NUMISMATICA PATAVINA

(13)

Collana diretta da Giovanni Gorini

 LE MONETE DI CIRENE E DELLA CIRENAICA
NEL MEDITERRANEO
Problemi e prospettive
Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Numismatica e di Storia Monetaria
Padova, 17-19 marzo 2016

a cura di
Michele Asolati
Numismatica Patavina
Curatori:
Giovanni Gorini (Curatore editoriale)
Michele Asolati (Curatore esecutivo)

Comitato scientifico:
Andrew Burnett
Aleksander Bursche
François de Callataÿ
Cécile Morrisson
Andrea Saccocci

Assistenti curatori:
Cristina Crisafulli
Alessandro Cattaneo

Questo volume è stato pubblicato con il contributo esclusivo dell’Università degli Studi di
Padova, Dipartimento dei Beni Culturali: Archeologia, Storia dell’Arte, del Cinema e della
Musica nell’ambito del Progetto PRAT 2014-2017 “From self-government and centrality
to marginality and dependency: coin finds and landscape organization in Cappadocia and
Cyrenaica before and after the Romanization”, coordinato da Michele Asolati.

DIPARTIMENTO
DEI BENI CULTURALI
ARCHEOLOGIA, STORIA
DELL’ARTE, DEL CINEMA
E DELLA MUSICA

I disegni proposti in copertina sono realizzati da Silvia Tinazzo

© 2016 by Esedra editrice s.a.s.

via Hermada, 4 - 35141 Padova
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 SOMMARIO

Premessa 7

Peter van Alfen

The Beginnings of Coinage at Cyrene: Weight Standards, Trade, and Politics 15

Giovanni Gorini
Emergenze monetali a Cirene alla fine del V sec. a.C. 33

Ute Wartenberg, Jonathan H. Kagan

Silphium, Jerboas, Genets and the Coinage of Cyrene 43

Wolfgang Fischer-Bossert
The Didrachm Coinage of Magas 57

Manolis I. Stefanakis
Looking towards the North: The Circulation of Cyrenaic Coins on Crete 65

Emilio Rosamilia
Numismatica e documentazione epigrafica: i piedi monetali e l’introduzione
del “bronze standard” a Cirene 83

Catharine Lorber
Cyrenaican coinage and Ptolemaic monetary policy 101

Olivier Picard, Thomas Faucher

Le monnayage de bronze de la Cyrénaïque hellénistique et les Lagides 127

Marta Barbato
Presenza di moneta straniera a Roma in epoca tardo-repubblicana:
il caso delle monete di Cirene 141

Clive Stannard, Samuele Ranucci

Late Cyrenaican Bronze Coin in Central Italy 157

Suzanne Frey-Kupper
Cyrenaican Coins in Site Finds from the Western Mediterranean.
The Evidence from Sicily and Adjacent Islands, and from Carthage 191

Alessandro Cavagna
Da Cirene a Mazin. Nota sulla presenza di monete cirenaiche nelle aree
dell’Adriatico orientale 225
François Chevrollier
Les monnayages communs à la Crète et à la Cyrénaïque au Ier siècle av. J.-C.
et la formation de la province romaine. Vers une histoire partagée? 245

Caterina Canovaro, Irene Calliari, Michele Asolati, Marco Breda

Studio metallografico delle emissioni bronzee provinciali
cirenaiche (I sec. a.C.-II sec. d.C.) 259

Michel Amandry
Le monnayage cyrénéen de Trajan 285

Piotr Jaworski
Some Remarks on the Coins in Circulation in Ptolemais 293

Oscar Mei
Recenti rinvenimenti monetali nel Quartiere dell’Agorà di Cirene:
contesti e problemi archeologici 305

Cristina Crisafulli
Il ritorno della moneta imperiale a Cirene e in Cirenaica nel III secolo d.C. 325

Michele Asolati
Bisanzio, Alessandria e la Cirenaica 343

Frédéric Bauden
The Islamic Coinage of Cyrenaica (Barqa) from the Arab Conquest up to
the Advent of the Fatimids 387

Considerazioni conclusive del Congresso (Giovanni Gorini) 413

Sommario, Premessa e Summaries in lingua araba (a cura di Mohamed Kenawi) 426

 Peter van Alfen

THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE:

WEIGHT STANDARDS, TRADE, AND POLITICS

ABSTRACT - Since the 19th century, commentators have been puzzled by the use of the
(Attic-)Euboic weight standard for the earliest coins produced in Cyrenaica. On the face of
it, it makes little sense that settlements of Doric origins with strong social and political ties to
the Pelopponese, Cyclades, and Crete would produce coins on the Euboic standard rather
than something more culturally appropriate, like the Aeginetan. Given Cyrenaica’s fame as an
exporter of silphium and grain, however, and the fact that archaic Cyrenaican coins have been
found in Egyptian and Near Eastern hoards, long distance trade seems the likeliest impetus for
the selection of the Euboic weight standard. But why exactly?  
In this paper, I consider the role that coinage and weight standards generally may have played
in archaic long-distance trade networks, before turning to the specific problem of Cyrenean
politics, trade and the incentives authorities may have had for selecting an unanticipated
weight standard.

Coins were first struck at Cyrene towards the end of the 6th century BCE under the
auspices of either Arcesilas III (ruled before 525-after 522) or Battos IV (ruled c. 510-
c. 470)1. Within a comparatively short period of time thereafter, those in Barce and
Euhesperides also began to produce coins. Several features of the earliest Cyrenaian
issues stand out: 1) the impressively broad range of denominations; 2) the number
of overstrikes recorded, several on Athenian owls; and 3) most perplexing of all, the
fact that these coins were produced on the Attic standard, which is not necessarily the
standard we would expect to find in use in archaic Libya.
Cyrene was, so Herodotus tells us, founded by a contingent of Therans in 631 BCE.
Some fifty years later, in the early part of the 6th century, Apollo at Delphi encouraged
all Greeks to settle among the Cyrenaians where a division of land awaited them; those
who responded were primarily from the Peloponnese, Crete and the Aegean islands2.
While the archaeological evidence gives cause to doubt some parts of Herodotus’
narrative, it largely supports these southern Greek connections3. During the archaic

