The Lab's Quarterly Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio

2009 / n. 1 / gennaio-marzo

Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Universit di Pisa

Direttore: Massimo Ampola Comitato scientifico: Roberto Faenza Paolo Bagnoli Mauro Grassi Antonio Thiery Franco Martorana Comitato di Redazione: Stefania Milella Luca Lischi Alfredo Givigliano Marco Chiuppesi Segretario di Redazione: Luca Corchia

ISSN 2035-5548

Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Universit di Pisa

The Lab's Quarterly Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio

2009 / n. 1 / gennaio-marzo

COMPLEXITY, VAGUENESS, FRACTALS AND FUZZY LOGIC: NEW PATHS FOR THE SOCIAL SEARCH

Massimo Ampola Marco Chiuppesi Paolo Pasquinelli Talita Pistelli Mc Clelland Luca Corchia

Complexity,vagueness, fractals and fuzzy logic Indexes, Scales and Ideal Types a Fuzzy Approach Some Aspect of the Quality in a Living Complex System. A Preliminary Approach: The Lichen Symbiosis Vague tendences: a review of fuzzy set theory comparative studies Explicative models of complexity. The reconstructions of social evolution for Jrgen Habermas Paths Towards Addiction: a Fuzzy Model of Causal Relations

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Chiara Ferretti

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RECENSIONI Elisabetta Buonasorte Essere e non essere. Soggettivit virtuali tra unione e divisione (Annalisa Buccieri, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2009)

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Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali, Universit di Pisa

Si tenuta a Napoli dal 1 al 5 Settembre 2008 la VII International Conference on Social Scienze Methodology nellambito di RC33 Logic and Methodology in Sociology. Pubblichiamo le relazioni tenute da studiosi impegnati nel Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale del Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, ora, confluito nel Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali. Section Complexity, vagueness, fractals and fuzzy logic: new paths for the social search

EXPLICATIVE MODELS OF COMPLEXITY. THE RECONSTRUCTIONS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION FOR JRGEN HABERMAS

Luca Corchia Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali Universit di Pisa luca.corchia@dss.unipi.it +39 050 2212420

Abstract
Habermas introduces the concept of reconstructive science with a double purpose: to place the general theory of society between philosophy and social science and reestablish the rift between the great theorization and the empirical research. The model of rational reconstructions represents the main thread of the surveys about the structures of the life-world (culture, society and personality) and their respective functions (cultural reproductions, social integrations and socialization). For this propose, the dialectics between symbolic representation of the structures subordinated to all worlds of life (internal relationships) and the material reproduction of the social systems in their complex (external relationships between social systems and environment) has to be considered. This model finds an application, above all, in the theory of the social evolution, starting from the reconstruction of the necessary conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-cultural-life forms (the hominization) until an analysis of the development of social formations, which Habermas subdivides into primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. This paper is an attempt, primarily, to formalize the model of reconstruction of the logic of development of social formations summed up by Habermas through the differentiation between vital world and social systems (and, within them, through the r ationalization of the life-world and the growth in complexity of the social systems). Secondly, it tries to offer some methodological clarifications about the explanation of the dynamics of historical processes and, in particular, about the theoretical meaning of the evolutional theorys propositions. Even if the German sociologist considers that the ex-post rational reconstructions and the models system/environment cannot have a complete historiographical application, these certainly act as a general premise in the argumentative structure of the historical explanation.

Keywords: new model, complexity, social evolution Index

Introduction The Lesson of the Classics: the General Theory of Society 1. The Theory of Social Evolution 2. Social Science and Historiography Basic Bibliography 54 56 70 79

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Introduction THE LESSON OF THE CLASSICS: THE GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Jrgen Habermas has devoted more than thirty years of his studies to social science, in order to define, through the reconstruction of its traditions of thought, a theorical framework which serves as orientation for programs of historical social programs. As well as the classics of the sociological thought, he has faced the problems of society as a whole, explaining the propositions, methods and aims as indispensable pre-requisites for a research which widens the disciplinary borders of the philosophical reflection on one side, and of the historical research on the other side. Within the long itinerary of his formation, this program represents a sort of main thread in the analysis of cultural systems, social systems, pe rsonality systems and, above all, in the theory of the social evolution, from the reconstruction of the necessary conditions for the anthropological genesis of the socio-cultural living forms the hominization until the examination of the logic and dynamics of the development of the social formations, that Habermas subdivides in primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. Considering these as the cognitive basis, it is unavoidable to question whether Habermas really achieves, in his itineraries through the history of ideas, the logical coherence and the depth of research which are necessary to systematize the researches in social science into a unitary theorical framework. Within the general reconstruction of Habermas work, the present paper f ocuses on the propositions of the explicative model of the theory of social evolution and on the particular relationships between sociology and historiography. But primarily, we also have to point out more precisely the object of interest of his writings, considering that, according to Habermas, the debates within the social science deal with the cognitive statute, but first of all with the objectual sphere and at least they concern the choice of methodologies and techniques of research in order to approach data, describe them, advance hypotheses, develop analyses and control their results in relation to the scientific community. In his opinion, the objectual sphere is then at the highest level of abstraction: nam ely a theory of society which reconstructs the constitutive components of the social formations and the processes-mechanisms of their reproduction, namely statics and dynamics of the social phenomena.

