves of the (Sunni) companions of the Prophet Muham-
61
mad91.
84 Ivi, pp. 13, 23-24 and 25.

85 Ivi, pp. 15-18, and Kristin Romey, Why ISIS Hates Archaeology and Blew Up An-
cient Iraqi Palace, “national Geographic”, 14 april 2015, https://goo.gl/36p8pq.
86 fouad al-Ibrahim, Why ISIS is a threat to Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism’s deferred
promise, “al akhbar english”, 22 august 2014, https://goo.gl/wBvcWk.
87 Leading Saudi Cleric Says IS and Saudi Arabia ‘Follow the Same Thought’, “Middle
east eye”, 28 January 2016, https://goo.gl/8hrXyu.
88 Isis Has Destroyed Iraq’s Oldest Christian Monastery, Satellite Images Confirm,
“the Guardian”, 20 January 2016, https://goo.gl/ezwvMv.
89 Dana ford and Mohammed tawfeeq, Extremists Destroy Jona’s Tomb, Officials
Say, “cnn”, 25 July 2014, https://goo.gl/hoazvo.
90 Kristin Romey, ISIS Destruction of Ancient Sites Hits Mostly Muslim Targets, “na-
tional Geographic”, 2 July 2015, https://goo.gl/SQ1ynk.
91 David commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, cit., pp. 18 and 20,
mentions the case of the very founder of Wahhabism, Ibn abd al-Wahhab, who
personally destroyed the dome over the grave of zayd ibn al-Khattab, a companion
of the Prophet and brother of the second caliph, umar. More generally, according
to commins, violent conflict over doctrinal matters among Sunnis was a rarity
before the appearance of Wahhabism. It was Ibn abd al-Wahhab who established

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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according to most observers, the 9/11 attacks on the united States

marked a watershed for u.S. foreign policy. however, despite the fact
that most of the 9/11 skyjackers, fieen out of nineteen, were (Wahhabi)
Saudis92 and that the mastermind of the attack, osama bin laden, was
also a Saudi, under President George W. Bush there was no significant
shi in policy towards Saudi arabia or Wahhabism. is was also the
case for the uae, who supplied two of the four (Wahhabi) remaining
hijackers93, and recognized the taliban regime.
e u.S. and, more generally, western foreign policy vis-à-vis Saudi
arabia and Gulf arab countries was not reconsidered despite the fact
that, according to a 2014 u.S. State Department report, a significant
source of financing for extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25
years has come from Saudi individual donors and Saudi-based charities94,
is report only added evidence to the well-known central role of Saudi
arabia and Gulf arab states, in particular Qatar and Kuwait, in spreading
jihadi global terrorism via state “passive finance”95. More generally, we
know that the highest echelons of the u.S. political establishment have
long been aware of the essential role of Saudi arabia in being a critical
support base for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda (Saudi arabia, world-
62 92
93
«a legacy of hostility that would endure for generations» (p. 26).
September 11th Hijackers Fast Facts, “cnn”, 24 august 2015, https://goo.gl/lSJpfr.
In addition to this, one should consider that Saudi and Gulf-sponsored Sunni
Wahhabi militantism poses the most serious security challenge to Western coun-
tries, as its agents represent the bulk of West’s homegrown jihadists. andrew l.
Peek, The Roots of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Why the West’s Homegrown Jihadists Are
All Sunni, “foreign affairs”, 12 January 2016, https://goo.gl/spv18J.
94 u.S. Department of State, 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), https://goo.gl/3cz4ns. this was also revealed by a December 2009
memo signed by former Secretary of State hillary clinton and made public by
Wikileaks. See US Embassy Cables: Hillary Clinton Says Saudi Arabia ‘A Critical
Source of Terrorist Funding’, “the Guardian”, 5 December 2010,
https://goo.gl/skDWze. More generally, the role of Gulf «deep pocket donors»
and “charitable organizations” (plus Pakistan and turkey) in sponsoring al Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations was in particular denounced by David S. cohen,
u.S. treasury undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, who in a
speech he gave in 2014 at the center for a new american Security pointed out
how al Qaeda leaders «receive the majority of their funds from Gulf-based sym-
pathizers, followed by supporters based in Pakistan and turkey;» see Remarks of
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the
Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Fi-
nancing’, 4 March 2014, available at https://goo.gl/zqaXz0.
95 hardin lang, Peter Julu, and trevor Sutton, Confronting the Terror Finance Chal-
lenge in Today’s Middle East, “center for american Progress”, november 2015,
https://goo.gl/4czcWe, in particular pp. 8 and 16.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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wide), the taliban (afghanistan) and lashkar-i taiba (Pakistan)96, e

reference to lashkar-i taiba, the taliban, osama bin laden and al Qaeda
is particularly significant because, in addition to opposing and containing
the Soviet union, one of the reasons for which in the last decades Saudi
arabia and other Gulf arab states have been using an important part of
their oil revenues to spread the Wahhabi ideology across the globe and
finance militant jihadi-takfiri Islamism has been to antagonize the Islamic
Revolution in Iran. is was done in coordination with the u.S., on
whose power the modern Kingdom’s economic fortunes and place in
international politics depend, in addition to petroleum wealth97. and
Saudi arabia (and Wahhabism) has been a pillar of the u.S. security
policies in the region. It is not by chance that when obama asked the
chiefs of the u.S. military and intelligence to prepare plans to foster the
forced removal of al-assad in Syria, the first thing that former cIa Di-
rector David Petraeus did was to get together with Saudi Prince Bandar
bin Sultan to formulate with him a scheme to arm a group of so-called
“moderate” Syrian rebels98.
THE U.S. AND THE RISE OF WAHHABISM, AL QAEDA AND ISIS
for many there is no real doubt that the u.S. played a central role in
the rise of ISIS and al Qaeda-affiliated groups in north africa and South-
west asia99, with the goal of shaping the region’s geopolitics and altering
63
the balance of power against Iran and Russia (and perhaps china).
e august 2012 DIa document mentioned earlier in this essay
shows that u.S. military intelligence knew that in Syria the major forces
driving the insurgency and leading the opposition to al-assad’s govern-
ment on the ground – supported by the West, the Gulf countries and
turkey – were the Salafists, al Qaeda in Iraq (aQI) and the Muslim
Brotherhood100. What is more, they were fully aware of the fact that:
96 this was for example indicated by a cable written in December 2009 by former
u.S. Secretary of State hillary clinton. Patrick cockburn, Al-Qa’ida, the Second
Act: Is Saudi Arabia Regretting Its Support for Terrorism, “Independent”, 17 March
2014, https://goo.gl/4eavzv.
97 D. commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, cit., p. 100.
98 fred Kaplan, Obama’s Way: The President in Practice, “foreign affairs”, January/fe-
bruary 2016, https://goo.gl/eunzlM.
99 Brahma chellaney, The Western Roots of Anti-Western Terror, “Project Syndicate”,
16 november 2015, https://goo.gl/lcb2Qp.
100 Pgs. 287-293 (291) JW v DOD and State 14-812, “Judicial Watch”, 18 May 2015,
https://goo.gl/8saMSe.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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If the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a de-

clared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria [in areas
adjacent to the Iraqi borders] (hasaka and Der zor), and this is
exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want101.
as underlined by the DIa document, this allowed the repetition of

a scenario already seen in libya, where the Salafist opposition was given
safe haven under international sheltering.102 Moreover, all of this hap-
pened despite the foreseen dire consequences for Iraq, where aQI was
allowed to return to its old pockets in Mosul and Ramadi, providing a
renewed momentum in which:
ISI [the Islamic State of Iraq] could also declare an Islamic State
through its union with other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria,
which will create grave danger in regards to unifying Iraq and the
protection of its territory103.
While some might be tempted to dismiss the relevance of this doc-

ument, arguing that it probably did not reach the White house or reflect
u.S. intentions and policy, an interview given by lt. Gen. Michael t.
flynn, former director of the DIa (2012-2014), to political journalist
64 Mehdi hasan not only acknowledges the significance of the document

but also reveals that the White house did not simply turn a blind eye to
what was happening, but actually took what flynn explicitly called a
«willful decision» to support an insurgency that was led by al Qaeda,
Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood104. In this respect, at least since
early 2016 there has been increasing bipartisan calls by u.S. politicians,
led by congresswoman tulsi Gabbard, to openly debate the central In-
telligence agency’s (cIa) support for al Qaeda affiliates and proxies in
Syria105.
e u.S. support for militant Wahhabis and al Qaeda proxies in
Syria should be moreover considered in light of the fact that we now
101 Ibidem.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Transcript: Michael Flynn on ISIL, “al Jazeera”, https://goo.gl/utah09, and
Brad hoff, Rise of Islamic State Was ‘A Willful Decision’: Former DIA Chief Michael
Flynn, “foreign Policy Journal”, 7 august 2015, https://goo.gl/5hik3t.
105 Reps. Tulsi Gabbard, Austin Scott Introduce Legislation to End Illegal U.S. War
to Overthrow Syrian Government of Assad, 19 november 2015,
https://goo.gl/crjMkz, and christina lin, Sleeping With The Enemy: Opposition
Grows to CIA-backed al-Qaeda Proxies in Syria, “asia times”, 4 february 2016,
https://goo.gl/r9vly1.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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know that Western intelligence had knowledge of the development of

chemical weapons by some rebel units since at least the spring of 2013;
the Jabhat al-nusra even maintained an ad hoc sarin production cell
whose program was described as «the most advanced sarin plot since
al-Qaida’s pre-9/11 effort»106. ese elements delineate a troubling sce-
nario and raise unanswered questions as regards the West’s allies in the
region, particularly when evaluated from the perspective of the 2013 ac-
cusations about the «routine» use of chemical weapons against rebels
leveled at the Syrian government, which in one famous case was accused
of killing 1,500 civilians including 426 children in a Damascus suburb107
while noteworthy evidence to the contrary later showed that the accusa-
106 there have been numerous reports of the use of chemical weapons by Islamist
groups in Syria and Iraq, the most recent in aleppo in april 2016. See Mark
Piggott, ‘Chemical Gas Attack’ on Kurdish-Held Area of Aleppo Says Kurdish Red
Crescent, “International Business times”, 7 april 2016, https://goo.gl/fKeh0y.
the use of chemical weapons by “Syrian rebels” was denounced in 2013 by carla
Del Ponte, the respected international Prosecutor and diplomat, as member of a
65
u.n. independent commission of inquiry on Syria, UN’s Del Ponte Says Evidence
Syria Rebels ‘Used Sarin’, “BBc”, 6 May 2013, https://goo.gl/rbgorm. It is worth
remembering that, still according to Del Ponte, the commission at that time had
also not seen evidence of the use of chemical weapons by government forces. See
U.N. Has Testimony That Syrian Rebels Used Sarin Gas: Investigator, “BBc”,
5 May 2013, https://goo.gl/Gat62M. In addition to the “Syrian rebels”, ISIS
militants also possess and have used chemical weapons, Jack Moore, CIA Director:
ISIS Has Used and Can Continue to Make Chemical Weapons, “newsweek”,
12 february 2016, https://goo.gl/ny3h75, and Barbara Starr, U.S.: ISIS Detainee
Providing Information On Chemical Weapons, “cnn”, 9 March 2016,
https://goo.gl/SRhahl. Government forces also have been accused of using che-
mical weapons, most notably on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta in 2013. this
brought the u.S. to announce a military intervention in Syria, later halted by a
Russia-mediated diplomatic deal that led to the removal and destruction of Syria’s
chemical weapons stockpile. Moreover, a well-researched article by Seymour M.
hersh published a year later questioned the accusations against the Syrian gover-
nment and suggested the possibility that the attack might have been planned by
Islamist groups within the Syrian opposition, possibly with the involvement of
the turkish security services. See Seymour M. hersh, The Red Line and the Rat
Line, “london Review of Books”, 17 april 2014, https://goo.gl/1zD3Iu.
107 Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S.
Says, “the Washington Post”, 30 august 2013, https://goo.gl/2Mzkpe.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
tion was in fact flawed108. Indeed, some intelligence pointed to turkey,

with a former senior u.S. intelligence official stating that:
We knew there were some in the turkish government who believed

they could get assad’s nuts in a vice by dabbling with a sarin attack
inside Syria – and forcing obama to make good on his red line
threat109.
Intelligence pointed in particular to Jabhat al-nusra110, a turkey,

Saudi and Qatar-backed al Qaeda affiliated group; all these countries
being key allies of the West.
as is well known, the u.S. has a long history of support for fanatics
gone awry. Western-backed extremism is neither limited to Wahhabi
takfiri terrorists nor regionally-bound; ranging from al Qaeda and the
taliban in afghanistan111 to contra rebels in nicaragua, extremists have
constantly been a tool of geopolitics for Washington. What is of concern
here is that, particularly following the success of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran (1979) and the Soviet invasion of afghanistan (1979), the u.S.
and its nato allies have been cooperating with the Saudi and Pakistani
governments to finance, train and arm takfiri-jihadi “freedom fighters”
around the world. e u.S. support for the extremists went so deep and
66 was so entrenched that the u.S. offered not simply financial support,
training and arms but also funded anti-Russian radical Islamist textbooks
to indoctrinate afghan children112, providing as many as 4 million school-
books.113 e results of a study carried out by an american academician
at new york university clearly indicates that promoting violence in the
form of jihad and religion was the goal of these “educational” programs
elaborated by the u.S. in the 1980s and 1990s114; their rationale being
108 Matthew Schofield, New Analysis of Rocket Used in Syria Chemical Attack Undercuts
U.S. Claims, “Mcclatchy Dc”, 15 January 2014, https://goo.gl/2zd2R2, and Sey-
mour M. hersh, The Red Line and the Rat Line, “london Review of Books”, 17
april 2014, https://goo.gl/xnGaI2.
109 S. M. hersh, The Red Line and the Rat Line, cit.
110 Ibidem.
111 andrew cockburn, A Special Relationship: The United States Is Teaming Up With
Al Qaeda, Again, “harper’s Magazine”, January 2016, https://goo.gl/bncWch.
112 Rob crilly, ‘Infidels Are Our Enemy’: Afghan Fighters Cherish Old American Scho-
olbooks, “al Jazeera america”, 7 December 2014, https://goo.gl/hKneus, and
Ishaan tharoor, The Taliban Indoctrinates Kids With Jihadist Textbooks Paid for
by the U.S., “the Washington Post”, 8 December 2014, https://goo.gl/GS6Bir.
113 Joe Stephens and David B. ottaway, The Abc’s of Jihad in Afghanistan * Courtesy,
USA, “the Washington Post”, 23 March 2002, available at https://goo.gl/u2iq0M.
114 Dana Burde, Schools for Conflict or for Peace in Afghanistan, “columbia university

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
to start the indoctrination of children with the idea of warfare as a reli-

gious duty as early as possible, in texts that describe all nonbelievers, not
only the Soviets, as the enemy115. What is more surprising is that the
textbooks, printed in Pashto and Dari, were not simply produced under
the auspices of the u.S. agency for International Development (uSaID)
but actually developed and published by the center for afghanistan
Studies at the university of nebraska at omaha and distributed by the
cIa and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency116. although
the program officially ended with the collapse of afghanistan’s communist
government, the books were used as afghan school system’s core cur-
riculum under the taliban and revised editions were published as recently
as 2011 and are available on sale in Pakistani cities and used in
afghanistan in areas under taliban control117.
In the last decades, the u.S. has collaborated closely with Saudi ara-
bia in the spread of militant Wahhabism through mosques and religious
schools, with Wahhabi extremism and “talibanization” supplanting local
indigenous forms of Sufi religiosity and conservative but tolerant Sunni
Islam. In this respect, the u.S. and more generally the West have shown
little sign of interest in the fate and sufferings this policy has caused for
ethnic and religious groups in both Pakistan and afghanistan118. More
alarming has been the spread of Wahhabism among Pakistan’s intelligence
and deep state, making the 191-million strong and nuclear-armed country
a major fertile ground and source of takfiri-wahhabi militantism119. Pak-
67
istan has been another key u.S. ally in the spread of Wahhabi militancy
in the region. following the Soviet withdrawal from afghanistan, Pak-
istani intelligence created the taliban with the aim of unifying the
country and providing it with a pro-Pakistani leadership120. In addition
to serving Pakistan’s interest in balancing India, this project also served
both u.S. and Saudi interests in containing and threatening the Islamic
Press”, new york, 2014.

115 R. crilly, ‘Infidels Are Our Enemy’, cit.
116 R. crilly, ‘Infidels Are Our Enemy’, cit., and I. tharoor, The Taliban Indoctrinates
Kids with Jihadist Textbooks Paid for by the U.S., cit.
117 R. crilly, ‘Infidels Are Our Enemy’, cit.
118 Pakistan: Arrest, Prosecute Sectarian Killers, “human Rights Watch”, 13 May 2015,
https://goo.gl/s7P2o2, Purvi thacker, Pakistan’s Hazara: ‘It’s Like Living in Jail’,
“al Jazeera”, 14 December 2014, https://goo.gl/e3lsek, and I. tharoor, The Be-
heading of a 9-Year-Old Girl Prompted Huge Protests in Afghanistan, “the Wa-
shington Post”, 12 november 2015, https://goo.gl/llaacd.
119 adrian Pabst, Pakistan Must Confront Wahhabism, “the Guardian”, 20 august
2009, https://goo.gl/JorWu3.
120 ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,
“yale university Press”, 2nd ed., new haven & london, 2010.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Republic of Iran on its eastern border, providing an alternative export

route for central asia gas and oil, outside the realm of Iran and the
Russian federation. e consequence of the successful operation that
we all know is that taliban-controlled afghanistan offered a safe haven
to al Qaeda fighters and leadership, seriously compromising homeland
security in both the u.S. and europe.
CONCLUSION
for many decades, the West has had a collaborative management of

north africa and Southwest asia with Saudi arabia and Wahhabism in
pursuit of western interests: countering socialism, Ba‘athism, nasserism,
the uSSR (in particular the Soviet invasion of afghanistan) and later
the Islamic Republic of Iran. is cooperation has in the short term en-
joyed various degrees of success, driving the Soviets out of afghanistan
and containing the Islamic Republic of Iran, but has also provided what
Iran’s foreign Minister zarif described as a «smoke screen,» which has
allowed the Saudis to export the Wahhabi ideology of extremism121 and
in the long term brought us ISIS and global jihadi terrorism.
as shown in the cases of Syria, yemen, Iraq, libya, tunisia and
68 egypt, both the selective support for regime change and counter-revo-
lutions sustained and financed by Saudi arabia and backed by the West
have offered an incredible opening for the expansion of Wahhabi ideology
via extremist militant groups. Moreover, the interdependency between
the rise of jihadi-takfiri “Islamism” and Saudi arabia’s ideological foun-
dations could paradoxically prove deadly for the Kingdom itself, leading
to its implosion122 and ushering instability into the very core of the
Persian Gulf and the global oil market. is is particularly worrying in
light of the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood to develop a working
model of Islamic participatory politics in egypt123 and of the process of
121 M. Krever, Iran: Saudi Arabia is ‘Panicking,’ The 2 Countries Can Coexist, cit.
122 a. crooke, You Can’t Understand ISIS If You Don’t Know the History of Wahhabism
and Saudi Arabia, cit.
123 Saudi arabia’s confrontational posture vis-à-vis the Brotherhood has in part been
due to the al Saud’s fear of a functioning alternative model of Islamic government,
which would inevitably threaten their claim to the leadership of the Muslim world
as protectors of the two holy Places, Mecca and Medina. Moreover, a successful
democratic transition led by the Muslim Brotherhood would have represented a
role model of popular (Sunni) Islamist-led change supported by two rival models
of Islamic governance, (aKP-led) turkey and Qatar; and the process would have
moreover restored egypt to its traditional role of leader of the arab world. James
M. Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar Challenges Saudi Arabia, cit.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
democracy-dismantling and autocracy-building put forward by the aKP

leadership in turkey and the consequent increase in ethnic and armed
conflict in the country124.
In July 2013, the Parliament of the eu identified Wahhabism as
the main source of global terrorism125. e increasingly destabilizing role
of Saudi arabia, in particular in the arab world, has been publicly rec-
ognized and denounced by european spy agencies, notably the German
Intelligence Service (BnD)126 – and this happened despite the fact that
Saudi arabia is a top customer of German weapons. In february 2016,
the european Parliament voted by a large majority in favor of a (non-
binding) eu arms embargo against the Saudis in connection to the
Saudi-led invasion of yemen127. a call in this sense was also issued by
human Rights Watch (hRM)128. even in the u.S. there are an increasing
number of news reports and articles that indicate at least a partial re-
consideration of the long-standing alliance with Saudi arabia129.
taking into consideration what has been discussed in this essay, it
should be evident that the Iranians perceive an important part of the
u.S. policy in the region as being aimed at containing the Islamic Republic
and what is commonly called the Resistance front; this includes and in
fact privileges the use of Wahhabi-financed extremist groups. Iranians
are aware of the fact that they have been vital in preventing the fall of
Baghdad, erbil, Damascus and aleppo and in preserving the fragile state
institutions of Iraq and Syria (and afghanistan), for a period waging an
69
almost solo open war against ISIS and al Qaeda in support of the gov-
ernments of Iraq (and the Kurdistan region) and Syria.
In this framework, the argument put forward by andrew l. Peek
should be duly added to the equation when evaluating objective threats
124 abdullah Demirbas, Undoing Years of Progress in Turkey, “the new york times”,
26 January 2016, https://goo.gl/h1wvKv.
125 Karem armstrong, Wahhabism to ISIS: How Saudi Arabia Exported the Main
Source of Global Terrorism, “new Statesman”, 27 november 2014,
https://goo.gl/k7v02e.
126 andrea thomas, Germany’s BDN Criticizes Saudi Arabia’s Role in Arab World,
“the Wall Street Journal”, 2 December 2015, https://goo.gl/zygcuW.
127 Jon Stone, European Parliament Votes for EU-Wide Arms Export Embargo Against
Saudi, “Independent”, 25 february 2016, https://goo.gl/ivSryk.
128 thalif Deen, Western Powers Unlikely to Impose Arms Embargo on Saudi Arabia,
“IPS news agency”, 27 March 2016, https://goo.gl/xGtqfw.
129 haleh esfandiari, Saudi Arabia Is No Longer a Reliable U.S. Ally, “International
new york times”, 4 January 2016, https://goo.gl/tS3GJs, noah feldman, U.S.
Can Afford to Side With Iran Over Saudis, “Bloombergview”, 4 January 2016,
https://goo.gl/aznchc, and Richard Sokolsky, Time To Get Tough On Saudi
Arabia, “foreign affairs”, 6 January 2016, https://goo.gl/ihwtyt.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
and security priorities130. he points out that the most serious security
challenge to Western countries is represented by Saudi and Gulf-spon-
sored Wahhabi militantism and by Sunni lone wolf terrorism as its agents
represent the bulk of the West’s homegrown jihadists. In his view this is
the real menace not Iran’s state-supported Shia resistance fighters and
popular militias.
Iranians do not buy into the recent claims about u.S. or Saudi-led
coalitions against the jihadi-takfiri groups that they and their policies
have created and financed for more than three decades. Iranians stress
that the u.S. commitment to actually eradicating ISIS and al Qaeda-
linked groups in Iraq and Syria should become factual, not simply rhetor-
ical. While in 2014 obama was professing Washington’s determination
to «degrade and ultimately destroy ISIl»131, the uS-led coalition on
average carried out just nine air strikes per day in both Syria and Iraq,
and this figure meant significantly fewer sorties against ISIS than against
enemies in previous wars.132 to have an idea of the insignificance of the
number, one can compare it with the Syrian air force that in the same
period at times carried out up to 200 airstrikes in 36 hours133. furthermore
the Russian air force, during its first week of operations in Syria in late
2015, carried out more airstrikes than those of the u.S. in the previous
thirteen months134. is is the basic reason why Russia’s intervention
70 brought immediate results, tipping the war balance in favor of the Syrian
government135.
e time is ripe for the international community to develop and
implement a coordinated plan of action for countering Wahhabi ex-
tremism by ending its accommodation of Saudi arabia and other arab
monarchies in the Persian Gulf and their support for Wahhabi governance
and ideology. is is increasingly and paradoxically becoming a necessity
130 andrew l. Peek, The Roots of Lone Wolf Terrorism: Why the West’s Homegrown
Jihadists Are All Sunni, “foreign affairs”, 12 January 2016,
https://goo.gl/nqQtlX.
131 President Obama: ‘We Will Degrade and Ultimately Destroy ISIL, “Dipnote”, 10
September 2014, https://goo.gl/gShpso.
132 America’s Reserved Air War: Fewer Mission, More Hits Against IS, “Spiegel online
International”, 04 December 2014, https://goo.gl/W4vw7Q.
133 Syria Air Force Strikes 200 times in 36 Hours: Monitor, “Reuters”, 21 october
2014, https://goo.gl/zxpo3o.
134 leith fadel, One Week of Russian Airstrikes in Syrian Exceeds the U.S. Totals in 13
Months, “al-Masdar al-‘arabi”, 08 october 2015, https://goo.gl/wQGvK8.
135 Russia Tipping The Balance For Assad in Syria War?, “cBS news”, 8 october
2015, https://goo.gl/sM8lPx, and Shianee Mamanglu-Regala, Assad Credits Rus-
sian Airstraikes for Tipping the Balance in Syria’s Favour in Civil War, “christian
today”, 24 november 2015, https://goo.gl/Qv24r3.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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shared by those very Gulf monarchies, as the threat of Wahhabi militan-

tism and its more recent frightening manifestations such as al Qaeda
and ISIS appears to be going full circle and back to the Wahhabi heart-
land, challenging the Saudi Kingdom with its same doctrinal claims and
preaching the same religious teachings formulated by Ibn abd al-Wah-
hab136. e eurasia Group’s forecast of the world’s top 10 risks for 2016
listed Saudi arabia in the fih position, interestingly following the threat
posed by «ISIS and friends»137. In this framework, Saudi arabia’s in-
creasing economic problems138 only add urgency to the West and Iran’s
shared challenge of imagining a different and more sustainable security
framework for the region. In this respect, in March 2016 akbar velayati,
adviser in international affairs to Iran’s leader, proposed cooperation
between the eu and Iran against terrorism aimed at re-establishing peace
and security in the region139.
e signing between Iran and the P5+1 of the Joint comprehensive
Plan of action in vienna on 14 July 2015 and its implementation on 16
January 2016 are possible signs of the increasing awareness in the u.S.
and the West of the need to move beyond self-made narratives of the
threat posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the sustainability of
the Wahhabi-guaranteed status quo in the region. Iran has been the
single force that has blocked the emerging threat of ISIS and other Wah-
habi militants from Baghdad to Damascus, and arguably from Beirut to
Sanaa (if not Kabul). endless western attempts to contain and destabilize 71
the Islamic Republic have ended in failure and today, partly because of
Western support for Wahhabism and jihadi-takfiri militantism, Iran is
increasingly viewed internationally as leading the region’s struggle against
Wahhabi extremism.
136 fouad al-Ibrahim, Why ISIS is a threat to Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism’s deferred
promise, “al akhbar english”, 22 august 2014, https://goo.gl/ip6X05.
137 Ian Bremmer and cliff Kupchan (ed.), Top Risks 2016, “eurasia Group”,
https://goo.gl/hMih0S. the same concerns had been expressed also by John
hannah, It’s Time for the United States to Start worrying About a Saudi Collapse,
“foreign Policy”, 7 october 2015, https://goo.gl/pauhby; Sarah chayes and alex
de Waal, Start Preparing for the Collapse of the Saudi Kingdom, “Defense one”, 16
february 2016, https://goo.gl/vjW8Bz; and nafeez ahmed, The Collapse
of Saudi Arabia is Inevitable, “Middle east eye”, 28 September 2015,
https://goo.gl/yq25bw.
138 for a comparison between Saudi arabia and Iran as regards internal challenges
posed by economy, see tobin harshaw, Saudi Arabia Has Bigger Problems Than
Iran, “Bloombergview”, 7 January 2016, https://goo.gl/n7wuXl.
139 Velayati Proposes Iran-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, “IRna”, 2 March 2016,
https://goo.gl/zifvJ9.

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Energy Security in Iran: The Way

Forward in the Post-Nuclear Era
GIuSePPe PRovenzano
Master in International Public Affairs,

LUISS School of Government (Rome)
ABSTRACT: This article analyses the energy security options available to Iran. After
the removal of sanctions and the international legitimisation of the Iranian nuclear
program, it is possible for the Islamic Republic to reassess its options and shape its fu-
ture energy policies for more secure, resilient, sustainable and cheaper supplies. By
analysing Iran’s rising electricity generation needs and the cost of energy production
in the country, this article argues for the need for an expanded production, while in-
creasing its sustainability and driving down costs. The data used for the article are
derived from sources in English and Persian, and include databases, academic liter-
ature, news articles and public declarations. Iran’s major energy sources are nuclear
energy, oil, gas and renewable sources. While generally nuclear energy holds benefits
for oil-producing countries preparing for their future, this does not seem to be the case
for the Islamic Republic. Addressing the different inefficiencies in other sectors while
expanding use of gas and renewable sources might increase the resilience of the Iranian
energy sector. The Iranian government is aware of the need for increased foreign in-
vestment in the energy sector and it is reportedly preparing new instruments for en-
ticing external players. The development of its renewable energy sector would entail
freeing the country from fossil fuels, while raising the national profile with the at-
tainment of advanced technologies, even more “modern” than the nuclear one.
KEYWORDS: ENERGY SECURITY IN IRAN, ENERGY POLICY, RENEWABLE ENERGY

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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INTRODUCTION
I ran is a country with a rich energy endowment (its proven oil reserves
are 158 billion barrels and its gas reserves are approximately 1,201
trillion cubic feet according to the u.S. energy Information admin-
istration).1 Such abundance, together with its history and a peculiar lo-
cation at the crossroads between central asia, the Indian subcontinent
and Middle east make inescapable taking into account its fossil fuel en-
dowments and the impact it had on its development from the downfall
of the Qajar dynasty into a full-fledged modern state and a regional pow-
erhouse.
like most polities, the Islamic Republic of Iran strives to achieve
energy security. is objective can be pursued in a variety of ways, each
of which entails both technocratic and political decisions based on their
main energy-related features: geographic location, mineral reserves, al-
liances and opposition from neighbouring countries, and so on. for in-
stance, the ukrainian crisis has prompted the european union to expedite
its collective work towards an energy union, with a three-pronged strategy
resting on energy savings, import diversification and a common energy
market. conversely, the united States are exploiting the development
74 of their shale gas fields in order to shield themselves from foreign insta-
bility.
nevertheless, the size of its population and the export of oil and gas
make impossible for Iran to have simple solutions for this strategic goal.
In post-sanctions Iran, the country will have to reassess its priorities for
a more favourable international environment, with better access to foreign
technology and less need for defensive energy strategies. considering
this easier background, a rebalance could take place, favouring policies
more economically parsimonious and more environmentally sustainable.
Such policy goals require an assessment of the different energy options
available to the Iranian energy mix, in order to pave the way for a renewed
energy policy, and of the trends in energy demand.
e following sections briefly explore all the main elements in plan-
ning a future energy environment for Iran. first, the desirability of
nuclear energy – now an internationally recognized right – in the Iranian
energy mix is assessed. Subsequently, the article focuses on possible poli-
cies for a more resilient and sustainable oil sector. e issues of gas and
energy subsidies are treated together, especially since there is a clear
trade-off between internal overconsumption (for electricity production)
1 united States energy Information administration (eIa), Iran. Country Brief,

2015.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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ENERGY SECURITY IN IRAN: THE WAY FORWARD IN THE POST-NUCLEAR ERA
and ability to export gas to neighbouring countries through planned

pipelines. is introduces the topic of the reduction of energy waste
through subsidy reform, infrastructural upgrading and green policies
promotion as a sensible path to explore. e last section covers renewable
sources, an underutilized sector in Iran that holds an enormous potential
given the country’s solar and wind endowment.
A GROWING POPULATION AND RISING ENERGY NEEDS
Despite the abundance of fossil fuels available to it, the scale of the
Iranian population dictates a minimalist approach adopted by decision
makers within the Government. Whereas many oil- and gas-producing
countries actually exploit their reserves as a way of “paying the bills” and
avoid developing a modern taxation system, in Iran extraction cannot
substitute an industrial economy. e size of Iran’s population, its growth
rate and the decline in oil production have reduced the amount of
petrodollars available per capita through the decades. e gap from the
past is self-evident when comparing the Shah’s era with the present time.
FIGURE 1: PER CAPITA OIL EXPORT REVENUES, 1913-2010
75
Source: Kamiar Mohaddes and M. hashem Pesaran, One Hundred Years of Oil
Income and the Iranian Economy: A Blessing or a Curse?, ceSIfo Working Paper
no. 4118, center for economic Studies and Ifo Institute, Munich, 2013.
When considered from the perspective of the financial means of

the population, the difference appears striking, from $2558 per capita
in 1974 (in 2009 uS Dollar) down to $715 in 2010, just under $2 per
day or slightly above the official poverty line. If the whole country were
to rely just on oil rents, there would not be any room for infrastructure,
education or the state machinery. ereby, the Iranian government has
to limit rent-seeking behaviour and focus instead on wealth creation, i.e.
economic development.
nevertheless, hydrocarbons sale is still the most significant item in
the state budget and as such there is a clear trade-off between exporting
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
oil and gas and utilizing it domestically. More than 50 percent of Gov-
ernment revenues and about 80 percent of total export revenues come
from oil exports.2 until now, the availability of local resources has
prompted the development of energy-intensive industries such as petro-
chemicals, cement, and steel.3 In order to rationalize its energy policy,
Iran should increase energy production at home to fulfil the needs of
the above-mentioned industries without affecting external sales and di-
versify the national energy mix.
TABLE 1: SHARE OF HYDROCARBON RENT IN MENA ECONOMIES 1970-2009 (% GDP)
76
Source: Richard auty, “oil and Development in the Middle east”, paper presented
at the BRISMeS annual conference, 26-28 March 2012, london School of eco-
nomics and Political Science, london, 2012.
In the last decades, energy needs have been growing significantly

(about 6 percent per year for the past 30 years),4 especially aer the eco-
nomic recovery from the war with Iraq and with the partial economic
liberalization policies of the ‘90s under President Rafsanjani. is trend
is in line with the wider Gulf region (see table 2).
e rising trends in energy consumption can be mainly attributed
to economic growth (5 percent for the past 40 years), population growth
2 Saeed Moshiri, farideh atabi, Mohammad hassan Panjehshahi and Stefan le-
chtenböhmer, Long Run Energy Demand in Iran: A Scenario Analysis, “Interna-
tional Journal of energy Sector Management”, vol. 6, no. 1, (2012), p. 123.
3 David Ramin Jalilvand, From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani: Recent Developments and
Challenges in Iranian Oil and Gas, “orient”, vol. 4, (2013), p. 69.
4 Saeed Moshiri, Energy Price Reform and Energy Efficiency in Iran, “International
association for energy economics”, Second quarter 2013, p. 33.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
(about 2 percent), and heavily subsidized energy markets (12 percent of

the GDP).5
forecasting future demand growth is complex and subject to un-
foreseeable developments, such as internal growth, geopolitical changes
and international markets. a 2012 analysis has given two possible long-
term developments for energy demand in Iran: a business-as-usual sce-
nario and a possible energy-efficiency scenario where the country succeeds
in implementing crucial energy-saving policies.6
according to the study, in the first case total demand for final energy
is projected to increase on average by 2.8 percent per year from 783
Mboe in 2005 to 1549 Mboe in 2030. for electricity, the demand would
follow a 2.7 percent average annual growth. In the efficiency scenario,
however, it would only grow with an annual average of 1 percent. Demand
for final energy by households will grow on average by 3.4 percent under
business-as-usual and -0.6 percent under the efficiency scenarios for the
period 2005-2030.7
TABLE 2. ELECTRICITY GENERATION 2005-2007 AND GROWTH RATE 1990-2000
77
Source: G. luciani, Nuclear Energy Developments in the Mediterranean and the

Gulf, cit.
5 Ibidem.
6 S. Moshiri, f. atabi, M. h. Panjehshahi and S. lechtenböhmer, Long Run Energy
Demand in Iran: A Scenario Analysis, cit.
7 Ibidem.

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FIGURE 2. IRAN’S ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND CONSUMPTION

BETWEEN 2000 AND 2010
Whichever of the two scenarios will be more representative of the
78 future reality, a considerable growth will put further strain on local

energy infrastructures; thus making the case for additional differentiation
and energy saving, especially if it is considered that the primary sources
for energy are oil and gas. Similar issues are experienced throughout the
region and not only in Iran, as using such commodities for sustaining
the subsidised local energy production curbs the ability of the Gulf coun-
tries to sell energy abroad, which would make more sense economically.
Given this trade-off, these countries have been driven towards differen-
tiating their energy portfolios.
Generally, in the Gulf region power generation has relied on crude
oil, oil products or residual fuel oil. In some remote areas, diesel-powered
generators are still in place.8 Iran and Qatar are notable exceptions to
this trend since both of them hold huge natural gas reserves, the biggest
of which is the South Pars field (shared between them). consequentially,
natural gas has now surpassed oil as the main provider of electricity in
Iran.
nevertheless, with current trends, Iran might not be able to export
oil anymore by the mid-2030s. Instead, if it will succeed in applying en-
8 Giacomo luciani, Nuclear Energy Developments in the Mediterranean and the

Gulf, “the International Spectator”, vol. 44, no.1, (March 2009), p. 115.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
ergy-saving measures, the export capacity will decrease more slowly, sus-
taining external trade of oil at least until the mid-century.9
ere is ample room for price and non-price energy-efficiency meas-
ures in Iran, as they could lead to 42 percent less energy demand than in
the business-as-usual scenario and a decline in energy density of 60 per-
cent by 2030; a level lower than today’s average but still higher than
German energy intensity targets by 2020.10 is dramatic reduction is
possible given the unusually high energy-intensity index in Iran, one of
the highest in the world (twice as much as the world average), which has
been increasing on average by about 3.4 percent per year over the past
40 years.11 is would also entail a 45 percent reduction in energy related
co2 emissions by 2030, with positive effects on healthcare expenses.12
e correlation between production of energy from fossil fuel and co2
is evident in Iran: during the period 1967-2007, the final fossil fuel con-
sumption increased by about 617%, and co2 emissions increased by
about 610%.13
a potential source of energy savings could be upgrading and repair-
ing the ailing electricity infrastructure: according to an estimate, about
18.5% of the electricity generated in Iran is wasted before it reaches its
consumers due to technical problems14 and efficiency in Iran’s power
plants was near 37.4% in 2010, below world average (43.6%).15
Moving energy production towards non-fossil fuel sources such as
wind and solar would help managing both soaring pollution in the coun-
79
try and electricity wastage, as renewable sources are usually exploited lo-
cally even in remote areas, lowering electricity distribution losses.16
9 S. Moshiri, f. atabi, M. h. Panjehshahi and S. lechtenböhmer, Long Run Energy

Demand in Iran: A Scenario Analysis, cit., p.142.
10 S. Moshiri, Energy Price Reform and Energy Efficiency in Iran, cit., p. 24.
11 Ivi, p. 33.
12 Ibidem.
13 ali a. tofigh and Maryam abedian, Analysis of Energy Status in Iran for Designing
Sustainable Energy Roadmap, “Renewable and Sustainable energy Reviews”, vol.
57, (2016), p. 1304.
14 G. najafi, B. Ghobadian, R. Mamat , t. yusaf and W.h. azmi, Solar Energy in
Iran: Current State and Outlook, “Renewable and Sustainable energy Reviews”,
vol. 49, (2015), p. 933.
15 a. a. tofigh and M. abedian, Analysis of Energy Status in Iran for Designing Su-
stainable Energy Roadmap, cit., p. 1301.
16 Ivi, p. 1305.

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FIGURE 3. IRAN’S TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SHARE BY FUEL (2013)
80 NUCLEAR ENERGY
«for us, the nuclear issue is a scientific and economic one. If we can
progress and reach the end of the nuclear issue, this path we went
through and in which, until now, we were completely successful
thanks to God, it would be a scientific and economic progress for
the country. Iranian youth gained in this field personal potential,
talent and scientific knowledge and for us this has value from a scien-
tific view. from an economic view, this holds too very self-evident
savings.»17
Seyyed ali Khamenei
even though mastering a full nuclear cycle holds cultural and strate-
gic value, the primary public reasoning for Iran’s nuclear program has
been framed on economic and scientific arguments,18 as a way to obtain
energy independence and planning for a future where eventually oil and
17 friday prayer speech of 19 august 2005 reported in M. hamidi, Pāsdāri az Ho-

viat-e Dini va Esteqlāl-e ‘Elmi va Melli dar Cāleš-e Fanāvari-e Enerji-e Atomi,
“Dar Gostare-ye farhang-e Bein-ol-Melal”, no. 2, (Winter, 2005), pp. 22-35.
18 arastu Salehi, Rethinking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, “orient”, vol.4, (2013), p. 56.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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gas reserves will run out. is section will assess if nuclear energy could
be a viable option for covering the rising trends in energy demand in
Iran.
aer many delays, the first reactor unit at the power plant in Bushehr
reached its full capacity in august 2012 at 1,000 megawatts (MW).19
to date, the Iranian nuclear program includes work performed in at
least 22 facilities located at nine sites.20 as world powers have recently
legitimised internationally the Iranian nuclear program, it is now possible
to assess its role in satisfying Iran’s growing energy needs.
on the overall, radioactive ore supply, fuel needs, development costs
(especially given the extraordinary timespan of more than 30 years for
the commissioning of the Bushehr plant) depict a bleak scenario when
assessing it on economic terms. Plans for opening new plants seem not
to take into account that the declared stock of uranium ore in Iran looks
dramatically undersized for future fuel needs, defeating the declared goal
of energy independence by requiring costly imports.
nuclear energy in Iran is part of the overall trend of growing interest
towards this technology that it is spreading in the whole Gulf region.
By its own nature, nuclear technology tends to be regarded as economi-
cally risky and not very attractive to private investors. at the same time,
however, it is seen as a potential solution for countries looking for ways
to differentiate their energy mix by investing in long-term projects either
abroad or domestically.
81
as a capital-intensive enterprise, the nuclear industry suits the sce-
nario of oil-producing countries receiving huge cash inflows and having
only a limited number of trained personnel available. e average lifespan
of a nuclear plant can reach 40 years and its returns over investment are
achieved over the long term.21 is makes the enterprise rather unattrac-
tive for private investors with yearly business cycle reports and share-
holders, while it is more suitable for governments looking for long-term
cheap energy sources for their countries, especially if they feel that their
fossil resources are depleting. furthermore, the requirement of a high
initial investment is not discouraging for many governments in the Gulf
region, given the high liquidity of their assets.
for Iran, however, nuclear electricity production loses most of its
attractiveness when considering the needs of the country, its peculiar
19 eIa, Iran: Country Analysis, U.S. Energy Information Administration, Washington,

2013.
20 thomas Wood et al., The Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, “nonproli-
feration Review”, vol. 14, no. 1, (March 2007), p. 90.
21 G. luciani, Nuclear Energy Developments in the Mediterranean and the Gulf, cit.,
p. 121.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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endowments and when comparing the costs of nuclear technology against

other readily available power sources. estimates put the cost for the
reactor in Bushehr at almost $11 billion (in today’s dollars) because of
its long and complex history, while only providing for 2 percent of Iran’s
electricity needs.22
Feasibility of Domestic Enrichment in Iran
With the exception of the construction of the plants, the most eco-
nomically sensible issue for long-term feasibility of nuclear energy in
Iran is fuel availability. In order to keep the reactors operating once com-
missioned, the Iranian government will have to overcome a possible fuel
scarcity.
currently only one reactor is active and working in Iran, producing
approximately 1,000MW. Iran maintains that its goal is to build at least
seven reactors. once built and commissioned, an idled reactor without
nuclear fuel would lose a return on its investment at a pace of at least
$200 million per year.23 e Russian custom-built vveR-1000 reactor
requires 25 metric tons (Mt) of uranium dioxide (uo2) each year, this
kind of fuel translates to 450,000 Mt of raw uranium ore.24
uranium ore is neither abundant nor cheap in Iran. e Iranian
82 uranium ore endowment is equivalent to 0.13 percent of the country’s
petroleum resources, 0.09 percent of its gas endowment, and 8.8 percent
of its hydropower potential.25
22 ali vaez and Karim Sadjadpour, Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks, carnegie
endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2013, p. vii.
23 a. vaez and K. Sadjadpour, Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks, cit., p. 13.
24 t. W. Wood et al., The Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, cit., p. 94.
25 Ivi, p. 17.

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FIGURE 4. IRAN’S ENERGY RESERVES (IN QUADRILLION BRITISH THERMAL UNITS)
Source: t. W. Wood et al., e Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, cit.

83
e kind of uranium ore available in Iran is rather expensive to ex-
tract, as the two uranium mines have a low uranium grade of 0.05-0.2
percent. according to 2010 data, the total capacity of these mines (71
metric tons of uranium per year / Mtu) is not sufficient to produce
fuel for a single vveR-1000 reactor, which would require approximately
223 Mtu per year.26
on the environmental side, extraction and production operations
require massive use of water in a country where water scarcity is worsen-
ing, especially in the far-flung regions where the mines are located. ere
is a possibility that it would contribute to the ongoing desertification
process.
an additional unavoidable issue is the size of the reserves: if the
uranium ore located in the proved reserve mines were to be extracted in
its entirety, it would power the single reactor already built for less than 9
years. If hypothetically all the reactors were to be built and commissioned
at the same time, the nuclear fuel would allow them to operate only for
little more than one year before running out.

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TABLE 3. REACTOR YEARS OF OPERATION BASED ON IRAN’S URANIUM RESERVES
Source: t. W. Wood et al., e Economics of Energy Independence for Iran cit.
especially aer the nuclear agreement, the limited scope of domestic

enrichment adds an additional layer of competitive disadvantage. as it
cannot exploit the economies of scale like bigger enrichment centres do,
it makes locally enriched nuclear fuel further uneconomical because of
its smaller scope. e acquisition of fuel abroad eases the economic bur-
den of powering the reactors, but the overall assessment puts this energy
source as the less advantageous for Iran.
considering the above-mentioned points on fuel availability, con-
struction cost and environmental concerns, it is fair to say that post-
84 sanctions Iran should be able to move forward to exploiting other re-
sources. oil and gas offer considerable room for fresh investment that
would be much better spent than on new nuclear reactors. Renewable
sources and diminishing energy wastage are policy options that may be
better suitable for covering Iran’s future energy demand than fresh nuclear
infrastructure.
OIL
In discussing the Middle east, oil is inescapable. It has influenced the

region’s relations with the rest of the world, notably the major powers.
It has influenced relations within the region, because it is not uni-
formly distributed; on the contrary it is highly concentrated, creating
a very distinctive polarization between oil-haves and oil-have-nots.27
Giacomo luciani
27 Giacomo luciani, Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the
Middle East, in louise fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East,
oxford university Press, oxford, 2009, pp. 81-103.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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e petroleum industry has contributed nothing to well-being of the

people or to the technological progress or industrial development of
my country.28
Mohammad Mossadegh
e history of oil in Iran is so ancient that it predates both the

Pahlavi dynasty and the Islamic Republic, arching back to the last days
of the Qajar monarchy. especially in the early years, the relationship be-
tween the Iranian government and foreign companies in charge of ex-
tracting national resources was sometimes torn between international
cooperation and defence against foreign exploitation and it has shaped
the country’s history.
for instance, the centralised management of oil revenues in the
hands of the royal family and their entourage is considered to be among
the factors that led to a deep sense of alienation and resentment among
the youths and part of the intelligentsia leading to the fall of the monar-
chy.29 In contrast, the Islamic Republic has been very careful in assigning
oil wealth to the public through the use of the constitution.
is linkage between politics and oil management in Iran is so sig-
nificant that, according to the International energy agency, the 1978
Islamic Revolution caused the most significant oil disruption in the
recent decades.30
oil will continue to play a preeminent role in the country’s future,
but aer decades of sanction, lack of competition and mismanagement,
85
it has become the crux of the issues that the Rouhani and future admin-
istrations will have to solve if they want to achieve both energy security
and sustainable economic development.
Future Prospects of Oil Management in Iran
according to Iranian authorities, the country requires between

$20031 and $30032 billion of foreign investment over the next decade to
28 Speech to the united nations Security council, 15 october 1951 quoted in Ka-
miar Mohaddes and M. hashem Pesaran, One Hundred Years of Oil Income and
the Iranian Economy, cit., p. 7.
29 Dauda abubakar, Oil and Resource Conflict in the Persian Gulf, in Kenneth omeje
(ed.), Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-regional Per-
spectives on Rentier Politics, ashgate, 2008, p. 241.
30 Giacomo luciani, Global Oil Supplies: The Impact of Resource Nationalism and
Political Instability, “cePS Working Document”, no. 350, (2011), p. 3.
31 Parisa hafezi and Rania el Gamal, Cancellation of Iran oil contracts’ presentation
signals infighting, “Reuters”, 11 february 2016. available at: https://goo.gl/qIsGpz.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
revamp and successfully improve its oil sector. In order to acquire such
funds and ignite a general overhaul of the existing infrastructure, it is
unavoidable to attract significant foreign direct investments (fDI). e
current post-nuclear sanctions environment is being managed towards
such a direction, as signalled by the intensification of political and fi-
nancial delegations traveling to and from Iran.
a significant obstacle against successfully wooing foreign capitals
and expertise is given by the current legal framework, which is influenced
by the political configuration created aer the Islamic Revolution. as a
reaction to perceived past misdeeds by foreign exploiters of national
wealth, the Iranian constitution33 poses that foreign companies cannot
own the country’s mineral resources in any form. Such rigid provision
has led to the almost exclusive use of a rather unattractive contract tem-
plate when dealing with foreign companies: the buy-back contract.
using this business framework, foreign companies build extractive
and distribution facilities in Iran and aer completion they sell them
back to the Iranian national oil company at a fixed price, usually as a
portion of future extracted oil.34 is amount does not take into account
additional costs that the foreign company may occur into, it does not
recognize any ownership of built infrastructure and it is thus considered
risky and not very attractive by private foreign investors.
86 considering this background, it appears that the stance of the ruling
elite towards foreign investors has been limiting the extractive economic
potential of the government. currently, the Iranian government is trying
to reduce hurdles and barriers in order to boost a major overhaul of its
oil sector, but it is finding such task particularly complex due to consti-
tutional boundaries, as legal workarounds are difficult to realize and
prone to political attacks.35
If Iran wishes to attract more private investors in its oil sector, in
order to improve production and recovery rates, it will need to finalise a
major overhaul of the country’s legal structure regarding this industry.
is seems to be the path currently chosen by the government. veteran
oil minister zanganeh (already operating during Khatami’s presidency)
has prepared a new contract package moving in that direction.36 Since
the beginning of the Rouhani administration, there have been calls to
33 Daniel Brumberg and ariel Ira ahram, The National Iranian Oil Company in Ira-
nian Politics, the James a. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, houston (uSa),
2007, p. 6.
34 D. R. Jalilvand, From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani, cit., p. 71.
35 G. luciani, Global Oil Supplies, cit., p. 11.
36 Iran’s Oil Industry - Dreaming of a New Golden Age, “the economist”, 31 august
2013.