1
Robinson’s date for the earliest coins beginning c. 570 BCE (BMC, Cyr., p. xviii) has long been
recognized as too high. More recent arguments (e.g., Price, Waggoner 1975, p. 114; cf. Buttrey 1997,
p. 3; Gorini 2010, p. 85) have brought the date down to the reign of Battos IV. Lazzarini 2014, following
Kraay 1976, p. 296, presents the most recent arguments for raising the date of the first coins to the reign
of Arcesilas III. Because of the overstrikes, all dating solutions hinge on the date of the earliest Athenian
owls. For the arguments presented here, it matters little whether coins were introduced under Arcesilas
III or Battos IV.
2
Austin 2004, pp. 1240-1249 provides a succinct overview of the history and archaeology of archaic
and classical Libya. See also Austin 2006. Osborne 2009, pp. 8-16 offers a cautious reading of the history
of archaic Libya found in Herodotus, 4, 150-159.
3
Austin 2006, pp. 193-194.
16 PETER VAN ALFEN

period, as Cyrene grew to become one of the largest, most populous and wealthy
poleis anywhere, this mix of mostly Dorian peoples maintained political, economic,
and no doubt social ties with their homelands4. Because of their Dorian origins, and
continued strong Dorian links, we might then expect the Cyrenaians to have adopted
the predominant Dorian coin standard, the Aeginetan, in widespread and nearly
exclusive use in the many parts of the Aegean (including Thera), the Peloponnese,
and on Crete, the closest jumping off point for voyages to Cyrene from the Aegean.
The fact that they did not requires explanation, particularly since there is no obvious
reason why the Cyrenaians would have adopted instead a standard used outside of
their circle of friends and relatives, as it were. Curiously, however, this is a problem that
has received little attention5. Those who have addressed it point to some sort of trading
connection with Euboia or Athens, but do not describe fully what this was, or why it
would have been in the interests of the Cyrenaians to adopt the standard6. The limited
evidence we have on the matter no doubt has encouraged many commentators to
remain silent. For the same reason, I cannot offer a definitive solution to this problem.
Instead, my purpose here is to consider the broader political and economic contexts
within which the decision to adopt the Attic standard at Cyrene was made, and in
doing so hope to gain greater understanding of the decision process and some of the
factors that may have steered it.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review the numismatic evidence
of the earliest Cyrenaian coinages; in the second section I consider the problem of
monetary authority and its link to coin production; in the third I look at the reasons
states generally had for selecting coin standards, including trade; and in the final
section I consider the impact of Cyrenaian politics on the initial decision to mint coins
and the choice of the standard.

Numismatic Overview
The key study of early Cyrenaian coinage remains Stanley Robinson’s British Museum
Catalogue volume7. Since its publication, there have been several subsequent studies
focusing on both hoard finds and excavation material that have added to the overall
picture; we currently await a fresh comprehensive study to tie it all together8. In general,
the early coinage of Cyrene particularly appears to have been comparatively large

4
Austin 2006, p. 194, notes: «[t]hus apart from the Samian connexion, Greek Libya was an area of
predominantly Dorian activity, using the Doric dialect…»; cf. Osborne 2009, pp. 13-16.
5
Müller 1860, p. 20, suggests that the standard was in use in Cyrene before it was adopted in Attica.
The reason why the Cyrenaians might have adopted the standard is not discussed by, for example,
Babelon 1907; Price, Waggoner 1975; Kraay 1976; Buttrey 1997; Gorini 2010; Lazzarini 2014.
6
Head 1911, p. 865: «This seems to point to commercial relations between Euboea and the Libyan
coast at a time when the Euboean cities, Chalcis and Eretria, exercised a predominant influence in the
eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea». BMC, Cyr., p. cclix: «…there is no reason why Cyrene should not
have taken her standard as well as supplies of metal from Athens».
7
BMC, Cyr.
8
E.g., Price, Waggoner 1975; Buttrey 1997; Gorini 2010; Lazzarini 2014. Wolfgang Fisher-Bossert
is currently preparing a new corpus and die studies of the coinages of Cyrenaica.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 17

based on observations of the dies used9. The denominational system in Cyrene was also
quite extensive, more so in fact than that found in late 6th century in Euboia or Athens,
including two multiples of the drachm (a didrachm, 2 drachms, and tetradrachm, 4
drachms) as well as several divisions of the drachm (= 6 obols): a possible tetrobol (4
obols), a hemidrachm (3 obols), an obol, a hemiobol (1/2 obol), and a tetartemorion
(1/4 obol)10. Within a generation or so after the first coins were struck, several new
denominations were introduced, a trihemiobol, but also a “fifth” and “tenth”, the
latter of which Müller associated with similar weight coins struck in Asia Minor; his
rather misleading designation of “Asiatic” drachms and hemidrachms for these has
been retained since11. The introduction of these new denominations also marked the
beginnings of a gradual shift towards the “Asiatic” standard with a tetradrachm of c. g
13,4 that was completed by Robinson’s third period corresponding primarily to the 4th
century BCE. Since my interest here lies with the decision-making concerning the first
coins of Cyrene, the problems associated with the “Asiatic” standard will not detain us.
Nor will the problems of the relationship between the coinages of Cyrene and those
of Barce and Euhesperides since production at these centers occurred later and was
heavily influenced by the monetary decisions made in Cyrene, if not dependent to
some degree upon them.
Compared with much contemporaneous coinage, the first series at Cyrene is
surprisingly crude; the die cutting for the obverse types is unimpressive, the reverses vary
from well formed, Rhodian-style parallel incuses to rough formless stamps. Overtime
the artistry of the coinage improved, particularly with the introduction of developed
reverse types in the second series, but as Robinson noted, the weights of the coins in both
the first and second series are «unusually irregular», an observation that subsequent
finds has not dispelled12. His histogram revealed «a flatter and more broken curve
than most other important coinages», suggesting an approach to coin production that
favored accelerated output over consistency. Another remarkable trait of these earliest
coins is the frequency of overstrikes. Among his first series, for example, Robinson
noted two tetradrachms overstruck on Athenian owls; several additional drachms and
tetradrachms from both the first and second series were overstruck as well, although
the undertypes are not clear13. More recent finds have revealed additional overstruck
coins, including a didrachm struck on a Corinthian stater14.
Scores of early Cyrenaian coins have been found in excavations in Libya, indicating
widespread local use15. At the same time, many have also been found farther afield,