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The reference to the constitutive aspects of society is confirmed in the Interview with Hans Peter Krger (1989). Habermas replies to the request of outlining a geographical map of his theory and affirms: Every theory of society must have ambition to explain how a society works, and through what it is reproduced1. In this way, he goes back to the research about the classics in the sociological thought that - starting from A. Comte, H. Spencer and K. Marx until P. Sorokin and T. Parsons, through F. Tnnies, E. Durkheim, M. Weber has maintained the idea of building models in order to describe the structural elements of social formations and the logics of development of human evolution, re-organizing the material of historical researches from a synchronic (or structural) and a diachronic (or genetic) point of view. The reference to the classics brings about the attention to the logics of research and to the interdisciplinary horizon opened by their perspective on social phenomena, in opposition to the reductionistic attempts to bring back social science to specialist spheres, such as economic sciences for production, exchange and use of wealth, political science for constitution and maintaining processes, crises of power and public opinion, sociology for social integration and anomic crisis in groups and institutions, psychology for the individuation and socialization of generations, cultural science for the genesis and the transmission of the canonical forms of knowledge and for heresies. Habermas faces the definition of conceptual framework of the theory of society, starting from the reflection on an unclear relationship between the theory of action and the systemic action. In other words, starting from the preliminary question on how conceptual strategies are orientated, social science can integrate in a unitary model, redefining the theory of action in terms of theory of communicative action and assuming, even if a reduced dimension, the neo-functionalist positions of the systemic theory 2. This approach, redefined on the model of rational reconstructions represents the thread of the r eflections about the structures of the life-world, cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization, also considering the connections between the stru ctures subjected to all worlds of life and their symbolic reproduction and m aterial reproduction3.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Hans Peter Krger, in Id., NR, cit., p. 90. J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 697. 3 J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 739.
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1. The Theory of Social Evolution The processes of social reproduction had been reconstructed in a specialist way by E. Husserls phenomenology and Gadamers philosophical hermene utics, referring to the actualization of cultural traditions, Meads symbolic inte ractionism and Webers comprehensive sociology with respect to the coordination of social actions, and at least S. Freuds psychoanalysis and J. Piagets, L. Ko lbergs, and R. Selmans cognitive ps ychology, the social psychology in relation to the processes of socialization. Without omitting the original contributions given by A. Schtz, T. Lckmanns and P. Bergers social phenomenology, A. Cicourels ethno-methodology and I. Goffmans dramaturgy4. The theory of communicative acting aims at making a synthesis of all these different traditions. The structures of the life-world regenerate in the processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization, but social systems also have to produce material resources, rule the internal functioning and control the environment and its boundaries; Marx defined this process as metabolism b etween society and nature5. Through the concept of society on two levels, H abermas goes back to T. Parsons6 and N. Luhmanns7 works. In the propositions of the social evolution, he specifies the integration of both explicative models in the analysis of the systemic crises of social formations provoked by environmental challenges and/or internal contradictions which fall upon the reproduction of the structures of the life-world and whose resolution requires innovative answers8. As we shall mention, Habermas connects the
J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociale ricostruttive e scienze sociali comprendenti, in Id., MB, cit., pp. 29-30. 5 J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente e mondo vitale, in Id., Il pensiero post-metafisico (NMD), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1991, p. 102. 6 J. Habermas, Talcott Parsons Konstruktionsprobleme der Theoriekonstruktion, in J. Matthes, Lebenswelt und soziale Probleme. Frankfurt a.M. New York, Campus, pp. 28-48; Id., it. transl. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 811-950. 7 J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, in Id., Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale (TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 95-195; Id., it. transl. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, in Id., La crisi di razionalit nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza, 1975, pp. 5-9; Id., it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., pp. 359-360; Id., J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp. 154-157, 175-179; Id., it. transl. Excursus sulla appropriazione delleredit della filosofia del soggetto da parte della teoria dei sistemi di Luhmann, in Id., Il discorso filosofico della modernit. Dodici lezioni (PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1987, pp. 366-383; Id., it. transl. Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, in Id., LPS, cit., pp. 105-123, 141-157; Id., Diritto e morale. Lezione seconda. Lidea dello Stato di diritto, in Id., Morale, diritto, politica (MDP), Torino, Einaudi, 1986, pp. 45-78, Id., it. transl. Sociologie del diritto e filosofie della giustizia, in Id., Fatti e norme. Contributi a una teoria discorsiva del diritto e della democrazia (FG), Milano, Guerini e Associati, 1996, pp. 61-67. 8 J. Habermas, it. transl. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, in Id., LPS, cit., p. 7.
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functionalist analysis of changes in structure and function, clarifying genetic questions9. The theory of social systems worked out by neo-functionalism is not able to explain, within the process of functional differentiation which cha racterizes social evolution, the genesis of organ ization principles which solve out the systemic challenges, because it precludes the reconstruction of learning process arising from the life-world. This problem had already been raised by the old master of functionalism, S. N. Eisenstadt10. The connection between the theory of action Habermas approach to indicate the reconstructions of formal pragmatics in the sphere of social theory and the theory of systems represents the most important problem for a the oretical construction of social components in the theories of cultural reproduction, of social interaction and socialization11. A conceptual and not banal connection between both paradigms is, above all, at the bottom of the study on social changing12. Indeed, even if the problem that dominates the researches is the reconstruction of structures and changing of the life-world, he considers that this study receives its right place online within a history of the system, only accessible for a functionalistic analysis13. In the perspective of the comparison with the systemic theory, he interprets Marx. During the Seventies, Habermas tried to make coincide the research program about social evolution with a reconstruction of historical materialism 14, addressing more attention to the results of the sciences consigned to the oblivion of middle-class knowledge15. During the Fifties, he had already taken into account the heritage of history of philosophy of occidental Marxism of the Se cond International and the Soviet canon, the Diamat, according to the news studies opened with the discover of the young Marx16. On the other hand, in the essays contained in For reconstruction of Historical Materialism (1976), Habermas
J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 182. J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 186. 11 J. Habermas, it. transl. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, in TKH, cit, p. 813. 12 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in ZRHM, cit., p. 183. 13 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in TKH, cit, p. 696. 14 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., Dialettica della Razionalizzazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 19942, p. 151. 15 J. Habermas, it. transl. Dialettica della razionalizzazione, in DR2, cit., p. 224. 16 J. Habermas, Marx in Perspektiven, in Merkur, IX, 1955, pp. 1180-1183; Id., it. transl. Sulla discussione filosofica intorno a Marx e al marxismo, in, DR2, cit., pp. 23-107; it. transl. Tra filosofia e scienza: il marxismo come critica, in Id., Prassi politica e teoria critica della societ (TP), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973, pp. 301-366; Metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, in Id., Conoscenza e interesse (EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832, pp. 27-45.
