6

politica

6
politica

PARALLELI LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEA TRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEA TRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEA TRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

Questo quaderno cerca di esplorare alcuni dei mille volti della Turchia, paese complesso e dinamico teatro di cambiamenti importanti soprattutto negli ultimi ventanni. Una riflessione sul ruolo geo-strategico che la Turchia potr giocare nei prossimi anni e sulle trasformazioni intense della sua stratificata societ.

POLITICA

Le attivit di Paralleli sono sostenute dalla

LA TURCHIA CONTEMPORANEA TRA REALT E RAPPRESENTAZIONE

I quaderni sono un progetto di Paralleli La Turchia contemporanea tra realt e rappresentazione uniniziativa di Rosita Di Peri Responsabile editoriale: Rosita Di Peri Curatore: Rosita Di Peri Revisioni: Laura Odasso, Kamilah Khatib Realizzazione grafica a cura di Sunrise.adv, Torino

Indice
Note di lettura I Quaderni di Paralleli di Rosita Di Peri Introduzione di Renato Lattes Secularization in Turkey: women and Islam di Fulya Atacan Unpacking European discourses: conditionality, impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations di Nathalie Tocci AKP and secular pillars of Turkish Republic di Kemal Kaya New directions of Turkish foreign policy: a radical shift from Ankaras Westpolitik? di Matteo Fumagalli Resoconto della Tavola Rotonda Dove va la Turchia? di Stefanella Campana Bibliografia Il presente quaderno riporta gli interventi di un convegno. Ovviamente ogni oratore responsabile di quanto afferma. Note sugli autori 2 3 6 15

25 53

59

73 85 87

I quaderni di Paralleli
Il dibattito su un possibile ingresso della Turchia nellUnione Europea ha portato questo paese alla ribalta dello scenario internazionale. Il suo ruolo a cavallo tra Occidente e Medio Oriente, il suo essere membro della NATO e, al contempo, un paese la cui islamicit potrebbe minacciare la cristiana Europa lo rendono un ibrido regionale che, ormai da anni, suscita dibattiti pi o meno intensi presso lopinione pubblica mondiale. Le complesse vicende storiche che hanno attraversato questo paese da quando allinizio degli anni 20 del secolo scorso, il padre dei turchi (Atatrk) Mustafa Kemal port avanti la gloriosa rivoluzione conducendo il paese allindipendenza dallImpero Ottomano hanno contribuito a segnarne il destino politico. Il segno delloriginalit turca stato dato dalla volont di staccarsi dal passato ottomano e da quello arabo-islamico proprio attraverso la negazione dellislm e del suo preteso significato politico: dallabolizione del califfato, prima temporale poi spirituale, alla dichiarazione di laicit dello Stato; dallintroduzione dellalfabeto turco in sostituzione di quello arabo ad una secolarizzazione di usi e costumi; dalla riforma del diritto di famiglia alla chiusura delle scuole coraniche e delle confraternite mistiche. Il tentativo turco di una nazionalizzazione dellottomanismo, per certi versi naturale continuazione delle riforme conosciute con il nome di tanzimat (1839-1876), ha dato vita ad una societ che ha fatto proprio della turchizzazione spesso esasperata una delle costanti della vita politica e sociale del paese, favorita dalla assidua presenza e rilevanza del ruolo dellesercito. Come la costruzione di una identit turca sia passata anche attraverso la negazione del ruolo delle minoranze e come lesercito stesso abbia al contempo utilizzato lislm come collante e come minaccia per le masse nella costruzione dellidea di nazione, sono due tra i capisaldi che furono posti alla base della nascita della nuova repubblica. Il presente quaderno prende le mosse da alcune delle questioni appena sollevate cercando di analizzare gli sviluppi pi recenti della vita politica e sociale di questo paese. Si tratta di un quaderno composito che attinge da tre diverse occasioni di confronto e di dialogo proposte e promosse dallIstituto Paralleli nellambito delle iniziative TurchiaItalia due penisole un mare. Lintroduzione, scritta dal nostro compianto Presidente Renato Lattes, riporta molto lucidamente alcune delle questioni che sono state sollevate durante una Tavola Rotonda dal titolo Turchia nella UE. Perch no? svoltasi il 7 febbraio del 2008 a Torino. Lanalisi di Lattes tratteggia una realt in chiaroscuro, complessa e interessante, che evidenzia le aspirazioni e i problemi di una societ come molte altre nel nostro tempo stretta tra le maglie di una globalizzazione accerchiante e una ricchezza culturale legata al territorio ed alle tradizioni che sono la vera forza di questo paese. Da fine osservatore e uomo politico Lattes ci indica la strada da seguire per elaborare riflessioni originali e non scontate, frutto della sua pluriennale esperienza nel mondo da protagonista attivo. E guarda dentro una societ in mutamento che, ancora allalba del nuovo millennio deve confrontarsi con i fantasmi del passato, con le spinte e le tendenze autoritarie, con il ruolo invasivo dellesercito.

Note di lettura
Per facilitare la lettura del quaderno ad un pubblico anche non specialistico, il curatore ha deciso di introdurre alcune note (inserite nel testo tra parentesi quadre) la trascrizione dei caratteri arabi stata semplificata per una maggiore leggibilit. Ovviamente, errori e/o omissioni in tali inserti sono sotto diretta responsabilit del curatore.

E proprio la societ civile con le sue sfide, le sue richieste e le sue trasformazioni al centro del dibattito attuale: il suo essere portatrice di una modernizzazione della tradizione, il suo voler affrontare le sfide sociali partendo da strategie non scontate e da percorsi non ovvi. E, infatti, proprio sulla stratificazione e multi-dimensionalit della societ turca si concentra il primo intervento di questo quaderno, quello della politologa turca Fulya Atacan presentato al Convegno di studi La Turchia tra passato e presente svoltosi sempre a Torino il 17 marzo del 2008. Atacan affronta uno degli aspetti pi controversi e attuali legati allidentit turca ossia al ruolo della donna in seno alla societ. Il saggio parte da un lavoro sul campo che Atacan ha svolto raccogliendo diverse testimonianze di donne turche provenienti da vari strati della popolazione ed analizza i complessi rapporti esistenti tra le donne, la societ e lo Stato. Una riflessione ancora pi rilevante se si pensa alle recenti discussioni sul tema del velo nelle universit turche e su un presunto revival religioso. Atacan offre una prospettiva che mette al centro la dimensione sociale e, soprattutto, quella economica e di classe, due elementi imprescindibili, secondo lautrice, quando si parla di condizione femminile. Il confronto a distanza tra le vite di due delle donne intervistate (entrambe appartenenti a gruppi islamici), sulle loro aspirazioni, abitudini e sfide, mette in risalto un paese dalla mille sfaccettature ma, soprattutto, quanto siano ancora rilevanti le questioni legate al censo, allistruzione, alla cultura politica. Sebbene, come sottolinea lautrice nel suo saggio le dinamiche di crescita del paese, soprattutto negli ultimi dieci anni, abbiano portato ad un mutamento delle strategie interne dei gruppi femminili, anche in quelli pi tradizionali, determinando un nuovo tipo di relazione tra queste ultime al loro interno e nei confronti dello Stato modificando un loro possibile ruolo a livello politico. Il secondo saggio del quaderno, quello di Nathalie Tocci, ricercatrice dellIstituto Affari Internazionali di Roma, affronta una questione che affonda le sue radici proprio nelle dinamiche di cambiamento della societ turca a partire dal processo che ha visto il paese fare richiesta di adesione allUnione Europea (nel 1999 alla Turchia stato concesso lo status di paese candidato). Ci che Tocci mette in evidenza attraverso il suo saggio, frutto di un progetto di ricerca pluriennale, proprio laspetto legato ai pregiudizi, alla percezione del dibattito pubblico che ha interessato la richiesta di membership della Turchia alla UE. Al di l dellambito puramente istituzionale in cui molto stato detto, si registra una lacuna proprio sul terreno del dibattito pubblico, delle percezioni, spesso degli stereotipi e dei pregiudizi che hanno connotato questo confronto. Il saggio, partendo da queste premesse analizza proprio come si sviluppato il dibattito in questione e quale stato il suo impatto sullopinione pubblica e sui media regionali. Il principale aspetto che traspare leggendo il saggio della Tocci che mentre non difficile individuare una dimensione europea del dibattito manca unanalisi dettagliata dei dibattiti condotti a livello dei singoli stati (lacuna che stata colmata dalla prosecuzione del progetto di ricerca).