9
Buttrey 1997, p. 10, note 4, notes that «[t]he early silver of Cyrene must have been issued in large
quantity as the scarcity of die links suggests».
10
BMC, Cyr., p. cclx, provides an overview of the denominational system based on the evidence
available to him, which did not include tetartemoria, for which see Buttrey 1997, p. 12. By comparison,
archaic Chalcis issued tetradrachms, didrachms, and tetrobols; archaic Eretria tetradrachms, didrachms,
drachms, diobols, and obols; and archaic Athens tetradrachms, didrachms, drachms, obols, and
hemiobols. However, the Athenians did not issue all of these denominations concurrently.
11
Müller 1860, p. 21; BMC, Cyr., pp. cclxi-cclxvii.
12
BMC, Cyr., p. cclviii. Cp. the weights of the 42 Cyrenaican coins found in the Asyut hoard, which vary
between g 16,85 and 17,62; see Price, Waggoner 1975, pp. 110-113.
13
Overstruck on owls: BMC, Cyr., nos. 1a, 2; overstruck on uncertain types: nos. 6, 10, 15, 16, 17.
14
Buttrey 1997, p. 13.
15
Buttrey 1994; Buttrey 1997.
18 PETER VAN ALFEN

often alongside coins of Barce (e.g., IGCH, no. 1644, Asyut). With the exception of two
coins of Cyrene found in the Taranto hoard (IGCH, no. 1874), no coins of Cyrenaica
have been found in hoards to the north or west, only towards the east. Dozens of coins
have been found in Egypt, while a handful have been found in the Levant16.

Monetary Authority and Politics at Cyrene

In antiquity as today, the production of coinage requires a series of greater and
lesser decisions. The most important decisions included whether to mint or not,
which standard to select, which denominations to produce, how many of each, and
what designs to use. Less important decisions included those pertaining to die
maintenance and flan production. For most poleis, the hierarchy of decision-making
included agents, like magistrates and mintmasters, who dealt with the more mundane
day-to-day decisions. Our concern here is with those who made the most important
decisions, in other words the monetary authority. Elsewhere I have discussed at length
the problem of monetary authority in the archaic period and its location within poleis,
which I briefly recap in the following paragraphs17.
In its most basic form minting is simply authorship, a creative act by individuals
or groups who have the resources, skills and desire to produce stamped pieces of
metal for monetary use. Although there is no necessary relationship between states
and monetary instruments, states often do assume the power to regulate both the
production and consumption of coinage as part of their larger command over public
finance. Having powers of coercion they can mandate the types of coins, indigenously
produced or not, that are acceptable for use in whatever markets or territories they
control. Thus authorship becomes authority, and minting authority becomes linked to
a community’s highest political power.
Here we are faced with two problems: 1) where was this highest power located
within a polis, and 2) what exactly was the nature of the link between this power and
coin production? Locating and defining this power proves difficult on the one hand
because the evidence for regime types, governmental structure, and the political
machinations of most archaic and classical period poleis is thin, and on the other
because the modern and ancient conceptualizations of this power do not exactly line
up. “Sovereignty” is the term frequently used to describe the supreme independent
authority associated with modern nation states; this, however, is far from being a
simple or unproblematic concept. Suffice it to say that while there seems to have been
a notion of a concentrated, supreme power within Greek poleis, expressed elliptically
by a combination of the words kratos and kyrion, a clearer expression of “sovereignty”
cannot be found18. Here I simply point to the existence of what I call, for the sake of
convenience, «sovereign power», that entity which was the font of all other authorities,

16
Egypt: IGCH, nos. 1636, 1637, 1639, 1641, 1642, 1644, 1645, 1647, “Coin Hoards”, 8, no. 57; Levant:
IGCH, no. 1185, “Coin Hoards”, 8, no. 45; also a stater of Cyrene came to light in hoard found on the coast
of Gaza for which see Lopez Sanchez, Gomez Castro 2015.
17
van Alfen 2014, pp. 635-643.
18
E.g., Arist., Pol., 3, 10-11: τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 19

including monetary authority, within a polis, and which acted as the final arbitrator of
important decisions concerning the community. This existed somewhere around the
person of a monarch, an oligarchic council, or the assembled demos.
Monetary policy and the production of coinage has long been closely linked to
sovereign power. Since the early modern period this link has been made explicit
by various treatises defending the sovereign’s role as the sole provider of legitimate
currency. This tradition in turn has provided the conceptual and legal foundations
for today’s territorial currencies19. Here I assume that the sovereign powers in Greek
poleis had full control over monetary policy and therefore coin production; they made
the most important decisions about policy and coinage. Thus monetary authority and
sovereign power were in most cases probably one.
Who then held sovereign power in Cyrene at the time the first coins were struck?
Ostensibly, the Battiad basileus did, either Arcesilas III or Battos IV, but the basileus’
hold on this power was tenuous and at times it shifted elsewhere. The political history
of early Cyrene, and of Greek Libya more broadly, is complicated, fractious, and
violent, mostly because of turmoil surrounding the hereditary kingship established by
the oikistes, Battos I, which lasted through eight generations of kings until c. 440 BCE20.
As Cyrene grew and became more prosperous and populous over time, this kingship
became increasingly contested. Herodotus records serious tensions developing within
the ruling family itself by the mid-6th century. As Arcesilas II assumed the throne,
he quarreled with his brothers causing them to leave Cyrene to found their own
settlement, Barce; a battle between the warring siblings cost Cyrene an astounding
7000 hoplites, so Herodotus tells us. In the aftermath Arcesilas II was strangled by one
of the defeated, Learchos21. In the ensuing reign of Battos III, the Cyrenaians, eager
to find a lasting political settlement, sought the intervention of Apollo at Delphi, who
instructed them to invite a mediator from Mantinea in the Peloponnese. Among his
solutions, this mediator, Demonax, gave «everything that had previously belonged to
the kings to the demos in common», which presumably included his sovereign powers;
the king retained only his temene and priesthoods22. Arcesilas III in his turn found this
settlement unacceptable and moved against the demos and sympathetic elites to regain
his family’s lost privileges23. In his initial attempt, Arcesilas III failed and was exiled, but
in Samos he assembled a mercenary army, while his mother Pheretime attempted to
do the same in Cyprus. Successful in fully restoring the kingship on their return, the
pair then sought to eliminate their political rivals, some by means of exile and others
by (attempted) execution. Arcesilas III himself was subsequently assassinated in Barce;
his mother sought Persian help from Egypt to seek her revenge, reminding the Persian