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explore the use of Production-Sharing agreement (PSa) for companies

from countries with no «negative historical experience» in Iran.37
another step towards major efficiency would be increasing com-
petitiveness by restricting companies lacking in expertise from winning
critical tenders only because of political connections.38
Despite the new contract package not yet being final, the proposed
new framework, known as the “Iran Petroleum contract” (IPc), would
give the right to outside oil companies of a set percentage of Iran’s oil re-
serves for a timeframe of 20 or 25 years.39 is formula should allow
compliance to the wording of the Iranian constitution while attracting
sizable fDI in the Iranian oil industry.
finally, a major improvement to the oil infrastructure that would
help with regards to energy self-sufficiency would be addressing its un-
usually high flaring rates. oil fields generate a certain quantity of natural
gas as a natural by-product of extraction. If unaddressed, it would quickly
fill the oil field, creating a dangerous environment. ere are three main
ways to deal with it: extraction for commercial use, reinjection in the oil
wells in order to elongate their natural life or flaring it at wellhead. of
course, the last option is the less efficient economically as it wastes
valuable available goods. Being that Iran is a major gas producer, one
would argue that its gas recovery technologies would be advanced; sur-
prisingly Iran has one of the highest flaring rates in the world.
87
37 D. R. Jalilvand, From Ahmadinejad to Rouhani, cit., p.72.

38 ali alfoneh, How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?,
“Middle eastern outlook”, no. 3 (october 2007), p. 4.
39 In Iran, New Battle Brews Over Contracts with Foreign Oil Giants, “new york ti-
mes”, 31 January 2016. available at https://goo.gl/eQvsfB.

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FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION FLARED AT WELLHEAD
Source: t. W. Wood et al., e Economics of Energy Independence for Iran, cit.
88 according to satellite data, Iran in 2011 flared 11.4 bcm (billion

cubic metres of natural gas) while the united States only burned 7.1
bcm40 on a much larger oil production scale. capturing and using the
flared gas from oil fields bringing flared rates to the Middle east’s or
north america’s average would support electrical generation projects
equivalent to two to four nuclear reactors of a capacity comparable to
the one installed in Bushehr.41
another economically efficient solution would be to use the wellhead
gas to preserve the declining production rates of the most mature oil
fields. as internal pressure decreases, so does production. a solution to
this issue would be pumping the extracted natural gas back in the oil
fields, thus rising again their pressure and reinvigorating oil production.
lack of funds has limited the development of gas reinjection upgrades
and other advanced techniques for oil rate recovery, thus making the de-
cline rates of mature Iranian fields among the highest in the world.42
40 the World Bank, Estimated Flared Volumes from Satellite Data, 2007-2011, Wa-
shington, 2013. available at https://goo.gl/WqMPkp.
42 Shayerah Ilias, Iran’s Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues, congressional Research
Service, Washington, 2010, p. 12.

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Infrastructure overhaul, new fDI policies and recovery techniques

may prove essential to keep the oil sector alive in Iran. nevertheless,
simply optimizing oil exploitation may not be enough for the country’s
energy security. estimates put a lifespan of approximately 94 years to
Iran’s oil production.43 In fact, the country may not be able to export its
oil any-longer well before that estimate, as discussed above, especially if
current issues are le unaddressed. on the other hand, gas and especially
renewable sources seem to hold a strategic value that has yet to be fully
exploited.
GAS INDUSTRY AND THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET REFORM
Iran’s proved natural gas reserves stand at 1,201 trillion cubic feet
(tcf ), according to recent estimates the most significant in the world.44
eighty percent of Iranian natural gas reserves are located in fields not as-
sociated to oil, and most of these reserves have not been developed yet.45
Given the lowering of world market prices in recent years due to
the development of u.S. shale gas fields, electricity production from gas
is considered now significantly cheaper than nuclear-derived power.
In 2009, the estimated cost for each kilowatt produced in Iran from
gas stood at $850 compared to $4,000 needed from nuclear energy pro-
duction.46
89
43 a. a. tofigh and M. abedian, Analysis of Energy Status in Iran, cit., p. 1298.

44 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, June. available at
https://goo.gl/5RQpKs.
45 eIa, Iran: Country Analysis.
46 a. vaez and K. Sadjadpour, Iran’s Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks, cit., p.17.

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FIGURE 6. LARGEST PROVED RESERVE HOLDERS OF NATURAL GAS, END 2014
Scarcity of funds and barrage from accessing innovative foreign

technology prevented Iran from properly developing its gas endowment.
90 is has resulted in the paradoxical trade-off of a country with huge
natural gas reserves that has to choose between domestic consumption
or exports. e latter is a move that holds a strategic geopolitical value
for Iran, as it would be welcomed by neighbouring countries wanting to
differentiate their energy mix and avoid receiving gas imports only from
Qatar, the other gas powerhouse in the Gulf region.
a further challenge to exporting gas and energy independence is
the internal market distortion caused by the extensive energy subsidies.
is has removed the need for energy efficiency in Iran and caused
massive domestic over-consumption: for producing the same quantity
of GDP, Iran needs 3.4 times more energy than world average, and 1.7
times more than regional average.47
at the same time, Iran is pushing for building pipelines and signing
export deals with its surrounding area. e feasibility of such projects is
yet to be seen, given Iran’s more or less balanced equilibrium between
extraction and domestic consumption. Such deals could gain additional
traction with a more technocratic energy decision-making, insulated
from political pressure: for instance, a contract to export gas to Sharjah
47 David Ramin Jalilvand, Geopolitics vs Economics: Between Domestic Utilisation

and Export Ambitions for Iranian Gas, in Iran’s Internal Market, “caspian energy
and environment Bulletin”, vol. 3 (2013), p. 13.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
never became operational because the Iranian side wanted to renegotiate

the price it had agreed to, and the importer refused to do so.48 ose
two different policy orientations (export and domestic consumption)
are preferred by two different bodies, compounding the impasse: while
the Iranian Parliament favours gas being used exclusively internally, gov-
ernment authorities tend to support export projects and try to promote
them through diplomacy.49
Given this current split of policies, a sensible plan to achieve energy
self-reliance would target the already-existing free boon represented by
flared gas in order to increase the quantity available. according to some
simulations, the construction of two facilities covering the electricity ca-
pacity of the Bushehr reactor and the additional pipeline required would
generate very high internal rate returns (as high as 18-23 percent) and
short payback times50 by using technology already available to Iran.
is should be coupled with a responsible subsidies reform that
should push towards major energy efficiency. It is a reform that the gov-
ernment cannot avoid undertaking as the problem cannot be solved only
by the development of nuclear energy, as subsidies have reached such a
massive scope that, according to available data, in 2009 they ate away
around 25 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product of $335 billion.51
although other factors have increased energy demand, such as growing
people’s wealth and a rising penetration rate of electric appliances, the
inefficient subsidy system has contributed to electricity mass overcon- 91
sumption. according to Iranian figures, energy consumption has in-
creased five-fold in the past 30 years while the country’s population has
only doubled.52 however, results may not become visible soon enough
even with an effective subsidy reform, as the relative price of energy must
remain high for a relatively long period before its full effects on energy
efficiency will be felt.53 additionally, the reform should be complemented
with complementary non-price measures towards energy efficiency (such
as subsidies towards low-consumption lamps and appliances).
48 G. luciani, Global Oil Supplies: The Impact of Resource Nationalism and Political
Instability, p. 12.
49 Ibidem.
51 Semira nikou, The Subsidies Conundrum, in The Iran Primer, 2015, p. 2. available
at: https://goo.gl/SwRa1p.
52 Ibidem.
53 S. Moshiri, Energy Price Reform and Energy Efficiency in Iran, cit., p. 36.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
currently, the Iranian grid generates about 70 GW of power with a

growing demand of approximately 5GW per year driven by its rising
economy.54 as the Ministry of energy indicated that about 15,000-
20,000 MW of capacity could be added to the existing capacity for the
next 20 years, an increasing share of future energy production is being
assigned to renewable energy sources.55
Despite renewable energy being largely neglected in the recent past,
the country is showing signs of accelerating in the adoption of significant
shares of renewable energy in the national electricity usage. estimations
vary sensibly, but, according to some estimates, only 232 megawatts (0.31
percent of the country’s total power generation capacity) are obtained
through renewable means.56 other calculations state that currently only
1% of energy production comes from renewable energy resources.57
although hydroelectric sources are limited in a country renowned
for its vast deserts, other renewable sources hold a huge potential for
electricity generation in Iran. e main benefit offered by these untapped
resources resides in their indefinite availability, even in a future where
oil and gas might deplete. furthermore, they strengthen the national
92 energy mix by making it more resilient to external shocks and by lowering
the carbon emission that would alternatively be generated by fossil
sources.
addressing a perceived policy gap, on 17 november 2015 the
Supreme leader ayatollah Khamenei issued a letter58 outlining general
policy guidelines concerning the environment, building on the policy-
making powers granted by article 110 of the Iranian constitution.59
among the other environmentally friendly policies outlined in this letter,
he asks the three branches of the state to provide for cleaner energy, es-
pecially promoting environmentally friendly fuels, and transfer and de-
velopment of international green technology.
54 G. najafi, B. Ghobadian, R. Mamat, t. yusaf and W.h. azmi, Solar Energy in

Iran: Current State and Outlook, cit., p. 932.
55 Ivi, p. 933.
56 Iran Calls for More Investment in Solar Energy Field, “azernews”, 23 november
2015. available at https://goo.gl/fiaax2.
Iran: Current State and Outlook, cit., p. 936.
58 Seyyed ali Khamenei, Eblāġ-e Siāsathāi-e Kolli-e Mohit-e Zist, 17 november 2015.
available at https://goo.gl/R0rhG7.
59 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, article 110, Paragraph 1.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Iran has one of the most ancient records in exploiting wind power.
for centuries, the badgirs, the Iranian wind towers, cooled houses during
the heat of summer thanks to their structure that captured the cool
breezes while making them circulate inside the buildings. nevertheless,
contemporary Iran has yet to exploit to its maximum the potential for
wind energy offered by its peculiar geographic situation (a mountainous
landmass located between two large bodies of water), even if the trend
seems to be improving significantly.
according to the Renewable energy organization of Iran, the wind
estimates in Iran illustrate that the nominal capacity of 45 sites is ap-
proximately 6,500 megawatt.60 is translates to 6.5 Busher-type nuclear
reactors. e cost of producing electricity by wind in Iran is estimated
to be 4-5 cents/kWh. electricity from steam and gas power plants costs
between 2 and 2.5 cents/kWh, respectively, but this is before adding the
social cost deriving from pollutants, which adds from 3 to 4 cents/kWh,
making the case that renewable energy is the most convenient in the
long run.61
Some important measures have been taken recently, such as the start
of energy purchase by the Ministry of energy at differentiated price
levels, the allocation of credit lines, and the permission for concluding
buy-back contracts with state-owned and private sector investors.62 e
stated goal of these measures is achieving 5% of national generation of
electricity by renewable sources.
93
With two large inhabited deserts, 300 sunny days a year, and an av-
erage of 2,200 kilowatt hour of solar radiation per square meter,63 Iran
also holds a huge untapped potential in solar energy. according to some
studies, it is estimated that the amount of energy received by just 1
percent of Iran’s land surface could fulfill the current country’s energy
needs and generate an equal amount of electricity for export.64
Being located in the world Sun Belt, Iran has an annual average of
sun radiation about 20-30 MJ/m2 that is even higher in the central re-
gions. Some estimates put the amount of solar radiation hours in Iran
over 2800 h per year.65
60 Suna, The Renewable Energy Organization of Iran, Wind & Wave Energy. avai-
lable at: https://goo.gl/kMaus3, retrieved on 14 March 2016.
61 a. a. tofigh and M. abedian, Analysis of Energy Status in Iran, cit., p. 1300.
62 Suna, History, Objectives and Missions. available at: https://goo.gl/cJ4bWP,
retrieved on 13 March 2016.
64 Ibidem.
65 G. najafi, B. Ghobadian, R. Mamat , t. yusaf and W.h. azmi, Solar Energy in
Iran, cit., p. 938.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
yet solar power is currently so underdeveloped that according to

the Ministry of energy there is less than 38,000 kilowatt of installed ca-
pacity throughout Iran,66 mostly thanks to about 77,000 m2 of solar col-
lectors installed during Iran’s third and fourth national development
plans.67
aer the removal of sanctions, many foreign firms are manifesting
interest in investing in solar power in Iran and the trend seems to be
growing. Recently an Italian company announced plans to build plants
in three Iranian cities with a total capacity of 10 Mega Watts.68 e
country’s total potential for producing solar and wind energy is estimated
to be around 40,000GWh and 100,000MWh. Policymakers are planning
the creation of 5GW of new renewable energy capacity by the year 2018,
a 25 times increase on current capacity, enough to sustain two million
households. e lion’s share will go to wind energy, with a significant
part reserved to solar.69
even though Iran is not a country noted for its water resources,
these could still provide for a significant input. for instance, Mohsen
Renani, an economist at the university of esfahan, has argued that the
Karun Dam located in the southwestern region of Khuzestan could pro-
vide more energy to the country than the Bushehr power plant.70
94 finally, Iran holds several potential geothermal sources, with a po-

tential capacity at around 7,000 MW, yet the only installed plant harnesses
a meagre 55MW of geothermal power.71
CONCLUSION
energy security is one of the main goals for most contemporary

polities, the same holds true for Iran. While different avenues do exist
for insulation against external energy shocks, Iran is keen on achieving
energy self-sufficiency by diversifying the exploitation of its vast energy
potential.
66 Suna, Photovoltaic Energy. available at: https://goo.gl/mDsRgg, retrieved on

13 March 2016.
Iran, cit., p. 938.
68 Italy to Build Three Solar Plants in Iran, “tasnim news agency,” 23 february
2016. available at: https://goo.gl/k2qwrx.
Iran, cit., p. 939.
70 nima Gerami, Leadership Divided? The Domestic Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Debate,
“Policy focus”, no. 134, (february 2014), p. 24.
71 Ivi, p. 21.

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FOCUS
By analysing the rising electricity generation needs of Iran, we noted

a significant rising trend in energy demand that could lead up to 1549
Mboe in 2030 in a business-as-usual scenario and the inability of the
country to export any oil by mid-2030s. e policy response to this wor-
rying possibility would require an expanded energy capacity, while driving
down costs and increasing sustainability of production.
e quantity of additional energy production required in the next
few decades will depend on the ability of Iranian policymakers to reduce
energy wastage through an upgraded infrastructure and local energy
production, and by implementing policies that tackle massive overcon-
sumption of the internal energy market. e major energy sources for
Iran are nuclear, oil, gas and renewable sources.
While generally nuclear energy holds benefits for oil-producer coun-
tries preparing for their future, this does not seem to be the case for the
Islamic Republic, given the scarcity of local fuel and requirement for
massive infrastructure that could be spent for better returns on other
energy options.
addressing the different inefficiencies in other sectors while ex-
panding the use of gas and renewable sources might increase the resilience
of the Iranian energy security. tapping the flared wellhead gas and its
huge solar and wind potentials could be an adequate way to help achieve
such goals in an inexpensive way.
e oil sector is part of a cost-opportunity dilemma, as freeing re- 95
sources from local use would allow acquisition of needed hard currency
through external sale, a renewed prospect in the post-nuclear agreement
era. e Iranian government is indicating it is aware of the need for in-
creased foreign investment in the sector and it is reportedly preparing
new frameworks for enticing external players.
e gas sector offers great room for development, given the space
opened by advanced technology becoming available thanks to the end
of sanctions.
e development of its renewable energy sector would entail light-
ening the country’s dependence on fossil fuels, while raising the national
profile with the obtainment of very advanced technologies, even more
“modern” than the nuclear one.
finally, it appears that many policies are constrained by political in-
fighting and past populist decisions and are likely to stay underperforming
unless the government manages to insulate decision-making from short-
term political calculations. e prospected removal of subsidies on fuel
seems to be a recognition of a much-needed overhaul of the energy
sector in Iran and could signal positive steps in the right direction.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Economic Development in
Post-Revolutionary Iran:
A State-in-Society Approach
haMeD MouSavI, Ph.D. & MohaMMaD a. MouSavI, Ph.D.
(1) University of Tehran, Assistant Professor

(2) University of Tehran, Associate Professor
ABSTRACT: The paper uses Joel Migdal’s ‘State in Society’ theoretical framework
to analyze development policy in post-revolutionary Iran. It is argued that in the three
and a half decades after the revolution the Iranian government has faced no harder
challenge than to reform the country’s economy. The Iranian economy has suffered
from high unemployment, two-digit inflation, a weak currency and a shortage of
social amenities. This has been partly because the Iranian state and society have had
difficulty in identifying an economic master-narrative; with one end of the political
spectrum stressing a liberal capitalist model of development based on the experience
of Western countries, while the other pursues a form of socialist economic strategy
based on Islamic values. The result of these conflicting approaches has hampered the
country’s development policy. The paper argues, however, that during the past few
years, as a result of Western economic sanctions on Iran as well as declining oil prices,
the vulnerability of the country’s oil dependent economy became bare. As a result of
these circumstances, the country’s political elites led by the Supreme Leader came to
adopt a “resistance economy” strategy to overcome these challenges. It is argued that,
in the post nuclear-agreement era where sanctions are slowly being lifted, this new
economic model – which emphasizes indigenous manufacturing and production, the
diversification of exports, and reform of banking and financial sectors – if imple-
mented correctly has the potential to revitalize Iran’s economy as never before.
KEYWORDS: IRANIAN ECONOMY, IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL, STATE-IN-SOCIETY THEORETICAL MODEL

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
t here are very few topics in political science that can ignore the
state and its institutions. is is particularly true regarding today’s
state since it influences and plays a role in wide ranging areas,
from foreign policy, economics and education to the media and even the
arts. Because of this, devising an accurate approach on how to study the
state and its policies has become a fundamental problem whose answer
affects different research areas in political science.
a broad categorization of the approaches taken to study the state
lists two sets of theories. e first group consists of institutional theories
that see the state as autonomous, coherent and usually powerful institu-
tions formulating and implementing the policies of a country. e second
group of theories analyzes the state as a set of processes rather than as in-
dependent institutions. In the “process approach”, the state is shaped
and influenced by many factors, including society, culture, values, beliefs,
etc., and is thus conditioned and bounded by these factors. In another
variant of the “state-as-process approach”, the state, while shaped and
constantly changed by the above factors, also influences them in return,
making the relationship bidirectional; with the state and society mutually
shaping and affecting each other. university of Washington professor
Joel S. Migdal has been a principal advocate of this more sophisticated
approach. is essay uses Migdal’s model for the study of the state, par-
98 ticularly his essays in State in Society: Studying How States and Societies
Transform and Constitute One Another, together with alexander Ger-
schenkron’s theory on economic development, to analyze development
policy in post-revolutionary Iran. While other theories have been intro-
duced since Migdal’s essays first appeared, as this paper will demonstrate,
his approach is a potent framework to analyze the contested nature of
the state, which is under continuous pressure from different ideologies
and political groups within society. e paper begins with a theoretical
discussion of the state, followed by its application to the Iranian case
and, finally, by addressing the merits of this theoretical approach.
e institutional approach to the study of the state became partic-
ularly prominent in the 1970s and 1980s with the works of political sci-
entists such as Samuel huntington. e institutional perspective sees
the state as an independent and autonomous organization, which through
its various means of power, including laws and regulations, bureaucracy,
education as well as the use of violence, shapes society. us, the role of
institutions is paramount and the study of political, economic and even
cultural issues should be done through the study of the institutional
state. is approach has played an important role in the formulation of
political and international relations theories, particularly those theories
that adopt a realist view of world politics (Migdal, 2001). In the institu-
tional approach, usually Weber’s definition of the state as «a human
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN
community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical

force within a given territory» is used. under this definition, the state
uses violence or the threat of violence, perceived as legitimate, to enforce
relationships of domination and subordination in society. In contrast to
Weber’s definition, Migdal defines the state as various processes that are
manifestations of the continuous struggles among shiing coalitions
over the rules and norms for daily behavior. Migdal calls this a “state-in-
society” model, which embodies the conflicting interactions of the differ-
ent groups of a society, each advocating their own sets of formal and in-
formal approaches to the country’s laws and policies.
Migdal’s approach borrows from some of edward Shils’ ideas in
which the community is defined as a «group of persons acquiring their
significance by their embodiment of values which transcend them and
by their conformity with standards and rules from which they derive
their dignity.» While Migdal does not accept all of Shils’ arguments,
however his approach also emphasizes the role of culture – which is
shaped by values and beliefs – in creating members’ identity, and society
in general. is in turn influences the state and its policies. however, in
many instances, society does not have a homogenous set of values and
beliefs, rather the values and beliefs as well as the interests of various seg-
ments of society struggle with each other to capture power in the state;
oen resulting in a state which embodies complex and competing rules
and policies. is is why Migdal’s definition makes the state a contradic-
99
tory and paradoxical entity that can act against itself (Ibidem). another
important element in Migdal’s work is the argument of political scientists
such as Greetz and laitin that emphasizes the need for a “cultural glue”
or a master narrative to keep the complex organization of the modern
state from breaking apart. is approach stresses that large organizations
are pulled in many different directions causing them to disintegrate. is
is especially true of modern states, which have increasing and complex
responsibilities to fulfill. culture is what prevents these centrifugal forces
from loosening the control and efficiency of the state, and this is where
the importance of a master narrative shared by both state and society
comes into play.
e state can use different tools, such as language policy, the educa-
tional system, rituals and symbols, mass media as well as religion to
create a sense of identity among the population and to create the imagined
community of a nation. is created identity is usually deeply connected
with the country’s master narrative and is what ties the state and society
together. is in turn allows for an effective mechanism to define goals
and devise the best means to achieve them. us this master narrative
not only creates loyalty and conformity among the population but also
decides the roles and limits of the state’s institutions (Ibidem). In many
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
countries in which the political system is experiencing significant turmoil,

society lacks a master narrative that everyone adheres to. for example,
in countries such as Pakistan, there are significant and sometimes unre-
solvable differences on what the main agenda and goals of the system
should be, both in society and among the country’s elites. In fact, many
failed states lack such a master narrative. In more stable Western societies,
a master narrative is more established and resilient. however, even in
these societies, the master narrative might come under threat in the case
of a prolonged crisis that the political establishment is unable to efficiently
handle. for example, it can be argued that the 2008 financial crisis in
the united States deeply threatened the country’s master narrative, leading
to not only calls for changes in financial regulations but also to demands
for social, political and cultural reforms; even though the success of this
movement for change has been disappointing thus far.
another theory used in this paper is the one on the role of the state
in fostering economic development in countries that are late arrivers in
this arena formulated by alexander Gerschenkron and presented in his
article titled Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. By analyzing
the industrialization of Soviet Russia, Gerschenkron comes to the con-
clusion that a set of institutions and ideologies can be favorable to eco-
nomic growth, adding that, by using the past experience of industrialized
100 states, developing countries can achieve a higher rate of growth and
progress through developmental stages similar to the way in which in-
dustrialized states progressed. however, he warns that the road towards
industrialization for these countries can be rocky, leading them to insta-
bility and even war (Gerschenkron, 1966).
IRAN’S ECONOMIC POLICY
In the three and a half decades aer the revolution, the Iranian gov-
ernment has faced no harder challenge than to reform the country’s
economy. e Iranian economy has continuously suffered from high un-
employment, two-digit inflation, a weak currency and a shortage of
social infrastructure. economists list many reasons for Iran’s economic
troubles, including a high dependency on oil exports – which makes the
country vulnerable to price fluctuations –, budget deficits, reduced capital
investment, a near empty treasury undercut by a paltry tax base, wide
spread cost/price distortions, an expensive subsidy system, capital flights,
over-evaluation of the currency, poor management and corruption as
well as an anti-profiteering political climate (amuzegar, 1999). ese
economic troubles have had serious consequences. for example, according
to official statistics from the Iranian government, the unemployment
rate from March 2015 to March 2016 was 11%. More troubling is the
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
fact that, during the same period, for 15-24 year olds the unemployment
rate was 26.1% (tabnak, 2016).
as with many other countries, economic issues have played a prime
role in Iranian politics. economic difficulties have repeatedly created
political crises and have played a major part in the rise and fall of politi-
cians. for example, Mohammad Khatami’s presidency was marked with
low oil prices and subsequently with a less than optimal economic per-
formance; bringing with it constant attacks on the administrations’ “eco-
nomic mismanagement” by the disenfranchised conservatives, in effect
undercutting his political agenda (amuzegar, 1999). at the same time,
while the administration of Mahmoud ahmadinejad enjoyed high oil
prices for most of its tenure, due to various reasons including misman-
agement as well as Western economic sanctions, inflation soared, reaching
a peak of nearly 40% in 2013 (e World Bank, Iran Data, 2016), a
major issue of concern during the presidential elections of 2013, in which
the conservatives lost their control of the executive branch.
e government’s economic policy has also been marred by radical
shis and turbulences. With the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the
government’s economic policy started to shi strongly in favor of a vast
subsidy system in order to undercut the cost of living for the country’s
poor. is period, which lasted until 1989, was also marked by a central-
ized and highly intrusive state policy, which strangled the freedom of
the private sector and assumed a socialist economic role for the state.
101
ese policies helped the country’s lower classes get by in a time of deep
economic troubles due to war and low oil prices; however, at the same
time, these policies accelerated the flight of entrepreneurs and investors
out of Iran and into countries such as the uS, uK and the uae. also, as
with most government run distribution systems, these policies brought
with them vast inefficiencies and mismanagement.
With the death of ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the election of
ali akbar hashemi Bahremani Rafsanjani as the country’s new president,
state policy started to favor free markets and the privatization of state
owned industries, even though the subsidy system was mostly kept intact
out of political considerations. is sudden shi in policy, however,
brought high inflation, increasing income inequality and a new economic
elite class. ese developments led to the decline of hashemi’s popularity,
something that he has yet to reclaim even though he has one of the most
distinguished careers fighting for the revolution against the Shah among
the country’s current political elites. hashemi’s downfall led to the emer-
gence of the “reform movement” led by his former cultural minister,
Mohammad Khatami, who campaigned on a pledge of political freedom
and reforms. Despite his landslide victory, however, his administration
was conflicted about the country’s economic policy and mostly sought
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
to keep the status quo; the result was that his report card on the economy
was mediocre at best (amuzegar, 1999).
aer the election of Mahmoud ahmadinejad in 2005 as the coun-
try’s new president, Iran’s paradoxical economic policies became even
more explicit and entrenched. on the one hand, ahmadinejad distributed
large sums of money to the country’s poor and rural residents, who had
been his main political base, and his government was not shy in interfering
haphazardly in the market in important areas such as auto-making,
telecommunications, transportation as well as awarding projects to semi-
governmental organizations. however, on the other hand, his government
was also responsible for implementing an ambitious plan to scrap the
subsidy system, the privatization of major government owned banks and
corporations as well as the deregulation of a thriving stock market. e
result of this was the continuation, if not intensification, of Iran’s con-
flicting economic policies.
While valid and worth researching, the reasons behind Iran’s eco-
nomic troubles listed above miss an important underlying cause for the
mismanagement of the economy by the state, and that is the fact that
post-revolutionary Iran has yet to decide on the economic system it is
pursuing. oentimes, Iranian politicians have denounced both capitalism
102 and socialism while at the same time concurrently implementing con-
flicting policies based on both systems. In short, both the Iranian society
and state have had difficulty in identifying an economic master narrative
and, as a result, development policy in the past three decades has seen
many fluctuations and paradoxes, and consequently the business sector
has been le confused and helpless.
e subsidy-eliminating plan that was implemented by ahmadine-
jad’s government is an example of this tension. e plan, which has also
been followed by Rouhani’s government, has aimed to completely elim-
inate government subsidies, estimated at over $70 billion (equal to 20%
of the country’s GDP) for bread and energy products and, as a result, al-
low the market to set the prices of goods (Salehi-Isfahani, 2011). is
move towards the liberalization of the economy has been highly praised
by the IMf (friedman, 2011). at the same time, however, the government
has used the money saved through the program to distribute $15 a month
to each Iranian; thus, for example, a family of five has been paid $75 a
month since the program started. ahmadinejad routinely snubbed the
Iranian parliament, which emphasized that a share of the tens of billions
of dollars obtained through the program should have been spent to sup-
port manufacturers who had seen their costs rise dramatically (Baji,
2011). even though the parliament passed a law in this regard, ah-
madinejad never implement it. While ahmadinejad’s dual track policy
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
was influenced by political calculations, however it was yet another ex-

ample of the paradoxes of Iran’s economic policies.
is confused economic approach of the state has roots in the
Iranian society, which has oentimes put strong pressures on the state.
at the same time, state policies have reinforced the paradoxes present in
society, creating a two-way relationship very similar to Migdal’s state-in-
society theory. e next section addresses three fundamental causes of
this conflict.
FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT
1 – Islamic thought: to understand Iranian politics and society one

has to primarily look at Shia Islam, since the Revolution and the state
that was created as a result of the revolution were strongly influenced by
religion. us, for the issue at hand, it is important to consider what
Islam says regarding economic issues. from a Western perspective, Islamic
economics might seem contradictory at first. on the one hand, Islam
recognizes private property and economic competition: «o ye who be-
lieve! eat not your property among yourselves in vanities: but let there
be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good will» (Qur’an, 4:29).
at the same time, however, Islam also proposes a taxation system to ben-
efit the poor by establishing the zakat tax (which ranges between 2.5-
10% of the stored possession not essential for one’s living) (Qur’an,
103
9:103) as well as khums (another revenue of taxation; it is one fih of
the annual excess of one’s profit to be taken by the Islamic Government)
(Qur’an, 8:41). also, Islam strongly encourages charity (sadaghah), even
though it does not make it mandatory. aside from these taxes, Islam,
like other abrahamic religions, bans usury. More importantly, it also
bans fixed interest rates on loans (Qur’an, 2:275, and 2:278-9). While
allowing private property and encouraging trade and commerce, on the
other hand Islam denounces leading a life of luxuries and more impor-
tantly the accumulation of wealth: «and there are those who bury gold
and silver and spend it not in the way of God: announce unto them a
most grievous penalty» (Qur’an, 9:34). to sum it up, Islam encourages
free trade and commerce while at the same time chastising greed and the
limitless accumulation of wealth. Simply put, a good Muslim would
spend the profits from his trade by living a moderate lifestyle while
spending any extra money on charitable causes. is arguably creates a
guarded and even ambivalent stance towards Western capitalism in the
sense that private property and free markets are accepted, while increasing
one’s profit solely in order to amass wealth (a central premise and incentive
for the flourishing of liberal capitalism) is rejected. Moreover, the ban
on usury and interests makes the functioning of modern banks difficult.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e real problem however arises from the lack of any substantial re-
search and jurisprudence in Islamic economics by scholars and the ‘ulama’.
Due to the infancy of research on such topics, the country’s relation to
many aspects of modernity are still under review from a religious per-
spective. even in areas where rulings have been issued, they are usually
vague and have not been tested policy-wise by the government, in effect
making them unusable by the state. also, many of the ‘ulama’, including
many grand ayatollahs, do not believe that it is their responsibility to
enter into such matters (in contrast to Khomeini’s approach to Islam, an
issue requiring an entire different essay altogether).
2 – Conflicting ideologies of revolutionary groups and figures: Religion

aside, many of the revolution’s intellectual fathers as well as the factions
supporting them had opposing ideas on the ideal economic system the
country should adhere to. for example, the revolutionaries connected
to the Bazaar have almost consistently backed a free market approach to
the economy. Political parties stemming from these groups like the hezbe
Motalefeh, which has strongly influenced Iranian politics in the past
three decades, has always advocated privatization and reduced state in-
tervention in the economy. on the other hand, many other revolution-
aries influenced by the writings and speeches of the famous Iranian soci-
104 ologist ali Shariati and revolutionary leader Mohammad Beheshti, who
headed Iran’s judiciary before being assassinated in 1981, favored socialist
policies, citing equality as the primary goal of the revolution. also, there
were the more extreme socialist groups such as the Sazmane Mujahedin
enghelab, many of whose members held influential government positions
aer the revolution, including cabinet positions during the Iran-Iraq
war.
e conflicting ideas behind the revolutionaries do not stop there
since the revolution’s fathers had somewhat contradictory ideas them-
selves. for example, the sociologist ali Shariati, who some scholars have
labeled the “ideologue of the Iranian revolution,” strongly denounced
capitalism as the enemy of humanity, while also condemning institutional
Marxism. e Sorbonne educated Shariati, who was highly influential
among many of the students who were active in the revolution, advocated
a system of Islamic socialism which would create a classless society based
on equality and human rights (abrahamian, 1982); although, by myste-
riously dying in 1975 in london, he never got the chance to advance his
thoughts beyond the utopianism and vagueness that plagued his ideas.
his attractive but conflict-ridden idealism was carried through by his
followers for years aer his death.
e ideas of ayatollah Khomeini also did not offer a clear blueprint
for a structured and coherent economic system. While Khomeini con-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
stantly chastised rich elites and famously called the revolution a movement
of the barefooted (referring to the underprivileged classes) ( Jamaran,
2009), however he also resisted leist views calling on the state to take
over the wealth of the rich and distribute it among the poor. an inter-
esting example of this was the le’s call, in the first year of the revolution,
for the state to ban any Iranian from having two houses, and as a result
to take over the “extra” houses of the rich and use the money to build
shelter for the poor. While this idea created a collapse in housing prices
as the rich rushed to sell their houses, it was never implemented by the
state. Khomeini’s approach was essentially aimed at enabling the func-
tioning of a modern economic system while trying to limit economic
inequality and injustice. us, for example, Khomeini issued a ruling on
the issue of usury and the banking sector that in effect allowed modern
Iranian banks to operate in a similar fashion to Western countries (Sepah
Bank, 2011).
ayatollah ali Khamenei, who became the supreme leader aer 1989,
is also known to have disagreed with the excesses of hashemi’s liberal-
ization policies and was a strong supporter of ahmadinejad’s attempts
to distribute the country’s wealth to rural and disenfranchised Iranians.
at the same time, however, Khamenei has continuously requested that
government officials speed up Iran’s move towards economic privatization.
he was the principle force behind the overturning of article 44 of the 105
constitution through amendment. article 44 had decreed that Iran’s
core infrastructure should remain state-run, while the new amendment
allowed 80% of these state assets to be privatized (BBc, 2006) (IMf,
2006). In a 2007 meeting with high-ranking government officials, he
criticized the government’s performance in implementing this new
amendment:
In the first 10 years aer [the] victory of the Islamic Revolution, the
Iraqi-imposed war forced the then officials to control the economy,
so the public sector developed without a balance with the private
and the cooperatives sectors. unfortunately, major steps have not
been taken to strike a balance among the three sectors. So, the public
sector developed further and the current situation in the economy is
not satisfactory. (Payvand Iran news, 2007)
Khamenei has also advocated the strengthening of ownership rights

in order to encourage investment. essentially, the approach of the Iranian
leader to the country’s economy has been aimed at empowering the
private sector while at the same time combating some of the excesses of
capitalism such as inequality, poverty and corruption.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
3 – Institutional: as discussed earlier, Migdal’s theory argues that

society shapes and creates the state. is is particularly true regarding
post-revolutionary Iran. Islam and the ideology of the revolution’s leaders
were instrumental in shaping a dual track institutional system in the
country. While recognizing the vast responsibilities of the modern state,
Iran’s revolutionary leaders also sought to minimize its negative conse-
quences. is is why they sought to reap the benefits of democracy and
representation as well as capitalism and free market, while at the same
time preventing its political and economic excesses and the “evilness and
greed” it instills in society. us, according to the Iranian constitution,
the Iranian state features most of the institutions developed in modern
democracies, such as an elected presidency and parliament, while at the
same time it also established the role of Supreme leader (in conjunction
with the president) and a Guardian council (in conjunction with the
parliament).
THE EMERGENCE OF A MASTER NARRATIVE IN THE POST-

NUCLEAR DEAL ERA
e lack of an economic master narrative among Iranian society

and elites in the first three and half decades aer the revolution had cre-
106 ated a dichotomy and paradox in the Islamic Republic’s development
policy. is paradoxical approach led to the creation of a dualistic insti-
tutional system with overlapping and conflicting mandates and policies.
In terms of economic policy, one end of the political spectrum stressed a
capitalist model of development based on the experience of Western
countries, while the other stressed a form of socialist strategy based on
Islamic values. e result was a vague and contradictory master narrative
that was perpetuated by both state and society and led to conflicting,
short lived and oentimes negative economic policies.
e mismanagement of the Iranian economy however only came
into sharp perspective during the past decade, when severe economic
sanctions were placed on the country. ese sanctions were especially
tightened in the 2010-2012 period, during which nearly all forms of
Iranian trade and economic cooperation with other countries was heavily
curtailed. even though high oil prices initially allowed Iran to somewhat
dampen the effects of sanctions, the decline of oil prices as well as the
placement of severe limitations by Western countries on the amount of
oil the country could sell exposed the weakness of Iran’s oil dependent
economy. e decline of Iran’s oil exports from an average of 2.6 million
barrels daily in 2011 to 1.4 million barrels in 2014 was especially worrying
for the country (Dipaola, Kalantari, Waldman, & Philips, 2016). e
2012-2013 period was especially difficult for the country’s economy, as
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
the Iranian currency, the Rial, depreciated by around 80% in 2012

(taghavi, 2012). Meanwhile, the GDP growth rate of the country de-
clined from 3.7% in 2011 to negative 6.6% in 2012 and negative 1.9%
in 2013. also, inflation soared from 20.6% in 2011 to 39.3% in 2013
(e World Bank, Iran Data, 2016). With the election of hassan
Rouhani as the country’s new president in 2013 and the introduction of
austerity measures as well as the onset of negotiations with the P5+1 to
reach a nuclear agreement, these trends were largely reversed. neverthe-
less, the 2012-2013 period was a stark reminder of the underlying weak-
nesses of Iran’s economy.
even though Western-imposed sanctions were the immediate cause
of the economic recession in Iran, much deeper and older issues were
the underlying cause of the economic downturn. Indeed, veteran Iranian
economist Jahangir amuzegar described four reasons behind the Rial’s
crash, with sanctions only being one of them and the other three being
overvaluation of the currency, mismanagement of the economy by the
ahmadinejad administration and, finally, the loss of the market’s confi-
dence in the government’s capacity to deal with the crisis. In fact, amuze-
gar rightly labels the role of sanctions as only a “catalyst” in bringing
about Iran’s economic troubles (amuzegar, 2012). as discussed in earlier
sections, Iran’s oil dependent economy was in trouble long before the
advent of sanctions. Iran’s economic mismanagement was primarily a re-
sult of a lack of a consensus, or a master-narrative, regarding the economic
107
direction the country should take. is is why the economic crash of
2012-2013 was so important in displaying the fragility of the country’s
economy to the political elites of the country. e economic collapse ef-
fectively led to disillusionment with the strength of the country’s economy
and the direction it had thus far taken.
e economic downturn of the sanctions period led to the adoption
a “resistance economic” model to overcome the challenges the country
faced. is new economic strategy emphasizes indigenous manufacturing
and production, the diversification of exports, reform of banking and fi-
nancial sectors and the lessening of the country’s dependence on oil ex-
ports. While the idea of a “resistance economy” were first introduced by
Iran’s Supreme leader in summer 2010, it was not until aer the economic
downturn of 2012-2013 that the need for a new economic model was
fully understood by Iran’s political elites. e economic model was turned
from idea into actual implementable policy objectives in february 2014,
when the Supreme leader issued a written decree outlining the main
goals of the framework. Since then, the government of hassan Rouhani
has begun to change the direction of the Iranian economy accordingly.
Several high-level task forces have been formed to plan for the imple-
mentation of the model.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
e main outlines of the resistance economy model are as follows:

the maximization of domestic capacity building with a special focus on
the promotion of a knowledge-based economy via scientific planning
and advancement; increasing the efficiency of domestic manufacturing;
optimizing energy consumption through reforming the country’s subsidy
system; reducing the country’s vulnerability to oil and gas exports; in-
creasing the country’s oil strategic reserves to minimize the effects of
price shocks; production and exportation of oil and gas value-added
products rather than solely exporting crude oil and natural gas; increasing
the government’s tax revenues in order to decrease its dependence on oil
revenues; reforming the financial sector in a bid to increase transparency
and fight corruption; and, finally, empowering and supporting the private
sector and entrepreneurship (Supreme leader of Iran ayatollah
Khamenei, 2014).
to summarize, the main goal of the resistance economy model is to
make Iran resistant to external economic pressures due to both the fluc-
tuation of global oil prices as well as economic sanctions placed on the
country by Western powers through the empowerment of domestic pro-
duction and the reform of the finance sector (Khajehpour, 2014 ).
What is unique with the introduction of the resistance economy
108 model is not the idea to decrease the country’s dependence on oil exports
– a goal that has been sought by successive governments aer the revo-
lution – but, rather, the gradual emergence of a grand consensus between
the country’s political elite on the economic direction of the country,
something that has been absent in the past three decades. Such consensus,
which is arguably at least partially the result of the economic crash of
2012-2013, is apparent by the acceptance of Iran’s oen warring political
factions of this economic doctrine. In fact, this model can be cited as
one of the few things that both the political le and the political right
in Iran have come to accept as the way forward, despite the two sides’ di-
vergent ideological roots.
e government of hassan Rouhani has been partially successful
in bringing the country out of a major financial recession using the new
economic doctrine. for example, inflation has decreased from 40.4%
when the new government took office in august 2013 to 9.2% in July
2016 (farsnews, 2016) (Mehr news, 2016). also, the World Bank pre-
dicts the country’s GDP growth should rise to 5.8% and 6.7% in 2016
and 2017 respectively (e World Bank, Iran in the World today, 2015),
a major increase from the negative 6.6% of 2012. With the gradual liing
of sanctions following the nuclear deal reached in the summer of 2015,
it is expected that the Iranian government will be further empowered to
tackle the decades old weaknesses of the Iranian economy using the new
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
economic doctrine. nevertheless, it is also important to point out the

pitfalls lying ahead.
one year aer the nuclear agreement, economic sanctions on Iran
have been slowly lied, at least on paper. In practice, however, Iran has
yet to enjoy the economic gains it had expected. a June 2016 poll com-
missioned by the university of Maryland’s center for International and
Security Studies found that while, right aer the deal was signed, 63%
of Iranians said they expected tangible economic improvements within
a year, today 74% of Iranians say there has been no improvement (taylor,
2016). In particular, american barriers to Iran’s access to global financial
markets has made the government’s efforts at revitalizing domestic man-
ufacturing and lowering the unemployment rate an uphill battle. is
issue could seriously jeopardize Rouhani’s chances of reelection next
year. erefore, while a consensus seems to have emerged on how to
tackle the country’s economic troubles in the past few years, if the gov-
ernment fails to improve Iran’s economy in the post-nuclear deal era,
then such a consensus might collapse.
CONCLUSION
Iran is a country that is rich in both natural as well as human re-

sources. It is also located in a geostrategic area of the globe. yet its econ-
omy has never reached anything close to its potential. Instead, it has
109
been frequently undermined by fluctuating oil prices and foreign sanc-
tions. efforts at reforming the economy have oen had mixed results to
say the least.
is paper argued that the mismanagement of Iran’s economy has
been primarily due to the lack of an economic doctrine that is accepted
by the country’s political elite. is has led to conflicting narratives about
the economic direction the country should take and has brought about
haphazard and contradicting policies. Iran’s conflicting economic master
narrative is partly due to the strong effects of the Revolution on both
state and society, but it also has roots in the contradicting efforts made
by different sides of Iran’s political spectrum in trying to mend the prin-
ciples of a free market society with Islamic values such as justice, equality
and fighting poverty. aer all, one of the principle slogans of the revolu-
tion was “neither east, nor West, the Islamic Republic”1, implying that
the new Islamic republic would neither copy the ideologies of the eastern
World (mainly seen as communist) nor of the Western World, but would
1 a direct translation from the farsi slogan of «Na sharghi, na gharbi, jomhouriye
eslami.»

