C H A P T E R 6

A Criterion of
Global Justice

21. T h e Traditional Law of Nations

2 1 . 1 . 1 . Rawls r e c o g n i z e s t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n c h a r a c t e r of h i s t h e o r y by
sketching, at least, h o w h i s criterion for a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a
n a t i o n a l society m i g h t b e c o m p l e m e n t e d b y a d d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of
justice governing i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s brief o u t l i n e jars, how­
ever, w i t h c e n t r a l c o m m i t m e n t s of h i s t h e o r y , chiefly h i s focus o n the
b a s i c s t r u c t u r e a n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n of all h u m a n b e i n g s a s free a n d
e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h e s e c o m m i t m e n t s w o u l d i n s t e a d , 1 will argue,
l e a d o n e t o a b a n d o n Rawls's p r i m a r y e m p h a s i s o n d o m e s t i c institu­
t i o n s in favor of globalizing h i s entire c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e .
S u c h a globalization is n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s
of Rawls's w o r k t h u s far. It is o n l y for t h e p u r p o s e of' a first a p p r o x i m a ­
t i o n " (BSS 70 n . 8), t h a t h e w a n t s t o "leave a s i d e h e r e t h e p r o b l e m of
justice b e t w e e n n a t i o n s " (BSS 57) a n d b e g i n w i t h t h e i d e a l i z e d c a s e of a
s e l f - c o n t a i n e d society. "At s o m e level t h e r e m u s t exist a c l o s e d back­
g r o u n d s y s t e m , a n d it is t h i s subject for w h i c h w e w a n t a t h e o r y . W e are
b e t t e r p r e p a r e d t o take u p t h i s p r o b l e m for a s o c i e t y (illustrated by
n a t i o n s ) c o n c e i v e d a s a m o r e o r less self-sufficient s c h e m e of social
c o o p e r a t i o n a n d a s p o s s e s s i n g a m o r e o r less c o m p l e t e c u l t u r e . If w e
a r e successful in t h e c a s e of a society, w e c a n try t o e x t e n d a n d t o adjust
o u r initial t h e o r y a s f u r t h e r i n q u i r y r e q u i r e s " (BSS 70 n 8; cf TJ 8).
a 1
Vif* C
£( C e d e t h a t a c r i t e r i
° n of justice for d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
w o u l d b e sufficient if m o d e m states w e r e i n d e e d c l o s e d s c h e m e s . I n
t h i s c a s e t h e r e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t be a global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e for p r i n c i ­
p l e s of global justice to a p p l y to. Of c o u r s e , t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of
a s s e t s (climate, soil, m i n e r a l resources) a m o n g a p l u r a l i t y of self-con­
t a i n e d s o c i e t i e s m a y b e radically u n e q u a l , a n d it w o u l d t h u s n o t b e

240
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.1.3 341

difficult to s h o w t h a t Rawlsian p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like

Charles Beitz's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e redistribution principle, even for
1
a world of t r u l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d societies. But this d o e s n o t suffice t o
demonstrate t h a t Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to r e q u i r e m e n t s of global
distributive j u s t i c e t h a t m a k e d e m a n d s even in t h e a b s e n c e of i n t e r n a ­
tional i n t e r a c t i o n . It r e m a i n s to b e s h o w n that t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e
onginal p o s i t i o n is r e l e v a n t t o t h e question w h e t h e r m e m b e r s of truly
self-contained s o c i e t i e s h a v e a n obligation to establish contact a n d to
develop joint i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h o t h e r s u c h societies. This Rawls s e e m s
to deny: H e r e s t r i c t s t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h e original position t o q u e s t i o n s
ofjustice a n d c o n c e i v e s (in)justice a s a property of social institutions
(which, b y h y p o t h e s i s , a r e a b s e n t o n t h e global plane). T h e r e a r e cer­
tain "relations of i n d i v i d u a l s t o o n e a n o t h e r which set t h e stage for
questions of j u s t i c e " (TJ 130). I s u r m i s e Rawls would agree with Kant's
more p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t (just) institutions are required " a m o n g
human b e i n g s . . . w h o c a n n o t avoid mutually influencing o n e a n ­
other.'^ Within h i s t h e o r y a s a w h o l e , there are g r o u n d s for bringing his
contractarian d e v i c e t o b e a r o n t h e global plane only if there is signifi­
3
cant global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .
Fortunately, t h e c o n c e s s i o n a n d t h e debate s u r r o u n d i n g it a r e e n ­
tirely a c a d e m i c , s i n c e all a g r e e that t h e r e is and will b e extensive global
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . If m o d e r n societies are not closed, w e m u s t at s o m e
Point g o b e y o n d Rawls's "first approximation" and ask h o w his c o n c e p ­
tion of j u s t i c e m i g h t best b e a d a p t e d to t h e complexities of t h e real
world. Rawls h a s n o t y e t seriously a d d r e s s e d this issue. The central
Place of d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s in his work u p to n o w rests o n n o t h i n g
deeper t h a n h i s (entirely plausible) h u n c h that making the simplifying
^ s u m p t i o n of n a t i o n a l isolation h a s significant expositional advan­
tages for i n t r o d u c i n g h i s b r o a d l y consequentialist approach.
. 21.1-3. H o w o n e a d a p t s Rawls's conception to m o r e complex real­
t i e s will e v i d e n t l y affect h o w t h e deliberations of t h e p a r t e s m t n e
original p o s i t i o n will eventually be p r e s e n t e d a n d ^ J ^ ™
argue for v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s as immediately addressing t h e world at

'Cf. Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 3 . f ^..^tp a broader requirement,

J K a n t , KPW 7 3 (cf. MEJ §§8-9). Vet Kant does " ^ J ^ ^ n l .
^ d r e s s e d t o "all m e n w h o c a n at all influence o n e a n o t n e r e c o n o m i c

'Scanlon m a k e s t h e s a m e point, relying on the f a c t o y

or "regularized c o m m e r c e " IRTJ 202). (n h.s book, ^^gritt** s 1 3 1

I R 143-53).
1 5 1 ) a n d

( P T

f ^ e s elaborately for t h e e x t e n s i v e n e s s of current global m i H ^ ^ ,„ t h e

Ye
t . p r o m p t e d b y criticism from David Richards [VOl g upon
d e p e n d e n t
c n
opposite v i e w - f h a t m a k i n g t h e validity of a f " ° " " X r a r U y favor the status quo
y
he factual q u e s t i o n o f global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " " ^ f t e r b e r s of differer,
former
t h e m e m

N S 595, a n d cf. n . 8) I fail to s e e this ^ g e r ,

( C [

m ^
societies c a n o r c a n n o t avoid m u t u a l l y influencing one arca ^ i s . i c a l l y avo d
^ t t e r , surely n o t u p t o t h e m . At this stage of world ^ mcenuve to
™ e m t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d s o the • n f ^ ^ S
e
a Zt h a v e

applytfsocieties were self-

n 0

*Ptoit t h e fact that t h e criterion of global , u s n c e would n

contained.
242 T h e T r a d i t i o n a l L a w of N a t i o n s , 21.2

large a n d a s d e a l i n g w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of n a t i o n a l societies only

w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t s o p r o v i d e d . T a k e n s e r i o u s l y , Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of
justice will m a k e t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d the
t o u c h s t o n e for a s s e s s i n g o u r b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s .
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n n e e d s d e f e n s e o n t w o levels. In t h i s s e c t i o n a n d the
next, I s h o w h o w m y global i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of justice
is p l a u s i b l e within h i s framework, h o w it is s u p p o r t e d , especially, by his
i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d h i s a r g u m e n t s for t h e f o c u s o n t h e b a s i c structure.
I n §23 I a r g u e t h a t o n t h i s , its m o s t u n i f i e d a n d e l e g a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,
Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n is still p l a u s i b l y a p p l i c a b l e t o o u r w o r l d — d e s p i t e ,
in particular, significant i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of c o n v i c t i o n s even
a b o u t justice. D r a w i n g o n a r g u m e n t s from all p a r t s of t h i s book, the
c o n c l u d i n g s e c t i o n a d d r e s s e s t h e p r a c t i c a l m e a n i n g of a Rawlsian
c o n c e p t i o n of global j u s t i c e i n o u r w o r l d .
2 1 J*. In d i s c u s s i n g h o w t h e c o n s t r u c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s h o u l d
b e b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of global justice, I will c o n c e n ­
t r a t e u p o n t h r e e m a i n alternatives, t w o of w h i c h are s u g g e s t e d by
4
Rawls's o w n brief r e m a r k s o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e s e remarks
are clear insofar a s t h e y p r o p o s e t h a t after a c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c
j u s t i c e h a s b e e n c h o s e n , t h e c o n t r a c t a r i a n device s h o u l d b e r e u s e d on
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. B e y o n d this, Rawls's d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e c o n d ,
global s e s s i o n of t h e original p o s i t i o n p e r m i t s t w o c o m p e t i n g r e a d i n g s ,
w h i c h h e d o e s n o t k e e p distinct. O n t h e f i r s t — h e n c e f o r t h R j — t h e
global p a r t i e s are viewed as r e p r e s e n t i n g persons from t h e various
societies, w h o , o n c e again, are "to m a k e a r a t i o n a l c h o i c e to p r o t e c t
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s " (TJ 378). T h e y m u s t d o so, h o w e v e r , e v e n t h o u g h "they
k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e i r o w n society,
its p o w e r a n d s t r e n g t h i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h o t h e r n a t i o n s , n o r do they
know their place in their own society" (TJ 378, m y e m p h a s i s ) .
O n t h i s r e a d i n g , t h e p a r t i e s will again b e g u i d e d by t h e i r clients'
i m p u t e d d e s i r e for social p r i m a r y g o o d s , a n d s i n c e t h e i r p l a c e in their
o w n society a n d t h a t of t h e i r society a m o n g o t h e r s a r e u n k n o w n , the
p a r t i e s will, b y m a x i m i n , c h o o s e a c r i t e r i o n t h a t m a k e s t h e globally
least a d v a n t a g e d t h e p r e e m i n e n t t o u c h s t o n e of global j u s t i c e , n o m a t ­
t e r w h i c h s o c i e t i e s t h e y m a y b e l o n g t o . Global i n s t i t u t i o n s will t h e n b e
a s s e s s e d b y h o w w e l l t h e y satisfy Rawls's c r i t e r i o n i n t e r p r e t e d glob­
5 H
ally.
This claim—that the parties w o u l d choose essentially the same
c r i t e r i o n in t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n as in t h e first—is s u p p o r t e d b y Rawls's
e n d o r s e m e n t of a thick veil of i g n o r a n c e . T h e p a r t i e s d o n o t k n o w "the
<TJ 3 7 7 - 7 9 . Rawls offers these t w o p a g e s as part of a d i s c u s s i o n of c o n s c i e n t i o u s
refusal It w o u l d therefore be unfair to regard this p a s s a g e a s a c o n s i d e r e d p r o p o s a l for
1 3 a r o x , m a t , o n s h o u l d
dence PP * » « * » t e d to t a t e a c c o u n t of global i n t e r d e p e n -

'Evidently, I a m here k e e p i n g fixed Rawls's a r g u m e n t s to t h e effect that h i s criterion

(the c o m b i n a t i o n of the general a n d special c o n c e p t i o n s ) is t h e m a x i m i n s o l u t i o n l e t
§11.1.1).
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.3 243

general c o n f i g u r a t i o n of society, its political s t r u c t u r e a n d e c o n o m i c

organization, a n d s o o n "—including p r e s u m a b l y its size a n d t h e d e ­
gree of its e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l , a n d geographical diversity—because s u c h
knowledge w o u l d at b e s t " o b s c u r e h o w intimately t h e p r i n c i p l e s
adopted are t i e d t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n " (KCMT 550; cf. BSS 58;
WOS VI). M o r e o v e r , i n f o r m u l a t i n g t h e parties' task, Rawls refers o n l y
vaguely to t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e of a n inclusive, self-contained system. For
aught t h e y k n o w , t h e p a r t i e s might be deliberating about t h e w o r l d at
large.
On t h e o t h e r r e a d i n g of Rawls's r e m a r k s — R — t h e s e c o n d session
2

involves a m o r e d r a m a t i c a d j u s t m e n t of t h e original position, s i n c e t h e

parties are n o w c o n c e i v e d as "representatives of states" (TJ 378,379, m y
emphasis). R a w l s tells u s t h a t s u c h representatives w o u l d b e c o n ­
cerned to f u r t h e r " t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . . . [as] defined by the princi­
ples of j u s t i c e t h a t h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n acknowledged [A] n a t i o n will
aim above all t o m a i n t a i n a n d to preserve its just institutions a n d t h e
conditions t h a t m a k e t h e m p o s s i b l e " (TJ 379). So the parties' ideal of a
just w o r l d w o u l d b e , essentially, a world of just states. For a world
falling s h o r t of t h i s ideal, t h e parties, a s s u m i n g they again e m p l o y t h e
maximin r u l e , w o u l d a d o p t a priority rule focused u p o n the states
whose d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e least just. So R, entails weaker con­
straints t h a n R o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. In this regard, a just
t

global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e n e e d m e r e l y e n s u r e that n o states are too p o o r to

6
°e able to satisfy Rawls's criterion domestically.
Despite this difference, t h e two readings agree that first-principle
7
goods a r e p a r a m o u n t T h o s e farthest from having a complete a n d
well-protected p a c k a g e of basic rights a n d liberties ipso facto c o u n t as
the globally l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d u n d e r R„ a n d those societies w h o s e least
advantaged suffer t h e g r e a t e s t shortfall from s u c h a fully a d e q u a t e
Package i p s o facto c o u n t as t h e least just u n d e r R . However mconsis- 2

tently Rawls m a y h a v e d e s c r i b e d t h e parties' second, global session, it

^ill q u i t e clearly yield a criterion that assesses global basic structures
hy t h e severity of t h e first-principle violations each t e n d s to P r o d u c e
»1 A It is t h e n a s t o n i s h i n g that Rawls takes this global session to

Q ^ ^ J ^ ^ / . J S
' T h e r , m a y b e r e a d i n g s or e x l e n s i o n s of the
Perhaps e n v i s a g i n g a criterion sensitive to the per capita income „ m e p
s
' k i P s u c h c o m p l e x i t i e s , a s s u m i n g that m y arguments against H, and 2

mediate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as well. „;„„;„i ;<= s u s o e n d e d in favorofthe

PS

U n l e s s , o f c o u r s e , t h e lexical ordering of the two P ™ ^ " " ^ £ hope that my ( n e

general c o n c e p t i o n . I neglect this complication in my^argun ^ ^ .. h a J f t v a y

a m e n d m e n t i o t h e first principle allows u s » « f * | ? c a£ i b l v apply. In any

n p u s

favorable") c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the special c ° n c e £ i o n H ^ ^ ^ PQORER

case, e v e n if t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n applied to toda>- s wt< for s m e n t of t h e a s s e s
s
, °ctetie (R ), R w i ' criterion w o u l d still have r a d i c a W
S 2 a s s j conception
( h e s p e c i a

'he current global b a s i c structure, especially if, as Kawis ^ i m p l i c a

d e t w m i n e s t h e long-range d e m a n d s of justice (TJ I*A ^ ' _ ent I

( h e a c t u a I a r g u m

h ° b s c o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d will be clear e n o u g h by analogy

Present in t h e text.
244 T h e T r a d i t i o n a l Law of N a t i o n s , 21.3

result in a reaffirmation of t h e "familiar" p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law,

for w h i c h h e relies o n t h e s e m i n a l b u t d a t e d a c c o u n t in J a m e s Brierly's
b o o k The Law of Nations. U n d e r t h i s r e g i m e , " s t a t e s h a v e c e r t a i n funda­
m e n t a l e q u a l r i g h t s . . . a n a l o g o u s to t h e e q u a l r i g h t s of citizens in a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e " (TJ 378). As e x a m p l e s , Rawls m e n t i o n s (TJ 378-
79) t h e rights t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n , a n d self-defense;
t h e r u l e s ofj u s in bello; a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t r e a t i e s c o n s i s t e n t with
t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s are t o b e k e p t (the r e m a i n i n g t r e a t i e s b e i n g void ab
initio).
T h e p a r t i e s , o n e i t h e r R o r R , h a v e v a r i o u s r e a s o n s for rejecting this
1 2

p r o p o s a l . T o b e g i n w i t h , it is w h o l l y i n s e n s i t i v e t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l con­
c e r n s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s s h a p e d by free bargaining
( a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s a n d o t h e r e c o n o m i c a g e n t s ) afford n o a s s u r a n c e
t h a t n a t i o n a l societies will n o t avoidably lack "a sufficient m a t e r i a l base
for m a k i n g t h e e q u a l liberties effective" (FG 545). But t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d
u r g e n t l y w a n t a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t p r o v i d e s s u c h as­
surance.
Next, a w o r l d of g r e a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s will give rise to
c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t . M a n y a g o v e r n m e n t will b e b o u n d
b y very b u r d e n s o m e treaties, w h o s e t e r m s , n e g o t i a t e d p e r h a p s by
s o m e p r e d e c e s s o r g o v e r n m e n t , reflect a b y g o n e a n d unfavorable dis­
t r i b u t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . T h e c o m m i t m e n t to k e e p s u c h treaties
will frequently c o m e u n d e r severe s t r e s s .
Moreover, t h e r e are, o n Rawls's p r o p o s a l , n o effective m e c h a n i s m s of
a d j u d i c a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t t h a t c o u l d offset t h e s e c o n s i d e r a b l e
s t r a i n s of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e r e b y k e e p t h e s i t u a t e d a s s u r a n c e p r o b ­
l e m from arising. In t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h r e c o g n i z e d m e c h a n i s m s ,
g o v e r n m e n t s have n o a s s u r a n c e s t h a t o t h e r s will c o m p l y w i t h t h e
g o i n g g r o u n d r u l e s even w h e n t h e n e t c o s t s of c o m p l i a n c e (including
o p p o r t u n i t y costs) are high. T h e lack of s u c h a s s u r a n c e s m a k e s it m o r e
often advisable a n d also m o r a l l y m o r e a c c e p t a b l e n o t to c o m p l y oneself
w h e n c o m p l i a n c e is costly or even risky. T h i s c l i m a t e of a c t u a l a n d
potential noncompliance, together with "honest disagreements"
a m o n g g o v e r n m e n t s t h a t are equally e n t i d e d to j u d g e a n d enforce
i n t e r n a t i o n a l laws a n d treaties, e n s u r e s t h a t t h e p e r e n n i a l s c o u r g e of
w a r will c o n t i n u e , as Rawls implicitly a c k n o w l e d g e s b y c o n c e n t r a t i n g
m o s t of h i s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n u p o n t h e r u l e s of warfare.
T h i s p e r m a n e n t d a n g e r from n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d w a r ( a n d t h e fear,
hostility, a n d s u s p i c i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h it) will in t u m a c t u a l i z e t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u r a n c e p r o b l e m . E a c h g o v e r n m e n t will, a n d will d e e m
itself m o r a l l y e n t i t l e d to, shift t h e g r o u n d r u l e s in its favor w h e n it can,
s o a s t o m a k e itself a n d its d o m e s t i c p o p u l a t i o n less v u l n e r a b l e to
n o n c o m p l i a n c e or attack by other governments.
T a k e n t o g e t h e r , t h e s e four c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s h o w t h a t u n d e r t h e r u l e s
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w Rawls e n d o r s e s e v e n a n initially w e l l - o r d e r e d (sta­
ble) i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m w o u l d t e n d t o d e g e n e r a t e i n t o a m o d u s vi-
 T h e Traditional Law of Nations, 21.4 245

vendi in w h i c h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e s e g r o u n d rules a n d t h u s their