19
Cohen 1998; Helleiner 2003.
20
Hdt. 4, 153: εἶναι δὲ σφέων καὶ ἡγεμόνα καὶ βασιλέα Βάττον; cp. the Theran foundation decree of
Cyrene SEG, IX, no. 3 (= ML, no. 5), lns. 26-28: ὁριστὸν δοκεῖ Θη[ραί|ο]ις ἀποπέμπεν ἐς τὰν [Λιβ]ύαν Βάττομ
μὲν ἀρχαγέτα[ν | τ]ε καὶ βασιλῆα.
21
Hdt., 4, 160; Plutarch (de Mul. Virt., 25) claims the assassin was not his brother but a false friend,
i.e., a disgruntled elite.
22
Hdt., 4, 161: τοῦτο δὲ τῷ βασιλέι Βάττῳ τεμένεα ἐξελὼν καὶ ἱρωσύνας, τὰ ἄλλα πάντα τὰ πρότερον εἶχον
οἱ βασιλέες ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἔθηκε. Robinson 1997, pp. 105-108, argues that Arist., Pol., 1319b, 6-27 refers
to this period; cf. Mitchell 2000, pp. 87-90.
23
The following is based on Hdt., 3, 13; 4, 162-165, 167, 200-205.
20 PETER VAN ALFEN

satrap, Aryandes, of her son’s submission to the Persian king, Cambyses. With Persian
assistance, after a nine-month siege, she inflicted such brutality on the conquered
Barcaians that the gods, says Herodotus, punished her with a death of festering flesh
and worms. For the reign of Battos IV the historical record falls silent, but serious
political tensions are again recorded in the reign of his successor, Arcesilas IV, whose
rule was overthrown and who soon thereafter was assassinated in Euhesperides thus
bringing the Battiad dynasty to an inglorious end24. Another democracy then followed,
but one often teetering on the brink of collapse25.
Within this impressively volatile political history, we see conflicts erupting within
the dynastic inner circle, between the kings and other elites, and between the kings
and the demos. External help was regularly sought to resolve the conflicts, either
through peaceful settlement or violence, an indication of how bad the situation had
become and remained. The bid for Persian help was an especially desperate act and
changed the nature of the game entirely by introducing a hegemon above the Battiad
king26. Once done restoring a form of order, it is unlikely that the Persians exercised
a claim to sovereignty in decisions regarding the Libyan communities, instead leaving
local rule to the established governments. For Cyrene, we have few clues about the
structure of the early government: in the diagramma of Ptolemy (321 BCE) we find
listed a public assembly, a council, a gerousia, a strategia, and an ephorate of five; the
ephorate and gerousia were perhaps a traditional nod to nomima inherited directly
from Sparta or indirectly by way of Thera27. How many of these institutions existed
generations earlier we cannot say. During the earlier democratic interlude instituted
by Demonax there must have been a public assembly, which might have continued
to exist under the restored kingship albeit significantly weakened, and perhaps used
solely to ratify decisions made elsewhere. Herodotus, however, does mention a council
(boule), which Austin equates to a gerousia, composed presumably of leading elites,
including the king28. It is there where sovereign power probably resided at the time
that the decision to strike the first coins was made; indeed, it was probably this council,
as an oligarchic governing body, that ruled Cyrene following Arcesilas III’s murder
and Pheretime’s departure to Egypt. The question is, how diffuse was sovereign power
within this council? Did the “privileges” (γέρεα) restored to the king include a veto on
what other members of the council decided? Continued tensions between the king
and elites suggest that this was the case29. Mitchell, in fact, has argued that after the

24
Mitchell 2000, pp. 95-96, summarizes what we know of Arcesilas IV’s reign and his downfall;
Pindar’s Pythians 4 and 5, composed in honor of Arcesilas IV’s victories in the Delphic Games, contain
(elliptical) references to political turmoil at Cyrene, e.g., an exiled elite, Damophilos (4, 501), and a
«wintry storm» (5, 10).
25
Mitchell 2000, pp. 100-102; Robinson 2011, pp. 129-136.
26
Mitchell 1966 has argued that the Battiad dynasty medized to protect itself against the
Cyrenaian elites and that the unexpectedly long survival of the monarchy was due to the fact that
it as protected by the threat of Persian force. Cf. Austin 1990, pp. 301-302; Austin 2006, p. 212;
Mitchell 2000, p. 92.
27
SEG, IX, no. 1; Robinson 2011, p. 135; Hornblower 2011, p. 63.
28
Hdt., 4, 165, 1: ἡ δὲ μήτηρ Φερετίμη, ἕως μὲν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλεως ἐν τῇ Βάρκῃ διαιτᾶτο ἐξεργασμένος ἑωυτῷ
κακόν, ἣ δὲ εἶχε αὐτὴ τοῦ παιδὸς τὰ γέρεα ἐν Κυρήνῃ καὶ τἆλλα νεμομένη καὶ ἐν βουλῇ παρίζουσα. Cf. Austin
2006, p. 200.
29
Mitchell 2000, p. 82, suggests that the kings at Cyrene held sovereign power exclusively. As noted
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 21

restoration of the privileges, the king was in a particularly precarious position vis-à-vis
other elites and the demos; in her estimation the kingship continued to survive only
because of the continued threat of another Persian incursion30. Once that threat was
removed in the 440s BCE, the king and the kingship were eliminated.
Regardless of whether Mitchell is correct about the Persians propping up the Battiad
dynasty, we can be certain that those holding sovereign power in Cyrene between c.
540 and 440 BCE, whether the kings, oligarchic elites, or the demos, did so under
persistent, bodily threats from internal political rivals seeking their elimination, and
later from their Persian overlords as well. Several recent studies, including those by
Sara Forsdyke, Matthew Simonton, and David Teegarden have detailed how Greek
regimes, in this case democracies and oligarchies, responded to such mortal threats by
creating both formal and informal institutions to enhance regime security, such as, for
example, ostracism31. One of the lessons learned from these studies, which may seem
obvious but has wide ramifications, is that those in power do whatever is necessary to
keep their power. We might then expect that in the dangerous, superheated political
environment of archaic Cyrene, decisions at the highest level that may not at first
glance seem to have much importance for regime survival, might in fact have been
critical. Deciding to produce coins, and doing so on the Attic-Euboic standard, for
example, may have been a far more serious matter than we realize. This decision, in
other words, may have had as much political motivation as it did economic. This is
something we shall return to below.