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takes seriously Marx and Engels theoretic attempt, defining the first th esis of his research program: Thesis I: Historical materialism should not be co nsidered as a heuristics, neither as history, neither as an objective of history, neither as an objectivistic theory of history, neither as a retrospective glance at an analysis of capitalism done more than a hundred years ago, but as an alternative solution to take into account in relation to the statement nowadays dominating about a theory of social evolution17. This reconstruction leads Habermas to redefine the propositions of historical materialism relating to the co ncept of social work, the theorem structure/superstructure, the dialectics between productive forces and reproduction relationships and the definition of social formation. In his Theory of communicative acting (1981), Habermas repeats argumentations that he had already exposed in his collection of writings For the reconstruction of historical materialism (1976), without qualifying the theory of development with the expression formulated materialistically. Now he takes about a partial overlapping among parallel theorical strategies 18. In each case, the attempt considering the meaning of the word reconstruction in Habermas pr oceedings, was then criticized in English-speaking and Latin countries, even if his studies founded their collocation in a continuity with the critical theory, in particular with the problem of modernity in M. Webers inte rpretation of HegelMarxism. It is meaningful that Webers consideration towards Habermas Theory, then at the end of ten-year researches carried out at Max Planck Institut in Starnberg, does not find a confirmation in previous writings. Only at the end of the Seventies, Habermas presents, in classical sociology, Erfurt sociologists works as the most important attempt to formulate a model of stages of development of the socio-cultural evolution intended as a logically reconstructed process. This displacement can be explain through the fact that exactly in those years the studies of S. Kalberg, W. Schluchter, F. H. Tenbruck, R. N. Bellah e R. Dbert, K. Eder and others were published. Here the dominating perspective of the philosophical debates in the Twenties about Webers Sociology of Religion goes back to investigate the theory of rationalization, after being shelved for long time by a deeper investigation in Economy and society19.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 152. J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769. 19 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 229-230, 289-291.
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If Marx interpretation is influenced by Habermas critics to neo-functionalism and the comparison with the production paradigm of philosophy of praxis 20, the new interpretation of Webers analysis of occidental rationalization must be re-conducted to the model of reconstructive science employed by psychology to explain the ontogenetic development. He presented the idea of an homology, relatively tight between filogenesis and ontogenesis21, which could find a confirmation in Meads inter-actionism, in the Ego-psychoanalysis and psychology and above all in genetic structuralism by Piaget, Kohlberg, Selman, Flavell and others a group of studies which represents the last of four traditions of thought, from which Habermas draws enduring conceptual themes, next to Parsons and Luhmanns systemic neo-functionalist theory, the historical materialism of lay versions which avoid fideisms of scientism and philosophy of history and Weberian sociology in the more carefully universalistic interpret ation suggested in the Seventies. The concepts and hypotheses of the psychology of development represent, indeed, a model for the redefinition of social science from a reconstructive perspective. In his anthropological reflections, Habermas maintains that social science must prepare a theoretical frame which permits not only to reconstruct the socio-cultural evolutional mechanisms, but also to define properly what is meant with the expression principle in the history of genre 22 a proposition that our author finds confirmed in Parsons Systems of societies (1966)23. We must anticipate that, following Lvy-Strauss and many other anthropologists studies, Habermas finds that the gap between man and other animal sp ecies must be found in the familiarization of man the evolutive innovation which makes the genesis of the social primitive formation possible, around the parental structures. If on a sub-human level, the biological reproduction represents a conditional center of the genesis of the nexus of solidarity among the members of a species, as E. Durkheim24 and S. Freud25 supposed, the unity of relationship is the factor for the diffusion of social solidarity. Family skips the hierarchical one-dimensional order, according to which every animal is assigned transitively only one status, allowing the male adult member of the
J. Habermas, it. transl. Excursus sullobsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, in Id., PDM, cit., pp. 77-85. 21 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di , in Id., ZRHM, p. 12. 22 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalit, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 224. 23 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identit dellio, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 142-143. 24 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, p. 604. 25 J. Habermas, it. transl. Psicoanalisi e teoria della societ. Nietzsche e la in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 271272.
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group to connect, assuming the paternal role (the structural family unit), the status within the system of women and children of the reproduction of s ocial ties to the status in the male system of economy based on hunting and war 26. Habermas presents this anthropological hypothesis as the Second Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism: The specifically human living way can be sufficiently characterized if hunting economy in the organization conditions of the family is taken into account. Production and socialization as equally important for human genre. The family structure of society which reigns as the appropriation of external natural as the integration of internal nature is fundamental27. Habermas does not specify any possible external or sociological conditions which, in the socio-cognitive process of co-generation of the social world and subjective world, determined the passage from the biologic al entity of family to parental structures. He is interested in the necessary assum ptions the logic of development so that the abstracted cognitive competences, the rules of social acting and subjective identity (necessary cond itions for the reproduction of every social formation) arise from the intera ctions based on an instinctual ground and symbolically mediated of groups of hominids. Habermas follows Meads and Durkheims 28 perspective about the transformation of the linguistic medium in its relationships with the cognition and interaction structures. Indeed, the new cognitive and relational competences allow, through communicative acts, the production of a knowledge culturally accumulated (cultural transmission), the satisfaction of generalized expectations of behaviour, conveniently to the context (social integration) and the co nstitution of steady personality structures (socialization). The critical literature neglects the fact that the theory of communicative acting is not a moral doctrine, but a reconstruction of the ontogenesis and filogenesis of competences29. Once reconstructed the necessary conditions to the constitution of human societies, Habermas works out a rational model which comprehends both evol utional challenges and the logics of development of the possible innovative s olution. As we have already explained before, integrating the systemic theory and the action theory, he presumes that the social evolution follows a do uble differentiation which produces, on the one side, the differentiation between life-world and the social sub-systems, and, on the other side, the formaJ. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 153154. 27 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in DR2, cit., p. 154. 28 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 548669. 29 J. Habermas, it. transl. Coscienza morale e agire comunicativo, in Id., MB, cit., pp. 123-204.
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tion of two different logics of development the growth of complexity of social systems and the rationalization of the life -world: I understand social evolution as a second grade differentiation process: system and life-world differ from one another, as the firsts complexity and the seconds rationality grow more and more, not only respectively as system and as life-world at the same time they get different from one another30. Within the theory of social evolution, Habermas assumes some hypotheses of theory of systems following Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Parsons and at least Luhmann. The beginning of the functionalistic analysis deals with the adaptive problems that a social system must solve within the sphere of mat erial reproduction, where some evolutive challenges arise which generate i mpulses to differentiation. The evolutive logic can be described, above all, as a growth of social complexity31. Habermas remembers that since Durkheims Division of Labour (1893), functionalism has focused on the concept of differentiation, whose explicative importance is not to be re-conducted to mere socioeconomical criteria. This differentiation is, above all, a segmented and/or functional differentiation of social structures to which forms of social integr ation in relationship to the type of social solidarity (mechanical/organic) and different forms of personal identities (collective/individual) are correlated. What is here interesting is the centrality dedicated to labour as development engine in the material reproduction of genre which characterizes the evolutive theory since Marx praxis philosophy until Spencers organicism32 and contemporary functionalism33. In this tradition the possibility in favour of the analysis of the c apacities of direction and control of systems consists of re-elaborating the internal complexity towards environmental challenges with the differentiation and re-unification of partial systems functionally specified34. In this reconstruction it results that from a first evolutive level primitive societies where only the repetition of similar and homogeneous segments is present familiar structures following the social development, a system of different organs, each of them having got a specific task, has generated, and these organs are built up themselves by different parts, which are reciprocally coordinated and subordinated around the same central organ the State which depends on them and exerts a moderating action on the rest of the orga n30 31