Il terzo saggio, quello di Kemal Kaya, collaboratore dellItalian Center for Turkish Studies, dopo una breve rassegna storica dei principali fatti che hanno caratterizzato lavvio della repubblica turca passa ad analizzare le posizioni e le strategie dellAKP (partito politico turco al governo di orientamento islamista) soprattutto allindomani della sua vittoria nelle elezioni del 2002. Il suo insediamento al governo ha provocato un dibattito molto pressante sul rinnovato ruolo della religione nella secolare repubblica turca provocando una divisione tra le lite turche ed una crescita della tensione politica nel paese che ha avuto ripercussioni anche sugli assetti macro-economici e, quindi, sulla stessa societ. In linea con il saggio precedente lultimo intervento di Matteo Fumagalli, ricercatore presso lUniversit Centrale di Budapest, affronta la vittoria dellAKP da una diversa prospettiva, cercando cio di misurare il suo impatto sugli orientamenti di politica estera della Turchia. Il saggio si concentra in particolare sulle recenti direzioni della politica estera turca ossia sulle nuove relazioni con stati che in passato non avevano avuto un ruolo strategico per questo paese ossia la Siria, lIran e la Russia. Fumagalli fa notare come, pur non perdendo il suo orientamento filo-occidentale, testimoniato dalla sua presenza nella NATO e dal processo di europeizzazione, la Turchia dellAKP abbia avviato una nuova era della sua politica estera. Il saggio dunque analizza le ragioni di questo apparente mutamento di strategia mettendo in evidenza le nuove prospettive e le loro potenzialit. Ma, come evidenzia Fumagalli nelle sue conclusioni, non si tratta di un mutamento completo di indirizzo in quanto le nuove alleanze sono strumentali al conseguimento di specifici obiettivi politici. Il quaderno si conclude con un resoconto di Stefanella Campana, responsabile dellarea Media dellIstituto Paralleli, che rende la complessit e la ricchezza della Tavola Rotonda da lei ideata svoltasi a Torino il 10 giugno 2008 dal titolo Dove va la Turchia. La percezione del paese nei media turchi e italiani. Un incontro che ha visto confrontarsi giornalisti italiani e turchi non soltanto sullo sviluppo e sul ruolo dei media in Turchia ma, anche, su come il paese viene visto e rappresentato dai media e dai giornalisti italiani. Il resoconto rende al meglio un dibattito a volte anche molto acceso che ha messo in luce una societ stratificata e moderna che convive con la tradizione ma che guarda al futuro con occhio attento. Desidero concludere dedicando il presente quaderno alla memoria di Renato Lattes, Presidente e amico che ho avuto il privilegio di conoscere e stimare. Rosita Di Peri Curatrice della collana

Nel 2008 la prima tappa di questo viaggio nella Turchia contemporanea stata lorganizzazione di un colloquio sui nodi politici pi importanti rispetto allentrata della Turchia nellUnione Europea (UE). In Italia la discussione pubblica su questo tema non molto diffusa: n sui media, n tra o allinterno delle forze politiche, n nelle Universit. Nulla di confrontabile, comunque, con quanto avviene, ad esempio, in Francia e in Germania. In Italia limmigrazione dalla Turchia limitata (ben diversa la situazione in Germania dove vivono oltre un milione di turchi); ne lItalia stata meta privilegiata (come, invece, avvenuto in Francia) di rifugio dei sopravvissuti agli eccidi e alla cacciata degli armeni e di altre minoranze dai territori del Nord-Est della Turchia o gi allinterno dei territori della stessa Armenia alla fine della prima guerra mondiale. Questa situazione pu essere unopportunit per aprire una riflessione pi libera, meno emotiva e condizionata da fattori di politica interna. Naturalmente, se questa la situazione nellopinione pubblica, va rilevato che alcune forze hanno seguito levoluzione del dossier Turchia con interesse: la FIAT presente in Turchia da molto tempo e lintero settore dellautomotive piemontese ha con tale paese rapporti commerciali e tecnici consolidati.
Italia-Turchia: due penisole un mare

INTRODUZIONE
di Renato Lattes

Il 2007 ed il 2008 hanno visto Paralleli impegnato in un articolato programma di iniziative che hanno avuto al centro la Turchia. Vi hanno partecipato attori del mondo economico, politico, culturale regionale e torinese: il Politecnico, la Camera di Commercio; archeologi e studiosi di architettura comparata; artisti figurativi, scrittori e registi cinematografici. Sono stati realizzati incontri tra amministratori, con il coinvolgimento dei Sindaci di Torino e di Bursa. Molti angoli di osservazione, per costruttori di ponti, dei quali Paralleli vuole favorire la realizzazione; coerentemente con la propria mission centrale, di costruttore di reti; allincrocio tra cultura, ricerca e politica.

Recentemente si tenuta ad Istanbul una mostra sul design italiano e torinese in particolare. Anche per queste relazioni la Turchia seguita con attenzione crescente da settori universitari: a Torino la facolt di Ingegneria, si aggiunta a quella di Architettura (coinvolta in ricerche storico/archeologiche da 50 anni). Il Politecnico ha deciso di dichiarare il 2008 anno della Turchia. La domanda di inclusione della Turchia nella Comunit Europea ha per sollevato reazioni e fatto emergere contraddizioni che vanno al di l di questi interessi specifici investendo questioni identitarie e storico-culturali di fondo. Pu un paese a cultura islamica essere parte dellEuropa (si dimentica spesso che da secoli c un islm europeo in

Bosnia)? La critica vaticana, enfatizzata dal Papa, allEuropa dimentica delle sue radici cristiane trova forte assonanza con chi vuole escludere, per ragioni identitarie, la Turchia dalla famiglia europea. Ma, al di l delle questioni identitarie, sono diversi i fattori che rendono particolarmente complessa la discussione. In Europa come in Turchia. Cerchiamo di ordinarle.
Il ruolo dellesercito...

Di fatto nella Turchia moderna non tutti i cittadini sono eguali davanti allo Stato: le minoranze hanno meno diritti, siano esse etniche o religiose. Ad esempio, agli aleviti, una confraternita non settaria nella tradizione sufi, vengono negati gli aiuti dallo Stato che sono invece previsti per legge allislm sunnita; chi non sunnita difficilmente pu accedere a cariche pubbliche; vietato linsegnamento del curdo, ecc. Periodicamente questa contraddizione di fondo riemerge sotto la spinta di fattori interni ed esterni e il paradigma culturale su cui il kemalismo ha fondato lidentit nazionale entra in tensione. Il sociologo Baskin Oran parla di sindrome di Svres [ndc. a Svres nel 1920 fu deciso, da parte delle grandi potenze, lo smembramento dellImpero Ottomano]: il complotto imperialista, i nemici interni che minacciano lunit della nazione, il pericolo ai confini. Il motto dei fascisti nazionalisti Turchia: chi non lama se ne vada ed era scritto sullo striscione del veicolo militare che doveva arrestare il terrorista responsabile dellassassinio di un giornalista armeno! I democratici turchi non mancano di denunciare questa paranoia identitaria che gi in passato ha portato a veri e propri pogrom contro le minoranze: nel settembre 1956, in occasione della crisi di Cipro, corse la voce che era stata incendiata la casa di Atatrk e a Istanbul furono saccheggiati e bruciati negozi e case di cristiani, ebrei e aleviti. Oggi i lupi grigi minacciano di morte i curdi sospetti di simpatia per il PKK [ndc. partito dei lavoratori del Kurdistan di calan]. La Turchia un paese di 68 milioni di abitanti. Un possibile grande mercato in pi per le economie dei paesi UE. Un largo bacino di manodopera a basso costo: molte grandi multinazionali americane, europee e asiatiche vi hanno stabilimenti. Se fosse accolto nellUnione Europea, sarebbe il secondo Stato per popolazione, dopo la Germania. Questo fa paura a molti politici e a molti cittadini europei. Paura facilmente manovrabile in Europa dal populismo di destra che fa perno sulla paura del diverso, sulla ricerca di capri espiatori, sullesasperazione di teorie come lo scontro delle civilt. Far entrare 68 milioni di turchi in Europa suonerebbe come la legittimazione, ad aspiranti cittadini
Il dibattito sullingresso nella UE

Lesercito turco ha una storia orgogliosa di creatore della Repubblica turca; stato lo strumento centrale su cui, 90 anni fa, Atatrk, padre della Patria, alla testa del movimento dei giovani turchi, formato prevalentemente da ufficiali, ha raccolto e radicalmente cambiato leredit dellImpero Ottomano, ridotto in cenere dopo la prima guerra mondiale, squassato e insanguinato da conflitti inter-etnici, invaso da eserciti stranieri che puntavano a spartirsene le spoglie. Custode, da quel momento, della laicit e dellunit della Repubblica turca, bastione centrale della NATO (con gli USA che ne curarono la formazione militare e la fornitura di armi) in funzione prevalentemente antisovietica, lesercito interpret molte volte, a suo modo, la difesa della democrazia, diventando attore di colpi di Stato e gestore di regimi autoritari dove erano ridotte al lumicino le garanzie democratiche, le libert e i diritti civili, politici, sociali (libert di stampa e diritti sindacali sono stati le prime vittime per almeno tre occasioni e periodi).

...e quello di Atatrk

Merito storico indubbio di Kemal Atatrk stata la modernizzazione a tappe forzate della societ turca. Il limite, ben messo in evidenza dalla situazione odierna, stata lomogeneizzazione obbligata di una societ assai complessa e variegata. Felice chi si dice turco fu il motto lanciato dal fondatore della repubblica. Ma chi turco? Allora e oggi. Il libro presentato da Paralleli nel mese di Novembre, La Turchia contemporanea di Hamit Bozarslan, ci descrive bene la miriade di gruppi etnici e religiosi che popolano il grande territorio della penisola. Minoranze religiose eredi del cristianesimo siriano, ellenico e armeno. Quindici milioni di curdi. Dieci milioni di musulmani aleviti considerati eretici dallislm sunnita. La Turchia un mosaico che il kemalismo ha tentato di ridurre a unit, alimentando, purtroppo, un nazionalismo esasperato di cui si nutrono i ben organizzati gruppi di estrema destra e non solo.