Weight Standards, Trade, and Coercion

In her recent study of weight standard selection in the archaic and classical periods,
Selene Psoma identified four primary incentives that poleis had for choosing a weight
standard that fall into two broad categories, those coerced or necessitated by external
political forces on the one hand, and those adopted voluntarily on the other32. These
are:
1) The voluntary adoption of a common standard to facilitate trade with others.
2) The voluntary adoption of a common standard to facilitate joint military
endeavors.
3) The voluntary adoption by an apoikia of the metropolis’ standard as part of the
continuity of the traditional nomima.
4) The coerced adoption of a standard by a political hegemon.
In the case of Cyrene, only two of these incentives might apply. While it appears

above (note 24), Pindar indicates continuing hostilities between the king and certain elites. Hornblower
2011, p. 64, notes that «[t]he landowners, like the ‘land-holders’ (gamoroi) of Syracuse, were a feudal
nobility who were not always on easy terms with their kings… These aspects of Cyrene – a monarchic
government supported or occasionally subverted by horsebreeding aristocrats – recall two other places
whose hospitality Pindar samples early in his career, Thessaly and Macedon».
30
Mitchell 1966; Austin 2000, pp. 90-96.
31
Simonton 2012; Teegarden 2014. For ostracism and its political origins see especially Forsdyke
2005.
32
Psoma 2015.
22 PETER VAN ALFEN

that the settlers retained many other aspects of their traditional nomima, the monetary
standard of Thera was ignored33. We also know of no joint external military adventures
that the archaic Cyrenaians were party to. Of the two remaining incentives, facilitating
trade has obvious appeal, coercion by a hegemon perhaps less so. Let us consider each
of these in turn.
The Cyrenaians in general were renowned for great wealth and there is little doubt
that a significant portion of this came from the export of agricultural products to distant
ports. But, what we know of this long distance trade in terms of the modes, mechanisms,
and groups involved is, sadly, rather limited. Both literary and archaeological sources
give us an idea of some of the commodities shipped in and out of archaic Greek Libya,
and we can guess at others. From these we can formulate a general outline of the
networks involved, but not the details.
Silphion was, of course, the most famed export and the appearance of the plant on
the coins of Cyrene from the start of minting would suggest an outsized role for it in the
overall economy of Libya, if not its export trade, something that the well known mid-
6th century cup depicting Arcesilas II supervising silphion (or wool?) weighing would
suggest34. We have no idea, however, of the scale of silphion production or exports in
the late 6th century35. We can presume, since it appears to have been a monopoly of the
Battiad dynasty, that it was a high value commodity, and that any revenue generated from
its export went straight into royal coffers36. Grain, however, was perhaps more important
than silphion as an export commodity, both in terms of the scale of production and the
diffusion of revenues from trade. The great fertility of the region allowed classical period
farmers there to produce tremendous surplus quantities; we get an idea of the scale of
production from a late 4th century inscription found at Cyrene detailing a massive gift
of 805000 medimnoi of grain from the Cyrenaians to scores of poleis in the Aegean to
stave off a grain shortage there37. It stands to reason that already in the archaic period,
Cyrene was exporting sizeable quantities of grain very likely towards the Aegean38. But
where precisely in the Aegean, or elsewhere, many of these archaic Cyrenaian exports
ended up we cannot say for certain, since the silphion, grain, and even textiles have
left no archaeological traces. Solon makes mention of silphion in a poetic fragment,
suggesting that some of the Libyan spice made it way to Athens not terribly long after
Cyrene was established39. The late-5th century comic poet, Hermippus, also mentions
Cyrenaian silphion and ox-hides coming to Athens, but by that time the Piraeus was
the major eastern Mediterranean entrepot attracting commodities from all over, so the
presence of these goods there comes as no surprise40.

33
Hornblower 2011, pp. 63-64; Malkin 2011, pp. 55-56, 80.
34
For interpretations of the scene on the cup and its inscriptions see Bresson 2000, pp. 85-94; SEG,
L, no. 379.
35
Cf. Amigues 2004.
36
Bresson 2000, pp. 85-94; Mitchell 2000, p. 89; Austin 2006, p. 210.
37
SEG, IX, no. 2; RO, no. 96; Bresson 2011.
38
Bresson 2011, p. 69; Herodotus (4, 198-99) also notes Cyrenaica as a source of grain.
39
Pollux, 10, 103 (= 33 G.-P.2 = 39 W.2); cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010, p. 504.
40
Hermippus, fr. 63. The silphion and ox-hides are mentioned along with a dozen other commodities
shipped to and through Athens from all over the known world. See Gilula 2000. Aristophanes (Eq., 890)
implies that silphion in Athens was usually a luxury.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 23

The archaic pottery that has been excavated at archaeological sites in Libya testifies
to connections between Cyrenaica and certain parts of Greece. Among the earliest
finds are Corinthian wares, but east Greek and Rhodian are also common, along with
an unusual amount of Laconian and Cretan wares41. Here the archaeological evidence
for imports broadly correlates with the origins of the Greek settlers in Libya, as well as
with other known social and political ties42.
Towards the end of the 6th century Attic ware also begins to appear in volume in
Libya43, along with Attic coinage, as the overstrikes noted earlier indicate. For our
purposes, this is an important development, since this evidence could provide a
trade-based motivation for the choice of the Attic-Euboic weight standard in Cyrene.
However, the appearance of Attic pottery and coinage in Libya correlates with a
general, well-documented surge of Attic goods that was building throughout the 6th
century BCE, not only in the western Mediterranean, but in the east as well. For both
ceramics and coins, this flow streaming from Athens reached a peak in the western
Mediterranean in the early 5th century and then tapered off rapidly; in the east the
flow continued unabated all through the classical period44. Arguments persist about
the role that Athenian traders themselves had in the dispersion of these Attic goods,
and indeed about the connection between pots and people generally45. For us, the
problem concerns not just the nationality of the shippers, but whether or not the items
found abroad signal direct, habitual interaction between two groups to the extent that
the exchange between them was formally organized or managed by, for example, tax
treaties or the adoption of a common currency or weight standard. The presence of
ceramics in Libya from Dorian territories underscores what we already know about
traditional and continued social and political ties between these groups, making the
possibility of formalized trading ties that much more likely. The same, however, cannot
be said of ties with Athens; it is not until the last quarter of the 5th century that we
have any evidence of social ties linking Athens and Cyrene46. Without indications of
closer social or political ties around 500 BCE, it seems just as likely that Attic coins and
ceramics went to Cyrene through indirect channels. In fact, it has been argued that the
overseas transportation of Attic wares in this period, at least in the western parts of the