J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 749. J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769. 32 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 698-699. 33 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 147. 34 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., pp. 347-350.

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ism35. If, passing from primitive societies to traditional societies, a diffe rent relationship among the structures of material reproduction segmented vs. functional emerges, modern societies must face a differentiation b etween no more centralized but decentralized social structures, which find their ba lance point in the complementary relationship between the State administration, regulated and legitimated by a rational -legal power and the capitalistic trade economy36. In this introduction it is not possible to sum up the scheme about the mech anisms of systemic differentiation and the medium of regulation, nor to explain in detail the long reflections about the single social formations:
SOCIAL FORMATIONS Equalitarian Primitive societies Stratified Traditional societies Modern societies DIFFERENTIATION AND
INTEGRATION OF

SYSTEMIC MECHANISMS Not economic exchange Not political power Political power Economic exchange and political power

Similar unities. Structural differentiation Not similar unities. Functional differentiation

Tab. 1. Mechanisms of systemic differentiation

Habermas joins the theorical convention, common in the sociology of changing, of distinguishing between primitive equalitary and stratified societies, traditional and modern societies based on mechanisms which raise the levels of possible increases of complexity37. On the other side, the criteria of systemic differentiation applied also by Habermas in the reconstruction of the theory of s ocial evolution does not suits, as from a functionalistic point a view, it must be made a distinction between grades of complexity, but not between evolutive levels38. Functionalism is able to describe the process of functional differentiation which determines the formation of new social structures, but cannot explain the genesis mechanism has no value of explanatio39. Besides, the differentiation processes can be clues of an evolutive process, but also causes of a movement in ev olutive directions without escape40. The complexity can be explained only examJ. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalit, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 192. 36 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 766-767. 37 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 749-750. 38 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 146-147. 39 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 179-180. 40 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.
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ining the mechanisms of learning which develop within the principle of social organization and those which, face the environmental challenges or internal insoluble contradiction allow innovative answers41. Habermas faces genetic questions bringing up the limitations between old and new sociological functionalism, introducing a comparis on between biological and social evolution, and indicating the conditions which make possible to investigate. Here it suffices to underline that the restoration of the evolutionism in social science is due to contemporary biology, whose model of organic changing does not explain exhaustively the logic of development of human beings: A sociologist who makes coincide the social development with the growth of complexity, acts as a biologist who describes the natural evolution of species in the concepts of morphological differentiation. An explanation of evolution must goes back to the inventories of behaviour of species and mutation mechanisms. Similarly, we should distinguish, on a level of social evolution, between the solution to control problems and the mechanisms of learning42. Besides, biologists explain the learning of species through the process of genetic mut ation a sort of mistake in the transmission of genetic information which creates the deviant phenotypes, which are selected under the selective spur of the environment, making the stabilizing of a population in the new environmental conditions possible43. As it is impossible to transpose such model to social changing, a mechanism of equivalent variation must be pointed out: the processes of cultural learning. Three aspects space out the genetic mutation in the human sub-species from learning on a cultural level: a) the evolutive learning process completes not only through the changing of genetic patrimony, but also through the changing of a potential of knowledge; b) on this level the distinction between phenotype and genotype loses any meaning. The inter-subjectively shared and transmitted knowledge is a constitutive part of the social system and is not owned by isolated people; c) who, indeed, constitute themselves as people just by means of socialization. Natural evolution brings among the member of the species a more or less homogeneous repertoire of behaviours, while social learning provokes an accelerated diversification of behaviour 44. Only reconstructing learning mechanisms and processes, we can explain why some societies even few of them have been able to find solutions to problems
41 42

J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 147. J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350. 43 J. Habermas, it. transl.Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, p. 143. 44 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, p. 144.

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of direction and control and why they have developed exactly those solutions, which have made possible a functional differentiation and a new balance in organizational structures. Then a distinction must be made between a whole of (equivalent) solutions of a systemic locatable problem, on the one hand, which must be investigated in functionalistic terms, and the learning processes on the other hand, which can explain why some systems widen their capability of problem solving and others fail face the same problems45. When learning problems are investigated, it must be clear which forms of knowledge are relevant for the evolution and what is the learning subject. On the cultural level, the life-world represents a handed down and linguistically organized reserve of interpretative, evaluative and expressive models, through which experiences are pragmatically organized in learning schemes and semantically formulated in inter -subjectively common notions and in daily communications and specialist discourses 46. The concept of culture offered by Habermas, that we cannot examine in this work, has the merit of illuminating implicit knowledge, behind processes of comprehension and agreement, showing how the background of linguistic knowledge and common sense takes shape, and how a cultural tradition of experts lies over, retroa cting and elaborating visions of the world (mythology, theology and metaphysics) and forms of specialist knowledge (science and techniques, moral and law, ae sthetics and arts). Facing systemic challenges, which get into crisis the adaptive and integr ative functions of society, the available forms of knowledge are the potentials of solution which allow to imagine and carry out new principles of social o rganization. On one side, integrative functions of comprehension, legitimation, socialization in symbolic reproduction Habermas expresses this sphere with the concept of life-world; on the other side, adaptive functions of innovation, direction and control of complexity in the material reproduction Habermas summarizes this sphere by the use of the concept social system. Every innovation rises from a new level of learning. At this point, Habermas redefines Marx dialectics between productive forces and production relationships, questioning that the process of social evolution must be intended in a technical sense, as if technical-scientific knowledge was a bound between both productive forces and forms of social integration: The fundamental assumption of historical materialism, that the growth of pro45 46

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 352. J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e Mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 712.

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ductive forces (and relative increase of productivity of social work) represents the learning mechanism, which helps us to explain the passing to new social formations, is not maintainable empirically47. The growth of cognitive potential and its conversion into technologies which develop the material reproduction can explain the birth of certain systemic problems, but it cannot be explained how this arisen problems can be solved. The introduction of new forms of social integration, i.e. the substitution of the relational system with the state of passing from the primitive society to traditional societies, does not require a technologically valuable knowledge, which can be actuated according to the rules of instrumental knowledge (a widening of control on the external nature), but the widening of the practical-moral knowledge, that can embody new interaction structures48. Only in this sense, according to Habermas, it can be defended the principle that a social system doesnt end and new production relationships does not take over before the material conditions for their existence take shape within the old society. The dialectics between systemic challenge and forms of knowledge is reformulated as the 4th Thesis for reconstruction of historical materialism: When systemic problems arise and they cannot be solved through the method of the dominating production anymore, the existing form for social integration is in danger. An endogenous mechanism of learning foresees the accumulation of a cognitive-technical potential, that can be used to solve problems which generate such crisis. But this knowledge can be given form in order to allow the deployment of productive forces only if the evolutional step towards an institutional framework and a new form of social integration has been made. This step can only be explained on the basis of different learning processes, the pratical-moral ones49. It is interesting that Habermas neglects here the aesthetical - expressive knowledge, that knowledge which raises the problem of authentic interpret ation of needs on the side of individuals in existential discourses and aesthet ical critic. On the other side, in the Theory of Communicative Action, he supports that the selectivity of modern societies towards the complex of aesthet icalpractical rationality is due to the scarce effect of art in the formation of social structures50.
47 48

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 357. J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 156157. 49 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157158. 50 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 341.

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As far as the imputed subject, Habermas affirms that learning neither can be ascribed only to individuals nor to society. If it is true that individuals learn the learning mechanisms fall within the exclusive prerogatives of the human organism they acquire the competences within the symbolic relationships of social groups and cultural traditions. Furthermore, he affirms that the learning processes which find their access to the interpretation system of cultural tradition reproduce themselves through the mediation of social movements or in exe mplary processes51. Knowledge acquired in a first time by individuals or ma rginal groups is then shared at a collective level and changes into a reserve of knowledge, a cognitive potential of adaptation or integration, which is socially usable52. Introducing the nexus between ideas and interests, he shows the limits of comprehending sociology and of the culturalistic concept of the life -world and he restores materialistically the study of the functions of culture within the social theory. Habermas is convinced that all societies based on classes with a political or economic ground are featured by the problem of legitimation or critics exercised by culture, and, in particular, of the relationship between the reproduction of cultural knowledge and control strategies exercised by power and money. Cultural traditions are not only the expression of ideas, values and needs of social groups they are created by, elaborated and transmitted in the sequence of generations. They also meet the need of cultural legitimation of the material interests of a group rank or class in relation to the interests of other groups, assuring the non-problematical reproduction of social formations which institutionalize the differentiated participation to political power, the unequal distribution of economical wealth, the selective acknowledgement of social prestige and dignity of cultural identities. In such a context of analysis, Habermas reflections about the strategy of manipulation of consensus and about the formation of ideological conceptions of the world have to find their colloc ation. In the definition of the concept of social formation, he reconfirms that the deployment of productive forces is important, but it is not the main dimension of a theory of social evolution which intends to periodize the development. If we want to find a definition, the Marxist traditions solution of identifying the social formation starting from the way of production wouldnt be adequate 53.
51 52

J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 259. J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350. 53 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 122-126.