europei, dei molti milioni di immigrati extracomunitari di cultura islamica, che, provenienti dallAfrica e/o dallAsia, sono gi residenti in Europa. Significativamente queste paranoie identitarie europee si sposano con quelle kemaliste prima descritte, dimostrando che, in fondo, gli stessi motivi che possono spingere una parte dei cittadini europei a diffidare dellentrata della Turchia nella UE, possono renderlo interessante per altri. La Turchia ha bisogno di fare i conti, nel bene e nel male con il suo passato e con se stessa. LEuropa ci deve aiutare (Orhan Pamuk). Paralleli impegnato, per sua stessa natura, a tessere legami e a consolidare reti culturali, politiche, economiche, sociali tra i vari popoli, nazioni, paesi del Mediterraneo. Per questo, guarda alle condizioni e alla possibilit che la Turchia entri nella UE come a un fattore di grande portata. Non pi confronto/scontro tra identit fossilizzate, ma incontro tra culture aperte allinfluenza dellaltro, che si contaminano nel riconoscimento di valori comuni. LEuropa della modernit non pu essere quella di Carlo Magno e nemmeno quella coloniale delle grandi potenze. La Turchia moderna non Solimano il Magnifico e la sede del Califfato. Questo il lavoro comune da svolgere andando oltre il concetto di dialogo che tipico dellordine delle religioni istituzionalizzate e rivelate ove ciascuno dialoga partendo dalla sua verit. La Turchia un grande paese che, anche sotto la spinta impressa alla possibile entrata in Europa, ha compiuto soprattutto negli ultimi anni, un notevole avanzamento nelle condizioni democratiche e laiche del proprio sistema di governo. un percorso non compiuto. Grandi problemi sono tuttora irrisolti, come abbiamo visto, sia per quanto riguarda la sfera dei diritti delle persone e delle libert democratiche per la societ civile (a partire dalla libert di stampa, di religione e, pi in generale, di manifestazione delle proprie idee); sia sul terreno della libert di organizzazione delle tante minoranze etniche, linguistiche, religiose (a partire dal complicato, ma centrale, problema curdo) e della loro rappresentanza politica; sia, infine, sul piano della soluzione del conflitto che ha diviso lisola di Cipro in due stati, dal 1974.

Cos come lEuropa divisa nella volont di accoglierla al proprio interno, anche in Turchia sono presenti spinte in direzioni diverse. Sono forti le spinte allentrata in Europa, soprattutto tra le nuove generazioni, tra la parte pi moderna e colta della popolazione, tra gli strati che pi hanno tratto stimoli e/o vantaggi dalle esperienze di emigrazione nellultimo mezzo secolo. Tra chi spera che lentrata in Europa possa concludere un processo di modernizzazione. Tra chi vede oggi i limiti della secolarizzazione imposta dal kemalismo: la soppressione di confraternite sufi, la forzata omogeneizzazione culturale del paese con lumiliazione e la messa al bando di ogni particolarismo identitario (politico, linguistico, religioso) considerato minaccia allunit dello Stato. Sono intense le spinte conservatrici e nazionaliste, anche con forti correnti di stampo fascisteggiante. Hanno una base di massa nelle popolazioni rurali dellinterno dellAnatolia, pi legate a cultura e identit derivate da uninterpretazione pi chiusa del nazionalismo e della fede religiosa. Alcuni guardano allidentit asiatica, ad antiche, mai cancellate immagini e agli orizzonti di riunificazione della grande nazione turca, dallAsia Centrale fino ai Balcani e al Mediterraneo; alla grande attrazione di un processo di nuova immersione in contesti di comunit del Mediterraneo non europeo, pi segnate dalle culture islamiche e anche dalle loro derivate pi fondamentaliste. In tale quadro di fondo, significativo e, fino ad ora, piuttosto equilibrato il ruolo del partito islamico vincitore delle ultime due tornate elettorali e a guida dellattuale Governo [ndc. Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo, AKP]. Un partito islamico che afferma di credere e di voler difendere il ruolo laico dello Stato e di volerne trasferire la difesa e la garanzia alla politica, svincolandole dal ruolo di tutoraggio svolto, nel passato, dallesercito. Anche noi, in passato, abbiamo visto, o vissuto direttamente, esempi simili. Dal ruolo che, in Italia, ha svolto, nel primo dopoguerra, Alcide De Gasperi, segretario della Democrazia Cristiana e Presidente del Consiglio; il quale, pur riaffermando la propria fede religiosa, si battuto con impegno per garantire la laicit della politica e dello Stato, anche in dura polemica con il Vaticano.

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Fino alle molte tragedie innescate, negli ultimi due decenni, dalle scelte di una parte del fondamentalismo islamico nella politica e/o nello scontro militare, nelluso globalizzato del terrorismo: dalla storia del FIS in Algeria, alle strategie di Al Qaeda, che dichiara di battersi per lunit della umma, per lislamizzazione degli stati, perch la loro legge centrale sia la sharia.
Il futuro

Lattuale leadership turca appare impegnata nellimplementazione del processo di avvicinamento allUnione Europea. Per molti anni una parte consistente dellopinione pubblica e politica liberale e di sinistra in Europa ha valutato come tollerabili gli eccessi nella funzione di tutoraggio compiuti dallesercito; pi spaventata del pericolo di un prevalere dellislamismo che attenta ai bisogni di democrazia e libert espressi da una parte crescente della societ civile. Anche una parte della sinistra politica interna alla Turchia stessa ha sostenuto interpretazioni di questo genere; perdendo il rapporto con importanti settori pi moderni e dinamici nella societ. Oggi la leadership politica della Turchia impegnata in unimpresa complessa, come quella della revisione della Costituzione. Molti sostengono che lUnione Europea, anche per le note riserve da parte di alcuni tra i membri pi importanti sullentrata della Turchia, sovente alzi lasticella del salto in alto mentre latleta sta gi correndo. Come Paralleli siamo convinti che: 1. vanno chiarite molto bene le ulteriori condizioni legate ai diritti civili e politici del paese cos come vanno sostenuti gli sforzi per una normalizzazione pacifica della situazione di Cipro; 2. importante sostenere questo processo di avvicinamento, dando, nuovamente, il messaggio di un grande interesse dellUE allentrata della Turchia; 3. scommettere sul ruolo geopolitico importante che una Turchia matura, dal punto di vista democratico, pu giocare nel rapporto tra lUE e il Mediterraneo; esempio importante di un paese a prevalente cultura islamica

con modello di democrazia Occidentale; 4. scommettere sulla possibilit di importanti ritmi di sviluppo, anche economico e sociale, quando la sua economia e la sua organizzazione sociale fossero maggiormente integrate con quelle dellUnione Europea; 5. lentrata della Turchia nellUE potrebbe avere come effetto anche quello di consolidare le tendenze gi presenti per una maggior autonomia delle comunit musulmane presenti in Europa, per una cultura islamica europea che sia protagonista di un accordo forte con la modernit, anche indebolendo i legami ideologici con le culture delle comunit islamiche nei paesi di origine. Siamo convinti che guardare ad un futuro di convivenza pacifica, con reciproca influenza e contaminazione tra popoli, culture e nazioni diverse una condizione essenziale nel Mediterraneo. Forse perch siamo figli di culture politiche e storiche, ferme nei principi democratici, relativiste e razionaliste nel concreto operare, pensiamo siano molto importanti le direzioni che i processi storici ci rimandano. Con molti limiti, ma riteniamo che la direzione messa in luce in questi ultimi anni vada valorizzata. Siamo convinti che la Turchia sia un nodo centrale di questa prospettiva e che essa stessa di fronte a diverse possibilit strategiche per il futuro: diventare un importante ponte tra lEuropa e i paesi delle rive africane e asiatiche del Mediterraneo; oppure guardare a un suo ruolo di leadership, con nuove forme di alleanza da costruire, nellAsia Centrale e nel Medio Oriente; e, come tale, interloquire con lUnione Europea. Questa seconda scelta potrebbe facilmente spingere la Turchia ad accentuare il proprio volto islamista e a diminuire quello europeo/democratico. Anche la funzione di piattaforma centrale per la difesa/ offesa militare nei confronti dellex Unione Sovietica, si molto affievolita dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino. Noi siamo tra coloro che, in passato, hanno ritenuto un errore politico grave non gestire politicamente, non sostenere i timidi tentativi di superare i confini difficilmente

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accettabili della democrazia nellIran degli Ayatollah, portata avanti, tra mille contraddizioni e grande cautela, anni fa, dal Presidente Khatami. Il risultato non stato positivo. Siamo tra coloro che preferirebbero non fossero fatti errori analoghi (pur in un contesto molto differente) nel caso della Turchia. In sostanza, crediamo che vada rimessa al centro la politica con visioni lunghe.

SECULARIZATION IN TURKEY: WOMEN AND ISLAM

di Fulya Atacan

Religious groups/organizations operate in a particular context, which is composed of social, political and economic conditions, at a certain historical moment. Religion becomes important when it is organized and it has gained importance as a political actor in the power structure of any given society. The roles played by different religious organizations in the socio-political structure of a given country or the positions held by them in the power struggles are various. At this point, not only the structure and the ideas of the religious group, but also the social, political and legal structure of the country and the international conjuncture become important as components of the change in these groups. The relations among different religious groups (internal and external) and between these groups and the State must be examined.