endurance w o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c . In o t h e r words, it is n o t t h e case that
the familiar l a w of n a t i o n s (at Brierly's time or our's) w o u l d work well if
only t h e r e w e r e mutual t r u s t . Rather, t h e prevailing modus-vivendi
framework is t h e e q u i l i b r i u m state t o w a r d w h i c h a n international sys­
tem g o v e r n e d b y t h i s l a w of n a t i o n s will t e n d regardless of initial
governmental a t t i t u d e s a n d g o o d will. A world o r d e r based o n t h e s e
ground r u l e s is inherently u n s t a b l e , a s can be s h o w n by e x t e n d i n g
Rawls's o w n o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t a n d t h e two
8
assurance p r o b l e m s .
We h a v e s e e n h o w t h e p a r t i e s have important r e a s o n s for rejecting
the traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime Rawls e n d o r s e s . The inequality
and instability (fostering n o n c o m p l i a n c e a n d wars) s u c h a regime
tends t o e n g e n d e r w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e t h e parties' aspiration for a world
in w h i c h first-principle g o o d s are universally secure. These r e a s o n s
apply even if w e a s s u m e t h a t all of t h e world's societies are firmly
committed to p r o t e c t i n g first-principle goods within their b o r d e r s (at
least insofar as t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e levels of development permit). Since this
assumption is h i g h l y unrealistic, however, one s h o u l d also consider
whether p r o p o s e d g r o u n d rules for international relations are plausi­
ble w h e n s o m e societies are less t h a n just a n d w h e t h e r they will exert
some i n f l u e n c e u p o n n a t i o n a l regimes to gravitate toward domestic
justice. Rawls's p r o p o s a l of equal state rights fails on these two c o u n t s
as well. Societies a n d t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s are to be accepted as equals
under t h o s e r u l e s , e v e n if t h e i r internal constitutions are characterized
°y tyranny, r e p r e s s i o n , exploitation, a n d radical inequalities. Persons
abused by t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s have no official remedies a n d m u s t
"ely on t h e w i l l i n g n e s s of o t h e r governments or agents to intercede in
their behalf. M o r e o v e r , s i n c e e a c h state is sovereign over its internal
^ a i r s , this i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r generates no countervailing forces that
* o u l d resist t h e d e g e n e r a t i o n of a national basic s t r o c h r o . Such in­
stitutional indifference to t h e d o m e s t i c (in)justice of national regimes
aggravates t h e instability of t h e p r o p o s e d world o r d e r b e c a u s e , u n d e r ­
l i n e s t h e moral r e a s o n s for unconditional compliance with interna­
tional l a w s a n d t r e a t i e s . , „„tr,fthPtradi-
d o r e e
21.4. T h e s e Rawlsian criticisms of Rawls's ^ Xrlns oft
"onal i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime indicate three ^ ^S5tT-nd
ftitutional r e f o r m t o w a r d a global order u n d e r ™
Gerties w o u l d be more c o m p l e t e a n d ^ J ^ ^ X
« e w o u l d favor an organization of the world economy that makes
S

sensitive to d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n c e r n s , so that ^ ^ ^ S X - S b c
sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e to satisfy t h e first P T ^ ^ T t o i r t t t a d
° n d , t h e y w o u l d w a n t (more) international disputes to oe
c « RMC 144 On what I have
*On t h e strains of c o m m i t m e n t , s e e TJ 176-78; RAM 6 5 3 , ™ ^ I O C n

called t h e s i t u a t e d a n d fundamental assurance problems,

and 1 9 - 2 0 , respectively.
246 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22

t h r o u g h m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d legal p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h
w a r o r t h r e a t a d v a n t a g e — a reform t h a t in d u e c o u r s e m i g h t b e comple­
m e n t e d b y c e n t r a l e n f o r c e m e n t m e c h a n i s m s . P r o g r e s s t o w a r d this
s e c o n d goal w o u l d r e d u c e o r e l i m i n a t e t h e i n c i d e n c e of w a r a n d make
it m u c h m o r e likely for right r a t h e r t h a n m i g h t t o prevail in interna­
t i o n a l conflicts. T h i r d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to
afford s o m e r e m e d i e s t o p e r s o n s a g a i n s t a b u s e b y t h e i r o w n govern­
m e n t s , s o m e i n c e n t i v e s for societies t o reform t h e m s e l v e s — m i n i m a l l y
b y p r o v i d i n g for d i p l o m a t i c a n d e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s ( w h e n these
w o u l d b e effective) against u n j u s t n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s . S e e i n g t h a t prog­
9
ress h a s b e e n m a d e s i n c e Brierly's t i m e , o n t h e l a t t e r t w o fronts, a n d
t h a t t h e p a r t i e s , o n a n y textually t e n a b l e c o n s t r u a l of t h e i r s e c o n d
s e s s i o n , w o u l d a d o p t a criterion t h a t favors s u c h r e f o r m s , I a m at a loss
t o e x p l a i n Rawls's quick e n d o r s e m e n t of a b y g o n e s t a t u s q u o . Given the
g e n e s i s of t h e i n t e m a t i o n a l - l a w r e g i m e a s a n i n s t r u m e n t d e v e l o p e d by
g o v e r n m e n t s t o serve t h e i r o w n s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s , it w o u l d s e e m a
s u r p r i s i n g c o i n c i d e n c e i n d e e d if it (in a n y of its h i s t o r i c a l versions)
w e r e t h e m o s t s u i t a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for realizing b a s i c rights
a n d liberties.
In o n e c o n c r e t e c a s e Rawls himself s h o w s a c o n c e r n for b a s i c liber­
ties t h a t radically d e p a r t s from t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. He writes
t h a t a n a r m y of c o n s c r i p t s r a t h e r t h a n m e r c e n a r i e s m a y b e " d e m a n d e d
for t h e defense of liberty itself, i n c l u d i n g h e r e n o t o n l y t h e liberties of
t h e c i t i z e n s of t h e society i n q u e s t i o n , b u t a l s o t h o s e of p e r s o n s in other
societies a s well. Therefore if a c o n s c r i p t a r m y is l e s s likely to b e a n
i n s t r u m e n t of unjustified foreign a d v e n t u r e s , it m a y b e justified o n this
b a s i s a l o n e d e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t c o n s c r i p t i o n infringes u p o n t h e equal
liberties of c i t i z e n s " (TJ 380). This d e m a n d g o e s far b e y o n d h i s c o n s e r ­
vative e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e l a w of n a t i o n s . O n e m i g h t , t h e r e f o r e , best
d i s c o u n t t h i s e n d o r s e m e n t , r a t h e r t h a n r e c o g n i z e it a s e v i d e n c e
a g a i n s t a n y r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w Rawls d e s c r i b e s t h e
p a r t i e s s e c o n d , global s e s s i o n .

22. The Internal Argument

Let m e t h e n r e t u r n t o t h e t w o i d e a s Rawls h a s s u g g e s t e d for e x t e n d ­

i n g t h e original p o s i t i o n t o t h e subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d
field a g a i n s t t h e s e i d e a s m y o w n alternative, G. I n s t e a d of t w o s e p a r a t e
9
F o r e x a m p l e , t h e International Covenant o n Civil a n d Political Rights a n d t h e Interna­
tional Covenant o n E c o n o m i c , Social, and Cultural Rights b o t h involve specific legal
obligations, t h o u g h o n l y a minority of states h a v e a c c e d e d to t h e m . T h e former o f t h e s e
e n v i s i o n s jurisdiction by the U.N. H u m a n Rights C o m m i t t e e (1CCPR §41) a n d also c o n ­
tains a n o p t i o n a l protocol recognizing the right to individual p e t i t i o n t o this U.N. b o d y
Similar p r o v i s i o n s are c o n t a i n e d in the E u r o p e a n C o n v e n t i o n o n H u m a n Rights. Reflect­
ing t h e parties' c o n c e r n for first-principle rights a n d liberties, a criterion of global justice
a c c e p t a b l e to t h e m w o u l d d e m a n d substantial further reforms a l o n g t h e s e l i n e s .
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.1 247

sessions in w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s a d o p t criteria for national a n d t h e n for

international i n s t i t u t i o n s , G envisions a single, global, original position.
This modification, again a p p e a l i n g t o t h e thick veil of ignorance, leaves
intact Rawls's w h o l e a r g u m e n t for t h e two principles, directing it how­
ever at o u r e n t i r e social w o r l d . T h e relevant "closed s c h e m e " is n o w
taken t o b e t h e w o r l d at large. This section will first s h o w h o w R is 2

incompatible w i t h Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s a n d t h e n p r e s e n t a n u m b e r
of a r g u m e n t s t h a t favor G over R, (and R ). 2

22.1.1. O n e m a i n r e a s o n Rawls gives for taking t h e basic s t r u c t u r e a s

the p r i m a i y m o r a l s u b j e c t is that institutional inequalities, at least
insofar a s t h e y a r e b a s e d u p o n natural o r social contingencies, a r e
inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth. They deeply s h a p e o u r c h a r a c t e r
and interests, g o a l s a n d aspirations, even talents a n d abilities (BSS V; TJ
7,259). T h u s t h e y affect o u r lives m u c h m o r e profoundly a n d call m o r e
urgently for m o r a l reflection t h a n inequalities arising from w h a t indi­
viduals c h o o s e t o d o (including participation in associations s u c h as
firms, c h u r c h e s , o r universities) a n d from h o w their activities h a p p e n t o
turn o u t .
Nationality is j u s t o n e further d e e p contingency (like genetic e n d o w ­
ment, race, g e n d e r , a n d social class), o n e more potential basis of in­
stitutional i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e inescapable a n d p r e s e n t from birth.
Within Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , there is n o reason to treat this case dif­
ferently from t h e o t h e r s . A n d s o it w o u l d seem that w e can justify o u r
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r only if w e c a n s h o w that the institutional
inequalities it p r o d u c e s t e n d to optimize (against t h e b a c k d r o p ot
feasible a l t e r n a t i v e global regimes) t h e worst social position.
N o w o n e m a y t h i n k t h a t t h e r e is a n o t h e r kind of justification peculiar
to t h e global c a s e , w h e r e t h e claims of states m u s t also b e given their
w h i c h h
due. S u c h a t h o u g h t is suggested by R , on 2 * °P^™^™Zt
as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of stales. Even conceding ^\Xh^nZorm^l
e
alternative i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s that would genera e a « " P " ™ ^
m u m s h a r e , o n e c a n still a r g u e that a n y s u c h f f ™ ^ ^ ^ e
infringe m o r e i m p o r t a n t rights a n d interests ™ g
a p l a u s i b l e i n s t a n c e of s u c h a justification, b u t in ^J™*^™
not fit i n t o a Rawlsian framework, *^^S?Jtice
with Rawls's individualistic conviction ^ ^ ^ L a l con-
a l ) m o r a

only persons a r e t o b e viewed as " ' t i m a t e u n i t s , ^ d o f

c e m : "We w a n t t o a c c o u n t for the social values, o r t h e m q {

institutional, c o m m u n i t y , a n d associative a c " ™ ^ ^ q (

justice t h a t i n its theoretical basis i s j n m v u n pt

d e f i n e d c o n c e

clarity a m o n g o t h e r s , w e d o not w a n t to relyjo ^ ^ a Jife

s o c i e n
of c o m m u n i t y , o r to s u p p o s e t h a t ; f J m b e r s in their
i t s m e

of its o w n d i s t i n c t from a n d superior-to i n however mdividu-

relations w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . . . . From this cone v . q { c o r n m u

alistic it m a y s e e m , w e m u s t eventually explain

nity" (TJ 264-65).
248 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2

C o n s e q u e n t l y , Rawls r e c o g n i z e s o n l y p e r s o n s a s "self-originating
s o u r c e s of valid c l a i m s " (KCMT 543) a n d s o c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to basing
h i s criterion of social j u s t i c e exclusively u p o n d a t a a b o u t individual
s h a r e s . This c o m m i t m e n t favors a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e original posi­
tion t h a t , like G a n d R„ c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n c e i v e s t h e p a r t i e s as represent­
i n g persons, n e v e r a s s o c i a t i o n s o r s t a t e s a s in R . In a n y c a s e , h o w
2

a s s o c i a t i o n s , c o m m u n i t i e s , a n d s t a t e s a r e t o b e c o n c e i v e d a n d what
roles t h e y a r e t o p l a y w i t h i n a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m m u s t for
Rawls d e p e n d o n l y u p o n h o w a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s w o u l d affect this
10
social s y s t e m ' s i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n p a r t i c i p a n t s .
2 2 . 1 . 2 . Let u s t u r n to Rawls's s e c o n d m a i n r e a s o n for b e g i n n i n g with
t h e s u b j e c t of b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e in­
equalities t h e y t e n d to p r o d u c e m u s t b e g o v e r n e d b y n o t h i n g less
d e m a n d i n g t h a n a m a x i m i n criterion. I n t e r p e r s o n a l a g r e e m e n t s c a n
c a r r y m o r a l w e i g h t o n l y if t h e y are freely e n t e r e d i n t o u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s
t h a t are fair (cf. BSS 5 2 - 5 3 ) . This, Rawls believes, is often n o t t h e case
w h e n s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' b a s i c rights a n d liberties, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , or
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s are grossly inferior. T h e attractive i d e a of "interac­
t i o n a m o n g c o n s e n t i n g a d u l t s " c a n b e m o r a l l y a p p e a l i n g o n l y if dif­
ferentials in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r d o n o t e x c e e d c e r t a i n l i m i t s . A t e n d e n c y
t o g e n e r a t e excessive i n e q u a l i t i e s is a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e e p m o r a l defect in
a social s y s t e m b e c a u s e m a n y of t h e v o l u n t a r y i n t e r a c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e
w i t h i n it will b e m o r a l l y flawed as a r e s u l t . It is t h e n of c o n s i d e r a b l e
m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e t h a t social s y s t e m s b e s o s t r u c t u r e d t h a t t h o s e limits
are m a i n t a i n e d , o r (as Rawls p u t s it) " b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e " is p r e s e r v e d .
This is given a s o n e m a i n r e a s o n for t h e p r e e m i n e n c e , w i t h i n m o r a l
reflection, of t h e q u e s t for a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e for t h e b a s i c s t r u c ­
ture.
T h i s r e a s o n , too, e x t e n d s to t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e , e v e n if e a c h
state maintained a distributional b a c k g r o u n d ensuring that interac­
t i o n s a m o n g its c i t i z e n s a r e free a n d fair, i n t e r n a t i o n a l ( i n c l u d i n g inter­
g o v e r n m e n t a l ) inequalities in i n f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r m a y
still b e s o g r e a t as t o r e n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n s unfair a n d
1 1
c o e r c i v e — h e n c e t h e n e e d for a c o n c e p t i o n of global b a c k g r o u n d
justice.

" T h i s constraint is still c o m p a t i b l e with the claim that the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l right of

persons is the right t o live i n a state that h a s t h e k i n d of state rights a c c o r d e d by
international law. If this w e r e true, t h e n the p r e s e n t o r d e r m i g h t i n d e e d b e t h e b e s t w e
c a n h o p e for. At least the foremost right of p e r s o n s is fairly s e c u r e . Given all Rawls h a s
s a i d a b o u t the basic liberties, t h i s p i e c e of conservative i n g e n u i t y will n o t fit i n t o h i s
c o n c e p t i o n of justice, but it is p o p u l a r w i t h others, m o s t notably Walzer (JUW 5 3 - 5 4 ;
MSS).
" H e r e , w e s h o u l d think not m e r e l y of individual transactions, s u c h a s a treaty e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g a foreign military b a s e o r a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n a W e s t e r n tourist a n d a Bangkok
prostitute. T h e r e are m o r e c o m p l e x c a s e s , as w h e n , in s o m e p o o r country, local d e m a n d
for grain a n d b e a n s c o m p e t e s w i t h foreign d e m a n d for c o t t o n a n d coffee. Even if the
coffee c o n s u m e r s are n o m o r e affluent than the relevant l a n d o w n e r s a n d n e v e r h a v e any
d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e ( m u c h poorerl w o u l d - b e c o n s u m e r s of grain, g r o s s l y u n e q u a l bargain-
 T h e Internal A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.1 249

The c u r r e n t l a w of nations is a c o m p l e t e failure in t h i s r e s p e c t

because it is e n t i r e l y insensitive to s u c h differentials in bargaining
power.
On R t h e global p a r t i e s w o u l d a d o p t a criterion that a s s e s s e s t h e
2

terms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n b y h o w t h e y t e n d t o affect t h e inter­

nal justice of (especially t h e least just) states. This criterion might
support s o m e i m p o r t a n t institutional reforms in t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r n a ­
tional-law r e g i m e . In p a r t i c u l a r , it w o u l d require a reorganization of t h e
world e c o n o m y s o a s t o e n s u r e that, a s far a s possible, e a c h society has
"a sufficient m a t e r i a l b a s e for m a k i n g t h e equal liberties effective" (FG
545). Still, t h i s c r i t e r i o n d o e s not offer an acceptable c o n c e p t i o n of
global b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e in Rawls's sense, b e c a u s e it c o u l d b e fully
satisfied d e s p i t e indefinite i n t e r n a t i o n a l inequalities. Let m e e l u c i d a t e
this p o i n t by d i s c u s s i n g s o m e w h a t m o r e concretely two i s s u e s w i t h
respect to w h i c h R , t h o u g h s u p p o r t e d by ordinary prejudice, conflicts
2

with Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s (which are a c c o m m o d a t e d by G a n d R,).

2 2 . 1 . 2 . 1 . O n e conflict c o n c e r n s t h e relative r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e first
principle, w h i c h ( b e y o n d specific "threshold" safeguards) envision
rough equality in r e g a r d to s o m e basic liberties. T h u s decisions t h r o u g h
the political p r o c e s s a r e r e q u i r e d to b e m a d e in s u c h a w a y that t h o s e
significantly affected b y t h e m have equal rights a n d roughly equal
o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e deliberations a n d to influence their
o u t c o m e s (cf. TJ §36). S h o u l d this r e q u i r e m e n t e x t e n d also to political
choices significantly affecting t h e citizens of m o r e t h a n o n e society?
R , v i e w i n g t h e p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g states a n d t h u s yielding a
2

criterion t h a t a s s e s s e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions exclusively in t e r m s ot

t h e i n t e r n a l j u s t i c e of s t a t e s , w o u l d lead h e r e to a break m continuity.
The right t o e q u a l political participation extends u p to but not b e y o n d
the n a t i o n a l level. Political m a t t e r s of supranational significance Jd c o u

t h e n b e d e c i d e d by o n e state unilaterally, provided only that the(deci­

sion is s a n c t i o n e d t h r o u g h t h e d o m e s t i c political process a n d d o e s . n o t
u n d e r m i n e o r e n d a n g e r t h e internal justice of o t h e r socie ^ F o r ­
eigners, if u n a b l e to exact a treaty, w o u l d b., <* igated to
d e c i s i o n s from w h i c h t h e y a r e by right e x c l u d e d . " This result is consis

^ w e r m a y y e t p l a y a p e r n i c i o u s role. By
d e m a n d for coffee t e n d s to raise food prices,
^f^^^J^S^ demand. (Such
Poorest l o c a l s t o transform their n e e d for food into ettecnv ^ If starvation
scenarios of d e c l i n i n g "exchange entitlements are discusse ea for i t u n d e r
c o n s u m e r e
results in t h i s c a s e , w e c a n n o t h o l d the ° f X b e requUed to anticipate such
Principle of morality. Market participants_cannot,possmiy hl q {
r
remote effects of their transactions (cf. BSS " "y e f s u c h problems
r o o t o

that a t t e n d s Jo t h e effects of institutions can correctly locate tne

and t h u s p e r h a p s h e l p eradicate them. matters of pure procedural
rana ,0
. "Political c h o i c e s , i n c l u d i n g^P ; XXn™rcannot be settled through the
m s t i c e that for r e a s o n s of fairness or collective rational^^c , ratjons d.- m A m

c u m u l a t i v e result of u n c o o r d i n a t e d d e c i s i o n ^ r p r o c e d u r a l justice,
viduals. Or t h e y m a y involve a more ^^^^J^ith
as t h e y m a y a c c o r d more or less well with moral enter.
r f e c

social justice, u s n c e (
250 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2

t e n t w i t h t h e s t a t u s q u o , b u t it conflicts w i t h Rawls's individualistic

c o m m i t m e n t , w h i c h links t h e first p r i n c i p l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t o t h e status
of all h u m a n b e i n g s as free a n d e q u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h i s c o m m i t m e n t ,
w h i c h m a k e s t h e r e s t r i c t i o n of political e q u a l i t y t o t h e n a t i o n a l a n d
s u b n a t i o n a l levels a p p e a r arbitrary, is h o n o r e d b y b o t h R a n d G, w h i c h t

s u p p o r t a right t o e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n (for t h o s e significantly affected) in

t h e m a k i n g a l s o of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political d e c i s i o n s .
22.1J2J2. T h e o t h e r conflict c o n c e r n s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Rawls's
second principle. According to R , international institutions should
2

e n c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t t h e fulfillment of t h i s p r i n c i p l e within each

state. T h e t e r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n m i g h t t h e n b e perfectly
just, even if t h e y t e n d t o p r o d u c e vast i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s in
a c c e s s t o h e a l t h c a r e a n d e d u c a t i o n a n d in i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h . T h e
c r i t e r i o n of global justice, a s Rawls's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of states w o u l d
fashion it, d e m a n d s only t h a t global c o n d i t i o n s b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t ­
ive of e a c h society's a t t a i n i n g its n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t "to m a i n t a i n a n d to
p r e s e r v e its just i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e m possi­
b l e " (TJ 379). Yet if excessive social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s are
u n j u s t d o m e s t i c a l l y , h o w c a n like i n e q u a l i t i e s a r i s i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y be
a m a t t e r of m o r a l indifference? T h e g r o u n d s o n w h i c h Rawls h o l d s t h a t
fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y a n d t h e difference p r i n c i p l e c o n s t i t u t e
r e q u i r e m e n t s of b a c k g r o u n d justice militate a g a i n s t c o n f i n i n g t h e s e
requirements within national borders.
Let m e explicate this i d e a of a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e s o m e w h a t
m o r e concretely b y examining the natural a n d social contingencies
that international socioeconomic inequalities m a y be based u p o n or
r e l a t e d t o (cf. §14.3). Let u s b e g i n w i t h a reflection u p o n t h e m o r a l s t a t u s
of t h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s ( s u c h as m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s , fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.) of
t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s . T h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of s u c h a s s e t s is cer­
t a i n l y m o r a l l y arbitrary in Rawls's s e n s e . " T h e n a t u r a l a s s e t s in a state's
t e r r i t o r y are n o t a reflection of t h e m o r a l w o r t h o f — a r e n o t Deserved
b y — e i t h e r this s t a t e o r its citizens. T h e m o r a l a r b i t r a r i n e s s of t h e
d i s t n b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s s u p p o r t s (within a R a w l s i a n framework)
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h o s e w h o s e territory i n c l u d e s e x c e p t i o n a l n a t u r a l
a s s e t s h a v e n o c l a i m t h a t a j u s t global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s h o u l d offer
a n y p a r t i c u l a r r e w a r d s for m a k i n g t h e s e a s s e t s available. J u s t a s G e n i u s

b e t w e e n g e n e r a t i o n s , or our natural duties (including t h o s e toward o t h e r f o r m s of life).