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Habermas prefers, indeed, to connote the social formation on the basis of very abstract regulamentations that he defines principles of organization, whose institutional nucleus builds up the engine of material and symbolical reproduction54. He summarizes the concept of principle of organization: With this term I intend those innovations which are produced by steps of learning which can be reconstructed according to an evolutional logics and establish a level of learning always new of society. [] they are structural models ordered according to an evolutional logic, which denote new structural conditions of possible learning processes. The principle of organization of a society circumscribes spheres of variation, and in particular it establishes within what structures possible changes of the system of institutions and interpretations are possible; to what extent the capabilities existing in the productive forces can be socially used, and to what extent such productive forces can be stimulated; and then how much the activity of control, and so the systemic complexity of a society can be powered55. This revisionist perspective expressed in other works in an identical way56 is the first part of the 5th Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism: A social formation is not to be defined through a determined way of production (or even through the particular economic structure of a society), but through a principle of organization. Every principle of organization establishes a level of learning, i.e. the structural conditions of the possibility of learning technicalcognitive and practical-moral processes57. The process of rationalization does not only concern the progress of productive forces in the solution of technical tasks and in the choice of strat egies, but also the moral conceptions of cultural traditions and moral co nsciences of the individuals which are institutionalized in structural nucleus of social integration. Habermas declares to follow Max Webers studies, where the process of r ationalization can be intended as a historical -universal process which proceeds on two levels: the cultural level of the differentiatio n of new forms of knowledge (and of levels of learning) and the social level of the translation of cultural knowledge into a process of modernization which institutionalizes conducts of personal life and forms of associated forms of life (the vital dispositions and social subsystems): This theory is based on the assumption that
J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 183-184. J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 158159. 56 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 353. 57 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157158.
55 54

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the processes of onthogenetical learning anticipate the push of social evolution in some way, so that social systems can, as soon as their structurally limited control capability gets over-stimulated by non-avoidable problems, they can, in some cases, resort to superabundant capabilities of individual learning, available also collectively through images of the world, and then use them for the institutionalization of new levels of learning58. Once the sociological model focuses on the abstract concept as the principles of organization, the theorem structure-superstructure is no more intended in a reductionistic sense. Habermas affirms indeed that at each evolutional stage, the relationships of production crystallize around a different institutional n ucleus, defining specific forms of social integration. The function of regulating the access to production means and then the distribution of social wealth is assumed by parental systems in primitive societies and by State institutions in the great ancient civilizations59. Only with capitalistic-liberal societies, economy becomes a central element of the entire society as the capital acquires the fun ction, through the medium of private law, of defining the class relationships, and not only the function of internal regulation within the market. Also in this case the basic assimilation to economic structure is misleading, because not even in capitalistic societies the basic sphere coincides with the economic system60. Habermas marks out a reasonable series of social formations, each of them is featured by a different principle of organization made possible by the institutionalization of higher levels of technical and practical learning, which present a own logic of irreversible and necessary development higher and higher structural stages of development while their development dynamics the historical way of achieving such stages remain contingent and conditioned according to the different events of the social systems.
SOCIAL FORMATIONS 1. Primitive societies Equalitarian Stratified Ancient reigns Great empires Feudalism Mercantilism Liberal capitalism Organized capitalism PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION Parental structure State organization Complementary relationship State/Market

2. Traditional societies

3. Modern societies

Table 2. Development of the organization principles of social formations

58 59

J. Habermas, it. transl.Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LWS2, cit., p. 352. J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 155. 60 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.

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Habermas summarizes the reflections about waves of evolution of social development as the 3rd Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism: The different ways of production joined in a complex build up the ec onomical structure of a society. This society crystallizes each time around an institutional nucleus (family relationships, state, market, etc.) and fixes the form of social integration. The theorem structure-superstructure must explain the waves of social evolution. This affirms that a) the systemic problems which, in determined circumstances require evolutional innovations, appear in the basic sphere of society and can be analyzed as disturbs of social reproduction; and that b) an evolutional innovation to which it is given raise always consists of a modification of the economical structure and of the relative form of social integration61. In this critical phase of trespassing to a new level the theorem of the superstructure is valid, according to which productive forces and production relationships acquire a direction role and constitute the basis which determine the whole society62. The problem deals with the nexus between the increase of systemic complexity of societies in relation to the problems of material reproduction and the adequacy of rationalization processes in the socialization of the new generations, in the coordination of social institutions and the formation of cultural traditions. When systemic problems arise in a society, and these problems transcend the capabilities of integration of the organization principle in force (familiar, political or economical), the social system must develop new production relationships in order to solve out the difficulties of reproduction in an evolutionally effective way, and these relationships imply the recourse to a practical-moral knowledge, endowed with a own logic of development, and previously accumulated (although socially still unused). Its institutionalization makes possible and furthers the development of a new technical-organizative knowledge, and also a widening of productive forces and the complex system-environment. Only with learning processes we can explain why some social systems develop in an evolutional sense, finding solutions to the problems of regulation and control, while others fail face these challenges63. These reflections can be found in the second part of the Vth Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism: In the explanation of the trespassing from a social formation to another (for example, the origin of the State or capitalism) we must: a) go back to systemic problems which transcend the capability of control of the ancient social formation, and b) resort to an
61 62

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 156. J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 118. 63 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., LSW2, cit., p. 350.

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evolutional learning process which generates the new principle of organization. A society can learn, evolving, as it allows to solve out systemic problems face which the available capability of control fails, maximizing and using institutionally the capabilities of individual learning in excess. The first step here consists of establishing a new form of integration, which then permits to potentiate the productive forces and to widen the complexity of the system64.

2. Social Science and Historiography The debated theme of the relationship between social science and historiographical studies has been object of Habermas reflecti on since the middle of the Sixties, as different passages taken from On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967)65 and Knowledge and Human Interests (1969)66prove. But only since the middle of the Seventies he has been completing the framework of relationships between historiography and social science, as the programmatical essay History and evolution (1976)67 attests and the Second intermediate consideration: System and life-world (1981)68 and then Actions, linguistic acts, interactions mediated linguistically and life-world (1988)69 precise. Tracing the nodal points of the debate between nomological sciences and ideographical sciences, Habermas realized that the necessity of concepts and comparative perspectives essential aspects of todays renewed historiography was stronger than the rigid methodological dualism canonized by Neokantism70. The junction of both field of knowledge has been experimented with success, so that some scientists have talked about sociologization of history 71. The mutual functionality in human knowledge was also due to the impulse given to co mpared research since the Fifties by American academicals institutions see Reports 54 and 64 of the Social Science Research Council, by European institutions
64