Religious groups and the State

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The characteristics of these relations may show differences with respect to different religious organizations.
Islam and its transformation in Turkey

Islam in contrast to Christianity has no church-like organization meaning that an individual can be a Muslim without being a member of any religious organization. But it does not mean that there are no religious organizations in Islam. Most of the time what is presented as Islam is actually one of these religious organizations. These organizations represent different forms of Islam but not Muslims in general. There are different interpretations of Islam in different groups; particularly if you consider religion as a living religion in the widest sense you will be faced with various forms of Islam. Actually, talking about one unique Islam is an essentialist approach which implies that Islam has never changed and will not be changed. This approach is usually adopted by right-wing politicians and some Islamists in order to justify their political actions. After World War II, agriculture in Turkey has been modernized using machinery, irrigation and fertilizers. The outcome of this modernization was a process of transition from the self-sufficient agricultural community to cash cropping. This gave rise to migration to big cities. This, in turn, resulted in large-scale structural change. It is impossible to expect religion to remain unaffected by these structural changes. Thus, religion has passed through a process of change and differentiation involving its organizational structure, its world view, its values and behavioral patterns. This process of change resulted in the disentanglement of religion and tradition and it ascribed to religion a new status within the differentiated, diversified and reorganized social structure. Religion has assumed a new position with a new content in the changing social structure of Turkey1. In this process, on the one hand, privatization of religion has increased and on the other hand, religion has gained public influence. When privatization is referred to as the rise of pluralist and voluntary religion among individuals, religious groups have started to be involved in social welfare, health care etc. in order to maintain their influencei2. In the differentiated social structure, Islamic groups, based on lower, lower middle and higher middle strata reproduce Islam as a political ideology. The differentiation among ideologies in general creates the need for Islamists to differentiate and redefine themselves from the others, particularly from the nationalist ones. This situation naturally gives rise to different

Islamic ideologies. In Turkey today it is impossible to talk about only one Islamic ideology. This differentiation based on Islam reflects the social stratification of these groups. On the other hand, Islamic ideologies have to compete with secular ones. With an increasing level of education, the wide spread use of mass media, rapid urbanization, and the changes in life styles, it is impossible to answer the needs of some groups by relying on strict, traditional Islamic ideology. Therefore, Islamic groups become more flexible and their ideology changes allowing bigger portions from different groups in society to adhere to it. Religion has also undergone a very important change at the organizational level. Islamic groups have organized themselves as a political party, have participated in the competitive political system and have organized various institutions, associations, endowments etc. in the society. A totally new element in these organizations is women. Islamist women are active in all these organizations. As I mentioned above, a process of transition from the self-sufficient agricultural community to cash cropping gave rise to migration to big cities. Migration from villages to big cities has started at the end of the 1950s. When people migrated to the big cites they did not have any work experiences or education to fit into the urban occupational structure. They were not familiar with urban life and they could not find the mechanisms or institutions which would have provided them some services like training for jobs, finding a house or solutions to their problems. So, they had to create their own strategies and mechanisms for adjustment. Migrants certainly did not change their values or interaction patterns just because they migrated to big cities. Expeasants using the values or interaction patterns in their baggage have developed new survival strategies in the form of clientelistic networks in big cities. In this context, Sufi orders and Islamic groups have reproduced themselves as important social security mechanisms mainly for the migrants. These religious groups worked in different ways to answer the needs of the migrants3. The members of the Sufi orders and different Islamic groups have brought their religious beliefs and organizations into the big cities and they have reproduced them in this context and consequently have made the continuation of these organizations possible in the big cities. The network brought by the ex-peasants is not only a religious network, but also a solidarity network functioning in the cities.

Islam and women

Religious networks: social security mechanism

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Economic re-structuring process

It is a well-known fact that migrants utilize different networks (like kinship and hemerilik, being from the same place with another person) to overcome the difficulties in their basic needs in big cities. In this framework, the religious networks are an important social security mechanism which has started in the place where the members were born and has continued in the city. If one bears in mind that most of the first generation migrants work as unskilled labour, artisans and small businessmen in the big cities, it will be clear that it is quite difficult for them to abandon this network easily. The economic re-structuring process initiated by the 1980 military government and followed by the other centerright parties which created new opportunities for some to move up the social ladder also caused for some, particularly the old middle-class, to go down. According to this neoconservative economic policy, the state is so powerful in the economic life of Turkey and it should be pacified and the state should abandon the regulatory role. Although they were inefficient in many ways, the social security mechanisms, which were provided by the state in the framework of the welfare state, were weakened using the discourse of neo-conservatism. When it became accepted that state interference, as a regulatory force, is not needed in many areas, the situation created many opportunities for new aggressive entrepreneurs. As a result of the same economic policies, the gap between the rich and the poor has widened enormously. In this context, class differences once more become more visible and the relationship between the poor and the rich became cause of tension. Among the members of Islamic groups, some of them have used new opportunities and religious networks to climb the social ladder. Class differences among the members have become more visible. Class differences is not a problem, it is rather acceptable for many members as long as the chance of upward mobility is open or is seen a real option by them. Upward mobility was a sign of progress or real faith until very recently. But it seems that class differences will be conceived as a problem by the some Islamic groups or by the some members of these groups. It is evident that today there is a socio-economic differentiation among the members of Islamic groups. This differentiation can also be observed in their life styles, political preferences and values. In addition to this, people experience a differentiation between small town and big city. Different socio-political contexts in these two levels

lead to some changes in the daily lives of the members. The complex web of interaction between these different levels, on the one hand creates new cleavages among the members, and on the other hand leads to new ways of coping with these changes. While Islamic groups have worked on this social structure and have tried to overcome the tensions and differentiation within themselves, changes in the political life of Turkey over the two-decades have also had a direct effect on the Islamic groupings. The most important political developments in this sense are the 1980 military coup dtat, which adopted a new official ideology called Turkish Islamic synthesis in order to overcome political divisions in the society and to curb the leftist movements in the Cold War era; the 28 February 1987 military intervention in which the military abandoned the idea that religion can be used to consolidate society, whereby Turkish Islamic synthesis lost its prominent role as an official ideology; and AKPs success in the 2002 general elections which has given different Islamic groups new opportunities to consolidate their positions in the political structure of Turkey. In this complex web of interaction among social differentiation, diversification, reorganization of society and religious groupings women are also affected by these changes. I will concentrate on the story of two women in order to explain this complex process. There is no doubt that women became more educated and relatively active in the professional life of Turkey in the last 50 years. As a result of structural change women have left their homes and have gained better education, thus becoming professionals. This profound change has added new dimensions to the discussions about the social status and covering of women which have always been the most debated issues in Islam. Many Islamic groups emphasize the particular verses of the Quran (XXIV, En-nr sura, verse 31; XXXIII Azhap sura, verse 59, 60), which refer to the extent to which a woman has to cover her body. Different Islamic groups interpreted these verses in different ways and argued about this issue both with one another and with secular Muslims who have a great concern for the issue. The first woman I will talk about is a daughter of a Sufi sheikh who claims to be a descendent of the Prophet. She is a middle-aged woman who was born in a small town in eastern Anatolia. She grew up in an atmosphere marked by a one party system and by Kemalism. Her father was very fond of education and sent her to a secular school. She had

The Turkish Islamic synthesis

Women: the new status

A point of view: the housewife, Aye -daughter of a Sufi sheikh

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The Sufi order and the emergence of a new elite order

her religious education at home from her father and she also graduated from a high school for girls. At that time, this level of education was quite high for women particularly in a small town in eastern Anatolia. After graduation she was married to one of her fathers disciples who is a doctor. Later they migrated to Istanbul. Aye believes that her main objective in life is to raise her children according to her family tradition. Since both her family and herself are the descendent of the prophet, they cannot behave like ordinary people and she must transmit special behavioral codes to the next generation. Actually, when these codes are examined, one cannot find striking differences from any middle class family except the pride of the family history. At the point of transmitting the tradition to new generations women play an important role. They always emphasize their ancestors - descendants of the Prophet- in order to teach the younger members of the family their heritage. This gives them a sense of being different. Young boys who have more chance to mix with other people from different strata seem careless about this secret tie. But the girls, who spent most of their times at home, consider themselves as the protector of the familys honorable heritage for the coming generations. Aye is a housewife. Since her husband earns a considerable wage she says she does not need to work. She believes that women may work if their family is in need of their income or if they have a respectable profession like a lawyer or a doctor. According to her, if women have higher education, there is no reason to keep them at home. But when they get married and, in particular, if they have a child it is better for them to stay at home and look after their children. She thinks that education is a must for women because there has always been a big difference between the educated and uneducated. The Sufi order, in which Ayes life is shaped, was organized in a very traditional way in the 1950s. Because of economic difficulties, many members of the order migrated to big cities. A group of people among these members has moved up to higher social strata via education or accumulation of capital. This led to the emergence of a new elite in the order. The elite of the group has earned a place for itself among the conservative circles in cities. Some of these members have powerful positions in the state bureaucracy and some of them became businessmen in the city and they have also enjoyed close relations with Turgut zal who was the Prime Minister and President of Turkey respectively from 1983 to

1989, and between 1989 and 1993. This new elite, who have higher socio-economic status, also gain a powerful position in the Sufi order network. City life, nonetheless, has started to affect the value system of the group. The new elite has become more conservative in respect to women compared to the members in the small town or village. Women members of the group in the small town refuse to cover themselves with a black cloth, which is traditionally used in villages of that region. They consider this type of covering as a symbol of peasantry. They use headscarves and wear them in the traditional way. They severely criticised turban, which is a modern and new way of covering the head, saying that it is political and symbolises membership of the Welfare Party as well as fanaticism. They also consider chador as the symbol of the radical Islamic groups whose members are part of a conspiracy trying to divide Turkey. Members in the big cities, on the contrary, consider the headscarf and the traditional way of wearing it as an indication of their provincial past and they prefer to wear turban in its place. While this type of covering represents more conservative tendencies in the group, it also indicates their integration into city. After migrating to the city, Aye has also started to wear turban - like expensive headscarves. Aye has great respect from the members of the group. She actually inherited this high status. Although she has an authority role in the group, she does not see any reason to mobilise women for the religious organization. According to her, women always find a place in Sufi orders, they can be a member of any particular Sufi order and they may progress along the line of orders hierarchy. However, to mobilise women for political aims or to put them in the frontline in political protests is unacceptable. Politics is the field of men. In contrast to Aye, Elif is an active member of a radical Islamic group. She was born in a village in central Anatolia, her family migrated to Germany as a guest worker and then she joined them at the age of six. She learned German from other kids when they were playing with but she did not attend school there. She eventually obtained her primary school diploma in Turkey. She had no knowledge or idea about Islam until she got married. She married at the age of 22 with a religious man from village origins in the eastern part of Anatolia. In the beginning they had some problems because she was not religious at all. She claims that when she began to learn more about Islam and womens rights

