Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars

PART I The Moral Reality of War

Against the Amoralism of Realism
Realist position: "war is hell" and as a consequence "all is fair" in war (even conduct that
appears unfair) - there are no rules. Any "moral talk" is simply epiphenomenal of underlying
interests.
MW discusses the classic passage for such a position - Thucydides's Melian Dialogue: Contra
the Athenian generals, MW argues the destruction of Athens was not inevitable if Melos was
left alone, there was simply a probability that Athens would have been weakend (and a
probability that this would have lead to its fall). Therefore, the destruction of Melos was not
strictly necessary. There was the freedom to make a decision, and therefore room for moral
debate. The position of the Athenian generals was a denial of that freedom, and a denial of
the meaningfulness of moral argument. However, they were not the only actors. The justice
of the Melian decree was passionately debated in the Athenian assembly. Our position is that
of the members of that discussion. Morality in war is determined by the judgements of
mankind, not the actions of soldiers.
MW also rejects the realist claim that "moral talk" is a euphemistic form of "interest talk." He
points out that we understand moral talk, and to say an attack is unjust does not simply mean
we don't like it . . . it means we don't like it for specific reasons. Moral language can be used
properly and when it is it expresses more than mere interest.
Against Relativism
There is a common moral language with respect to war.
MW asserts Even those soldiers and statesmen who dont feel the agony of a problematic
decision generally know that they should feel it. p.19
The hypocrite lies precisely because morality is real -- people will judge him, and their
judgements matter
The Crime of War
A key point to understanding the morality of war is that it is divided into two parts - jus ad
bellum (the issue of whether the war is just) and jus in bello (the issue of whether it is being
fought justly). These concepts are independent: you can fight a just war unjustly, and an
unjust war justly.
o Jus ad Bellum refers to justice in going to war. The question: is the war just or unjust?

The basic idea (though we shall complicate this later), is that it is a crime to
initiate war - the crime of aggression (or as MW calls it "tyranny" over one's
own people and those of the target state).

It is a crime because "war is hell" - the aggressor "force[s] men and women
to risk their lives for the sake of their rights.(51)

Of course the kind of aristocratic wars of yesteryear where posh young men
(all fully consenting) waged 'honorable' battle is not hell because no one is
forced to fight. However, the fact that professional soldiers 'consent' by
joining the military, does not mean they are not forced to fight by an enemy's
aggression. He is like a doctor who risks his life during an epidemic, using
professional skills he chose to acquire but whose acquisition is not a sign that
he hopes for epidemics. (27) The lives of soldiers are "nationalized . . . by
the modern state"(35). Because of this, war is hell even when the rules are
observed.

o Jus in Bello refers to justice in conducting war. The question: is the war being fought
in a just or unjust manner? The basic idea is that there are limits to appropriate
combat and that these limits are set by individual rights (e.g. noncombatant
immunity, the right to quarter, etc.)

Even in hell, it is possible to be more or less humane, to fight with or
without restraint.(33)

A key premise for jus in bello is that all soldiers on both sides of a war are
equal, regardless of the moral status of the state for whom they fight.
Armed, he is an enemy; but he isnt my enemy in any specific sense . . . I
find in them my moral equals . . . They can try to kill me, and I can try to kill
them. But it is wrong to cut the throats of their wounded or to shoot them
down when they are trying to surrender. (36)

All of this is independent of whether their state is fighting a just war. Both
sides have a moral obligation to fight justly (and equally so).

Responsibility for jus ad bellum lies with the orchestrators of the war, not the
soldiers who fight it: Generals may well straddle the line, but that only
suggests that we know pretty well where it should be drawn.(39)

This does not make lower-level soldiers irresponsible, it just limits their
responsibility to matters of jus in bello. War is hell and they are under duress
so it is a qualified responsibility, but it is there and it part of MW's project to
define it's limits. He begins by arguing that there are 2 kinds of rule relating
to soldiers' right to kill:
(1) "When and how they can kill" (41) --- this is less interesting and varies
over time and by war (bc of technological innovation etc) without
dramatically altering our overal concept of the morality of war
(2) "Whom they can kill" (41) --- this (in MW's eyes) is far more important
and is essentially constant across time and place. Details change, but the
basic thrust is that war is "combat between combatants" (42). Thus
civilians, neutral parties, and soldiers who have surrendered are all
immune from attack.
MW calls the "set of articulated norms, customs, professional codes, legal precepts, religious and
philosophical principles, and reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgements of military
conduct the war convention. (44)