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-

158. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 31-86; Id., it. transl. La problematica della comprensione del senso , in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 149-153, 220-253. 66 J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria del comprendere dellespressione di Dilthey, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 142-162; Id., it. transl. Lautoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 163-186. 67 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-183, 192-197. 68 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in TKH, cit., pp. 704-744. 69 J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente , in NMD, cit, pp. 82-97. 70 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 31. 71 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-155.
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and by works about history of society by M. Bloch, L. Febvre, F. Braudel in the Annales, by R. Bendix, P. Lepsius, C.W. Mills, H.U. Wehler, W. Cahnman and A. Boskoff, E. Schulin and F.G. Maier, O. Hintze, B. More and many other researchers that, following the trail of Weberian studies and Marxist historiography, worked out an approach whose results were assumed by Habermas as partial theories in many passages of the theory of social evolution. The German scientist underlines that this direction of research appears critical towards traditional historiography, gaining a wider space -time perspective and a sensibility for phenomena that had been, until those days, completely or partially neglected: history as social science moves away from the political history of State and capital actions, framed in a history of ideas, and leads to a social and economical history, where the history of cultures is also integrated72. Habermas also points out the centrality of collective actors and the use of aggregated quantitative indicators in a progressive displacement of weights, without that the narrative application of sociological instruments denies the idea of historiography. While sociology of history enriches and does not damage historiography, Habermas affirms that other instruments of social science, the rational ex-post reconstructions of the theory of action and the models system/environment of the systemic theory, cannot, contrarily, have full historiograhical applic ation73. The reconstructions of the development logics of social formations and the narrative representations of historical events are, indeed, two forms of knowledge which represent complementary but different ways of studying society and their terms of cooperation lead the matter to explanations on historical research. Retracing critically the epistemological discussions of the Fifties/Sixties on the Theses expressed by K. Popper, G. Hempel, E. Nagel, H. Oppenheim, Habermas focuses first of all the problem if historical explanations can be causal explanations. The reflections move round the extensibility of the so called Covering Law Model and to the critics that he only partially shares to positivism made by the idealistic philosophy of history (R. Collingwood and W. Dray) and by analytical philosophy of language (A. Danto). But generally his writings remain indefinite and require many efforts of interpretation74.
J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit, p. 165. J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-155. 74 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in LWS, cit., pp. 45-52; Id., it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 161-221; Id., it. transl. La logica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 91-112; Id., it. transl. Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 113-141; Id., it. transl., Lautofraintendimento scientistico della metapsicologia, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 255-256; Id., it. transl. lim.
73 72

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Habermas introduces the casual problem distinguishing the descriptive and the explicative function in historiographical research. If descriptions are assertions which reproduce a particular context of observation, explanations are arguments which deduce the genesis of past events and the prevision of the f uture ones through the nexus between the elements of the context and the law which directs the production of the specific historical events75. The Covering Law Model, in its classical form, affirms that the explanans is composed by a series of existential statements about initial or contextual conditions of the beginning of phenomena and theorical statements about their general laws. The different types of statements are the premises of the casual expl anation: starting from the general or universal laws and from the initial conditions it is possible to infer a single statement which expresses the conclusion about the object of prevision (explanandum)76. In the course of the epistemological reflexions, the studies about the logics of science have led the Neopositivism to more cautious cognitive proposals but, for Habermas, the whole debate about the theme of historical explanation versus scientific explanation would remain mortgaged by the limited conceptions of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science77. For the co-operators of the Encyclopedia, as for the first Positivists-, the historical-social phenomena represented a research sphere in a rear position in relation to the natural ones, and while they cherished a hope about the development of social science, they had great doubts about the same possibility in relation to a theoretical kno wledge abut history. Habermas reminds that Popper tempered the unity of science with the idea of different functions of scientifical theories about nat ural and social phenomena and in relation to historical studies. While morphological sciences are interested in researching hypotheses whose explicative content always growing is fortified by results of conditioned prognoses, the gen eralization doesnt fall, in prima facie, within the possibilities of history. With the expression explanation sketch, Hempel pointed out more punctually that historians interested in the explanation of specific events do not work out complete e xplanations, but explanations in rough draft which do not include general laws

Discorso e verit, in Id., LWS2, cit., pp. 319-343; Id., it. transl. Charles S. Peirce sulla comunicazione, in Id., TuK, cit., p. 17-21; Id., it. transl. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 285, 291, 295, 319. 75 J. Habermas, it. transl. Poscritto del 1973, in Id., EI2,cit., p. 317. 76 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 40-41. 77 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 242.

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but imply them in an implicit and pre-reflexive way78. Nagel himself refused a sharp separation between natural sciences and historical sciences, observing that if historical investigation deals with what is singular, we must not suppose a different logical structure of scientific and historical explanation, for these lasts make a wide use of general laws, even if implicitly79. Definitely, the supporters of the Covering Law Model are not interested in the fact that the general law are assumed as a background which is not thematized by the historical e xplanation, [22] not even that the initial conditions of events are hardly reco nstructable, in consequence of the time distance and the impossibility to repropose them, in laboratory. Also the history of the Logics of the scientific discovery follows the unique cognitive model: in spite of the restrictions of their model, Popper, Hempel and Nagel firmly believe that the historians job, as far as it follows the requirements of investigation or not, such as the criteria of a literary exposition, ends with a casual explanation of events and circumstances, where the sussumption to general laws is valid as explanation scheme80. From this point of view, Poppers specification that the historical explanation only describes state of things in determined space -time regions does not modify the problem, because its control always deals with the use of initial conditions and general laws. The statistical translation of E. Nagels model d oes not even change the state of the debate. According to Nagel, apart from the logics of explanation, the incompleteness of the necessary conditions and the imposs ibility of indicating the sufficient conditions of events forbid a relationship of logi c deduction between conditions and conclusions. What appears as gene ral law of historical explanations cannot be a category statute, namely it ca nnot belong to the explanations as major conditions in deduction procedures. On the other side, as Hempel affirmed if adequate fundaments for the e xplanation of the explanandum are not available, the event can be inferred starting from statements which define the explanans, then replacing, as condition for the law, a statistical-probabilistic assertion: E. Nagel, in agree with Hempel, focuses the attention on the fact that historical explanations do not imply the assumption of laws at all; the condition through which we get to conclusions about the cause, usually has the form of a statistical generalization as it follows: in determined
78

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p.

41.
79

42.
80

45.

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circumstances, we can expect a determined behaviour with more or less probability. The historian must then be satisfied with probabilistic explanations81. Habermas affirms that re-considering the conditions of historical explanations not as universal but as probabilistic hides some objections raised by R. Collingwood and W. Dray about the possibility that historical explanations can satisfy the condition of a sussumption to general law. Unfortunately, Habermas reflections are fragmentary and this introduction only allows us to list the stages of the investigation that leads him to believe that the empirical generalization of historical explanations cannot be assumed as an inference criteria for the formation of historical laws. According to some references of his writings, we can summarize the following line of reasoning: a) the historical explanation does not permit the complete d escription of events, because the historian can only indication the suffi cient conditions which gives birth to a certain event in general; he can only go back to a series of necessary conditions to the genesis of past events; b) the hist orian is within a margin of uncertainty, not only for the unavoidable provincia lism in relation to the future, but also for the arbitrarity of the narrative system of reference where historical events are comprehended and explained. To this respect, Habermas confirms that every historical explanation does not represent the beginning of a work in progress in an un-ended series, on principle, of possible explanations82; c) the narration fixes some relationships between the events of a determined general situation, selecting the possible series of necessary cond itions, starting from a knowledge background without pretentions of empirical validity, but which is the object of investigation even if only globally 83; d) the basic choices of the direction to take in the research of necessary cond itions and about the moment when it is reasonable to end it depend on the hist orians judgment, according to his expectations and the logics of control valid in the historiographical tradition. Habermas reminds that also Popper, trying to keep together his solution to the Kants pro blem and the reflections of postpositivism, introduced the concept of metaphysical programs of investig ation84.
81

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., p.