G r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s i n political i n f l u e n c e are u n j u s t in b o t h t h e s e c a s e s , albeit for s o m e ­
w h a t different r e a s o n s . Possible e x a m p l e s of supranational political c h o i c e s are p o l i c i e s
p e r t a i n i n g to t h e installation a n d proliferation of nuclear t e c h n o l o g i e s ; d i s e a s e control;
g e n e t i c engineering; the preservation of historical a n d cultural treasures; t h e storage, use,
a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of information; exploitation of natural assets (air a n d w a t e r p o l l u t i o n ,
u s e of o c e a n s a n d o u t e r s p a c e , d e s t r u c t i o n of tropical forests a n d o z o n e layer); d e c i m a ­
t i o n a n d e x t i n c t i o n of biological s p e c i e s ; experimentation w i t h a n i m a l s global capital
a c c u m u l a t i o n ; g r o u n d rules for international trade a n d investment (operation of interna­
t i o n a l financial i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d multinational corporations).
" A s a r g u e d in Beitz, PTIR 1 3 6 - 4 2 — t h o u g h Beitz d o e s not u s e "morally arbitrary" in
(what I think is) Rawls's s e n s e .
 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2 251

has no prior c l a i m t h a t s h e b e offered a n y specific i n c o m e a d v a n t a g e for

the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e r c i s e of h e r g r e a t e r talents (cf. §6.3), s o t h e
Saudis have n o p r i o r c l a i m t o b e i n g offered a n y specific i n c o m e advan­
tage for p r o d u c i n g a n d delivering c r u d e oil. T h e t e r m s of international
cooperation m a y a n d s h o u l d therefore be d e s i g n e d s o that t h e social
inequalities t h e y a l l o w t o a r i s e from n a t u r a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s (the dis­
tribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s ) t e n d to o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t representative
individual s h a r e (cf. §6.4). I n t h i s way, a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e
would c o n s t r a i n b u t n o t p r e c l u d e i n c o m e inequalities t h a t reflect
skewed t e r m s of t r a d e (for e x a m p l e , c r u d e oil versus cotton) arising, via
patterns of s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d , from t h e morally arbitrary g e o g r a p h ­
ical d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l a s s e t s .
Beitz w a n t s t o d e r i v e m o r e from t h e parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l e n d o w ­
ments a n d n a t u r a l a s s e t s , n a m e l y a global r e s o u r c e redistribution prin­
ciple (which h e believes s h o u l d a p p l y even in t h e a b s e n c e of a n y
international i n t e r a c t i o n ) . He w a n t s t h e criterion of global justice to
govern n o t m e r e l y t h e t e r m s o n w h i c h states c a n develop a n d market
their n a t u r a l a s s e t s b u t a l s o rights over t h e s e assets themselves. But
Beitz's a r g u m e n t for h i s global r e s o u r c e redistribution principle cru­
cially d e p e n d s u p o n Nozick's m i s t a k e n interpretation of h o w Rawls
treats n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s . If social institutions m a y be d e s i g n e d to
rectify i n e q u a l i t i e s i n n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s — p e r h a p s t h r o u g h organ
transplants o r t h r o u g h collective o w n e r s h i p of (or a h e a d tax on) spe­
cial g i f t s - t h e n w e c a n i n d e e d c o n c l u d e that social institutions m a y
also r e d i s t r i b u t e n a t u r a l a s s e t s (provided t h e s e are relevantly similar to
natural e n d o w m e n t s ) . But t h e n , as w e have seen (§5.1.1), Rawls is not
c o m m i t t e d t o t h e p r e m i s e of this a r g u m e n t . There is n o r e a s o n vvrthrn
his s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e - n o t e v e n a ^ a j
overidden b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p e r s o n a l
the n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of special gifts a n d h a n d i c a p ^ E a c h . p e r s o n *
to have a right t o h e r n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d » » ^ ™ ^ 5
e e
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise. W h a t w o u l d follow from ? £ ^ * ™
Parallel of n a t u r a l a s s e t s w i t h n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t t h e r e f o r e quite
different from w h a t h e c o n c l u d e s . E a c h state is t . h a v e a n g h t t o ^
n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d t h u s m a y beefy ^ ^ " ^ ^ S a e d
them domestically, o r to market them ^ ^ T e n T o f such a
s c
within a j u s t global e c o n o m i c h e m e Under t n e , n s

scheme s i a t e s r i c h in natural assets ^^^S^magni-

f o r t u
could d e r i v e a d v a n t a g e s from their g o o d , " ^ ™ d e s i g n e d s 0

t u d e of t h e s e a d v a n t a g e s is limited by t h e s c h m e s b ^ ^ d u a l
as t o o p t i m i z e t h e social position of t h e least aov
Participants." ^ s t a t e s and their natural
C
"These limits would probably be less ^ " J E n d o w m e n t s because states can
assets than in the case of individuals « ^ . ^ ™ l ^ £ a m l n g more self-rehant The
more easily reduce their economic p a r t ^ ° ^ ^ i s o f cooperation would then
terms of an economic scheme designed to ^J*™^ to gifted persons.
t h a n

Probably be relatively more favorable to asset-ncu

252 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.1.2.2

But t h e n Beitz's parallel b e t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w ­

m e n t s is m i s t a k e n . Yes, t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l assets
is just a n a t u r a l fact o r c o n t i n g e n c y , b u t h a v i n g a p r o p e r t y right or
e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s is very m u c h a social fact. Such
rights a r e a m o n g t h e benefits a n d b u r d e n s of social c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d
t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , unlike t h e n a t u r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of en­
15
d o w m e n t s , d o e s t h e n s t a n d in n e e d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Part of t h e dis­
t r i b u t i o n of i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of n a t u r a l
a s s e t s is i n c l u d e d i n t h e m a s t e r p a t t e r n i n t e r m s of w h i c h a Rawlsian
c r i t e r i o n of global justice w o u l d a s s e s s a n y p a r t i c u l a r global basic
structure. This d o e s not m e a n t h a t — a s s u m i n g global interdepen­
d e n c e — B e i t z ' s r e s o u r c e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p r i n c i p l e c a n after all b e de­
rived from Rawlsian c o m m i t m e n t s . Rather, h o w a j u s t global institu­
tional s c h e m e w o u l d regulate o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l over natural
a s s e t s d e p e n d s u p o n t h e empirical q u e s t i o n of w h i c h institutional
d e s i g n w o u l d o p t i m i z e t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n .
T h e parallel b e t w e e n individuals a n d s t a t e s , w h i c h t h e parallel be­
t w e e n n a t u r a l a s s e t s a n d n a t u r a l e n d o w m e n t s is p a r a s i t i c u p o n , will
n o t fit i n t o a Rawlsian m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n . F o r Rawls, i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n
p e r s o n s , a n d t h e y a l o n e , a r e t h e u l t i m a t e u n i t s of m o r a l c o n c e r n . While
p e r s o n s , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r n a t u r a l a t t r i b u t e s , a r e t h e f u n d a m e n t of his
s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of justice, all o t h e r u n i t s (firms a n d
families, states, c h u r c h e s , a n d universities) a n d t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s are
v i e w e d a s d e p e n d e n t o n a n d r e g u l a t e d b y social i n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h are
t o b e d e s i g n e d for t h e sole benefit of p e r s o n s , v i e w e d as potential
p a r t i c i p a n t s in t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s .
It m a y s e e m t h a t a globalized s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e is m u c h l e s s plausible
a s a c o n s t r a i n t o n inequalities b a s e d u p o n social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . But I
d o n ' t t h i n k t h i s is so. For s u p p o s e , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t s o m e n a t i o n a l
s o c i e t y is p o o r o w i n g to a g r e a t e r aggregate p r e f e r e n c e for l e i s u r e t i m e
a n d c o n s u m p t i o n , d e p r e s s i n g t h e r a t e of savings. Even t h e n , t h e rela­
tive n e g l e c t of t h e h e a l t h a n d e d u c a t i o n of its c h i l d r e n c a n n o t b e
justified m e r e l y b y t h e fact t h a t o t h e r s in this s o c i e t y d i d n o t m a k e
a d e q u a t e savings. W i t h its e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l lifetime s h a r e s ,
Rawls's criterion of justice w o u l d favor i n s t i t u t i o n s d e s i g n e d s o t h a t
p e r s o n s w h o b y c h o i c e enjoy m o r e leisure t i m e o r c o n s u m p t i o n m u s t
n o r m a l l y b e a r t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s b y receiving less of (other) g o o d s ,
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o r at o t h e r t i m e s . B e y o n d t h i s provision, Rawls r e q u i r e s

" I t m a y b e helpful (though slightly m i s l e a d i n g in light of t h e n e x t paragraph) to recall

here w h a t I have said about Rawls's distinction b e t w e e n natural a n d social c o n t i n g e n ­
c i e s . Social inequalities related to the distribution of natural a s s e t s d o n o t really arise
e i t h e r from a natural c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o t a l e n t - i n d u c e d inequalities) or from a social
c o n t i n g e n c y (as d o c l a s s - i n d u c e d inequalities). T h e y are c l o s e s t to g e n d e r - a n d race-
i n d u c e d inequalities. T h e y are b a s e d o n natural facts that, a b s e n t certain social facts,
m i g h t n e v e r have h a d the slightest social i m p o r t a n c e . It is a social fact that h u m a n b e i n g s
c a m e to a t t a c h s u c h e n o r m o u s moral i m p o r t a n c e t o skin color, a n d it is a social fact that
t h e y d i v i d e d the w o r l d into national properties.
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.1.3 253

domestic i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e w h a t e v e r b u r d e n s r e m a i n in w a y s
satisfying t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e , a n d h e s h o u l d t h u s require i n t e r n a ­
tional i n s t i t u t i o n s t o d i s t r i b u t e s u c h b u r d e n s analogously. P e r s o n s
should suffer from t h e u n p r o d u c t i v e n e s s of their p a r e n t s o r c o m ­
patriots o n l y i n s o f a r a s ( b e c a u s e of t h e resulting incentives) t h e i r social
position w o u l d still b e b e t t e r t h a n t h e worst social position u n d e r all
feasible a l t e r n a t i v e e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s (including o n e s that d o n o t
permit selective p e n a l i z a t i o n at all). Rawls's individualistic perspective
never allows b u r d e n s to b e i m p o s e d u p o n s o m e o n e merely on a c c o u n t
of t h e c o n d u c t of h e r relatives or compatriots. Their propensities to­
ward l e i s u r e t i m e a n d c o n s u m p t i o n a r e inappropriate d e t e r m i n a n t s of
her social p o s i t i o n — n o l e s s morally arbitrary t h a n t h e geographical
distribution of n a t u r a l a s s e t s .
22.1.3. O n e m a y think, d e s p i t e t h e arguments presented, that t h e
description of t h e global p a r t i e s as representatives of states can y e t be
saved o n s o m e o t h e r interpretation. T h e global parties could b e d e ­
scribed, for e x a m p l e , a s c o n c e r n e d for t h e (political, economic, mili­
tary) s t r e n g t h of t h e s t a t e s t h e y represent, so that they w o u l d c h o o s e a
criterion t h a t is sensitive t o t h e wealth a n d bargaining p o w e r of t h e
worst-off s t a t e s . But s u c h modifications of ^ - b e s i d e s simply assum­
ing a m o r a l l y f u n d a m e n t a l role for t h e s t a t e - s t i l l d o not adequately
cope w i t h t h e relative a s p e c t s of justice. If the problem is split u p s o
that i n e q u a l i t i e s a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s a n d inequalities a m o n g states a r e
l t i e
dealt w i t h s e p a r a t e l y , t h e n n o excessive ^ ^ ^Za7ZrdeS
view even t h o u g h e n o r m o u s inequalities exist across
Togiveasimplfexamp^^
by a ratio of 30:1. Allowing t h e separation of-levels w o ^ ^ ^
weaken fhY«
n a i n t h e
tional H n poorest state {with a p e r capita gross
, N C O M E

f 2 M m i g h t v a r y b e t w e e n 3 6 0 12 w b i i e
b e h e s t si i ° ' ° and < in t h e
a e r
spread " h P capita gross national product of 6,000) the
t W G e n 6 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 0 0 lm sin
tions c ^ f °' ' - P° S two separate 30:1 Umita-
l 2 r t a b , y e r r n i t
'- T ° i? n - P s inequalities of 5,000:1 (a spread of 60,000 to
e S n t
qualit\ / ^ c a n b e a d a p t e d to m o r e complex measures of in-
a s n e
°f c o m . t Gini coefficient} or to nonquantifiable dimensions
a n s o n S u c n
'ar t h ^ ^ a s political influence). It undermines, in particu-
1 ( e a t W O s e a r a t e
°f inrT ^ ° ^ P maximin criteria, one formulated in terms
W
othp f s h a r e s a n d applying to domestic basic structures, t h e
irisft . ^ " l a t e d i n t e r m s of national shares a n d applying to the global
o n a
gloh ^ n J framework. Even if both are satisfied, t h e position of the
a n y l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d could still b e far worse than is unavoidable.
U n a c c e
on ^ P t a b i l i t y of s u c h a dual criterion emerges clearly when
6
e x ° h s e r v e s that it w o u l d provide a n incentive to "just-ify" otherwise
cessive i n t e r p e r s o n a l inequalities (in political influence, socioeco-
1C p o s i n o n
borH ' a n d t h e like) through t h e interposition of national
refers. A n unjust state can conveniently be split into two just ones,
' " h a b i t e d , respectively, b y the rich and the poor. This "reform" would
254 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.1

b e essentially c o s m e t i c , r e m o v i n g t h e injustice (as d e n n e d b y t h e p r o ­

p o s e d d u a l criterion) w i t h o u t m i t i g a t i n g t h e g r o s s i n e q u a l i t i e s in bar­
g a i n i n g p o w e r a n d social p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o g r o u p s . S u c h i n c e n ­
tives a r e n o t a farfetched possibility. T h e y m a y w e l l b e at w o r k i n South
Africa, w h e r e t h e w h i t e s a r e p u r s u i n g s u c h " r e f o r m s " b y c r e a t i n g a
n u m b e r of s e p a r a t e " h o m e l a n d s " ; a n d o n e m a y a l s o a r g u e t h a t t h e First
W o r l d ' s r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a formerly colonial p e r i p h e r y i n t o sovereign
s t a t e s w a s p a r t l y m o t i v a t e d b y i n c e n t i v e s of t h i s sort. I n o u r world,
n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s f u n c t i o n a s w e l c o m e b l i n d e r s for o u r m o r a l sen­
16
sibilities.
T h e individualistic b a s i s of Rawls's t h e o r y a s e m b o d i e d i n h i s con­
c e r n for b a c k g r o u n d justice s u p p o r t s , t h e n , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e
original p o s i t i o n o n w h i c h t h e global p a r t i e s r e p r e s e n t p e r s o n s a n d
t h e r e f o r e a s s e s s a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y t h e w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a ­
tive i n d i v i d u a l s h a r e it t e n d s t o p r o d u c e . Ideally, t h e y w o u l d w a n t s u c h
a s c h e m e to b e m a x i m a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties, to
foster fair e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y w o r l d w i d e , a n d t o g e n e r a t e social
a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s o n l y insofar a s t h e s e o p t i m i z e t h e s o c i o e c o ­
n o m i c p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s . H e n c e Ri
p r o v i d e s t h e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y m o r e satisfactory r e a d i n g of Rawls's re­
m a r k s , a n d t o it I will n o w t u r n .
2 2 . 2 . 1 . O n e a r g u m e n t favoring G over R is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e
1

i s s u e s j u s t d i s c u s s e d . O n R t h e p a r t i e s , c o n c e i v e d a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of
a

persons, l e a m at t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e s e c o n d s e s s i o n t h a t t h e i r society
is n o t really c l o s e d a n d self-sufficient b u t p a r t of a m u l t i n a t i o n a l
s c h e m e . T h i s b r i n g s o u t a n i n c o h e r e n c e in R , for t h e p a r t i e s (to p u t it
1

dramatically) w o u l d c o m e t o regret t h e i r p r i o r c h o i c e of a c r i t e r i o n of
d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d n o w , b y m a x i m i n , favor a c r i t e r i o n b y
w h i c h all b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s are a s s e s s e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e globally
w o r s t social p o s i t i o n . Only p r i n c i p l e s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s re­
m a i n t o b e c h o s e n , h o w e v e r , s i n c e e a c h n a t i o n a l b a s i c s t r u c t u r e is
a l r e a d y p l e d g e d t o its o w n d o m e s t i c least a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p . A n d
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s d e v i s e d for t h e m a x i m u m benefit of t h e glob­
1 7
ally least a d v a n t a g e d m a y n o t benefit t h e m very m u c h . In a n y c a s e , t o
w h a t e v e r e x t e n t t h e d a m a g e c a n b e c o n t a i n e d , t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d at t h i s
p o i n t w a n t t o u n d o t h e i r first a g r e e m e n t , s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e s t i p u l a t i o n
t h a t all b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y t h e t w o p r i n c i ­
p l e s , i n t e r p r e t e d globally.
, 6
I elaborate this t h o u g h t in a forthcoming e s s a y o n mora! i n c e n t i v e s .
, 7
F o r e x a m p l e , the m o r e favorable the t e r m s of international trade are t o t h e globally
least a d v a n t a g e d , the l e s s s u c h trade there w o u l d t e n d to be. Overly favorable t e r m s
u n d e r m i n e their o w n p u r p o s e a n d therefore will n o t b e favored b y t h e global difference
p r i n c i p l e . T h u s , e v e n i n a w o r l d that fully satisfies b o t h criteria a d o p t e d o n R„ institu­
t i o n s m a y n o t sufficiently mitigate t h e effects of c o n t i n g e n c i e s — m a y a l l o w e x c e s s i v e
inequalities p r e s e n t from birth or m a y fail t o e n s u r e the fairness of individual transac­
tions.
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.2.2 255