41
For synopses of the ceramic finds see Austin 2006, pp. 193-194; Osborne 2009, pp. 15-16. See also
Erikson 2010, pp. 292-293; 324.
42
Links to the Peloponnese, for example, included the cult of Zeus Lykaios of Arcadian origin, and
Demonax, the Mantinean lawgiver; see Austin 2006, p. 193. For links to the greater Dorian family
including those in Asia Minor and Rhodes see Malkin 2011, pp. 35, 80.
43
McPhee 1997, pp. 76-78 provides an overview of the archaic Attic ware finds in Cyrenaica.
44
Attic ceramics in the west: Gill 1991; Osborne 1996; McPhee 1997; Fletcher 2008; Paleothodoros
2007; Bresson 2015, p. 372; Attic ceramics in the east: van Alfen 2002, pp. 261-269; Stewart, Martin
2005; Attic coins in the west: IGCH, nos. 1874, 2065, 2066, 2071; Attic coins in the east: van Alfen 2012.
It is worth noting as well that Fischer-Bossert 2012, pp. 145-146, has attributed the use of the Attic
standard in archaic Syracuse not to direct contact with Athens, but rather to contacts with the northern
Aegean, where both the Attic and Euboic standards were in use, for which see van Alfen 2015.
45
Fletcher 2008, p. 120; Paleothodoros 2007.
46
Inscriptiones Graecae (Consilio et auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Berolinensis et Brandenburgensis
editae), i3, no. 125 is an Athenian decree honoring the Cyrenaian Epikerdes, who gave money to aid the
Athenian prisoners in Syracuse in 413; while this was going on, however, Cyrenaians were also aiding
Peloponnesian forces against Athens (Thuc., 7, 50).
24 PETER VAN ALFEN

Mediterranean, was largely in the hands of east Greeks and traders from Aegina47. In
other words, precisely those we would expect to have the closest trading ties with Libya.
Moreover, the Aeginetans appear to have fought hard to control Aegean-Libyan trade
as the history of the west Crete settlement, Cydonia, demonstrates48. What positive
evidence we have then for archaic Cyrenaian trade suggests that it was conducted
through Dorian networks that operated primarily in a north-south corridor between
Dorian southern Greece and Libya49. The scarcity of archaeological finds or textual
sources linking archaic Libya with, for example, Carthage and Italy to the west and
Phoenician to the east affirms this observation50.
There is little question that coins moved towards Cyrene within this north-south
trade corridor, but precisely how long distance trade worked as a mechanism for the
movement of coinage in the late archaic period is unclear. In a study that looks at
the role of coinage in archaic Aegean-Egyptian long distance trade, with a focus on
the well known Aramaic customs account from 475 BCE (TAD, C, 3, 7) recording
import and export duties paid at an Egyptian port51, I was able to find little conclusive
evidence that coins, or precious metals generally, were taken overseas for the purposes
of making payments for cargoes52. While precious metals, including coins, were shipped
abroad as commodity bullion, these shipments probably occurred infrequently, even
if regularly scheduled, when compared to the traffic in other goods53. Where there
is solid evidence for the overseas movement of precious metals on a habitual basis is
within the realm of taxation, particularly for import and export duty payments. Greek
ships sailing to Egypt from the Aegean in the early 5th century, for example, needed
to have on board a minimum of c. kg 1 of silver, and nearly g 100 of gold to cover the
import duties. Athenian owls appear to have been preferred for the silver portion of
these payments, but any number of other coins, as the hoards indicate, and Hacksilber
were no doubt accepted as well.
Even if coins were being transported overseas to purchase cargoes, it is open to
question how the alignment of coin standards between, for example, Athens and
Cyrene, would have facilitated this. In a study that has been largely overlooked,
Schmitz 1986 took to task the trade-based assumptions made about such alignments,
underscoring particularly the high barriers that many poleis, including Athens, set
against the circulation of foreign coinages within their territories. Unless there was
a formal cooperative agreement between poleis either to allow for the mutual use of
their respective coinages, or to produce coins jointly, foreign coins would need to be
exchanged at the gate, immediately imposing additional costs on transactions, thus
negating whatever benefit an informal alignment was supposed to render. It is clear
that the Athenians did not allow the circulation of Cyrenaian coins in Attica, nor, as

47
Eirkson 2010, pp. 292-293 (especially note 115) summarizes evidence and earlier arguments for
Aeginetans carriers of Attic ware. See also Fletcher 2008, p. 120.
48
Hdt., 3, 69. Erikson 2010, pp. 291-293.
49
Erikson 2010, pp. 283-284, 291-293.
50
Cf. Austin 2006, p. 194.
51
TAD, C, 3, 7; cf. Yardeni 1994.
52
van Alfen forthcoming.
53
Cf. van Alfen 2012.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 25

far as we can tell, did Athenian coins circulate in Cyrene without being overstruck first.
If the facilitation of trade then seems an unlikely motivation for the adoption of
the Athenian standard, what then of hegemonic imposition? The cost of the Battiads
seeking out the Persians in Egypt as allies in their internal power struggles was Cyrene
joining Egypt as part of the Persian 6th satrapy54. From the reign of Darius (522-486 BCE)
on, the rulers of Cyrenaica and Egypt paid an enormous annual tribute to the Great
King of 700 Babylonian talents of silver55. As noted, the vast majority of Cyrenaican
coins that travelled abroad went to Egypt. Among archaic hoards found in Egypt, they
comprise a respectable proportion of the coinages overall, and contribute to the large
proportion of Attic-Euboic weight coinages found in the hoards (table 1)56. While we
can posit trade as a mechanism for the movement of Cyrenaican coinages eastward,
the administrative ties between Egypt and Cyrene complicate this picture; it is just as
likely that Persian tribute payments were a mechanism57. Herodotus, in fact, records
Cyrenaians bringing 500 mina of silver to Egypt as their first gift to Cambyses while he
was campaigning there in 525 BCE. The historian also notes that Cambyses scattered
this gift among his army, apparently dissatisfied with its small size. If this account has
any basis in truth, it is noteworthy that the Persian king was able to seize and scatter
the silver with his own hands, suggesting that it was in the form of Hacksilber, or
more likely coinage58. If the latter, the gift could have comprised 12500 Attic-Euboic
weight tetradrachms, although these need not have been Cyrenaian coins59. Elsewhere
Herodotus notes that the Persians required those making tribute payments in silver
to render these according to the Babylonian talent, but there is no indication that
they were overly concerned with demanding weights of silver below the level of the
talent, particularly since the incoming silver was melted and then poured into large
vessels for storage60. With tribute transactions occurring at such elevated weight levels,
it is unlikely that the Persians would have dictated to the Cyrenaians, or anyone else,
a standard to use for their coinage, even if the coins were produced for and used in
tribute payments.
In sum, there is little direct or even circumstantial evidence to suggest that facili-
tating trade with the Euboians or Athenians had any bearing on the selection of the
Attic-Euboic weight standard in Cyrene. And while Cyrenaian coinage may have for-
med part of the tribute payments to the Persians, the Persians certainly did not insist
that these payments be made in Attic-Euboic weight coinage only.