42.
82

48.
83

49. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id., LWS, cit., pp. 44-45.
84

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Elsewhere, Habermas had fixed a parallel between the role of paradigms in scientific explanations and the role of general interpretations in hi storical explanations85. The type gap from the particular to the universal is not pro blematic if it happens in the context of a system of reference recognized as adequate by all participants to the discussion: a community of investigators establishes and works in empirical conditions and proceeds contemporarily in the research of consensus on meta-theoretical problems linked to pre-scientific experience [24] accumulated in the language of common sense. Since the Sixties, Habermas has been sharing Th. S. Kuhns idea that systems of reference which specify the conditions of validity of argumentation of theoretic assertions can be accepted derive from primary experience of daily life86. Habermas points out that the answer about the meaning of a historical event is strictly predefined by the questions that the interpretation frameworks permits to develop. The sense of history is not a data it self and the collocation of the event A1 in the narration, namely the history which tells A1, depends on the choice of the interpretative hypotheses. A same event will have a different meaning according to the decisions assumed by the historian, first of all, in relation to its belonging (or not) to the narrative plot and secondly according to the relationships he establishes between that event and groups of following events. As it is not possible to put any pre-arranged limit to the number of different possible perspectives, that means that every historical narration is in certain measure conventional, and its sense depends in any case on the hermeneutical starting situation of the narrator87. Habermas points out that the continuity of history is also a product of narr ation. Certainly, the continuity of the related events underlines on the unifying force of existential nexus, where events have already acquired their meaning for the contemporaries, before historiography arrives. On the other side, it may not be ignored that selecting the interpretation framework, the historian chooses the beginning and the end of the story and what must be considered as a period, where the relevant events are conceived as elements of a unique nexus gene rated narratively88. The historian establishes also, as with Weber, some relations to the value which orient the attribution of meaning in the cognitive research. There are some normative aspects that Habermas expresses with the concept of contemporarity of history and therewith he tries to stimulate the conscience

85 86

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 199. J. Habermas, it. transl. Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura, in Id., EI2, cit., p. 131n. 87 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 161. 88 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 159-160.

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that any application imply an unavoidable actualization of the past on the base of expectations and concerns of the present89. But contrarily to H. M. Baumgartners critic about the historians auton omous donation of form, Habermas believes that the historian finds a own obje ctual already-built sphere, and more precisely, already narratively pre-build90. In historiographical works, historians set themselves in the background of previous knowledges handed down in individual and collective memories whose contin uity overcomes the distance between the interpreter and his/her objectual sphere91. Habermas theory of social evolution represents an attempt of defining the fundamental problems of a general model of rules for possible solutions to pro blems which indicates on the one side the evolutive challenges, and on the other side the logics of development of innovative solutions through which social formations overcome crises or fail. So he investigates the necessary conditions to the genesis of the social principles of objectual organization in instit utional complexes, starting from cultural resources, namely the logics of deve lopment of pragmatic competences, without which we could not even i magine the individual conceptions, behaviours and attitudes which, spread in collective sphere, are the human capital of innovative processes. In such sense, reconstructive social science must indicate and test universal hypotheses 92. The atypical character of the assertions about social evolutions derives, for Habermas, firstly from the fact that, while nomological sciences allow to infer some conditioned previsions about events which happen in the future 93, the rational ex-post reconstructions cannot exclude that in the future some stru ctures of conscience different from the known ones become accessible94. As social theory develops a model ex-post, separating such structures by the changing processes of empirical substrata95, we must not suppose the unicity of sense, the continuity, the necessity or irreversibility of the historical course96. If the idea that the development logics is not predefined and that ev erything could have been different is valid for the past nothing worries him more than seeing the theory of social evolution confused with a philosophy of history -, in the diagnosis of the problems of the future, Habermas pays atten89 90

J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 238. J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 198. 91 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id., LWS, cit., p. 232. 92 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 194. 93 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 160. 94 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 196. 95 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., p. 161. 96 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 115.

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tion to the structural possibilities which have not been yet institutionalized and, perhaps, will never be97. Even if the casual explanation of history has not been explained, he writes that history has the task of individualizing the changes of the outline conditions which are favourable or not to the genesis and consolidation of the forms of social integration, as well as the conditions which offer an evolutive challenge in the phases of development of social formations98. The principles of organizations only circumscribe the logic evolutive space but if and when it comes to new structures depends on the contingent circumstances of the single histor ical events, for whose study only historic research is competent: historic research must explain, in genetic terms, if, how and when a determined society has achieved a determined level of development in its base-structures99. In another passage he writes: I find more appropriate to start, first of all, from the interdipendence of two casualities which flow in two opposite directions. If we distinguish the level of the structural possibilities (levels of learning) from the level of the factual courses, it is possible to comprehend both casualities with an exchange of the perspective of the explanation. We can explain the occurring of a new historical event referring to contingent outline conditions and to the challenge set by structurally open possibilities; instead, we explain the arising of a new structure of conscience referring to the logic of development of the previous structures and to the boost given by the events which generate problems100. In this interdisciplinary framework, Habermas separates the problems of ev olutive logics from those of evolutive dynamic of historical events, to the extent that he affirms that historical material is related to determinations which are specific for social evolution101. The theory of social evolution and historic research are methodically distinguished and referred each other102. This does not mean that he neglects the problems of social dynamics. In the study about the changing of social systems it is necessary to evaluate, at the same time, the l ogics of development (the structures of conscience) and the historical processes (the events)103. In the debate started in the ex-Federal Republic of Germany by J. Rsen104, Habermas reflects then about the offer, even modest, of the theory of social
97 98

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, p. 197. J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 357. 99 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 184. 100 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 183. 101 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 195. 102 J. Habermas, it. transl. Unaltra via di uscita dalla filosofia del soggetto, in Id., PDM, cit., p. 303. 103 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 182. 104 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 203.

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development to historiography, not excluding that a theory of social evolution cannot be used as a meta-theory to evaluate the concurrent histories of a same sphere of phenomena. Perhaps it is possible to get some points of view adequate to the critics or the justification of problematic directives and narrative perspectives. In this mediated manner, a theory of social evolution can still inspire historiography105. Even if, at the beginning of the same essay, he recognized that the real offer of theory elevated to history by the theory of social evolution, only shows its first hints106. On the other side, the historical explanations are absolutely indispensable for the definition of reconstructive sciences for the re-discovery and control of hypotheses. On the one hand, through the intellectual engagement and the historians experience of life the historical research carries out a euristic function for the formations of theorems of the evolution, as it suggests typological co mparisons among social structures and schemes of development. On the other hand, it carries out the irreplaceable technical function of obtaining the nece ssary historical data for the indirect check of the almost -empirical theorems of reconstructive sciences107. Habermas, indeed, aims at integrating the general framework of reference of the theory of social evolution with partial theories into the different ambits of research in order to verify indirectly his hypotheses necessary to social reproduction 108. Furthermore, the sociological theory can count, as well as historiography, on the results of historical researches whose contribution represents a correction in relation to the unavoidable space-time and thematic provincialism of the same theory109. But what does the indirect check of the propositions of the reconstructive science consist of? Some Habermas answers can be proposed which can be d educed by his fragments of reflection, but none of them brings to clarity. This aspect of his methodology has not been solved yet by the critical literature, even if it is fundamental in the antinomy between the great theorization and the e mpirical researches. The answer to that questions remains then undetermined. Anyway, I hope that I have achieved the argumentative clarity and the linguistic simplicity I due to the reader/hearer, and rely on the friendly-unfriendly cooperation of many scientists.