The use of headscarf

Another point of view. Elif,active member of a radical islamic group

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Uselessness of secular education

Lower class position

in Islam, she became religious and decided to wear chador. Even though she has no formal education, she is very ambitious and self-confident and she is one of the petty female leaders in this radical group. Elif thinks that secular education is not necessary for women. This is because they are not taught Islam and because coeducation is not acceptable from the Islamic point of view. She claims that according to Islam, women do not have to work; it is the responsibility of men to support family. Similarly, women do not have to do housework. Women have only one responsibility: to take care of the children and raise them according to Islam. Instead of doing housework women should work for Islam. When working for Islam is the Muslim womans priority, she has to deliver the massage of Islam to everyone. This practically means that she can be out of home for long hours. She actually gives sermons and speeches in private homes and group meetings, she participates in protests against the ban of head covering at universities, she collects money or aid in kinds for the needy and for people in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq etc. She leaves home about nine in the morning and comes back at five or six. Since she is working for Islam, her absence from home is acceptable and not a subject of dispute. Elif has earned respect in the group and she wants to keep this status. Religious activities of the group gave her a chance to be out of home and establish herself as a petty leader of the women branch. For her this is irreversible. She cannot sit at home any more because she found Islam and she had to fight for it. Being part of the group is more important than daily work or secular education. Actually, she has neither education nor profession but by being one of the leaders of the women branch she has some form of job. Although it is not paid in cash, it is paid in respect and authority. Members of this group have peasant origin and are mainly lower class. Many of them have very poor education and lower income. In other words, they do not have higher status or wealth. Elif and none of them believe that they can achieve these in current Turkey. For them, the only possible way to change their life is to change the current sociopolitical system. According to this group in an Islamic state they do not have to suffer from economic difficulties and/ or lack of status. In the Islamic state they will have respect as well as better life conditions. In the case of Aye, the maternal role of women are

emphasised and she has no problem with her position in society. She also has no fear to lose her high status. But in the case of Elif the situation is different and being a member of an Islamic group gave her an opportunity to become someone important. Her Islamist activities justify her absence from home, give her leadership roles and allow her to be someone who has a say and who could change the society. She cannot afford to lose her current position. Although many Islamic groups, which mobilize women for political aims or group organization, cannot afford to put women aside, they still defend the division of labour in the family. They claim that men and women are different by nature and at the same ime they complement each other. There might be some misbehaving which emanates from people in the history of Islam. The basic principle is to have just division of labour in the family; each side has weak and strong features and if people adopt this complementary role many families would not have the problems that many are facing now. In this point, womens main role is the reproduction of humankind. They define women as mothers so their first responsibility is to stay at home and raise children. This approach can be accepted by Aye very easily but Elif has some problems with it. She puts the jihad, fight for Islam, at the centre of her life. Consequently, she considers her Islamic activities outside her home more important than reproduction. Certain sacrifices are needed to be successful in her cause. After achieving her status with her own efforts, she is not willing to leave this position in the name of being a good mother. In the last two decades, many female members of Islamic groups have learnt how to make politics and have developed the skills of politics. Some of them are very well aware that they are not given important responsibilities to formulate policies and strategies. Like other political parties, they are not represented in the central hierarchy of Islamic parties or Islamic organizations. Some of these Islamist women are asking for more power in different organizations. Their experiences led them to question patriarchy in Islamic tradition and to adopt some of the feminist arguments in their discussions. Although many of them do not declare themselves as feminist in public, in private conversations they will explain you that feminists are right to criticise traditional gender roles and patriarchy in Turkish society.
Women: mother or fighter for Islam

Women, political skills and patriarchy in Islam

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In conclusion, we can say that the social dynamics behind the Islamic groupings has changed over the last decade in Turkey. Today tensions in different levels are inseparable parts of these groupings. On the one hand, the urbanization process reached a level that new opportunities for new migrants are very limited but for these groups, Islamic groupings are still an important social security mechanism. On the other hand, some members of these groupings, who have moved to upper strata, have different social, economic and, sometimes, political preferences than the groups themselves. Class differences have become a sensitive topic that have to be dealt with within Islamic groups. Islamist women who belong to different social strata interpret and practice Islam in different forms. In this context it is impossible to talk about one unique, coherent position taken by Islamist women in respect to the social and political role of women in society. In other words, if we ignore the complexity of this fact, we will not be able to analyse these different positions and social dynamics behind this complexity.

UNPACKING EUROPEAN DISCOURSES: CONDITIONALITY, IMPACT AND PREJUDICE IN EU-TURKEY RELATIONS

di Nathalie Tocci

1. Atacan F., Sosyal Deisme ve Tarikat, Cerrahiler, Hil Yayin, Istanbul, 1990. 2. Bayer P., Religion and Globalization, Sage Publications, London, 1994, p. 71. 3. Atacan F., Migration, Change and the Tarikat, in Les Annales de lAutre Islam, 1999, n. 6, pp. 91-97.

Since Turkey was accorded candidacy, EU-Turkey relations have become the focus of growing academic and policy interest both in Turkey and in several member states. A large body of research papers has been published and long series of conferences, seminars and workshops organized, debating the intricacies of EU-Turkey relations. Surprisingly perhaps, although the political decision to grant Turkey candidacy was taken in 1999, the research interest that followed largely focussed on whether Turkey should join the European Union rather than on how Turkeys accession could take place. Hence, although the fundamental political decision on the eligibility of Turkeys membership was already taken, the research that followed concentrated on the adequacy of that decision rather than on the nuts and bolts of Turkeys accession process.

Filling the gap between research and public debate on EU-Turkey relations

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Moreover, the valuable research results produced in recent years have by and large failed to inform and influence the political, media and wider public debate on EU-Turkey relations. On a whole, the quality of the debate on Turkey in the EU has been rather poor. In some member states, there is hardly a debate at all, and a lack of information prevails. In other member states, the debate gathered steam after 2002, that is three years after the launch of Turkeys accession process. Yet there where a debate exists, it has evolved on a parallel plane detached from the growing body of research on EU-Turkey relations, and it is often poisoned by misperception, misinformation and at times outright prejudice. The main exponents of this debate, whether in favour or against Turkeys accession, often have little or no acquaintance with Turkey and rarely ground their arguments on existing research. Likewise in Turkey, while the public debate on the EU began much earlier and has enjoyed far greater resonance than in member states, those with a deep understanding of the Union and the implications of Turkeys membership are still a minority. The underlying rationale for this report follows from these observations. There is a visible disconnect between the research on EU-Turkey relations and the political, media and public debates and opinions in both Turkey and EU member states. The major contention advanced here is that the reason for this disconnect lies in the fact that public debates on Turkey largely act as proxies for debates and views on either Turkey or the EU, rather than on the relationship between them. Within Turkey, the EU debate mirrors different political views about the desirable political, social and economic development of Turkey itself. Within member states, the debate on Turkey largely reflects different ideas about the desirable evolution of the Union, and, in turn, of the member state in question.
Origins and meanings of the discourses on Turkey question

revealing how different interests, perceptions and at times prejudices colour and condition these debates, triggering opinions both in favour and against Turkeys accession. We try to disentangle where possible the content of these debates from the political views, perceptions and prejudices in which they are embedded. We also seek to understand the extent to which these perceptions and prejudices are uninformed or informed, that is whether they stem from an absolute lack of knowledge and contact, or whether they are founded on selective information and ad hoc contact. From a policy perspective, disentangling the two is of utmost importance in so far as informed and uninformed perceptions and misperceptions often require radically different remedies. The benefit of this exercise, we believe, is first and foremost that of gaining a deeper understanding of the motivations, assumptions and significance of these debates, including those which may appear as the most irrational, populist or even nonsensical. We hope this understanding can contribute to narrowing the mistrust and miscommunication which has developed, particularly in recent years, between Turkey and several member states. Mistrust fuels the tendency - especially in Turkey to presume that any argument has little meaning in and of itself, but simply reflects European prejudices and double standards against it. This reduces the credibility and transformative potential of EU conditionality, stifles the debate on both Turkeys inclusion and its exclusion from the EU, and reinforces misperceptions of Europe within Turkey. To narrow mistrust and miscommunication, we believe that the media holds a major role and responsibility. Beyond political elites and official policy circles, journalists in fact represent one of the prime target audiences of this project. Unlike politicians and officials, inevitably entangled in political deadlines and timetables, the media, together with academia and other segments of civil society, can be critical in bringing greater clarity to the EU-Turkey debate, elevating it beyond short-term political horizons and interests. By unpacking the discourse on conditionality and impact, we also wish to provide a tool for future policy research on EU-Turkey relations; a tool for presenting and disseminating research results in a language that resonates in different domestic contexts and can be more

Starting out from this premise, the aim of this report is not to present new research on a particular aspect of EUTurkey relations. Rather, it is to unpack the discourses within several member states on the Turkey question, seeking to understand from where these discourses derive and what their political significance is. In particular, we have selected two issues that occupy much of the space in the public debate on EU-Turkey relations, namely EU conditionality towards Turkey and the impact of Turkeys EU accession. We analyse conditionality and impact by

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fruitfully used to inform the public debate on Turkey. This debate, while belated and often misinformed, is now unstoppable. If it can be moulded into a more frank, open and enlightened discussion, it might become beneficial to the future evolution of EU-Turkey relations. It could concomitantly desensitize the political climate surrounding the Turkey question and foster a greater sense of joint responsibility and destiny.
Conditionality