2 2 . 2 . 2 . My s e c o n d a r g u m e n t targets m o r e generally t h e priority of t h e

domestic c a s e . S u p p o s e w e finally begin (as Rawls d o e s provisionally)
with a n a t i o n a l s e s s i o n of t h e original position, yielding a criterion of
domestic j u s t i c e , a n d t h e n c o m p l e m e n t this result with p e r h a p s quite
elaborate i n t e r n a t i o n a l g r o u n d rules for preventing global injustice.
This p r o c e d u r e involves a n implausible a n d u n n e c e s s a r y a s s u m p t i o n ,
namely t h a t t h e favored m o d e l of t h e national basic s t r u c t u r e can b e
developed w i t h o u t p a y i n g a n y attention to t h e international environ­
ment in w h i c h n a t i o n a l societies exist.
This a s s u m p t i o n is i m p l a u s i b l e b e c a u s e the fact of a plurality of
nations c a n n o t b e a c c o m m o d a t e d simply by a d d i n g further rules. O n e
difficulty, w h i c h Rawls raises in regard to d o m e s t i c institutions, is that
the r u l e s g o v e r n i n g a g r e e m e n t s a n d individual transactions c a n n o t b e
too c o m p l e x , o r r e q u i r e t o o m u c h information to be correctly a p p l i e d "
(BSS 54). In t h e global c o n t e x t , it is even less reasonable to i m p o s e u p o n
the v a r i o u s i n t e r a c t i n g a g e n t s t h e responsibility to c o n d u c t t h e i r trans­
actions s o a s t o p r e c l u d e , say, t h e e m e r g e n c e of excessive d i s c r e p a n ­
cies in b a r g a i n i n g p o w e r . S u c h agents " c a n n o t c o m p r e h e n d t h e ramifi­
cations of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n s viewed collectively, n o r can they b e
e x p e c t e d t o foresee future c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t s h a p e a n d transform
p r e s e n t t e n d e n c i e s " (ibid.). T h e r e are t h u s n o practicable rules that
could reliably p r e v e n t t h a t "the invisible h a n d guides things in the
w r o n g d i r e c t i o n a n d favors a n oligopolistic configuration of a c c u m u l a ­
tions t h a t s u c c e e d s in m a i n t a i n i n g unjustified inequalities a n d restric­
tions o n fair o p p o r t u n i t y " (ibid.). H e n c e there is a n e e d for "institutions
that d e f i n e t h e social b a c k g r o u n d a n d . . . continually adjust a n d
c o m p e n s a t e for t h e inevitable t e n d e n c i e s away from background fair­
n e s s " (ibid.).
This difficulty is h e i g h t e n e d by t h e fact that if a n international in­
stitutional s c h e m e is t o e n d u r e , it m u s t e n g e n d e r in national govern­
m e n t s a n d p o p u l a t i o n s sufficient c o m p l i a n c e with a n d a basic moral
allegiance t o its g r o u n d rules. W h e t h e r it will e n g e n d e r s u c h com­
p l i a n c e a n d allegiance, however, d e p e n d s in large part on the internal
i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of national societies. Reflections o n national
i n s t i t u t i o n s s h o u l d therefore be c o n d u c t e d with a n eye to s u c h consid­
e r a t i o n s , r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e counterfactual a s s u m p t i o n of national
isolation. T h i s p r o b l e m , again, c o r r e s p o n d s to o n e Rawls discusses on
t h e n a t i o n a l level. He h o l d s that it w o u l d be pointless to address the
internal o r g a n i z a t i o n of associations or to describei various roles n
social c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e prerogatives a n d obligations a t t j c h e d t o
t h e m , before d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of background jusnce which
s t i p u l a t e s w h a t features t h e society as a whole d should P?»™™£%
BSS II). o r a n a l o g o u s r e a s o n s o n e ^ /^£^JSS^-M t
F

global b a c k g r o u n d justice from t h e start. Jf^ ^«SSZel

nation of s o c i e t i e s m u s t b e developed t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e preferred ,o
256 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.3
of a global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e w i t h w h o s e stability a n d o p t i m a l functioning
1 8
they are to h a r m o n i z e .
I n v i e w of t h e a p p a r e n t c o m p l e x i t y of t h e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d
justice, it is t h u s i m p e r a t i v e t o take a global p e r s p e c t i v e from t h e start,
to a d j u s t o u r m o r a l reflections a b o u t t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of so­
cieties a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s a n d a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n s t r a i n t s u p o n
i n d i v i d u a l c o n d u c t in light of o u r a s p i r a t i o n for a s t a b l e a n d just global
basic structure.
A look a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n
c o n f i r m s t h i s r e s u l t . As is p l a i n from o u r h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , the
stability a n d o p t i m a l f u n c t i o n i n g of a society's d o m e s t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s
are heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n its global e n v i r o n m e n t . O r in Kant's w o r d s ,
" T h e p r o b l e m of e s t a b l i s h i n g a perfect civic c o n s t i t u t i o n is d e p e n d e n t
u p o n t h e p r o b l e m of a lawful e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n a m o n g s t a t e s , a n d
c a n n o t b e solved w i t h o u t a s o l u t i o n t o t h e l a t t e r p r o b l e m " (KPW 47).
Since n a t i o n a l a n d global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s s t r o n g l y affect e a c h o t h e r ' s
stability a n d a r e closely i n t e r r e l a t e d i n t h e i r effects u p o n individual
lives, w e s h o u l d t h i n k a b o u t o u r b a s i c social i n s t i t u t i o n s in general a n d
from a global p o i n t of view, t h e r e b y a i m i n g for a n i n t e g r a t e d solution, a
just a n d stable i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e p r e s e r v i n g a d i s t r i b u t i o n of basic
rights, o p p o r t u n i t i e s , a n d i n d e x g o o d s t h a t is fair b o t h globally a n d
w i t h i n e a c h n a t i o n . S u c h a n institutional s c h e m e , if c o n s t r u c t e d along
Rawlsian lines at all, w o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h a single unified
original p o s i t i o n global in s c o p e .
2 2 . 2 . 3 . Let m e reinforce t h e p r e c e d i n g t w o a r g u m e n t s t h r o u g h a
parallel p o i n t t h a t c a n b e m a d e w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to global i n s t i t u t i o n s .
If w e follow Rawls's brief s k e t c h (in TJ §58) a n d a p p l y h i s c o n c e p t i o n of
justice for a self-contained social s y s t e m t o t h e s t a t e s of o u r closely
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w o r l d , t h e n w e r e p e a t a failing t h a t is c o m m o n t o all
historical s o c i a l - c o n t r a c t d o c t r i n e s . In a s s e s s i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c ­
t u r e of a s o c i e t y b y looking m e r e l y at h o w it affects ( d i s t r i b u t e s benefits
a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g ) its members, w e fail t o c o m e t o t e r m s w i t h h o w
o u r s o c i e t y affects t h e lives of foreigners ( a n d h o w o u r lives a r e affected
b y h o w o t h e r societies a r e o r g a n i z e d ) — w e d i s r e g a r d t h e (negative)
externalities a n a t i o n a l social c o n t r a c t m a y i m p o s e u p o n t h o s e w h o are
19
not p a r t i e s t o i t . T h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e t h e p a r t i e s w o u l d p r e f e r
for t h e i r c l i e n t s ' o w n society n e e d n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e o n e t h e y
w o u l d rationally w a n t in t h e o t h e r societies of a n i n t e r d e p e n d e n t

"^National d e m o c r a t i c control over a given territory a n d its natural a s s e t s , say, s e e m s

o b v i o u s l y desirable in itself a n d y e t m a y have distributive effects that t e n d t o subvert the
fairness of international e c o n o m i c relations. T h i s consideration is a n a l o g o u s to Rawls's
point that rules p e r m i t t i n g free transfer a n d bequest, t h o u g h u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e i n t h e m ­
selves, w o u l d t e n d to disrupt a fair distribution of opportunities a n d bargaining p o w e r
(BSS 54). B a c k g r o u n d justice m i g h t b e preserved i n the face of differential n a t i o n a l a s s e t s
t h r o u g h s o m e form of s h a r e d control over, (or an extraction tax u p o n ) n o n r e n e w a b l e
natural a s s e t s .
, 9
R a w l s is s o m e t i m e s aware of this point, a s I have s h o w n i n §21.4 (TJ 380)
 T h e Internal Argument, 22.2.4 357
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m . A n d s i n c e impartiality (/the veil of ignorance)
p r e c l u d e s u s ( / t h e parties) from making a n exception of o u r (/their
clients') o w n society, t h e criterion of d o m e s t i c justice m u s t t h e n b e
a d o p t e d from a p o i n t of view that c o m b i n e s b o t h perspectives—from
the s u i t a b l y c o n s t r a i n e d s t a n d p o i n t of p e r s o n s w h o a r e b o t h insiders
a n d o u t s i d e r s of (different) national societies. Precisely s u c h a s t a n d ­
point is afforded b y t h e global original position I have p r o p o s e d .
2 2 . 2 . 4 . F u r t h e r m o r e it w o u l d s e e m difficult in a context of tight
global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e t o m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n
national a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions t h a t Rj a n d R p r e s u p p o s e . H o w 2

does o n e d e c i d e w h e t h e r s u c h institutions as "competitive markets,

private p r o p e r t y i n t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e m o n o g a m o u s
family" (TJ 7) a r e n a t i o n a l o r international, a n d therefore a r e t o b e
g o v e r n e d b y t h e d o m e s t i c criterion a d o p t e d in t h e first or by t h e global
criterion a d o p t e d in t h e s e c o n d session of t h e original position? By
r e c o u r s e to t h e i r history, by t h e a m o u n t of international interaction
they involve, o r b y s o m e c o n c e p t u a l criterion? Or c a n w e follow Rawls,
w h o s i m p l y d e c l a r e s t h a t t h e task of t h e global parties is confined to
c h o o s i n g " t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principles to adjudicate conflicting claims
20
a m o n g s t a t e s " (TJ 378)?
But e v e n t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n o n l y highlights t h e most intractable i s s u e —
the institution of the modern state as a particular form of political a n d
e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n c e n t e r i n g a r o u n d governments that have emi­
n e n t d o m a i n i n a d e m a r c a t e d territory, control overwhelming force
w i t h i n it, a n d i n t e r p r e t a n d enforce international law beyond its bor­
21
d e r s . T h i s i n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d simply b e taken for g r a n t e d . In Rawls's
sketch, t h e m e r e e x i s t e n c e of t h e states system in its c u r r e n t form
r e d u c e s t h e a g e n d a of t h e parties' global session to dealings between
g o v e r n m e n t s a n d motivates t h e priority of d o m e s t i c over global p n n c i -
2
° P r e s u m a b l y Rawls here has conflicting claims among state 8™™™*?*
Constricting the a g e n d a for the global session in this way would c ^ a ^ m a t e t easier
to have the p a r t i e f a d o p t s o m e t h i n g like the familiar W ^ ™ ^ ^ o y

w o u l d e n s u r e in a d v a n c e that the a d o p t e d critenon could ^ P ^ ^ ' t h e oToor-

0 1

»he other, w h a t m a n y believe to b e t h e most significant in,ust>c e . o t o u r ^ ^ T ^ .

•unities for international exploitation that the world martet affords to powerful e c o
e
n o m i c a g e n t s o p e r a t i n g in impoverished Third World ™™™™^ titutes j a d e f i n i t v e
2
' T h e claim that a b s o l u t e military and territorial ™^*^^ Z£$Z, T
characteristic of states, and h e n c e must be ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ A l
c o n c e p t i o n of global justice, w o u l d go counter to Rawls s repea ,
substantive q u e s t i o n s c a n n o t b e settled ^ Z^ZZvX^o defined
Even a c c e p t i n g t h e p r o p o s e d definition, w e ^ . ^ j l t a . e s system funda-
ought t o exist. Let m e also n o t e h o w transcending the Prevaumg _^^2-63, 301,
5n

m e n t a l l y differs from abolishing the institution of the: t a m u y i e l e m e n t a r y

7411 w o u l d think that t h e latter goal, unlike t h e former f o r i n
w h
facts a b o u t p e r s o n s a n d their place nature, i™ ^ ^ differences, re)evant

Rawls's t h e o r y a n d i n t h e original position 11J &n..IIK historical develop-

e a c h s i n g l y sufficient, first, t h e nation-state is a ^ P ^ * ™ ^ , second, what is
m e n t a n d t h u s certainly u n c o n n e c t e d to a n y ^ , e r n , t i o n a l organiza-
a ) i n s t i u

« i s s u e is n o t t h e abolition of states but the reform o ^ ™ *™ . b A e n a i a a

tion a n d (especially) of the g r o u n d rules regulating intemanoi

258 T h e I n t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 22.2.6

p i e s of j u s t i c e . His e n d o r s e m e n t of this i n s t i t u t i o n c a n h a v e force,

h o w e v e r , only if it h a s b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o m o r a l e x a m i n a t i o n (like o t h e r
social i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . O t h e r w i s e Rawls w o u l d b e b e g g i n g a c r u c i a l q u e s ­
tion, p r o v i d e d w e allow, as r e a s o n a b l y w e m u s t at t h e o u t s e t , t h a t
j u s t i c e m a y fail to require t h e s t a t e s s y s t e m in its p r e s e n t form. Here
Rawls, given h i s i n d i v i d u a l i s m , c a n n o t r e s p o n d t h a t s t a t e s o r t h e tradi­
t i o n s a n d c o m m u n a l life t h e y p r o t e c t h a v e in t h e i r o w n right a claim to
exist. A n d w h i l e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a n y i s o l a t e d s t a t e m i g h t b e justified
b y r e f e r e n c e t o its least a d v a n t a g e d m e m b e r s , a system of sovereign
s t a t e s r e q u i r e s a global justification, w h i c h , w i t h i n a R a w l s i a n c o n c e p ­
tion, m u s t involve a c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t e m b o d i e s a p r i o r i t y c o n c e r n
for t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e globally least a d v a n t a g e d p e r s o n s .
2 2 . 2 . 5 . My final a r g u m e n t in favor of G is t h a t it offers a significant
e x p o s i t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e . Not o n l y c a n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e original
p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e motivational a s s u m p t i o n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g t h e
p a r t i e s a s r e p r e s e n t i n g persons w h o s e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y g o o d s
t h e y seek t o o p t i m i z e , r e m a i n t h e s a m e o n t h e global level. (Rj also h a s
this advantage.) But in a d d i t i o n w e s e c u r e t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d h a r m o n y
of o u r c o n c l u s i o n s in a d v a n c e . All i n s t i t u t i o n a l m a t t e r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e
ideal e x t e n t of n a t i o n a l sovereignty, a r e n o w systematically a d d r e s s e d
22
w i t h i n a single f r a m e w o r k . T h e r e is n o c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n institu­
tional d e s i d e r a t a i s s u i n g from t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of p a r t i e s differently
defined, n o r a r e specific institutional features p r e s u p p o s e d a d h o c
p r i o r t o t h e original p o s i t i o n . By n o t taking t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e s s y s t e m for
g r a n t e d , b y letting t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e (as it were) a m o n g criteria t h a t
a c c o m m o d a t e e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l diversity in different w a y s , w e c a n
t h e n c o n s i d e r a b l y d e e p e n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m a k e it m o r e unified
a n d e l e g a n t . T h i s gain is significant in its o w n right, e s p e c i a l l y i n v i e w of
Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , w h i c h a i m s t o s y s t e m a t i z e o u r m o r a l c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s i n t o a p r i n c i p l e d a n d surveyable w h o l e . Rawls h o l d s t h a t
w h a t m o v e s u s t o a c c e p t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice over o t h e r s is first its
c o m p r e h e n s i v e n e s s i n a c c o m m o d a t i n g o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s (the
a g g r e g a t e initial plausibility of its v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s ) a n d , s e c o n d , t h e
u n i t y a n d e l e g a n c e a c h i e v e d in their s y n t h e s i s (cf. KCMT 5 1 8 - 1 9 ) . G is a
m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t in b o t h t h e s e r e s p e c t s .
2 2 . 2 . 6 . Let m e a d d t h a t G is also i n g r e a t e r h a r m o n y ( t h a n R a n d R ) t 2

w i t h a n ideal to w h i c h Rawls s e e m s to b e q u i t e a t t r a c t e d , t h e i d e a l of a
c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d . T h u s , in h i s d i s c u s s i o n of stability, h e m a i n ­
t a i n s t h a t o u r "sense of justice is c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e love of m a n k i n d "
(TJ 476) a n d a d d s t h a t w e w o u l d ideally d e v e l o p a "devotion t o i n s t i t u -
2 a
T h i s greater u n i t y is a l s o reflected in n o n i d e a l c o n t e x t s w h e r e , for i n s t a n c e , national
b o r d e r s m a y b e controversial. What looks like t h e repression of a local d i s t u r b a n c e from
o n e p e r s p e c t i v e m a y a p p e a r to b e d e n i a l of t h e right to self-determination from a n o t h e r .
Given t h e p r o p o s e d m o d i f i c a t i o n , o n e c a n systematically tackle s u c h q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h a
specification of t h e basic political liberties, w h e r e a s conceiving justice a s w i t h i n a n d
b e t w e e n s o c i e t i e s p r e s u p p o s e s that their b o r d e r s are already b e y o n d d i s p u t e . Cf.
D'Amato, J 268.
 The External Argument, 23.1 259

tions a n d t r a d i t i o n s . . . w h i c h serve the general interests of m a n k i n d "

(TJ 489, cf. 501). In e n l a r g i n g u p o n Humboldt's ideal of a social u n i o n of
social u n i o n s , Rawls again finds himself "led to t h e n o t i o n of t h e
c o m m u n i t y of h u m a n k i n d the m e m b e r s of w h i c h enjoy o n e a n o t h e r ' s
excellences a n d individuality elicited by free institutions, a n d t h e y
recognize t h e g o o d of e a c h as a n e l e m e n t in t h e c o m p l e t e activity t h e
w h o l e s c h e m e of w h i c h is c o n s e n t e d t o a n d gives p l e a s u r e t o all" (TJ
523).

33. T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t

So far I h a v e s h o w n only t h a t Rawls's idea of a global interpretation of

the original p o s i t i o n , o n a n y of t h e t h r e e specifications I have consid­
ered, y i e l d s a c r i t e r i o n of global justice that is unlikely to vindicate t h e
traditional i n t e r n a t i o n a l - l a w regime, w h i c h Rawls also e n d o r s e s . T h e
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y c a n b e dissolved in two ways. We might say that d e s p i t e
this e n d o r s e m e n t , Rawls is really c o m m i t t e d to s u p p o r t i n g global in­
stitutional r e f o r m s t o w a r d a regime u n d e r which radical inequalities
and d e p r i v a t i o n s (especially of basic rights a n d liberties) w o u l d b e less
w i d e s p r e a d a n d severe. Alternatively, o n e might h o l d that s u c h a crite-
n o n of global j u s t i c e is so implausible that one s h o u l d rather reaffirm
Rawls's e n d o r s e m e n t of t h e law of nations a n d t h e n modify drastically,
or even w i t h d r a w h i s i d e a of globalizing the original position. I will
defend t h e f o r m e r s o l u t i o n .
In m a k i n g t h i s defense, I will not worry about the charge that a global
order satisfying Rawlsian principles w o u l d be morally unacceptable in
itself, for t h i s w o u l d b e a n objection to Rawls's entire conception a n d
not to its g l o b a l i z a t i o n . His c o n c e p t i o n centrally involves the claim that
any s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social system satisfying the two principles is morally
acceptable.
My c o n c e r n is w i t h objections asserting that in the world as it is t h e r e
are s p e c i a l factors, relevant o n the global but not the national plane,
that m a k e it i n a p p r o p r i a t e to apply Rawls's maximin criterion to the
global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e It is convenient to sort s u c h objections into four
categories, d e p e n d i n g o n whether they appeal to (A) realist or IB) moral
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , a n d o n w h e t h e r they concern (1) the ideal of a just
world o r d e r o r (2) t h e transition toward s u c h an order. This section
P r o c e e d s i n t h r e e s t e p s . I will first (§23.1) s h o w that only objections in
category (fil) c a n seriously e n d a n g e r m y main t h e s i s - n a m e l y that
given R a w l s i a n c o m m i t m e n t s , w e s h o u l d assess t h e justice,ot our
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e b y reference to the worst representahve
s h a r e it t e n d s t o g e n e r a t e . I will t h e n (§23^) discuss three less impor
' a n t o b j e c t i o n s i n this category, before (§23.3) J^^^iiX
s'der t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection, the argumentTrom ^ers'ty.
W e m i g h t still c o n c l u d e in t h e end, after the most thorough
260 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.1

analysis of i n s t i t u t i o n a l o p t i o n s w i t h t h e i r c o o r d i n a t e p a t h s of transi­
tion, t h a t t h e r e is n o feasible a n d m o r a l l y viable a v e n u e of institutional
reform t o w a r d a j u s t e r global r e g i m e . P e r h a p s o u r w o r l d , s o full of
o p p r e s s i o n , starvation, a n d w a r , p r o v i d e s t h e b e s t feasible m i n i m u m
2 3
s h a r e . O r p e r h a p s j u s t e r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s a r e o u t of r e a c h from
w h e r e w e a r e . If t h i s w e r e really t r u e , it w o u l d g o s o m e w a y t o w a r d
s h o w i n g t h a t t h e w o r l d is a s just as w e n o w c a n o r m a y m a k e it, b u t it
w o u l d not s h o w t h a t a R a w l s i a n c r i t e r i o n is i n a p p r o p r i a t e o n t h e global
p l a n e . It still " c a n serve a s a s t a n d a r d for a p p r a i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d for
g u i d i n g t h e overall d i r e c t i o n of social c h a n g e " (TJ 263), t o b e c a r r i e d "as
far a s c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t " (TJ 246). S u c h a s t a n d a r d w o u l d n o m o r e
b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t it c a n n o t b e fully satisfied t h a n a n achieve­
m e n t test w o u l d b e refuted b y t h e fact t h a t n o o n e c a n a n s w e r all the
q u e s t i o n s in t h e allotted t i m e . It is n o t a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h a b o u t justice
t h a t a just w o r l d is a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l
reforms.
It i s a l s o possible, t h o u g h n e v e r k n o w a b l e , t h a t w h a t e v e r i m p r o v e ­
m e n t s a r e feasible will never t a k e p l a c e . P e r h a p s it is n a i v e o r Utopian t o
h o p e t h a t a n y future w o r l d will b e t t e r a c c o r d w i t h a Rawlsian c o n c e p ­
tion of global justice. But this is a n i n d i c t m e n t n o t of t h a t c o n c e p t i o n
b u t of o u r s e l v e s . Realism h a r d l y r e q u i r e s t h a t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e m u s t
c o n f o r m t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e prevailing s o r d i d realities. W e d o n ' t feel
justified t o give u p o u r ideals of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e o r p e r s o n a l h o n e s t y
just b e c a u s e w e d e s p a i r of achieving t h e m fully. W e c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y
d e m a n d of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t t h e y v i n d i c a t e t h e s t a t u s q u o . All w e
m a y a s k is t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice p r o v i d e a c r i t e r i o n for a s s e s s i n g
o u r global o r d e r t h a t allows u s t o c h o o s e from a m o n g t h e feasible a n d
m o r a l l y a c c e s s i b l e a v e n u e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e a n d t h u s specifies
o u r m o r a l t a s k g r a d u a l l y t o improve t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r .
T h o u g h t h e y d e f e n d m y c e n t r a l thesis, t h e s e r e m a r k s a r e i n a n
i m p o r t a n t s e n s e a w e a k defense, leaving o p e n w h e t h e r t h e existing
global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e c a n b e criticized a s u n j u s t . W h e t h e r it c a n d e ­
p e n d s o n g e n e r a l e m p i r i c a l facts t h a t I c a n n o t e s t a b l i s h : Is t h e r e a
feasible alternative global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a t w o u l d t e n d t o g e n e r a t e
less s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s i n first-principle g o o d s ? Is t h e r e a feasible p a t h
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o w a r d s u c h a w o r l d o r d e r ? T h e R a w l s i a n crite­
r i o n of global j u s t i c e still m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to justify t h e prevailing
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r b y d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t all feasible a l t e r n a t i v e
s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d t o p r o d u c e e v e n g r e a t e r d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d in­
equalities.