54
Hdt., 3, 13; 3, 91, 3; 4, 165.
55
Hdt., 3, 91, 2.
56
Cf. van Alfen forthcoming.
57
Mitchell 2000, p. 91; Austin 2006, p. 212.
58
Hdt., 3, 13: Καμβύσης δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ Λιβύων ἐλθόντα δῶρα φιλοφρόνως ἐδέξατο: τὰ δὲ παρὰ Κυρηναίων
ἀπικόμενα μεμφθείς, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέει, ὅτι ἦν ὀλίγα: ἔπεμψαν γὰρ δὴ πεντακοσίας μνέας ἀργυρίου οἱ Κυρηναῖοι:
ταύτας δρασσόμενος αὐτοχειρίῃ διέσπειρε τῇ στρατιῇ. Lazzarini 2014, p. 98, argues the gift was in the form
of coins.
59
Lazzarini 2014 uses this passage as a central part of his arguments for dating the introduction of
coinage at Cyrene to c. 530 BCE.
60
Hdt., 3, 89; 3, 96. Cf. Zournatzi 2000.
26 PETER VAN ALFEN

Who Decides and Why?

If there was no externally directed motivation for the selection of the Attic-Euboic
weight standard, the incentive must then have been internally generated, as was the
need for coinage generally. Given the state of our evidence, we can only speculate
why the Battiad king decided to mint coins, particularly with an emblem that tied the
coinage more closely to the dynastic silphion monopoly than to the community at
large. Aside from their own internal disputes, the archaic Cyrenaians were involved
in no external wars that would have required coinage for troop payments. If Arcesilas
III was the first to make the decision to strike coins, he might have done so to pay off
the mercenaries he brought from Samos, but Herodotus says he promised instead
to give them land allotments in Libya for their service61. Naval developments might
also have necessitated coinage as it did elsewhere, but there is no indication that
the Cyrenaians had a navy before the last quarter of the 5th century62. There were,
of course, large building projects, particularly temples, undertaken around the time
coins first appeared, but we have little clue how these projects were financed63. Were
they communally funded, for example, or a gift to the gods from the king? And in
either case would coinage necessarily have played a necessary role in expediting their
construction? The evidence for state payments as a driving factor in the decision to
mint at Cyrene is then equivocal; such needs probably existed but may not have been
entirely compelling. Nor can they explain the selection of the Attic-Euboic standard.
Let us consider a different approach to the problem, one that brings us back to
the political turmoil of early Cyrene described earlier. The decisions concerning the
production of coinage at most any point in history has been a matter of state-enacted
monetary policy, the ultimate goal of which has been to enhance the well being of
a select group of people; that group may be a smaller or larger subset of a given
society depending on the governing regime type and the political incentives of those
making the policy64. The decision making process about monetary policy must then
involve trade offs; because it is impossible to design a monetary policy that benefits
all members of society equally, some will benefit from the policy more than others.
There is then a political relationship between those who benefit from the decisions
about monetary policy and the monetary authority making that policy, in addition
to whatever economic relationship between them that may exist. The political
relationship, I suggest, is characterized by pay-offs, or benefits, since those making the
decisions seek political support from a select group within society; the Logic of Political
Survival, as formulated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et alii 65, describes how this works

61
Hdt., 4, 163. Lazzarini 2014, p. 100, posits the king’s need to pay off his mercenaries as a driving
factor in Cyrenaian coins production. Note also that the Cyrenaians were not called up by the Persians to
provide land or sea forces for the invasions of Greece under Darius or Xerxes.
62
Archaic navies and coinage: Davies 2013; van Wees 2013; late 5th century Cyrenaian triremes: Thuc.,
7, 50.
63
Austin 2006, p. 200; Gorini 2010, p. 87.
64
Frieden 2015. In his account of Solon’s monetary reforms in early 6th century Athens, Plutarch
(Solon, 15, 4 = Androtion, 324, F 34) notes how certain groups benefitted greatly from the new monetary
policy (ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς ἐκτίνοντας μεγάλα).
65
Bueno de Mesquita et alii 2003.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 27

with those in power attempting to stay in power by steering benefits to supporters, or

the “winning coalition,” sometimes to the detriment of others in society66. If this is so,
then decisions about monetary policy are also linked to political survival, since again
such policies can be designed to enhance the wealth and well-being of the winning
coalition as a pay-off for its support of those in power.
In studies of the archaic and classical Greek world, the link between political
survival and pay-offs has long been noted67, but not that between political survival and
monetary policy. Elsewhere, I have argued that there was a correlation between regime
type and denominational range in the archaic period, concluding that those regimes
that catered to popular support, such as democracies and some monarchies, tended to
have a broader range of denominations than the oligarchies that did not cater68. Small
coins, like tetartemoria, better served the needs of the masses than the tetradrachms that
served the needs of the elites, thus the very existence of small coins signaled important
social and political considerations69. Small coins were also terribly inefficient and
expensive to produce compared to large ones, so those governments that produced
them typically did so only under some sort of social or political compulsion70.
As we have seen the political situation in archaic Cyrene was nasty, violent, and
unstable71. Regardless of whether it was Arcesilas III or Battos IV who first made
the decision to produce coins, both ruled precariously. Arcesilas III was ultimately
assassinated. And the apparent peace of Battos IV’s reign could be a mirage; as
Mitchell notes, if the silence of our sources reflects actual quietude, it was only because
his elite opponents were waiting for the right moment to strike, as they did during
his son’s, Arcesilas IV, reign72. Given the political insecurities, the decision by either
Arcesilas III or Battos IV to initiate coinage thus takes on greater political significance.