PART II - The Theory of Aggression - Jus ad Bellum

International law and order and the Legalist Paradigm
The Crime of Aggression
Aggression is the name we give to the crime of war."(51) --- "We know the crime
because of our knowledge of the peace it interrupts - not the absence of fighting, but
peace-with-rights, a condition of liberty and security that can exist only in the absence of
aggression itself. (51) It is the only major international state-on-state crime, and occurs
wherever territorial integrity or political sovereignty are violated.
As noted above, The wrong the aggressor commits is to force men and women to risk
their lives for the sake of their rights" - Having been placed in that position, they are
justified in fighting -- indeed it is the morally preferred response. (51) This is what makes
it a particularly heinous crime -- "it challenges rights that are worth dying for."(53)
Underlying the Crime of Aggression - the Rights of Political Communities
The two key rights of political communities are territorial integrity and political
sovereignty. However, it is essential to understand that while communities are granted

importance above individual lives through these two rights, the rights of communities
derive all of their importance from individual rights. The community is granted
importance over individual lives, only because the individuals within it value it and have
created a common life within it.
The territorial integrity of a nation derives from the common life of its citizens not from a
legal title to the land. The "land follows the people" -- he gives the example of AlsaceLorraine here, arguing that the people were loyal to France, and that that should have
settled the matter. Of course borders are arbitrary, but they are important for the
protection of individuals. Therefore, it will often "be necessary to defend a bad border
simply because there is no other. (58)
The Legalist Paradigm (later on he will propose revision to this paradigm)
This is essentially the domestic analogy -- underlying the theory of aggression is the
notion that the international order btwn states is somewhat parallel to domestic order
btwn individuals
However, aggression challenges the order between actors much more dangerously than
does domestic crime because of anarchy - "there are no policemen." (59) Aggression,
then, is a crime against int'l society as a whole.
Because of anarchy, two fundamental propositions follow:
o first, you must be able to resist aggression with military force (both to protect
rights today and deter attack tomorrow)
o second, at least one party must be fighting an unjust war and must be morally
and legally responsible for the breach of peace
There are 6 propositions underlying the theory of aggressio
(1) "THERE EXISTS AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF INDEPENDENT STATES.
(61) - NB states are the units of this society, not individuals - Though states are founded
for the sake of life and liberty, they cannot be challenged in the name of life and liberty
by any other state. (61)
(2) "THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY HAS A LAW THAT ESTABLISHES THE
RIGHTS OF ITS MEMBERS -- ABOVE ALL, THE RIGHTS OF TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY. p.61
(3) "ANY USE OF FORCE OR IMMINENT THREAT OF FORCE BY ONE STATE
AGAINST THE POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
ANOTHER CONSTITUTES AGGRESSION AND IS A CRIMINAL ACT. p.6
(4) "AGGRESSION JUSTIFIES TWO KINDS OF VIOLENT RESPONSE: A WAR OF
SELF-DEFENSE BY THE VICTIM AND A WAR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT BY
THE VICTIM AND ANY OTHER MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. p.62
--- Anyone can come to the aid of a victim, use necessary force against an aggressor,
and even make whatever is the international equivalent of a citizens arrest. p.62 (think
of first Gulf War)
(5) "NOTHING BUT AGGRESSION CAN JUSTIFY WAR. p.62
(6) "ONCE THE AGGRESSOR STATE HAS BEEN MILITARILY REPULSED, IT CAN
ALSO BE PUNISHED. p.62
Modifying the Legalist Paradigm
Preemption / Prevention
Aggression can and often does begin "without shots being fired or borders crossed." (74)
And, as per above, once a state has initiated aggression the target has a right to defend
itself. Therefore, pre-emptive war is technically just under the legalist paradigm. The

question, of course, is what constitutes pre-emptive war. MW sets a high bar, though not
as high as traditional legal accounts
Trad'l legal accounts restrict pre-emptive war to the point of making it practically
meaningless. The test is something along the lines of: "once we had seen it coming." In
other words, the enemy troops have to be lining up, the missiles taking aim, before one
can pre-empt.
Walzer wants to push the bar lower, but to continue to rule out preventive war.
o The preventive maxim is Hobbesian in character. Prudent leaders assume malign
intentions and may attack with a long-sighted view to preventing a threat from
arising. Similarly, Balance of Power theorists argue that one can justify
preventive war as checking the rise of a great power to maintain the BoP.
o MW strongly rejects this: It isnt really prudent to assume the malign intent of
ones neighbors; it is merely cynical (78) One is justified in acting preemptively when under real threat, not when simply afraid. "The mere
augmentation of power . . . cannot be a warrant for war or even the beginning of
warrant" (79)
o Why does it matter? Because, again, war is hell, and "there is a great difference . .
. between killing and being killed by soldiers who can plausibly be described as
the present instruments of an aggressive intention and killing and being killed by
soldiers who may or may not represent a distant danger to our country. (80
o Real threat: -- "boastful ranting" does not count; nor do arms races or military
build up; "hostile acts short of war" don't fully count. Military alliances,
mobilizations, troop movements, border incursions, and naval blockades may
count depending on circumstances. The key is that we are looking for true
enemies, states that are already "engaged in harming us." (81) Three criteria must
be met: 1. manifest intent to injure. 2. a degree of active preparation that makes
intent a positive danger. 3. a situation in which doing anything other than fighting
greatly magnifies the risk
The general formula must go something like this: states may use military force in the
face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial
integrity or political independence. (85) The Six Day War (Israel vs Egypt) is used as a
case to demonstrate legitimate pre-emptive war. This, in MW's terms is a "major
revision" of the legalist paradigm.