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
rather introduce a third way, a third master narrative on how humans

should live and organize, and the country has been trying to present this
third way ever since. is prospect has become a real possibility following
the introduction of the indigenous resistance economy doctrine and the
gradual rise of Iran’s economy following the nuclear deal.
Migdal’s state-in-society model allows for the study of this para-
doxical quality of the state. It demands that students of political science
view the state in dual terms. according to this theory, the state is both
the powerful, clearly-bounded, and unified organization that can be spo-
ken of in singular terms but also the combination of loosely connected
parts with ill-defined boundaries between them, with different groups
inside and outside official state borders that moreover oen promote
conflicting sets of rules. is approach allows for a more sophisticated
and accurate analysis of the state. nevertheless, it is understandable why
so many political scientists still use the institutional model. e institu-
tional model is simpler to apply, has clearer boundaries and in sum is
parsimonious; making comparison and analysis easier. on the other
hand, the state-in-society model requires detailed knowledge of wide
subjects such as the religion, culture, politics, economics and other aspects
of a region as well as the relationships between all these forces. e case
study examined in this paper is a testament to this difficulty.
110 nevertheless, Migdal’s model, which emphasizes a two-way rela-
tionship between state and society, provides a more complete approach
to the study of political science questions. Such an approach allows for
the study of non-institutional factors in shaping state behavior. With
the use of this model, it was shown that Iran’s economic troubles are not
just the result of politic and economic pressures by the West (including
sanctions) or poorly designed policies or incompetent officials; a con-
clusion commonly reached by research models using the institutional
approach. Rather, they are also the results of the limitations and con-
flicting nature of the Iranian state, which must continuously contend
and struggle with opposing ideologies and groupings. is more sophis-
ticated approach to the study of the state gives a clearer picture of the re-
lationship between state and society and also attempts to explain, rather
than ignore, the contradictions within them.
Since the victory of the revolution, the Iranian state has actively
sought a centralized and organized state-sponsored development policy
based on the successful experiences of other countries, as discussed in
Gerschenkron’s writing. however, while Gerschenkron believes that un-
derdeveloped countries can usefully exploit the experiences of other
countries, he also stresses the significance of native elements in the road
to development. he adds that it is difficult for advanced countries to ac-
cept and understand these indigenous forces, particularly the role of ide-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
ologies. is viewpoint is especially true regarding the study of Iran,

which has a rather unique culture, religion and history different from its
neighbors and even more from Western nations. Missing or ignoring
these domestic variables in research models will lead to mischaracteriza-
tions of development policies in countries such as Iran. Migdal’s model,
which aims to incorporate these complex domestic forces, if used cor-
rectly, can lead to a deeper understanding of other states and societies
and thus avoid the pitfalls Gerschenkron warns about.
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112

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FOCUS
Iran’s Political Culture, Internal

Development, and International
Environment after the End of Sanctions
haSSan BeheShtIPouR, M.a. & tuoMo MelaSuo, Ph.D.
(1) Senior Research Fellow and Member of the

Academic Council at the Institute of Iran Eurasian
Studies (IRAS); former Manager of Al-Alam;
former Director of PressTV (2) University of Tampere
(Finland), Former Director and Professor Emeritus
at TAPRI (Tampere Peace Research Institute)
ABSTRACT: This article addresses the development of the political culture in Iran
after the end of international sanctions. This depends on Iran’s internal socio-economic
development and domestic political life as well as on the international relations of the
country. In this framework, the realisation of the JCPOA is also relevant. The election
of the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts in February and April 2016 were very
important for the years to come. In the parliamentary election, the reformists and the
moderates close to President Rouhani won 140 out of 290 seats. This means that the
Parliament is balanced in the sense that negotiations between different political forces
are needed in order to realise any of the reforms planned by the reformists. This results
in progression in the political culture because a new kind of dialogue becomes neces-
sary. Iran’s international relations also have an important impact on the country’s po-
litical culture. They determine how much Iran can open itself up to the world. Two
dimensions are essential here: firstly, the civil war in Syria and relations with Saudi
Arabia; and, secondly, the outcome of the nuclear deal and the ending of the sanctions.
Iran supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, believing that if it is toppled, it will be
replaced by extremist groups such as Islamic State and/or Jabhat al-Nusrah, which
might cause the dismantling of the country and the destabilisation of the whole security
architecture in the region. Similar issues concern relations with Saudi Arabia, which,
in reality, does not so much indicate Shi‘a-Sunni antagonism, but rather competition
between the two dominant regional powers.
KEYWORDS: IRAN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
t his article studies the general tendencies of the political

development in Iran and asks to what degree the removal of
sanctions leads to a significant development in Iranian political
culture and a new phase in Iran’s international environment.
e development of Iran’s political culture is difficult to predict. as
such, we need to understand the country’s historical realities and to
analyse its internal political processes. however, understanding Iran’s
socio-economic development is even more important. e emergence
of a new political culture can be seen in the interconnection of the
domestic and international spheres.
e Joint comprehensive Plan of action ( JcPoa) on the Iranian
nuclear programme was reached in mid-July 2015 in vienna. In mid-
January 2016, the International atomic energy agency (Iaea)
published its report stating that Iran had respected all the requirements
of the agreement. is opened the door for the liing of the sanctions1.
During the six months from the nuclear agreement until mid-January
2016 many things changed rather dramatically, including things that
will have an impact on Iranian – and regional – opportunities to truly
benefit from the end of sanctions. is period ended with the Iranian
elections at the end of february 2016. President hassan Rouhani’s
reformist camp was successful in the parliamentary elections in the whole
114 country, but in the election of the assembly of experts2, the reformist
camp won only in teheran. nationally, most of the seats in the assembly
of experts still belong to the conservatives close to the Supreme leader
ayatollah Khamenei.
While this six-month period saw many important, rapid, and
dramatic changes, the whole preceding decade witnessed important,
oen structural changes in Iran and Iranian society, including increasing
urbanisation, demographic development with a new kind of age pyramid,
economic hardship due to international sanctions, and high inflation.
all in all, the perspectives in March 2016 were very different from
what they were supposed and expected to be in the middle of the summer
2015 when the nuclear agreement was reached.
ordinary Iranians, especially the youth, have been waiting for
relatively rapid progressive changes in society and particularly for fast
economic growth and increasing national prosperity. ese expectations
1 Information Note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan

of Action ( JcPoa), Brussels, 23 January 2016, https://goo.gl/zzW6ky. La fin
des sanctions va permettre à l’Iran de récupérer ses avoirs gelés, « le Monde.fr avec
afP et aP », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/lnyBKe.
2 this assembly of experts will select the next Supreme leader after the death of
ayatollah ali Khamenei.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
IRANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE, INTERNAL EVOLUTION & INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
should be observed in the light of the country’s internal development,

which takes place in its regional and international environment. Specific
attention should be paid to the economic conditions where these
developments occur.
Diminishing oil prices and thus much lower oil revenues than were
expected even in the summer of 2015 are having a huge impact on the
entire Iranian economy. furthermore, the uS, and especially its
Republican Party, are trying to hinder and create obstacles to the liing
of the sanctions, which is perceived very negatively by the Iranians and
regarded as a very unfair act. If this kind of behaviour continues, not
only will it negatively influence Iranian economic development; it will
also have a regrettable impact on Iran’s attitudes towards the outside
world.
Reduced revenues mean fewer investments and thus slower economic
growth and development. is domestic economic development is very
important and sensitive for the political regime and for the political
power struggle between the three major political factions: the reformists,
the moderates, and the conservatives.
e elections for the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) at the end of
february and the complementary round at the end of april 20163 were
won by the reformists of the Rouhani camp. however, due to the results
of the elections for the assembly of experts, they cannot govern without
115
compromising, for instance, with the different elements of the moderate
conservative camp. is means negotiations and political struggle for
most of the reforms President Rouhani and his supporters want to pass
in the Parliament. ey concern domestic policies and civil society, but
also Iran’s opening up to the world and the international community. as
a matter of fact, we can presume that the issue is about how much the
policy-making is based on the population’s expectations and how much
is based on the ideological values of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
In the vicinity of Iran, the international context is also changing
very rapidly, and oen in an unpredictable way. two issues dominate
this environment. e civil war in Syria is having a very negative impact
on all kinds of relations in the entire region. It is an obstacle to any kind
of normal and sane development in any of the fields. With varying
intensity, Iran is backing assad’s regime in Damascus. Without having
to take a position on this issue, it is obvious that Iran would definitely be
better off without the civil war in Syria. from an external point of view
3 Iran elections: Hardliners lose parliament to Rouhani allies, “BBc news”, 30 april
2016, https://goo.gl/i0crrI.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
and in the long run, this is a burden for Iran’s foreign relations, as it is for
the whole region.
e civil war in Syria is also, at least partly, connected to the
worsening relations Iran has with Saudi arabia, which supports the anti-
assad opposition and its different armed groups. at the same time, Saudi
arabia has been trying to build up and lead a kind of arab coalition of
Sunni nations at odds with the Shi‘a world that is supposed to serve
Iran’s interests. Besides the Persian Gulf, this is said to be happening in
the yemeni civil war, where Iran and Saudi arabia back opposite sides.
e sad thing here is that, besides its negative impact on Iran, this rivalry
might somehow result in the whole region losing the opportunity to
benefit from the positive impact of the end of the nuclear controversy
and the liing of the Iranian sanctions. Instead of useless competition,
one might consider how this new evolution could help to resolve the
Syrian catastrophe, as well as the conflict in yemen4.
e entire international community is, of course, affected by the
nuclear agreement and the liing of the sanctions against Iran. e
opening up of the Iranian markets aer almost ten years of sanctions is
of interest to political spheres and the business world globally. e
number of official high level delegations and commercial expeditions
116 visiting Iran is astonishingly important. almost everybody is interested
in getting a share of the market and offering services. In certain fields of
the Iranian economy and social life, this is particularly important. ese
interests are also bound to more general features in international relations.
e uS and europe have, at least partly, different understandings of
their relations with Iran, and Russia is playing its own cards rather
originally with its long-standing support of Iran. Russia’s massive
involvement in Syria since September 2015 and its sudden partial
withdrawal in March 2016 make things unclear. is means that it is
also difficult for Iran to predict Russian policy in the region. It has been
argued that the main result of the Russian campaign was to show that
there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis and to bring the
stakeholders back to the negotiation table in Geneva5.
4 the uS Secretary of State John Kerry invited Iran on 7 april 2016 to help end
the wars in yemen and Syria. It is worth on noting that the uS recognised the im-
portance of Iran in these peace processes just before meeting his counterparts
from the Gulf cooperation council in Bahrain, “al-arabiya–afP”, london,
Paris, 7 april 2016.
5 at the panel Joining Hands for Syria’s Future: Prospects for Cooperation between
the EU and Russia?, university of tampere, 4 april 2016, by Dr. ekaterina Stepa-
nova, Institute of World economy and International Relations, IMeMo, Moscow.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
all this forms the context in which Iran has been evolving since the
spring of 2016 onwards. Many things are very difficult to foresee, and
we currently lack serious scientific research and analysis of several different
critical fields. e development of a new Iranian political culture can be
seen in the interconnection of four dimensions: the internal development
in Iran and the three concentric circles constituting the country’s
international relations.
INTERNAL DIMENSIONS IN IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT
Since the revolution in 1979, and especially during the last ten years,
Iran’s political life has been very dynamic. all recent election campaigns
indicate that the bases for popular participation in the political process
exist, and there is also possibly the option for partial political change.
e end of the sanctions and the implementation of JcPoa are having
a significant impact on the political atmosphere in Iran, and these have
started a new cycle in the country’s political life. how the local actors
will react to these changes is one of our main research questions.
e whole six-month period between the nuclear agreement in July
2015 and the elections in february and their complementary round at
the end of april 2016 witnessed the preparations for those elections.
Besides the political debate on the main issues that were at stake in the 117
elections, such as economic reforms and the opening up to the outside
world, the particular character of the Iranian electoral system became
the subject of debate, particularly the so-called Guardian council of 12
members, which vets all candidates for President, Parliament (Majlis),
and the assembly of experts, and states if the candidates are qualified to
run or not.
apparently, there seems to be increasing pressure to reform or even
to get rid of this system of disqualifying electoral candidates. In august
2015, President hassan Rouhani stated that there is no place in Iran for
disqualifying qualified persons who want to serve their country based
on their political faction6. e Supreme leader ali Khamenei did not
favour this approach. nevertheless, during the electoral campaign,
President Rouhani tried to make it more difficult for the Guardian
council to reject reformist and moderate candidates. concerning the
assembly of experts, this issue has been continued by the discussion of
the criteria that the next Supreme leader should fulfil, the conservatives
6 Shahir Shahidsaless, The road to choosing Iran’s new leader, “Middle east eye”, 26
December 2015, https://goo.gl/uDjfRr.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
trying to add new criteria to those mentioned in the country’s

constitution7.
In the 26 february 2016 Majlis elections, the Guardian council
approved only 4,700 candidates of an original 12,000. In the case of the
assembly of experts, only 161 were accepted out of 800 candidates.
ere were very few reformists among those selected8. It is obvious that
this question of vetting candidates and disqualifying an important
number of them will be an issue for political debate in the future of Iran
for years to come and a challenge for all the political stakeholders. e
country certainly needs a lot of creativity and imagination in order to
overcome this dilemma while respecting the values of the Republic. is
is already a sign of a new political culture in the making.
e 26 february 2016 Majlis and assembly of experts elections
were a success as such for the Islamic Republic of Iran. ey were peaceful
and without serious incident. e turnout was about 62%, which is more
or less the same – even a little higher – than previously9. is shows
that, in fact, most people have understood that their votes will be counted
and will have an effect. for the assembly of experts, which has 88
members, ali akbar hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami’s
list, both former presidents and close to hassan Rouhani, won about
118 50% of the members, all of whom belong to the moderate camp.
concerning the Majlis, the moderates won almost half of the seats,
altogether 140 out of 290 seats, which is a remarkable result. however,
their number is not enough to govern alone, especially if they want to
realise political, economic, and social reforms or to have an open foreign
policy10.
for this reason, the time is ripe for a profound and accurate
assessment of the performance of all three camps – the reformists,
moderates, and conservatives – and it would be better for the reformists
not to become euphoric about their victory. Instead, they should
7 Ibidem.
8 Ghazal Golshiri & louis Imbert, Le succès diplomatique ne renforce pas M. Rohani,
« le Monde », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/vfaumJ. louis Imbert
(propos recueillis par), Ayatollah Youssef Saanei ‘Où sont les actes de Hassan Rohani?’,
« le Monde », Paris, 27-28 february 2016.
9 Elections en Iran : premiers résultats encourageants pour les réformistes, «le Monde.fr
avec afP, aP et Reuters », 27 february 2016 at 14:34, updated 28 february
2016 at 07:46, https://goo.gl/1BKgtf, https://goo.gl/9gRV6R, and
https://goo.gl/QRO4gD.
10 hassan Beheshtipour, Lessons and Opportunities Resulting from Iran’s Elections, in
“Iran Review”, teheran, friday, March 4, 2016, https://goo.gl/DxKeKo.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
understand the current conditions in Iran and realise the need for
cooperation in the new parliament in order to solve the people’s problems.
is is especially true because the new Parliament will need
cooperation between all factions in order to start parliamentary
interaction in the post-JcPoa era. If all the factions manage to engage
in constructive interaction, they will be able to provide strong support
for the presidential administration in its bid to promote constructive
interaction with the world, without having any concern of being accused
of dependence on foreign powers.
at present, unlike in the past, reformists and moderates know that
the conservatives are an undeniable reality in Iranian society, and this
might facilitate the political power game and also result into more
balanced relations between different political camps and more realistic
expectations for the future.
e second political issue in the 2016 elections dealt with the
challenges of the economic reforms and the opening up of the country
to the world. It also concerned the content of the nuclear agreement
and the meaning of economic relations aer the end of the sanctions.
one of the big questions asked was what kind of cultural impact this
opening up to the world would have. In practice, this question refers to
how much control and limitation there should be concerning the Internet,
for instance. is is an important issue in Iran, where the population is
very young.
119
from a demographic perspective, Iran is a youthful country: about
half of Iran’s 80 million inhabitants are under 35 years old, and the
median age in Iran is 30.1 years11. In Iran, the youth is the largest part of
the population compared to any other country in the world, with 35%
of the population aged between 15 and 29 years. is fact is at least
partly due to the baby boom in the early 1980s aer the Islamic
Revolution. is high percentage of youth will start to reduce from 2020
onwards12.
is large, youthful population means several particularities in social,
economic, and political life. from 2008, due to global crises and sanctions,
the difficult economic situation and its negative impacts on ordinary
people started to increase. In the same year, demographic pressures also
became more important. is especially concerned the Iranian youth,
particularly those from lower income families. is group is still suffering
the most from inflation and international isolation.
11 Worldometers, 2016, https://goo.gl/WgoQw2.

12 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis, in “Iranian Stu-
dies”, 2011, vol. 44, no. 6.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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In Iran, the youth forms 60% of the electorate and young people
played a crucial role in the election of President Mohammed Khatami
already in 1997 and again in 2001. In 2009, the youth questioned the
results of the elections. today, it is said that the Iranian youth is more
interested in social and cultural fields than in politics13. In this, the
Iranian youth is following a global tendency where there is a kind of
disinterest and disappointment in politics, but this might be only
temporary and we should expect that the youth in Iran will play a major
role in the country’s new political culture in the future.
e Iranian youth is well educated: universities and other higher
education establishments enrol an increasing number of students. today,
students number some 4.5-5 million young people14. It is also worthy of
note that about 60% of higher education students are female15.
nevertheless, even good quality education is not solving most of the
difficulties young people face in Iran.
Perhaps the two most important challenges the Iranian youth faces
today are employment and marriage – that is, being able to start a family.
ese two items somehow determine many other issues in young people’s
social and individual lives within Iranian society. ese phenomena also
result in something known as “waithood”16, which means that young
people must wait increasing periods of time – sometimes several years –
120 before filling a job vacancy aer completing their studies and before
forming a relationship.
e general unemployment rate in Iran is high: it is about 11%
officially, but in reality it is estimated to be at least 30%17. among the
youth, even official figures are much higher: about 25% of young males
and 46% of young females are unemployed. for those young people who
have a university degree or diploma, unemployment is an even more
serious problem. although varying very much across different fields, it
13 https://goo.gl/3hSGuq, and https://goo.gl/WnDwvu.

14 valentine ayse, Jason John nash, Rice leland ( January 2013), “The Business Year
2013: Iran”, london, uK: the Business year: 162, and Over 350,000 Iranians
studying abroad: Education Minister, “teheran times”, 9 January 2014,
https://goo.gl/01thGf, and https://goo.gl/0e1zQl. today the number of Iranians
studying abroad is about half a million.
15 florence Beaugé, Les Iraniennes ne désarment pas, « le Monde Diplomatique »,
no. 743, 63è année, Paris, february 2016, and https://goo.gl/QPt9Rb.
16 navtej Dhillon & tarek yousef (eds.), Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Young People in the Middle East, Brookings Institution Press, Washin-
gton, Dc, 2009.
17 florence Beaugé, Un pays grippe, « le Monde Diplomatique », no. 743, 63e an-
née, Paris, february 2016. according to some sources, the official rate of unem-
ployment is about 19%.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
can be about 30% for men and more than 50% for women in some
cases18.
one of the reactions to unemployment has been young higher
educated Iranians leaving the country for the Persian Gulf countries,
europe, north america, and australia. In all, aer the 1979 Revolution,
the Iranian diaspora consists of about 5 million people, and those with
an academic education form an important part of it19. today, aer the
end of sanctions, they seem to have started returning to Iran, hoping, of
course, that they can restart their life in their own country20.
the question of forming a couple and starting a family is an important
issue in all north african and Middle eastern societies, and this is the
case in Iran also. the debate on the marriage market is certainly very
serious, but at the same time a little amusing. all the savant calculations
on different age tranches and suitable spouses seem a little too “statistical”
in their rigid categorisation. for our understanding, besides “true love
for ever”, the question of employment – that is the possibility to sustain
a family – and housing – that is where to live with the family – are
essential. If young people cannot form a couple, or need to wait
excessively long to do so, this is a real and unfair problem for the whole
society. In Iran, there is relatively a lot of discussion on the unbalance
between the sexes and the lack of males – there is about a 25% deficit at 121
marrying age21. however, there still seems to be surprisingly little
discussion on housing concerning this issue compared to other countries
in the Middle east and north africa, where it is an important obstacle
to forming a family22.
18 nader habibi, Iran’s Overeducation Crisis: Causes and Ramifications, “Middle

east Brief ”, crown center for Middle east Studies, Brandeis university, no. 89,
february 2015, Waltham, Massachusetts, https://goo.gl/JSs1Mf, and tara vi-
shwanath, Ouvrir les portes: égalité des sexes et développement dans la région de
MENA, « afrikar / idées. Revue trimestrielle pour le dialogue entre le Maghreb,
l’espagne et l’europe », no. 48, Winter 2015/2016, estudios de Política exterior
S.a, Madrid & IeMed, Instituto europeo del Mediterráneo, Barcelone.
19 https://goo.gl/R9havu.
20 nader habibi, Iran’s Overeducation Crisis: Causes and Ramifications, “Middle
east Brief ”, crown center for Middle east Studies, Brandeis university, no. 89,
february 2015, Waltham, Massachusetts, https://goo.gl/Ksyc3i, and World Po-
pulation Review 2016.
21 https://goo.gl/lteQrw.
22 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Iranian Youth in Times of Economic Crisis, “Iranian Studies”,
vol. 44, no. 6, (2011), https://goo.gl/czfMnK. As a matter of fact, Djavad
Salehi-Isfahani is one of the few scholars to thoroughly describe the

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
as stated earlier, the Iranian youth is more interested in their

socioeconomic living conditions and in cultural affairs than in politics.
oen the main issue concerns civil liberties in the domain of culture
and creation, and how much, for instance, the foreign websites and tv
and radio channels are controlled. is might be a false issue in the sense
that in reality it is so easy to bypass all of these restrictions, and young
Iranians are well-educated enough to know how to do it23. Perhaps it
would just be wiser to trust this educated generation of Iranians and
believe that due to their high level of education and attachment to their
own civilisation they can “read” the foreign media critically enough and
analyse its weaknesses and positive contributions. Regardless, in the new
period aer the end of sanctions and the international isolation of Iran,
the youth of Iran will be fully integrated into the global society, at least
in the medium term.
e attachment of the Iranian youth to their own civilisation has
been seen, for instance, in the way how they have appropriated the
traditional cultural events such as norooz (nowruz) or even different
religious holidays by creating their own manners of celebration. also of
note is the richness of Iranian cinema and film production, the large
number of daily newspapers (400) as well as the country’s remarkable
efforts in translating foreign literature, one of the greatest in the world24.
122 It is more than obvious that this kind of cultural landscape means
that the Iranian youth and young people should be taken very seriously
into account by the political regime and political leaders. economic
reforms might require the reduction of the Revolutionary Guards’ role
in the country’s economy. Still, it seems that the conservatives have no
intention of giving up their power in the economic field. conservatives
are afraid that economic openness brings with it Western cultural
penetration, especially for the younger generations. Khamenei at least
partly shares this view, and this remains a real dilemma for the regime.
During the 2016 election campaign, President hassan Rouhani
promised “a better future” for young Iranians and this is something he
and the country should take very seriously and try to accomplish. e
new Iranian political culture will most probably be a combination of
patterns of the Iranian marriage market and the difficulties the youth has
in forming a relationship.
23 https://goo.gl/Mtt2uW.
24 erik nyström & Kambiz Ghafouri, Kansan valitsema presidentti, “uP-ulkopoli-
tiikka”, no. 1, helsinki, 2016, and esmaeil haddadian-Moghaddam, Literary
Translation in Modern Iran: A sociological study, “Benjamins translation library”,
no. 114, Ku leuven, John Benjamins Publishing co., 2014,
https://goo.gl/wQghpP, as well as https://goo.gl/RpeiWM.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
the expectations of the young people and the ongoing result of the
political factions’ power struggle in the context of the new international
environment.
IRAN’S IMMEDIATE VICINITY
ere are three principal circles in the international relations of

Iran. e immediate neighbours in the Persian Gulf constitute the first
set of partners. Relations here are extremely important but very difficult.
In the Persian Gulf, the six arab countries of the Gulf cooperation
council each have an individual approach towards Iran, which differs
from their common opinion within the council.
of course, the relations of Iran with the arab countries in the Persian
Gulf are today very dependent of the attitude of Saudi arabia, which is
trying to dominate the whole Sunni Islam part of the arab world, if not
wider. In practice, this situation might be more complex, especially when
we take into consideration that many Persian Gulf partners have a long
peaceful history with Iran and that they have no interest in any kind of
animosity in the near future.
e neighbours to the north and east of Iran – azerbaijan, armenia,
turkmenistan, afghanistan and Pakistan – are important, but perhaps
less problematic than those of the Persian Gulf. two of them
– afghanistan and Pakistan – may be the most crucial. afghanistan is,
123
of course, problematic because of the security situation in the country.
as for Pakistan, it is notable that there are millions of Pakistani workers
in Saudi arabia and the Persian Gulf countries. Still, Pakistan did not
accept a request from Saudi arabia to send troops to yemen. aer the
end of sanctions in 2016, the construction works for the Iran-Pakistan
gas pipeline, which were started in 2010 and later interrupted, have
resumed. ere is competition between different regional actors, with
India and china participating in the construction of harbours in Iran
and Pakistan. Pakistan has also tried to mediate between Iran and Saudi
arabia25.
In more general terms, we can presume that the nearby vicinity of
Iran is certainly not without problems, but at the same time, being
realistic, these countries are looking, at least partly, for positive relations
with Iran. Some of the Persian Gulf countries have a kind of Iranophobia
that is accentuated by the attitude of Saudi arabia. e development of
the crises in Syria and Iraq will, most probably, have an impact on their
25 Jean-luc Racine, Le Pakistan cherche sa place dans une région tourmentée, « le
Monde Diplomatique », no. 744, 63e année, Paris, March 2016.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
attitudes. is takes place, of course, in the more general context of the
international relations in the Middle east.
It is not oen noticed, but Iran has one of the largest refugee
populations in the world. e country officially hosts more than three
million refugees, mostly from Iraq and afghanistan; the number from
Syria is not known26.
MIDDLE EAST
e second circle of Iran’s foreign relations consists of the arab

countries in general plus turkey. is is the most difficult element for
Iran. here, the development of a positive approach is crucial, and it does
not depend solely on the Iranians; for instance, Saudi arabia and Bahrain
play also an important role. of course, this second circle overlaps with
the first one concerning the Persian Gulf, but it includes the whole of
the Middle east.
is domain is marked by two sets of problems. e first set consists
of the civil war in Syria and the internal situation in Iraq as well as the
crisis in yemen. Iran is involved in all of these conflicts. We need to
analyse how the end of the sanctions will affect these contexts and impact
both the internal development and the external relations of Iran.
124 It is clear that the civil war in Syria is the most difficult issue for
Iran. aer the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), in which europe and the
uSa supported Saddam hussein’s Iraq, it is not at all surprising that
Iran remains extremely hesitant and suspicious concerning all the security
challenges that are taking place in the country’s vicinity.
e war in Syria is damaging all kind of different relations and
developments across the Middle east. It has become clear for all parties,
especially aer Russia joined the war in September 2015, that there is
no military solution; military action can only support the political
process27.
In the war in Syria, there seems to be different attitudes and a whole
variety of opinions concerning Iran’s participation and strategic goals.
Some studies estimate that Iran is, since March 2016, following the
Russian example and reducing its engagement in Syria. ayatollah youssef
Saanei has even publicly criticised the country’s military presence in
Syria. ose who are close to the conservatives and especially Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards corps strongly support the Iranian presence in
26 World Population Review, 2016.

27 cécile hennion & Madjid zerrouky (interviewers), Jean-Marie Guéhenno, L’Etat
islamique et Al-Qaida ne seront pas vaincu de l’extérieur, “le Monde”, Paris, 10-11
april 2016.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Syria, saying that if they do not fight the violent jihadists – Islamic State
and Jabhat al-nusra – today in Syria, they will have to face them at home
in about five years28. Iran is also afraid that if the assad regime is toppled,
Syria will share the destiny of libya and the battle between different
radical entities will dominate the Syrian scene. Iran is also afraid that the
assad regime could be replaced by a government with closer ties to Israel
and thus drastically change its security environment.
e fragile cease-fire in february 2016, the partial withdrawal of
Russia, and the participation of Iran in the Syrian peace talks might
contribute to a situation where the Syrian stakeholders are more eager
to start a political process that might lead to a more sustainable solution.
for Iran, participation in the peace talks might consolidate a political
culture that values dialogue and mediation in solving social issues.
In the vicinity of Iran, a second set of problems concerns relations
with Saudi arabia and the whole Shi‘a-Sunni confrontation, which is,
in some degree, artificial – or at least ideological, overemphasised, and
exaggerated – because as it is so old, it cannot serve anything other than
contemporary political passions. as a matter of fact, this Shi‘a-Sunni
confrontation is a fig leaf, camouflage for the regional power struggle
taking place between Iran and Saudi arabia29.
historically, Saudi arabia and Iran were competing partners, and
their “cooperation” mainly served both countries’ domestic and foreign
policy goals. In the 1970s, during the hot years of the cold War, the
125
Western alliance (nato) referred to Saudi arabia and Iran as the “twin
pillars” in the region.
e 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran changed all this, however, and
Iran grew ever more isolated in both the Middle eastern and international
spheres. In this context, Iran increasingly emphasised relations with
different Shi‘a minorities, especially in Iraq and in lebanon, where she
supported hezbollah. is support was justified as the desire to help
the Palestinians and all those who fought the Israeli occupation of
southern lebanon. In Iraq, the support aimed to bolster the Shi‘a majority
neglected by Saddam hussein’s regime.
It is difficult to estimate how serious the claims are of Iran’s wish to
form a kind of “Shi‘a empire” and expand its zone of influence. ese
28 louis Imbert (interviewer), ayatollah youssef Saanei ‘Où sont les actes de Hassan
Rohani ?’, « le Monde », Paris, 27-28 february 2016, and louis Imbert, Les Ira-
niens unis face à la guerre en Syrie, « le Monde », Paris, 13-14 March 2016.
29 ari Kerkkänen, Syyria ja lähi-itä. Havaintoja nykypäivästä ja heijastuksia historiasta,
“Pystykorvakirja”, Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat & like, Riika, helsinki, 2015. Be-
sides theological and religious differences, it is obvious that there is also a clear hi-
storical issue between the Sunni and Shi‘a that explains today’s controversy.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
kind of pretensions have been present since the Islamic Revolution. Still,
as many specialists have stated, the evidence of history show us that there
has not been an attempt to form an Iranian empire since the pre-Islamic
Sassanid empire. today, it seems that Iran has neither the will nor the
capacities for an empire. furthermore, the country’s military expenditures
are far behind those of the other Persian Gulf states30.
e so-called arab spring, the civil war in Syria and the new attitude
of the uS towards Iran have resulted in a situation where Saudi arabia
has been seeking a leadership role in the Sunni world and has created an
arab coalition to intervene in the Syrian civil war, one which is fighting
Islamic State but also backing some anti-assad forces. e relations
between Iran and Saudi arabia deteriorated drastically in early 2016
aer the execution of a Shi‘a religious scholar by Saudi arabia and the
retaliatory sacking of the Saudi embassy in teheran. Diplomatic relations
between the two countries were frozen, and the situation remains
extremely worrying as there are very few signs of detente.
Without delving too deeply into the details we can, of course, ask:
Is the Iranian regime really trying to solve this problem? If Saudi arabia
and other arab countries are reluctant, can europe or the international
community help them to accept a resolution to this impasse? is is a
126 very important question because so many stakeholders in the international

community are putting much too much emphasis on this Iran-Saudi
arabia dichotomy today. once again, outside actors can play a role, but
only by taking into consideration the local forces and accompanying
political processes. It is certainly a domestic issue for Iran and for the
country’s new political culture in the making. In the case of Saudi arabia
and the difficulties it faces – for instance with the war in yemen – there
is a possibility to clearly demark where the limits of military adventure
and attempts to dominate lie by reducing arms delivery31 .
e role of turkey also remains a question mark for Iran. Besides
the Syrian civil war, the issue of the differing ambitions of the Kurds
30 Riccardo alcaro, The West and the Middle East After the Iran Nuclear Deal, “IaI
Working Papers 15/25”, IaI, Istituto affari Internazionali, Rome, July 2015.
When the Muslim arabs invaded Iran during the Sassanid empire, they had not
yet expanded to the Roman and later to Muslim empire in andalusia and north
africa. according to the definition of empire in political science, the concept
and the principle of the Shi‘a empire in the current state of global and regional
issues in the Middle east is virtually impossible.
31 Rouzbeh Parsi, The Middle East and the Deal: In Search of a New Balance, in
Paolo Magri & annalisa Perteghella (ed.), “Iran after the Deal: the Road ahead”,
ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), edizioni epoké, Milano,
2015.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
might be a problem. is is something which seems to change every six

months. e foreign policy of Recep tayyip erdogan has become
increasingly difficult to foresee as the regime has become more
authoritarian. on the one hand, Syria remains an issue between turkey
and Iran, and the Kurds’ interests might lead to the issue becoming even
more serious. on the other hand, turkey is challenging Saudi arabia as
the leading Sunni power. is might align it closer to Iran’s position.
In some way, we could hope that in the medium term, the whole
region will enter a new era where the positive elements of the arab
Spring and the end of sanctions against Iran prevail.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
as for the third circle of Iran’s foreign relations, the development of

the whole international community will have a multiform impact on
the country aer the end of the sanctions. If the implementation of
JcPoa is done correctly, it will impact the overall relations in the
international context and contribute positively to the solution of the
ongoing difficulties. It is obvious that this will influence Iranian internal
development and, in the long run, Iranian political culture. e
interaction of these three foreign relation circles with the internal
development of Iran will determine the country’s future in the coming
decades. 127
aer the end of the sanctions, two issues are becoming crucial for
Iran’s development. e first is – as already stated – the implementation
of JcPoa and its economic options. e second concerns world politics
more generally, in particular the impact of relations between Russia and
the uS, and the role of china and the BRIcS32.
In the first issue, the progressive liing of the sanctions started 16
January 2016. is meant the release of the Iranian financial assets in
international banks. ere are different estimations of their worth starting
from 32 billion uS dollars33, but the figure could be very much higher
in a rather short period of time, up to 100 milliard uS dollars. e
SWIft code was re-established on 3 february 2016 at nine international
banks, making financial transactions possible. e process of liing the
sanctions has different effects in europe and the uS: some political
circles (right-wing Republicans) in the uS are trying to hinder the liing
of the international sanctions. furthermore, in the uS many unilateral
sanctions still remain in place and new ones are being created because of
32 BRIcS: the “emerging countries” of Brazil, Russia, India, china, and South africa.
33 La fin des sanctions va permettre à l’Iran de récupérer ses avoirs gelés, « le Monde.fr
avec afP et aP », Paris, 19 January 2016, https://goo.gl/idQfX5.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Iranian human rights policy and the issue of ballistic missiles. Many
european and international banks are hesitant to start business with
Iran as the uS treasury has the possibility of pursuing them legally34.
In this new situation, Iran is looking for foreign investments and
hoping her own oil and gas incomes will increase. e fluctuating and
the eventual low level of the price of oil on the world market has cut
Iranian incomes by half compared to the calculations made in July 2015.
is has, of course, a negative impact on the expectations of rapid growth
and prosperity by the population. today Iran produces about 2.8 million
barrels a day, and the goal is to increase daily production by half a million
barrels.
Since the second half of 2015, but especially aer the end of
sanctions, an important number of foreign official and commercial
delegations have visited Iran. President hassan Rouhani himself visited
Italy and france at the end of January 2016. e German vice-chancellor
Sigmar Gabriel was the first european minister and chinese president
Xi Jinping the first foreign head of state to visit Iran following the nuclear
agreement. a number of important treaties were signed during these
visits. chinese commerce is expected to grow tenfold in the coming
decade. france has signed contracts worth about 15 milliard euros, while
those signed by Italy are worth 17 milliard euros. e french energy
128 giant total, airbus, PSa Peugeot citroën, and Paris airport are among
those who signed large, long-term contracts35. Similar agreements will
be signed with austria, Switzerland, and Spain in the coming months.
Iran’s Supreme leader ali Khamenei has stated this spring that uS
companies can also participate in Iranian tenders, but added that several
political issues will be considered beforehand. obviously, this can be
seen as an offer to negotiate.
e implementation and careful respect of JcPoa is of great
importance to Iranians. If Iranians do what is required by the agreement,
they naturally presume that the international community will do the
same. is is important for the prestige of the regime and also for
common Iranians in terms of national pride, and perhaps even more for
the economic dimensions of everyday life.
34 louis Imbert, L’“eldorado” iranien peine à voir le jour, « le Monde », Paris, 26
april 2016.
35 James M. Dorsay, China & the Middle East: Tilting Towards Iran?, “RSIS com-
mentary”, no. 20/2016, 28 January 2016, RSiS, S. Rajaratman School of Interna-
tional Studies, nanyang technological university, Singapore, 2016, and Visite
d’Hassan Rohani à Paris: des contrats à profusion, « economie », RfI, Radio
france Internationale, 29 January 2016, as well as Italy and Iran Cooperation Agree-
ment, “Bridgewest”, lawyersItaly.eu, 3 february 2016, https://goo.gl/fpKo8a.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
aer 37 years of difficulties, the nuclear deal is a golden opportunity,

and this is a kind of test case for the model of an organised agreement. If
executed well, it will very positively affect substantial international
agreements regarding other political matters.
as a matter of fact, this dilemma largely surpasses the case of Iran. It
concerns the whole credibility of the international community and the
prestige of the un Security council: the world needs to trust the
agreements that are concluded by the “major players”. here, the visit of
Barak obama to cuba has some importance, as it shows the world that
the unhappy politics of sanctions can be overcome.
from an Iranian point of view, international relations at large consist
of the roles played by uSa and Russia, primarily in the Middle east.
Russia’s intervention in Syria at the end of September 2015 and its
surprise withdrawal in March 2016 made Russia perhaps the most
important foreign player in the Syrian and Middle eastern context.
Russia backing for the assad regime and the uSa arming and training
the opposition is a kind of proxy war between the two, but this is a very
dangerous and cynical game in which uS prestige in the Middle east
and the Russian profile on the international stage are at the stake. Russia
is clearly hoping to find a fresh start aer the failures of ukraine and the
crimea, and the country seems to have succeeded only very partially.
e uS hopes to maintain its influence without investing too heavily.
e nuclear agreement with Iran is very important for the uS and it
129
must somehow succeed to balance this agreement with the dissatisfaction
of the unhappy arab states.
a different kind of military cooperation and arms delivery becomes
very problematic in this scenario, and europe has more or less the same
kind of dilemma. Some of the european countries are very keen to restart
relations with Iran, both politically and economically. at the same time,
they must try to satisfy their partners such as Saudi arabia, some of the
Persian Gulf emirates, and egypt with important arms deliveries and
direct military cooperation without compromising relations with Iran,
which are, in the long run, very important. is arms trade is very
problematic: despite the cease-fire, the uS is arming Syrian rebels and
Russia is delivering a modern anti-aircra defence system to Iran36.
e nuclear agreement between Iran and the international
community is irreversible, since it involves the interests of both parties.
even if the future uS president is a Republican, he/she will most likely
implement JcPoa. failure to do so would alienate the uS’s allies in
36 louis Imbert, La Russie livrerait des missiles S-300 à l’Iran, « le Monde », Paris,
13 april 2016.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
europe and asia. It would also provoke irritation in Iran and most
importantly, it would isolate the supporters of opening up the country
to the world.
ultimately, the question is about the nuances concerning the
attitudes europe, the uS, and Russia have towards Iran on the one hand
and towards Middle eastern crises more generally – Syria, yemen, Saudi
arabia as well as libya and egypt – on the other. ere are also new
actors, such as the BRIcS and especially china. Both Iran and china
are eager to develop bilateral cooperation, not only in economic fields
but also in the military and political domains, as shown during the visit
of President Xi Jinping.
If all the stakeholders – Iran, local actors, and international partners
– are really interested in benefitting from the nuclear agreement and the
end of sanctions, they should seriously and collectively try to address
the main problems of the regions mentioned above. is requires
cooperation, moderation, and flexibility. It will take time and will have
to be established step by step. however, it also means that the new
political culture in Iran – which will be based on the interests of the
majority of the Iranians – is just the beginning. It should be extended to
the whole region from cairo to teheran. In a way, this political process
could be compared with the european reconstruction era aer the Second
130 World War. let us hope that it does not lead to a new cold War, but to
a new political culture, one more positive for Iran and for the whole
region.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
Giovani di Bam
Storie di ordinaria vita quotidiana
nella provincia di Kerman
SaRah ScIo’
Università degli Studi di Perugia, Dipartimento di

Scienze Politiche, Scuola di dottorato in Politica,
Politiche Pubbliche e Globalizzazione, Dottoranda
TITLE: Young Iranians of Bam: Stories of ordinary daily life in the Kerman
Province.
ABSTRACT: This paper was inspired by fieldwork research I conducted in Iran be-
tween December 2015 and January 2016. The research discusses, from a comparative
perspective and through a socio-anthropological analysis, the daily life of young Ira-
nians in the cities of Bam and Kerman. The analysis addresses this new generation’s
approach to Islam, which is slowly taking an innovative shape to adapt to modernity.
A few scholars have written about the youth in Iran, especially about the metropolitan
area of Tehran. However, no research has been conducted, and there is also an absence
of bibliographic references in English, on the Kerman Province. The research method
consisted of face-to-face interviews and participant observation. A fieldwork diary
was written every day during my stay in Iran. The approach to the research was to be
part of the group of friends I studied. It is important to note that I altered, when
needed, names and places. The interviewees were informed of their rights to choose
whether to change their names in order to guarantee their anonymity. Interviewees
signed an informed consent which allowed the researcher to make the results public.
I was helped by a translator, when needed. In this case, consideration was given to
the gender of the translator to ensure an open and honest dialog between me and in-
terviewee. This paper can sharpen our knowledge on young Muslims in the south-east
of Iran. The early results of the research suggest that, in the cities of Bam and Kerman,
Islam plays an important role in the lives of young Iranians. Young women in Bam

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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are generally proud of their veil, which is part of their identity. While they wear the
hijab inside their homes in the presence of male friends, they do not feel it as a com-
pulsion, but wear it more as a protection of their status.
KEYWORDS: IRAN, YOUNG IRANIANS, ISLAM
INTRODUZIONE
[…] Il futuro delle vostre nazioni sarà nelle vostre mani […]
21 gennaio 2015/01 bahman 1393
(Khamenei, 2015)
È con queste parole che l’ayatollah Khamenei si rivolge ai giovani

occidentali subito dopo gli attacchi terroristici del 13 gennaio
2015 alla sede di Charlie Hebdo a Parigi, rivendicati dallo Stato
Islamico (IS, ISIS, ISIl o Daesh). la lettera scritta dalla Guida della Re-
pubblica Islamica dell’Iran, come lui stesso dichiara, è esplicitamente di-
retta a loro, i giovani occidentali, che poco conoscono la realtà del vero
Islam, quello non inquinato dalla presenza del terrorismo, di cui molti
ragazzi vanno fieri e che auspica la pace, la speranza e la convivenza. I gio-
vani, il futuro delle nazioni, una parte fondamentale della società, coloro
132 che guideranno i loro governi nelle rappresentanze internazionali: è pro-

prio a questi che Khamenei si riferisce. Perché i giovani sono importanti?
Perché i giovani devono essere a conoscenza di ciò che li circonda?
Si parla spesso di un occidente frutto del pensiero illuminista, quel
pensiero cui Kant ha dedicato i suoi studi:
l’illuminismo è l’uscita dell’uomo da uno stato di minorità il quale è

da imputare a lui stesso. Minorità è l’incapacità di servirsi del proprio
intelletto senza la guida di un altro. Imputabile a sé stessi è questa
minorità se la causa di essa non dipende da difetto di intelligenza, ma
dalla mancanza di decisione e del coraggio di servirsi del proprio in-
telletto senza esser guidati da un altro. Sapere aude! abbi il coraggio
di servirti della tua propria intelligenza – è dunque il motto dell’illu-
minismo. (Kant, 1784)
Si è davvero sicuri che questo è già accaduto in occidente? nono-

stante la separazione tra potere religioso e potere politico e l’affermarsi
dei principi della Rivoluzione francese, ancora oggi la maggior parte dei
giovani occidentali non è a conoscenza della reale quotidianità dei loro
coetanei nel vicino oriente.
Parlare delle giovani generazioni di ragazzi musulmani e dei loro
cambiamenti dovrebbe, in un certo senso, acuire l’interesse verso questi
“sconosciuti” di cui si ha poca notizia, se non qualche accenno sui social
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
GIOVANI DI BAM: STORIE DI ORDINARIA VITA QUOTIDIANA NELLA PROVINCIA DI KERMAN
network. In questo saggio, cercherò di analizzare, attraverso aspetti so-

cio-antropologici, la vita quotidiana di giovani ragazzi iraniani in due
particolari casi: le città di Bam e Kerman.
METODOLOGIA E CONTESTO STORICO-GEOGRAFICO
tutte le interviste sono state realizzate nelle due città di Kerman e

Bam tra il dicembre 2015 e il gennaio 2016. Pur trattandosi di un periodo
troppo ristretto per offrire dati autenticamente scientifici, peraltro raccolti
in un singolo periodo di lavoro sul campo – che si inserisce, tuttavia, in
un progetto di ricerca di dottorato a lungo termine –, a mio avviso i
primi risultati emersi possono offrire interessanti spunti di riflessione.
Di qui l’idea di presentare queste prime indicazioni nelle seguenti pa-
gine.
la ricerca qualitativa e il lavoro etnografico sul campo si sono basate
sull’osservazione partecipante e partecipata, la stesura di un diario di
campo, focus groups e interviste dirette. Per quanto riguarda l’aspetto
linguistico, si è rivelato prezioso l’aiuto di una traduttrice dal persiano
all’inglese. Durante tutto il processo di conoscenza e di intervista, si è
cercato di presentare la ricerca assicurando agli intervistati che il lavoro
principale fosse quello di conoscere il loro punto di vista e le loro storie
di vita senza porre, in alcun modo, giudizi. alla fine di ogni colloquio,
gli intervistati hanno espresso molto orgoglio ed entusiasmo nei confronti
133
dell’interesse che la ricerca mostra nei riguardi dell’Iran e della sua odierna
società. tutte le giovani donne hanno manifestato impressioni di fiducia
e di flessibilità nel parlare di determinati argomenti con una straniera;
non capita spesso, in città come Kerman e Bam, di parlare di questi temi
con donne non iraniane. Il motivo principale per cui l’inchiesta si svolge
nel sud-est dell’Iran è dato dal fatto che quest’area geografica, trovandosi
decisamente lontano dallo spazio metropolitano della capitale, teheran,
offre una visione più originale e meno, se vogliamo azzardare, “occiden-
tale” della vita quotidiana delle giovani generazioni.
la città di Kerman fu fondata da ardashir I, capostipite della dinastia
Sasanide. Dopo la sconfitta dei Sasanidi in Iraq, insieme ad altre città,
Kerman divenne una meta per le forze arabe inviate dal califfo omar
(634-644 d.c.). nonostante le forze militari sasanidi, di religione zo-
roastriana, furono in grado di mantenere il controllo fino al nono secolo,
gli invasori arabi riuscirono a far affermare la religione islamica nella re-
gione. Il ruolo principale della città di Kerman si può identificare nella
sua storica funzione di centro strategico di amministrazione e supporto
militare per tutta la provincia. Dal punto di vista politico ed economico,
la città si è trovata al centro della rotta commerciale che fu costruita a se-
guito dell’apertura del porto di Bandar abbas (1625) verso l’India, con-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
tribuendo, in seguito, allo sviluppo dell’artigianato locale, dei tappeti e

della lana di pecore e capre. Dal 1956 al 2006, la popolazione è cresciuta
rapidamente1, grazie a tre fattori importanti: la politica di industrializ-
zazione delle “nuove città”, l’inizio dello sfruttamento delle miniere di
rame e le migrazioni provenienti sia dall’afghanistan che dalle regioni
dell’Iran lambite dalla guerra con l’Iraq.
fino al 1980, l’aspetto economico del capoluogo della regione era
basato sulle attività tradizionali. la città di Kerman disponeva solamente
di sei industrie che offrivano lavoro a circa cinquanta persone (produzione
di mattoni, tessuti, cemento, bevande). tuttavia, le nuove forme di tra-
sporto, la realizzazione di un aeroporto internazionale e la costruzione
di una conduttura di gas dalle raffinerie di petrolio di Bandar abbas
hanno concesso alla città le risorse necessarie per divenire la capitale
della regione omonima e la metropoli di riferimento del centro-est del-
l’Iran. non solo: le miniere di rame, la produzione di automobili nella
città di Bam2, un impianto di produzione di cemento e diverse industrie
(elaborazione di olio, frutta, frutta secca e imballaggi) hanno dato e con-
tribuiscono a dare alla città e alla provincia una nuova e moderna imma-
gine industriale, conferendole autorevolezza. Per evitare il consumo ec-
cessivo delle riserve acquifere, la provincia e la città di Kerman stanno
lavorando ad una politica generale di riciclo dell’acqua.
134 tra il 1985 e il 1990 vennero istituite le due università della città:
l’università azad di Kerman, che ha conseguito un ruolo molto impor-
tante nelle pubblicazioni scientifiche, e l’università Shahid Bahonar, fon-
data con una donazione privata dall’ingegnere e filantropo alireza af-
zalipour (De Planhol e hourcade, 2014).
Il censimento del 2011 rivela che, nella regione, il 35% della forza
lavoro maschile opera nel settore dell’agricoltura, il 24% nel settore del-
l’industria e il 32% nei servizi. Per quanto riguarda invece la forza lavoro
femminile, si nota che il 35% opera nell’agricoltura, il 52% nei servizi e
solo il 9% nell’industria. Il tasso di disoccupazione è al 26.3% per gli uo-
mini e al 47.3% per le donne. nella regione di Kerman, il 99.3% della
popolazione è musulmana, il restante è diviso fra cristiani, zoroastriani,
ebrei, e bahai (Iran national census of Population and housing, 2011).
ILLUMINISMO SÌ, ILLUMINISMO NO
Se da un lato l’europa è stata avvolta dal pensiero Illuminista, dalla

Rivoluzione francese e dalla separazione fra Stato e potere religioso, dal-
1 circa 4.2% all’anno.

2 In collaborazione con grandi compagnie straniere (volkswagen, Daewoo, tata) e
la Tire and Rubber Company (Barez Industrial Group).

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
l’altro il vicino oriente ha reagito a tale processo in tutt’altro modo. la

decolonizzazione ne è un eccellente esempio. nonostante i mandati fran-
cesi, inglesi, olandesi, ecc., intenti a “civilizzare” le popolazioni locali in
africa, nord africa e nel vicino oriente, la conquista dell’indipendenza
e la conseguente decolonizzazione hanno invece suscitato una reazione
ben diversa nelle nazioni nascenti; segnata da un ritorno alle “origini”
ovvero a ciò che erano prima dell’influenza occidentale. Recentemente,
le cosiddette “primavere arabe” hanno portato grandi sconvolgimenti in
tutta l’area. tese, al loro albore, al richiamo alla democrazia e libertà di
scelta, e contrarie a un’occidentalizzazione forzata, le primavere arabe si
sono concluse con l’affermazione di partiti fondamentalisti islamici che
hanno tentato e stanno ancora tentando di omogeneizzare la società
sotto aspetti religiosi arrivando al punto tale da essere ora definite, da al-
cuni, come “inverni islamici”. Se nell’area Mena tutto ciò è accaduto a
partire dal 2011, il caso dell’Iran è molto più particolare; la necessità di
avere una sua identità, senza alcuna interferenza (occidentale), si è sentita
a partire dalla fine degli anni ’70 del secolo scorso. le politiche di occi-
dentalizzazione e modernizzazione3, volute da Reza Shah e suo figlio
Reza Shah Pahlavi, condussero la popolazione iraniana a voler marcare
la propria identità come stato musulmano e, quindi, a rivendicarne i
propri diritti.
KHOMEINI COME CALVINO?