^ S u c h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d b e akin to t h e "slaveholder's argument" i n Rawls (TJ

1 6 7 - 6 8 ) . Yet this justification of t h e s c h e m e w o u l d still leave o p e n w h e t h e r w e are
entitled t o t h e particular p o s i t i o n s w e o c c u p y w i t h i n t h e s c h e m e Even if t h e a i m i m e n t
justifies slavery (the institution), t h e slaves m i g h t still argue that this slaveholder is n o t
e n t i t l e d t o h i s advantaged p o s i t i o n , a p o i n t Rawls d o e s n o t take n o t i c e of l i k e w i s e e v e n if
the prevailing institutional s c h e m e w e r e a s just a s w e c a n or m a y m a k e it it c o u l d still b e
true that b e c a u s e o f past c r i m e s o r injustices, m a n y p e r s o n s a n d g r o u p s are n o w m o r e
(dis)advantaged t h a n b y right t h e y o u g h t to b e .
 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.1 261

Alternatively, o n e c a n a r g u e t h a t all feasible w a y s of working for o r

implementing i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms are blocked by m o r a l c o n s i d e r ­
ations. Yet t h i s is a h o p e l e s s claim. T h e r e surely are i m p o r t a n t m o r a l
constraints o n h o w to p r o m o t e institutional c h a n g e , centrally i n c l u d ­
ing c o n s t r a i n t s o n violence, b u t t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s still leave us, the
more a d v a n t a g e d , m a n y o p t i o n s (though t h e y limit w h a t t h e less ad­
vantaged m a y d o w h e n t h e m o r e advantaged resist institutional re­
forms t h a t j u s t i c e d e m a n d s ) .
Similarly s p u r i o u s ( t h o u g h c o n v e n i e n t a n d therefore popular) are
claims t o t h e effect t h a t t h o u g h w e may p r o m o t e institutional reform,
we also may insist o n t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of o u r advantaged position. Let
me briefly d i s c u s s t w o c l a i m s of this kind. First, it is said o n behalf of the
advantaged p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e that t h e y
formed " l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s " guiding their choice of a profession,
their d e c i s i o n s t o f o u n d a family, t o save money, a n d so forth a n d that it
is unfair t h a t t h e y s h o u l d have to c h a n g e their lives now, after having
m a d e c o n s e q u e n t i a l d e c i s i o n s o n t h e basis of sincere, albeit false,
moral beliefs. T o b e g i n with, s u c h a view is questionable in that it w o u l d
increase t h e i n c e n t i v e s t o w a r d p e r s u a d i n g others (for example, o u r
children) t h a t p r e v a i l i n g institutions are just even w h e n w e are not at
all c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y are. By inculcating s u c h legitimate expectations
in t h e m , w e i n s u r e t h e m against institutional reforms that w o u l d re­
d u c e t h e i r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n . Moreover, t h e view clashes with w h a t
is w i d e l y affirmed for morality, t h a t y o u have n o moral claim to stolen
Property b e q u e a t h e d to y o u by y o u r mother, n o m a t t e r h o w (inno­
cently) a t t a c h e d y o u m a y h a v e b e c o m e to it in t h e m e a n t i m e . Why
s h o u l d m a t t e r s b e different w h e n w h a t is b e q u e a t h e d to y o u is a n
excessively a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n in a n unjust institutional s c h e m e ?
Finally, t h e a p p e a l t o fairness c a n be raised m u c h m o r e plausibly for
the o t h e r s i d e . F o r it is h a r d l y fair that t h o s e w h o have been h a r m e d
a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t institutions should continue to suffer so
that t h o s e w h o h a v e b e e n unjustly advantaged by t h e m will not have
their e x p e c t a t i o n s d i s a p p o i n t e d . , , ...
S e c o n d , it is often said t h a t p e r s o n s have an indefeasible right
'strictly: privilege) t o s p e n d m o s t of their i n c o m e a n d wealth as they
Please, t h a t w e enjoy, as J a m e s Fishkin p u t s it, a cutoff for heroism
a n d a " r o b u s t z o n e of [moral] indifference" (LO c h a p s . 3-4). Let us> grant
(for t h e s a k e of a r g u m e n t ! ) t h a t there is s u c h a n ^erno^gpn^ege.
h a t
P e r h a p s l i m i t i n g m o r a l l y m a n d a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s to 2 P « « £ ° ( £
w e o w n . W e m a y "sacrifice" m o r e b u t c a n n o t be m o r a l l y £
-o- Again, s u c h a f u n d a m e n t a l privilege c a n ^ ^ X ^ Z ) Z
morally e n t i t l e d t o . It n e e d n o t a p p l y to w h a t
a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h c r i m e s or w i t h i n a n unjust i n s t i t u t i o n ^ scheme. S o
even if w e g r a n t t h e overriding moral privilege
a r g u m e n t l e l d s n o w h e r e if it is t r u e ^ ^ J T ^ S ^ S ^
P a n t s u n d e r prevailing institutions a n d *£^£S£ scheme
a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a t least o n e accessible alternau
362 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.2.1

u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s c o u l d e n j o y t h e i r (ex hypothesi) p r e e m i n e n t Fish-

kinian privilege, w h i l e l e s s e r r i g h t s (to b e free from v i o l e n c e a n d starva­
tion) a r e also b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d .
A parallel r e s p o n s e a p p l i e s t o t h o s e w h o i n v o k e o t h e r v a l u e s — s u c h
a s o u r c o m p a t r i o t i c fellow feeling o r o u r d e e p loyalties a n d c o m m i t ­
m e n t s , c o n s t i t u t i v e a t t a c h m e n t s a n d f r i e n d s h i p s , a n d e s s e n t i a l proj­
e c t s — t o a r g u e t h a t w e m a y resist p r o g r e s s t o w a r d global justice.
W i t h i n a j u s t w o r l d o r d e r , all p e r s o n s , a n d n o t j u s t a small minority,
c o u l d l e a d lives t h a t e m b o d y a n d a r e e n r i c h e d b y t h e s e v a l u e s . T h e r e ­
fore, t h o s e c o n c e r n e d for s u c h v a l u e s h a v e r e a s o n t o s u p p o r t global
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . Yet all t o o often w h a t s u c h critics c a r e a b o u t is
n o t t h a t s u c h v a l u e s s h o u l d thrive b u t t h a t they ( p e r h a p s w i t h t h e i r
family, friends, c o m m u n i t y , o r nation) s h o u l d e n j o y t h e m . Yes, p r o g r e s s
w o u l d entail t h a t w e w o u l d h a v e less of a c h a n c e t o p u r s u e o u r m o r e
e x p e n s i v e p r o j e c t s , b u t t h e n t h e q u e s t i o n is a g a i n w h y t h e existing
c o m m i t m e n t s of t h o s e greatly a d v a n t a g e d b y u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s
s h o u l d take p r e c e d e n c e over t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h o s e w h o , at t h e m a r g i n s
of survival, are i n l a r g e p a r t d e p r i v e d of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o form a n d
p u r s u e s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s in t h e first p l a c e .
My r e s p o n s e s t o c l a i m s of t h i s g e n e r a l k i n d a r e s o m e w h a t t a n g e n t i a l
t o m y m a i n goal. Even if t h e r e w e r e significant m o r a l o b s t a c l e s to
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s (be t h e y e n t i t l e m e n t s of t h e m o r e a d v a n t a g e d or
f u r t h e r c o n s t r a i n t s o n action), t h e y w o u l d n o t c o u n t a g a i n s t t h e Rawls­
ian criterion of global j u s t i c e . T h e y w o u l d m e r e l y s h o w t h a t it is m o r e
difficult t o m a k e p r o g r e s s t o w a r d satisfying t h i s c r i t e r i o n .
2 3 . 2 . Let m e n o w d i s c u s s t h r e e o b j e c t i o n s of c a t e g o r y (Bl), w h i c h , b y
a p p e a l t o s p e c i a l factors p r e s e n t o n t h e global p l a n e , s e e k t o d e n y t h e
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Rawls's m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n t o t h e w o r l d at large.
2 3 . 2 . 1 . C o n s i d e r t h e view t h a t w h e r e a s Rawls's c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e is
m e a n t t o a p p l y to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social s y s t e m
w h o s e p a r t s a r e closely i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n is in
fact r a t h e r insignificant. C o m i n g , as it d o e s , from t h e m o r e affluent
c i t i z e n s of t h e First W o r l d , t h i s objection is m a r r e d b y h i s t o r i c a l c o n s i d ­
e r a t i o n s . P e r h a p s our history, e c o n o m y , a n d social life h a v e n o t b e e n
affected v e r y m u c h b y e x o g e n o u s influences, b u t c o n s i d e r t h e i n v e r s e
v i e w p o i n t . T h e N o r t h Atlantic s t a t e s have, r a t h e r brutally, i m p o s e d a
single global s y s t e m of military a n d e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n , d e s t r o y i n g
in t h e p r o c e s s t h e social s y s t e m s i n d i g e n o u s t o four c o n t i n e n t s . O u r
political a n d e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s , even t h o s e i n t e r n a l t o t h e devel­
o p e d W e s t , c o n t i n u e t o exert a n o v e r w h e l m i n g influence o n n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d social p o s i t i o n s i n T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s .
My p o i n t h e r e is n o t t h a t w e m u s t m a k e g o o d for colonial p l u n d e r ,
slavery, a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n . N o r a m I a r g u i n g t h a t t h e s e historical e v e n t s
c o n t r i b u t e d t o o u r a d v a n t a g e d p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t o d a y ' s radically u n ­
e q u a l g l o b a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social p o s i t i o n s a n d t h a t w e a r e t h e r e f o r e
beneficiaries of p a s t c r i m e s a n d i n j u s t i c e s ( t h o u g h it s e e m s difficult t o
 T h e External Argument, 23.2.2 263

deny that w e a r e ) . It is e n o u g h t h a t t h e lives of t h e vast majority of

human b e i n g s a r e p r o f o u n d l y s h a p e d a n d affected b y events rever­
berating t h r o u g h a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c h e m e of trade a n d d i p l o m a c y i n
24
which w e a r e h i g h l y a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s .
But c o u l d w e n o t g o b a c k t o a w o r l d of closed, self-contained s o ­
cieties in w h i c h , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y c o n c e d e d , a Rawlsian criterion of
global j u s t i c e w o u l d b e o u t of place, since t h e r e w o u l d be n o global
basic s t r u c t u r e for t h e m t o a p p l y to? Or couldn't w e move t o w a r d a
world of m i n i m a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l interaction in w h i c h straightforward
25
rules of r a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n m i g h t be a p p r o p r i a t e ? 1 a m n o t d e n y i n g
such possibilities, b u t t h e y a r e a c a d e m i c . T h e world is not, a n d h a r d l y
will b e again, o n e i n w h i c h a criterion of global justice is u n n e c e s s a r y o r
undemanding.
23.2.2. Still, s u c h a c a d e m i c speculations are relevant for a s e c o n d
objection t o g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls, w h i c h asserts that a criterion of justice
is to b e r e j e c t e d if t h e s c h e m e it favors would not be mutually benefi­
cial. T h e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s states, t h e objection continues, would d o
better w i t h o u t a n y i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation t h a n within a global in­
stitutional s c h e m e satisfying a Rawlsian criterion. This objection is
raised b y Brian B a r r y against Beitz: "I d o not think that [a global differ­
ence p r i n c i p l e ) c a n p l a u s i b l y b e said to b e advantageous to rich as well
as p o o r c o u n t r i e s ' ' (HJGP 232, cf. 233-34).
Barry's o b j e c t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d in two ways. He c a n be taken to
assert t h a t t h e transition to a j u s t global s c h e m e m u s t benefit even
those n o w u n j u s t l y a d v a n t a g e d . Barry would then be insisting that
existing a d v a n t a g e s i n capital, technology, education, a n d t h e like,
need n o t b e r e l i n q u i s h e d voluntarily. This is the construal to which
David R i c h a r d s r e s p o n d s : " W h e n . . . J o h n Stuart Mill . . . cnticizfed)
'"-justices to w o m e n , h e c o n c e d e d that m e n , as a class, would suffer
some l o s s e s w h e n t h e y s u r r e n d e r e d their unjust domination, just as
slaveowners d i d w h e n slavery w a s e n d e d ; Mill's argument is quite d e a r
* a t t h e g a i n is n o t o n e of a c t u a l reciprocal » ^ ' " ^
*hey lose), b u t t h e g a i n in justice w h e n m e n regulate their conduct by
Principles t h e y w o u l d r e a s o n a b l y accept if they were w o m e n o n t h e
" t ^ ^ ^ o as claiming that t h e n e w institu-
• FI « intprpsl rates or speculative
" E v e n a p p a r e n t l y d o m e s t i c events, s u c h as changes i n . " ™ , have a
s t a t e s t h a

*» c o m m o d i t y futures, c a n have a tremendous'™P*" Jcash , require

c r o p s o r

M e a n t foreign d e b t , rely o n the export ° ex ^ ed. ^ W M W r n governments and their

f m m

tood i m p o r t s . Or c o n s i d e r t h e direct influence ^ t^^ediafe impact of arms sales

r
organs ( s u c h a s t h e International Monetary Fund) ° the m m e c u ^ ^ w h o l e g Q o d

^ d foreign i n v e s t m e n t s . At i s s u e here is not v v h e m e r m e s e e ^ ^ , m a k e n e

or bad. W h a t m a t t e r s i s h o w profound W™J£<^cMI w a r

< or government
* f t r e n c e b e t w e e n life a n d death, e.g„ through starvanon,
repression. ri „„ (trading apples and pears). A
^ S e e Beitz, PTIR 165, for t h e idea of minimal ^ ^ ^ J ^ r ^ i e l s o n , VP.
theory o f global j u s t i c e a s rational cooperation is suggestea
"See a l s o m y last n o t e to Chap. 2.
264 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.2.2

tional s c h e m e , once in place, m u s t b e a m u t u a l l y beneficial o n e . He

c o u l d t h e n r e p l y to R i c h a r d s that, w h e r e a s m e n d o b e t t e r w i t h sex
equality t h a n if t h e y d i d n o t i n t e r a c t w i t h w o m e n at all, t h e United
States, say, w o u l d d o w o r s e i n a Rawlsian w o r l d o r d e r t h a n in s p l e n d i d
27
isolation.
T h i s objection m a y rest o n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m a x i m i n
criterion. T h e t e r m s of social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e r e q u i r e d t o o p t i m i z e
(interschemically) t h e w o r s t social p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e y will d o s o o n l y if
t h e y e n g e n d e r a g o o d d e a l of c o o p e r a t i o n . C o o p e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r —
b e t w e e n p e r s o n s o r c o l l e c t i v i t i e s — c a n n o t b e c o e r c e d ; it m u s t b e elic­
ited. P a r t i c i p a n t s will b e p r e p a r e d t o c o n d u c t i n t e r p e r s o n a l / i n t e r c o l -
lective t r a n s a c t i o n s only insofar a s t h e s e benefit t h e m u n d e r t h e p r e ­
vailing t e r m s . Here t h e e q u a l i z i n g t e n d e n c y of t h e m a x i m i n c r i t e r i o n is
c h e c k e d . T h o u g h a n egalitarian s c h e m e e n s u r e s for t h e least a d v a n ­
t a g e d (the p o p u l a t i o n s of less d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s ) a large relative
s h a r e of t h e benefits of social c o o p e r a t i o n , it m a k e s s u c h c o o p e r a t i o n
less attractive t o o t h e r s a n d t h u s less extensive. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , it m a y
2 8
b e less j u s t t h a n a m o r e inegalitarian s c h e m e . In a n y c a s e , a global
o r d e r t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights is o n e u n d e r w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d
collectivities a r e free t o s h u n e c o n o m i c t r a n s a c t i o n s of specific k i n d s .
T h e p o p u l a t i o n s of m o r e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s a n d r e g i o n s , i n p a r t i c u ­
lar, w o u l d b e free t o t r a d e only d o m e s t i c a l l y a n d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d
h e n c e c a n b e p r e s u m e d to benefit from w h a t e v e r f u r t h e r t r a n s a c t i o n s
t h e y w o u l d c o n d u c t . In this s e n s e o n e c a n say, b a r r i n g externalities,
t h a t a n a t i o n a l o r global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e satisfying t h e Rawlsian crite­
r i o n is, by t h e very construction of this criterion, m u t u a l l y beneficial for
i n d i v i d u a l s a n d collectivities a s against a b e n c h m a r k of n o n c o o p e r a -
t i o n ( t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y n o p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d benefit a s m u c h a n d as
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y from t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s a s w e
in t h e d e v e l o p e d West d o at p r e s e n t ) .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , Barry's objection m a y b e r e n e w e d o n e last t i m e . A
global difference p r i n c i p l e m a y justify n o t m e r e l y a g e n e r a l a d j u s t m e n t
of m a r k e t p r i c e s b u t a different specification of p r o p e r t y rights over
n a t u r a l assets—involving, for e x a m p l e , a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t a x o n (or inter­
n a t i o n a l o w n e r s h i p a n d c o n t r o l of) n a t u r a l a s s e t s . It is t h e n q u i t e
p o s s i b l e t h a t a n a s s e t - r i c h society or g r o u p of s o c i e t i e s w o u l d d o w o r s e
u n d e r a just global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e t h a n i n perfect isolation, n a m e l y ,
w h e n t h e benefits of c o o p e r a t i n g are o u t w e i g h e d b y t h e c o s t s of s h a r ­
ing natural assets.
But is t h i s a p r o b l e m ? S h o u l d o n e , in c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l
isolation s c e n a r i o s t h a t are t o serve as b e n c h m a r k s , t a k e as given t h e

"Barry's objection, s o c o n s t r u e d , arises n o t o n l y in t h e global c o n t e x t It c a n e q u a l l y b e

raised w i t h i n a state, o n behalf of a w e a l t h y province, for e x a m p l e , or b y a g r o u p of s u c h
p r o v i n c e s s e e k i n g to e x c l u d e a p o o r o n e . Quite apart from the i s s u e of globalization, then,
it is crucial for Rawls's theory that this objection b e m e t , as I h o p e t o d o in t h e text.
*»Cf. Rawls's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "perfectly just" a n d "just t h r o u g h o u t " (TJ 7 8 - 7 9 ) .
 T h e External Argument, 23.2.3 265

natural a s s e t s of t h e v a r i o u s societies (territories w i t h their m i n e r a l

resources, fertility, c l i m a t e , etc.)? Doing s o involves t w o p r e s u p p o s i ­
tions, b o t h of w h i c h s e e m q u e s t i o n a b l e a n d difficult t o defend. First,
one w o u l d b e p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e institution of s t a t e s s h o u l d b e
understood a s i n c l u d i n g full national o w n e r s h i p of all n a t u r a l assets
within t h e n a t i o n a l territory, regardless of t h e distributional effects of
this u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e r e little is gained by simply declaring in t h e style
of Nozick t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e of national sovereignty "is f u n d a m e n t a l . "
Arguing for t h e p r i n c i p l e w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y involve t h e claim t h a t it is
morally i m p e r a t i v e t h a t s t a t e s o r national c o m m u n i t i e s , p e r h a p s c o n ­
ceived a s u l t i m a t e u n i t s of moral c o n c e r n , s h o u l d fully o w n s o m e
territory. It w o u l d n o t b e e n o u g h t o s h o w that they s h o u l d fully control
some n a t i o n a l territory, b e c a u s e s u c h control w o u l d b e compatible
with, for e x a m p l e , a n international tax o n t h e extraction of national
mineral r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h w h i c h at least t h e distributional effects of
the morally a r b i t r a r y g e o g r a p h i c a l distribution of natural assets c o u l d
h
e mitigated. S i n c e t h e p r e m i s e that t h e r e ought to b e full national
control of n a t u r a l a s s e t s d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e desired conclusion, t h e
complaint d o e s t h e n involve t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n that nations have a
moral claim fully t o own t h e natural assets within their territory. It
seems d o u b t f u l t h a t t h i s full-ownership claim h a s sufficient plausibility
to furnish (part of) a n i n d e p e n d e n t constraint against w h i c h a criterion
°f global j u s t i c e c a n b e c h e c k e d .
The s e c o n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n is that the currently existing distribution
of n a t u r a l a s s e t s a m o n g states is morally acceptable. I find this i m ­
plausible i n light of h o w s u c h assets w e r e in fact acquired m a history
involving g e n o c i d e , colonialism, slavery, unjust wars, andI t h e hke.
These h L o r i c a l facts c a n n o t b e corrected for. We cannot
natural ( a n d social) assets w e w o u l d n o w ^ * t * * ™ ^ ^
and injustices of t h e p a s t h a d never occurred. Who would w e e v e n
be, i n s u c h a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l world? This ^ f ^ ^ Z t l
different specification of Barry's benchmark,yielding:a ^ ™ ™ J
Rawlsian m a x i m i n criterion m e e t s easily. °
societies, m u s t b e m o r e p r o s p e r o u s c o o p e r a t m g ^ £ g £ « £ t t h
e e c t
basic s t r u c t u r e t h a n it/they w o u l d be if e x i s h n g m P ^ J° , . a

a s h a r e of t h e w o r l d ' s n a t u r a l assets proportionate to its/tne p P