Interventions
JS Mill's position:
o Non-intervention is based on the principle of self-determination / self-help (a
people can be self-determining even if it does not have free political institutions indeed having free institutions imposed by an external power denies a people
self-determination) - self-determination is the right of a people to "become free
by their own efforts" if they can.
o In any event, you cannot set a people free, they must do it themselves. Indeed, it
is only in the struggle for freedom that a people comes to value freedom enough
to do the work necessary to maintain it once it is won.
o Brief foreign intervention cannot shift the domestic balance of forces in a
decisive way; while prolonged intervention will itself pose the greatest threat to
freedom.
Walzer presents a Millian Reformulation of the Nonintervention Principle: ACT SO AS
TO RECOGNIZE AND UPHOLD COMMUNAL AUTONOMY. This leaves room for
intervention on three (perhaps four) bases:

(1) secession - there must be a "distinct national community" that can claim territorial
integrity. This is a high bar - most nationalist movements cannot credibly make such a
claim. Indeed it is very difficult to prove this status without winning secession
independently. He gives the example of the attempted Hungarian Revolution of 1848
(which Mill also claims would have been a valid case for intervention, though he uses it
as an example of counterintervention. Walzer says it would have been both). Hungary
works because Hungary was widely recognized as "one of the oldest nations in Europe."
(2) counterintervention - Here Mill and Walzer agree. Hungary 1849 and 1956 are two
examples. When a state illegitimately intervenes on one side of a civil war (secessionist
or not), other states may intervene on behalf of the opposite side to restore the domestic
balance of forces and negate the effect of the illegitimate intervenor. The balancing is
crucial here, you do not intervene to win, you intervene to give the wronged side a fair
chance at winning.
a. The case is US in Vietnam. The sophisticated US defense is that it was assisting a
legitimate gov't in response to illegal help to rebels by the North Vietnamese
regime. It was not
i. the gov't was not legit bc it relied on US support to maintain its power
(this is tolerable early in a regime's startup, but the South Vietnamese
regime was way beyond that point)
ii. it was not a legit counterintervention bc North's help started after US
economic and military aid, and anyway, the US did not respond with
anything near symmetrical force.
(2.5) Assistance to a legitimate government - (Walzer doesn't distinguish this, but it does not
fall into any of the other categories). You can help a government contain a rebellion if the
rebel forces have not achieved substantial enough standing and control over territory to
plausibly claim nationhood - if it goes beyond that you must remain neutral. "As soon as
the insurgents establish control over some substantial portion of the territory and
population of the state, they acquire belligerent rights and an equality of status with the
government." (96)
(3) enslavement/massacre - "when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we
must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of selfdetermination might apply. (101) Indeed, When a people are being massacred, we
dont require that they pass the test of self-help before coming to their aid. It is their very
incapacity that brings us in. (106) Now, motives are obviously often mixed w/ regard to
humanitarian intervention (it is never pure humanitarianism). This is not (on its own) an
argument against humanitarian intervention. To those who argue for multilateralism, MW
argues it isn't necessarily less selfish. Case studies are Cuba 1898 and Bangladesh 1971.
Bangladesh was valid, Cuba was not. While HI needn't be purely motivated, the
intervenor must not stand in the way of the purposes of those it is trying to help. This
regard for the purposes of the oppressed directly parallels the respect for local autonomy
that is a necessary feature of counter-intervention. The two revisionist principles reflect a
common commitment: that intervention be as much like nonintervention as possible.
a. It is vital to remember that the burden of proof falls squarely on the political
leader who tries to intervene. And when the attempt is made with armed force,
the burden is especially heavy (86) In all 3 cases of legitimate intervention, the
prospective intervenor must for moral reasons weigh the dangers an action will
impose on the people it is designed to benefit and all other innocent parties.
The Ends of War and exceptions to legalist conservativism
Many wars end without destruction of enemy forces and many war aims can be achieved
well short of destruction and overthrow. (110) What, then, are the appropriate ends of a

just war? It is important to know, bc once they are won or are within political reach, "the
fighting should stop. Soldiers killed beyond that point die needlessly" to force them to do
so is "a crime akin to that of aggression itself." (110)
The aim of unconditional surrender is, generally speaking, not legitimate (just wars are
not crusades). Ultimately "enemy states must be treated, morally as well as strategically,
as future partners in some sort of international order." (116) Just wars are limited wars,
restrained by prudence and the principle of valuing human life.
There are rare exceptions: "Nazism was a conscious and willful challenge to the very
existence of such a world" (116) And we had a right (absent an internal German
revolution) to conquer and politically reconstruct the state. This is the absolute limit of
the just ends of war, and even here, while it is as far as we can go, the surrender could not
be said to be unconditional -- we did not suddenly have a right to obliterate the German
state.

So there are 5 Revisions to the Legalist Paradigm

1 preemption -- states may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure
to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence.
2, 3, 4 intervention -- secession, counterintervention, and enslavement/massacre
5 conservative character of wars except against Nazi-like states -I can now restate the fifth
revision of the legalist paradigm. p.121