135
Gli episodi della Rivoluzione di Khomeini si differenziano dalle
“primavere arabe” per vari motivi. esigendo «la trasformazione del pro-
prio sé» (cavazzini, 2005: 14), la «collettività iraniana» (Ibidem) voleva
un leader spirituale in grado di garantire una stabilità politica e religiosa
alla sua gente. Questo modello è stato visto dagli iraniani, soprattutto i
più giovani e i più istruiti, nella persona di Ruhollah Mostafavi Mousavi
Khomeini, un ayatollah nato a Khomein. esiliato dallo Shah Reza Pahlavi
nel 1963, dapprima in turchia, poi in Iraq e, infine, in francia, rientra in
Iran il 1 febbraio 1979 con grandi aspettative e promesse fatte alla po-
polazione. Donne e uomini erano pronti a cambiamenti economici e so-
ciali fondamentali, primi fra tanti la questioni del velo/chador, resi illegali
se indossati nei luoghi pubblici e di lavoro con una legge del 1936, voluta
da Reza Shah. a livello economico e internazionale, sotto la Guida (la
carica attribuita al nuovo leader del paese), l’Iran si preparava ad avere
un ruolo centrale e di fondamentale importanza sia nell’area del Golfo
persico che a livello internazionale.
3 Il termine modernizzazione inteso in senso di “secolarizzazione” della società.

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Samuel huntington, nel suo celebre libro Lo scontro di civiltà, para-

gona l’ayatollah Khomeini a calvino:
[…] nelle sue manifestazioni politiche, la Rinascita islamica presenta

dei tratti in comune con il marxismo: i suoi testi sacri, la sua visione
della società perfetta, la dedizione al cambiamento radicale, il rifiuto
delle autorità costituite e dello stato nazionale, e una disomogeneità
dottrinaria che consente di accorpare tanto i riformisti moderati
quanto gli estremisti rivoluzionari. ancor più calzante, tuttavia, è
l’analogia con la Riforma protestante. entrambe sono fenomeni di
reazione alla stagnazione e alla corruzione delle istituzioni esistenti;
entrambe invocano il ritorno a un’espressione più pura e severa della
religione; entrambe esaltano i valori del lavoro, dell’ordine e della di-
sciplina; entrambe guardano al dinamico ed emergente ceto medio;
entrambe, infine, sono movimenti complessi, costituiti da varie com-
ponenti di cui due dominanti (luteranesimo e calvinismo da un lato,
fondamentalismo sciita e sunnita dall’altro) e che presentano finanche
dei parallelismi tra Giovanni calvino e l’ayatollah Khomeini, che
tentarono di imporre la loro disciplina monastica alle rispettive società.
lo spirito di fondo tanto della Riforma quanto della Rinascita è una
riforma globale […]. la Rinascita si differenzia tuttavia dalla Riforma
per un aspetto fondamentale: l’impatto di quest’ultima fu limitato
136 in larga parte all’europa settentrionale, trovando ben poco spazio in

Spagna, Italia, europa orientale e nelle terre asburgiche in generale;
la Rinascita, viceversa, ha toccato quasi tutte le società musulmane
[…]. (huntington, 1997: 62)
forse è proprio per questo motivo che l’ayatollah ha avuto l’appoggio

degli iraniani, soprattutto delle giovani generazioni degli anni settanta.
la Guida prometteva un’eguaglianza economica e la possibilità del ceto
medio di avere accesso a molti servizi, prometteva alle donne che sareb-
bero state loro a decidere cosa indossare o no nei luoghi pubblici, garantiva
più libertà, intendeva offrire ai giovani un futuro. È proprio foucault a
parlare di loro, di quei giovani che, fino a qualche settimana prima, erano
all’opposizione ma poi si sono schierati a favore del leader religioso:
Due avvenimenti hanno preparato il week-end a teheran. 1) tutta

l’opposizione si era raggruppata dietro Khomeini. una soluzione ap-
poggiata dagli americani, prevedeva la semiritirata dello Scià e una li-
beralizzazione progressiva. essa supponeva la neutralità dei principali
partiti d’opposizione. Durante la giornata di venerdì, Karim Sandjabi,
il dirigente del fronte nazionale, aveva finito per accettare il primo
punto della dichiarazione dell’ayatollah: la monarchia dello Scià è il-
legittima e illegale. la caduta e la partenza della dinastia erano dunque
diventate una condizione per qualsiasi ricostruzione della vita politica.
venerdì sera il sovrano non aveva più alcun appoggio, neppure indi-

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retto, nell’opposizione, quindi nessuna possibilità di manovra. contro

di lui l’opposizione aveva fatto il pieno. 2) Il giorno prima la stampa
ufficiosa sovietica aveva considerato “pericolosa” la rivendicazione di
un governo islamico in Iran. Significava avvertire gli americani che
l’uRSS non faceva obiezioni a una soluzione, anche “vigorosa”, su-
scettibile di sbarrare la strada a una opposizione raggruppata dietro
Khomeini. e anche avvertire lo Scià che in caso di lotta lunga e
violenta l’opposizione non avrebbe trovato appoggio né nell’uRSS
né nelle democrazie popolari fornitrici di armi, né nei Paesi del Medio
oriente patrocinati dai russi. Dunque sul piano internazionale, era
lo Scià che venerdì sera aveva fatto il pieno e l’opposizione che era
perfettamente isolata. l’occasione è stata la sommossa studentesca.
Si discuterà a lungo per sapere se essa è stata “provocata” e da chi. Il
sabato, dai tiri dei soldati? la domenica, dal loro ritiro? Il vocabolo
“provocazione” mi imbarazza sempre, perché non c’è azione che non
sia “provocata”. Il problema è di sapere ciò che rende qualcuno “pro-
vocabile”, perché gli studenti sono passati, durante il week-end, a un
tipo di azione che non era quello dei mesi precedenti e che senza
dubbio non era auspicato dai responsabili, neppure da quelli più ra-
dicali dell’opposizione? forse perché c’è stata rivalità tra i gruppi più
“politicizzati” e quelli più “religiosi”. Ma forse soprattutto perché
c’era nella testa di tutti, una specie di sfida tra il radicalismo rivolu-
zionario e il radicalismo islamico, nessuno dei due volendo riconoscersi
più concitante e meno coraggioso dell’altro. Per questa ragione e a
causa di una situazione che era molto evoluta, l’ambiente studentesco
137
si è trovato molto più “detonante” dell’insieme della popolazione
con la quale questi stessi studenti manifestavano qualche settimana
prima. (foucault, 1998: corriere della Sera del 7 novembre 1978)
l’importanza che oggi l’ayatollah Khamenei, al potere dal 1989

(anno di morte del primo leader della rivoluzione), ripone nei giovani è
fondamentale. egli stesso comprende in quale modo e in quale maniera
i giovani possano influire sul futuro di un’intera nazione. Questo vale si-
curamente anche per i giovani iraniani, giovani che sembrano però essere
stati dimenticati dalla Repubblica islamica, che emigrano in cerca di
lavoro o per avere più opportunità a livello universitario, oppure perché
non si sentono di voler far parte di quella rivoluzione tanto voluta dai
loro genitori.
al censimento del 2011, la popolazione iraniana contava 75.149.6694
di abitanti di cui 30.666.118 erano giovani di età compresa tra i quindici
e i trentaquattro anni; l’11,5% apparteneva alla classe di età tra i venti-
cinque e i ventinove anni (Iranian Statistical center 1390/2010-
4 Secondo le statistiche delle nazioni unite, nel 2016, la popolazione iraniana ha

raggiunto più di ottanta milioni di abitanti.

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1391/2011). l’aumento della popolazione giovanile è il prodotto degli

incentivi che la Repubblica islamica offriva, durante gli anni ottanta, alle
famiglie del ceto medio-basso.
nonostante ciò, molti di questi giovani, per svariate ragioni, spesso
riguardanti studio e lavoro, decidono di lasciare l’Iran per mete occi-
dentali. Secondo il bollettino dell’unIcef (2013), concernente i profili
migratori, le cinque mete più ambite dai migranti iraniani sono: Stati
uniti, Germania, canada, Regno unito, Irlanda del nord e Svezia.
GIOVANI IRANIANI
l’immagine dei giovani iraniani offerta dai mass media occidentali

potrebbe non essere sufficiente a presentarli in modo adeguato e merite-
vole; non esistono solamente i “giovani e ricchi ragazzi di teheran”, tan-
tomeno esistono solo i giovani intenti a “occidentalizzare” il Paese scat-
tandosi foto senza hijab o in costume in lussuose piscine. non basta. a
chi, come me, visita a fondo il paese – da nord al centro e al sud-est, con
diverse città come Shiraz, esfahan, Rasht, yazd, teheran, lahijan, Jiro,
ecc. –, l’Iran dà l’impressione di essere diviso in due componenti, una
rurale e l’altra urbana. Queste appaiono inoltre distanti tra loro. con ri-
ferimento al periodo trascorso in Iran, un episodio interessante è stato
138 quando il tassista, che guidava verso l’aeroporto per il rientro in Italia,
mi fece notare che stavamo passando nella “vecchia” teheran, la zona
del Bazar. «Qui i giovani non ci vengono più, è un posto per vecchi»,
dice, «sei mai stata a nord della città? lì i quartieri sono come quelli eu-
ropei, lo stesso vale per le persone. non si vede neanche una donna in
chador». Ripenso a Gramsci (1948) che, nei suoi Quaderni, parla di
quelle culture subalterne che, a suo avviso, potrebbero riuscire a sconfig-
gere l’egemonia culturale attraverso l’aiuto degli intellettuali “organica-
mente” formati per mediare quei processi egemonici (Dei, 2012: 114).
l’Iran è dunque un oceano sconfinato di questa subalternità che ha “col-
pito” i giovani nel secondo decennio del ventunesimo secolo. I Cultural
Studies, che riprendono i concetti di egemonia e subalternità di Gramsci,
si concentrano non più sulla contrapposizione tra contadini e agrari o
operai verso capitalisti, ma sulle differenze di genere, di generazione ed
etniche (Ivi: 144). non è forse ciò che sta accadendo, oggi, in Iran?
Durante le ricerche è emerso che, nonostante la maggior parte dei
giovani tra i venti e i trenta anni siano contrari a un sistema religioso così
rigido come quello attuale, ce ne sono molti altri che si sentono a loro
agio e preferiscono poter vivere nell’Iran nato dalla rivoluzione “kho-
meinista”. Sembra un paradosso, ma in realtà è ciò che accade quotidia-
namente. Giovani della stessa età, nati in due contesti diversi, una città
metropolitana e una di provincia, nonostante siano cresciuti in famiglie
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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più o meno religiose ma che condividono stessi principii, hanno idee

opposte e contrastanti tra loro5.
Proprio per questo, durante la ricerca in Iran, si è voluto prendere in
esame due città di una stessa regione, Kerman e Bam. la prima capoluogo
di regione, la seconda città ultra millenaria di provincia; tra loro distano
circa duecentotrenta chilometri. In questo studio, prenderò in conside-
razione due interviste realizzate rispettivamente a Kerman e a Bam e un
caso specifico, quello del gruppo di amici della coppia di ‘ali e Maryam.
Nooshin vs Faeze
contesto: nooshin ha ventun anni6, è nata in una famiglia religio-

samente moderata, è single, sta finendo gli studi di scuola superiore e si
considera assolutamente non religiosa. ha sempre vissuto a Kerman.
faeze ha venticinque anni7, è nata in una famiglia religiosamente
“mista”, la sua discendenza matrilineare è religiosamente non praticante
e non osservante, mentre la sua discendenza patrilineare è da considerare
moderatamente religiosa, è sposata, ha una laurea triennale in ingegneria
civile, è in costante ricerca di un lavoro e si considera non religiosa. ha
sempre vissuto a Bam.
È necessario, a questo punto, aprire una piccola parentesi sul concetto
di “non religioso/moderato” che gli individui riflettono, di loro stessi, 139
nella società. come osservatrice partecipante ho notato che, ogni qual-
volta si chiedevano informazioni circa il livello di religiosità delle donne
da intervistare, gli informatori parlavano di persone non religiose o mo-
derate. l’aspettativa era quella di incontrare donne che praticassero il
loro credo in maniera non esagerata e donne che, non essendo osservanti,
non esercitassero per nulla alcun tipo di ritualità e/o preghiera musul-
mana. le aspettative sono fatte per essere anche smentite. Infatti, si è
notato che, secondo i canoni tradizionali, una donna non religiosa8 è
colei la quale: non indossa il chador quando esce, ma segue le regole
della tradizione musulmana-iraniana quando è a casa; prega tre volte al
giorno ma in alcuni, particolari, casi non indossa l’hijab anche se ci sono
5 non dimentichiamoci, però, che in Iran ci sono molte città conservatrici, come
ad esempio, Mashhad, Isfahan e yazd, per quanto riguarda, soprattutto, l’aspetto
della vita sociale. Si deve tener presente la distinzione di base fra teheran, megalo-
poli e capitale del paese, con il resto della nazione; anche quest’ultima, è da distin-
guere in zone, “centri” e “periferie”.
6 al momento dell’intervista.
7 al momento dell’intervista.
8 Secondo quanto emerso dalla ricerca.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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uomini (al di fuori del suo atomo di parentela9) in casa10; legge il corano,
ma quando sta tra amici non ha problemi a indossare mini vestiti, shorts,
maniche corte e ovviamente non indossa il velo. al contrario, una donna
religiosamente moderata, nonostante non indossi il chador, indossa sem-
pre l’hijab11, prega tre volte al giorno, se ha occasione va in moschea e se-
gue con impazienza i riti religiosi del calendario islamico.
Prendendo in analisi le due interviste con nooshin e faeze, possiamo
notare che due ragazze della stessa generazione, distanti l’una dall’altra
poco più di duecentocinquanta chilometri, e con idee simili possono
scontrarsi su alcuni temi fondamentali riguardanti gli aspetti privati delle
giovani generazioni e le scelte dei singoli individui.
[…] Penso che tra un uomo e una donna sia normale avere delle rela-
zioni sentimentali. alcune persone decidono di frequentarsi ed io
non vedo quale sia il problema. anche io ho avuto un partner poco
tempo fa e se ho un ragazzo che mi piace molto, ci esco insieme. an-
diamo a fare un giro a piazza azadi, ci andiamo a prendere un gelato,
e così via. Se amo davvero qualcuno e so che voglio sposarlo non ho
problemi a parlarne con mia madre o qualcuno della mia famiglia,
credo proprio che loro non abbiano nessuna preoccupazione ad ac-
cettarlo. […] Penso che in Iran sia normale avere rapporti sessuali
140 prematrimoniali anche se molto spesso alcune di queste donne, prima

di contrarre matrimonio, non ammetteranno mai di aver avuto rela-
zioni sessuali con altri uomini e confermeranno la loro verginità al
futuro marito. Penso proprio che tra le ragazze iraniane, che si defi-
niscono “non religiose”, ce ne sono davvero poche che non hanno
avuto esperienze sessuali. Secondo la mia opinione il 90% delle donne
che non sono religiose hanno avuto rapporti prematrimoniali.
(nooshin, 2015)
nooshin è l’ultima di sei fratelli, quattro maschi e due femmine; tra

lei e il fratello più grande ci sono quasi vent’anni di differenza e circa tre
generazioni. nonostante sia cresciuta in un ambiente moderatamente
religioso, nooshin crede nella sua libertà, ha delle idee chiare di come e
quando usare il suo corpo, ed è fermamente convinta che se si ama una
persona non si deve dar retta ai precetti religiosi, ma seguire i propri
istinti. I «caratteri maschili e femminili determinati più dalla cultura
che dalla natura» (fabietti 2001), in questo contesto, vanno a sfumarsi.
9 Si vedano i numerosi lavori dell’antropologo levi-Strauss riguardo al concetto di

atomo di parentela.
10 alcune eccezioni sono sempre presenti.
11 anche a casa nel momento in cui fossero presenti membri al di fuori del suo
nucleo familiare, ma non in assoluto.

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È ovvio che l’idea di nooshin è data da vari aspetti che l’hanno influen-
zata: segue con interesse la televisione internazionale, le mode mondiali
e ha diversi profili sociali nel web. nonostante sua madre sia una donna
religiosa moderata e praticante, le ha sempre lasciato la possibilità di sce-
gliere come comportarsi dandole, in alcuni casi, solo dei consigli.
«non mi considero una donna religiosa, lo so, qui in Iran siamo
musulmani, ma io stessa non conosco bene le regole dell’Islam e a volte
non riesco a seguirle del tutto. ogni giorno, nel mio piccolo, leggo dieci
versi del corano in farsi e prego per tre volte in casa, non vado mai in
moschea. So perfettamente che, per essere una buona musulmana, devo
seguire alcune regole di base, la più difficile? Quella di indossare l’hijab.
È una regola che, giornalmente, devo rispettare e credo anche che la cosa
più comune che distingue una donna musulmana da una non religiosa è
proprio quella di come indossa l’hijab. È l’Islam che ci fa capire cosa sia
haram (proibito) e cosa sia halal (permesso). ad esempio, in base alle
regole islamiche non è consentito nessun tipo di contatto fisico tra uomo
e donna, ma io non sono d’accordo. Penso che tra una coppia si dovrebbe
avere molta più liberà […] alcuni dei giovani che io conosco cercano il
matrimonio per poter avere rapporti sessuali moralmente e legalmente
autorizzati, ma un matrimonio del genere non va proprio bene» (faeze,
2016).
faeze si considera assolutamente non religiosa, ma nella sua dichia-
141
razione indica chiaramente che lei prega tre volte al giorno e legge il co-
rano. Il suo sentirsi non religiosamente affiliata all’Islam è più un riallac-
ciarsi all’idea che una donna musulmana è obbligata a indossare l’hijab
piuttosto che seguire tutti gli altri precetti. la stessa faeze, per accon-
sentire a una relazione socialmente e culturalmente condivisa, ha deciso
di ricorrere al sigheh, ovvero il matrimonio a tempo determinato regola-
mentato dal codice civile della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran negli articoli
1075/1076/1077 (Codice Civile della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran,
2015). nonostante molti iraniani vedano il matrimonio a tempo deter-
minato come una «legalizzazione della prostituzione12» (Mohammad,
2016) molti altri lo ritengono un passaggio fondamentale per il matri-
monio a tempo indeterminato. Durante l’intervista con l’ufficiale di
stato civile (a’qed) si è notato che il numero di matrimoni a tempo deter-
minato registrati in quattro anni (1390-2011/1394-2015) è di trecento
undici, mentre i matrimoni a tempo indeterminato registrati negli ultimi
sei mesi, solo in quell’agenzia, sono centoventuno13. uno dei massimi
12 Dall’intervista con il responsabile dell’ufficio matrimoni del 9 gennaio 2016.

13 Dati aggiornati al gennaio 2016.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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esponenti e leader della rivoluzione del ’79, Morteza Motahhari (1980),

scrive:
If you ask a boy student of eighteen years of age who sexual ardour is
naturally at its height, to get married permanently, people would laugh
at you. e same is the case with a girl student of sixteen […] I ask you
how, in these circumstances, with these natural instincts, should we
behave […] our modern way of life does not permit us to marry at sixteen
or seventeen years of age. Are the young ready to undergo a period of
temporary asceticism and put themselves under the strain of rigid aus-
terity till such time as there may arise an occasion for permanent mar-
riage? […] ere remain two alternatives only. We may leave the young
to themselves and ignore what they do. We may allow a boy to have un-
lawful sexual relations with hundreds of girls, and allow a girl to have
unlawful relations with tens of boys and have so many abortions. […]
e other course is fixed-term ee marriage. Fixed-term marriage puts
the limit on a woman that she must not be the wife of two men at the
same time. […] With this arrangement a young man and woman may
live through the time of their education without falling back upon tem-
porary asceticism and enduring its penalties, and without falling into
the abyss of sexual communism. (Motahhari, 1980: 21-24)
142 È nel pensiero di Motahhari, oggi minoritario fra l’establishment

religioso del paese, che si racchiude l’idea di faeze: legalizzare una rela-
zione sessuale e sentimentale in attesa di un momento più adatto, rispetto
ai canoni di modernizzazione imposti alla società (Ibidem), al matrimonio
a tempo indeterminato (aghd-e daem).
Motahhari nasce il 2 febbraio 1920 a farima, settantacinque chilo-
metri a sud est di Mashhad, da una famiglia clericale. Dopo aver finito le
scuole elementari al Maktab Khanih, intraprende lo studio della religione
grazie anche all’appoggio del padre. a dodici anni, si trasferisce a Mashhad
insieme al fratello, Mohammad ali, per iniziare il loro percorso formativo
religioso. finiti gli studi, si trasferisce a Qom, dove incontra, per la prima
volta, il rinomato filosofo allameh Mohammad hossein tabatabai, l’aya-
tollah Khomeini e tanti altri studiosi. nonostante i suoi lavori sembrino
più inerenti alla moderna teologia islamica, durante il percorso formativo,
Motahhari preferisce identificarsi generalmente come filosofo.
e term ‘modern Islamic theology’ covers a branch of the Islamic sciences

which deals with social and political matters. It is concerned with the
new problems raised by modern developments within Islamic societies.
On the other hand, it deals, as a part of Islamic theology (‘Ilm-i kalam),
with the questions advanced by the modern scientists and philosophers
about the function of religion and the truth of religious principles.
(Davari, 2009: 31).

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Per una buona parte della sua vita, i discorsi, gli insegnamenti e gli
scritti del filosofo, hanno preso spunto dalle idee materialiste, marxiste,
secolariste, tradizionaliste e dai movimenti pro occidentalizzazione. no-
nostante inizialmente i suoi studi riguardassero principalmente questioni
etiche, religiose e di natura filosofica, gradualmente si spostarono verso
argomenti di natura sociologica, economica e politica (Ivi: 32).
certo è che, nella visione della non religiosità di nooshin e faeze,
le due donne si trovano d’accordo riguardo all’uso dell’hijab. entrambe
si sentono legate a una cultura tradizionale che non gli appartiene. non
c’è nessuna ragione politico-religiosa per cui le due non amano l’hijab,
ma piuttosto un non sentirsi appartenenti a una tradizione millenaria.
Mi ricordo un matrimonio di un cugino che decise di celebrarlo con

una festa mista. non c’erano separazioni tra uomini e donne e, non
so bene il perché, forse a causa della nostra tradizione o per rispetto,
nonostante alcune donne non indossassero l’hijab, io dovevo farlo
anche se avevo un vestito con le maniche corte. […] Sono fermamente
convinta che il nostro hijab non sia di natura politico-religiosa, ma
tradizionalmente insito nella nostra cultura (nooshin, 2015).
È della stessa opinione faeze, che durante l’intervista si ricorda di

un episodio avvenuto poco prima del funerale del nonno di suo marito.
Quando ero al funerale, in un piccolo paese vicino a Bam, tutte le

143
donne indossavano il chador, io ero l’unica senza. Mi sentivo fuori
luogo e a disagio, è stato l’unico momento della mia vita che avrei
voluto indossarlo (faeze, 2016).
non c’è da stupirsi se, nelle campagne iraniane, le donne siano av-
vezze a seguire certi comportamenti non dati tanto dagli aspetti politici,
quanto soprattutto da quelli tradizionali.
nooshin e faeze non divergono per nulla sugli aspetti della moderna
tecnologia. nonostante faeze, nella sua non religiosità, pratichi la pre-
ghiera tre volte al giorno, non ha problemi a farsi vedere in foto (senza
velo) sui moderni social network, come ad esempio, facebook, Whatsapp,
telegram e Instagram; i più in uso in Iran. faeze fa eccezione su What-
sapp: «uso moltissimo i social network e metto qualsiasi foto io voglia
senza porre particolare attenzione alle opinioni degli altri. la mia unica
eccezione è la foto su Whatsapp, che è sempre con il velo poiché ho ap-
pena aderito a un gruppo di corano e non voglio essere cacciata» (faeze,
2016). Il nuovo Islam vorrei definirlo come “ciò di cui i giovani iraniani
hanno bisogno”. faeze ne è un vivido esempio, si sente musulmana fino
in fondo, ma non ce la fa a fermarsi a questo punto; lei deve poter andare
avanti pur mantenendo la sua identità religiosa.
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nooshin non aderisce a nessun gruppo di corano e non si fa pro-

blemi a inserire foto di lei senza velo nei suoi profili social. a questo
punto viene spontaneo chiederle: «che differenza c’è tra l’indossare il
velo davanti a tuo cugino quando viene a casa tua e postare una foto
senza shal [un altro modo di chiamare il foulard] su Instagram o What-
sapp dove può vedere i tuoi capelli?». la sua risposta conferma sempre
di più la tradizionale usanza dell’hijab in Iran. «la realtà è lungi dall’essere
vicina alla rete internet» (nooshin, 2015). Potrebbe sembrare una ba-
nalità, ma forse in questa frase è contenuto il senso di ciò che i giovani
iraniani, almeno una buona parte, pensano.
Maryam, ‘Ali e i loro giovani amici
cinque donne in cucina, una in chador le altre con l’hijab, tutte

impegnate per i preparativi della cena. a Bam, tra amici, si porta l’hijab
e non importa se si è tutti giovani; qui alcuni dei presenti sono molto re-
ligiosi e il rispetto nei loro confronti vale molto di più di chi non crede
nel velo. aspettiamo il kebab. È un continuo andirivieni, in questo mo-
mento sono l’unica donna tra gli uomini. non parlo una parola di farsi,
ma capisco. ecco di nuovo alcune delle mogli, ricominciano a lavorare
in cucina, tutte indaffarate, noi aspettiamo che arrivino gli altri amici
144 andati al ristorante a prendere la cena. eccoli. Portano il kebab. Il capo
della casa inizia a stendere la tovaglia. Siamo molti, si mangia a terra.
non mi sento molto a mio agio, ho indosso il cappotto che mi stringe e
lo shal che mi continua a cadere. la cena è servita, si ride, si scherza, si
fanno selfie e video. Si scherza sulle parole in comune con l’italiano,
alcune di loro in farsi hanno un significato diverso, un po’ particolare. È
tutto nella normalità. finiamo di mangiare e a questo punto gli uomini
iniziano ad andare a fumare fuori, sul balcone di casa; parlano, ridono e
scherzano. alcuni di loro non si vedono da anni. Siamo rimaste solo noi
donne, mi sento un po’ persa, vorrei tanto andarmene. Il mio disagio
cresce. Gli uomini iniziano ad accendere il narghile (o qalyān) e le donne
iniziano a chiacchierare tra loro, una di loro è in dolce attesa, le faccio i
miei complimenti, torno a osservare ciò che sta accadendo intorno e
vedo la netta separazione tra uomini e donne. Penso e ripenso. Mi dico:
anche in Italia accade la stessa cosa. la divisione di genere non è prero-
gativa di questa situazione, qui in Iran (Diario di campo di Sarah Scio’, 2
gennaio 2016).
Maryam è una giovane ragazza nata e cresciuta a Bam, a ventitré

anni ha deciso che era il momento di sposarsi con ‘ali, suo cugino. I due
sono cresciuti insieme. Dopo una piccola e innocua relazione sentimen-
tale, hanno entrambi deciso di annunciare il loro fidanzamento e matri-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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monio. vivono in un appartamento sopra il negozio di erboristeria di

‘ali. Maryam non lavora ma suo marito, oltre ad occuparsi del negozio
di famiglia, svolge il servizio militare presso una scuola superiore di Bam
dove insegna elettronica a giovani adolescenti.
Il servizio militare è uno dei punti più caldi che riguardano i giovani
uomini iraniani. Molti di loro cercano qualsiasi modo o maniera per po-
terlo evitare. le leggi generali del servizio militare, emanate dall’orga-
nizzazione generale militare e approvate dal Parlamento (Majles-e Showrā-
ye Eslami14), prevedono all’art. 4 le seguenti regole per tutti i cittadini
(uomini15):
aRt. 4 – Il servizio militare generale è di trent’anni, suddivisi nei

seguenti periodi cui devono sottoporsi i soggetti al servizio militare:
a. Periodo obbligatorio: 2 anni. nel caso in cui il numero dei sog-
getti al servizio militare16 superi o non superi il bisogno minimo
richiesto, il consiglio Supremo della Difesa può, dopo l’otteni-
mento del permesso del comando generale delle forze armate,
aumentare o diminuire tale periodo obbligatorio.
B. Periodo cautelativo: 8 anni.
c. Primo periodo di riserva: 10 anni.
D Secondo periodo di riserva: 10 anni. (organizzazione generale
militare, 1390/2012: 4-5)17. 145
‘ali è uno tra i più fortunati. la sua situazione familiare, sposato e
con un padre over sessanta, gli garantisce di completare il servizio militare
a pochi chilometri da casa e come insegnante di scuola superiore. fino a
qualche anno fa era legale “comprare” l’esonero dalla leva con un costo
variabile a seconda del grado di scuola che si era ottenuto, mentre oggi è
quasi impossibile riuscire ad evitare il servizio militare (anche con metodi
illegali).
14 assemblea consultiva Islamica.

15 vedi art.1 del Libro delle leggi militari aggiornato al 1390/2012.
16 Dal farsi mashmul, è quel ragazzo che ha raggiunto l’età di diciotto anni e undici
mesi e che quindi può essere chiamato al servizio militare obbligatorio.
17 Maddeh 4 – Khedmat-e vazife omumi si sal ast va marahel-e an baraye koliye ma-
shmulan be sharh zir ast:
Dowreh zarurat do sal va dar suratikeh mashmulan mazad va ya kamtar az tedad
mored-e niyaz bashand setad kol ba kasb ejazeh az farmandehi kol, an ra be kamtar
ya bishtar az moddat zarurat taghir midahad.
Dowreh ehtiyat hasht sal
Dowreh zakhireh aval dah sal
Dowreh zakhireh dovvom dah sal. (traduzione dal persiano di Sarah Scio’).

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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nonostante il doppio impegno di ‘ali, la vita di coppia con sua

moglie non si ferma. hanno entrambi deciso che fino a quando lui non
finirà il servizio militare non sarà possibile avere dei figli; vogliono ga-
rantire una stabilità economica alla loro prole. Per il momento, la loro
vita quotidiana si divide tra lavoro, famiglia e amici.
Il giorno dopo il nostro primo incontro e la cena a casa loro a base di

kebab, abbiamo deciso di fare un barbecue nel deserto, a circa ottanta
kilometri da Bam, in un piccolissimo villaggio vicino a fahraj. la
prima sensazione che ho avuto è stata quella di aver sentito molto
freddo. ero stata nel deserto prima di quel momento ma, nel mio im-
maginario fiabesco, nel deserto fa caldo e trovarmi a due o tre gradi
sopra lo zero mi ha scioccata. abbiamo subito acceso tre fuochi, sia
per scaldare un po’ l’aria sia perché dovevamo prepararci per cucinare
il kebab di cammello e pollo. Mangiare cammello non era nelle mie
priorità, ma è pur sempre stata un’esperienza diversa. Siamo arrivati
in tempo per ammirare il tramonto; non avevo mai visto una bellezza
naturale siffatta. I nostri amici non erano ancora arrivati, e rilassan-
domi ho fatto scivolare la sciarpa sulle spalle, eravamo nel deserto,
non ci sarebbero stati molti controlli. abbiamo lasciato la nostra
macchina decidendo di camminare un po’ sulla sabbia rocciosa del
deserto Dasht-e lut. con noi c’era un amico di mio marito, ershad.
146 È lui che gli ha proposto di accendere una sigaretta, ma non fanno in
tempo a fare il primo tiro che abbiamo intravisto la macchina di
Sadeq e Golnaz, un’altra coppia di Bam. a questo punto ho capito
che ershad chiede a mio marito di buttare la sigaretta perché sta arri-
vando Golnaz e non è bello che lei li veda fumare. ci ho pensato un
attimo e mi sono sentita decisamente offesa da questo gesto di rispetto
verso i confronti di una donna iraniana, ma non nei miei. chiedo a
mio marito: «che differenza c’è tra me e Golnaz? Io non merito forse
lo stesso rispetto?». lui mi ha tranquillizzata dicendomi che non
era una questione di donna iraniana o donna italiana e che lui (ershad)
si era preoccupato (di fare bella figura davanti a Golnaz), ma assolu-
tamente senza pensare che io fossi italiana. Questa cosa non mi ha
molto convinta, anche se poi lui si è riacceso la sigaretta e, dopo qual-
che frase in farsi che non ho ben capito, se l’è riaccesa anche ershad.
Questo episodio, seppur durato pochi secondi, mi ha dato molto fa-
stidio e proprio per questo senza pensare se ci fossero state delle con-
seguenze “morali” mi sono tolta completamente l’hijab di fronte a
tutti. ho pensato: sono nel bel mezzo del deserto, non sono a casa di
nessuno e qui la decisione è solamente mia. ho resistito pochi minuti.
era freddissimo, ma abbastanza per far capire che il rispetto per una
donna non dipende né dalla religione né dalla nazionalità. la serata
è continuata. alcuni tra i nostri amici sono andati per un “riforni-
mento”. (In Iran, l’alcool è vietato, ma il mercato nero è molto proficuo.
Basti pensare che, come documentato da un articolo della BBc (Pour-

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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parsa e ahmadi 2012), tra il 2011 e il 2012, ottocento ventinove per-

sone, tra cui ventitré donne, sono state fermate dalla polizia stradale
per guida in stato di ebrezza).
Mentre stavamo aspettando il rientro di tutti abbiamo intravisto una
macchina a circa uno o due chilometri da noi. È stato difficile intra-
vedere chi stava arrivando, il colore della notte era troppo scuro e ab-
biamo pensato che fossero alcuni dei nostri amici che avevano perso
la strada principale e che non riuscivano a intravedere la luce del
fuoco. abbiamo discusso po’, ma a un certo punto è sembrato che la
macchina se ne fosse andata e non ci abbiamo fatto più caso. Pochi
minuti dopo, in una frazione di secondo, abbiamo intravisto quattro
figure di uomini, inaspettate. In un primo momento non riuscivo a
capire se erano degli amici oppure no, ma quando ho notato le divise
da militare e i kalashnikov in mano, ho capito che erano dei poliziotti
e che stavano facendo dei controlli. fahraj è un piccolo paese che si
trova sulla via del traffico di esseri umani tra l’afghanistan e le vie
principali che portano a teheran, è normale che ci siano delle ispezioni
per evitarlo. Quando i militari hanno capito che eravamo solo un
gruppo di amici che si stavano divertendo hanno semplicemente chie-
sto i documenti per un controllo di routine, si sono riscaldati le mani
grazie ai nostri fuochi e, augurandoci una buona serata, se ne sono
andati. Dopo alcuni respiri di sollievo, siamo tornati alla nostra nor-
malità chiacchierando del più e del meno.
arrivata l’ora della preghiera della sera, ha suonato la sveglia che Ma-
ryam aveva impostato per ricordarle di quando avrebbe dovuto iniziare
147
a fare le abluzioni minori. È stato molto interessante, non c’era acqua
per potersi lavare e sia lei che suo marito hanno usato la sabbia del
deserto per la purificazione. Insieme, uno accanto all’altra, Maryam
e ‘ali hanno iniziato a pregare. Sono stati gli unici due che, in un
gruppo di quindici persone, hanno pregato sopra la tovaglia dove,
fino a quel momento, avevamo appoggiato i nostri viveri.
finalmente, dopo qualche minuto, è arrivato il kebab di cammello e
pollo. timidamente, uno tra noi ha offerto il primo bicchiere (clan-
destino) di whisky. nessuno mi ha chiesto se avessi voluto provarlo,
in quel momento ero stata “etichettata” come donna e, quindi, in
questo caso, esclusa dal giro “alcolico”. Mi sono fatta coraggio ed ho
chiesto: «posso provarlo anche io?». Dopo qualche secondo di stu-
pore, mi hanno fatto assaggiare una goccia di questo whisky. era tal-
mente forte che non ce la facevo a mandarlo giù. Maryam mi ha guar-
data, incuriosita. ‘ali era poco distante, ma non ci ha mai tolto gli
occhi di dosso. Dopo avermi visto i capelli e dopo avermi vista bere
alcol, ho creduto che la sua fiducia, di lasciarmi sola con la moglie,
era svanita. Dopo un altro giro di questo liquore così forte, Maryam
era ancora troppo curiosa e mi ha chiesto: «cosa si prova a bere alcol?
cosa senti?». nello stupore generale ho capito che la curiosità di
Maryam era un po’ la curiosità di tutte le donne che mi erano intorno.
nessuna di loro quella sera ha toccato alcol. Mi sono chiesta: non lo

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
hanno toccato perché non bevono alcol o per non “rovinare” la loro
reputazione davanti agli amici dei loro mariti? Sapevo benissimo che
Maryam è una musulmana praticante e che crede nei suoi principi
islamici e sa benissimo la differenza tra ciò che è haram e ciò che è
halal, ma delle altre conoscevo poco. la serata è continuata. final-
mente sono riuscita ad avere una conversazione con tutti i nuovi
amici che avevo fatto. Il mio farsi non è perfetto, ma almeno posso
comunicare disegnando. così, tra una risata e l’altra, ho iniziato a di-
segnare le caricature di noi stessi sulla sabbia e ho iniziato a chiedere
«ki ast? chi è?», impossibile non divertirsi. È finita così la nostra
serata tra i giovani ragazzi di Bam; un’esperienza che tra soldati, ani-
mali del deserto e cammello per cena, non scorderò mai più (Diario
di campo di Sarah Scio’, 3 gennaio 2016).
Incontrare Maryam e ‘ali mi ha fatto pensare molto alle generazioni

di giovani in Iran. nonostante quello che traspare dai social network su
quanto i giovani iraniani siano tecnologicamente al passo con i nostri
tempi e molto lontani dall’aspetto religioso, non vuol dire che non ci
siano dei loro coetanei che, invece, hanno fede e si sentono bene come
giovani, come iraniani e come musulmani.
148 GIOVANI? SÌ, CERTO! DOR-DOR, FLIRT TRA VENTENNI E IL

SISTEMA MATRIMONIALE
finora si è parlato di giovani iraniani in due contesti diversi, la

grande città e la piccola provincia. Si è detto, inoltre, che ci sono due di-
verse concezioni di “non religiosità”, ma si è anche notato che ci sono
giovani molto credenti che pregano nel deserto mentre altri bevono
alcol. con faeze e nooshin si è compreso quali sono le diversità com-
portamentali tra coetanei, mentre con Maryam e ‘ali è emerso che si co-
noscevano fin da bambini e che la loro relazione, seppur per un breve
periodo sia stata clandestina, è stata accettata dalle relative famiglie in
quanto parenti: i due sono infatti cugini paralleli matrilineari.
una breve parentesi è necessaria per spiegare le relazioni matrimoniali
in uso in Iran. Il sistema matrimoniale iraniano si riallaccia a quello
arabo-islamico, il matrimonio tra cugini paralleli e cugini incrociati è
spesso pratica comune. uno dei maggiori esponenti dell’antropologia
socio culturale, levi-Strauss, fondatore dello strutturalismo, si è occupato
di sistemi di parentela e scambi matrimoniali. nel suo primo libro di
grande rilievo Le strutture elementari della parentela (1947), ci descrive
il significato dell’esogamia e la proibizione dell’incesto, che segna il pas-
saggio dell’uomo della natura alla cultura. levi-Strauss definisce “atomo
di parentela” quell’unità minima parentale che è composta da madre,
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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padre, figlio/a e fratello della madre (levi-Strauss, 2003: 201-215). la

struttura più elementare di matrimonio è quella data dall’unione tra
cugini incrociati, ovvero figli di siblings, mentre il matrimonio tra cugini
paralleli, ovvero tra figli di due sorelle o due fratelli è, invece, frequente
nei sistemi arabo-islamici, ma considerato molto spesso, dalle società oc-
cidentali/non musulmane, una sorta di incesto. l’ideale matrimoniale
(fabietti, 2001: 186), in queste società, è quello del matrimonio con «la
bint’ amm, ovvero la figlia dello zio paterno (quindi con la cugina parallela
patrilineare)» (Ibidem). anche Dale f. eickelman, nel libro e Middle
East: An Anthropological Approach, afferma che in alcuni contesti me-
diorientali la donna, qualora scegliesse un marito che non sia suo cugino,
dovrebbe chiedere l’autorizzazione di quest’ultimo per poter prendere
in sposo un altro uomo (eickelman, 1981: 165). Secondo un rapporto
delle università di Shiraz e teheran, il 38,6% degli iraniani è sposato con
un suo parente consanguineo (Saadat et al, 2004).
Detto ciò, in Iran, questi tipi di matrimonio sono frequenti e in

alcuni casi si preferiscono18, ma la regola non è universale e molti giovani
cercano il/la partner al di fuori della propria famiglia.
come fanno a conoscersi i giovani iraniani? esistono diversi modi,
uno dei quali è chiamato dor-dor (gira-gira). antropologicamente par-
lando il dor-dor è molto interessante. È entrato a far parte integrante
della cultura giovanile e, attraverso specifici atti e riti, porta alla conoscenza
149
del futuro compagno.
contesto: il dor-dor è un fenomeno che riguarda specificatamente

grandi città e città metropolitane. È difficile trovare il rito del dor-dor in
cittadine di provincia come Bam. essendo una cittadina, è molto facile
conoscersi e non è rispettoso per la propria famiglia farsi vedere per
strada per conoscere un ragazzo o una ragazza. Se due giovani di Bam
vogliono conoscersi meglio, si fanno un giro in macchina e molto spesso
passano le giornate al parco Shazdeh, storici giardini persiani parte del
patrimonio mondiale dell’uneSco. Si trovano a circa 50km da Ker-
man.
uno dei dor-dor più famosi è quello di teheran, a via Iranzamin. a
Kerman, c’è via Shafa. Il fenomeno si svolge quasi sempre durante il fine
18 Questa pratica era, in un certo senso, legata al dono nuziale (mahr o mehrieh).
Molte famiglie preferivano che il mehrieh rimanesse all’interno delle relazioni pa-
rentali, in modo tale da non doverlo condividere con “estranei”. oggigiorno in
Iran, il mehrieh, è divenuto un mezzo per richiedere il divorzio, quasi nessuno lo
versa più e molte donne rinunciano al donativo nuziale proprio per uscire dal
contratto matrimoniale.

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settimana, soprattutto il giovedì e il venerdì pomeriggio. Il dor-dor è es-

senzialmente un continuo girare in automobile per cercare ragazzi o ra-
gazze interessanti. Il rito consiste nel passarsi, tramite i finestrini dell’auto,
bigliettini con poesie, frasi carine e numeri di telefono. È un sistema “so-
cialmente classista”, molti giovani spendono centinaia di migliaia di euro
per comprarsi automobili adeguate all’occasione; più un’automobile è
lussuosa, più un ragazzo o una ragazza hanno possibilità di trovare un
partner. Il significato culturale del dor-dor cambia anche a seconda della
città. a teheran, i giovani ragazzi cercano partner per brevi avventure o
semplicemente per rapporti sessuali. a Kerman, la situazione varia: c’è
chi cerca partner temporanei e chi, invece, compagni per la vita. nulla
cambia, tanto più la macchina è costosa, tanto più la persona è interes-
sante. un ragazzo con una BMW non condividerà mai il suo numero
con una ragazza che guida una tiba19 e viceversa. lo scambio e la reci-
procità sono fondamentali: «Io giovane ragazzo (ricco) dò a te, giovane
ragazza (ricca), il mio numero». È anche un “scontro/gara” tra i più
ricchi. I giovani si contendono chi ha la macchina più costosa e più bella.
Sembra un po’ l’analisi che franz Boas aveva fatto del potlach (1894/95).
nel suo significato etnografico, potlach è il nome che comunemente

viene dato a un insieme di pratiche rituali diffuse tra le popolazioni
150 indiane stanziate sulla costa della columbia Britannica e sull’isola di
vancouver. Si trattava di rituali di “ostentazione” che prevedevano la
distruzione di grandi quantità di beni considerati di “prestigio”
(fabietti, 2001: 46).
nel dor-dor, non viene distrutto nessun tipo di bene di “prestigio”,

ma sicuramente vengono “ostentati” beni (in questo caso automobili,
capi d’abbigliamento e cellulari di ultima generazione) che molto spesso
possono ricoprire il valore di dieci anni di stipendio per un individuo di
ceto medio-basso. Possiamo, infine, definire il dor-dor come un investi-
mento economico; come l’acquisizione di uno status sociale di rilievo.
oggi siamo usciti per andare a cercare un completo per il matrimonio.

ci dirigiamo verso via Shafa, a Kerman, non molto lontano da casa.
Inizio a intravedere un grande andirivieni di automobili. In ogni caso,
penso che è venerdì pomeriggio e la popolazione esce per rilassarsi
un po’ e far le compere del fine settimana. Dopo un gran cercare, riu-
sciamo a trovare un posto per l’auto. Parcheggiamo e ci dirigiamo
verso il negozio hacoupian, molto famoso in Iran. oggi è natale e il
proprietario, un iraniano cristiano armeno, fa uno sconto del 25%
19 automobile di marca iraniana.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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come tutti gli anni. Il negozio è stracolmo. Dalle vetrine intravedo

sempre più macchine e chiedo: «come mai tutto questo traffico
oggi?», «c’è il dor-dor». alla domanda cosa è il dor-dor, tutti ridono.
non capisco il perché. Dopo avermi spiegato che è un metodo per
fare conoscenze, capisco che nonostante ci siano molte persone che
lo fanno è sempre una sorta di tabù che diverte tutte le generazioni
(Diario di campo di Sarah Scio’, 25/12/2015).
CONCLUSIONI
ho iniziato questo saggio parlando dell’importanza che l’ayatollah

Khamenei ripone nei giovani occidentali, dell’impatto che ha avuto la
Rivoluzione francese in europa ed infine dei giovani iraniani in Iran.
ho voluto presentare la mia esperienza di ricercatrice e osservatrice par-
tecipante, durante il mio fieldwork in Iran, perché vedo nelle mani dei
giovani iraniani il futuro della loro nazione.
Sembra un cliché, ma in Iran la situazione potrebbe essere questa:
potrebbe esserci un Iran metropolitano sempre più vicino all’occidente,
in termini sia di secolarizzazione sia di cambiamento culturale, e potrebbe
poi esserci un Iran rurale che è rimasto saldo alla tradizione e alla religione,
senza rinnegare i processi di sviluppo tecnologico e modernità. I giovani
iraniani della provincia, seppur legati alla loro tradizione culturale e re-
151
ligiosa, non si sentono affatto indietro rispetto ai loro coetanei; anzi,
usano internet e hanno cellulari all’ultimo grido, si “sentono giovani”.
nonostante le censure che la Repubblica islamica ha posto ad alcuni dei
maggiori social network (facebook, you tube, twitter, …) e alcuni filtri
di comunicazione, i giovani hanno trovato e trovano tutt’oggi sistemi
per poterli evitare. tutti, tra i miei amici iraniani, hanno un profilo fa-
cebook o Instagram e sono o su Whatsapp o su telegram. È divenuto
quindi impossibile per il governo controllare i “suoi figli”. Su cosa accade
fuori (forse) riesce a tenerli a bada20, ma, quando le porte di casa e i
recinti dei giardini si chiudono dietro di loro, è impossibile fermarli.
ci troviamo in un limbo: cambiare l’Iran come lo vogliono cambiare
alcuni dei suoi giovani non è un processo che dura una settimana, ci vo-
gliono anni, decenni, forse anche un secolo. ne è un valido esempio il
“movimento verde”, nato nel 2009 sotto la leadership di Mir-hosein
Mousavi, Mehdi Karrubi e hossein-ali Montazeri.
20 non sempre… È di pochi mesi fa la notizia del lancio di una nuova applicazione
atta a evitare la polizia morale (gasht-e ershad) che serve a tener a bada comporta-
menti fuori dall’etica islamica.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
FOCUS
la mia ricerca vuole affermare che l’Iran non rappresenta solamente

quella parta di quei giovani “all’occidentale” ma è, soprattutto e ancora
per il momento, parte integrante di quelli che invece si sentono di aderire
a un modello statale religioso.
timothy Garton ash, saggista e giornalista britannico, in un suo
articolo intitolato “Giovane Persia” scrive: «la rivoluzione islamica, come
in passato la francese e la russa, non ha perso tempo a divorare i propri
figli: un giorno i suoi nipoti divoreranno la rivoluzione» (Garton ash,
2005).
Questo è un aspetto che può essere messo in discussione in ogni suo
punto e voglio concludere questo saggio con un quesito: sarà vero che i
nipoti della rivoluzione si mangeranno la loro “nonna” o sarà, ancora
una volta, crono a mangiarsi i suoi figli?
BIBLIOGRAFIA
– cavazzini, andrea, Foucault e l’Islam, in Michel foucault, L’Islam e la rivoluzione

iraniana, Mimesis edizioni, 2005.
– Codice Civile della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran, traduzione dal persiano di Raffaele
152 –
Mauriello, eurilink, Roma, 2015.
Davari, Mahmood, e Political ought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahari: An Ira-
nian eoretician of the Islamic State, Routledge, london-new york, 2009.
– Dei, fabio, Antropologia Culturale, edizioni Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012.
– De Planhol Xavier, hourcade, Bernard, KERMAN ii. Historical Geography, Iranica
online, https://goo.gl/tlucxR; consultato il 24 maggio 2016.
– eickelman, Dale, e Middle East an anthropological approach, Prentice-hall, en-
glewood cliff nJ, 1981.
– fabietti, ugo, Storia dell’Antropologia, zanichelli editore, Bologna, 2001.
– faeze, intervista di Sarah Scio’, traduzione di Saudabe B., Bam, Kerman 5 gennaio
2016.
– foucault, Michel, Sfida all’opposizione, corriere della Sera, 7 novembre 1978.
– foucalut, Michel, Taccuino persiano, a cura di Renzo Guolo e Pierluigi Panza, an-
gelo Guerini e associati, Milano, 1998.
– Gramsci, antonio, Quaderni dal carcere, einaudi, torino, 1975.
– Garton ash, timothy, Giovane Persia, e New York Review of Books, “la rivista
dei libri”, 2005.
– herskovitz, Melville Jean, Statement on Human Rights, “american anthropologist”,
vol. 4, (1947), pp. 539-543.
– huntington, Samuel, lo scontro delle civiltà e il nuovo ordine mondiale, Milano,
Garzanti, 1997
– Kant, Immanuel, Risposta alla domanda: che cos’è l’Illuminismo?, 1784.