105 106

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, pp. 196-197. J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, p. 154. 107 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 192. 108 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 155. 109 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., p. 156.

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Basic Bibliography
Here is a bibliography about Habermas publications, selectively limited to the documents where the assumptions of the theory of social evolution are precised. Some Italian translations are quoted and, in case they do not exist, their editions in German or in other foreign languages are indicated. Furthermore, Habermas publications are often collection of writings which have been taken and re-ordered chronologically in this bibliography. In view of the complex structure of some books, such as The Theory of Communicative Action, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and Between Facts and Norms, we have preferred to indicate the titles of each chapter using a subnumeration. This allows the reader to individuate easily the themes, the systemic th eory, the authors, the history of ideas they deal with.
1967 J. Habermas, it. transl. Logica delle scienze sociali (LWS), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1970: 01. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, pp. 3-66. 02. La metodologia delle teorie generali dellazione sociale, pp. 67-136. 03. La problematica della comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione empirico analitiche, pp. 137-258. 04. La sociologia come teoria del presente, pp. 259-286. 1968 J. Habermas, it. transl. Conoscenza e interesse (EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832: 02. La metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, pp. 27-45. 04. Comte e Mach: lintenzione del vecchio positivismo, pp. 72-90. 05. La logica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce: laporia di un realismo degli universali rinn ovato secondo una logica del linguaggio, in EI2, cit., pp. 91-112. 06. Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura: la critica pragmatica del senso, pp. 113-141. 07. Teoria del comprendere dellespressione di Dilthey: identit e comunicazione linguist ica, pp. 142-162. 08. Lautoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito: la critica storicistica del se nso, pp. 163-186. 10. Autoriflessione come scienza: Freud e la critica psicoanalitica del senso, pp. 209-238. 11. Lautofraitendimento scientistico della metapsicologia. Per la logica di uninterpretazione generale, pp. 239-264. 12. Psicoanalisi e teoria della societ. Nietzsche e la riduzione degli interessi della conoscenza, pp. 265-291. J. Habermas, it. transl. Su alcune condizioni necessarie al rivoluzionamento delle societ tardocapitaliste, in Id., KK, cit., pp. 61-76. 1970 J. Habermas, it. transl. La pretesa di universalit dellermeneutica, in AA.VV., Ermeneutica e critica dellideologia (HI), Brescia, Queriniana, 1979, pp. 131-167. J. Habermas, it. transl. Appunti per una teoria della competenza comunicativa, Giglioli P.P. (ed.), Linguaggio e societ, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973, pp. 109-125. J. Habermas, Machtkampf und Humanitt, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.12.1970. J. Habermas, ber das Subjekt der Geschichte, in Koselleck R. Stempel W. D., Geschichte Ereignis und Erzhlung, Mnchen, Fink 1973, pp. 470-476.

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1971 J. Habermas, it. transl. Osservazioni propedeutiche per una teoria della competenza comunicativa, in J. Habermas N. Luhmann, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale (TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 67-94. J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, in J. Habermas N. Luhmann, TGS, cit., pp. 95-195. 1972 J. Habermas, it. transl. parz. Discorso e verit, in Id., Agire comunicativo e logica delle scienze sociali (LSW2), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980, pp. 319-343. 1973 J. Habermas, it. transl. La crisi di razionalit nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza, 1975: 01. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, pp. 3-36; 02. Tendenze di crisi nel capitalismo maturo, pp. 37-104; 03. Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, pp. 105-159. 1974 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identit dellio, in Id., Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp. 49-73. J. Habermas, it. transl. Possono le societ complesse formarsi unidentit razionale?, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 74-104. J. Habermas, it. transl. Il ruolo della filosofia nel marxismo, in Id., Dialettica della Razionalizzazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 1994, pp. 139-166. J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia: lesempio delle teorie dellevoluzione , in Id. LSW2, cit., pp. 340-360. J. Habermas, it. transl. Problemi di legittimazione nello Stato moderno, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 207-235. 1975 J. Habermas, it. transl. Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di strutture normative, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 11-48. J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 105-153. J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 151-165. 1976 J. Habermas, berlegungen zum evolutionren Stellenwert des modernen Rechts, in Id., Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (ZRHM), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1976, pp. 260-270. J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-206. 1980 J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociali ermeneutiche e scienze sociali ricostruttive, in Id., Etica del discorso (MB), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1985, pp. 25-47.

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1981 J. Habermas, it. transl. Dialettica della razionalizzazione: J. Habermas a colloquio con A. Honneth, E. Kndler-Bunte e A. Widmann, in Id., DR, cit., pp. 221-264. J. Habermas, it. transl. La funzione vicaria e interpretativa della filosofia, in Id., MB, cit., pp. 524. J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dellagire comunicativo. Razionalit nellazione e razionalizz azione sociale (TKH.I), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986: 01. Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalizzazione, pp. 53-228. 02. La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, pp. 229-378. 03. Prima considerazione intermedia: agire sociale, attivit finalizzata e comunicazione, pp. 379-456. 04. Da Lukcs ad Adorno: razionalizzazione come reificazione, pp. 457-529. J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dellagire comunicativo. Critica della ragione funzionalistica (TKH.II), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986: 05. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim: dallattivit finalizzata a uno scopo allagire comunicativo, pp. 547-696. 06. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, pp. 697-810. 07. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, pp. 811-950. 08. Considerazione conclusiva: da Parsons attraverso Weber sino a Marx, pp. 951-1088. 1985 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il discorso filosofico della modernit (PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1985: 01. La coscienza temporale della modernit e la sua esigenza di rendersi conto di se stessa, pp. 1-11. Excursus sulle Tesi di filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, pp. 12-23. 02. Il concetto hegeliano della modernit, pp. 24-45. Excursus sullobsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, pp. 77-85. Excursus sulla appropriazione delleredit della filosofia del soggetto da parte della teoria dei sistemi di Luhmann, pp. 366-383. 1986 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storiografia e coscienza storica, in G.E.Rusconi (ed.), Germania: un passato che non passa, cit., pp. 33-35. J. Habermas, it. transl. Luso pubblico della storia, in G.E.Rusconi (ed.), Germania: un passato che non passa, cit., pp. 98-109. 1987 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sullevoluzione delle scienze sociali e dello spirito nella Repubblica Federale, in Id., TuK, cit. pp. 217-228. J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Angelo Bolaffi, in LEspresso, 25.01.1988. J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Robert Maggiori, in NR. KPS VII, cit., pp.32-40. 1989 J. Habermas, it. transl. La sociologia nella Repubblica di Weimer, in Id., TuK, cit., pp.195-215. J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Hans Peter Krger, in Id., NR. KPS VII, cit., pp. 86-102. J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con Barbara Freitag, in Id., NR. KPS VII, cit., pp.103-116. J. Habermas, it. transl. Intervista con T. Hviid Nielsen, in Id., KPS VII NR, cit., pp. 117-146.