T I
' 0 N 2 9
. H th^t o u r global social system, in
c
t n a t i
3 3 . 2 . 3 . A t h i r d objection c o n t e n d s j 'f ^ short of being
f l s s o f a r
c o n t r a s t t o s o m e d e v e l o p e d Western ocienes,iaiis
S ^
w e l l - o r d e r e d i n Rawls's s e n s e that w e cannot apply

1
"So understood, the constraint, rather ^ ^ X ^ ^ O ^ ' ^ ^
Rawlsian criterion of global justice, ^^^^^.Weyyoutdcan^^^
societies, those falling f i r below the " f * * * ^ ? ^ insofar as some soc.eues or
Bavvlsian grounds, that the existing ^ovder » un^^ ^ sted in t h e v exa

groups of societies would be more P I ^ P ^ . ' r a l assets,

r i d a r u

isolation with a proportionate share ot tne won

266 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.2.3
30
c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e a s w e m i g h t a p p l y to t h e l a t t e r . Rawls, however,
3 1
w a n t s h i s c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t o b e m o r e w i d e l y a p p l i c a b l e His
n o t i o n of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society is n o r m a t i v e , n o t d e s c r i p t i v e : "It em­
b o d i e s . . . c e r t a i n g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of a n y s o c i e t y t h a t it s e e m s one
w o u l d , o n d u e reflection, w i s h t o live in a n d w a n t to s h a p e o u r interests
a n d c h a r a c t e r " (RAM 634). T h u s , w h e n t h e p a r t i e s a r e s a i d to c h o o s e a
criterion of j u s t i c e for a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, t h i s c a n n o t m e a n t h a t
t h e i r c r i t e r i o n is a p p l i c a b l e only to w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t i e s , t h a t a dif­
ferent c r i t e r i o n s h o u l d b e u s e d for a s s e s s i n g s o c i e t i e s t h a t a r e n o t well-
o r d e r e d . (If it m e a n t this, t h e n Rawls's p r i n c i p l e s w o u l d b e entirely
irrelevant b e c a u s e m o s t of h i s twelve c o n d i t i o n s for w e l l - o r d e r e d n e s s
[RAM 634-36] a r e n o t satisfied b y a n y e x i s t i n g n a t i o n a l s o c i e t y either.)
Rather, it m e a n s t h a t t h e c h o s e n c r i t e r i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t h a r m o n i z e
w i t h a c l u s t e r of o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s t h a t R a w l s c o l l e c t s t o g e t h e r
i n t o t h e " m o d e l c o n c e p t i o n " of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. It m u s t be
satisfiable u n d e r t h e ideal c o n d i t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m .
B e y o n d this, h o w e v e r , it m u s t also g u i d e u s t o w a r d s u c h i d e a l c o n d i ­
t i o n s , m u s t " p r o v i d e a n A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t for a p p r a i s i n g existing
i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . a n i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d a r d for g u i d i n g t h e c o u r s e of
social c h a n g e " (TJ 520). Precisely t h i s f u n c t i o n of Rawls's criterion
w o u l d b e j e o p a r d i z e d if t h e A r c h i m e d e a n p o i n t itself shifted in re­
s p o n s e t o c h a n g i n g c o n d i t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , o u r c h a n g i n g d i s t a n c e
from a w e l l - o r d e r e d social s y s t e m .
T h i s p o i n t is clear o n t h e n a t i o n a l level. W h e n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de­
m o c r a c y l a p s e s into t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m or a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m (as G e r m a n y
d i d i n t h e 1930s o r Chile in t h e 1970s), w e a r e h a r d l y l e d t o t h i n k t h a t
n o w a different criterion of j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e u s e d t o a p p r a i s e t h e n e w
r e g i m e a n d t o g u i d e o u r efforts to effect c h a n g e . Similarly, I w o u l d
think, w e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of o u r criterion of global j u s t i c e , o u r r a n k i n g
of alternative global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s , a s c h a n g i n g i n r e s p o n s e to
varying i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s . Of c o u r s e , m a n y i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e c h a ­
n i s m s c r u c i a l for a n y t h i n g like a w e l l - o r d e r e d w o r l d c o m m u n i t y are
p r e s e n t l y lacking, b u t h o w d o e s this l a c k u n d e r m i n e t h e belief t h a t in a

3 0
I o w e t h i s objection, forcefully stated, t o Robert F u l l i n w i d e r of t h e University of
Maryland Center for P h i l o s o p h y a n d Public Policy.
"Originally Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n w a s t o have b e e n applicable to all s e l f - c o n t a i n e d social
s y s t e m s e x i s t i n g i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of justice (TJ §22). Rawls h a s s i n c e b e e n n a r r o w i n g
the s c o p e h e c l a i m s for h i s c o n c e p t i o n . He n o w says that "justice a s fairness is f r a m e d to
a p p l y t o w h a t I have called t h e basic structure' of a m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y .
W h e t h e r justice a s fairness c a n b e e x t e n d e d to a general political c o n c e p t i o n for different
k i n d s of s o c i e t i e s . [or] to a general moral c o n c e p t i o n . . . are a l t o g e t h e r separate
q u e s t i o n s . I avoid p r e j u d g i n g t h e s e larger q u e s t i o n s o n e w a y or t h e other" (JFPM 2 2 4 - 2 5 ) .
He d o e s n o t m e a n , I a m afraid, that the ideal of a just b a s i c structure h e s e e k s t o specify is
to e n v i s i o n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . Rather, h e s e e m s to b e d e l i m i t i n g w h a t i s n o w the
s c o p e of h i s theoretical c o n c e r n . His c o n c e p t i o n is to apply to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c ­
racies; it m a y o r m a y n o t be relevant to social s y s t e m s t h a t are s t r u c t u r e d differently. It is
t h e r e b y left o p e n w h e t h e r it is still applicable e v e n to Great Britain, w h i c h d o e s n o t h a v e a
constitution.
 T h e External A r g u m e n t , 23.3 267

just w o r l d s u c h m e c h a n i s m s w o u l d exist a n d t h a t t h e y o u g h t to be
established? T h e c r e a t i o n of political a n d legal institutions o n b o t h t h e
national a n d g l o b a l levels w o u l d s e e m p a r a d i g m a t i c i n s t a n c e s of o u r
natural d u t y "to a s s i s t in t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of just a r r a n g e m e n t s w h e n
they d o n o t e x i s t " (TJ 334, cf. 115).
2 3 . 3 . T h e final o b j e c t i o n I will c o n s i d e r is that t h e ideal of a global
regime t h a t is j u s t b y Rawlsian lights m a y c o h e r e well with our cultural
heritage a n d our c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s b u t is nevertheless i n a p p r o p r i ­
ate o n a c c o u n t of existing i n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity of traditions a n d m o r a l
j u d g m e n t s . W e m u s t n o t i m p o s e o u r values u p o n t h e rest of t h e world,
m u s t n o t p u r s u e a p r o g r a m of institutional reform that envisions t h e
gradual s u p p l a n t i n g of all o t h e r c u l t u r e s by a globalized version of o u r
32
own c u l t u r e a n d v a l u e s .
This is, I t h i n k , t h e m o s t s e r i o u s objection to globalizing Rawls a n d
33
the o n e t h a t s e e m s to have influenced Rawls himself. C o n s i d e r this
passage:

We take our examination of the Kantian conception of justice as addressed

to an impasse in our recent political history; the course of democratic
thought over the past two centuries, say, shows that there is no agreement
on the way basic social institutions should be arranged if they are to
conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons.. [W]e
are not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all societies
regardless of their particular social or historical circumstances. We want to
settle a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic institutions
within a democratic society under modem conditions How far the
conclusions w e reach are "of interest in a wider context i s a separate
question. [KCMT 5 1 7 - 1 8 ]

It is w o r t h n o t i n g , t o begin with, that in t h e r a t h e r agnostic final

s e n t e n c e Rawls is careful n o t to prejudge the question of an eventual
global e x t e n s i o n (as h e says explicitly at JFPM 225). Moreover by a p ­
p e a l i n g t o s u c h l a n d m a r k s of "our" political culture as t h e D e d a r a t m n
of I n d e p e n d e n c e , I m m a n u e l Kant, a n d t h e French Revolution, Rawls

- T h e p l e a n o t t o ride r o u g h s h o d over the values ^ ^ ^ S S A ^

w e i g h , . But i, c a n b e a m u s i n g to observe ^ J ^ ^ t e arena
7
e m p h a t i c p r o t e s t a t i o n s against pursuing our .deals o - V ^ £ L d v a n t a g e d ones at that,
c o m e from m e m b e r s of o u r o w n culture, and from «™ without protection from
There is n o c o m p a r a b l e outcry from that global m a j a r f l j l v m g vvi. j-^ ^ ^
h
h u n g e r a n d o p p r e s s i o n . Asserting that tyranny and « ^ « » ^ ewell be
T h e r e m a v
e s
a c c e p t e d parts of its culture is often convenient b u t ' * ° v , e e m e n t than is
d i s a g r

m u c h l e s s g e n u i n e l y Intercultural (and thus m o r a U y . ^ ^ t u ^ e n « y from a

often taken for g r a n t e d . See Bergen ATHR tor s o m e iu
sociologist. . c .u„ f global justice a n d n o
D

3 3
T h e later Rawls, that is, w h o is withdrawingfron>*e top.c^ j j j ^ ^ T h e

longer a s s e r t s that h i s c o n c e p t i o n of justice is appropi m s to have

U c a b ] e t o s e e

s p a t i o t e m p o r a l d o m a i n that h e claims his conception i ^he United States in the

w a
u n d e r g o n e substantial shrinkage t ° r d J h e centrat ma for foUowirig m y
t a n
1960s a n d '70s. T h o s e u n e a s y with thus » ? £ £ ™ £ accommodates it.
b u t

interpretation. G d o e s n o t s i d e s t e p cultural divergence out

268 T h e Externa] A r g u m e n t , 23.3

i m p l i e s that h e takes this c u l t u r e to e x t e n d well b e y o n d o u r national

3 4
borders.
M o r e i m p o r t a n t , Rawls's h e s i t a t i o n s affect o n l y o n e a s p e c t of the
global e x t e n s i o n . T h e y i n d i c a t e s o m e d o u b t as to w h e t h e r h e should
take a s t a n d o n h o w societies c u l t u r a l l y different from o u r o w n should
b e o r g a n i z e d a n d o n h o w t o a s s e s s t h e j u s t i c e of t h e i r d o m e s t i c institu­
t i o n s . C o n c e r n i n g this q u e s t i o n , t h e r e m a y s e e m to b e a m o r a l l y attrac­
tive alternative, namely, t o leave t h i s u p t o t h e m e m b e r s of t h a t society.
No s u c h alternative is available, h o w e v e r , w i t h r e g a r d to t h e d e e p e r
q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e global b a s i c s t r u c t u r e s h o u l d b e a s s e s s e d a n d
reformed. This q u e s t i o n w e c a n n o t e v a d e s h o r t of r e n o u n c i n g interna­
tional i n t e r a c t i o n altogether. Nor c a n w e a d e q u a t e l y r e s p o n d to it
e x c e p t t h r o u g h a c o n c e p t i o n of b a c k g r o u n d j u s t i c e . T h e r e is n o recog­
n i z e d natural criterion of justice. Nor c a n t h e r e b e a neutral criterion
equally c o n g e n i a l to all v a l u e s a n d c u l t u r e s — m i n i m a l l y b e c a u s e t h e r e
is o u t r i g h t d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t f o r m s of n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a
just global o r d e r s h o u l d allow. S o m e will a d v o c a t e t o l e r a n c e for as
m a n y diverse forms of n a t i o n a l r e g i m e as c a n coexist, w h i l e o t h e r s will
insist o n t h e global proliferation of s o m e n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d form of
35
regime.
But if t h e s e t w o a p p r o a c h e s fail a n d if global i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e p o s e s
a g e n u i n e p r o b l e m of b a c k g r o u n d justice, t h e n h o w c a n Rawls even
h e s i t a t e t o globalize t h e t w o p r i n c i p l e s — h i s c r i t e r i o n for assessing
b a s i c i n s t i t u t i o n s ? H o w c a n h e d e c l i n e t o take a s t a n d , a Rawlsian stand,
o n a global o r d e r in w h i c h t h e social p o s i t i o n of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d is
u n i m a g i n a b l y w o r s e t h a n t h a t of t h e least a d v a n t a g e d i n t h e d e v e l o p e d
West, in w h o s e behalf Rawls h a s criticized t h e d o m e s t i c b a s i c s t r u c ­
t u r e s of a d v a n c e d W e s t e r n societies?
T h e a n s w e r h a s to d o , I believe, w i t h Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i v i s t m o d e of
justification. Reflective e q u i l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d a m o n g , a n d relies u p o n ,
o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , at least s o m e of w h i c h a r e m o r a l o n e s :
"There is a n a p p e a l t o intuition at t h e b a s i s of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e ' ' (TJ
124-25). Rawls d o e s n o t s p e a k of i n t u i t i o n s in t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s e n s e ,
h o w e v e r , as a priori a n d s h a r e d b y all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . He r e c o g n i z e s
t h a t o u r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s evolves h i s t o r i c a l l y a n d o n t o g e n e t i c a l l y
a n d t h a t its fixed p o i n t s , t h o u g h w e h a v e n o t h i n g e l s e t o g o on, lack a n y

M
S e e also his references to "the c o u r s e of d e m o c r a t i c t h o u g h t over the past two
centuries, say" (KCMT 517), to "a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y u n d e r m o d e m c o n d i t i o n s " (KCMT
518, 537), a n d to "a m o d e m constitutional d e m o c r a c y " UFPM 224).
" A n o t h e r flaw in the ideal of neutrality is that alternative global basic s t r u c t u r e s differ
in t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e y w o u l d s u p p o r t a n y particular form of national organization.
T h i s is a n a l o g o u s to a point Rawls m a k e s w h e n h e s a y s that the c h o i c e of a d o m e s t i c basic
structure will differentially affect t h e c h a n c e s of alternative religions a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of
the g o o d t o gain a d h e r e n t s (FG 549). T h e idea of institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s u n d e r w h i c h
all v a l u e s f l o u n s h equally is d e e p l y i n c o h e r e n t .Any institutional s c h e m e c a n b e o p p o s e d
o n t h e (accurate) g r o u n d that it is comparatively i n h o s p i t a b l e t o s o m e particular v a l u e or
form of life.
 T h e Externa] Argument, 23.3 269

ultimate foundation—rational or empirical (cf. JFPM 235). Rawls's ex­

plicit s t r a t e g y is therefore to convince others of t h e criterion h e p r o ­
p o s e s b y b r i n g i n g t h e i r o w n considered j u d g m e n t s to b e a r u p o n t h e
issue of social i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e idea of globalizing Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n
of j u s t i c e is t h e n c h a l l e n g e d by the great international diversity of
c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s , w h i c h rules out any "appeal to intuition" in t h e
36
global s e t t i n g .
But I d o n ' t t h i n k this p r o b l e m defeats t h e idea of globalization, at
least w h e n t h e " s e a r c h for reasonable g r o u n d s for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t
. . . r e p l a c e s t h e s e a r c h for moral truth," a n d "the practical social task is
p r i m a r y " (KCMT 519). To attain this practical goal o n t h e global p l a n e ,
an a g r e e m e n t n e e d n o t specify a particular derivation of o r rationale for
t h e c r i t e r i o n of justice, "there can, in fact, b e considerable differences
in c i t i z e n s ' c o n c e p t i o n s of justice provided that t h e s e c o n c e p t i o n s lead
to s i m i l a r political j u d g m e n t s . And this is possible, since different
p r e m i s e s c a n yield t h e same conclusion. In this case t h e r e exists w h a t
w e m a y refer t o as overlapping rather t h a n strict c o n s e n s u s (TJ 387-
88- cf JFPM 246-51- IOC). What counts, then, regardless of t h e consid­
e r e d j u d g m e n t s a n d other reasons mat m a y motivate a p a r t i c u l a r
p e r s o n , is c o n v e r g e n c e u p o n the criterion itself T h e p r e s e n t objection
to t h e globalization of Rawls's criterion m u s t t h e n s h o w m o r e t h a n
c u l t u r a l diversity; it m u s t at least show that a g r e e m e n t o n s u c h a
c r i t e r i o n of global justice is out of r e a c h ^
I s a y "at l e a s t " because, v * ^ e n d o r e e d j f f e r e n t M o f

overlapping consensus. i f a j u s t e r w o r d o r d e r m a v s m

justice a n d a different long-term v> ^ ^ , fe & t h e o r e t i c a

agree a b o u t t h e first stretch oi in , politically s u p - reforms

possibility. M a n y proposals ro , d hv Rawlsian prin-b v f a v o r e

p o r t e d b y T h i r d World nations an « ^ ^ . g w e m m e n t s o f t h e d e

ciples, h a v e b e e n blockea m diversity is exploited to

v e l o p e d West. Here the taci ^ ^ j i t i v e self-interest l e u p h e -
c o e c

c o m p l e m e n t t h e tedious a p p moral justification for s u c h

a

mistically, t h e "national intere ^ i d aU,

e r g e s t o resist u w o u o w U

resistance. Such a j u s t i n c a t i o ^ ^ s w e ourselves u n d e r s t a n d

u s u c e a

i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms d e m a n - recognize as unjust advantages w e