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FOCUS
– Khamenei (ayatollah), Seyyed ‘ali hoseyni, Lettera ai giovani in Europa e Nord

America, tehran, 21/01/2015.
– levi-Strauss, claude, Le strutture elementari della parentela, universale economica
feltrinelli, Milano, 2003.
– Motahari, Morteza, e Rights of women in Islam, World organization for Islamic
Services, tehran, 1980.
– M.Q, Mohammad, intervista di Sarah Scio’, traduzione di R.f., Kerman
09/01/2016.
– nooshin, intervista di Sarah Scio’, Kerman, 26 dicembre 2015.
– organizzazione Generale militare, Libro delle leggi militari (Ketab eghanoon e
vazife omomi), 1390/2012. https://goo.gl/nMgqd8.
– Pourparsa, Parham e arash, ahmadi, Iran’s ‘Hidden’ Alcoholism Problem, BBc
Monitoring, 2012. https://goo.gl/8Kvt7S,
– Reza, intervista di Sarah Scio’, Kerman 07/01/2016.
– Saadat, Mozafar et al, Consanguineous marriage in Iran (short report), “annals of
human Biology”, vol. 31, no. 2 (marzo-aprile 2004), pp. 263-269.
– Scio’ Sarah, Note di campo – Iran – dicembre 2015/gennaio 2016, Kerman – Bam
– fahraj, 2015/16.
– unIcef, MIGRATION PROFILES Part I. Global legal instruments related to
international migration, States parties to united nations legal Instruments (Iran,
Islamic Republic of ) 2013. https://goo.gl/lePJmq.
153

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
P RO OR SI ZP ZE OT NT TI VI E
Iran e Grande Medio Oriente:

tra intrecci regionali
e grandi potenze
alBeRto BRaDanInI
Ex-diplomatico, tra i vari incarichi ricoperti è stato

Ambasciatore d’Italia a Teheran (agosto 2008-
gennaio 2013) e a Pechino (gennaio 2013-maggio
2015)
TITLE: Iran and the Greater Middle East: Between Regional Networks and Great
Powers
ABSTRACT: The Middle East puzzle, between precarious alliances and historic re-
sentments, is often combined with illogical behaviors. The repercussions of a dark per-
spective of the Kurdish question is an additional component of the regional riddle.
The long-standing unsettled Palestinian issue keeps influencing the whole regional
frame. Identity factors are intertwined in a strong religious sentiment, but religion
only prevails in certain circumstances, since ethnic belonging, cultural heritage and
economic interests play a complex role in defining relations and conflicts. The absence
of life prospects, a weak education system and poor social conditions as root causes of
the regional disasters. In this framework, Europe keeps a poor political profile. While
the Gulf countries wave between religious extremism, western standards and economic
interests; after the nuclear deal Iran is more at ease with the West. Nevertheless, its
international position remains unstable. For this reason, Tehran intends to strengthen
its comparative advantage with Russia and China, emphasizing a variety of assets.
In domestic affairs, Iran’s ruling leadership is fighting a lost battle, trying to contain
the inevitable encounter between Iran and Modernity, and therefore the West. The
February 2016 Iranian elections – Parliament and Assembly of Experts – are to be
judged with local parameters and placed in the domestic context, if we are to avoid
misunderstandings and a false illustration of unreasonable perspectives.
KEYWORDS: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
IL GROVIGLIO VICINORIENTALE
u n’accorta attenzione alla nozione di complessità consiglia mas-

sima cautela quando si tenta un’analisi della scena vicinorientale,
dove sedimentazioni storiche e interessi contingenti si mesco-
lano con sovrastrutture religiose, arretratezza culturale, assenza di pro-
spettive di vita e lavoro per popolazioni giovani e frustrate. Deve a questo
aggiungersi un acuto, diffuso risentimento contro l’occidente che af-
fonda le sue radici in secoli di relazioni turbolente con l’europa e, più di
recente, con gli Stati uniti. Se poi si considera l’opacità delle informa-
zioni di cui disponiamo in un contesto fluido e mediaticamente mani-
polato, il quadro diviene davvero opaco, rendendo difficile giungere a
qualche plausibile conclusione. al più, dunque, si tenteranno qui alcune
illustrazioni di scenario e qualche congettura, con un cauto sguardo oltre
l’orizzonte.
Israele è contro i palestinesi, più contro hamas (sunnita) che contro
l’autorità nazionale Palestinese (anP), e in ogni caso contro lo spettro
di uno Stato Palestinese indipendente. Israele è anche nemico di hez-
bollah, che gode invece del pieno sostegno dell’Iran. l’Iran finanzia ha-
mas (la quale tuttavia riceve più aiuti dalle monarchie sunnite che da te-
156 heran) e appoggia al-asad, il quale è oggi avversato da hamas, che sostiene
la cosiddetta opposizione moderata siriana; assistita e finanziata dai paesi
del Golfo e dall’arabia Saudita (aS), oltre che – in forma oggi incerta e
intermittente – da Stati uniti e alleati. l’egitto governato dal generale
al-Sisi è a favore dell’anP, ma non di hamas, e mantiene relazioni di
buon vicinato con Israele. hamas e Iraq sono entrambi contro Israele,
ma non hanno buone relazioni tra di loro. anP e hamas si confrontano
a Gaza, ma sono uniti (seppure con strategie diverse) contro Israele. la
turchia sostiene la causa di hamas, eppure ha ristabilito rapporti politici
con Israele dopo l’episodio della Mavi Marmara nel 2010.
hezbollah ha pessime relazioni con i paesi sunniti, è alleato dell’Iran
e della Siria governata dalla minoranza sciita/alawita (una minoranza
questa che, secondo una certa dottrina mussulmana – un po’ come i
Drusi libanesi – non sarebbe nemmeno mussulmana).
la Siria è alleata di Iran e Iraq (per ragioni strategiche e la comune
fede sciita) e ha buone relazioni con l’anP. l’Iraq a sua volta è nemico
dell’aS, ma amico dell’egitto di al-Sisi, che ha invece ottimi rapporti
con Riad. al-Sisi, come i suoi predecessori, ha qualche problema con
l’Iran, plaude alla rivolta contro al-asad, ma rimane guardingo nei riguardi
della turchia, con la quale compete per la supremazia regionale. l’aS è
ai ferri corti con Siria, Iran, Iraq ed hezbollah, ha un rapporto pragmatico
con Israele e relazioni distese, ma sempre sospettose, con la turchia.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
IRAN E GRANDE MEDIO ORIENTE: TRA INTRECCI REGIONALI E GRANDI POTENZE
l’aS appoggia hamas ma è nemica dei fratelli Mussulmani, i quali – pur

con agende nazionali diverse – di hamas sono tutti alleati.
l’Iran, alleato di al-asad e di hezbollah, ha relazioni accettabili
con al-Sisi (assai guardingo nei riguardi di hezbollah) e appoggia hamas,
anche se un po’ meno da quando quest’ultima ha preso le distanze da al-
asad. l’Iran inoltre – visto con sospetto da tutti i paesi del Golfo – so-
stiene gli houti (sciiti) nello yemen, paese questo invaso dall’aS senza
mandato delle nazioni unite, con l’aiuto finanziario delle monarchie
del Golfo e l’avallo politico americano. la turchia è nemica di al-asad,
che l’Iran beninteso sostiene, eppure turchia e Iran mantengono una
solida intesa, per ragioni economiche (il gas iraniano) e per la condivisione
delle medesime preoccupazioni nei riguardi dei curdi (potenzialmente
destabilizzanti per entrambi).
I curdi iracheni sono autosufficienti (grazie ai Peshmerga) e com-
battono l’Isis in Siria, ma per ankara sono un pericoloso magnete nei ri-
guardi del PKK, il Partito curdo dei lavoratori nemico del nazionalismo
turco monoetnico. Per ragioni etniche, i curdi iracheni, sunniti, sono
contro gli arabi iracheni sia sunniti che, per ragioni etniche e religiose
insieme, sciiti. In Iraq, almeno per il momento, prevale l’appartenenza
etnica su quella religiosa. finora, in Iran era prevalsa l’appartenenza re-
ligiosa su quella entica: i curdi iraniani, un po’ sunniti e un po’ sciiti, che
sembravano silenti, hanno iniziato anch’essi, seguendo il fiume carsico
delle spinte destabilizzanti, a manifestare le loro inquietudini nel Kurdi-
157
stan iraniano con attacchi ai Pasdaran e conseguente dura repressione.
tutti – almeno sulla carta – sono nemici dell’Isis, ma aS e altri
paesi del Golfo con svariate ambiguità, tra acquisti di petrolio spot e fi-
nanziamenti occulti al califfato. anche ankara – sempre sulla carta –
combatte l’Isis, ma si preoccupa soprattutto dello spettro di un possibile
Kurdistan siriano, che – insieme a quello turco, quello iracheno e forse
quello iraniano – potrebbe aprire un giorno uno scenario inquietante
per la stabilità etnica di questa turchia. Per erdoğan, e le forze conserva-
trici/religiose che egli rappresenta, sarebbe esiziale riconoscere rappre-
sentanza politica ad una minoranza che costituisce il 20/25% della po-
polazione del paese, perché ciò equivarrebbe ad accettare di por fine ad
un patologico panturchismo in ritardo con la storia.
Sul piano religioso, i sunniti – fieri nemici degli sciiti, siano essi ira-
niani/duodecimani, alawiti, ismailiti o altro – sono però inquieti anche
al loro interno: wahabiti contro salafiti, a fasi alterne e a seconda dei
contesti; al-Qaeda contro molti governi sunniti; fratelli mussulmani con-
tro altri atelli e contro wahabiti; e case regnanti (sunnite) contro chiun-
que attenti alla stabilità dei loro regni, a prescindere dalla fede religiosa.
hezbollah è un gruppo terrorista per gli americani, che però distin-
guono il braccio militare da quello politico, avendo un ambasciatore
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
accreditato in libano, dove il Partito di Dio è al governo con sunniti,

drusi e cristiani. hezbollah non è però un gruppo terrorista per gli
europei e, curiosamente, nemmeno per la turchia, che ne apprezza alcune
caratteristiche in politica interna e di pressione costante su Israele.
Gli Stati uniti sono contro Isis, al-Qaeda, hamas e hezbollah, ma
finanziano il libano – dove hezbollah è al governo – perché quel paese
(hezbollah tuttavia, non l’esercito libanese, per quanto è dato sapere)
combatte Isis e al-Qaeda, e per semplice pragmatismo. Gli Stati uniti ri-
mangono diffidenti nei riguardi dell’Iran – nonostante l’accordo nucleare,
e in attesa del prossimo inquilino della casa Bianca – e sono nemici di
al-asad, ma sostengono al-Sisi (assai cauto verso i turchi, alleati degli
americani) e sono alleati dell’Iraq, che però è amico di Siria, Iran ed
hezbollah (tutti e tre ostili agli americani). Gli Stati uniti sono i principali
sponsor politici e militari di Israele, ma finanziano anche l’anP che si
contrappone ad Israele e sono amici dell’aS che a sua volta è nemica del-
l’Iraq (sostenuta dagli americani) e dalla quale provengono finanziamenti
più o meno occulti a talebani, al-Qaeda e Isis.
Gli Stati uniti hanno contestato all’aviazione russa di aver colpito
l’opposizione siriana assai più dell’Isis, ma la medesima attenzione non
viene da essi riservata ai curdi siriani – bersagli di attacchi aerei e terrestri
158 da parte di ankara –, i quali combattono per la loro libertà allo stesso
tempo contro al-asad, contro Isis e contro le incursioni turche. l’evolu-
zione del quadro vicinorientale ha travolto l’amicizia tra Mosca ed ankara
(sebbene ora, dopo il fallito golpe di luglio, sembra farsi luce l’ennesimo
ribaltamento di alleanze), che era stata edificata su basi solide, tra lotta
al terrorismo e comuni interessi energetici. come altrove, anche per la
turchia le priorità di politica interna – il contenimento dell’avanzata
curda – determinano le scelte di politica internazionale. nell’intreccio
di strategie, i turchi erano stati arruolati da Washington tra le truppe di
contenimento della Russia di Putin, divenendo funzionali – insieme alla
vicenda ucraina – per dissipare l’incubo americano di un avvicinamento
strategico tra Russia ed europa. Gli effetti del fallito golpe estivo contro
erdoğan si faranno sentire, in termini che non possiamo ancora valutare,
anche su tali risvolti.
Se alle contorsioni di alleanze e ostilità dei paesi/gruppi politici
sopra menzionati dovessimo aggiungere l’ottica e gli interessi di libano,
afghanistan, Giordania, da una parte, e paesi minori del Golfo, dall’altra,
il quadro si trasformerebbe in un cruciverba senza soluzione.
In tale intreccio, dunque, mobile e confuso, non è facile avvistare il
bandolo della matassa. alleanze ed ostilità si combinano talora in forma
indecifrabile agli stessi protagonisti, e soprattutto agli occhi di chi avrebbe
la responsabilità di disegnare un possibile percorso d’uscita.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
Il grafico sottostante mostra le relazioni di amicizia/vicinanza ovvero

di ostilità/distanza tra i principali paesi e gruppi politici/militari nel vi-
cino oriente. I cerchi rivolti a sinistra indicano ostilità, quelli a destra
alleanza, mentre i centrati relazioni complicate. come si vede, i cerchi
rivolti a sinistra sono i più diffusi. l’ostilità prevale dunque di netto sulle
ragioni della convivenza. che sia essa di stampo politico, etnico o reli-
gioso, si tratta di una scena che si nutre di tanta miseria e scarse prospettive
di vita.
159
BY JOSHUA KEATING AND CHRIS KIRK
I fattori identitari – come in altri teatri di crisi – sono quelli di sem-

pre: lingua, etnia, colore della pelle, religione (e al suo interno le sotto-
chiese di riferimento), e si sommano a interessi politici ed economici,
locali e di paesi terzi, interni ed esterni alla regione. a seconda dei luoghi,
momenti o personalità coinvolte, alcuni di tali fattori prevalgono su altri.
la religione – che per sua natura è ovunque messaggera di orizzonti
messianici – occupa un posto centrale nelle identità vicinorientali, vittima
e insieme protagonista di estremismi, fanatismi, arretratezze culturali ed
esegesi teologiche anti-moderne, su cui prosperano i privilegi delle ri-
spettive gerarchie ecclesiastiche. Raramente si affianca a tale scenario
un’agenda rivendicativa di carattere sociale, in una regione dove la co-
scienza di classe (si direbbe nel lessico marxiano occidentale) è per varie
ragioni scarsa o del tutto assente. Solo condizioni sociali diverse, un ac-
celerato miglioramento dell’istruzione e la riconquistata centralità di
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
una politica inclusiva – temi sui quali la qualità dell’azione di governi

locali, comunità internazionale e gerarchie religiose hanno ampi margini
di miglioramento – potrebbero portare risultati meno precari di quelli
che oggi possiamo ragionevolmente sperare.
negli ultimi decenni, la prassi della destabilizzazione che l’occidente
ha de facto privilegiato non ha portato i risultati sperati, aggravando di-
visioni e conflitti. la soluzione politica rimane dunque l’unica percorri-
bile. Il terrorismo, figlio diretto o indiretto di tale intelaiatura, è un fe-
nomeno criminale che affonda le radici in un quadro di frustrazioni e
rivendicazioni sociali e politiche, nodi che occorre affrontare con coraggio
se vogliamo sperare di sradicarne la piaga una volta per tutte. Prevenire e
colpire i terroristi con maggiore efficienza, come pure occorre fare, non
è sufficiente.
IRAN, DOSSIER NUCLEARE ED EVOLUZIONI POLITICHE
negli anni recenti, in parallelo con il dipanarsi degli eventi che

hanno dato vita alla primavera araba, teheran aveva cercato di proiettare
l’immagine di una nazione estranea alle turbolenze che colpivano altre
nazioni vicinorientali; vale a dire di un paese forte e stabile, seppure por-
tatore di posizioni critiche dell’occidente e guardingo verso i paesi
160 arabo-sunniti. l’obiettivo principale, rimasto sulla carta per le troppe
incoerenze domestiche, era quello di recuperare qualche spazio d’azione
in attesa di uscire dall’isolamento nel quale la questione nucleare l’aveva
relegata.
Sono trascorsi pochi anni, e lo scenario che abbiamo di fronte è
assai diverso da quello sognato dal giovane ambulante tunisino, Mohamed
Bouazizi, che nel dicembre 2010 aveva innescato con il suo sacrificio la
miccia della primavera araba. Da allora, abbiamo assistito ad una frenetica
accelerazione degli eventi, tra cui l’imporsi di un soggetto inedito, il c.d.
califfato, cessioni di sovranità in Siria e in Iraq, la metamorfosi turca,
l’esordio militare russo, qualche diversa priorità americana, lo sgretola-
mento della libia – esiziale quest’ultimo agli interessi italiani, frutto di
avventurismo neo-coloniale e velleità di multinazionali petrolifere – cui
si aggiunge la drammatica latitanza politica dell’europa. Qualche fatto
nuovo dunque, cresciuto però su paludi preesistenti.
Dopo l’accordo nucleare, l’Iran guadagna oggi sulla scena interna-
zionale uno sguardo diverso, in campo economico e politico. va detto
qui che i termini dell’accordo siglato nel luglio 2015 con il Gruppo 5+1
(i cinque membri del consiglio di Sicurezza delle n.u., più la Germania)
sono da considerarsi per teheran tutt’altro che una capitolazione. Il
lungo negoziato con il Gruppo, del quale gli americani hanno sempre
avuto la guida, si è sbloccato quando Washington ha accolto la condizione
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
che teheran aveva stimato sin dall’inizio irrinunciabile, vale a dire il

diritto a sviluppare il nucleare civile (ricerca e controllo del ciclo del
combustibile). Insieme alla parità di trattamento in seno al trattato di
non Proliferazione (tnP) di cui è parte, e alla rimozione delle sanzioni,
l’Iran ha in tal modo incamerato un riconoscimento dal valore politico
ancora maggiore, vale a dire il reingresso nel consesso internazionale,
che dà spazio ad una dimensione politica internazionale prima fortemente
compressa, aprendo altresì a nuove prospettive, tra cui la possibilità – un
giorno forse non così lontano – di accedere all’organizzazione Mondiale
del commercio, un’adesione questa di grande valenza economico-stra-
tegica.
In politica interna, le elezioni del febbraio 2016 sembrano aver con-
segnato ai moderati-riformisti (ma su questo è lecito qualche dubbio,
poiché molti tra questi fanno fatica ad aderire a tale definizione, e non
solo secondo parametri europei) la maggioranza assoluta dei seggi del-
l’assemblea degli esperti, 54 su 88. almeno sulla carta – va ricordato
che il Sistema di Potere possiede in Iran strumenti pressoché infiniti per
ottenere obbedienza – tale assemblea avrà il compito di eleggere la
Guida Suprema, in caso di scomparsa di ali Khamenei nei prossimi otto
anni. la medesima coalizione moderata-riformista ha conquistato, insieme
ai cosiddetti indipendenti, anche la maggioranza relativa in Parlamento
(200 seggi su un totale di 290). In Iran il Parlamento – è bene precisare
– non dispone di pieni poteri legislativi come nei sistemi occidentali,
161
poiché le leggi da esso approvate devono passare al vaglio religioso e co-
stituzionale dei 12 membri del consiglio dei Guardiani (sei ùlama no-
minati dalla Guida Suprema e sei costituzionalisti nominati dal Potere
Giudiziario, questi ultimi con il via libera del Parlamento).
tali risultati e un’apparente postura più distesa – in ragione del per-
cepito abbandono della strategia del regime change da parte americana –
da parte del potere militare/religioso che governa i gangli del paese hanno
ravvivato la fiaccola della speranza, anche se pochi scommettono che
cambierà davvero qualcosa nella vita quotidiana della popolazione, in
particolare quella dei giovani. le passate disillusioni e le voci provenienti
dalla società suggeriscono infatti ampie riserve sulle prospettive di un
cambiamento reale, poiché la gestione del paese continua a basarsi pre-
valentemente sull’esercizio della forza, e assai poco sul consenso del po-
polo o lo Stato di Diritto.
Sul piano internazionale non si intravvedono per il momento colpi
di scena. È verosimile che il sistema di potere iraniano voglia valutare gli
effetti dell’accordo nucleare insieme all’evoluzione della scena regionale,
misurando sino a che punto le aperture di obama saranno condivise
fino in fondo dagli apparati politici, militari ed economici americani nel
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
loro complesso, e monitorando il rischio di possibili colpi di scena, una

volta che alla casa Bianca si sarà insediato un nuovo inquilino.
l’accordo nucleare e il doppio successo elettorale dei moderati-ri-
formisti – ancora una volta la massima cautela è d’obbligo – potrebbero
indicare un cambiamento di priorità in seno al potere sciita/militare del
paese, consentendo così alle forze moderate che hanno lavorato per la ri-
mozione delle sanzioni di guadagnare influenza. tuttavia, i perenni tor-
menti del clero radicale e dei Guardiani della Rivoluzione sui rischi di
cedimento ai valori di vita occidentali (etici e/o politici) rimangono una
barriera formidabile, che non autorizza facili entusiasmi e che potrebbe
opporsi ancora a lungo alle spinte che gli avvenimenti sembrano aver
impresso alla storia del paese. In Iran, l’orologio del tempo si è rimesso
in moto, ma nessuno è in grado di anticiparne i capricci. l’incontro tra
Iran e modernità – insieme a quello tra Iran e globalizzazione – appare
inevitabile, nonostante prevedibili colpi di coda. I vantaggi per la regione
e la comunità internazionale sono evidenti (specie per l’europa). Il valore
della stabilità in un paese, anche quando si confronta con sussulti e ri-
baltamenti, è enorme, come si può vedere – in negativo – in Siria e nord
africa.
162 LA SCENA INTERNAZIONALE
Sulla scena internazionale teheran è dunque determinata a ricon-

quistare un ruolo propulsivo e un’identità rispettata, sebbene la strada
da percorrere sia tutt’altro che agevole.
Gettiamo uno sguardo sui paesi o organizzazioni politiche su cui
teheran può oggi ragionevolmente contare nella sua azione esterna. la
Siria, in primis, ma la logica va qui rovesciata: è Damasco ad aver bisogno
di teheran, e non l’inverso, nonostante un certo interesse di teheran ad
affacciarsi sul Mediterraneo e garantire sostegno politico/militare al Par-
tito di Dio in libano (obiettivo questo più rilevante del primo). la Siria
è inoltre avvolta in una tempesta di destrutturazione, alla quale nessuno
sa bene come e quando si possa mettere fine. a loro volta, e a dispetto di
alcune semplificazioni, hezbollah e hamas – in specie quest’ultima –
fanno riferimento ad una agenda che non ne autorizza l’automatico alli-
neamento alle priorità della Repubblica Islamica. viene poi l’Iraq, a
maggioranza sciita ma araba – nella guerra degli anni ’80, l’appartenenza
etnica era prevalsa sulla comune fede sciita – con una componente curda,
messaggera di un insidioso contagio anche per teheran, un contagio per
ora contenuto sotto una sostanziale (seppure inquieta) stabilità. a loro
volta, i rapporti tra Iran e turchia rimangono solidi, sebbene oscillanti
su interessi energetici (ankara ha bisogno di gas, oggi più di ieri alla luce
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
dei volatili rapporti con Mosca), nemici comuni, i soliti curdi, e amici
diversi, al-asad/Stati uniti.
Qualora una diversa dinamica della questione palestinese portasse
ad uno storico riavvicinamento tra Israele e mondo arabo, verrebbe meno
una delle ragioni profonde di contrapposizione tra quest’ultimo e l’oc-
cidente, si ridurrebbero risentimento e fanatismo religioso e si darebbe
infine spazio ad una nuova inquadratura anche dei rapporti tra Israele e
Iran, tenendo conto che teheran ha dichiarato di volersi allineare alle
decisioni che fossero adottate dal popolo palestinese. Se tale evoluzione
portasse dunque alla pace tra Israele e palestinesi, l’Iran vedrebbe evapo-
rare l’intento di diventare un giorno la guida politica del mondo mus-
sulmano vicinorientale, un intento per la verità velleitario quanto mai
agli occhi di popolazioni e paesi in maggioranza sunniti, ma pur sempre
segretamente coltivato.
vengono poi Russia e cina, due potenze tuttavia portatrici di inte-
ressi strategici extra-regionali, e per di più percepite dall’Iran nella loro
storica propensione all’infedeltà (la prima) e al cinismo (la seconda). Se
oggi un raccordo strategico con Mosca e Pechino è giudicato funzionale
alla visione iraniana, esso non è però privo di apprensioni. Ma la storia
evolve, ed oggi le relazioni di teheran con Mosca e Pechino sono sospinte
da un forte vento di realpolitik, centrato su un pragmatismo che sfida an-
che quello cinese, notoriamente il più sorprendente al mondo. l’orizzonte
che sembra accomunare i tre paesi è quello di contenere la pervasività
163
americana, percepita da tutti, seppure per ragioni diverse, come ostilità
strategica: l’Iran rimane esposto alle pressioni americane, oggi non più
in direzione di un regime change, ma pur sempre con finalità di conteni-
mento delle pretese di leadership politico-religiosa regionale, che infa-
stidiscono le monarchie sunnite alleate di Washington e interferiscono
con gli interessi del principale alleato americano, Israele, e con l’irrisolta
questione palestinese. l’Iran non potrà sottrarsi del tutto al ruolo di ne-
mico strumentale, servito per rinviare sine die la soluzione della questione
palestinese, vera priorità di Israele. la cina tocca a sua volta con mano il
peso di un containment di stampo antisovietico, mentre la Russia deve
fare i conti con l’incubo americano di un potenziale rapprochement
storico con l’europa. Sebbene le forze in campo non siano confrontabili,
l’Iran non sarà però un boccone scontato per i due colossi euroasiatici,
che dovranno vincere la diffidenza iraniana di aver a che fare con alleati
disinvolti e tendenti alla strumentalizzazione. Qualcosa potrebbe cam-
biare – aspettiamo di disporre di analisi più accurate in proposito – se e
quando, con il nodo nucleare ormai sciolto, teheran venisse accolta a
pieno titolo nella Sco (Shanghai cooperation organization). Pechino
aveva sinora posto il veto, preoccupata di irritare senza vantaggi di ritorno
un partner economico fondamentale come gli Stati uniti. Molti reputano
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
che sarà difficile alla Sco non cedere alla tentazione di allargare le com-
petenze all’area politico-militare, ciò che la renderebbe con il tempo una
sorta di nato euroasiatica, consolidando in una struttura strategica
quelle cointeressenze di natura politico-economica che Mosca e Pechino
hanno raccolto come dono inatteso dalla pessima gestione occidentale
della crisi ucraina.
vediamo ora da vicino alcuni aspetti delle relazioni Iran-cina/Rus-
sia.
Iran-Cina
la cina è vista da teheran come un paese lontano, a-religioso e con

un’ideologia politica antitetica all’ideale teocratico sciita. In generale il
mondo cinese suscita in Iran scarsa empatia, oltre che inquietudine sul
piano economico e industriale.
Pechino, ciononostante, è destinata a ricoprire un rilievo crescente
per teheran, che su di essa, oltre che sulla Russia, intende puntare per ri-
durre il perimetro di un isolamento che nemmeno l’accordo nucleare
consente di superare a sufficienza. le sanzioni nucleari americane ver-
ranno tolte, per di più con limitazioni e tentennamenti, ma non quelle
legate alle accuse di terrorismo e di violazione dei diritti umani; e dunque
164 le restrizioni principali sembrano destinate a protrarsi almeno fino al-
l’insediamento del prossimo presidente americano. a teheran non sfug-
gono gli ostacoli da superare per una piena normalizzazione dei rapporti
con l’occidente, tenendo conto della posizione di oggettiva fragilità
nella quale continua a trovarsi sotto diversi aspetti.
teheran parte dal convincimento che, sebbene oggi il mondo sembra
annegare nel petrolio, l’insaziabile sete cinese di energia è un fattore de-
stinato a protrarsi nel tempo, e la proverbiale preveggenza di Pechino
non si farà fuorviare da fattori passeggeri, quali una minore crescita
globale o un eccesso di petrolio/gas sui mercati, destinato presto a rien-
trare. negli anni recenti – incurante delle sanzioni americane che colpi-
vano chiunque facesse affari con teheran e avesse interessi in america –
la cina acquistava in Iran il 15% del suo import petrolifero, ed era di-
ventato il grande beneficiario nel vuoto lasciato dalle imprese occidentali.
Il commercio tra i due paesi sfiora oggi i 50 miliardi di dollari, è in forte
crescita e bilanciato da ingenti importazioni di prodotti cinesi. Per la
cina uno scenario ideale. nella sua visita a teheran nel gennaio scorso,
Xi Jinping e il suo omologo Rouhani si sono impegnati a portare l’inter-
scambio cina-Iran a 600 miliardi dollari in 10 anni, traguardo questo
che fa impallidire i 7 miliardi che Roma e teheran, nel corso della visita
in Italia del Presidente iraniano Rouhani il 25 gennaio scorso, hanno
affermato di voler raggiungere entro 5 anni.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
I due paesi si sono anche impegnati a promuovere un forte flusso di

investimenti reciproci nei trasporti, porti, energia, industria e servizi, te-
nendo conto che le imprese cinesi – diversamente da quelle europee –
sono accompagnate in forma efficiente dal loro governo e sono in grado
di affiancare alle proposte adeguati finanziamenti, battendo così la con-
correnza delle imprese europee, pur tecnologicamente superiori.
le aziende petrolifere cinesi – cnPc, cnooc e SInoPec –
hanno avviato negli anni progetti per decine di miliardi di dollari, sosti-
tuendosi ai paesi bloccati dalle sanzioni, e approfittando del trattamento
che gli iraniani hanno loro riservato. In futuro, è da tener presente, non
sarà scontato per le società europee recuperare il terreno perduto contro
la concorrenza cinese.
che sia l’Iran a giocare la carta cinese a sostegno dei suoi interessi
strategici, o la cina a giocare quella iraniana nel dialogo geo-politico
con Washington (è verosimile che i due scenari corrano paralleli), rimane
indubbio che i rapporti tra i due paesi presentino oggettive convergenze.
teheran è convinta che gli atout (energia, collocazione geo-politica)
di cui dispone possiedono una forza capace di vincere anche la tradizionale
diffidenza di Pechino ad avventurarsi su teatri insidiosi come il vicino
oriente. una volta consolidata la reciproca fiducia costruita durante gli
anni delle sanzioni (a teheran erano chiari i limiti della diplomazia cinese
per gli interessi incrociati con gli Stati uniti), la partita politica potrà
essere giocata tra alleati – pur se con peso politico diverso – più che tra
165
concorrenti, in particolare la sfera multilaterale, a sua volta non limitata
allo Sco.
nel corso del negoziato nucleare, la cina aveva condiviso con gli
altri paesi del Gruppo 5+1 la necessità di contenere le ambizioni nucleari
iraniane, perché ciò avrebbe potuto influire sugli equilibri, in specie i
fondamentali rapporti economici con l’occidente. la cina tuttavia non
ha mai attribuito alcun connotato di urgenza al programma nucleare
iraniano, e non ha mai ritenuto che la tecnologia a disposizione di teheran
fosse davvero in grado di produrre l’arma atomica in tempi brevi, o senza
che gli ispettori dell’aiea ne venissero a conoscenza con ampio anticipo.
teheran ritiene che a Pechino prevalga una scuola di pensiero che
vede gli Stati uniti poco propensi a risolvere le problematiche della re-
gione con mezzi pacifici, quanto invece ad alimentare tensioni e conflitti,
con il fine di perpetuare il loro dominio, ostacolando inoltre l’accesso
cinese alle fonti di energia per rallentare quanto possibile l’ascesa della
cina, considerata la sola potenza in grado di sfidare l’egemonia ameri-
cana.
Pechino inoltre ha sempre ritenuto che la responsabilità storica del
dossier iraniano fosse da attribuire agli Stati uniti, ai quali incombeva
dunque l’onere di trovare una via d’uscita, senza farne ricadere i costi
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
sulla cina. Pechino condivide con teheran l’addebito all’occidente di

praticare una politica di due pesi e due misure, in tema non solo di diritti
umani ma anche di proliferazione nucleare, acquiescente nei riguardi di
Israele – unico paese della regione in possesso di armi nucleari, fuori dal
tnP e inadempiente verso numerose risoluzioni cdS – e incoerente,
come nel caso dell’India – che con un accordo del 2008 con gli Stati
uniti, diviene l’unico paese non membro del tnP, e con armi nucleari
dichiarate, ad accedere alla tecnologia civile di paesi membri –; confer-
mando così che nemmeno un accordo internazionale del calibro del
tnP è in grado di ostacolare gli interessi fondamentali delle grandi po-
tenze.
Sebbene i nodi della politica estera di teheran si collochino sul
fronte occidentale del suo quadrante geografico, per Pechino l’Iran
occupa una posizione di rilievo anche nella sua proiezione centro-asiatica.
la strategia cinese della nuova via della Seta (una cintura, una strada),
che annuncia miliardi di investimenti per lo sviluppo di comunicazioni
e trasporti tra la cina e i territori centroasiatici, assegna un ruolo di qual-
che rilievo anche all’Iran.
tra cina, Russia e Stati uniti, la partita politica iraniana vede l’eu-
ropa giocare un ruolo trascurabile, mero territorio con cui fare affari, e
solo fin quando non vi sia necessità di affiancamento politico. Per Pechino
166 vale lo scoraggiante giudizio di irrilevanza verso un’europa percepita
(Brexit o meno) come costola afona dell’egemonismo americano (a sua
volta in relativo declino) e inspiegabilmente latitante di fronte alla ne-
cessità di tutela dei suoi stessi interessi.
Iran-Russia
nei riguardi della Russia, gli iraniani sono fiduciosi ma rimangono

circospetti, sia per le depredazioni territoriali del passato che per le gira-
volte più recenti: ne è esempio eloquente il blocco/sblocco del contratto
sul sistema difensivo antimissile S-300, che nell’evolversi del negoziato
nucleare ha seguito il destino dell’interazione geopolitica tra Mosca e
Washington, e non di una coerente amicizia nei riguardi di teheran.
nelle trame di un mondo non più bipolare – e tantomeno unipolare,
sebbene gli Stati uniti vi conservino la supremazia militare, politica ed
economica – anche i rapporti Iran-Russia acquistano una colorazione
che trascende la contingenza regionale, dipanandosi nelle praterie della
geopolitica planetaria. la molteplicità degli interessi in gioco si confronta
con le variabili domestiche in una dimensione ultra-regionale, infitten-
done le trame.
Se come sopra menzionato l’Iran è paese rilevante per la cina anche
nella sua proiezione centroasiatica, tale peculiarità è ancor più tale per la
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
Russia. le relazioni bilaterali con quest’ultima sono state storicamente

problematiche, attraversate da conflitti frequenti e precarie riappacifica-
zioni. tuttavia, se è vero che esistono solo interessi eterni, non amici eterni,
possiamo allora aggiungere che nemmeno i nemici sono destinati ad essere
eterni. e dunque oggi teheran ritiene che vi siano tutte le condizioni per
costruire con Mosca un dialogo solido, nuovo rispetto al passato.
la complementarità economica ed energetica che esiste con Pechino
soffre tuttavia con Mosca di una forte attenuazione. entrambi i paesi
sono ricchi di petrolio e gas: l’Iran il primo al mondo per riserve cumulate
di tali risorse, la Russia il secondo, a poca distanza. Quest’ultimo – e
Mosca l’ha bene a mente – è destinato a diventare il principale concor-
rente energetico in europa, con la prospettiva futura di vendere ai paesi
europei rilevanti quantitativi di gas in alternativa a quello russo. un ipo-
tetico cartello del gas che qualcuno aveva in passato immaginato è risultato
per svariate ragioni di difficile attuazione.
Quanto al dossier nucleare, un Iran con l’arma atomica avrebbe mi-
nato la cornice securitaria di Mosca (proliferazione, vicinanza geografica,
riduzione dell’oligopolio dei paesi nucleari, ...), accrescendo le già vive
preoccupazioni verso le cosiddette potenze nucleari improprie, vale a
dire India, Pakistan, corea del nord e Israele. È stata questa una delle
ragioni per l’adesione russa ai dieci anni di politica sanzionatoria anti-
iraniana in consiglio di Sicurezza. nemmeno Mosca tuttavia, come Pe-
chino, ha mai attribuito a questo dossier un carattere di urgenza o creduto
167
che vi fossero seri rischi di proliferazione, alla luce tra l’altro delle infor-
mazioni che i tecnici russi che hanno lavorato per anni alla centrale nu-
cleare di Bushehr erano in grado di raccogliere.
D’altro canto, un conflitto tra Iran ed occidente – che, nonostante
il lessico ansiogeno di Israele, non è stato mai all’ordine del giorno –
avrebbe messo a repentaglio sicurezza e interessi della Russia, accendendo
di riflesso le minoranze islamiche delle sue repubbliche meridionali e
fornendo ulteriore combustibile alle mire espansionistiche americane
nell’area.
Per Mosca la soluzione dell’intrico vicinorientale richiede pragma-
tismo costruttivo, nel quale dovrebbe trovar posto – in un futuro per ora
imprevedibile – anche il riconoscimento iraniano all’esistenza dello Stato
ebraico. Il sorgere di uno Stato Palestinese indipendente ne sarebbe be-
ninteso la condizione necessaria. un processo questo che andrà accom-
pagnato, quando ne emergeranno le condizioni, da un’azione coraggiosa
da parte dei principali attori internazionali.
Sempre per Mosca, inoltre, un Iran passivamente ri-occidentalizzato
rappresenterebbe un deficit di influenza geopolitica che si rifletterebbe
sulla sua presenza nel vicino oriente, come mostra l’evoluzione degli
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
eventi in Siria e il conflitto contro Daesh, e nell’insieme delle relazioni

geo-strategiche tra Russia e Stati uniti.
Gli altri
In tale cornice, e alla luce della valenza strategica delle relazioni in

seno al trinomio usa-cina-Russia, non si può non riflettere mestamente
sulla marginalità dell’europa (anche quella residuale di stampo nazionale
delle c.d. potenze nucleari minori, Regno unito e francia), profondamente
divisa, centrata sugli interessi dei paesi nordici, destinata a giocare al
massimo un ruolo di natura economica, ancillare agli interessi americani
e senza alcuna forza di influire su dinamiche che hanno un impatto cen-
trale sulla stabilità del nostro continente, come ad esempio i flussi inar-
restabili di immigrazione provenienti dal vicino oriente e nord africa.
teheran cercherà di bilanciare con l’ue l’attivismo economico-in-
dustriale un po’ ingombrate delle imprese cinesi, mentre con Mosca vorrà
verificare la tenuta dei rapporti bilaterali alla luce della prospettiva di
esportazione in europa di gas iraniano (e/o turkmeno, che deve neces-
sariamente transitare sul suolo iraniano, ovvero sul caspio ma pur sempre
con il via libera russo/iraniano) e dei benefici derivanti dai lucrosi contratti
sul nucleare civile.
168 l’accordo politico con gli Stati uniti ha sbloccato il dossier nucleare,
aprendo la strada a nuovi orizzonti tra Iran ed occidente, un percorso
che appena alcuni anni orsono sembrava utopico, e che va attribuito ad
una rara congiunzione siderale, tra una nuova percezione degli interessi
emergenti nei due campi e personalità originali come quelle di obama e
Rouhani, ciascuno alle prese con le proprie difficili constituencies. Per
convertire questo potenziale in una vera riappacificazione dovranno però
verificarsi alcune condizioni. la prima è legata alla capacità di ciascuno
dei due fronti di contenere i colpi di coda dei rispettivi settori variamente
impensieriti dalle prospettive di riavvicinamento. In Iran, si tratta come
abbiamo visto delle ali estreme dei Guardiani della Rivoluzione (più de-
filati i militari di artesh) e della gerarchia sciita radicale, minoritaria ma
cruciale. In america, oltre alle lobby pro-Israele – sempre al lavoro –, si
tratta del settore militare-industriale e di quelle componenti occulte che
perseguono la strategia del caos, dividendo amici e nemici per conservare
quanto possibile lo status di unica superpotenza mondiale.
la logica suggerisce che Stati uniti ed europa (il peso politico del-
l’ue, come abbiamo visto, rasenta oggi lo zero) trarrebbero enormi be-
nefici da un’intesa strategica con teheran, capitale di un mercato di 80
milioni di consumatori, in gran parte giovani e affamati di occidente,
ma anche prezioso alleato contro le insidie del mondo arabo-sunnita,
decisivamente più irrequieto di quello sciita. Sinora tale varco è stato at-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
traversato solo a metà. Per il momento Washington non sembra manife-

stare la volontà di portare a compimento tale percorso. la prospettiva di
un reset globale (grand bargain), che a determinate condizioni anche te-
heran potrebbe accettare, è ostacolata dai legami tra Washington e le
monarchie/dittature sunnite della regione (arabia Saudita in primis) e
dallo strabismo sull’irrisolto impasse palestinese, bloccato dagli interessi
del suo principale alleato regionale, Israele; interessi che non si sovrap-
pongono completamente. I trascorsi storici hanno combinato aspetti di
politica estera, i rapporti Washington-teheran, con altri di politica interna
americana, dove le lobby israeliane sono in grado di condizionare – at-
traverso aIPac, intellettuali, media (ne controllerebbero il 40%) e ap-
parati militari – le pertinenti decisioni del congresso e il successo di
qualsiasi candidato alla casa Bianca.
Qualcuno ha rilevato la scarsa inclinazione degli imperi – quello
americano non farebbe eccezione – ad acquisire coscienza di quei segnali
di declino, seppur relativo, che all’esterno risultano palesi, mantenendo
l’illusione che le glorie passate siano destinate a perpetuarsi all’infinito,
invece di cercare soluzioni diverse a problemi nuovi. osservare l’Iran
con occhi diversi sarebbe dunque d’aiuto ad una nuova strategia americana
nel vicino oriente, che per di più tenesse maggiormente in conto gli in-
teressi degli alleati europei, poiché l’impatto di politiche avventurose in
quella regione si riflette molto più sull’europa che oltreoceano. ne co-
stituiscono eloquente evidenza la frequenza di attentati di cui l’europa
169
va tragicamente perdendo il conto e l’abnorme ondata di rifugiati/mi-
granti verso nord quale riflesso delle guerre in Iraq, Siria, libia e afgha-
nistan, oltre che dell’instabilità del continente africano nel suo insieme.
non si può negare che qualche passo nella giusta direzione sia stato
fatto: il superamento dell’impasse nucleare con l’Iran e un riposiziona-
mento sulla Siria rispetto alle scelte iniziali – Bashar al-asad non sarebbe
più per gli americani il nemico da abbattere ad ogni costo – dovuto
anche alle difficoltà sul terreno e all’entrata in campo della Russia, il cui
intervento, va precisato, rimane l’unico formalmente legittimo in quel
paese. non siamo ancora, ciononostante, al punto di svolta, poiché i se-
gnali di un cambiamento di rotta rimangono insufficienti. Secondo molti,
occorrerebbe concentrare gli sforzi sul mondo sunnita, ampliandone il
dialogo e riducendo le ambiguità, poiché da questo proverrebbero i rischi
maggiori rispetto a quello sciita, mentre ritenere la Russia una minaccia
per gli interessi dell’europa in vicino oriente costituisce per lo meno
una strumentale forzatura. fa riflettere la singolare indolenza di molti
paesi nei riguardi dell’azzardo turco, ogni giorno meno lucido e credibile,
sia in patria che fuori, ancor più dopo i più recenti eventi domestici,
estranei a questa trattazione. l’abbattimento del jet russo nel novembre
2015 da parte della turchia, paese nato, avrebbe meritato una presa di
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PROSPETTIVE
distanza più convinta di quella alla quale abbiamo assistito: lo sconfina-

mento tecnico di un aereo che non minacciava la turchia non giustificava
certo un gesto ostile di tale gravità e dalle insidiose finalità. la condotta
di erdoğan conferma l’affanno scomposto delle gerarchie turche per
l’inarrestabile imporsi della questione curda nella regione, una dinamica
che la dirigenza di quel paese farebbe bene ad includere nella sua agenda
come processo storico ineludibile.
andrebbero infine affrontati (ma da chi?) i nodi strutturali del sot-
tosviluppo dell’intera regione, nodi legati all’instabilità politica, certo,
ma anche all’estrema polarizzazione distributiva dei redditi, alla mancanza
di lavoro e alle magre prospettive di crescita; una tela di fondo questa
che alimenta rivolte, fanatismo religioso e pressioni migratorie epocali.
la povertà diffusa che accomuna le società di tanti paesi della regione è
dovuta all’espropriazione da parte delle dittature nazionali, ma è anche
il frutto di politiche predatorie da parte degli apparati economici e fi-
nanziari internazionali, sostenuti dalle grandi potenze, ai quali interessa
molto di più il profitto che non la pace e il progresso.
CENNI DI POLITICA INTERNA IRANIANA
Sul piano domestico, non sembrano per ora percepiti quei rischi di-
170 sgregativi che – qualora le condizioni socio-istituzionali dell’Iran do-
vessero modificarsi, sotto la spinta di emergenze di natura etnica – po-
trebbero replicare le tragedie vissute nella ex-Jugoslavia, con conseguenze
drammatiche per l’Iran, la regione e il mondo intero, europa in primis.
Sotto la cenere, infatti, il mosaico del paese lascia intuire alcuni movimenti
di natura carsica poco rassicuranti tra le diverse componenti etniche. Il
gruppo più numeroso e dominante, quello persiano, si aggira intorno al
50% della popolazione. Il resto è composto da azeri (24%, di lingua
turca) curdi (6/7%, le cui istanze per di più sono legate alle dinamiche
regionali), baluci 3/4%, arabi 3/4%, lori 2%, turkmeni 2% e altri minori
intorno al 10%.
l’esperienza storica non giustifica l’indolenza rassicurante della di-
rigenza iraniana che la religione sciita costituisce una diga invalicabile
da parte di potenziali spinte centrifughe, tenendo conto che in Iran i
processi di transizione politico-istituzionale non hanno concluso la loro
parabola, e che il mondo contemporaneo sembra in preda ad una spa-
smodica ricerca di identità divisive.
Il paese è alle prese con antinomie e ambiguità storiche, la prima
delle quali è quella di conciliare il suo attuale sviluppo sociale e istituzio-
nale – nonostante tutto il meno retrogrado nella regione – con le sfide
di una modernità che preme alla frontiera di un paese colto (4,5 milioni
di studenti universitari) e popolato da giovani (60% al disotto dei 32
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
anni) impazienti di vivere come in occidente. la società iraniana è per