EU accession conditionality - that is a policy whereby the successive steps in the accession process of a candidate country depend on the candidates fulfilment of specific conditions - is often presented in both the EU and Turkey as a purely technical and objective process. But is this really the case? And what are the implications of flagging the technical nature of an inherently political process such as conditionality? Within Turkey, the pro-EU political class and administration often portrays the technical nature of EU conditionality mainly in reference to the obligations embedded in the adoption of the acquis communautaire. Within the EU, the European Council has repeatedly affirmed the objectivity of conditionality, applied equally to all candidates at all times. Finland has insisted upon the objectivity and non-negotiability of the accession criteria, first and foremost the Copenhagen political criteria. A theoretically technical bureaucracy, the Commission, is moreover entrusted with the task of implementing conditionality by abiding to objective and non-political standards. The technical or objective character of conditionality is emphasized in Turkey and the EU for good reason. For conditionality to be taken seriously by the recipient party, it requires an aura of technicality and objectivity. This allows for the specification of clear and measurable benchmarks, for the effective monitoring of compliance, for a detached appraisal of performance and for an objective decision to proceed with the successive steps in the accession process. In other words, perceived objectivity allows for a game of mutual trust and dependable expectations between Turkey and the EU. Objective conditionality also encourages the de-politicization of sensitive political issues, making these more amenable to solution. Couching political conditionality in technical and seemingly objective

language has indeed helped desensitize and has made it possible to tackle problems that were formerly taboo in Turkey, such as the abolition of the death penalty or the liberalization of languages other than Turkish. More generally, the manner in which the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria was objectified through Commission progress reports and accession partnership recommendations in the run-up to the opening of accession negotiations, acted as a key external anchor to the reform process in Turkey. This reform process, while still incomplete and deficient in many respects, is unprecedented in the history of republican Turkey. However, highlighting the technicality of conditionality jeopardizes the ability of EU institutions, member states as well as reformist forces in Turkey to tackle clearly political problems in Turkey. While effective in promoting broad-brush individual human rights and democratic reform, conditionality has been largely silent about specific political problems in Turkey, such as the ten percent electoral threshold, the return of the internally displaced, the amnesty to former PKK militants or the headscarf issue. Furthermore, when moving beyond the established area of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms and turning to more complex questions such as minority rights or the role of the armed forces, the EU itself displays a variety of different models. In the case of minority rights for example, the Union presents diametrically opposed models, ranging from the Belgian quasi-confederal system to the Greek or the French emphasis on the unitary nature of the state and nation. Added to the need to forge EU consensus when identifying conditions and conditionalities, this raises the difficulty of clear-cut and agreed upon EU policies in these areas. In other words, there where political problems cannot be automatically resolved through legislative reforms in the established area of individual human rights, technical conditionality, which hinges on an established and uniform basis of law and practice across Europe, cannot be the answer in Turkey. EU conditionality is also relatively ineffective in promoting change in Turkey in terms of practical implementation. While successful in triggering two sets of constitutional reforms and eight legal harmonization packages, conditionality has been far less successful in
and pitfalls

... potential

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terms of actual implementation on the ground. Simply put, this is because implementation requires a far deeper process of change than a simple elite re-calculation of the costs and benefits induced by EU conditionality. Beyond a change in laws and institutions, implementation requires a genuine absorption of these new rules by society, altering its political, economic and social behaviour. It entails a radical transformation of the interests, beliefs and ways of doing things of all sectors of society, including those underground sectors in Turkey (the deep state - derin devlet) that still represent fundamental obstacles to deeprooted progressive change in the country. Finally, underlining the technical nature of conditionality after the opening of negotiations means loosening the link between the accession process and political reforms in Turkey. For all candidate countries, the accession process requires the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria before the opening of negotiations. During accession negotiations instead, conditionality refers principally to the adoption of the obligations of the acquis. Hence, the opening and provisional closure of the thirty-five chapters of negotiations, should call for fulfilment by the candidate country of specific and spelled-out acquis-related conditions. Yet in practice, compliance with the wideranging Copenhagen political criteria is all but complete by the time accession negotiations begin. In the 2004 enlargement round, notable cases in point were the rights of the Russian minorities in the Baltics or the reunification of Cyprus. The same applies to Turkey. Indeed when proposing the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004, the Commission explicitly stated that Ankara only sufficiently fulfilled the political criteria and that much work remained to be done. Yet beyond stating that the Commission would continue to monitor reforms and engage in a political dialogue with Turkey that would be fed into negotiations, little detail was provided as to how the accession negotiations would be conditioned to ongoing political reforms in Turkey. Instead, the specific conditions and benchmarks laid down by the Commission in the screening process referred to the nuts and bolts of the negotiation chapters. Having highlighted the technical nature of political conditionality up to that time however, when member states such as France, Austria, Greece and southern Cyprus

continued criticizing Turkeys political shortcomings and when EU institutions linked progress in Turkeys accession negotiations to political conditions (e.g., eight chapters were suspended in 2006 on the grounds of Turkeys refusal to open its air and sea ports to southern Cyprus), this was harshly criticized in Turkey. Turks argued that the EU was now attempting to politicize political conditionality, thereby undermining its legitimacy and credibility. In other words, EU actors fell into their own rhetorical trap concerning the technicality of political conditionality. Having emphasized its technicality of conditionality and the Commissions prime role in the process, when several member states began voicing their conditionality concerns, these were read as blatant signs of discrimination in Turkey. Hence, while the emphasis on technical conditionality had been effective in spurring reforms in Turkey until 2005, it became powerful ammunition in the hands of those resisting change in Turkey thereafter. The accession process with Turkey now risks proceeding slowly and with interruptions, and being progressively emptied of its political transformationist potential. But not only is the articulation of political conditionality as a technical process problematic in terms of effectiveness, it also fails to capture the realities of conditionality, thereby fuelling misunderstanding and mistrust between the EU and Turkey. Conditionality is an inherently political process when viewed from the perspective of the candidate country. As the precedent of the eastern enlargement shows, the manner in which conditionality works itself into domestic dynamics, triggering political, economic and social change, is above all political. Conditionality changes the internal power balances within a candidate country between political actors with different worldviews and aspirations. It does so both by altering the legal and institutional framework in which domestic actors operate and by empowering one set of actors over another, as the ousting of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in 1997 or the election of Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat in 2005 demonstrate. When it comes to Turkey, it is thus of key importance for EU actors to understand how conditionality plays into Turkish politics. It is the changing internal balance between conservatives and reformists, establishment and periphery, nationalists and liberals, civilians and military,
Conditionality as a political process

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or between secularists and Islamists which determines the nature and pace of Turkeys reform process. The task for the EU is thus to understand how its conditionality, coupled with other domestic (e.g., elections), regional (e.g., the war in Iraq) and wider international developments (e.g., the war on terror), influences these internal Turkish balances and ensuing reform efforts. By emphasizing the technical rather than political nature of conditionality, many of these domestic intricacies are lost. This leaves EU actors at a loss in trying to understand when and why conditionality succeeds in producing specific results in Turkey and therefore how conditionality can be refined to empower reformist actors in the country and obtain better reform results in the future.
Conditionality and UE foreign policy goals

Conditionality is also a highly political process when viewed from an EU perspective. Despite the much acclaimed objective nature of conditionality, conditionality is a political means for the EU to pursue its foreign policy goals, particularly those with an alleged normative content such as the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights. In so far as foreign policy is a prime area in which the European publics would like to see the EU develop, an effective policy of EU conditionality can also help bringing the Union closer to its citizens. More specifically, the EUs interpretation of its normative goals and accompanying political conditions inevitably changes in response to the changing goals and interests of the member states and the changing political, economic and security-related developments in the neighbourhood. Hence for example, in the case of the eastern enlargement, the Commission flagged minority rights conditionality in view of the minority and border tensions in the Baltics, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. In the case of the Western Balkans, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia became an explicit condition for progress in the stabilization and association process and in the ensuing accession process. More precisely, some member states with particular interests in certain candidate countries (e.g., Germany viz Poland, Finland viz Estonia, or Slovenia viz Croatia) inserted and channelled their national requests into the EUs framework of political conditionality. Likewise in the case of Turkey, the interests and views

of several member states have led to internal EU pushes to condition Turkeys accession process to obligations relating to Armenia, the Aegean and Cyprus. Other member states have placed specific attention on conditionalities regarding questions such as womens rights, the rights of non-Muslim minorities, the abolition of article 301 of the Turkish penal code and civil-military relations, while neglecting others, such as Turkeys socioeconomic inequalities, the rights of its Muslim minorities, or the transformation of the informal economy. The choice of which conditions to emphasize, how to interpret them and what benchmarks to set is inevitably subjective and political. It results from specific national interests, debates and worldviews and the precise regional and international context in which enlargement unfolds. At the EU-wide level instead, the crisis over the Constitutional Treaty, a perceived enlargement fatigue and widespread fears of expanding towards the turbulent East, have all raised the need to tighten accession conditions towards candidate Turkey amongst EU elites and publics alike. In other words, the politicization of conditionality is inevitable the product of changing national debates and interests, and the manner in which these intersect in the EUs complex decision-making machinery. The point here is not whether EU conditionality on these and other questions is viewed, legitimately or not, as misplaced or discriminatory. Rather, it is that changing political conditions, interpretations and weights attributed to the fulfilment or violation of these conditions inevitably result from changing national interests, the evolving EU project and developments in the regional and international context in which EU policies are formulated. Failing to appreciate this fact by overemphasizing the objectivity or technicality of an inherently political process such as conditionality risks increasing miscommunication and mistrust between the EU and Turkey. The task is that of retaining as much as possible the quality of credibility engendered by technical conditionality, without concealing the political attributes of this policy; attributes which if effectively channelled and articulated can serve the double purpose of helping transform candidate Turkey and bringing the European publics closer to the Union. The discourse on Turkeys impact in Brussels and other
EU conditionality may be misplaced or discriminatory?