&

it a n d t o exploit what we ou o n a J the g r o u n d s that o t h e r

o r d e n o n

e n j o y w i t h i n t h e current int h i s is a n a l o g o u s
c o n v i c t i o n s ( T

c u l t u r e s d o n o t (nifty) share ^ , . c h r i s t i a n s w e m a v c o l o

to t h e familiar if outdated beiiei

3 6
T h o u e h culturaloMversih/mmor
nral concepoon*
,ceptions is
^
•»>-'=•""•".' n-*—,
certainly great,
„
cumciy clear
il isn'l• entirety iiear
,
t o o m u c h a e n t i o n | 0 g o v e m m e n

h o w g r e a f i t is. Here om! s h o u l d ^ ^ ^ e o n s d . u t i o n s or international d o c u m e n t s

s
behavior. In adopting h ^ : ° ^ £ i g n audience, and s u c h d o c u m e n t s may then n o
r e

g o v e r n m e n t s may be catering ' ^ „ ° ^ p o l i t i c a l pnsonere. o n the other hand, govern

f^.^!"„i^ilconsensus.lntorWnngK-^ m e m o p a ) c o m m i ( m e n ( s o f
showinterculturalconsens^m^ — i n g , the moral c o m m i t m e n t s of their
e x p r e s s

m e n t s m a y well be violating, ™™
culture.
270 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.3

n i z e a n d enslave o u r n e i g h b o r s so long a s t h e y a r e n o t C h r i s t i a n s
themselves.) If w e m a y not, t h e n w e n e e d a c o n c e p t i o n of global justice
at least for t h e critical a s s e s s m e n t a n d g u i d a n c e of o u r o w n govern­
m e n t ' s policies, w h i c h m a y c o n s t i t u t e very significant o b s t a c l e s to
global i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform t o d a y — o b s t a c l e s , m o r e o v e r , for w h i c h w e
would be most immediately responsible.
H o w e v e r n a r r o w a m o r a l o v e r l a p w e m a y a i m for, I a d m i t w e w o n ' t
get it. T h e r e are b o u n d to b e p e r s o n s w h o d i s a g r e e w i t h u s , in g o o d
faith, e v e n a b o u t t h e very first s t e p s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m . T o t h e m , t h e
Rawlsian f r a m e w o r k p o s e s a c h a l l e n g e t o w o r k o u t t h e i r o w n c o n c e p ­
t i o n of justice or at least to e x p o u n d t h e g r o u n d s of t h e i r d i s a g r e e m e n t .
P e r h a p s s o m e of t h e i r criticisms c a n b e u n d e r c u t internally, or Rawls s
m a i n c o n c l u s i o n s c a n b e p r e s e r v e d b y justifying a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e m
in t h e objectors' t e r m s t o t h e i r satisfaction. M a y b e t h e Rawlsian con­
c e p t i o n will h a v e t o b e revised in light of t h e i r c r i t i q u e . S u c h t h i n g s
c a n n o t b e k n o w n in a d v a n c e . Only t h e e n s u i n g d i s c u s s i o n c a n s h o w
w h e r e c o n v e r g e n c e is a t t a i n a b l e a n d w h e r e a g r e e m e n t o n p a r t i c u l a r
reforms c a n i n d e e d n o t b e achieved.
Even if d i s a g r e e m e n t p e r s i s t s , w e m a y still c o n c l u d e t h a t a c o m p e t ­
ing p o s i t i o n is w r o n g , a n d w e m a y t h e n w o r k for a j u s t e r w o r l d w i t h o u t
or e v e n a g a i n s t o u r o p p o n e n t s , insofar a s d o i n g s o is m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i ­
ble b y o u r lights. T h i s is w h a t h a p p e n e d in t h e A m e r i c a n Revolution, in
t h e Civil War, a n d in t h e N e w Deal. Social i n s t i t u t i o n s derive n o special
m o r a l s a n c t i t y from t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e y n o w exist. If w e a r e c o n ­
v i n c e d o n reflection t h a t t h e y are u n j u s t , t h e n w e o u g h t t o w o r k t o w a r d
feasible i m p r o v e m e n t s , even if s o m e g e n u i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s
c a n n o t n o w b e resolved. T h e fact of d i s a g r e e m e n t is n o r e a s o n n o t to
act in light of w h a t e v e r (factual and) m o r a l beliefs w e n o w t h i n k a r e best
s u p p o r t e d . O u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s s u p p o r t a c o n c e p t i o n of justice
3 7
w h o s e s c o p e is universal, even t h o u g h its p r e s e n t a p p e a l is n o t . A n d
w e a r e s u r e l y n o t morally r e q u i r e d t o a c q u i e s c e i n a n y c o n d u c t or
p r a c t i c e b a c k e d b y t h e (sincerely held) c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s of o t h e r s .
As Rawls says, "A t h e o r y of justice m u s t w o r k out from its o w n p o i n t of
view h o w to t r e a t t h o s e w h o d i s s e n t from it" (TJ 370). W h y s h o u l d
liberals s h u n t h e political struggle over i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s ,
leaving t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o t h e n o n l i b e r a l d i s p u t a n t s ?
T h e c e n t r a l p o i n t of t h e last t w o p a r a g r a p h s is t h a t t h e difficulty is
n o t u n i q u e t o t h e global p l a n e . I n t e r c u l t u r a l diversity is o n l y a s p e c i a l
c a s e of diversity of c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s in g e n e r a l . T h u s , p r e d i c t a b l y ,
critics of Rawls h a v e rejected h i s ideal of a w e l l - o r d e r e d s o c i e t y by
refusing a l l e g i a n c e t o t h e "requisite u n d e r s t a n d i n g of f r e e d o m a n d
e q u a l i t y " (KCMT 517) t h a t h e c l a i m s is implicit i n o u r p u b l i c c u l t u r e .
Rawls w a s n o t d e t e r r e d b y t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t o t h e r t h i n k e r s in t h e W e s t
w o u l d , in light of t h e i r m o r a l convictions, c o m e to reject h i s c o n c l u -

37
C f . Beitz, CINS 596.
 The; External Argument, 23.3 271

sions. He c o u l d n o t a n d d i d n o t achieve even the narrowest overlap

within a single n a t i o n a l society. He c o u l d h o p e to (and, I think, did)
express t h e c o n v i c t i o n s of a s e g m e n t of t h e intelligentsia in the United
States a n d s o m e o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , b u t c a n h e claim to speak for t h e
o'ack, Hispanic, a n d native A m e r i c a n s u b c u l t u r e s or even for ordinary
fa
nners, clerks, h o u s e w i v e s , o r factory workers? Rawls left s u c h q u e s ­
tions open, a t t e m p t i n g m e r e l y to systematize "one (educated) p e r s o n s
sense of j u s t i c e " (TJ 50). He h a s thereby initiated a discourse a b o u t
Justice from w h i c h g r e a t e r clarity a n d convergence m a y emerge m d u e
course
The idea of g l o b a l i z i n g Rawls a i m s for n o more a n d w^™?™*
"ot be d i s h e a V t e n e d - o r feel a b s o I v e d ! - b y P ^ l ^ Z T X T o f
'bout t h e a p p e a l a n d political s u c c e s s
J W K » o r of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reforms it ^ ^ . T Z t h objections
develop a n d p r o p o s e this c o n c e p t i o n a n d then d e a ^ ^
and c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s from o t h e r cultures o r fromrw*
they a c t u a l l y a r i s e . A cross-cultural ^ c o u r s e J b o vision of its t h e

moral i s s u e of g r e a t c o m m o n concern ™ t i o n s involved less c e p

Participants a n d will t e n d to m a k e the moral y i r a b I e or even t o e

Parochial a s e a c h tries to a c c o m m o d a t e w h a t
38
valuable in o t h e r c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . of justice is a n especially
c o n e
A g l o b a l i z e d v e r s i o n of Rawls's f P ross-cultural discourse. It is
suitable o n e w i t h w h i c h to e n t e r sucn ^ ^ j d e a s a n d i t c a n
aCC
based u p o n a s m a l l set of widely X i d g i n g a n d incorporating lovV e

°ffer a g o o d d e a l of flexibility for-a ^ dical, s o m e w a y s m o r e ra

cultural diversity. My proposal G, m a - w n sketch of global B a w J s s 0

h a s m o s t t o offer by way or
of s u c h n e w ^ e r y national w o M m w h i c h e V

j u s t i c e — o n e i t h e r Ri ^T^esaiae
two principles, toward a p r e -
society p r o g r e s s e s , in light ot ° ? ajjovvs s o m e variation in national J s

d e t e r m i n e d institutional i d e a l - ^ d through a hypo- d e t e r m i n e

c o n s t i t u t i o n s by letting each oi u
g behind a thinner featurin p a r t i e s

thetical "constitutional levant co^"

general facts a b o u t their ^
veil of i g n o r a n c e , w h o know flexibility ( T J 1 9 7 ) B u t t h e

society" including i » P ^ U of ignorance is quite limited,f t h e v e

afforded b y this g r a d u a l ^ J ^ o n in h o w m s c n t e n o n of d o m e s t i c
1 d o e S a W
T h o u g h Rawls a l l o ^ e d ^ " ° c n t e n o n itself t o vary
j u s t i c e m a y be specif^
from society to society- ^ ^ believing that an international d i s c u s s i o n of
ther i n i ^ ^ ^ c a t a l v s t for moral progress Many persons in the West
3 s a
T h e r e is a n o m <*n » g^mmem t b e c a u s e thev believe that—
t h e t o p i c of 8 " * ftacign
a c q u i e s c e in the ^^ggy, P
s ( i c e

f&^J^ps
J^
f

it >s justified but b e c a u s e thev have n o settled

6
n o

vor the other In view of the enormity of prevailing

c u l t n , a t
thanks to ^ t h i s ^ ° h o w e v e r . this is an issue that o n e ought to reflect u p o n . If
t
8 3
moral b e l i e f s ^ j j s a d V s n ' ^ ' ^ , ^ make a substantial moral difference, then a
r e a v

deprivations ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ well be it
a <
a n y t h i n g j * „ , global ju» , d e n c v to think of the political p r o c e s s as an instance of
e n

discourse a O T ^ ^ ^ < r f n » D
(§13-2-3'. Rawls ties even the limited international
0

39 oreover, ^ d u r a l
M e

e r f e C t V
only i m P
272 T h e E x t e r n a l A r g u m e n t , 23.3

G is m o r e liberal in t h i s r e s p e c t . T h e global p a r t i e s a r e n o t con­

s t r a i n e d b y a n y p r i o r c r i t e r i o n of d o m e s t i c justice; a n d t h e y will t h e n
specifically d e c i d e h o w m u c h r o o m t o leave for differences in n a t i o n a l
i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d in n a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s of d o m e s t i c
justice. Seeing h o w t h e original p o s i t i o n is d e s c r i b e d , t h e p a r t i e s d e c i d e
this q u e s t i o n b y b a l a n c i n g t w o d e s i d e r a t a (cf. §13.3 a n d §13.5): T h e y
w a n t t o e n a b l e c i t i z e n s t o c h o o s e a n d revise t h e i r o w n d o m e s t i c c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n , e v e n t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c j u s t i c e , s o l o n g a s s u c h
c h o i c e r e s u l t s from a n d g u a r a n t e e s for t h e f u t u r e free a n d i n f o r m e d
d e c i s i o n s . Yet t h e y also w a n t t o p r e c l u d e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t t e n d to
p r o d u c e severe d e p r i v a t i o n s o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s for s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
T h e r e s u l t i n g c r i t e r i o n of global j u s t i c e m i g h t b e s i m i l a r t o t h e crite­
rion I h a v e d e v e l o p e d in Part T w o . A s s u m i n g t h e s p e c i a l c o n c e p t i o n
a p p l i e s , t h e globalized first p r i n c i p l e m i g h t b e v i e w e d a s r e q u i r i n g a
" t h i n " set of b a s i c r i g h t s a n d liberties ( a n a l o g o u s t o t h e Universal
Declaration of Human Rights a n d i n c l u d i n g a n effective right to emi­
grate), w h i c h e a c h n a t i o n a l society c o u l d , in light of its n a t i o n a l c o n ­
c e p t i o n of d o m e s t i c justice, "inflate" a n d specify i n t o its o w n bill of
rights. T h i s s u g g e s t i o n is in line w i t h o u r c u r r e n t m o r a l beliefs. While
w e firmly believe t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s of o u r (Western) societies o u g h t
t o p r o h i b i t t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d a y s of g o v e r n m e n t - e n f o r c e d religious
fasting, w e c a n still a c c e p t as just a global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e i n w h i c h
s u c h legislation is n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l in s o m e ( n o n - W e s t e r n ) so­
cieties. (Yet w e c a n n o t a c c e p t as just a global o r d e r i n w h i c h t o r t u r e is
n o t r u l e d o u t in all societies, w h a t e v e r t h e i r culture.)
Similarly, w h i l e t h e global s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e w o u l d c o n s t r a i n h o w
s o c i e t i e s m a y a r r a n g e t h e i r e c o n o m i e s , t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s w o u l d b e less
s t r i n g e n t t h a n Rawls's r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t e a c h s o c i e t y m u s t satisfy t h e
difference p r i n c i p l e internally. This m a y b e so b e c a u s e a c o u n t r y ' s
c h o i c e a m o n g v a r i o u s forms of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n ( m o r e o r less
egalitarian t h a n Rawls's n a t i o n a l difference p r i n c i p l e w o u l d require)
d o e s n o t affect t h e globally w o r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h a r e of social p r i m a r y
g o o d s o r b e c a u s e t h i s c h o i c e is p r o t e c t e d b y t h e b a s i c political liberties
w h i c h a l l o w t h e c i t i z e n s of e a c h n a t i o n t o c h o o s e , w i t h i n c e r t a i n limits,
t h e i r o w n m o d e of e c o n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t i n g global institu­
t i o n a l ideal w o u l d t h e n a l l o w e a c h society a g o o d d e a l of c h o i c e as
r e g a r d s its i n t e r n a l p r a c t i c e s ( a n d m o r a l principles), s o l o n g a s s u c h
c h o i c e s a r e s u p p o r t e d b y m o s t of its c i t i z e n s a n d are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
4 0
t h e b a s i c r i g h t s of all h u m a n beings, c i t i z e n s a s well as o u t s i d e r s .

variation h e a l l o w s to t h e diversity of national c i r c u m s t a n c e s , rather t h a n to t h e diversity

of national collective p r e f e r e n c e s (§17.3). Even w h e r e constitutional a n d political c h o i c e s
m a y differ from c o u n t r y t o c o u n t r y , h e requires s u c h differences to b e rationally related
to differences in national c o n d i t i o n s . Actual c i t i z e n s a n d legislators are required to
a c c o m m o d a t e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s i n their deliberations a n d d e c i s i o n s t h r o u g h t h e t h o u g h t
e x p e r i m e n t of h o w R a w l s i a n rational parties (placed b e h i n d a veil of i g n o r a n c e of t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e thickness) w o u l d a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m .
"°Rawls m a y n o w actually agree w i t h this view. At least this is o n e p o s s i b l e w a y of
m a k i n g s e n s e of this cryptic remark: "The political liberties, a s s u r e d their fair-value a n d
 Conclusion, 24.1.2 273
C 0 U h 6 S e d 6 t a i l s a r e n I U I u s t
• !? . u T ! ° ^ r a t i v e s p e c u l a t i o n . What m a t t e r s
is t h a t by b a l a n c i n g t h e liberty interest in collective a u t o n o m y against
o t h e r liberty i n t e r e s t s , G g o e s b e y o n d R, a n d R in t h e liberal q u e s t to
2
0 5 re,igi US M o s h i
Sts^I^ ^ °' P ° P c a l , a n d m o r a l convictions"

24. Conclusion

2 4 . 1 . Let m e r e c a p i t u l a t e t h e main s t e p s t h r o u g h w h i c h I have c o m e

to d o u b t t h e a p p e a l i n g m o r a l conviction that t h e r e is n o t h i n g seriously
w r o n g , m o r a l l y speaking, w i t h the lives w e lead. I s h o u l d say in a d v a n c e
t h a t s t e p s 1, 2, 3, a n d 6 are essential to m y a r g u m e n t ; s t e p s 4 a n d 5
m e r e l y b r o a d e n a n d s t r e n g t h e n its conclusion.
2 4 . 1 . 1 . T h e r e a r e t h e a b u n d a n t l y d o c u m e n t e d facts of w i d e s p r e a d
e x t r e m e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d disadvantages. Large s e g m e n t s of h u m a n ­
kind suffer severe o p p r e s s i o n a n d poverty. They have n o effective civil
a n d political rights a n d are helplessly e x p o s e d to violence a n d a b u s e by
s o l d i e r s a n d guerrillas, l a n d o w n e r s a n d officials. Moreover, t h e y are
e x c l u d e d from t h e n a t u r a l a n d social r e s o u r c e s of this p l a n e t : t h e y are
so p o o r a s to b e chronically exposed to malnutrition a n d outright
starvation; t h e y lack a c c e s s to even minimal health care, a n d are liable
to die early from t h e m o s t trivial diseases; they rarely have e n o u g h
e d u c a t i o n e v e n t o b e able to read, write, or d o e l e m e n t a r y arithmetic.
Finally m o s t a r e in n o position to improve their situation or to e s c a p e
from it. S u c h w i d e s p r e a d h u m a n misery provides t h e occasion for
m o r a l reflection, w h i c h m u s t e x a m i n e two ways in w h i c h w e might be
c o n n e c t e d to this misery: Why d o s u c h radical inequalities persist, a n d
w h a t r o l e (if any) d o w e p l a y in their p r o d u c t i o n ? And h o w might s u c h
radical i n e q u a l i t i e s be overcome, a n d w h a t role (if any) can w e play in
their eradication?
2 4 . 1 . 2 . T h e r e are t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of s u c h extreme depriva­
t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . T h e s e d o n o t c o m p e t e with true microex­
p l a n a t i o n s , s u c h a s : this villager is killed by a d e a t h s q u a d b e c a u s e its
l e a d e r believes h i s village to b e sympathetic to t h e rebels, this baby is
s t a r v e d b e c a u s e h e r father lost his job, this s t u d e n t is r a p e d a n d tor­
t u r e d b e c a u s e s h e p a r t i c i p a t e d in a d e m o n s t r a t i o n against the reigning
military j u n t a . M a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s aim for a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t
m i c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s leave u n e x p l a i n e d : Why d o e s o u r world have s u c h
h i g h rates of m a l n u t r i t i o n , illiteracy, a n d infant mortality? What ac­
c o u n t s for t h e incidence of torture a n d poverty; for the frequency ot
w a r s , d e a t h s q u a d s , a n d military j u n t a s ; for the increasing gap between
rich a n d p o o r ? T h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of these aggregate p h e ­
n o m e n a p r o m i n e n t l y involve reference to basic global institutions. 1 h e

"other r e l e v a n t g e n e r a l principles, properly circumscribed, may of course supplement the

p r i n c i p l e s of justice'' (BLP 49-50).
274 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.4

f r e q u e n c y of w a r s a n d military j u n t a s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d a p a r t from
t h e fact t h a t o u r global political o r d e r reflects a n i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l
m o d u s vivendi. A c c o u n t i n g for t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s of m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d
infant m o r t a l i t y r e q u i r e s in a d d i t i o n r e f e r e n c e to h o w t h e existing
global e c o n o m i c s c h e m e a s s i g n s e m i n e n t d o m a i n over n a t u r a l a s s e t s
a n d h o w it r e g u l a t e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h u n c o n s t r a i n e d
market m e c h a n i s m s . Such macroexplanations m a y be highly complex,
b u t w h a t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e is o n l y t h a t o u r global f r a m e w o r k of basic
i n s t i t u t i o n s figures p r o m i n e n t l y in t h e t r u e m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s of m o r ­
ally significant p h e n o m e n a a n d t h a t r e f o r m s of t h i s f r a m e w o r k c o u l d
l e a d t o s u b s t a n t i a l i m p r o v e m e n t s in r e s p e c t to t h e s e p h e n o m e n a . I d o
n o t p r e t e n d to h a v e p r o v i d e d satisfactory m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s o r t o have
s k e t c h e d in a n y detail p a t h s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t o w a r d a w o r l d
order that w o u l d not t e n d to p r o d u c e radical inequalities.
2 4 . 1 . 3 . In t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e a s s e s s m e n t a n d reform of b a s i c institu­
tions, w e m u s t n o t i g n o r e t h e i r effects a n d , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e benefits
a n d b u r d e n s t h e y t e n d t o engender. By d e n y i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e of e n g e n ­
d e r e d p h e n o m e n a , o n e c o u l d insist t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame­
w o r k is perfectly j u s t a l r e a d y : " T h e g r o u n d r u l e s d o n o t d i r e c t l y call for
d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , s t a t e s a r e officially
a s s i g n e d e q u a l r i g h t s a g a i n s t o n e a n o t h e r a n d e q u a l sovereignty to
r e g u l a t e t h e i r o w n i n t e r n a l affairs. (Even p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e
U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l is b a s e d o n e n g e n d e r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s in
power.) Any i n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e political a n d e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h of
s t a t e s a n d in t h e r i g h t s a n d affluence of t h e i r c i t i z e n s , h o w e v e r radical
and predictable they m a y be, are not established but only engendered
b y t h e prevailing global o r d e r a n d h e n c e c a n n o t b e h e l d a g a i n s t this
o r d e r . " In c o n t r a s t t o s u c h a s t r o n g l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of
justice, I h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d Rawls a s c o m m i t t e d to a b r o a d l y c o n s e q u e n ­
tialist ( m o r e specifically, a s e m i c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t ) a p p r o a c h to t h e s u b ­
ject of social justice, w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e d a n d e n g e n d e r e d benefits a n d
b u r d e n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d o n a p a r . A l t h o u g h I h a v e myself d e f e n d e d this
a p p r o a c h , m y m a i n c o n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e s o s t r o n g a claim.
So l o n g as e n g e n d e r e d d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s c o u n t for a n y ­
t h i n g at all i n t h e a s s e s s m e n t of social i n s t i t u t i o n s , a g o o d c a s e c a n b e
m a d e t h a t t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r is u n j u s t against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s t h a t w o u l d n o t e n g e n d e r s u c h r a d i c a l
i n e q u a l i t i e s . Even a m i l d l y d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e w o u l d
s u p p o r t this conclusion.
2 4 . 1 . 4 . T h e w o r s t p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e existing global i n s t i t u t i o n a l
s c h e m e t e n d s t o p r o d u c e affords a n a p p r o p r i a t e v a n t a g e p o i n t for
a s s e s s i n g t h e j u s t i c e of t h i s o r d e r a s a w h o l e . I n a s s e s s i n g t h e e x i s t i n g
global o r d e r i n c o m p a r i s o n t o its feasible i n s t i t u t i o n a l alternatives, o n e
s h o u l d b e p r e e m i n e n t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e worst-off p a r t i c i p a n t s
u n d e r e a c h i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . N o w it m a y b e d e n i e d t h a t t h e c o n ­
c e r n for t h e least a d v a n t a g e d s h o u l d h a v e t h e a b s o l u t e priority it h a s for
 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.1.5 275