molti versi già percorsa da profonde venature di occidentalizzazione,
assai visibile nella capitale, ma anche negli interstizi delle città minori e
delle province lontane. Si potrebbe rilevare che una maggiore tolleranza
culturale e sociale rispetto al pugno di ferro che il regime impone oggi al
paese non avrebbe alcun connotato di drammaticità per la stabilità in-
terna. Gli unici contraccolpi sarebbero a carico delle sfere religiose inte-
graliste e degli apparati di repressione che perderebbero i vantaggi di cui
godono oggi, e qualche timore di evoluzione politica indesiderata.
Mentre la dirigenza del paese aveva esultato (seppure con ambigua
cautela) alle rivolte della primavera araba, allo stesso tempo tentava di
nascondere la plateale contraddizione nella quale si dibatteva, dal mo-
mento che nell’estate del 2009 era stato proprio il popolo iraniano a col-
tivare l’illusione di poter eleggere liberamente il Presidente. l’accani-
mento delle gerarchie del paese contro i valori di libertà, da una parte, e
la voglia di cambiamento che cova nella società iraniana, dall’altra, ri-
mangono però oggettivamente in contrapposizione strategica.
anche le oscillazioni in politica estera si giustificano con l’ansia di
salvaguardare quegli aspetti ideologici del sistema che costituiscono l’im-
palcatura del regime. la sopravvivenza di quest’ultimo, incarnato nello
sciismo politico, dipenderebbe da una cesura antistorica (ma inconscia-
mente percepita) tra popolo iraniano e modernità, una modernità che
sgretolerebbe la precaria ideologia khomeinista insieme alla struttura di
171
privilegi della classe che la sostiene. Il timore recondito di tale evoluzione
richiede, di riflesso, il rigetto di un genuino riavvicinamento all’occidente
in ogni sua configurazione, fatti salvi quegli indispensabili rapporti eco-
nomici che siano compatibili con lo Stato teocratico.
In tale logica, trova decodifica l’ostinato rifiuto della dirigenza (Guida
Suprema e Guardiani della Rivoluzione) a considerare, dopo la fine delle
sanzioni, qualche apertura in senso liberale della società che consentirebbe
all’Iran di rendere massimi i ritorni di natura economica, politica e d’im-
magine. In realtà, alcuni reputano che un compromesso su tali aspetti
non equivarrebbe a capitolazione. Sarebbe anzi plausibile ritenere che la
dirigenza iraniana trarrebbe giovamento da un’evoluzione governabile
del sistema con benefici di ritorno in termini di popolarità.
non vi sarebbe dunque alcun automatismo tra una diversa sensibilità
del regime in tema di diritti civili e rischi di cedimento della struttura di
potere, in particolare, potremmo aggiungere, qualora esso si convincesse
che la politica del regime change fosse stata realmente abbandonata da
parte americana (e, in tale cornice, una inequivoca presa di posizione da
parte americana, Presidente e congresso, sarebbe funzionale). Rimane
tuttavia indubbio che nella mente dei dirigenti iraniani – tutti, in diversa
maniera, espressione del sistema teocratico e degli interessi collegati –
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PROSPETTIVE
continua a pesare la logica valoriale religiosa, che teme il prorompere del

pensiero laico, per il quale dio non è più un’immanenza necessaria, ma
solo una (possibile) scelta di segno personale. al contrario, la dirigenza
iraniana – anche qui, come in ogni esperienza storica di natura teocratica,
a tutela di privilegi materiali – impone il messaggio religioso, per sua na-
tura intrinsecamente sovrastrutturale, come si trattasse davvero della
legge di dio, la cui messa in discussione è dunque proibita in termini
aprioristici, pena conseguenze esiziali per chiunque. lo sviluppo culturale
– per cultura intendiamo qui la capacità di mettere costantemente in di-
scussione ogni convinzione presente nella società – porterà di certo
grande beneficio al popolo iraniano, che in futuro sarà maggiormente in
contatto con il mondo esterno.
INFINE
tra le tante incoerenze degli scenari illustrati ve ne sono alcune a

doppio taglio. teheran accusa gli Stati uniti (e in generale l’occidente)
di applicare un diverso standard di giudizio in funzione dei suoi interessi,
condannando la violazione dei diritti umani in Iran, ma non nei paesi
amici della regione – a partire dall’arabia Saudita –, e appoggiando le
rivolte in egitto, tunisia, Siria e libia, ma non ad esempio quelle della
172 maggioranza sciita contro il governo sunnita in Bahrein, un minuscolo
paese del Golfo pressoché dimenticato, ma il principio di coerenza è in-
franto.
non si può, in chiusura, non accennare alla tunisia, il paese dove
ha avuto inizio la primavera araba che ha alimentato speranze di profonda
palingenesi nella regione, speranze come noto andate per lo più deluse.
In tunisia, invece, è stato avviato un esperimento politico positivo, unico
nella regione rispetto alle delusioni che hanno caratterizzato gli altri
paesi, con elezioni politiche libere, un parlamento e un governo espressioni
del popolo. Il rapporto Freedom in the World 2015, di Freedom House,
definisce la tunisia «uno Stato politicamente libero, di incoraggiante
anomalia nel mondo arabo», nonostante inadeguatezze anche pesanti
da parte del Presidente essebsi (si è dichiarato contrario alla depenaliz-
zazione dell’omosessualità), il quale pur dichiarandosi laico è assediato
da un integralismo religioso per nulla rassegnato e la cui invadenza – va
realisticamente rilevato – non è facilmente contenibile. Sarebbe interesse
della comunità internazionale – in prima istanza dell’europa, se questa
riuscisse a respingere il suo fatale declino – avviare un processo di coo-
perazione politica/economica/culturale con società e istituzioni tunisine,
nel rispetto di sensibilità ed esperienze locali, maturate in questi anni
difficili. Il successo della tunisia in questo momento storico diventerebbe
così un esempio straordinario per la modernizzazione delle istituzioni
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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anche di altri paesi islamici, mostrando che Islam e Democrazia (o, se si

vuole, Islam arabo e Democrazia) non sono incompatibili, un esempio
che alcune nazioni aborrono al massimo grado, ma che l’occidente do-
vrebbe invece sostenere con forte impegno. va infine rilevato che le ma-
nifestazioni contro il governo di tunisi che hanno avuto luogo in diverse
aree del paese nel gennaio 2016 si sono concentrate su lavoro e migliori
condizioni di vita, a conferma che la chiave di volta si trova nella lotta
alla povertà, un’equa distribuzione della ricchezza e la capacità di offrire
alla popolazione un futuro degno di questo nome.
Se guardiamo alle prospettive politiche della regione, è sotto gli
occhi di molti che le divergenze politiche, religiose, etniche o sociali non
possono essere risolte attraverso conflitti armati. le guerre producono
anarchia, violenze e massacri senza fine, esodi biblici, cessazione dello
stato di diritto e prevalenza del più forte. Per di più, guerre ed invasioni
sono state intraprese nella regione senza nemmeno uno straccio di stra-
tegia d’orizzonte sulla gestione del dopo (errore o calcolo, a ciascuno il
suo giudizio), vale a dire a quali forze affidare la guida del paese una
volta cacciato il dittatore di turno. Se non immaginassimo un’agenda
nascosta, non sarebbe ad esempio sostenibile la bizzarria di chi reputa
che la Siria possa diventare un paese democratico una volta liberatasi di
Bashar al-asad. e ancor più che una tale mitologica visione sia tuttora
rappresentata sui media internazionali o di qualche paese minore, alla
luce delle tragedie che si consumano ogni giorno in Iraq, a 13 anni dalla
173
cacciata di Saddam hussein, o in libia, dopo 5 da quella di Gheddafi.
una causa fondamentale di aggravamento delle condizioni in questi
paesi, migrazioni e tragedie incluse, risiede proprio nel crollo del potere
statuale. Per quanto vessatoria possa essere una dittatura, l’anarchia e le
violenze che derivano da uno stato di guerra sono assai peggiori, come
mostra l’evidenza. la strada del dialogo, per quanto tortuosa e di difficile
tessitura con dittatori di ogni risma, rimane preferibile; lavorando con
trasparenza e coraggio affinché quei dittatori divengano ogni giorno un
po’ meno tali, e un po’ più servitori del popolo. oltre che di realpolitik si
tratta qui di far uso di buon senso e onestà intellettuale. emergono in
proposito le ambiguità dell’occidente (non solo il suo paese-guida), per
il quale gli interessi politici ed economici – è banale ripeterlo – hanno
quasi sempre prevalso sugli ideali della solidarietà internazionale. Gli in-
teressi economici di un paese vanno dunque tenuti in conto insieme a
quelli delle collettività di riferimento, mentre andrebbero contenute (ma
ancora una volta da chi?) le incursioni dei giganti industriali e finanziari
internazionali che spingono per una globalizzazione senza regole, centrata
sul profitto, massimo e ad ogni costo.
Per chiudere, se i conflitti possono essere diversamente catalogati a
seconda dei principi etici, giuridici o funzionali di riferimento, ebbene
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
nel vicino oriente, nei decenni scorsi, essi sono risultati allo stesso tempo
ingiusti, illegittimi e inopportuni, sebbene funzionali agli interessi
di coloro che – se la storia fosse maestra di giustizia e non solo di vita –
dovrebbero un giorno essere chiamati sul banco degli imputati, o almeno
questo è il nostro umile auspicio.
174

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The Role of Economic

Diplomacy in Making Iran
a Developed Country
BeneDetto fRanceSco BallatoRe, Ph.D.
Italian Ministry of Agriculture,

Foodstuff and Forestry Policies
ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this study is to provide a conceptual framework

to understand the evolution and implementation of Iran’s economic policies by ap-
plying economic diplomacy. Major players of Iran’s economic diplomacy and decision-
making process are also addressed. Finally, this study analyses Iran’s new geo-economics
and geo-political relations (especially with the Asia economies) and their impact on
the geopolitical scenario. Despite the economic sanctions, Iran is the second largest
economy in the Middle East and North Africa region after Saudi Arabia, with an es-
timated GDP in 2014 of US$406.3 billion. Iran’s economy is based on the hydrocar-
bon sector, small-scale agriculture and service sector, and a noticeable state presence
in manufacturing and financial services. Furthermore, Iran ranks first in the world
in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves. Economic activities
and government revenues depend to a large extent on oil revenues and therefore re-
main volatile. Iran’s economic policies have had always a Western oriented tendency.
However, new internal and international situations changed the mentality of Iranian
decision makers and consequently their policies. For example, in order to diversify its
economic partners, Iran decided to take a shift in its strategies and conducted new
policies towards Asian countries; with the result that, during the last fifteen years,
Asia has become the first economic partner of Iran, occupying the traditional position
of Europe.
KEYWORDS: ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, ECONOMIC POLICIES, FOREIGN POLICY.

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1. INTRODUCTION
t he process of globalization intensifies the interdependency of

states and the wide rules governing world trade open the doors
to new opportunities in global business. is new context means
that governments have become increasingly involved in negotiations,
leading to regional, bilateral, multilateral and international treaties. all
these aspects require thorough knowledge and skill in economic diplo-
macy.
economic diplomacy not only promotes the prosperity of a nation,
but also manipulates its foreign commercial and financial relations, as in
the case of sanctions against Iran. accordingly, economic diplomacy is
the offspring of trade diplomacy, which was traditionally a field exclusive
to government authorities and diplomats. on the contrary, the private
sector and civil society were excluded.
With the expansion of globalization, economic diplomacy has be-
come a key component of foreign policy in the majority of countries
worldwide. roughout the years, the increased significance of economic
diplomacy within the context of foreign policy has caused the inclusion
of the private sector and civil society in order to maintain both compet-
176 itive capabilities and national interests. Since economic diplomacy deals
with prediction of the effects of economic policies of other countries, it
requires full recognition of market forces in various countries and in the
world economic environment. continuous involvement in economic
diplomacy helps countries simultaneously realize their economic interests
and consider those of their partners. a fundamental prerequisite for this
goal is the existence of a rich reservoir of experts in government, the pri-
vate sector, and civil society.
ese aspects are pertinent to the Islamic Republic of Iran. e Is-
lamic Revolution of 1978 to 1979 broke a lengthy political tradition of
rule by monarchs or shahs, and institutionalized a dominant political
role for the Shia clergy. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has always as-
pired to recover its geopolitical relevance, especially in Western asia, as
in its past history1. In pursuit of regaining political and economic lead-
ership in Western asia, Iran’s leaders have faced the challenge of balancing
their ideological (idealism) and geopolitical (pragmatism) approaches
to foreign policy. nevertheless, over the years, the geopolitical factor has
1 ancient Iranians, also known as Persians, organized three powerful empires:

achaemenian (550-330 Bc), Parthian (247 Bc-aD 224), and Sassanian (aD
224-642). at their heights, these empires extended east into modern afghanistan
and central asia and west as far as anatolia and the Mediterranean Sea.

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THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN MAKING IRAN A DEVELOPED COUNTRY
predominated in Iran’s management of its relations with other states at

both regional and global levels. e main reason may be attributed to
the nature of the geo-economics and economic-security issues that Iran
has constantly faced since its establishment: 1) military threats from the
united States; 2) a sectarian conflict on Iran’s western flank (Iraq); 3)
failed and fragile states on Iran’s eastern frontier (afghanistan and Pak-
istan); 4) states along Iran’s northern border whose political, social, and
economic transformations are unsteady and incomplete (central asia
and the caucasus); 5) the strategic position of the country, being located
north of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of oman, and its de facto control
of the Strait of hormuz, a vital maritime pathway for crude oil transport;
6) immense oil and gas production; and 7) the fact that Iran borders di-
rectly or indirectly fieen countries and covers a market of almost three
hundred million consumers.
however, almost thirty years aer the cease-fire with Iraq in 1988
and the death of ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Iran continues to be char-
acterised by the same socio-economic problems, despite having the world’s
fourth largest petroleum reserves and the first largest natural gas reserves
(cIa, 2016; BP 2016); a young well-educated population alongside a
solid civil society inspired by international standards of democracy; a
well-developed industrial and commercial infrastructure; a vast domestic
market; current account surpluses; large foreign exchange reserves and a
good import cover.
177
over the last decade and mainly during ahmadinejad’s presidency,
from 2005 to 2013, Iran has suffered from high inflation, high unem-
ployment, unstable prices in the commodity market, and low growth of
production per capita. ese unresolved problems have rendered the
system unable to satisfy further the needs of a changing internal and in-
ternational context. one of the most serious problems remains the per-
vasive corruption within the public administration, which has continued
to plague the Iranian economy. is standing is unacceptable for a nation
seeking to attract hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign investments.
to transform Iran into a developed country2, the current government,
led by President Rouhani, should endeavour to reform the public ad-
ministration whose efficiency levels may play a key role in attracting for-
eign investors, and to employ new methods of foreign policy simultane-
ously, thereby providing the grounds for the national economy and
commerce to enter local and global markets.
In this study, Section 2 reviews definitions of “economic diplomacy.”
Section 3 describes the role of economic diplomacy in the context of re-
2 this aspect is stated in the 20-year perspective document of the Islamic Republic.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
cent history, and provides a conceptual framework concerning goals and

key actors in economic diplomacy. Section 4 describes how foreign and
internal policies of Iran’s policy-makers affected the country’s economic
development. Section 5 highlights new developments in Iran’s economic
diplomacy. Section 6 provides a picture of the main actors in Iran’s eco-
nomic diplomacy. Section 7 analyzes Iran’s geo-economics and geo-po-
litical relations. Section 8 concludes with caveats with respect to the au-
thor’s interpretations.
2. DEFINITION OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW
2.1. A brief review of the most recent studies and definitions concerning
economic diplomacy
Definitions of the term “economic diplomacy” are elusive and fre-

quently reduced to characterisations. Woolcock and Bayne (2003) argue
that economic diplomacy concerns the decision-making process rather
than structures, and is mainly related to international economic issues.
In economic diplomacy, governments attempt to reconcile three types
of tensions: (1) tension between politics and economics; (2) tension be-
178 tween international and domestic pressure; and (3) tension between
government and other actors, such as private companies and nGo
(okano-heijmans, 2007).
Reaching beyond such rather broad political consideration, Suh
(2004) characterises economic diplomacy in four dimensions: 1) scope
and territory; 2) level and strength; 3) influence (as viewed by the other
country); and 4) time-frame. Interestingly, Suh argues that economic
diplomacy can be performed through “candy” (i.e., economic aids or
“carrots”) and “severity” (i.e., economic sanctions or “sticks”). is type
of economic diplomacy is exemplified by the u.S. which has traditionally
carried out a “carrot and stick” policy by attracting and winning over
countries that obey with the “carrot” of assistance from the u.S., while
suppressing those that disobey with the “stick” of military and economic
sanctions. e implementation of the Marshall Plan3 aer the end of
the Second World War, and the imposition of sanctions against Iran
aer the Islamic Revolution represent typical examples of the u.S. im-
plementing its foreign policies.
a very useful definition to clarify the main principles at the basis of
economic diplomacy is provided by lee and hudson (2004), who state
3 the plan is named after Secretary of State George c. Marshall who announced it
in a commencement speech at harvard university on June 5, 1947.

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PROSPETTIVE
that economic diplomacy is «the work of a network of public and private

actors who manage commercial relations using diplomatic channels and
process.» according to okano-heijmans and Melissen (2007), this defi-
nition aptly captures the actors and process of not only commercial
diplomacy but also economic diplomacy.
Since economic diplomacy has attained greater prominence within
the international agenda over the years, the quality of studies in this spe-
cific field of diplomacy has improved immensely. from this viewpoint, a
study conducted by Berridge (2005) stated that economic diplomacy
can be imagined as: (1) “diplomacy concerned with economic policy
questions;” and (2) “diplomacy which employs economic resources,
either as regards sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy ob-
jective.”
Bergeijk (2009) states that economic diplomacy can be understood
as a state’s full spectrum of economic tools to achieve its national interest
comprising all the economic activities including, but not limited to, ex-
port, import, investment, lending, aid, free trade agreements, etc.
according to Woolcock (2013), the new economic diplomacy may
be defined as a set of activities (both regarding methods and processes
for international decision-making) related to cross border economic ac-
tivities (i.e., export, import, investment, lending, aid, and migration)
pursued by state and non-state actors in the real world.
lastly, a recent study by Moons and Bergeijk (2016) underscores
179
that a mix of political and economic factors has influenced the recent
development of economic diplomacy, particularly: 1) the integration of
former communist countries into the world economy; 2) the new aus-
terity; 3) global warming; and 4) the occurrence of transnational terror-
ism. is last definition clearly identifies the main future problems with
which economic and traditional diplomacy will have to contend.
2.2. Pragmatist economic diplomacy: a key tool for implementing a

state’s economic policy
In light of the above statements, economic diplomacy can be un-

derstood as a network of public governmental bodies/departments (em-
bassies, consulates, ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of economic
affairs/trade) and commerce private actors (for example national associ-
ations representing manufacturing and service companies) in supporting
domestic business and companies abroad in foreign markets. erefore,
an effective and pragmatic economic diplomacy activity should assist
companies in various ways, deal with a variety of different complex in-
ternational issues, and fulfil the following tasks: a) trade promotion as
well as the promotion of transnational investments (inward and outward);
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PROSPETTIVE
b) Information-gathering and supplying and advisory tasks; c) Securing

property rights; d) Influencing foreign national policy-making in order
to further the interests of (international) domestic companies; e) Rap-
prochement function between two or more countries at the level of low
politics, laying the foundations for further collaboration and developing
power for each party individually.
In addition, one can state that economic diplomacy is a basic tool
in order for a state (as a rational player) to exert influence to promote its
interests and to evolve into a hegemonic power, initially in its own region
and later in the international system, without using deterrent factors
such as military power.
Despite of recent developments4, turkish foreign policy can be con-
sidered a virtuous example of how a country can employ profitably eco-
nomic diplomacy. Since the victory of President erdogan’s Justice and
Development Party (aKP), turkey’s foreign policy was reoriented toward
economic goals even more so than before. During these years, the turkish
government has always thought that the top priority of its foreign policy
was to serve the country’s economic interests. In that way, turkey dubbed
its approach “zero problems” foreign policy, which emphasized cooper-
180 ation above confrontation.
4 In the last four years turkey’s foreign policy has been characterised by a more
ideological and interventionist approach which has come at a steep cost. this
new course was best demonstrated by turkey’s reaction to the arab Spring uprisings
that began in 2010. Immediately after the 2011 uprisings in egypt, for example,
turkey sided with the demonstrators and Muslim Brotherhood and called on
then-President hosni Mubarak to step down. these interventionist postures were
surprising because they politicized turkey’s previous growing economic relations
with egypt. for example, a free trade agreement that went into effect in 2007 in-
creased trade between the two countries to $4.1 billion in 2011 from under $1
billion in 2005. lucky for turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood took the reins of
power in elections in 2012, which led to a further expansion of trade. But just a
year later, President abdel fattah el-Sisi – whom turkey vociferously opposed –
toppled the government, leading to a decline in trade and investment. turkey’s re-
sponse to the Syrian uprisings in 2011 was similar. the affinity of aKP toward
Islamist opponents of President Bashar assad shaped turkey’s initial response to
the uprisings despite strong economic ties that had developed during the zero
problems era, when exports to Syria soared from $266 million in 2002 to $1.64
billion in 2010. this support for Syrian rebels also led to the downing of a Russian
fighter. the desire to protect the turkmen minority of Syria from Russian attacks
and frustration with Russian support for the assad regime were somehow perceived
by the turkish leadership as being more important than economic relations with
Russia (not to mention a nuclear power).

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It is well known that ankara instead of viewing Russia, Iran and

arab countries as security threats looked at them as potential export
markets and energy partners. Good relations with Israel and the arab
world gave turkey more diplomatic and economic weight in both sides.
Similarly, turkey’s friendly relations with Iran and Western nations gave
it some leverage in the recent nuclear negotiations.
turkey’s main business associations successfully lobbied the gov-
ernment to improve diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq and
particularly with the independent Kurdish region. Similarly, the turkish
federation of Businesses and Industrialists convinced the aKP to
strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with africa.
Russia, notwithstanding the recent diplomatic tensions, quickly be-
came turkey’s second-largest trade partner aer Germany – worth more
than uS$35 billion in 2013 – and its largest supplier of natural gas. e
volume of trade between Iran and turkey rose from $1.2 billion in 2002
to $21.3 billion in 2012.
a pragmatist approach in the implementation of foreign policy has
been successful also for the improvement of diplomatic relationship be-
tween turkey and Greece. Since 1999, the two countries established a
variety of dialogue mechanisms streamlining the relations such as regular
political consultations, exploratory contacts on aegean issues, confi-
dence-building measures, high-level cooperation council (hlcc)
meetings as well as high-level visits and contacts. enhancing bilateral re-
181
lations with Greece in every possible field and the implementation of
tangible projects to the benefit of both countries is one of turkey’s pri-
orities.
commercial and economic relations with Greece have also improved
since 1999 along the lines of positive developments witnessed in bilateral
political relations. e establishment of the hlcc mechanism in 2010
in particular has also paved the way for a substantial increase in com-
mercial relations. e bilateral trade volume thus doubled between 2010
and 2014, reaching 5.6 billion uSD by the end of 2014. e initial turk-
ish data for the year 2015, however, reveals a decrease in trade volume.
(e preliminary figure for 2015 is 3.26 billion uSD.) In 2012, during
the Second hlcc Meeting, 10 billion uSD of trade volume was de-
clared as a common goal and both sides are committed to explore ways
and means to reach this target (habibi, 2016).
e stock of direct investments from Greece reached 6.8 billion
uSD in 2015. Greek investors, apart from the banking sector, operate
in information technology (It), agricultural applications, packaging,
plastics, pharmacy, cosmetics, fisheries, tourism and the construction
sector. e stock of direct turkish investments in Greece amounts to
approximately 500 million uSD. turkish investors mostly focus on in-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
vesting in marinas, ports and the overall tourism sector in Greece. every
year, almost 1 million tourists each from turkey and Greece visit each
other’s country (habibi, 2016).
transport is another field where both sides are willing to intensify
their cooperation. currently, turkish airline operators are conducting
more than 50 flights a week between turkey and Greece. e imple-
mentation of projects regarding the Izmir-essaloniki Ro-PaX ferry
line and the high-speed train link between Istanbul and essaloniki
will pave the way for an intensified cooperation in maritime and railroad
transport between two countries.
a study carried out by Papadiminitriou and Pistikou (2014) supports
the above statements pointing out that the significant relevant increase
of the economic activity between two countries reduced armaments
spending on both sides as have turkish challenges to Greek sovereignty
in the aegean.
3. ROLE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN A HISTORICAL

CONTEXT
3.1. The origin of economic diplomacy
182 e link between economics and politics, or more precisely, the use
of economic instruments for political purposes, dates back to antiquity
when inhabitants of different countries, regions, and city-states exchanged
products and offered services to one another. from the very beginning
of human history, diplomacy was about trade issues and war. e history
of diplomatic relations also shows how trade interests loomed large in
international relations (okano-heijmans, 2010).
according to cohen and Westbrook (2002), the oldest records doc-
umenting commercial exchanges are the “amarna archives,” clay tablets
from Middle egypt (1460-1220 Bc) detailing extensive trade existing
in that era between egypt and West asia. conversely, reference to the
use of sanctions can be found, for instance, in e History of Peloponnesian
War by ucydides who mentions a trade boycott imposed by athens
against Sparta’s ally Megara. e “Silk Routes,” which traversed central
asia, and the eastern and western routes that crossed what is presently
Myanmar provide evidence that economic exchanges have always been a
vital component of human history, promoting a steady advancement of
technical and scientific knowledge. trade was also the impetus for colo-
nialism as it drove vasco de Gama’s journey to India in 1498, europe’s
“discovery” of the riches of the east Indies, and the journey of christopher
columbus to america.
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Durable commercial relationships among countries, empires, and

city-states were implemented by consulates which had permanent pres-
ences in many areas and were established in the Mediterranean during
the ottoman empire. Italian principalities sought commercial markets,
while the foreign traders themselves organised a form of joint represen-
tation in the ports to deal with the local authorities (Berridge, 2005).
ese early consulates supported their home administrations, and hence,
the first overseas representative offices were born. e resident embassy
evolved a century or so later.
In the 16th century, the role of representatives of merchants of the
main Southern european harbour cities increased with the aim of ex-
panding international trade in europe when the Lex Mercatoria (literally,
merchant law) regulated commercial dealings (okano-heijmans and
Melissen, 2007). according to okano-heijmans (2010), this is a case of
practice preceding history; the concept predating its label.
at being said, the link among politics, diplomacy and economy
became more significant in the academic context only in the second half
of the twentieth century. aer the Second World War, the implementa-
tion of the european Recovery Program (eRP: the so-called Marshall
Plan5) represents one of the most relevant examples of the link between
economics and developmental policies6.
e Japanese provided evidence about the increasing importance
183
of commercial and economic diplomacy policies, implementing these in
a very effective way aer the end of the Second World War. Due to its
defeat, Japan lacked a voice and influence politically, militarily and in
other traditional areas of diplomacy. considering that the mid-1950’s
witnessed rapid growth of the Japanese economy and a concurrent growth
in demand for resources and markets, the government used economic
diplomacy as a strategy to improve its diplomatic-commercial relations
5 the plan was implemented in europe through the establishment of the economic
cooperation administration (eca), a u.S. government agency set up in 1948 to
administer the Marshall Plan.
6 as a consequence of developmental policies, developmental state is a term used
by international political economy scholars to refer to the phenomenon of state-
led macroeconomic planning in east asia in the late twentieth century. In this
model of capitalism (sometimes referred to as state development capitalism), the
state has more independent, or autonomous, political power, as well as greater
control over the economy. a developmental state has a number of features (among
them are the competent state agency and the careful industrial policies), which
allow it to play a strategic role in directing the course of a nation’s economic and
social growth.

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with Southeast asian countries by providing economic assistance and

helping them improve their infrastructure and investment environments.
e twentieth and twenty-first centuries have included a lengthy
series of events which have played a major role in redefining the modalities
by which nations have entrenched their commercial exchanges and eco-
nomic diplomacy policies. among these, the most significant included:
a) e end of the cold War with the establishment of the u.S. as the
world’s leading superpower; b) e neoliberal policies implemented by
Margaret atcher and Ronald Reagan since the beginning of the 1980’s.
Promotion of the market rule, cuts in public expenditure, reduction of
government regulation, and globalization of financial markets were at
the origin of the recent financial crisis and of the north-South gap and
global inequality (Bourdieu, 1999a, 1999b); c) e oil shocks and the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system; d) e emergence of non-Western
economies aer the collapse of the Soviet union; e) e increasing eco-
nomic integration among different countries and geographical areas aris-
ing from the interchange of world views, products, ideas and other aspects
of culture (i.e., globalization).
us, one can state that the present era is characterised by the in-
tensity of multidimensional relations between nations and people world-
wide. Generally, the globalization process has created significant com-
mercial opportunities in newly emerging markets. is is one reason for
184 the increased interest in economic diplomacy. conversely, the stability
of the global system is at risk. Shocks transmit rapidly from one side to
another side of the system, while a global mechanism to coordinate
policy responses remains unavailable. erefore, the role of economic
diplomacy, as well as being a useful tool to defend and promote the eco-
nomic interests of a nation, will be increasingly pertinent in future to
generate and improve a state’s economic security (Moons and Bergeijk,
2016).
3.2. Conceptualizing economic diplomacy
e key theoretical issue in the study of economic diplomacy is the

extent to which it is tied to the state and public interests, or whether it
pertains to a broader range of social actors and interests. nevertheless, if
diplomacy is tied to state actors and state interests, economic diplomacy
tends to be limited to the use of traditional diplomatic tools to achieve
economic goals (lee and hocking, 2010). is state-centric framework
postulates that economic diplomacy is an intergovernmental activity im-
plemented by foreign service officials having the advancement of the
state’s economic interests in a foreign country and the world economy
as their main goal. erefore, economic diplomacy sees a constitutive
relationship between diplomacy and state sovereignty (Barston, 1997;
Gardner, 1980; Watson, 1982).
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PROSPETTIVE
at the power-play end of diplomacy, there is economic statecra,

meaning the strategic use of negative and positive economic sanctions
(i.e., trade embargoes, aid programs) by states and other actors such as
the united nations to coerce other states to cooperate (Davis, 1999;
Kunz, 1997; zimmerman, 1993).
us, economic diplomacy is concerned with the economic agenda
in diplomacy, which can be distinguished from the political agenda (lee
and hocking, 2010). Indeed, some studies have shown that the very ori-
gins of diplomacy in most countries lie in developing cordial relations
to facilitate trade and businesses between different states.
e newer approaches to economic diplomacy recognize that diplo-
macy cannot be compartmentalized into separate economic and political
activities and that, in practical terms, most countries would find such
separation simply unworkable. taken together, these definitions and
concepts demonstrate the following:
a) Diplomacy is implemented not only through the foreign ministry
and its officials in overseas missions, but also by the employment of the
so-called “national Diplomatic System” (nDS). is concept better
captures the diverse and complex nature of coordinated diplomacy.
b) e foreign ministry generally drives economic diplomacy, but
concomitantly involves other economic and social actors having their
own economic responsibilities and interests (i.e., associations representing
manufacturing and service companies, non-governmental organizations).
c) In the nDS rendering of diplomatic structures and process, the
185
foreign ministry becomes the integrator or coordinator of diplomacy,
working with “partners” such as other government departments, as well
as business and civic groups to deliver diplomatic goals (lee and hocking,
2010).
lastly, being a key tool of state economic policies (and in the context
of the twenty-first century), economic diplomacy can be implemented
effectively only if a national government builds it on solid principles
such as: 1) the opening up of the domestic economy; 2) the empowerment
of private sector growth; 3) the encouragement of foreign and domestic
investment; and 4) the creation of conditions for business partnerships
to flourish and trade to flow. It is clear that such worthwhile context ne-
cessitates the presence of a very well organised, efficient public sector.
4. THE EFFECT OF THE FOREIGN AND INTERNAL POLICIES OF

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ON THE COUNTRY’S SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
considering that an objective picture of Iran’s economic history is

fundamental to understanding the current trend of Iran’s economic
diplomacy policies, this section discusses the most significant elements
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
of Iran’s economic policies since the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza

Pahlavi (1941-1979).
4.1 Iran’s socio-economic policies during the Pahlavi years: an overview
following the Second World War, Iran enjoyed a period of indus-

trialization and investment in infrastructure under the guidance of the
new shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. e country achieved sus-
tained growth supported by substantial oil revenues. During the period
between 1960 and 1977, Iran’s annual real growth rate of nearly 9.6%
was approximately double the average of other ird World countries,
and social problems such as infant mortality, malnutrition, endemic dis-
ease, and illiteracy were significantly reduced (amuzegar, 2014; Maloney,
2015).
e Shah’s regime implemented an agrarian reform and a new elec-
toral law which were perhaps the most significant and problematic leg-
islative measures for the regime. e agrarian Reform abolished the
peasant-landlord tenure system in favour of redistributing and selling all
landed estates on easy terms to the former peasants, inciting strong op-
position from the landlords. e latter objected to the government pur-
chasing at fair prices, selling their properties in smaller plots to the citi-
186 zenry at a lower price, and undercutting their authority with respect to
dealing with the peasants or land labourers.
e amendment of the electoral law to grant voting and other re-
lated rights to women and the extension of equal and universal suffrage
to all Iranian citizens was particularly countered by the powerful Shia
clergy, which highly disapproved further of the reforms that removed
much of their traditional powers in the realms of education and family
law, and diminished their previously strong influence in the rural areas.
e causes behind the Islamic Revolution are socio-cultural and
economic if one considers the consequence of the wide program of so-
cio-economic reforms known as the ‘White Revolution’: a) e replace-
ment of the authority of Islamic courts with secular courts, thereby di-
minishing the influence of the clergy in Iran; b) e establishment of a
public education system that competed with religious schools; c) e
creation of an education Ministry that required religious schools through-
out Iran to conform to standardised curriculum; d) e agrarian Reform
intended to break up landholdings owned by landlords and Shia clergies;
e) e electoral law that allowed women to vote and religious minorities
to hold public offices, and granted legal equalities in marital issues.
according to amuzegar (2009, 2014), the economic reasons behind
the fall of the Shah’s regime were due to: a) the adoption of a Western
development model that made Iran’s economic survival and prosperity
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
overly dependent on foreign raw materials, technology, and trade; b)

overly rapid exploitation of oil reserves; c) insufficient investment in
agriculture; d) an industrialization drive geared towards assembly-plant
operations, and undue reliance on oil export revenues to finance domestic
public expenditure; e) scant attention to non-oil exports; f ) a widening
gap between classes and regions; g) the promotion of a consumerist
economy.
e tremendous increase in inflation and corruption within the
public administration created hardships for many Iranians and played a
significant role in the upcoming political crisis. compared to the early
1970’s, the last period of the Shah’s reign was characterised by a substantial
drop of the per capita income and increase in the cost of living.
however, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Iranian economy has been stagnant, not only because of economic
sanctions imposed by the u.S. and u.n., but also due to the regime’s
constitutional and political contradictions, faulty and unrealistic national
goals, shiing politico-economic models, bureaucratic incompetence,
and distorted world view (Maloney, 2015; amuzegar, 2014).
4.2 What happened after the Islamic Revolution?
Iran’s economic growth has been relatively volatile during the first
two decades aer the 1979 Revolution during which a sequence of
187
chaotic legislative measures negatively affected the country’s economy
(Maloney, 2015; amuzegar, 2014). labour strikes and elite emigration
paralysed the industrial sector. further, Iran’s constraints increased aer
the november 1979 seizure of the u.S. embassy in tehran, when Wash-
ington froze approximately $11 billion in Iranian assets and imposed
other sanctions. aer two years of disruptions to the economy, the post-
revolutionary turmoil put the country on the brink of economic collapse
(Maloney, 2015). Iran’s approach to the economic issues revealed a stark
contrast within the revolutionary coalition itself, with the powerful
leist component of the anti-Shah movement being more oriented to
adopt a 1960’s-era Marxist dogma, and traditional clerics being more
market-oriented. eventually Khomeini decided to nationalize the ma-
jority of the economic sectors. e assets of the Pahlavis and other elite
families were absorbed by newly created semi-governmental organizations
or foundations, which evolved into important, oen unaccountable, eco-
nomic actors over the next 30 years.
e theocracy’s enlargement of the state’s economic role was an im-
provised response to circumstances. us, all sectors of the Iranian econ-
omy and, consequently, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined
consistently during the first years of the revolution (figure 1).
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PROSPETTIVE
FIGURE 1. IRAN’S GDP PERCENTAGE TREND*
* Source: https://goo.gl/hywi6x; central Bank of Iran.
e already serious economic situation became even more dire

during and aer the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) for the following rea-
sons:
a) a further implementation of the statist economic policies which
greatly strengthened the government’s influence in all of the country’s
188 economic sectors.
b) e 1985 oil collapse which severely constrained Iran’s capacity
to import goods for industrial production.
c) e economic sanctions which dramatically affected the socio-
economic conditions of wide sectors of the population.
d) State-controlled price policies which consequently discouraged
foreign entrepreneurs to invest in Iran.
ultimately, Iran’s entire ruling class demonstrated a substantial in-
adequacy to manage domestic and foreign economic policies.
4.3. The Rafsanjani Period (1989-1997): a partial economic and

diplomatic success
e 1988 decision to accept a cease-fire with Iraq and Khomeini’s

1989 death facilitated a shi in Iran’s economic policies. newly elected
President Rafsanjani tried to reshape Iran’s economy through the support
of a new approach in foreign policy. aer Khomeini’s era ended, President
Rafsanjani had to rebuild a country wholly devastated with around $1
trillion in direct and indirect costs. Iran’s new economic agenda thus ad-
dressed the following: a) infrastructure development: b) privatization
of state enterprises; c) foreign exchange liberalization; d) establishment
of free-trade zones; e) elimination of subsidies and price controls.
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PROSPETTIVE
Between 1989 and 1993, strong post-war investments and the re-
laxation of government restrictions spearheaded robust growth in GDP
(figure 1), government revenues, and employment. however, the progress
ran aground because of continuing sanctions imposed by the u.S. and
the following policy miscalculations and political tensions (amuzegar,
1997):
a) Massive increases in government spending and private consump-
tion increased the inflation rate (figure 2).
b) Growth was inequitably distributed.
c) unemployment rose when baby boomers began to enter the job
market.
d) ere was greater dependence on petroleum, and unfulfilled di-
versification of the economy.
e) e privatization process of the state’s companies failed, mainly
because the governmental and quasi-governmental bureaucracy remained
intact, continuing to antagonize entrepreneurs, undermining privatization
plans, and detracting from economic development and job creation.
f ) ere was delay in the implementation of the subsidy rational-
ization and exchange rate unification, and scarce foreign direct investment
(fDI) outside the oil and gas industry.
FIGURE 2. IRAN’S CONSUMER PRICE INFLATION, ANNUAL % CHANGE
189
* Source: IMf, World Economic Outlook, october 2014 database.
4.4. The Khatami Period (1997-2005)
leist groups isolated by Rafsanjani regrouped and reassessed the

state they helped create. eir efforts culminated in the 1997 election of
President Khatami and his effort to reform the power structure of the
country. however, once in office, Khatami had to tackle several economic
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
problems due to the global recession, the deep slump in oil prices, infla-
tion, unemployment, and mismanagement of the public sector (Maloney,
2003).
During Khatami’s period, the economy of Iran was characterised by
a stable growth (figure 1). During his two terms, Khatami’s socio-eco-
nomic policies were partially successful in terms of economic and social
restructuring, with the most significant achievements being:
a) unification of the exchange rate.
b) establishment of an oil Stabilization fund as a cushion against
market volatility.
c) authorization of the first post-revolutionary private banks.
d) Improvement of the legal framework to increase foreign invest-
ment.
e) Stewarding of the economy through a tumultuous period of un-
precedented low oil revenues.
f ) e lure of new investment from the West.
g) Improvement of the standard of living and cultural rights of the
Iranian people.
h) fewer restrictions on freedom of expression and association.
unfortunately, more strategic ambitious plans such as the reduction
of energy subsidies were met with opposition from conservative parlia-
190 mentarians adopting an obstructionist approach to Khatami’s economic
agenda as a means of subverting his political and cultural reforms.
While Khatami and the reform movement can be credited with
some stepping-stone economic reforms, they failed to build and maintain
public support for their agenda. eir political problems persuaded
much of the Iranian public that press freedom ranked higher than job
creation on their priority list. is strategic mistake le them vulnerable
to a populist challenge, as demonstrated by the unexpected election of
tehran mayor, Mahmoud ahmadinejad, in 2005 (Maloney, 2015).
4.5. The Ahmadinejad Period (2005-2013): populism in power
In 2005, Mahmoud ahmadinejad won the presidential elections

on the basis of a populist socio-economic program that envisaged a re-
distribution of wealth and the enlargement of economic opportunities
for the poorest social classes of the population. ese aspects played an
important role in his electoral victory. he assumed office in a period
fraught with a substantial increase in oil prices, which sustained illusory
growth rates and brought a relevant influx of revenues and foreign ex-
changes (Maloney, 2015; Bakhash, 2015). e other factor that worked
in favour of ahmadinejad was the rise of asia as a commercial counter-
weight to Iran’s historic trade partners in europe, which enabled tehran
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
to blunt the impact of the u.S. and u.n. sanctions. aer the united
arab emirates, china became the largest source of Iran’s imports, and
asia purchased more Iranian oil than any other region.
however, in the early years of ahmadinejad’s presidency, the fol-
lowing external and internal factors contributed to a sharp decline in
growth (figure 1):
a) e tightening of the international economic sanctions because
of the country’s nuclear ambitions.
b) Inexpensive loans and heavy spending on infrastructural projects
together with a wide range of subsidies (on fuel, foodstuffs, etc.) signifi-
cantly raised the inflation rate to about 10% in the first term of his pres-
idency and reaching nearly 25% in 2009 (figure 2).
c) a privatization process benefited mainly state-affiliated companies,
particularly those associated with the Revolutionary Guards.
d) feuding openly with a series of cabinet ministers and central
Bank chiefs and dismantling the planning bureaucracy.
Senior political figures sharply criticized ahmadinejad’s spending
and interventionist approach, while strikes by bazaaris in 2008 and 2010
forced the government to delay or abandon planned tax hikes. In the
2009 presidential campaign, ahmadinejad countered withering attacks
on his record with misleading statistics and allegations of corruption
against his rivals. e post-election unrest aggravated Iran’s economic
dilemmas, intensifying the brain drain and capital flight. It also fuelled
191
european support for vigorous economic pressure.
new u.n. sanctions in mid-2010 boosted the u.S. effort to cut off
Iran’s access to the international financial system, and provided a platform
for surprisingly robust measures by the european union (eu). e fur-
ther tightening of commercial sanctions during 2011 and 2012 produced
huge losses for the Islamic Republic in terms of oil revenues, and placed
a serious strain on the economy which registered a contraction of GDP
equal to -6.6% in 2012 and -1.9% in 2013. furthermore, ahmadinejad’s
economic policy measures (e.g., his low-income housing initiative) faced
major budget and implementation problems. his attempt to reform
Iran’s costly subsidies on energy, foodstuffs, and other goods was much
costlier than anticipated. Both initiatives contributed to Iran’s rising in-
flation rate which soared to nearly 40% by 2013 (Maloney, 2015).
4.6. President Rouhani’s 2013 election
aer eight years of ahmadinejad’s problematic presidency, hassan

Rouhani’s election meant that the country wished for the return of a
government with experience and common sense. he ran on a platform
that emphasized moderation, resolving Iran’s stand-off with the West
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
over its nuclear program, repairing Iran’s relations with its Persian Gulf
neighbours, a reversion to sensible economic policies, and less interference
by security agencies in the lives of Iranians. Rouhani’s election also
marked a return of reformers to office. unlike the Khatami team, Rouhani
aimed not at a sweeping reform but rather a limited, gradualist ap-
proach (Bakhash, 2015).
In one of his first speeches aer the election, Rouhani described the
socio-economic situation of the country as “very worrying.” With this
viewpoint, Rouhani understood that the first step to restart the country’s
economy was a resolution of the nuclear issue. he and his team believed
that once the nuclear issue was addressed, sanctions would be lied. as
a consequence, economic activity would pick up, foreign investment
would flow in, and Iran could begin to integrate itself further into the
international community.
following marathon negotiations, a final deal was reached in July
2015, shortly aer which Rouhani commenced a lengthy diplomatic
european trip starting in Italy, where he signed several commercial and
economic agreements. Rouhani’s other economic goals included:
a) Improving fiscal and monetary discipline to reduce inflation.
b) enabling economic recovery without strict austerity measures.
192 c) enhancing domestic capabilities and reducing dependence on oil
revenues.
to reach these goals, Rouhani has attempted to modify or cancel
many of ahmadinejad’s economic initiatives, including his costly attempts
at subsidy reform. e government raised gasoline prices twice by 2015
and cut three million wealthy Iranians from the cash handout list. how-
ever, further work remains to make the program sustainable (Maloney,
2015).
two years into his presidency, Rouhani’s most notable economic
achievement was reversing the contraction of Iran’s GDP and reducing
inflation such that the economy grew 3% in 2014, and inflation dropped
to 15.6% by early 2015. however, the economy still faced daunting chal-
lenges. unemployment remained above 10%, and youth unemployment
had reached nearly 27%. Some seven million Iranians (about 8% of the
population) were also living in extreme poverty. erefore, if Rouhani
strives to deliver on the high expectations and optimism in the wake of
the nuclear deal, he will have to find a way of addressing two major eco-
nomic issues: 1) the monopolistic hold of the Revolutionary Guards,
parastatal organizations, and privileged individuals over large sectors of
the economy; and 2) the precarious state of several major banks with
large portfolios of non-performing loans.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
5. KEY ASPECTS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS OF IRAN’S

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: LEARN FROM THE PAST TO IMPROVE
THE FUTURE
5.1. Foreign policy trends before Rouhani’s election
economic diplomacy plays a key role in the process of economic

development, including a series of measures which enhance government
policies in the fields of production, transfer of goods, services and labour
force. ese elements have become even more important over the last
years, characterised by a persistent economic and financial crisis that is
affecting not only the economic performances but also sovereignty of
countries. erefore, the presence within a nation of an effective, efficient
public and non-public apparatus which is capable of setting up and im-
plementing adequate strategies of economic diplomacy plays a strategic
role in the process of formulation, development, and protection of na-
tional interests. ese statements are particularly relevant for a country
such as Iran that has a high strategic and geo-economic role among the
international community due to its position in the heartland of the
world’s energy. Iran enjoys a special status for having the fourth biggest
oil reserves and the first biggest gas reserves in the world.
considering that known energy resources are dropping across the
globe and european countries have become increasingly dependent upon
193
hydrocarbon energy resources including oil and gas reserves, the impor-
tance of Iran as a source of energy supply to the world is expected to in-
crease. economic diplomacy should thus play a significant role for Iran’s
future economic development. clearly Iran’s foreign policies must shi
from an attitude of confrontation or aggression to one of conciliation
and business-oriented. is change is not new to Iran. Depending on
the policy agenda of each newly elected president, Iran has always been
characterised by continuous shis in the implementation of its foreign
policies.
on the other hand, since the establishment of Iran, the principles
of the Islamic Revolution have influenced the goals and strategies of
Iran’s foreign policies (haji-yousefi, 2009). ese values reported in the
new constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be summarized as
follows: 1) prevention of foreign domination on Iran; 2) non-alignment
towards the dominant and great powers; 3) establishment of relations
with peace-seeker states; 4) negation of seeking dominance by Iran over
other countries; 5) preservation of Iran’s independence in all aspects;
and 6) Islamic-Worldism and ird-Worldism. four principles out of
six attest to the fact that Iranians are extremely concerned with their in-
dependence and territorial integrity (haji-yousefi, 2010).
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e seizure of the u.S. embassy and the hostage crisis in november