Which conditions to emphasize?

The impact of Turkey on the European Union

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European capitals often takes for granted the answer to a fundamental question: the impact of what?. More precisely, European politicians, the media, civil society and the Commission (in its 2004 Impact Study on Turkey) all unmistakeably focus on the impact of Turkeys inclusion in the EU. As detailed below, some actors focus on Turkeys impact on the EUs institutional structure and budget, others discuss the impact on EU public opinion or migration flows, while others still debate the impact on European policies. What all these debates have in common is their focus on the costs and benefits of Turkeys inclusion in the EU.
Impact... of what?

Focussing on inclusion is the natural corollary of the enlargement policy, whose declared intent is full membership. The accession process - as opposed to the neighbourhood policy or alternative proposals for privileged or unprivileged partnerships with Turkey - is expressly intended to pave the way for Turkeys entry into the EU. Yet given the long-term and uncertain nature of the accession process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed, as spelt out in Turkeys Accession Negotiations Framework, it is nonetheless notable that hardly anyone in the EU raises the question with respect to the opposite scenario: the impact of Turkeys exclusion from the EU. For the EU, the consequences of deciding to exclude Turkey from the EU are equally, if not more important than those of deciding to include Turkey. Especially if the decision to exclude Turkey occurs outside the rule-bound and technical framework of the accession process (e.g., through referendum results in France or Austria), the implications for the EUs credibility, its political identity, its economy and its foreign policy would be as, if not more significant than the impact of Turkeys inclusion. The implications would relate both to how Europeans view and understand themselves, and to how outsiders perceive the nature, mandate and spirit of the Union. The implications of Turkeys exclusion from the EU receive far greater attention in Turkey itself. Perhaps in view of the Turkish publics lack of confidence that the accession process will result in full membership, far more often than EU member states and institutions Turks debate the consequences of Turkeys exclusion. Here, the different worldviews within Turkey visibly come to

the fore. Turkish liberal and progressive forces fear that if the Union ultimately turns Ankara a cold shoulder, Turkey could see the re-empowerment of nationalist and conservative forces, moving back on the progress made in political and economic reforms. Turkish secularists and establishment forces warn against an impending resurgence of political Islam. On the other end of the spectrum, Turkish Eurosceptics, nationalists and conservatives highlight Ankaras geostrategic alternatives both across the Atlantic, in the Middle East and Eurasia, as well as further afield towards India or China; they emphasize the benefits of retaining full sovereignty over Turkeys development path, and thus downplay the costs of Turkeys exclusion from the EU. A second EU-Turkey question, which receives far greater attention in the EU, is that of the impact on what?. Here the debate is often confusing and a definite cost-benefit balance sheet has not been convincingly presented. A clear cost-benefit calculus regarding Turkeys EU accession can only be speculative, given the impossibility of making precise impact assessments regarding an entry date lying sometime after 2014. It is unreasonable to expect a definite answer as to what Turkeys impact on EU institutions will be, when the EU itself is in a deep state of flux, and its constitutional status lies at a critical juncture with its future difficult to predict. By the same token, it is unreasonable to speculate on the precise levels of future Turkish immigration in other member states, given the pace of Turkeys political, economic and social development. This makes Turkey 2014 impossible to predict. It is even more unreasonable to attempt impact assessments in areas where both Turkish and EU variables are rapidly changing, such as in the realms of the economy and foreign policy. Moreover, a cost-benefit calculation can only be highly subjective, in so far as it hinges upon an a priori subjective choice of the specific areas upon which Turkeys accession will impact. In other words, responding to the question: impact on what?, depends upon a subjective view of which areas are deemed most important. In debating the impact of Turkeys membership, different actors within the EU and Turkey have focussed on very different issues. In the economic sphere, the discussion has focussed on a set of disparate issues ranging from the impact on the
Impact... on what?

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EUs role in the global economy to the impact on the EUs budget, labour markets and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In the political and social spheres, the discussion has also touched upon a large variety of questions, including Turkeys impact on European institutions, public opinion, foreign policy and political identity. What explains how different actors go about analysing and speculating about Turkeys future impact? As elaborated below, a useful key to understanding which aspects and spheres different actors focus on when debating the impact of Turkeys accession is to look at the different levels at which the debate takes place.
The impact of Turkeys accession on the EUs role in the world

the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East. Many also highlight how Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries carefully watch the evolution of EU-Turkey relations, focussing especially on the expected growth in the EUs actorness in these regions in view of Turkeys accession. A second level of analysis highlights the impact of Turkeys accession on the EUs internal institutional, political, social, cultural and economic set-up. Here the arguments emphasize the expected costs of Turkeys accession far more than the benefits. Beginning with institutions, both France and the Commission have placed much attention on the impact of Turkeys accession on EU institutions. Here the most commonly found arguments - which paradoxically resonate the most in France, whose no to the Constitutional Treaty triggered the Unions current crisis - is that the EU would function less with a greater number of member states, particularly large ones that allegedly do not share the Unions ill-defined esprit communautaire. Hence, even in the area of foreign policy, where the impact of Turkeys membership is normally associated with key benefits for the Union, the greater internal diversity brought about by Turkeys accession would arguably hinder the EUs external capabilities and actorness in the current institutional framework. Moreover, especially if demography is going to have growing weight in determining member states decision-making power, then the newest member state, Turkey, will also be the most important one, a situation which the Unions founding members, and France in particular, view with great unease. Hence, the argument goes, before even considering Turkeys membership, the Union has to put its house in order and equip itself with the necessary absorption capacity to digest Turkey and operate effectively. The Turkey question coupled with the post 2004 enlargement situation in the EU has in fact reawakened the long-standing widening versus deepening debate in Europe. Here, many exponents particularly in continental Western Europe adamantly espouse the view that, while not necessarily competing, enlargement raises the stakes in deepening the Union in order to assure its continued effectiveness. Others, and in particular the eastern European member states cast this reasoning into question. Enlargement alone
The impact of Turkeys accession on the Unions internal governance, society and economy

A first level is that of Turkeys impact on the EUs role in the world. Here the debate focuses predominantly on the economic and foreign policy domains. Those examining this level of analysis, including key constituencies in member states such as the UK, Finland, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey itself are rather positive about Turkeys expected impact, highlighting the assets that Turkeys membership would bring to the EUs role in international relations and the global economy. Turkeys growth, its rising productivity, its young and growing labour force, its rising trade levels and growing FDI inflows are brought to the fore, emphasizing how these would contribute to the fulfilment of the EU Lisbon agenda and better equip the Union to face rising competition from emerging economic giants such as India or China. Business and pro-EU political circles in Turkey, as well as key business constituencies in the EU with interests in Turkish markets also emphasize how these economic benefits would risk serious dilution if the EU were to insert permanent derogations to the full liberalization of the four freedoms for future member Turkey. Turkeys role as an energy and transport hub, facilitating the EUs much sought energy diversification is also underlined, especially by eastern European member states which remain almost entirely dependent on unpredictable Russian supplies, as well as by European energy companies with interests in transit routes through Turkey. Finally, political and civil society elites in member states like the UK, Greece, Finland, Poland and Slovenia, as well as the Commission or foreign policy specialists across Europe, highlight the assets that Turkeys inclusion could bring to bear upon the fledging European foreign policy, in terms of location, logistics and ties to neighbouring regions such as Russia,

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has not noticeably complicated the EUs institutional workings they argue. Intra-EU divisions hindering effective policy-making remain the ones between old member states. Several small member states such as Denmark or Finland have argued that it is easier to digest one big member than a number of small or micro states. They suggest that the entry of another large member state would make relatively little difference to the current balance between small and big. Finally others still, including the Commission, have highlighted that the EUs institutional and constitutional reform is expected to take place well before Turkeys entry, and that Turkeys accession process can act as a further external push factor inducing a successful EU reform process.
France and German positions