Rawls. O n e m a y s a y that, w h i l e terrible poverty a n d o p p r e s s i o n a r e

certainly p r e v a l e n t a n d w i d e s p r e a d , h u m a n k i n d h a s m a d e g r e a t p r o g ­
ress, a s w i t n e s s e d b y t h e s e c u r i t y a n d affluence enjoyed by t h e citizens
of t h e d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n n a t i o n s . Although t h e least a d v a n t a g e d a r e as
badly off a s ever, at least t h e b e t t e r positions (the t o p quintile o r so of
world p o p u l a t i o n ) h a v e b e e n i m p r o v e d considerably. But s u c h p r o g ­
ress, w h i c h c e r t a i n l y exists, also raises t h e p r o b l e m of justice in s h a r p e r
form. B e c a u s e w e a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, almost everything w e d o
has a significant i m p a c t u p o n living c o n d i t i o n s elsewhere, a n d b e c a u s e
we a r e s o affluent a n d powerful, w e are in a u n i q u e position to take u p
the t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l task of institutional reform. In a n y case, it
s e e m s q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e to d e n y that t h e position of its least a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s is at least o n e i m p o r t a n t m e a s u r e of t h e justice of a n
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . If s o m e feasible institutional reform is e x p e c t e d
to lead t o a significant i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e worst position, t h e n this is
surely a n i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n in its favor.
2 4 . 1 . 5 . A p l a u s i b l e evaluation of t h e morally significant c o n s e ­
q u e n c e s of feasible institutional s c h e m e s m u s t give a p r o m i n e n t p l a c e
to t h e satisfaction of basic social a n d e c o n o m i c n e e d s . Here it m a y be
too m u c h to r e q u i r e t h a t a n institutional s c h e m e b e so d e s i g n e d that
even t h e s p e c i a l n e e d s of its naturally h a n d i c a p p e d participants are
met. P e r h a p s s u c h special n e e d s raise issues of morality r a t h e r t h a n
justice (as Rawls suggests b y favoring a semiconsequentialist over a
fully c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t a p p r o a c h ) . W h e n even the s t a n d a r d basic socio­
e c o n o m i c n e e d s of s o m e p a r t i c i p a n t s are not met, however, w e have a
m o s t u r g e n t r e a s o n t o think about, a n d p r o m o t e , institutional reforms.
This c l a i m is often o p p o s e d by t h e assertion that it is m o r e i m p o r t a n t
that social i n s t i t u t i o n s recognize a n d protect basic civil a n d political
rights a n d liberties t h a n that they e n s u r e that basic social a n d eco­
n o m i c n e e d s a r e m e t . Even if this assertion could be sustained (and I
have a r g u e d extensively t h a t it cannot), my m a i n conclusion w o u l d
r e m a i n largely i n t a c t . T h e c u r r e n t global distribution of basic civd a n d
political r i g h t s a n d liberties is extremely uneven. While we, t h r o u g h
exercising c o n t r o l over a very powerful g o v e r n m e n t car. play a s ^ n i h -
c a n t r o l e in s h a p i n g t h e c o m m o n future of h u m a n k i n d ,
lack political rights altogether or exercise s o m e ^cra^ontrol
w i t h i n a s t a t e t h a t is t o o p o o r a n d i m p o t e n t to have any real influence.
While o u r f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e are s e c u r e o h « t to
u n d e r i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d rulens i n s t a l i e d o r approved' * ^ ^ J ,
iect t o t h r e a t s , subversion, o r invasion from a b r o « L A n d iritate^the ba c
rights a n d liberties r e c o g n i z e d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S i f y
tion c l u s t e r s , s u c h basic rights a n d "berties are ° " e n n
e n f o r c e d a b r o a d even w h e r e they are officially o n h e books, n
m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e s e international o f the
a n d political f r e e d o m will again p r o m i n e n t l y involve teatu
existing global o r d e r .
276 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.2

2 4 . 1 . 6 . A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e is i m p o s e d b y all of u s o n e a c h
of u s . It is i m p o s e d o n u s i n t h a t w e c a n n o t s i m p l y d r o p o u t a n d
r e n o u n c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s fact is m o s t significant in t h e c a s e of t h e
s c h e m e ' s m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h o a r e literally b e i n g
forced, u l t i m a t e l y w i t h r e s o r t t o violence, to a b i d e b y t h e g o i n g g r o u n d
r u l e s . T h u s a m o t h e r , u n a b l e t o find e m p l o y m e n t a n d d e s p e r a t e t o feed
h e r c h i l d r e n , will b e p u n i s h e d if s h e tries to take food from a s h o p , will
b e c h a s e d a w a y if s h e tries t o g r o w food o n l a n d t h a t is n o t h e r s , will b e
a r r e s t e d if s h e tries t o d e m o n s t r a t e , will b e t u r n e d a w a y if s h e tries t o
c r o s s i n t o a n o t h e r c o u n t r y ( s u c h a s o u r s , for e x a m p l e ) — a n d t h i s n o t b y
crooks a n d t h u g s b u t b y "the law,'' by j u d g e s , i m m i g r a t i o n i n s p e c t o r s ,
a n d t h e police, w h o , b a c k e d b y o u r r e c o g n i t i o n o r a c q u i e s c e n c e , d o
41
t h e i r "duty" in t h e n a m e of h u m a n j u s t i c e . T h i s reflection reveals h o w
unjust institutions e m b o d y not only the d e e p e s t a n d m o s t c o n s e q u e n ­
tial form of h u m a n w r o n g b u t also ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y ) t h e m o s t intoler­
able. At least in t h e m o d e r n era, injustice a p p e a r s in official c l o t h i n g ,
u n d e r t h e n a m e of justice, o p e n l y before t h e e y e s of t h e w o r l d . It
s u b v e r t s n o t m e r e l y w h a t is right b u t t h e very i d e a of right a n d leaves its
victims w i t h o u t a n y r e c o u r s e o r a p p e a l .
A global i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k is i m p o s e d by, especially, its m o r e
advantaged, m o r e powerful participants. Institutions are n o t only
"staffed" a n d e n f o r c e d by h u m a n b e i n g s (are c o m p l e x p a t t e r n s of
h u m a n c o n d u c t ) ; t h e y are also c r e a t e d , s h a p e d , p e r p e t u a t e d , o r
c h a n g e d b y u s . P r o p e r t y a n d p r o m i s e s , m o n e y a n d m a r k e t s , govern­
m e n t s a n d borders, treaties a n d diplomacy—all these d o not o c c u r
n a t u r a l l y b u t are i n v e n t e d b y h u m a n b e i n g s a n d c o n t i n u o u s l y evolve
t h r o u g h h u m a n c o n d u c t . S u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e " u p to u s , " collectively,
a n d w e therefore have a collective causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for existing
institutions. Together w e change t h e m or preserve t h e m as they are.
Since social i n s t i t u t i o n s are m o r e o r less j u s t d e p e n d i n g o n h o w t h e y
d i s t r i b u t e m o r a l l y significant benefits a n d b u r d e n s a m o n g t h e i r h u m a n
p a r t i c i p a n t s , this c a u s a l responsibility gives rise t o a moral r e s p o n ­
sibility, w h i c h is a collective responsibility for o u r collective role i n
i m p o s i n g existing i n s t i t u t i o n s u p o n , in p a r t i c u l a r , t h e i r m o s t d i s a d v a n ­
t a g e d ( a n d involuntary) p a r t i c i p a n t s . This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a y b e of g r e a t
m o m e n t w h e n w e find o u r s e l v e s t o b e (advantaged) p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n
u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e . W e h a v e a negative d u t y n o t t o c o l l a b o r a t e
in t h e i m p o s i t i o n of u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a n d w e m u s t t h e n reflect u p o n
a n d p r o m o t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform.
24.2. Taken together, these considerations s u p p o r t two conclusions:
4 1
S u c h r e c o g n i t i o n is not c o n f i n e d w i t h i n national borders; t h e p r a c t i c e s i n a n o t h e r
c o u n t r y are not "a different ballgame." We d o not just take n o t i c e of foreign g o v e r n m e n t s ,
l a w s , judges, a n d p o l i c e m e n (as empirical facts); w e r e c o g n i z e t h e m a s g o v e r n m e n t s ,
l a w s , j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n . T h e plausibility of t h e i d e a of a global basic structure
derives n o t o n l y from t h e w o r l d w i d e e x i s t e n c e of states w i t h national g o v e r n m e n t s , l a w s ,
j u d g e s , a n d p o l i c e m e n b u t from their international r e c o g n i t i o n a n d their role i n interna­
tional p r a c t i c e s a n d interactions.
 Conclusion, 24.3 277
o u r c u r r e n t global institutional s c h e m e is unjust, a n d as a d v a n t a g e d
p a r t i c i p a n t s in this o r d e r w e s h a r e a collective responsibility for its
injustice. T h e injustice m e a n s , in h u m a n terms, not merely that m a n y
p e r s o n s t o d a y a r e very b a d l y off—are unfree, u n e d u c a t e d , powerless,
starving, a n d p o o r — b u t t h a t they are disadvantaged by existing institu­
tions, d e p r i v e d of f r e e d o m a n d education, o p p r e s s e d , starved, a n d
i m p o v e r i s h e d . T h e responsibility m e a n s that t h o s e w h o u p h o l d a n d
p e r p e t u a t e t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s , all of u s together, are collectively d o i n g
w h a t is d o n e t o (in particular) t h e least advantaged. We have a negative
d u t y t o d e s i s t ; w e o u g h t to u s e o u r m o r e advantaged political a n d
e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n to w o r k for global institutional reforms.
T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h e s e conclusions d o e s not materially d e p e n d on
s t e p s 4 a n d 5 (the priority c o n c e r n for the least advantaged a n d t h e
a m e n d m e n t t o t h e first principle). If they h a d to be w i t h d r a w n or
modified, t h e n t h e c u r r e n t global o r d e r might b e less unjust (and w e
collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for less deprivation) t h a n I a m presently in­
c l i n e d t o believe. Nevertheless, t h e failure of t h e s e two ideas w o u l d not
entail t h e c o l l a p s e of m y a r g u m e n t .
To r e a c h its c o n c l u s i o n s , m y a r g u m e n t m u s t a s s u m e that t h e r e are
feasible p a t h s of institutional reform w h o s e p u r s u i t w o u l d substan­
tially r a i s e t h e globally w o r s t representative share, particularly in re­
gard to t h e satisfaction of s t a n d a r d basic n e e d s (as a c c o m m o d a t e d by
t h e first p r i n c i p l e ) . T h a t t h e r e are s u c h feasible p a t h s of reform is
s o m e t h i n g t h a t , h o w e v e r likely it m a y seem, I have m a d e n o a t t e m p t to
establish.
In o n e r e s p e c t , this is n o t a serious gap. For s u p p o s e my argument
w e r e a c c e p t e d We w o u l d t h e n have gained a reasonably clear a n d
d e t e r m i n a t e i d e a of w h a t a plausible defense of the status q u o m u s t
look like. My a r g u m e n t leaves room for t h e attempt (by s o m e social
scientists, p e r h a p s ) t o provide s u c h a defense by showing, for example,
t h a t t h e globally w o r s t representative share c a n n o t be raised through
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s . T h e c h a n c e that s u c h a claim could survive col-
legial s c r u t i n y s e e m s slight, given the severity a n d extent of c u r r e n t
h u m a n m i s e r y . Still, t h e r e is a r e m o t e possibility that some such argu­
m e n t will t u r n o u t t o be convincing, a n d so w e
( t h o u g h h a r d l y elated) to learn that o u r global order is n o w as j u s t a s w e
c a n m a k e h a n d that t h e r e is n o t h i n g by way of institutional reform that
we o u g h t to undertake. , , _
l , i^p
l f h t r ) n e

. i n a n o t h e r r e s p e c t , t h e g a p is quite J T S ^ ^ ^ S
a s
in a p o s i t i o n t o offer c o n c r e t e a n d realistic ^ ^ . X achieved As
a n d e c o n o m i c reforms justice d e m a n d s might ' ^ ^ ^ Z
it is, 1 c a n o n l y h o p e that t h e i ^ ^ ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ o r e
i d e a s (involving politicians, jurists, a n d economi ^ ^
it is c l e a r e r w h a f justice requires ^ ^ S E ^ H ^ , collec-
2 4 . 3 . I have argued that we ^ S ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^
tive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e existing global o r d e r (specincany
278 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

social p o s i t i o n w e p r o d u c e t h r o u g h its i m p o s i t i o n ) a n d t h a t w e h a v e a
negative d u t y t o h e l p reform t h i s o r d e r insofar a s it is u n j u s t . But I d o
n o t m e a n t h i s c o n c l u s i o n t o entail a n a t t r i b u t i o n of b l a m e o r guilt. It
w o u l d b e (not o n l y c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e b u t also) plainly i m p l a u s i b l e to
claim of m o s t o r d i n a r y citizens of d e v e l o p e d W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s t h a t
t h e y a r e b l a m e w o r t h y o n a c c o u n t of all t h e existing h u m a n m i s e r y . An
a n a l o g o u s p o i n t c o u l d b e m a d e a b o u t p a s t i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s in­
volving slavery o r a radically inferior s t a t u s for w o m e n . M a n y of t h o s e
w h o c o l l a b o r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e c e n t u r i e s in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of s u c h
u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n n o t fairly b e b l a m e d , b e c a u s e t h e y c o u l d n o t
r e a s o n a b l y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d t h e w r o n g n e s s of t h e i r c o n d u c t . Still, as is
n o w agreed, their c o n d u c t was wrong, a n d they o u g h t to have worked
t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s insofar as t h e y w e r e a b l e t o d o s o . It is in
this k i n d of situation, I believe, t h a t m o s t o r d i n a r y c i t i z e n s of t h e
d e v e l o p e d West a r e t o d a y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e prevailing global i n s t i t u ­
tional f r a m e w o r k . It w o u l d b e m o r a l i s t i c a n d s o m e w h a t silly, p e r h a p s ,
t o b l a m e s u c h p e r s o n s for v i o l e n c e a n d s t a r v a t i o n a b r o a d . But t h i s d o e s
n o t d e v a l u e t h e a t t e m p t to explain to t h e m h o w , t o t h e best of o n e ' s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y d o in fact s h a r e responsibility for s u c h w r o n g s a n d
o u g h t t o reflect u p o n a n d h e l p w o r k t o w a r d i n s t i t u t i o n a l reform. T h i s
a t t e m p t is n o t silly o r m o r a l i s t i c , b e c a u s e , insofar a s t h e y a r e m o r a l
p e r s o n s , t h e y w o u l d t h e m s e l v e s w a n t to b e c h a l l e n g e d t o reflect u p o n
s u c h p o t e n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a n d d u t i e s . My c o n c e r n , t h e n , is n o t
w i t h b l a m e o r guilt. I m e r e l y w a n t to s h o w w h a t , I think, is n o t easily
a p p r e c i a t e d — t h a t o u r global i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r is u n j u s t , t h a t w e d o
w r o n g i n s i m p l y c o l l a b o r a t i n g in t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n a n d i m p o s i t i o n of
t h i s o r d e r , a n d t h a t w e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e e x p l o r e n e w w a y s of a c t i n g for
o u r s e l v e s ( w h o c a n h e l p in t h e reform of institutions) a n d for t h o s e w h o
will c o m e after u s (who, t h a n k s t o t h e j u s t e r i n s t i t u t i o n s w e will leave
b e h i n d , s h o u l d find it e a s i e r t h a n w e d i d to live well).
2 4 . 4 . D e s p i t e t h i s qualification, m y c o n c l u s i o n m a y p r o v o k e s o m e
i n c r e d u l i t y (if n o t a n n o y a n c e ) . Please r e m e m b e r t h a t even t h e i n j u s ­
tices w e n o w r e c o g n i z e a s t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s (slavery a n d t h e
inferior s t a t u s of w o m e n ) w e r e o n c e e n t i r e l y t a k e n for g r a n t e d . T h o s e
a d v a n t a g e d b y t h e m f o u n d it e a s y n o t t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e m or, a t b e s t , t o
invoke s o m e s h a l l o w r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s , especially s i n c e t h o s e s u b j e c t e d
t o s e v e r e d e p r i v a t i o n s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s typically lack t h e r e s o u r c e s
fully to u n d e r s t a n d a n d p r o t e s t t h e i r c o n d i t i o n . Are w e t o d a y a n y m o r e
i m m u n e t o c o m f o r t a b l e e r r o r s of m o r a l j u d g m e n t ?
M o r e o v e r , n o t all t h e f e a t u r e s t h a t m a k e t h e p r o m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of
t h e past so c o n s p i c u o u s are present in w h a t I have portrayed as t h e
p r i n c i p a l i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e ( a n d it is therefore p e r h a p s e v e n l e s s
a p p r o p r i a t e t o a t t a c h b l a m e a n d guilt t o t h e m ) . Here t w o factors a r e of
s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . T h e p r e e m i n e n t i n j u s t i c e s of o u r t i m e t y p i c a l l y
involve r a d i c a l i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e engendered rather than estab-
 Conclusion, 24.4 279
lished, a n d t h e y a r e injustices in the global s t r u c t u r e of h u m a n i n t e r a c ­
tion r a t h e r t h a n in t h e internal s t r u c t u r e of relevant social u n i t s (a
family, city, o r state). T h e r e a r e two ways in w h i c h t h e s e t w o factors
t e n d to o b s c u r e injustice a n d responsibility for it.
O n t h e o n e h a n d , b o t h factors make injustice h a r d e r to d i a g n o s e a n d
i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m s h a r d e r to conceive a n d to i m p l e m e n t . T h e q u e s ­
tion w h e t h e r a n institutional s c h e m e establishes excessive depriva­
tions o r d i s a d v a n t a g e s c a n b e a n s w e r e d r a t h e r straightforwardly. But
s u p p o s e w e w a n t to find o u t w h e t h e r existing h a r d s h i p s , t h o u g h n o t
called for by t h e g r o u n d r u l e s of an institutional s c h e m e , are neverthe­
less e n g e n d e r e d b y it a n d w h e t h e r there are feasible institutional r e ­
forms t h r o u g h w h i c h the i n c i d e n c e of the relevant deprivations c o u l d
be r e d u c e d . Before o n e c a n a n s w e r these questions affirmatively, o n e
m u s t h a v e g a t h e r e d a great deal of empirical information, developed
e s t i m a t e s a b o u t w h a t deprivations a n d disadvantages feasible alterna­
tive i n s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e s w o u l d t e n d to p r o d u c e , a n d c o n s t r u c t e d a n d
t e s t e d v a r i o u s m a c r o e x p l a n a t i o n s . T h e s e tasks are obviously even m o r e
difficult o n t h e global p l a n e b e c a u s e of t h e greater size a n d complexity
of t h e global social system a n d also b e c a u s e of t h e lesser accessibility of
comparative data.
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e n excessive deprivations a n d disadvantages
clearly a r e avoidable c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e prevailing institutional
s c h e m e , b o t h factors also t e n d to make it h a r d e r to appreciate that t h e
relevant s c h e m e is therefore unjust a n d that we, as advantaged partici­
p a n t s in it, s h a r e a m o r a l responsibility for s u c h injustice. Here t h e
injustice of national institutions that establish radical inequalities a n d
t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of citizens for s u c h injustice were easiest to u n d e r ­
s t a n d ( a n d historically the earliest to be widely understood). The wide­
s p r e a d a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e s e points in t h e United States w a s a main
p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e abolition of slavery in the 1860s a n d the i n t r o d u c ­
tion of w o m e n ' s suffrage in t h e 1920s. Meanwhile w e have (one might
say s o m e w h a t simplistically) advanced to t h e point w h e r e o n e factor-
a l o n e n o l o n g e r o b s c u r e s o u r vision. It is n o w widely u n d e r s t o o d that
national i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y b e unjust o n account of radical inequalities
t h e y engender a n d t h a t citizens may share a moral r e s p o n s e J i t y for
s u c h injustice. T h e w i d e s p r e a d appreciation of t h e s e ^ *
a c h i e v e t h e institutional reforms of the New Deal in t h e , 1 9 3 0 * 1 : u n o w
also g e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d that a global institutional s c h e m e may be
u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of radical inequalities it e s t a t ^ * r i h a t it
participants ought to contribute » J % Z * £ ^ £ % ^
J o n s . T h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n ^ . J ™ ? ™ ^ Z ^ T t L of o u r global
S ^ ^ f f i S ^ i_
T * P — of
that the citizens of countries tnai
7
d tm
- I t is p r o b a b l y the general ^ ^ ^^Z7hZ a negate duty to w o * for global
d i d n o t h a v e c o l o n i e s h a d merely a positive rather than n e g
280 C o n c l u s i o n , 24.4

c o n c l u s i o n c o m b i n e s t h e s e t w o w i d e l y a c c e p t e d p o i n t s — a global in­
s t i t u t i o n a l s c h e m e m a y b e u n j u s t o n a c c o u n t of excessive d e p r i v a t i o n s
a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s it engenders.

institutional reform. O n m y view, the d u t y w o u l d be a negative o n e — p r o v i d e d c o l o n i a l ­

i s m is correctly u n d e r s t o o d a s a global institution rather than a set of separate b u t similar
crimes.