66
Bueno de Mesquita et alii 2003, pp. 7-8: «Political leaders need to hold office in order to accomplish
any goal. Every leader answers to some group that retains her in power: her winning coalition. This group
controls the essential features that constitute political power in the system… Leaders make three related
sets of decisions. First, they choose a tax rate that generates government revenue and that influences how
hard people work. Second, they spend the revenue raised in a manner designed to help keep incumbents
in office, particularly by sustaining support among members of their winning coalition. Finally, they
provide various mixes of public and private goods. Private benefits are distributed only to members of
the winning coalition and diminish in value to individual coalition members as the size of the group
expands. Consequently, as the size of the coalition increases, leaders are expected to shift their effort to
the provision of public goods that benefit all in society».
67
See, for example, Schaps 2004, chp. 9, «The monetization of politics».
68
The unpublished talk, “Archaic Small Change and the Logic of Political Survival”, delivered at the
2015 annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America, can be found on my academia.edu page:
https://www.academia.edu/11692097/Archaic_Small_Change_and_the_Logic_of_Political_Survival
(accessed 25 March 2016).
69
The social, political and economic ramifications of small change in the archaic Greek world are
discussed by Kim 2001.
70
Sargeant, Velde 2003.
71
Forsdyke’s study of elite political competition in archaic Athens provides additional insight into the
situation in Cyrene: Forsdyke 2005. She notes (p. 1) «…that in the archaic period (c. 750-500), elites
engaged in violent competition for power and frequently expelled one another from their poleis. I label
this form of political conflict the ‘politics of exile’, and I suggest that it was particularly unstable, since exiled
elites often called on foreign allies to help them return to their poleis and expel their opponents in turn».
72
Mitchell 2000, p. 93.
28 PETER VAN ALFEN

Whatever precise economic purpose the coins were intended to serve (state payments
for temple building? a means of adding liquidity to retail markets?), their rather sudden
appearance in large numbers and in an astoundingly broad spectrum of denominations
hints at an attempt by the threatened king to shore up political support as broadly and
as rapidly as possible. A limited number of elite supporters might have benefitted from
the largest denominations, but the smallest coins would cater to a wider spectrum of the
public; those most likely to desire small coins were also those who could serve as a foil
against political opponents73. Here again the silphion plant depicted on the coins may
have been intended as a reminder of who it was ultimately supplying the coinage, the
sign, as it were, of the Battiad faction.
In such a scenario, the decision to strike on the Attic standard may simply have been
made by default, encouraged by an abundance of owls in Battiad coffers accumulated
through trade, but especially taxation mechanisms. Whatever portion was owed by the
Greeks in Libya of the 700 talents of silver tribute paid by the 6th satrapy to the Great
King, we can be certain that this fiscal drain forced the Battiad king to reevaluate the
means for bringing silver into his own realm; instituting or readjusting import duties
would be an obvious solution. In Egypt, import duties at the beginning of the 5th century,
such as those recorded in the Aramaic customs account noted above (TAD, C, 3, 7),
were generating significant revenue, which as both the customs account and the hoards
suggest, were being paid mostly with Attic owls74. By the end of the 5th century, there was
a general and near exclusive preference for Athenian owls all along the Nile75. Whether
this preference was the result of a specific demand for owls or a response to the most
common type of coins offered in tax payments we cannot say76. Aeginetan turtles do, of
course, appear in significant numbers in early Egyptian hoards, but just not in the same
quantities as do the owls (table 1).
If the proportion of coinage received in Cyrene was in any way parallel to that received
in Egypt, the Aeginetan turtles we would expect to find from the Cyrenaians’ strong ties
with their Dorian homelands were no doubt sitting in Battiad coffers, but just buried under
the still more abundant Attic owls and other Attic-Euboic weight coins. Assessing both the
silver he had at hand and the political situation, the Battiad king probably realized that
the quickest way to get his silphion-bearing coins into supporters’ hands was to restrike or
recast what he had most readily available. This expedient was, however, only a temporary
solution as the introduction of the indigenous “Asiatic” drachms and hemidrachms soon
thereafter illustrates, as does the eventual wholesale shift to the “Asiatic” standard.

73
In his narrative of the democratic revolution in Athens in 508/507 BCE, Herodotus (5, 66) notes
that the elite Kleisthenes attempted attempt to «make the demos his hetairos» (ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον
προσεταιρίζεται) in his bid to gain political control, demonstrating how elites might try to win over the
demos in their political struggles. The rare verb prosetairizesthai underscores both the loyalty that was
expected of these groups and their use by elites competing for political primacy.
74
van Alfen forthcoming. For a synopsis of the customs account see Yardeni 1994.
75
van Alfen 2012.
76
In an as yet unpublished paper, The Logic of Overstruck Coins: Some Observations from Athenian Coinage,
Kenneth Sheedy offers these observations: «The overstrikes at Cyrene, and the (unexpected) adoption
of the Attic-Euboic weight standard by the mints of Cryenaica, suggest the emerging international
importance of the Athenian owls as a source of silver by the end of the 6th century BC». I thank Prof.
Sheedy for allowing me to see a draft of this paper.
 THE BEGINNINGS OF COINAGE AT CYRENE 29

Table 1A. Proportion of Coin Weight by Issuer in Archaic Egypt Hoards.

Athens: 24%
Aegina: 13%
Acanthus: 5%
Cyrene: 5%
Corinth: 3%
Mende: 3%
Thasos: 3%
Orescii: 2%
“Lete”: 2%
Derrones: 2%
Lycian dynasts: 2%
 
90+ other issuers: >2% each


Table 1B. Proportion of Coin Weight by Standard in Archaic Egypt Hoards.

Attic-Euboic: 47%
Aeginetan: 16%
Northern g 9,8: 16%

Note: These tables are based on the ideal weight of the coin type found in the hoards multiplied by
the number of that type found. For example, 221 Athenian tetradrachms multiplied by g 17,2 gives
g 3801,2, which then serves as the basis of comparison with other coinages. For further explication
of the material, and a summary of the hoards used, see van Alfen forthcoming.
30 PETER VAN ALFEN

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