1979 became an ordeal for revolutionary idealist foreign policy, which
pitted Iran against most countries in the world (Ramazani, 2009). By
the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980, Iran discovered
that it faced almost all countries in the international system, with both
the u.S. and Soviet union supporting the Iraqi regime. In response, Iran
adopted a self-sufficiency strategy in political and economic affairs that
isolated the country, as the logical consequence of the Iranian Islamic
Revolution and foreign policy in its early periods (haji-yousefi, 2008).
aer the ceasefire with Iraq in 1988 during President Rafsanjani’s
era, Iran put in the agenda to accept reality without revolutionary action
and to start economic reforms. Rationalism and pragmatism dominated
the Iranian foreign policy decision-making system. e principle of Iran’s
foreign policy during the leadership of Khomeini, stated in the motto
“neither east, nor West,” was affected theoretically and practically by a
new principle which may be called “both north and South” (Ramazani,
2009). roughout 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani’s government used foreign
lending to attract domestic and foreign investment. for example, despite
the intensification of u.S. sanctions against Iran, he awarded $1 billion
dollars to the american oil company conoco as a means of sending a
goodwill signal to the u.S. in an attempt to normalize the relationship
194 between the two countries aer the 1979 hostage crisis. e results of
such détente policy were fairly positive and a reduction of government
constraints supported a decent economic growth.
During Khatami’s presidency, coalition-making and a pragmatic ap-
proach were the dominant strategies in Iran’s foreign policies. Iran sought
friends in the international scene and developed its relations with other
countries, particularly its neighbours, to avoid external threats (Dehghani,
2009). is policy required Iran to accept the dominant order of inter-
national relations, to respect international rules and principles, and to
strive to create peaceful coexistence and cooperation with other countries
– particularly neighbouring and european countries – in order to solve
economic problems and crises resulting from the Revolution and the
Iran-Iraq War (asghandi, 2002). us, since the end of the Iran-Iraq
War, and especially aer the bipolar system collapsed, Iran’s foreign
policy has shied from a domestic-oriented, isolationist policy towards
an external-oriented, cooperationist policy.
notwithstanding the fact that Iran adopted a cooperationist strategy
in foreign policy, Western countries, particularly the u.S., did not di-
minish their hostility towards Iran. aer the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Iran
was placed in the “axis of evil” and Iran’s threat to regional and interna-
tional security was again highlighted by Israel. consequently, once ah-
madinejad took power in 2005, he emphasized the inefficiency of foreign
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
policy based on cooperation with the West and interaction with other
states. e new administration again started a foreign policy approach
based on a truculent posture towards Western countries and interaction
with other countries, particularly asia, arabia, and latin america. ah-
madinejad called for the eradication of Israel and denied the holocaust.
furthermore, he challenged america’s international dominance and
called for a new world order. following this line of thought, Iran’s gov-
ernment pushed ahead with the nuclear fuel enrichment program despite
new u.n. and u.S. sanctions between 2006 and 2010. is aggressive
approach concerning international relations with Western countries was
a poor move considering that economic and banking sanctions imposed
by the u.S., the e.u., and under u.n. Security council resolutions, and
the government’s own mismanagement severely dislocated the economy.
furthermore, the inability of his government to reform an inefficient
public administration and to fight corruption despite his proclaims
during the electoral campaign caused an immediate departure of several
foreign entrepreneurs from the country, thereby further worsening eco-
nomic conditions.
5.2. Rouhani’s period: the return of cooperative foreign policies and

economic diplomacy
When Rouhani took power, the country’s economic situation was

195
already in a state of chaos. his election marked a return to government
of men and (some) women with experience and common sense who
shared an immediate understanding that structural enhancement of the
country’s socio-economic conditions was correlated to the employment
of effective foreign policies. is was a key tool to bring the country out
of international isolation. Rouhani implemented the nuclear deal, which
awarded Iran partial relief from u.S. and e.u. sanctions. Immediately,
european and asian companies took steps to establish a foothold in the
Middle east’s second largest economy. Interestingly, only days aer the
deal was implemented, Iran engaged in several high-profile diplomatic
visits; for example, chinese President Xi Jinping visited Iran on January
22 and 23 and signed seventeen commercial agreements. two days later,
Rouhani embarked on his first trip to europe. During the four-day visit,
Iran inked deals worth $43 billion with french and Italian companies.
china, Italy, and france were major trade partners with Iran before sanc-
tions were tightened in 2010, and all are eager to boost economic ties
(Glenn, 2016).
erefore, if Iran wants to fix its socio-economic problems and play
a greater role in the international arena, the current ruling class should
solve mainly the issues of corruption especially within its bureaucratic
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
apparatus and difficult business environment which may deter foreign

investors. Simultaneously, the new political class should change the
paradigms of its economic diplomacy by applying the following princi-
ples:
a) Pleasant use om economic instruments in bargaining. e diplo-
matic system of the country should pay attention to economic instru-
ments in diplomatic negotiations and activities in the age of complex
and reciprocal relatedness.
b) Solving the present problems and complexities in relations between
Iran and great economic powers. e role of great powers like the u.S.,
e.u., Japan, china and Russia cannot be overlooked. under this view-
point, the first acts of Rouhani’s presidency are quite encouraging, con-
sidering that the distension of diplomatic relations – particularly between
Iran, u.S. and e.u. – has yielded a new flow of foreign investment towards
Iran.
c) More inclination of Iran’s diplomacy toward economic and com-
mercial problems. Iran’s diplomatic apparatus should be active with other
countries to attract foreign investment, to conduct marketing, and to
prepare the background for economic and commercial cooperation in a
preplanned and directive procedure.
d) Effort of foreign policy in operationalizing the economic and com-
196 mercial plans. e system of foreign policy effectively operationalizes
economic plans. Plans to transform Iran into a commercial, transit and
global energy centre may include the transfer of oil and gas from central
asia and caucasia to the Persian Gulf, India and Pakistan, and planning
for the transit corridor of north-South and transportation of oil from
central asia to europe through negotiations and innovation. is latter
aspect is particularly important considering that, for example, with liing
of the economic sanctions, Iran would be capable of restoring the full
capacity of its existing oilfields and finding new international outlets for
its oil, thereby achieving a production capacity of 4 mbd (Maugeri,
2016).
as previously discussed, it is imperative that Rouhani’s government
develop a more constructive relation between the official diplomatic ap-
paratus and the country’s economic and commercial system7.
7 this aspect also applies to Western governments. for example, the Ministry of
foreign affairs of Denmark in 2014 developed an action plan focusing on strategic
initiatives abroad aiming to: 1) optimize existing and create future market oppor-
tunities; 2) ensure Danish influence and access, politically and commercially; 3)
attract knowledge and investments to Denmark; 4) promote economic and com-
mercial competencies throughout the foreign Service, including recruitment of
business competencies to the Ministry Diplomatic corps, recruitment in the bu-

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
6. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND MAIN PLAYERS IN

IRANIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
tehran’s foreign policy is formulated and conducted not only by

the foreign Ministry. other institutions, such as the national Security
council, the President’s office, the office of the Supreme leader, and
the Parliament also participate. furthermore, the foreign policy deci-
sion-making process is influenced by advice from state think-tanks, dec-
larations and public statements of the Grand ayatollahs, and public
opinion as conveyed by the media. In practice, the problem of unclear
allocation of competencies between state and revolutionary institutions
is regulated by a three-step convention (hourcade, 2010; Posch, 2008):
a) foreign policy analysis and the real opinion-forming process
occur within the formal institutions. is is based on a mechanism of
intensive preliminary consultations in which the Supreme leader is as-
signed a central role.
b) e decision-making process occurs formally (institutions) and
informally (political networks) within the political elites to which not
only active but also former politicians belong, as do “non-political” cler-
ics.
c) e final decision is formulated by the Supreme leader as a con-
sensus reached by the political elite.
hereinaer are described the most prominent institutions involved
197
in the implementation of foreign policies in Iran.
e Foreign Ministry and the President’s Office. at the govern-
ment level, the foreign Ministry and the President’s office prepare
foreign policy decisions. eir clearly regulated competences assign the
president the stronger position, making it difficult for even proactive
foreign ministers to put their own stamp on foreign policy; for example,
foreign Minister Mottaki was removed from office by President ah-
madinejad at the end of 2010 (Posch, 2011). as president, he appointed
personal envoys for various regions of the world and spheres of interna-
tional policy who then de facto governed the foreign Ministry from the
President’s office.
however, their appointment represents the expression of an emerging
new generation of foreign policy personnel. e professional diplomats
who served the previous imperial regime or belonged to the first gener-
ation of revolutionaries in the foreign Ministry had graduated mainly
from european or u.S. universities. ey are now retiring from active
siness community for relevant positions, and stationing of staff in Danish and in-
ternational companies.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
service and are being replaced by actors who experienced the Iran-Iraq
war as soldiers and were educated entirely in Iran. is tendency in the
past, especially under ahmadinejad’s presidency, caused several diplomatic
problems and substantially was one of the factors that caused Iran’s in-
ternational isolation; for example, the extent to which the new generation
of Iranian diplomats lacks a cultural and political understanding of the
West is illustrated by their behaviour following the Western outcry
prompted by the so-called “holocaust conference” in 2006 (Posch,
2011). ey were incapable of recognising that the West viewed ah-
madinejad’s inflammatory statements in the context of the hardening of
the Iranian position on the nuclear issue. erefore, the fear that Iran
could eradicate Israel with nuclear weapons has dominated the image of
Iran in the eyes of the Western public.
e President, Parliament and Splinter Groups. e president
plays a central role in the political decision-making process. on the basis
of the constitution, he is responsible for setting new foreign policy em-
phases and priorities, with the only limitation being that he has to answer
for them before Parliament, the Supreme leader and the Supreme na-
tional Security council. is can lead to dramatically diverging inter-
pretations of Iranian foreign policy, as the example of Israel shows. Pres-
198 ident Khatami visited the synagogue in tehran, promoted his “Dialogue
among civilizations,” and conveyed that, in the event of a resolution of
the Middle eastern conflict, Iran did not wish to be «more Palestinian
than the Palestinians.» on the contrary, President ahmadinejad, quoted
an old statement of Khomeini about the need to eliminate Israel and or-
ganised the above-mentioned “holocaust conference” in 2006.
e situation is different with the various interest groups and political
groups, which exert influence both on public opinion and, through the
parliament, on decisions made by the president. yet even then, according
to the constitution and convention, the President is still in a stronger
position. e only situation in which an Iranian President can be con-
sidered feeble in the implementation of foreign policies occurs when
the Supreme leader publically withdraws his favour, as Mahmoud ah-
madinejad experienced from spring 2011 onwards if not indeed before.
Despite visible efforts to base decision-making on foreign policy
questions on a consensus, individual groups feel overlooked and try to
exert their influence through aggressive rhetoric. ese are groups con-
nected with the ideological volunteer militias (Basij and ansar-e hezbol-
lah8). While their activities are primarily directed towards domestic
8 not to be confused with hezbollah in lebanon.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
policy, they have influenced foreign policy issues such as Iran’s relationship
with Israel and the u.S.
e Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). is institutional
body is chaired by the President of the Republic and headed by a secretary
appointed by the president in consultation with the leader. It comprises
the most important representatives of the military (the General Staff,
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard corps or IRGc) and the secret service,
the foreign Minister, representatives of the Supreme leader, and other
ministers as required. e significance of the SnSc lies in the fact that
the president can declare any issue to be a matter of national security,
thus sometimes turning the SnSc into a kind of ersatz government (as-
gari, 2012).
e SnSc is primarily a technical administrative body. When it
comes to delicate substantive issues, it is assigned the function of a
clearing house which prepares various opinions and standpoints in the
institution into a final dra resolution for the Supreme leader. In most
cases, its work comprises the routine handling of security policy issues
led by the General Secretary in place of the President. above and beyond
this, the SnSc is the most important forum for the IRGc to present its
foreign policy ideas.
e Guardian Council, the Expediency Council and the Assembly
of Experts. e Guardian council, the expediency council and the as-
sembly of experts tend to be mainly consultative bodies. e clergy is
199
generally informed of important political events, such as nuclear negoti-
ations, but otherwise has a hands-off attitude to foreign policy. only
under ahmadinejad’s presidency there were such major tensions between
the clergy and the government that the clergy used its influence to
torpedo foreign policy. e Guardian council, the assembly of experts
and the expediency council have a right to hearings with the Supreme
leader. ey not only advise him but also coordinate the work of various
institutions such as the Parliament, the foreign Ministry and the SnSc.
ey also strive to maintain a balance between different political ten-
dencies with the aim of ensuring that foreign policy is supported by all
political forces.
ink-Tanks and Security Journals. like other countries, Iran has
research institutes for foreign and security policy from whose expertise
the foreign Ministry draws. e researchers at these institutes enjoy rel-
ative freedom in articulating their views. e majority of the think-tanks
were founded only in the early 1990’s under the Rafsanjani presidency;
for example, the Diplomatic School is primarily a training institute but
also engages in research. e main centre for research into foreign and
security policy is the center for International Research and education
(cIRe) which includes the internationally known Institute for Political
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
and International Studies (IPIS), a research centre and a political advisory

body. like the foreign Ministry, the expediency council also has its
own think tank, the center for Strategic Research (cSR), which likewise
conducts foreign and security policy research and participates in Iranian
track two diplomacy. Both institutes are well connected with the relevant
academic institutions and with the active diplomatic service. It is not
uncommon for Iranian diplomats to spend several years doing research
at one of these two institutions.
another relevant think-tank is the research unit of the Iranian par-
liament, the Majlis Research center (MRc), which was restructured in
2012 and acts as a port of call for foreign contacts. Interestingly, the
President’s office and military establishments (the army and the IRGc,
the joint general staff, military schools or academies) also have their own
foreign and security policy research units whose research findings are
published in renowned Iranian security journals (Journal for National
Security, Journal for National Defence, Name-ye Defa, Journal for Strategic
Information, all in Persian). an important role in the arena of foreign
policies’ studies is played by the Institute for Middle east Strategic Studies
(IMeSS) and the tehran International Studies and Research Institute
(tISRI). Both are independent institutes which publish several journals
and act as political advisory bodies.
200 lastly, mention should be made of the Internet, particularly the bl-
ogosphere and websites where members of the military and politicians
comment on foreign policy. ese Internet platforms and the above-
mentioned journals together make up the forums in which academics
and the general public can express their opinions on Iranian foreign
policy. In recent years, Iranian public diplomacy has become increasingly
important; for example, the founding of PressTV represented an attempt
by the Iranians to counteract the impact of Western public diplomacy
(uS State Department, nato) in the region and in Iran (Kiaei, 2012).
7. IRAN’S GEO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AFTER SANCTIONS

LIFTING
Geopolitics and foreign policy are closely connected to economic

matters. e Joint comprehensive Plan of action to which the P5+1
countries and Iran agreed in vienna (with the consequent liing of the
sanctions against Iran) will significantly change the political and economic
balance of power in the Middle east, and the global economic/strategic
relationships between Iran and the most relevant countries.
from this perspective, it is useful to remind that Iran, as one of the
foremost members of the organization of the Petroleum exporting
countries (oPec) and Gas exporting countries forum (Gecf) and
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
in relation to its strategic geographical position by which it ensures access

to markets within the region, will have an increasing role in forthcoming
economic and political issues. e new deal may transform Iran from a
potential power to an emerging regional power that could become a
future cornerstone of strategies of both the Western and non-Western
worlds.
Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran had a close commercial, eco-
nomic, and political relationship with the u.S. however, following the
u.S. embassy hostage crisis, support for terrorism, failure to comply with
the u.n. on its nuclear program, and human-rights violations, the broad-
ening of sanctions has substantially cleared economic relationships be-
tween the two countries. Iran has on the other hand developed significant
economic ties over the years with the most important e.u. countries in-
cluding Germany, Italy, france, and united Kingdom. however, these
relationships have been suspended aer the sanctions imposed by the
e.u. on account of the nuclear issue. to escape from such international
isolation, Iran has established an extensive network of diplomatic and
economic alliances with china, Japan, India, South Korea, Russia, turkey,
Brazil, and zimbabwe. ese alliances, together with the strengthening
of commercial and political relationships with western countries, would
greatly improve the future wealth of Iran’s population. e agreement
reached in vienna may be considered a turning point in early twenty-
first century geopolitics and economic development, potentially having
201
vast implications for years, and perhaps decades, to come. ending the
sanctions will allow Iran to return to normalcy and its economy to regain
its dynamism lost since the imposition of sanctions. furthermore, it will
provide Iran with access to an international market both for imports
and exports, as well as financing and investment. In short, Iran will rein-
tegrate itself into the global economy in order to continue to grow its
economic and political power.
obviously, for Western countries, liing of the sanctions upon Iran
is perceived as a new opportunity for corporations to rake in untold bil-
lions of dollars in profits by penetrating a virtually untapped market for
everything from consumer goods to energy investments and financial
services. In this way, Iran offers the potential for massive profits from a
market comprised of tens of millions of highly educated citizens and
thousands of small and medium sized companies seeking deals and
achieving growth in the near and long term.
In the future, Iran can offer to foreign investors numerous engineers,
computer technicians, scientists, and entrepreneurs who can be employed
immediately in the job market without any kind of training. furthermore,
the country already has much of the technical infrastructure in place to
rake in massive profits both for Iranian companies and those abroad.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
of course, in the new geopolitical scenario made possible by liing

of sanctions, the question of investment in Iran’s vast energy sector must
be taken into account. It is certainly no secret that Iran has one of the
largest reserves of energy in the world, as it has been a major player on
the global market for decades. however, because of the sanctions, not
only has the world been closed off to Iran to a large extent, but Iran has
likewise been a no-go zone for energy investments, especially for major
corporations. In one of the highest profile examples of this point, Italy’s
energy giant enI was forced to suspend billions of investments in Iran
due to sanctions and the political risk associated with the country. as
the Italian oil company was one of the most prominent buyers of Iranian
oil before the sanctions, this new geopolitical situation will undoubtedly
produce significant financial advantages for both countries, especially
aer President Rouhani’s recent visit in Italy9.
lastly, it must be said that if, on the one hand, the new trend of
Iran’s policies implemented by President Rouhani’s government appears
to move towards a more practical or business-oriented approach con-
cerning diplomatic relationships between Iran and the Western countries,
on the other hand, the Iranian government seriously needs to reform its
public administration including the diplomatic apparatus. is worth-
while process must be carried out as soon as possible, especially aer the
202 victory of reformists in the recent electoral round.
as previously discussed, Iran’s public sector remains plagued by lack
of a unitary tax system with capability to check all economic centres, es-
pecially those linked to the IRGc and some powerful pious foundations
which are not subdued to any fiscal regime; high levels of incompetence;
lack of coordination among the different government bodies; and a per-
vasive corruption that lowers the efficiency of the public administration.
consequently, one of the most important solutions for Iran’s socio-eco-
nomic recovery would be the establishment of a friendly business envi-
ronment in a manner which attracts foreign investment and is charac-
terised by well-defined rules and an efficient public administration.
CONCLUSIONS
In general, economic development in a geopolitical context charac-

terised by extreme complexities requires following logic-oriented foreign
9 During the visit, Iran and Italy signed multi-billion dollar contracts covering
various sectors including health, transportation, agriculture and energy. the con-
tracts, worth up to 17 billion euros (uSD 18.4 billion), were signed in a ceremony
attended by Iranian President hassan Rouhani and Italian Prime Minister Matteo
Renzi in Rome.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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relations and an expansion of friendly relations among commercial parties

through the tools of cooperation and economic diplomacy. Since the es-
tablishment of the Islamic Republic, military threats, Iraq’s war on Iran,
america’s military threats, and economic sanctions prioritised defence
and security as the dominant strategy of the country’s foreign policy ob-
jectives. consequently, dealing with these threats and preserving the
identity of the country became the top priorities of foreign policy; thus,
the armed forces attempted to play a more influential role in the deci-
sion-making process of foreign policy.
aer the end of the war with Iraq, political, military, and economic
threats against Iran continued in the following forms: 1) critical condition
of the surroundings, with the Iraqi army’s occupation of Kuwait and
the u.S.-led war on Iraq in the summer of 1990; 2) demolition of the
cccP and appearance of newly made states; 3) eagerness of the u.S. to
be present in districts with power vacuum; 4) the 9/11 attacks in 2001,
and the u.S. invasions of afghanistan and Iraq (both coordinated with
Iranian ruling elite, although the objectives between the u.S. and Iran
diverged aer the overthrow of the taliban regime in afghanistan and
Saddam in Iraq). erefore, the country consolidated and activated a
type of security-oriented foreign policy (heydari and alamdari, 2012).
is attitude became even stronger during ahmadinejad’s presidency,
when the country was plagued by a lengthy series of wrong choices in
foreign and economic policies. ahmadinejad’s aggressive foreign policies
203
increasingly discouraged foreign investment and attempted to make the
economy more self-reliant. however, this inward direction and con-
strained ability to source capital goods or raw materials from abroad
caused a misallocation of resources and limited overall growth.
consequently, as President Rouhani declared in an open letter to
first vice President eshaq Jahangiri, «it is time for Iran to undertake a
large number of structural reforms able to boost the economic perfor-
mances of the country, enhancing at the same time the well-being of the
population and reducing the relevant youth unemployment rate that
still affects Iran» (Baddawi, 2015). ese reforms will be focused gener-
ally on enhancing the banking sector, amending the country’s investment
legal framework, and increasing a unitary fiscal discipline. as previously
discussed, this reform package may be implemented more easily aer
the recent 2016 parliamentary electoral round. however, Rouhani’s ad-
ministration will have to deal with the fact that the IRGc considers for-
eign investments, particularly those of the West, as a potential threat to
not only the country’s national security, but also the Guards’ control of
the private sector which they have used for several years to manipulate
the economic scene. of course this aspect would affect the successful re-
sults that Rouhani’s economic diplomacy activity has reached to date.
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PROSPETTIVE
Recently Rouhani carried out a successful business/diplomatic journey

to the most important european capital cities.
Immediately aer the recent nuclear deal, foreign Direct Investment
(fDI) increased significantly, reaching $3 billion. tehran is presently
eyeing between $100 billion and $185 billion of foreign investment in
its oil and gas sector. is would exceed the $157 billion in foreign in-
vestments that Mohammad Bagher nobakht, the President’s adviser for
Supervision and Strategic affairs, expects Iran to secure for its 2016-21
five-year developmental plan, which predicts an economic boom fol-
lowing the nuclear deal and sets targets for investment, employment, ex-
ports, and other economic indicators accordingly.
It is quite clear that Rouhani’s administration has to overcome the
IRGc’s entrenched economic interests, which obstruct the development
of an attractive investment environment. In fact, the IRGc has had a
noteworthy presence in the Iranian economy since Iran embarked on
liberalization in the early 1990’s. aer the war with Iraq, President Raf-
sanjani tasked the Guards with assisting the government in reconstructing
the country, which allowed the IRGc to expand into the oil, housing,
agriculture, mining, and transportation sectors, among others. is trend
continued, and under ahmadinejad’s presidency, the IRGc engineering
conglomerate Khatam al-anbia was awarded an unprecedentedly large
204 number of no-bid contracts. Between 2006 and 2013, the IRGc was
awarded an estimated 10,000 projects (Badawi, 2015).
In view of the above issues, the current Iranian government must
adopt a series of measures and reforms. Beyond the necessity of a more
inclusive political system, the most critical measures and reforms include:
1) Reform of the diplomatic apparatus towards a more business-
oriented approach.
2) Sustain the effort towards a more effective public administration
through the systematic use of administrative reviews to balance quality
of service delivery and efficient public spending.
3) continue moving towards a performance-focused public admin-
istration through high-quality indicators that systematically track public
administration performance. a meritocratic process could be imple-
mented also through new policies capable of attracting the best univer-
sities’ graduate students and midcareer transfers.
4) an essential, effective fight against corruption to support long-
term growth and restore trust in government, considering that Iranian
citizens identified corruption as a key factor that exacerbated the eco-
nomic crisis.
5) e limitation of IRGc power. If Rouhani’s administration wants
to be successful in achieving a more productive business environment, it
needs to find a clever legislative solution to this difficult problem.
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
In consideration of the seriousness of the above discussed problems,

it is quite clear that the current Iranian government will be unable to
solve them quickly. however, there are no excuses. It is only a matter of
political willingness to commence this long trip towards a better country
with grand ambitions and to return to play a significant role in the in-
ternational arena. With its geostrategic position in virtue of its civilization,
cultural history, human and economic resources, and its historical voca-
tion for stability regardless of the current political order, Iran remains
an essential country for regional and international security.
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V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
Iran’s National Interests

and the Geo-Strategic Imperative
leRe aMuSan, Ph.D. & SaMuel oyeWole
(1) Department of Politics and International Re-

lations, North-West University (South Africa), Pro-
fessor (2) Department of Political Science, University
of Ilorin (Nigeria), Postgraduate Student
ABSTRACT: Since the end of the Cold War, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has
ascended to geostrategic importance in the Middle East (ME), Caucasia, Central Asia
and beyond. Though unwelcomed by Saudi Arabia and many other Arab states, Israel,
and the United States (US); Iran has a range of influences in Iraq, Syria, the Persian
Gulf and among the Shia population in the ME and beyond. Despite their differences
in many post-Soviet states, Iran has improved relations with Russia and positioned
itself as a revisionist player at the regional level. The sources of the IRI’s behavior have
become a subject of debate, given the series of animosities generated by its foreign poli-
cies across time and space. This study explores the geostrategic framework of the IRI’s
quests for security, power and influence through a dual – but seemingly unconnected
– foreign policy approach based on realism and idealism. The study concludes that
Iran’s national interests (NI) are products of the available opportunities and challenges
faced by the country in the international arena.
KEYWORDS: NATIONAL INTERESTS OF IRAN, BALANCE OF POWER, MIDDLE EAST
INTRODUCTION
t he IRI has evolved amidst a hostile regional balance of power

since the 1979 Revolution in the country. however, the end of
the cold War has shied the geopolitics of the region in favor
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
of Iran. e collapse of the union of Soviet Socialist Republics (uSSR)

between 1990 and 1992 substituted the threat against Iran from the
northern border with opportunities for the latter to expand its influence
in the same direction among post-Soviet states. is development eased
the fear of the IRI over the Soviet’s long desire for access to fresh water
in the Indian ocean, the military incursion into afghanistan and the
support for hostile neighbors such as Iraq. e threat against Iran from
the western border was also reduced with the rollback of Iraq’s annexa-
tion of Kuwait (1990-1991), shortly aer the Iraq-Iran War, by a coali-
tion force led by the uS. Iraq was subsequently subdued by america in
2003, a development that has neutralized the threat of the former against
neighboring countries and brought the post-war regime dominated by
the Shias close to Iran on socio-political grounds (anderson and Stans-
field, 2004; freedman, 2008). to the east, america led coalition forces
snowballed to the fall of the taliban government in afghanistan, a de-
velopment that contributed to the raise of Iran’s influence and power in
the region.
e growing geostrategic importance of Iran in international politics
has generated mix reactions across the world. Iran has recently attracted
some roles (as a socio-economic and cultural partner in central asia
and the caucasus) and respect as a power to be reckoned with in the re-
210 gion (Kaplan, 2009; Khanna, 2009, pp. 227-233). Many post-Soviet
states, especially those around the caspian Sea and in central asia, have
continuously viewed Iran as a regional power that can contribute to their
efforts to develop culturally, economically and politically; and to reduce
their dependence on Russia (atai, 2008; Koolaee and hafezian, 2010;
nourhanov, 2012). ough Iran has been an unwanted contender for
influence among post-Soviet states, Russia also considers tehran as a
partner in its efforts to balance the united States and its allies in Syria
and the Me as a whole (oyewole, 2015). In the same way, Russia, china,
north Korea and venezuela and other seasoned enemies of the ameri-
can-dominated world order consider the IRI as a friend and (potential)
strategic partner in their revisionist ends (christensen, 2015). Moreover,
the Shias, who constitute the political minority in some parts of the
Me, asia and africa, have always viewed the IRI as a source of motivation
and support for regime change or at least favorable policy concessions
in their various countries.
e growing relevance of the IRI in international politics has become
an important source of concern. as the core of Shia Islam (see further
below) and promoter of militant Islamism in a Sunni dominated region,
the IRI is considered by many arab countries as an outcast power in the
region. Beyond the ideological incompatibility in the Me, especially
since 1979, there is a growing animosity in power balance between the
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
IRAN’S NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE GEO-STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE
IRI and other regional powers such as Israel, Saudi arabia and turkey
since the end of the cold War (Mabon, 2016; Rezaei and cohen, 2014;
Rich, 2012). furthermore, the uS and european powers have favored
and supported allies such as Israel, Saudi arabia and turkey against the
IRI in the regional balance of power. ough some small states in the
region consider Iran as a balancer in some considerations, many of them
have learned to be careful of tehran’s nuclear ambition. e enormous
influence of Saudi arabia in the global oil market is moderating the po-
sition of emerging powers such as china and India in the regional balance
of power. a catch 22 scenario ensured because many countries in africa
and elsewhere are swinging positions between the fears of a nuclearizing
Iran and suspicion of the uS presence and primacy in the Me.
Iran’s nI is a product of the sum total of available opportunities
and challenges faced by the Islamic Republic in the international system.
Several efforts have been made to understand the sources of Iran’s foreign
policy by observers of international affairs. however, the determinants
and directions of the state’s nI have continued to generate intense debates.
ese debates have been dominated by Western scholars, politicians and
journalists, who are largely selective in treating the subject of Iran’s nI
and international behavior. is is not surprising as issues of sponsoring
terrorism and nuclear ambition have overshadowed every other matter
and become the most appealing framework for understanding the grand
strategy of the IRI. Moreover, academic investigations of the post-1979
211
constitution that emphasize Islamic internationalism have led many an-
alysts to conclude that the foreign policy of the IRI is idealistic rather
than realistic. Quite differently, this paper seeks to examine Iran’s nI
within the framework of the regional and global power balance. e
paper thus focuses on the geostrategic imperative of Iran’s external en-
gagements.
SECURITY CONCERNS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
nI can assume different meanings in different contexts (frankel,

1988). first, it means the aspirations of the state. Second, it can be used
operationally, in application to the specific policies and programs pursued
by a state in the international arena. ird, it can be used polemically in
political arguments, to explain, rationalize or criticize the position of a
state in international affairs (frankel, 1988, p. 93). Many attempts to
understand Iran’s nI fall under the critical polemic category, as they are
largely political arguments on the rationale for the Iranian nuclear bomb
and Iran’s ambitions to renew its Persian identity (Khanna, 2009; Sherrill,
2012; Seliktar, 2011; Waltz, 2012). Most of these attempts have simply
denied the rationality in whatever constitutes Iran’s nI on the basis of
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
some selective evidence (ahmadi, 2008; Sherrill, 2012). ahmadi (2008)

went further to describe the IRI’s interest as largely idealistic on the
basis of its anti-national and Islamic Internationalist orientation. In this
way, Iranian foreign policymakers are easily assumed to be less objective
in assessing the threats to the security of their country and balance it
with aspirations for economic development through rational policy pro-
grams.
all states are driven by some common interests in the international
system, of which security is primary in the form of protection of a nation’s
physical (territorial), political and cultural identity and survival against
encroachments from outside ( Johari, 2009). Despite the common ten-
dency among observers to ignore, underplay or undermine the course of
Iran’s nI, there is insufficient evidence to show that the successive gov-
ernments of the country have been less sensitive to protect the nation’s
territorial integrity, political regime and cultural identity, prevent en-
croachments from outside powers and chart economic development
paths. Iran is not in any way unique in this geostrategic context. Security
is a common interest shared by every state, and which they always protect
at all cost. however, the process and means considered in defining the
security of a state remain a subject of debate. at the conventional level,
the debate is between structuralists and humanists. e latter is premised
212 upon the fact that the security concerns of a state derive from multiple
factors, including inherent human fear, morality, construct and discourse
(Baylis, Smith and owens, 2014). e position of the structuralists is
that the quest for security by a state is a product of the pressures of the
external environment and the capacity of the state (Waltz, 2000).
In order to guarantee the security aspirations of a state, there is an
overriding need to develop necessary capabilities to defend it against
other states with some competing interests (Morgenthau, 1991; Waltz,
2000). is is important as the idea of a “global policeman” popularized
at the end of the cold War against the conception of the international
system as anarchical has waned recently. e continuous rise of other
powers has reclined the primacy of the uS and reduced the relevance of
its self-ascribed position as the “global policeman” in international politics
(Gills, 2008; huntington, 1999; MacDonald and Parent, 2011). e
crimean crisis shows that self-help has remained a more reliable security
option than collective security or any other global policing. e crisis
triggered by Moscow in its annexation of crimea would have been de-
terred if ukraine did not relinquish all the nuclear weapons inherited
from the uSSR in exchange for a security guarantee from Russia, the
uS and france in 1999 (calvocoressi, 2001).
States have not been dissuaded by the multiplicity of their engage-
ments in the international arena to reconsider survival as anything other
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
than a primary interest. It will be idealist for anyone to expect a state to

think or act otherwise with the return of geopolitics and associated
strategies in a post-american world order (huntington, 1999; Kotkin,
2016; MacDonald and Parent, 2011). Realists have maintained that se-
curity is a primary aspiration of every state, and the quest for power and
influence are the only available policy programs that can guarantee this
objective. Iran is not in any way unique in this realm. e security con-
cerns of the IRI cannot be disconnected from the fear of (im)morality,
construct, discourses and actions of other states in the international sys-
tem. Iran’s nI is, therefore, considered as a product of the structure
under which the Islamic Republic operates and explores in the light of
the geostrategic framework.
THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

AND DISTANCE
e relevance of geography in international politics has been un-

derexplored in recent years. is development is a result of a basic logic
of globalization that has undermined geographical considerations with
the assumption that time and space have been compressed, which literarily
means that distance is fading away and space is shrinking (axford, 2013).
nevertheless, security threats have not faded with distance nor shrunk
with space. is implies that geography still matters in the strategic cal-
213
culations of states in international politics. Geography has retained a
key position in determining the strategic behavior of a state in interna-
tional affairs, despite the prevailing belief to the contrary recently (Porter,
2015). although technological innovation transcends territoriality of
strategic national interests such as territorial integrity, stability of a po-
litical system, socio-cultural and economic development, and political
independency/autonomy of state; these cannot be guaranteed by disre-
garding geopolitics.
e euphoria of the “shrunk of distance” is evident following the
uS response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in early 1990s. however, it
would have been more difficult if not impossible for the coalition forces
led by the uS to liberate Kuwait without allies and bases in the region.
e operation was largely coordinated from the uS base in Saudi arabia.
Moreover, the contiguity of Kuwait to Iraq prompted the latter to invade
the former (freedman, 2008). likewise, the close location of Georgia
and ukraine to Russia have recently made it attractive for Moscow to
violate their territorial integrity, while the far distance involved between
the countries and capabilities that would be required in the frontlines
have reduced the possibility of direct intervention of and confrontation
with the uS (lukyanov, 2016; treisman, 2016). In a similar way, the
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
distance between Israel and Iran is among the factors believed to have
deterred the former from invading the latter in attempts to destroy its
nuclear facilities (eilam, 2013). Since there is no shared land border be-
tween the two countries, Israel’s options are largely limited to airstrikes.
Such operations will require a closer base and massive deployment of
warplanes, which are less possible without alarming the enemy and the
region as a whole (eilam, 2013).
e immediate neighbors of a state and their locations are very sig-
nificant for the assessment of threats and strategic behavior of every state
(amusan, 2008). Israel is a regional power largely considered in Iran as a
security threat against the Islamic Republic. In this way, some observers
have argued that the IRI is responding to a call for power balance in the
region (Waltz, 2012). Moreover, the existence of Iran as a Shia-dominated
state in a Sunni-dominated region is another source of security concern
for the Republic. likewise, the military presence of the uS and its allies
in afghanistan and Iraq aer the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
was more threatening to Iran than a hostile superpower at a distance
(afrasiabi and Maleki, 2003; Barzegar, 2007-08; 2010). In this way, con-
cerns over territorial integrity and encroachments from outside powers,
political stability, economic development and socio-cultural identity
cannot be underplayed in Iran’s nI and quest for power and influence
214 cannot be misplaced in its foreign policy. nevertheless, Iran’s raison d’être
for security with the quest for power and influence have alarmed many
of its neighbors, the contending regional players and the international
community at large (Khannan, 2009). is development has further be-
come a source of insecurity for Iran, which is oen isolated and encircled,
and a catalyst for a security dilemma in the region.
IRAN AND THE RING OF HOSTILITY
e IRI has been locked in layer upon layer of hostility in interna-

tional politics in recent years. few sources of hostility against Iran pre-
dated its 1979 revolution. e animosity between the arab states and
Iran can be traced back to the birth of the Safavid empire and the adop-
tion of Shia Islam as its official faith. e Shia sect was born out of the
confusion surrounding succession of leader of the community of believers
and the subsequent killing of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad
in a failed rebellion led by him against the caliphate in the late 7th cen-
tury (Riddell and cotterell, 2003). e differences between Sunnis and
Shias have remained till date. a study by the Pew forum on Religion
and Public life (PfRPl) shows that Shias make up 10-13 per cent and
the Sunnis 87-90 per cent of the total population of Muslims in the
world. With 90-95 per cent Shia population and 37-40 per cent of the
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
world total Shias, Iran is recognized as the core of Shiism (PfRPl,

2009). With this development, the IRI has always been seen as the
beckon of the Islamic religion, thus making it a cornerstone of the state
foreign policy to encourage proliferation of the Shia “sect” at the global
level with an emphasis on the arab world. is is concretized by article
152 and 154 of the Iranian post-revolution constitution, which charge
the IRI to defend the rights of all Muslims and support the struggle of
the mostaz‘afin (oppressed people) against the mostakberin (oppressors)
across the world (ahmadi, 2008; Mauriello and Marandi, 2016).
ough the hostility between Iran and the arab states predates the
revolution, it has become very pronounced aer it. e revolution over-
threw a conservative monarch and established an Islamic Republic based
on the theocratic Islamic system of the velayat-e faqih in its place. e
anti-monarchy position of the revolution brought the IRI in direct con-
flict with Saudi arabia and other Gulf states governed by monarchs
(Rich, 2012; takeyh, 2014). Moreover, the religious basis of the post-
revolution regime brought the differences between the Shias and Sunnis
to the frontline of the arab-Iranian relations aer 1979. In 1980, Iraq
unilaterally withdrew from the algiers agreement of 1975 that settled
its territorial dispute with Iran and invaded the latter thereaer (anderson
and Stansfield, 2004). In reaction to this development, the arab states,
except for Syria and libya, saw the Iraq-Iran war (1980-88) as a contin-
uation of Sunni-Shia hostility and threw their weights behind Iraq
215
(Rezaei and cohen, 2014; Rich, 2012). e arab position in the war
was largely reinforced by the uS and european powers, which deployed
their naval power to the disadvantage of Iran (anderson and Stansfield,
2004; freedman, 2008; Ganji, 2013). furthermore, the international
community was largely silent on the use of chemical weapons by the
Iraqi army against the Iranians during the war. is development hardens
the IRI’s position on the importance of power capability for self-defense
and influence.
Iran had lived with the threat of Russia from its northern border
since the early 19th century. e first Russo-Iranian territorial war dates
back to 1804-13. Russia’s influence expanded in caucasia and aimed to
have access to the Gulf. Iran faced different territorial losses, and a re-
maining portion of Iran was saved and its independence guaranteed
based on the British desire to use the country as a buffer zone against
Russia (Keddie, 2003). e uSSR renewed Russian expansionist foreign
policy aer the Second World War, following the decline of British in-
fluence in the region. attempts to reinforce Western influence and gain
control of arab oil fields, and contain the threat of communism, increased
the uS presence in the region. is rendered Iran a theatre of crises and
competition at the onset of the cold War, although the country became
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
a uS strategic ally aer the Iran-azerbaijan crisis, stemmed from the

uSSR refusal to relinquish occupied Iranian territory (Mcfarland, 1994).
amidst these, Mohammad Mosaddeq emerged as the Iranian Premier
in 1951 and implemented a series of nationalization policies that affected
american and British interests in the country. In response, both the uS
and Britain collaborated with the Shah to sponsor a coup that overthrew
Mosaddeq and installed a royal dictator, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in
1953 (Keddie, 2003; takeyh, 2014).
although the Shah Regime was locally unpopular in Iran, it was
maintained by Western powers because their interests were at the front
burner of the king’s policies. e regime shared common interests with
Western powers over the threat of Soviet expansion, with Israel over the
threat of arab hostility and with the Gulf States over the threat of Pan-
arabian nationalism led by egypt against the stability of monarchical
states in the region (Keddie, 2003; Rezaei and cohen, 2014; Rich, 2012).
however, the 1979 revolution eroded all these common interests as the
new regime ushered in a different strategic perspective. e success of
the revolution is primarily based on its ability to undermine the influence
of america and Britain in the country. In this way, the revolution included
a scene where the uS embassy was seized and its diplomats taken as
216 hostages. e Shah was also allowed into the uS aer he was deposed
(Glad, 1989). is, among other developments, set the tone of the ani-
mosity between the IRI and Western powers since 1979.
at the regional level, the anti-monarchical dimension of the revo-
lution dissipated the previous common interests between Iran and the
Gulf States, which set the tone of their animosity. e Saudis rejected
the religiosity of the post-revolution regime and called on Iranians to
stand against it. e Islamic Republic also rejected the legitimacy of the
al Saud as a beckon of the Islamic religion and tacitly supporting the
Shia population in the country (Mabon, 2016; Rich, 2012). is among
others have turned Riyadh and tehran into unending rivals for regional
hegemony. In this way, the IRI goes beyond the call for revolution in the
arab states of the Gulf to support those that yielded to the call. e po-
sition of the Gulf States in the Iraq-Iran War was also consistent with
this development. nevertheless, Iran was not totally unpopular in the
region. oman and Qatar have developed warm relations with tehran,
while the united arab emirates (uae) have maintained a normal rela-
tion with the IRI despite constant support for Western sanctions against
it (Guzansky, 2015a). Besides Saudi arabia, Bahrain also is a major hard-
liner in the Gulf states animosity against the IRI. as a state with between
65 and 75 per cent of Shia population but ruled by a Sunni monarch,
Bahrain has always alleged that Iran is sponsoring subversive forces
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
against the lilliputian Kingdom (PfRPl, 2009). erefore, their rela-

tions are always at low ebb.
e radical religious orientation of the Islamic Republic also shied
Iran from accepting an olive branch extended by Israel because of the
Jewish state amidst the unresolved Palestinian question. Israel tried in
vain to maintain friendly relations with the IRI and covertly supplied
the state with weapons in the course of the Iraq-Iran War (Rezaei and
cohen, 2014). Iran is consistently maintaining military, diplomatic and
political support for hamas in Palestine and hezbollah in lebanon di-
rectly and indirectly through its strategic partnership with Syria. In this
way, Iran has been involved in subversive activities against tel aviv’s po-
sition in Palestine and sponsors terrorist activities within Israel and
against the country’s interests across the world (Mabon, 2016; Parsi,
2008). Moreover, tehran has not hidden its displeasure for the existence
of the Jewish state. ese, among other things, have reinforced animosity
against Iran in the uS and europe.
e honey moon between Iran and the uSSR aer the revolution
did not last long, the radical religious mobilization of the Islamic Republic
threatened to inspire rebellion among the Soviet Muslim population in
caucasia and central asia. at the same time, Soviet military intervention
in the internal affairs of afghanistan in 1979 alarmed the IRI over the
ever present danger from its northern border. During the cold War, the
afghanistan crisis turned into a proxy war between the uS and the
217
Soviet union. e country also received thousands of Sunni militants
fighting the Soviets. is was a twine threat for the Islamic Republic,
the presence of Sunni militants and their military support from the uS
in its neighborhood was perceived as a future seed of instability in Iran.
aer the Soviet withdrawal from afghanistan, the country was thrown
into chaos and tribal war started in which the taliban emerged victorious
with the support of the uS. e taliban government was another radical
religious-based regime in the region. however, the limited capacity of
the regime to govern the country and its accommodation for militant
movements became another source of threat for the Iranian state.
e September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the uS and the subse-
quent global war against terrorism further redefined the ring of hostilities
around Iran. e attacks were planned and coordinated by the al Qaida
terrorist network, hosted by the taliban regime in afghanistan (Bobbitt,
2008). america led the north atlantic treaty organization’s (nato)
invasion of afghanistan soon aer the attacks. In 2003, the uS also led
a «coalition of the willing» and invaded Iraq on the basis that Saddam
hussain’s government supported terrorism and was building nuclear
weapons in defiance to non-proliferation concerns of the global com-
munity. although the two invasions offered Iran some opportunities,
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
they also brought about an encirclement of the IRI by hostile powers

with the american military presence in the eastern and western borders
of the country.
e IRI has been on its way to develop nuclear weapons since the
Shah in 1974 announced a plan for energy diversification (Katouzian
and Shahidi, 2008). Iran’s motives have generated skepticisms and the
country has attracted sanctions and hostilities because of its nuclear
policy (Guzansky, 2015b; o’Sullivan, 2010; Sherrill, 2012). ere is fear
that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is putting pressure on Saudi arabia,
egypt and turkey and may plug the whole region into an arms race
(fuhrmann, 2009). It also endangers the security of neighboring post-
Soviet states in central asia that have relinquished inherited weapons
and adopted a nuclear free zone (Gleason, 2012). on this basis, Iran’s
relations with arab states, Israel and Western powers have grown hostile.
In this way, under the Bush administration, america announced that
Iran, Iraq and north Korea are an «axis of evil» and has contemplated
military option against tehran since the Iraqi invasion of 2003. at the
same time, america has increased its military presence in caucasia and
the Gulf States. on many occasions, the IRI has also found itself on the
brink of war with Israel on this subject. all these developments have
shown that Iran is largely encircled by hostile powers.
218 OPPORTUNITIES AMIDST HOSTILITIES
e IRI has witnessed a series of windows of opportunities for sur-

vival, power and influence despite the ring of hostility around it. Some
of the windows of opportunities are rooted in the pattern of the 1979
revolution and the religious bases of the Islamic Republic. e revolution
is a significant turning point in the Muslim world. It has turned Iran
into a role model for many of the radical minds and revolutionary forces
in the Islamic world. is made it possible for the IRI to sponsor revolu-
tionary forces in an attempt to deter or reciprocate the hostilities of
some of its neighbors. Moreover, the religious basis of the Republic
places Iran in the position of defendant of Shia interests across the world.
is made it possible for Iran to develop the capacity to influence the
internal affairs of countries with significant Shia populations, including
azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, lebanon, Saudi arabia and yemen.
also worth noting is the fact that, in its struggle for survival, power
and influence, Iran has collaborated with many other states designated
by the West as pariah states. e IRI received support from libya, Syria
and north Korea in its struggle for survival during the war with Iraq. at
the same time, Iranian secret agents were privileged to acquire the knowl-
edge and materials for nuclear weapons designed by the Pakistani weapon
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
hero, Dr. aQ Khan in the 1980s. ere are, however, some evidences
that indicate that the transfer was not officially sanctioned by the Pakistani
state. Dr. aQ Khan has been implicated in the illegal transfer of know-
how and materials for designing nuclear weapons to Iran, Iraq, libya
and north Korea (Bobbitt, 2008). e hostility between Iran and the
West has occasionally served the revisionist ends of Russia, china and
other emerging powers (Khanna, 2009; Kaplan, 2009). In this way, Iran’s
economy and military have benefited from a growing revisionism among
world order actors.
e collapse of the uSSR and the emergence of post-Soviet states
in caucasia and central asia provided Iran with significant opportunities
to expand its influence. Iran is popular in many of the post-Soviet states
as one of the regional power balancers and a key revisionist player. e
Iranian state has, therefore, struggled to improve cultural, economic,
political and technical influence in the region. In tajikistan, for example,
Iran is highly popular for promoting pan-Iranianism and the Persian
legacy in the post-Soviet state. economic assistance, infrastructural de-
velopment, intervention during the civil war and other stabilization
measures in the country served as political socialization and prestige for
the tehran government (nourzhanov, 2012). Moreover, Iran supplies
electricity, oil and gas at concessionary prices to many states in the region
in exchange for political, cultural and diplomatic support. Iran filled the
vacuum when Russia cut its gas supply to Georgia in 2006 (Koolaee and
219
hafezian, 2010).
Despite the expanding influence of Iran in caucasia and central
asia, the presence of america, Russia and turkey in the region has cur-
tailed tehran’s influence in some of its political and economic adventures.
e uS has directly intervened to undermine many economic, military
and technical initiatives for collaboration between Iran and regional
players. In this way, the uS pressure forced armenia to reject Iran’s offers
to mediate the armenia-azerbaijan dispute (Koolaee and hafezian,
2010). turkey has received a boost from the West to counter-balance
Iran’s influence and act as a model of liberal (Islamic) democracy in the
region. nevertheless, Iran’s economic and cultural diplomacy has seen
some measure of success among post-Soviet states in caucasia and central
asia. ese have yielded some headways for Iran at the political front,
despite the international pressure to the contrary. Iran was able to secure
agreements from many of its neighbors and other states in asia in an at-
tempt to undermine america’s influence in the area; and, by extension,
making it a remote strategic option for Washington to invade Iran. In
an effort to avert a full-fledged war and a global economic crisis, the uS
had to rely on non-military options, such as diplomacy, sanctions, and
covert operations, to prevent Iran from acquiring a bomb (Kroenig,
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
2012; o’Sullivan, 2010). Despite always competing with each other,

India and china are working towards bringing the IRI, azerbaijan, Kaza-
khstan, turkmenistan and other former Soviet republics together for an
unperturbed supply of oil and gas for the two emerging economies (Ka-
plan, 2009). Moreover, Iran has committed efforts to override its ideo-
logical imperatives in consideration of the geopolitical opportunities of
allying itself with Russia, china and central asian states within the
framework of the Shanghai cooperation organization (Sco) (ak-
barzadeh, 2015). is is to better position Iran with revisionist powers
against the uS.
Many of the uS policies in the Middle east have turned out to be
unintended blessings for the IRI1. ese include the decision of the uS
to lead a coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991. e military
operation of the coalition reduced the power capacity of Iraq to further
threaten its neighbors in the region (anderson and Stansfield, 2004;
freedman, 2008). Israel’s decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear facility also
relieved Iran of the threat of a nuclearizing Iraq. Moreover, the global
war against terrorism led by america has brought mix blessings for Iran.
e uS invasion of afghanistan and Iraq was earlier supported by Iran,
in the hope that it could settle its differences with the West. however,
220 the Pentagon soon unveiled different military options against Iran. In
response, Iran supported some rebel movements to tie uS and its coalition
down in afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, tehran secured agreements
with many of the countries in the region to deny their territories as for-
ward military bases for a possible american invasion of the country.
Iran’s cultural diplomacy yielded some gains for the country in the
Me. e most important gain for the IRI is how post-Saddam hussain
Iraq has come under a Shia dominated government (anderson and Stans-
field, 2004; Barzegar, 2007-8; 2010; ehteshami, 2003; IcG, 2005). e
Shia branch of Islam is recently estimated to have 65-70 per cent of Iraqi
population as adherers (fRPl, 2009). ethnic conservative estimates
recorded the Shias as 55-60 per cent, the Sunnis as 20-25 and the Kurds
as 20 per cent in Iraq (anderson and Stansfield, 2004). however, Iraq
had been governed by Sunni-dominated governments since its creation
in 1921. e IRI has identified with the Shias of Iraq and maintained
favorable relations with them throughout the odd days from Saddam
hussain’s regime to the country’s civil war (Khedery, 2015). Presently,
the regional influence of the IRI has increased since the american-im-
1 for a comprehensive discussion on this, see Foreign Affairs, november/December

2015 issue. also see Marc lynch’s and Jessica Stern’s contributions on the same
issue in Foreign Affairs, September/october 2015 issue.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
posed majoritarian democracy on Iraq, which is by implication a friendly

Shia-dominated government.
e situation in Syria appears to be contrary to what obtains in Iraq
in terms of the regional influence of the IRI. e Shias are in the minority
numerically in Syria, they constitute about 15-20 per cent of the popu-
lation. nevertheless, Syria has been ruled by a Shia-dominated govern-
ment in the last five decades (Mihaylov 2013). In this way, Syria has
been a strategic ally to the IRI regional policy. Syria is the basic reason
why Iran’s influence has gained grounds in lebanon and its covert war
with Israel sustained through hezbollah (hokayem, 2012). hezbollah
has further expanded the so-called Shia crescent and Iran’s influence in
the Me and africa (Wege, 2012). likewise, with their renowned culture
of migration, the lebanese have become instrumental in the spread of
Shia Islam and Iran’s influence in africa (leichtman, 2015). Iran also
sponsors many militant Shia and Sunni movements, including the
houthis and hamas. however, the fate of the IRI-supported government
in Syria has remained uncertain amidst the arab Spring. e uprising in
Syria has been exploited by the Gulf states to settle old scores with the
(Shia) alawi regime as well as by Israel and Western powers that want to
reduce Iran’s influence in the region. ese informed the drive to sponsor
some opposition rebel movements in Syria by the uS and the Gulf states,
such as Saudi arabia and Qatar (Mabon, 2016).
e position of the Syrian government has been seriously weakened
221
in the recent past. e Syrian army had proven to be incapable of con-
taining the expanding influence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), until the military intervention of Iran and Russia (both long-
standing strategic allies of Syria). e Gulf states are suspected to have
sponsored this group and other radical religious motivated rebel groups
in the country until recently (see the contribution by Marandi and Mau-
riello to this special issue). e secular opposition rebel groups with a
nationalist agenda sponsored by america have proved less battle worthy
in Syria. however, in Syria, Iran and Russia are turning the tide against
the rebels, the Gulf states and the interests of Western powers. Russia
has deployed air power to Syria and equipped and trained its army in
counterinsurgency. Iran has supported Syria with weapons, training, re-
connaissance and politically. ese have given Iran and Russia a common
ground to co-sponsor a campaign to maintain the Syrian regime against
the interests of the arabs and the West. Iran and Russia have also mounted
pressure on the uS and Saudi arabia to shelf the idea of deploying troops
to Syria. ese developments have increased Iran’s strategic importance
in the region and drawn it closer to the revisionist powers. In this context,
recent military successes against ISIS have witnessed further divisions
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
between regime supporters like Iran and Russia and forces of regime
change like Saudi arabia and the Western powers.
another window of opportunity for the IRI is represented by the
nuclear deal with the five permanent members of the un Security coun-
cil plus Germany (P5+1) in 2015. a series of sanctions, threats and
covert sabotage have failed to deter Iran’s desire to acquire a nuclear
weapons program (eilam, 2013; hymans and Gratias, 2013; Guzansky,
2015b; o’Sullivan, 2010). Because of a lack of trust between and among
the parties, a long series of negotiations had ended in little headways
(Ganji, 2013; alcaro 2012), before the development of a growing political
commitment to end the negotiations via diplomacy from the uS, Russia
and Iran (Geranmayeh 2015) led to a successfully negotiated-agreement
reached in 2015 among the parties. Despite their skeptical positions,
the uS has been able to persuade Israel and Saudi arabia to give the ne-
gotiated agreement with Iran a chance to prove its worth. e agreement
committed Iran to halt its uranium enrichment for ten years, surrender
its advance enrichment and open its facilities for international inspection
(Geranmayeh, 2015). is is in exchange for the uS and european com-
mitments to unfreeze Iran’s assets and reintegrate the country into the
global community. With this development, Iran is recording positive
progress economically, most especially from coterminous states and
222 Western powers. erefore, it may be safe to affirm that Iran’s foreign
policy and national interests are better served in the post P5+1 negotia-
tion, although its long-range missile program is a continuous subject of
international concern.
CONCLUSION
Iran’s behavior in the international system has been largely driven

by the desire for security, power and influence. from a geostrategic per-
spective, Iran’s national interest has been shaped by the available oppor-
tunities and challenges faced by the country in its immediate region and
at the international level. In this way, the agreement produced from
recent nuclear talks with Iran has generated many debates. optimists
are of the view that Iran can abolish its pursuit of nuclear weapons in
the long run, given a fair opportunity for security in the region. however,
pessimists believe that the agreement only delays the quest for nuclear
weapons, which Iran is more likely to renew as soon as its economy is re-
vived from the years of sanctions and when geopolitically favored. hence,
Iran’s national interests have continued to generate debates. is paper
has tried to provide a geo-strategic perspective to understand its different
aspects.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
PROSPETTIVE
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“nonproliferation Review”, vol. 19, no. 1, (2012), pp. 31-49.
– takeyh, Ray, What Really Happened in Iran: e CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq,
and the Restoration of the Shah, “foreign affairs”, July/august 2014, pp. 2-12.
– treisman, Daniel, Why Putin Took Crimea: e Gambler in the Kremlin, “foreign
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vol. 25, no. 1, (2000), pp. 5-41.
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(2012), pp. 45-56.
226

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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Islam and International

Relations: Contributions to
Theory and Practice
antonIno PellItteRI, Ph.D.
Università di Palermo, Professore Ordinario
e saminare un’opera di recente pub-

blicazione e valutarne critica-
mente la portata non è sempre
cosa facile. ancor più difficile quando
l’opera in questione tratta il tema islam e
relazioni internazionali. Il volume pub-
blicato dalla casa editrice Palgrave Mac-
millan in questo anno 2016 in lingua
inglese porta il titolo di Islam and Inter-
national Relations: Contributions to
eory and Practice ed è curato da specia-
listi come Deina abdelkader, nassef Ma-
nabilang adiong e Raffaele Mauriello.
non è il caso qui di citare i nomi de-
gli autori dei diversi contributi, tra cui
quelli degli stessi curatori, distribuiti nelle
tre parti in cui è divisa l’opera. la prima parte si intitola “Towards an
Islamic Contribution to International Relations eory: Setting the Stage”
(Raffaele Mauriello); il titolo della seconda è “Diplomacy, Justice, and
Negotiation in Islamic ought” (Deina abdelkader); la terza “Contem-

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
RECENSIONI
ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY AND PRACTICE
porary Muslim Insights on Muslim in questo articolo è il versetto 46

Governance and International Re- della sura del Ragno (XXIX, sura
lations” (nassef Manabilang meccana). vi si recita:
adiong).
Si tratta di un’opera di grande e non disputate con la Gente del
interesse ed attualità, considerato libro altro che nel modo mi-
anche che i curatori sono riusciti a gliore, eccetto quelli di loro che
raccogliere i diversi contributi sono iniqui, e dite: “noi cre-
diamo in quel che è stato rivelato
nell’intento, ben riuscito, di co-
a noi e in quel che è stato rivelato
niugare teorie e pratiche in un qua- a voi e il nostro e il vostro dio non
dro di riferimento che tiene conto sono che un Dio unico, e a lui
degli spazi diversi e del tempo della noi tutti ci diamo!”.
storia. Quest’opera si presenta
quindi come un utile contributo a Da tale versetto l’autore ira-
meglio comprendere le dinamiche niano fa discendere il dato che
del variegato sistema di relazioni, nelle relazioni umane la pluralità
qui oggetto di analisi, in rapporto delle religioni vada considerata, a
alla difficile contemporaneità. ragione, una realtà e che la consa-
tutti gli autori, sotto tale profilo, pevolezza di tale realtà si rivela at-
sono consapevoli che il problema titudine rispettosa verso tutti gli
della conoscenza e del corretto ap- esseri umani. È bene spiegare allora
228 proccio è, più che nel passato, fat-
tore determinante al fine di rites-
il significato della terminologia
araba impiegata nel versetto sud-
sere nuove e più giuste relazioni detto.
tra Mondo dell’Islam ed occi- la gente del libro, ossia i mo-
dente. noteisti, è “ahl al-Kitab” e, quindi,
È importante che ad aprire la se dialogo ha da essere, questo va
prima parte sia un articolo dell’ira- fatto nel modo migliore: «allati
niano ali akbar alikhani, profes- hiya ahsanu». la radice verbale da
sore associato di Pensiero politico cui deriva ahsan esprime l’idea di
islamico presso l’università di te- bontà, ma anche bellezza, e soprat-
heran, in cui vengono presentati tutto di azione giusta. eccetto
in modo ragionato i fondamenti quelli di loro che sono iniqui, si
islamici nei rapporti internazio- aggiunge: «illa alladhina zalamu
nali. minhum». Dalla radice verbale za-
Il punto di partenza non può lama derivano zulm e zalim (ini-
che essere il riferimento al corano, quità/oppressione e iniquo), che
la kalima per eccellenza, a cui l’au- indicano, oltre ad oppressione, ini-
tore aggiunge quelli al costume del quità, come si è accennato, ma an-
profeta e, essendo musulmano che empietà. I due termini si con-
shi‘ita, dell’imam ‘ali. non a caso trappongono a ‘adl e ‘adil, che
uno dei versetti coranici che cam- significano giustizia e giusto. ‘Adl
peggia, in modo opportuno direi, (giustizia) è l’opposto di prepo-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
RECENSIONI
tenza, sopruso, tirannia (nel co- dio e il vostro dio è il Dio unico e
rano in arabo taghiyah e/o tu- a lui ci diamo: ilah wahidun wa
ghiyan). l’opposizione è più volte nahnu lahu muslimuna». Questo
rilevata nei versetti coranici, come è il significato più profondo del-
nel costume o sunna del Profeta. l’essere musulmano. Derivano da
va sottolineato che tale opposi- ciò, secondo alikhani, una serie di
zione si trova registrata anche obblighi morali, politici e giuridici
presso storici arabi e musulmani riguardanti il rispetto della dignità
d’epoca classica e moderna a pro- di ciascuno, il dialogo fondato
posito delle relazioni con l’altro sulla ragione, il giusto negoziato
non musulmano, soprattutto nei nel quadro di un’etica che i giuristi
casi di conflitto. musulmani, di tutte le tendenze,
In un hadith (detto riferito al hanno condiviso in adesione a
profeta) trasmesso da abu Dharr sano empirismo. lo stesso Profeta
al-Ghifari, tra i più vicini compa- d’altra parte aveva affermato più
gni di Muhammad, si recita: «o volte, rivolto ai membri della
miei servi! ho proibito (har- prima comunità musulmana: «le
ramtu) a me stesso l’oppressione azioni valgono secondo le inten-
(al-zulma) e la proibisco tra di voi. zioni ed ogni uomo avrà secondo
Quindi, non vi opprimete l’un l’al- il suo intento» (al-nawawi, Qua-
tro... o miei servi! È delle vostre ranta hadith). a meglio illuminare
azioni che io terrò conto e vi ri-
compenserò. così, chi troverà il
quanto qui considerato, e il pro-
cedimento adottato nella storia, si
229
bene glorifichi Iddio e chi troverà potrebbero fare molti esempi. Mi
tutt’altra cosa non avrà che da bia- limito a citare, per la loro esempla-
simare sé stesso». In un altro ha- rità, due fatti d’epoca diversa e re-
dith riferito da abu hurayrah, lativi a spazi diversi.
Muhammad dice: «non invidia- Il primo concerne la Sicilia
tevi l’un l’altro; non maggiorate i dopo la conquista degli uomini del
prezzi; non odiatevi l’un l’altro; nord o normanni. nell’isola più
non voltate le spalle l’un l’altro e grande del Mediterraneo, che per
non siate venali, ma siate fratelli, oltre due secoli e mezzo era stata
o servi di Iddio! Il musulmano è parte del Mondo dell’Islam, e dal
fratello del musulmano: non lo op- 909 amministrata da governatori
prime (la yazlimuhu) né lo abban- fatimidi shi‘iti, erano rimaste nu-
dona, non l’inganna né lo di- merose comunità musulmane. esse
sprezza. Qui sta la devozione.» erano trattate dai nuovi conqui-
Ma è bene tornare al versetto statori normanni con lo statuto
coranico della sura del Ragno so- musulmano di gente della prote-
pra citato. «noi crediamo in quel zione o ahl al-dhimma. tale sta-
che è stato rivelato: unzila ilayna tuto era stato sperimentato nei
wa... ilaykum (è stato fatto scen- primi tempi dell’islam, già nel 631,
dere su di noi e su di voi); il nostro col patto di najran, mentre era an-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
RECENSIONI
cora in vita il Profeta. I musulmani dell’India2). Scriveva l’autore ye-

rimasti in Sicilia posero un quesito menita:
all’imam e faqih Muhammad Ibn
‘ali al-Mazari (m. 1141), d’origine nel Mulaybar i musulmani non
siciliana, residente in Ifriqiyya avevano un capo autorevole che
(oggi tunisia) su un tema assai li governasse. Il loro signore, in-
fedele, li governò secondo le leggi
complesso dal punto di vista giu- del paese … nonostante ciò, i mu-
ridico e sociale. la domanda era: i sulmani godettero di rispetto e
musulmani possono dare fiducia a considerazione (wa ma‘a hadha,
un giudice (qadi) nominato da un fa-li’l-muslimina fima baynahum
sovrano non musulmano ed ope- huramat – inviolabilita – wa ‘iz-
rante in un contesto non islamico? zah); era loro concesso di pregare
la fatwa o responso dell’imam al- e celebrare le proprie festività, i
Mazari fu assai singolare ed im- giudici e i mu’adhdhin regola-
prontata a saggio pragmatismo: vano i doveri e provvedevano al-
l’applicazione dei precetti della
non importa che il qadi sia nomi- legge tra i musulmani. non era
nato da un sovrano cristiano, ma permesso loro di interrompere le
importa che il giudice sia giusto attività il venerdì e chi non rispet-
ossia ‘adil1. tava la norma era multato in de-
Il secondo caso riguarda in- naro. Se un musulmano commet-
230 vece il processo di islamizzazione

delle regioni costiere del sud del-
teva un delitto passibile di pena
di morte, la pena veniva applicata,
ma solo con l’assenso dei notabili
l’India, così come descritto in
della comunità musulmana …
un’opera di zayn al-Din Ibn ‘abd
allo stesso modo quando un mu-
al-‘aziz al-Ma’abari (m. 1521) nel sulmano trasgrediva la loro legge,
contesto dello scontro con i por- non lo arrestavano se prima non
toghesi, interessati al dominio di avessero avuto l’autorizzazione
quella costa indiana. al-Ma‘bari fu degli stessi notabili. e quando un
storico e faqih shafi‘ita dello ye- hindu, appartenente alle caste in-
men, e la sua opera si intitola Tuh- feriori, si convertiva all’islam, lo
fat al-mugahidina fi ba’d akhbar rispettavano alla stregua degli al-
al-burtugaliyyina (ovvero la storia tri musulmani, anche se prove-
niva da infima casta (p. 75).
dell’impresa portoghese nel sud
aggiungeva Ibn al-‘aziz al-
Ma‘abari:
1 a. turki, Consultation juridique d’al- al-muslimuna dakhalu fi banadir

Imam al-Mâzarî sur le cas des mu- Mulaybar wa tawattanu fiha wa
sulmans vivant en Sicile sous l’auto-
rité des Normands, “Mélanges” de
l’université Saint-Joseph, vol. 50, 2 a cura di amin tawfiq al-tibi, tri-
(1984), pp. 691-704. poli 1987.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
RECENSIONI
dakhala ahluha fi din al-islam mane oggi del sistema di relazioni

yawman fa-yawman wa zahara delineato e cosa fare per riattivare
fiha al-islam zuhuran balighan lo stesso sistema, come delineato
hatta kaththara al-muslimuna dal prof. alikhani e da altri. va per-
fiha wa ‘umira bihim buldanuha tanto precisato il senso di confine
ma’a qillat zulm ru’atiha al-ka- tra mondo dell’islam e mondo non
farah (p. 46).
musulmano. ancora una volta il
riferimento al passato storico può
un brano questo importante rivelarsi opportuno. Il termine
in cui l’autore yemenita sottoli- arabo per definire il limite è
neava, da un lato, il dato dell’inse- thaghr; vuol dire breccia, passaggio
rimento pacifico dei musulmani aperto e fluttuante, secondo
nella società ospitante, l’acquisi- quanto indicava Ibn Manzur nel
zione giuridica della residenza (ta- suo importante Lisan al-‘arab (la
wattanu fiha); dall’altro, quello lingua degli arabi). Il territorio ol-
dell’islamizzazione che interessò i tre la breccia non va individuato
locali, avvenuta a tappe, giorno necessariamente come un settore
dopo giorno. grigio tra il bianco e il nero; rap-
vi si affermava cioè un si- presenta ciò che è contiguo con il
stema di relazioni improntate a mondo dell’islam. tanto è vero
patto giuridico concordato e ri- che nella storia e presso gli storici
spetto fondato sulla convivenza,
non a tolleranza, cosa che è a
arabi e musulmani non viene regi-
strata la dicotomia dar al-
231
tempo e fondata su separazione, e islam/dar al-harb (mondo del-
quindi un processo di islamizza- l’islam/mondo della guerra), che
zione non forzata («dakhala non appare nel corano e negli
ahluha fi’l-din qalilan qalilan»), ahadith, ma un riferimento con-
come si è accennato, in cui la civiltà sono alla storia del tempo. l’islam
islamica non aveva il senso di con- non essendo concepito necessaria-
quista di paesi non musulmani, ma mente come spazio fisico, ne de-
quello di capacità dell’islam di in- rivò una sorta di inapplicabilità,
fluenzare l’altro attraverso il pen- come già si è notato, nella storia
siero (fikr) e i comportamenti, reale della suddetta dicotomia. la
come ha affermato poco tempo fa storiografia musulmana e araba, e
la guida spirituale dell’Iran, l’aya- gli storici, che spesso erano anche
tollah ‘ali Khamenei (al-‘Alam giurisperiti, hanno coniato diffe-
TV, 25 aprile 2016). renti termini per le relazioni con
Quanto qui considerato in le differenti regioni e popoli, fun-
breve introduce un tema che attra- zionalmente alle particolari situa-
versa, anche se talvolta non espli- zioni storico-politiche. È così che
citamente, tutti i contributi del vo- spesso troviamo il riferimento a
lume oggetto di questa mia non dar al-aman (territorio di sicu-
tradizionale recensione. cosa ri- rezza), dar al-silm (territorio di
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
RECENSIONI
pace), dar al-muwada‘ah (territo- pressione ed empietà (tughiyan, p.

rio di mutuo accordo), tanto per 43).
citare le definizioni più frequenti. nell’impresa di Gerba
la terminologia utilizzata as- – aveva scritto Ibn abi Dinar –
sume invece connotazioni di tipo «al-fransis (il francese o nor-
etnico-geografico: ianj-rum e bi- manno) uccise uomini, fece vio-
lad al-Rum (franchi-bizantini e lenza alle donne dell’isola, catturò
paese dei cristiani); di tipo poli- bambini e giovani che furono ven-
tico: al-‘adw (nemici) o barr al- duti in Sicilia» (p. 114). lo sto-
‘udwa; di tipo giuridico-ideolo- rico maghrebino, trattando dei
gico: ahl al-ku – nasrani e ta‘ifah fatti legati all’espansionismo ianj
min al-nasraniyyah (gente dell’em- nell’africa Settentrionale, descrive
pietà-cristiani e raggruppamento una realtà storico-politica; il suo
dei cristiani), rapportata a iniquità fine è quello di ammonire i gover-
(zulm). lo storico nord-africano nanti musulmani a restaurare la
Ibn abi Dinar al-Qayrawani (m. giustizia (al-‘adl) come antidoto al
1690) affermava per esempio nella sistema zulm, qui inteso come ag-
sua Storia di Tunisi o al-Mu’nis fi gressione esterna.
akhbar Iiqiyyah wa Tunus a pro- Per concludere questa breve e
poco esauriente recensione del vo-
posito dei siciliani e di Ruggero II,
lume preso in esame va sottoli-
232 che il re normanno aveva inviato
per la conquista dell’isola di Gerba
nel 1135 una flotta al comando del
neato ancora che Islam and Inter-
national Relations: Contributions
to eory and Practice si presenta
suo ammiraglio Giorgio d’antio- come intero rifinito e coeso, cosa
chia, comprendente anche truppe per cui non ho voluto qui offrire
musulmane «muslimuna min ahl un sommario di tutti gli articoli
Siqilliyyah wa-rigal min al-ianj» compresi nel saggio. esso offre al
(«musulmani della gente di Sicilia lettore interessato, e non solo allo
e franchi», p. 113), configurando specialista, strumenti di seria ri-
quasi una distinzione all’interno flessione sul tema al centro dei di-
del raggruppamento nemico, au- versi contributi, fatto non sempre
tore dell’aggressione militare, facile in un momento, come quello
quindi iniqua, contro il nord attuale, in cui le relazioni interna-
africa musulmano. la politica di zionali sono caratterizzate da in-
Ruggero II in quell’occasione co- comprensioni e dalla ignoranza
stituì momento di passaggio di ca- della visione dell’altro.
pitale importanza storico-politica,
non solo per la perdita della Sicilia,
ma per l’intero sistema delle rela-
zioni nel Mediterraneo. non a
caso Ibn abi Dinar definiva Rug-
gero II come “ribelle” reo di op-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
La cartografia geopolitica
negli atlanti Putzger
del primo dopoguerra
valeRIo laRcheR
Dottorato di ricerca in Studi Storici, Geografici e

Antropologici delle università di Padova, Venezia e
Verona
ABSTRACT: This article analyses how propagandistic cartography from the Weimar
Republic times was not only adopted, but also re-elaborated in the well known his-
torical school atlas Putzger. The author compares propagandistic geopolitical -in a
Ratzelian meaning – maps produced mainly by völkisch groups and geo – and carto-
graphic societies during the twenties and the thirties with their equivalents inside
Putzger’s editions from the same period. These maps were specifically created for the
sake of nationalistic propaganda and can be divided in three categories: Volks – und
Kulturboden (ethnic – and cultural body) maps, Germany’s alleged desperate strategic
situation maps and regional organic unity maps. The methodological instruments
used for this article derive mostly from critical cartography and historical cartography
works such as Rethinking the Power of Maps by Denis Wood et al and The History of
Cartography by John Brian Harley and David Woodward. Notably, the author em-
ploys the cartographical analysis instruments from these works to study historical at-
lases maps. The analysis reveals how the flexibility of the medium historical atlas
succeded not only in adopting the geopolitical propaganda maps, but also in re-elab-
orating them in more refined and powerful ones. This reprocessing was mainly
achieved through the psychological use of colours, which permits to invisibly influence
the atlases’ users, and through the positioning of the maps, which is a powerful way
to associate different elements in the user’s mind.
KEYWORDS: PUTZGER HISTORICAL SCHOOL ATLAS, GEOPOLITICAL CARTOGRAPHIC SYMBOLOGY, GERMAN

HISTORICAL CARTOGRAPHY

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
LA CARTOGRAFIA GEOPOLITICA NEGLI ATLANTI PUTZGER DEL PRIMO DOPOGUERRA
l ’analisi culturalista della

cartografia nasce dalla ne-
cessità percepita da molti ri-
cercatori verso la fine della Guerra
mente, queste due tematiche di
studio, entrambe facenti capo alla
ricerca cartografica, si sono sfio-
rate senza mai toccarsi4.
fredda, di mettere in relazione le Dell’uso propagandistico
produzioni cartografiche di un della cartografia nella Germania
certo periodo storico con i conte- weimariana e nazista è stato am-
sti culturali e le istanze politiche pliamente scritto5. anche del-
ad esse contemporanee1. Questa l’atlante storico Putzger è stato
richiesta ha portato alla produ- scritto molto, principalmente in
zione di strumenti di analisi critica lingua tedesca6. l’importanza di
della cartografia stessa2, i quali questo testo è data dal fatto di es-
vennero poi applicati anche a casi sere stato allora il più diffuso, tanto
studio storici come quello della da godere di un virtuale monopo-
produzione cartografica propa- lio7, atlante storico per la scuola
gandistica della Germania nazista.
allo stesso tempo, il risveglio dei
nazionalismi nell’europa orien- ven, 2000.
tale post-sovietica causò una risco- 4 come nell’opera di Sylvia Schraut,
perta delle varie storie nazionali, Kartierte Nationalgeschichte, cam-
pus-verl., frankfurt, 2011.
fondamentali strumenti di nation
234 building. Queste rinate storiogra-
fie nazionaliste produssero una
5 Si ricorda, tra gli altri, Guntram
henrik herb, under the Map of
Germany, Routledge, new york e
grande quantità di atlanti storici, londra 1997.
risvegliando l’interesse per lo stu- 6 oltre alla già citata opera di Sylvia
dio di questo medium3. curiosa- Schraut, si ricordano gli articoli di
armin Wolf: armin Wolf, What
can the History of historical atlas te-
1 cfr. John Brian harley e David Wo- ach? Some lessons from a century of
odward, The History of Cartography Putzger’s Historischer Schul-atlas,
Vol. 1, university of chicago Press, “cartographica”, vol. 28, no. 2
chicago, 1987. John Brian harley, (1991). armin Wolf, Das Bild der
Maps, Knowledge and Power, The europaischen Geschichte in Geschi-
Iconography of Landscape, cam- chtsatlanten verschiedener Lander,
bridge university Press, cambridge, “Internationales Jahrbuch für Ge-
1988. schichts- und Geographie-unter-
2 cfr. Mark Stephen Monmonier, richt”, no. 13 (1970-71). armin
How to lie with maps?, university Wolf, 100 Jahre Putzger – 100 Jahre
of chicago Press, chicago, 1996. Geschichtsbild in Deutschland
David Wood et al, Rethinking the (1877-1977), “GWu”, no. 29
power of maps, Guilford Press, new (1978).
york, 2010. 7 esistevano comunque altri atlanti
3 cfr. Jeremy Black, Maps and Hi- come il noto Spruner e in ogni caso
story: Constructing Images of the il Putzger non fu mai una pubblica-
Past, yale university Press, new ha- zione ufficiale dello stato tedesco.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
tedesca. Quest’ultima condizione geo-organica, di definizione “ne-

rende il Putzger un documento di gativa” del territorio (cioè del po-
interesse unico per la ricerca storica tenziale pericolo a cui era esposto
perché, allora come oggi, non ri- il “cuore” della Germania a causa
sulta possibile l’adozione di un te- della perdita di alcuni territori con
sto per la scuola in Germania senza il trattato di versailles) e della de-
l’approvazione del ministero del- finizione di Volks – und Kulturbo-
l’istruzione, statale o federale. den (spazio etnico e culturale)9.
Questo articolo si pone l’ob- Questi tre concetti confluirono
biettivo di analizzare la ricezione nella più ampia teoria del Leben-
di tre macro categorie di carte geo- sraum, la quale ebbe una profonda
politiche nelle edizioni degli anni influenza sull’immaginario nazio-
’20 e ’30 di questo atlante. nalsocialista.
È noto che durante gli anni Senza volersi dilungare in
’20 e ’30 del novecento il nazio- questa problematica, già amplia-
nalismo di stampo conservatore mente indagata nella già citata
ebbe un ruolo egemone nel dibat- opera di herb, è importante sot-
tito geografico tedesco8 e che la tolineare come membri influenti
stragrande maggioranza dei geo- dei circoli geo-cartografici tede-
grafi e cartografi tedeschi applica- schi, si coordinarono con i capi di
rono le già conosciute teorie geo- noti gruppi völkisch (un esempio
grafiche di friedrich Wilhelm
Ratzel e dello svedese Rudolf Kjel-
è Karl von loesch della Deutscher
Schutzbund) per fondare organiz-
235
lén per elaborare una visione “na- zazioni scientifiche volte alla revi-
zionalisticamente organica” della sione dei trattati e alla difesa della
Geopolitik tedesca. Questo sforzo Deutschtum come la Stiung für
va inquadrato all’interno del più deutsche Volks – und Kulturboden-
ampio quadro di ricerca di moti- forschung, la Schlesisches Gesel-
vazioni scientifiche atte a giustifi- lscha für Erdkunde e la Gesellsch
care l’apparentemente inesplicabile für Erskunde zu Berlin. I membri
sconfitta a cui era andata incontro di questi gruppi confluirono suc-
la Germania durante il primo con- cessivamente nella società carto-
flitto mondiale e, soprattutto, a grafica tedesca (Deutsche Karto-
fornire delle basi scientifiche alle graphische Gesellscah), fondata
pretese territoriali tedesche du- nel 1937 sotto il regime nazista.
rante e dopo le conferenze di pace.
nacquero così i concetti di unità
9 vanno citate le opere di Wilhelm
volz dell’università di Breslavia,
8 Michael fahlsbuch et al, Conserva- Bruno Dietrich – esperto in econo-
torism, ideology and geography in mia e geografia dei trasporti, al-
Germany 1920-1950, “Political brecht Penck, Max hildebert Bo-
Geography quarterly”, vol. 8, no. 4 ehm, ernts tiessen, Karl haushofer
(1989). e Kurt trampler.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
I prodotti cartografici di que- mento slavo rispetto a quello ger-

sti gruppi e organizzazioni furono manico. Per fare questo bisogna
tre categorie di carte geopolitiche tornare indietro all’ultima edi-
create per il grande pubblico in zione imperiale del Putzger, quella
cui, volta per volta, fu mostrata la del 1918. In questa edizione, in-
giustificazione dell’espansionismo fatti, la carta (fig. 4), rappresenta
tedesco verso l’est attraverso il con- le due popolazioni negli usuali
cetto di Volks – und Kulturboden (per il Putzger) colori rosa e az-
(fig. 1), la supposta disperata si- zurro ed è considerata decisamente
tuazione strategica della Germania neutrale anche da parte non tede-
(fig. 2) o l’unità organica di alcune sca10 in quanto rispecchia abba-
regioni (come l’alta Slesia e la stanza fedelmente la situazione et-
Prussia occidentale) divise dai nica. la fig. 5 (edizione del 1925),
trattati (fig. 3). va detto che il va- invece, ha una valenza già più po-
lore geopolitico di queste carte litica in quanto le popolazioni
non deve essere confusa con quello slave sono rappresentate da un co-
delle odierne carte geopolitiche, le lore che è decisamente più con-
quali sono, nella maggior parte dei trapposto al rosa quale è il verde11;
casi, risultato di analisi intellettual- i dati etnografici rimangono però
mente oneste: queste carte vennero ancora invariati. la vera svolta
infatti elaborate nell’ambito di una nella manipolazione della carta av-
236 geopolitica di parte e fortemente
nazionalista quale fu la Geopolitik.
viene in epoca nazista. la carta
tratta dall’edizione del 1935 (fig.
6) presenta degli elementi di evi-
come esempio iniziale, si può dente propaganda nazionalistica:
partire dall’analisi della tavola che il “corridoio polacco” viene mo-
mostra la colonizzazione tedesca strato come interamente tedesco,
dei territori europei orientali a par- le isole linguistiche germaniche in
tire dal medioevo, la cosiddetta Polonia, lettonia, ungheria e Ro-
Ostsiedlung. la valenza geopolitica mania sono molto compatte e le
di questa tavola è data dalla grande popolazioni slave vengono divise
importanza rivestita dalla coloniz- cromaticamente per “assimilabi-
zazione medievale dei territori lità”: i Sorabi, i casciubi e i cosid-
orientali nell’immaginario nazio-
nalista tedesca e ha il pregio di es-
sere presente in tutte le edizioni 10 Questa stessa carta, unita a quella
del Putzger, permettendo così uno etnografica generale dell’europa,
sguardo cronologicamente ampio venne usata dalla delegazione po-
lacca alla conferenza di versailles
sulla concezione dei rapporti inte-
come base per le pretese polacche
retnici da parte dell’intellighenzia sulla Posnania e sul cosiddetto “cor-
tedesca. andando a confrontare le ridoio Polacco”.
fig. 4, 5, 6 e 7 si può notare una 11 nello spettro dei colori, il rosa e il
progressiva “alienazione” dell’ele- verde sono complementari.

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ORIZZONTI
detti “Slavi dell’elba” vengono Istria, infatti, era stato fatto deci-
rappresentati con un arancione di samente arretrare (cfr. fig. 6).
una tonalità molto simile al rosa l’analisi di questa serie di ta-
tedesco e decisamente contrappo- vole può essere inserita a pieno ti-
sto al verde polacco12, i cechi pre- tolo nella categoria di carte che
sentano una colorazione marron- trattano di Volks – und Kulturbo-
cina, gli Jugoslavi una simile ma di den, soprattutto per quanto ri-
tonalità più marcata e, infine, i Po- guarda l’identificazione di alcuni
lacchi mantengono il verde gruppi di lingua slava, come i già
“alieno” e totalmente non assimi- citati Sorabi e casciubi, con il Kul-
labile al rosa tedesco. un altro dato turboden germanico attraverso la
interessante riguardante questa vicinanza cromatica. c’è da ag-
particolare carta è il suo posizio- giungere, però, che questa partico-
namento: nelle edizioni precedenti lare tavola era presente fin dall’edi-
era inserita nella storia medievale, zione del 1897 dell’atlante, e che
in quest’ultima in quella contem- quindi in questo caso ci troviamo
poranea a dimostrazione che la co- di fronte a una carta “geopoliticiz-
lonizzazione dei territori dell’est è zata” in quanto nata come normale
ancora in corso. un’ultima impor- carta storica e solo in seguito resa
tante osservazione si può fare con adatta alla propaganda.
il confronto tra questa tavola e il
suo corrispondente nell’edizione
del 1937 (fig. 7). In questa carta,
all’interno del Putzger tro-
viamo anche quest’ultima catego-
237
infatti, le isole linguistiche tede- ria di carte: la fig. 9, tratta dal-
sche in Italia al di fuori dell’alto l’edizione del 1931, è un tipico
adige/Südtirol spariscono. Que- esempio di ricezione del concetto
sto è indice di un più marcato riav- di Volks – und Kulturboden all’in-
vicinamento tra l’Italia fascista e terno della cartografia storica. a
la Germania nazista13, che era co- questa tavola, ne verrà aggiunta
munque già presente in stadio em- un’altra ancora più dettagliata
brionale nella carta dell’edizione nell’edizione del 1935 (fig. 8),
del 1935: l’insediamento slavo in mentre la prima sarà sostituita da
una versione cromaticamente più
accattivante (completamente in
12 Queste popolazioni sono storica- scala di rossi) nell’edizione del
mente collegate allo stato Prussiano, 1937 (fig. 10). come già notato
ma la loro lingua è molto simile al da armin Wolf nel suo articolo
polacco. What can the History of historical
13 Riavvicinamento avvenuto grazie al
supporto dato dalla Germania al-
atlas teach? Some lessons om a cen-
l’Italia durante la Guerra d’etiopia tury of Putzger’s Historischer Schul-
(1935-36) e al rilassamento della po- Atlas, la prima edizione di que-
sizione italiana su una possibile an- st’ultima carta (fig. 8), era
nessione dell’austria alla Germania. presente in un’edizione, quella del
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
1931, di ben due anni precedente Per quanto riguarda le carte

alla scalata al potere di hitler. Si sulla situazione strategica della
può affermare che, in questo caso, Germania a seguito dei trattati di
la cartografia abbia anticipato la versailles (il già citato concetto di
politica. un aspetto particolar- “territorio nazionale negativo”), le
mente importante nell’analisi di varie edizioni del Putzger forni-
queste due carte, risiede ancora scono alcuni esempi, concentrati
una volta nell’utilizzo dei colori, solamente in quelle degli anni ’30
tratto che le distingue essenzial- e più propriamente in quelle di
mente dalla loro carta “madre” epoca nazista. È infatti a partire
(fig. 1): la fig. 9 presenta una co- dall’edizione del 1935 che ritro-
lorazione in scala di azzurro dalle viamo la tavola sulle condizioni
tonalità abbastanza sbiadite, la fig. strategiche imposte alla Germania
8 una colorazione “mista” (nella (fig. 11) e sul pericolo rappresen-
carta mondiale il Reich e le ex co- tato dalle possibili incursioni aeree
lonie in azzurro, e la “germanicità sul territorio del Reich (fig. 12).
all’estero” in grigio, nella carta eu- Quest’ultima carta in particolare
ropea il Volksboden in rosso e le va- ne ricalca una presentata dalla de-
rie accezioni di Kulturboden in gri- legazione tedesca alla conferenza
gio) e la fig. 10 completamente in sul disarmo di Parigi del 1931 (fig.
scala di rossi. l’evoluzione della 13). confrontando attentamente
238 volontà politica che sta alla base
di queste diverse colorazioni è evi-
la fig. 12 con la fig. 13, possiamo
notare come una differenza sta nel
dente: nei primi due casi siamo di fatto che, a esclusione di quelli pro-
fronte una Germania ancora sulla venienti da londra e da Minsk
difensiva e tesa solo a rivendicare (che sono al di fuori dei confini
territori la cui “germanicità” (come della carta), i possibili attacchi ae-
l’austria e i Sudeti) è al di fuori di rei provengano solo da città che
ogni dubbio, mentre nel terzo caso facevano parte del Reich o dell’al-
possiamo leggere una già bene evi- leato austro-ungarico prima della
dente volontà espansionista verso guerra. In questo caso il messaggio
la totalità dell’est europa e, possi- che viene veicolato è molto forte:
bilmente, di tutto il mondo data la Germania è messa in pericolo
dal fatto che non esiste un colore da aeroporti che dovrebbero ap-
differente per rappresentare questi partenerle.
territori, bensì solo tonalità diffe-
rente dello stesso colore che tutt’al come nel caso precedente,
più possono indicare la diversa im- anche le carte sull’unità organica
portanza di obiettivi. essendo l’ul- delle regioni dell’alta Slesia e della
tima carta tratta dall’edizione del Posnania-Prussia occidentale
1937, la progressiva crescita in ag- sono presenti solo dall’edizione del
gressività della politica estera te- 1935 (fig. 14 e fig. 15) e sono
desca pare evidente. volte soprattutto a denunciare il
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
pericolo che corre la “germanicità” quelle presenti all’interno di que-

di questi territori al seguito del- sto atlante si può notare una mol-
l’annessione alla Polonia. addirit- teplicità di messaggi. nella fig. 11
tura, nella tavola riguardante la il fruitore non è messo di fronte
Prussia occidentale assistiamo a solamente alla precaria situazione
una rivendicazione della “germa- strategica della Germania, gli viene
nicità” del territorio che risale al- anche comunicato che quella si-
l’antichità; questa primigenia ri- tuazione è figlia di decisioni ingiu-
vendicazione (cfr. “momento di ste e contrarie alla volontà dei po-
acquisizione primaria” in “e poli: le regioni che le sono state
myth of Nations” di Patrick Geary) tolte sono infatti indicate come
è messa però in pericolo dalle po- popolate da un gran numero di
litiche antitedesche del nuovo go- abitanti di lingua tedesca (glis-
verno Polacco che avrebbero “ri- sando ovviamente sul numero di
pulito” (si vedano i grafici della abitanti di lingua non tedesca) e
fig. 15) le città del corridoio dal- viene sottolineato come spesso
l’elemento germanico. anche in queste secessioni furono attuate
quest’occasione almeno una delle senza un preventivo plebiscito.
carte (la fig. 15) è tratta diretta- Parimenti, nella fig. 14 non
mente da una precedente carta di viene solo denunciata la divisione
Walter Geisler (fig. 16) pubblicata
nel 1926 in un articolo sulla rivista
di geopolitica Zeitschri für Geo-
dell’alta Slesia nonostante il ple-
biscito a favore della Germania,
ma viene anche messo in evidenza
239
politik14. il pericolo a cui sono esposte le re-
gioni tedesche orientali da
una considerazione impor- un’eventuale avanzata sovietica in
tante, legata alla ricezione della car- Polonia come già accaduto durante
tografia geopolitica tedesca all’in- la guerra Russo-Polacca del 1920-
terno del Putzger risiede nella 22.
pluralità di informazioni veicolate
all’interno di una stessa carta. Se un’altra innovazione causata
nelle carte geopolitiche tradizio- dalla ricezione della cartografia
nali, infatti, il tipo di informazione geopolitica, ma possibile sola-
veicolata era solamente uno15, in mente all’interno di un atlante, è
quella legata alla disposizione delle
14 Walter Geisler, Politik und Sprachen- carte all’interno di una o più pa-
karten, “zeitschrift für Geopolitik”, gine. con l’edizione del 1934, la
no. 3 (1926). carta sull’Ostsiedlung, presente fino
15 un esempio tipico è la fig. 1: la Sle- a quel momento nella sezione di
sia è minacciata da un possibile at-
tacco a tenaglia ceco-Polacco e Ber-
lino risulta essere molto vicina al questo caso è di tipo puramente mi-
confine, l’informazione veicolata in litare.

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
storia medievale, viene inserita cangelo Ghisleri) potrebbe essere

nella sezione di storia contempo- estremamente proficua nel portare
ranea a fianco delle carte sulla si- nuova luce sulla storia della carto-
tuazione strategica della Germania grafia geopolitica.
sul Volks e Kulturboden. l’associa-
zione di idee risulta ovvia: la colo-
nizzazione verso l’est è ancora
aperta. Questo stratagemma non
venne usato solo con le carte deri-
vate dalla cartografia geopolitica,
ma venne anche applicato (sempre
con evidenti intenti politici) ad al-
tri casi. la fig. 17 è una tavola
tratta dall’edizione del 1937 com-
posta da quattro carte. tre di que-
ste rappresentano la distribuzione
della popolazione ebraica in Ger-
mania e in europa, mentre la
quarta raffigura gli omicidi politici
commessi dai comunisti nei primi
anni ’30. anche in questo caso,
240 uno sprovveduto fruitore non po-
trà che associare mentalmente le
due tematiche presenti nelle carte.
la breve analisi (nel senso del

lasso temporale preso in conside-
razione e della limitazione dello
studio al solo Putzger) dimostra
quanto gli studi sulla cartografia
geopolitica non vadano limitati al
dibattito geografico e cartografico.
essa, infatti, non venne solamente
recepita all’interno degli atlanti
storici, ma grazie alla versatilità di
questo medium, venne rielaborata
in forme più raffinate e potenti che
meriterebbero ulteriore attenzione
da parte degli studiosi di geopoli-
tica. una futura lettura in chiave
geopolitica di altri atlanti storici
novecenteschi (anche italiani,
come il noto Testo-Atlante di ar-
V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
CARTOGRAFIA
FIG. 1 – VOLKS – UND KULTURBODEN, PENCK 1925
241
FIG. 2 – LA PERICOLOSA SITUAZIONE DELLA GERMANIA ORIENTALE, STRÖHLE 1931

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
FIG. 3 L’UNITÀ GEO-ORGANICA DELL’ALTA SLESIA ESPRESSA ATTRAVERSO

I SUOI SISTEMI DI CANALI, FERROVIE E RETI ELETTRICHE, JÄGER 1938
242

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 4-5-6-7 – “OSTDEUTSCHE KOLONISATION”,

PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1918-1925-1935-1937
Si noti la progressiva alienazione dell’elemento slavo che passa da avere una colo-
razione blu (più scuro nella fig. 4) a una colorazione verde (fig. 5) fino ad essere
suddiviso in vari colori (evidente anche in scala di grigi nella fig. 6). originali a
colori.
243

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
244

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
245

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
246

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 8 – “DAS GRENZLANDSDEUTSCHTUM”

PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1935
originale a colori (scala di azzurro).
247

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 9 – “DAS DEUTSCHTUM”, PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1931
In questa tavola la carta in alto presenta una colorazione azzurro-grigia che risulta
poco incisiva da un punto di vista cromatico (infatti anche in scala di grigi risulta
poco chiara), mentre quella in basso ne presenta una rosso-grigia e risulta per
questo più efficace. originale a colori.
248

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 10 – “DAS DEUTSCHTUM”, PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1937
Questa tavola è a tutti gli effetti un’evoluzione della fig. 9: in questo caso entrambe
le carte rappresentate presentano una colorazione in scala di rosso che, nel caso di
quella in basso, sfocia addirittura nel giallo. originale a colori.
249

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
FIG. 11 – “VERSAILLES”, PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1937
originale a colori
250 FIG. 12 – “DIE FLIEGERGEFAHR”, PUTZGERS HISTORISCHER SCHULATLAS, 1937
Si compari con la fig. 13. originale a colori

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 13 – LA VULNERABILITÀ DELLA GERMANIA AGLI ATTACCHI AEREI,

PRESSMATERIAL DES REICHSWEHRMINISTERIUMS, BA R431/518
251

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 14 – “KÄMPFE UM DEN OSTDEUTSCHEN VOLKSBODEN”,

originale a colori
252

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 15 – “ZUR GESCHICHTE DES KORRIDORS”,

Si compari la carta in basso a sinistra con la fig. 16. originale a colori
253

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
FIG. 16 – “THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL GROUPS

IN THE CORRIDOR AREA”, GEISLER 1926
254

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ORIZZONTI
FIG. 17 “ZUR NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN REVOLUTION II”,

Si noti l’accostamento tra la carta sugli omicidi commessi dai comunisti negli anni
’30 (“Rotmord”) e le altre tre sulla distribuzione della popolazione ebraica. origi-
nale a colori.
255
Per una miglior fruizione delle carte a colori si consiglia di visitare la sezione sul
Putzger dell’archivio di atlanti online atlassen.info

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
ORIZZONTI
Princeton university Press, oxford,

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257

V o l . V, N ˚ 2 Lug.-Dic., 2016
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L’IRAN DOPO LE SANZIONI:

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GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

Sede sociale e direzione:

Editore [Publisher]: AVATAR Editions

Cartografie a cura di Lorenzo Giovannini

Progetto Grafico & Impaginazione

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Geopolitica. Rivista di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie

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ORGANIGRAMMA DELLA RIVISTA

COMITATO SCIENTIFICO NAZIONALE: Diego Abenante (Università di Trieste), Paolo Bargiacchi

COMITATO SCIENTIFICO INTERNAZIONALE: Anis Bajrektarevic (IMC Krems, Vienna), Miguel A.

REVISORI PARITARI DI GEOPOLITICA NEL BIENNIO 2014-2015: Diego ABENANTE (Università

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

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GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

Impero, shi‘ismo e iranismo:

l ’Iran viene generalmente presentato come la culla dell’eresia più

getto si presenta come riformatrice bilmente parola che non può essere

minoranza della popolazione. Bi- comunità. tuttavia, il panorama

pero di elementi identitari che lo

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

Did Sanctions Make Iran’s

University of Tehran Center

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

TRACK RECORD OF SANCTIONS

t he eﬀectiveness of coercive diplomacy, the most prominent and

But if the threat of sanctions and sanctions themselves have had

the costs of sanction to sender(s), if through sanctions policymakers are

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

While much research has been conducted on the eﬃcacy of sanc-

change in the policy or conduct of a country’s decision-making elite is

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

P5+1 countries were negotiating to ﬁnd a solution to what had seemed

EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON IRANIAN PUBLIC

to evaluate the eﬀect of sanctions on Iranian Public opinion toward

is section uses two econometric techniques to test the hypotheses

group that does receive a treatment is referred to as the “treatment group”

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

forgo uranium enrichment as part of a deal that would also li

THE LOGIT REGRESSION MODEL

e dependent variable of this study is the willingness to forgo ura-

Q. Would you favor or oppose an agreement whereby the current

PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014

Would favor such an agreement 32 29

Would oppose such an agreement 55 62

GEOPOLITICA – RIVISTA SEMESTRALE DELL’ISAG

using this question as a dependent variable, this section employs

H1: e pain of sanctions was positively associated with Iranian public

H2: e threat of increased sanctions was positively associated with

H1 suggests a commonly held perception that the more painful

Q. as you may know, Iran is currently under sanctions for enriching

PIPA 2009 UTCPOR 2014

Has had a lot of negative impact 23 47

Has had some negative impact 37 23

Has had only a little negative impact 15 19

Has had no negative impact 15 7

H2 is based on the commonly held assumption that «coercive diplo-

Confidence in the UN 0.4758 (0.016) 0.3339 (0.001)*

Education -0.1293 (0.023) -0.0608 (0.048)

Significant at 0.1 level Significant at 0.05 level Significant at 0.01 level