Yet the worries of many in France and in particular of French liberals go well beyond the concern that Turkeys accession would complicate the EUs institutional functioning. The fear - coupled with a strong sense of nostalgia for the past - is that Turkeys accession and ongoing enlargements will ring the death bell of the Unions federalist aspirations. More generally it would seal the end of the political project as conceived by the Communitys founding fathers, as well as the role that France played in that project. As European federalists would argue, it is only those who abhor the prospect of a federal Europe (e.g., British conservatives) or those who have lost all hope in it (e.g., German Christian Democrats or the Italian centre-left), who may be prepared to accept Turkey in the European fold. Indeed according to some, if deepening were to become directly correlated to widening, some anti-federalists who are now favourable to Turkeys accession would turn against Turkeys EU aspirations. Their Euroscepticism would easily trump their support for Turkeys accession. France is also at the helm of arguments doubting Turkeys membership on the grounds of contrary public opinion. Here the argument takes different tones. Some argue that the need to rectify the Unions disconnect from the demands, desires and expectations of EU publics is as great as ever. The French and Dutch nos to the Constitutional Treaty are attributed to the rejection by European societies of an increasingly elitist EU project. By the same token, others argue that enlargement fatigue, first and foremost with respect to Turkey, is

partly explained by the inability of EU elites to engage the publics in the debate over the eastern enlargement. The Union, it is argued, went through its biggest enlargement ever in 2004 and 2007, with the entry of twelve member states which almost two decades ago belonged to and constituted Europes much feared other. A plethora of Western Balkan states and Turkey are now channelled in the same accession process. Beside them are a number of aspiring applicants, insistently knocking at the Unions door. Yet all this has happened and continues to happen without the remotest engagement of the public, a lack of engagement which has rendered Brussels ever more alien and distant in the minds of EU citizens. It is with these arguments in mind, that some in France, for instance, criticize the Commissions inertial and technical progress in enlargement and its alleged stifling of the Europeanwide debate on Turkeys accession. Yet others, including Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, rebuke many of these points. Rehn, in a speech at the University of Helsinki on 27 November 2006, forcefully suggested that the political debate on Turkey runs the risk of undermining the credibility of EU policies towards Turkey. If the Unions right hand lectures Turkey on the Copenhagen criteria arguing that these are the sine qua non for EU entry, while the left hand engages in highly politicized and often populist debates over the desirability of Turkeys entry, then the Unions credibility in Turkey risks being seriously undermined. Others argue that the need to engage with European publics is certainly real and pressing and is, incidentally, a need that has always accompanied the highly elitist EU project. Yet those very actors who keep reminding of the importance of taking European public opinion into account are doing little to insert greater clarity and cool-headedness in the European public debate on Turkey. Less still do they foster European solidarity towards Turkey. Far more often, raising the issue of contrary public opinion, and calling for national referenda on the Turkey question, appears to be more of a shield to hide the absence of strong leadership than a genuine concern for the Unions democratic deficit. Turning to a different aspect of Turkeys expected impact on European societies, another common strand of arguments links Turkeys accession to the EUs multiculturalism and the question of a European identity.
Enlargement Commissioners position

The question of the European identity

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As the cases of Denmark and Germany highlight, in public debate, Turkeys integration in the EU is mirrored to the integration of Muslim migrant communities in Europe, with positive and negative repercussions. Here views differ depending on the different understandings of a European identity. To those highlighting the essentialist features of a European identity, including culture, religion and history, as many in Austria or the European Peoples Party do, Turkeys accession represents the nemesis of a much-sought European identity. Turkey, it is argued, cannot integrate into the EU, just as non-European Muslim migrants have failed to integrate into their respective host European countries. Hence, accepting Turkey into the European fold would entail abandoning aspirations to forge the Unions identity, defined through history, culture and religion. Others, including key constituencies in the UK and more recently in Germany, refute the claims that a European identity is and can be premised on monocultural interpretations. They emphasize the importance of fostering unity in diversity, encouraging the development of an EU identity based precisely on multiculturalism. Following a different line instead, several commentators in France doubt Turkeys membership not on the basis of its different religion or culture per se. Rather, they express concerns on the one hand about Turkish secularism which is viewed as contrary to the French understanding of laicit, and on the other hand about the threat of resurging political Islam in Turkey.
Identity and borders

The definition of the EUs borders, the argument goes, is a critical political step in the formation of a European identity. Yet the delineation of these borders is conceptualized as an arbitrary and purely political fact, rather than as a preordained inevitability. In other words, for reasons of political interest and identity, the European polity would choose not to extend its borders to Iraq, Iran and Syria by refuting Turkeys accession. The EUs borders would be determined on the basis of their functional political utility in pursuing the Unions interests, defining a European identity and allowing the European polity to live in a comfort zone, protected by friendly buffer states such as Turkey. The underlying political outlook permeating these views is strongly Eurocentric. Europes world is predominantly confined to itself and its neighbouring other, in contrast to the more global outlook espoused by arguments highlighting the EUs role in the world. A last set of arguments relating to the impact of Turkeys accession on the internal nature and functioning of the EU relates to the economic realm. As opposed to the rather pro-Turkey arguments embedded in analyses focussing on the EUs role in the global economy, more inward-looking economic arguments tend to be far more sceptical of Turkeys accession. A prime issue mentioned most notably by the Commission relates to the budgetary costs of Turkeys accession, given Turkeys size and level of economic development. Yet rather than the absolute cost to the EU budget, which in terms of individual member state contributions is unlikely to change radically, it is the relative distribution of Community funds which would alter as a result of Turkeys accession. Hence, structural funds would be redirected away from current recipients in eastern Europe and, much to Frances displeasure, the CAP would risk being seriously affected by the entry of a large new member state with a significant agricultural sector. Arguments focussing on budgetary issues are especially speculative and prone to populist fear-mongering. Not only is it entirely fictional to speculate about the EU budget or the CAP in 2020, but the rate of change in Turkeys economy is such that predicting Turkeys impact on the EUs budgetary, cohesion or agricultural policies with any reasonable degree of precision is almost impossible. A third level of analysis favoured by many national commentators within the EU is the impact of Turkeys
The economic realm

A related question which receives rising attention across the EU is the link between identity and borders. To those viewing a European identity through culturalist lenses, geographical borders represent an integral element separating and defining us and the other. Hence, Turkey should be kept out of the EU on the basis of its different culture, religion and history. Its otherness would be physically expressed through the delineation and consolidation of the EUs borders well within the boundaries of the European continent. Unsurprisingly, actors within core member states such as Austria or Germany are far more receptive to this interpretation of borders than members lying on the periphery of the Union such as Finland, Italy, Spain, Portugal or the UK. The French also place much emphasis on the question of borders, yet they have downplayed its cultural dimension.

The impact of Turkeys accession on the member states

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accession on member state economies, societies and security. Here two primary aspects are raised in public debate. The first and most important source of member state concern is that of Turkish immigration, particularly within member states such as Germany and Austria which already host large Turkish communities. In countries like Germany, populist slogans principally rouse economic fears, with arguments about the invasion of Turkish plumbers now replacing former worries about eastern European migrants swamping the EU. Opinion polls in Germany confirm that most of those opposing Turkeys membership do so for economic reasons. While still dormant in view of the low levels of Turkish immigration, similar worries could also become a factor tilting the now relatively favourable attitudes towards Turkey in member states such as Italy, Spain or the UK. In member states such as Germany and Austria instead, migration worries are also linked to wider fears about economic globalization and the erosion of the welfare state, despite the fact that the immigration of young Turkish migrants could help ageing European states confront their monumental pension system problems. Others still in member states like France, Austria and Holland cast their arguments about Turkish immigration in the more emotional language of societal integration or lack thereof. Unlike arguments pitched within the framework of Europes role in the world, these arguments focussing on Turkeys impact on member state economies and societies view Turkeys size and demography as a threat rather than an asset. It is these concerns that induce member states to pre-empt the future by inserting the possibility of permanent derogations to the full liberalization of the four freedoms in future member Turkey. This opens the worrying prospect of Turkeys second-class membership in all but name.
The realm of security

related to Greek interests such as the Aegean, Cyprus or the rights of the Orthodox community in Turkey, as well as issues indirectly connected to Greek interests such as the rebalancing of Turkeys civil-military relations which would allow, amongst other things, Greece to cut its defence budget. It is precisely because Turkeys accession is conceptualized through the lens of national security that other unsecuritized issues pertaining to TurkeyEU relations, irrespective of whether they are viewed as assets or liabilities, are considered non-issues in Greece. A similar argument applies to Cyprus, where the impact of Turkeys accession is discussed exclusively within the framework of the Cyprus conflict. Far more so than Greece however, Greek Cyprus is more inclined to use all sticks at its disposal lest Turkey refuses to toe the Greek Cypriot line on the conflict. In the case of other member states such as the UK, the security impact of Turkeys accession is framed in relation to other threats and interests. Turkeys accession process and the impact of its membership is viewed positively because of the prospects for deepening Anglo-Turkish police and intelligence cooperation over terrorism. The 2003 Al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul created a close bilateral tie between the Turkey and the UK, inducing especially the British defence community to emphasize the security benefits of Turkeys accession to member state Britain. A last variable, unsurprisingly discussed very little in the EU, while receiving greater albeit still limited attention in Turkey, is the impact of Turkeys accession on Turkey itself. The primary observation to make here is that the impact of the accession process on Turkey hinges upon the nature and extent of the domestic transformation engendered by the accession process, thus creating a critical link between the effectiveness of conditionality and the expected impact of accession. The impact of accession or rather of the accession process on Turkey is already being felt, not only in the domestic political realm, but also in the economic and foreign policy domains. Since the beginning of Turkeys accession process, the levels of trade between Turkey and the EU have steadily risen, European FDI in Turkey has gathered steam, and Turkeys production cycles are increasingly following those of the EU economies. Also in the realm of foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy allegedly approximates increasingly
The impact of Turkeys accession on Turkey

A second element of member states understanding of the costs and benefits of Turkeys accession relates to the realm of security. For some countries such as Greece or Cyprus, the understanding of national security principally hinges on relations with Turkey itself. Indeed for Greece, national security is the primary reason why Turkeys accession is accepted, yet only on the basis of Turkeys fulfilment of what Greece would like to see framed as clear-cut conditionalities relating to Greek security interests. These conditions would include issues directly

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that of the EU, as revealed by positions adopted by Turkey and the EU in multilateral fora such as the UN. In other words, the accession process is already impacting upon the Turkish domestic political system, economy and foreign policy in a manner that could make the question of membership and its impact far less salient over the accession years.
Impact on ordinary citizens

turn are moulded on the basis of prevailing perceptions and misperceptions about the EU and Turkey. A first conditioning factor influencing the public debate in different European countries is the manner in which the Turkey question intersects with the goals and interests of different constituencies in member states, including political parties, bureaucracies, the media, civil society, Diaspora and migrant communities, business, industrial or agricultural lobbies, foreign policy specialists and defence establishments. In order to delve into the EUTurkey discourse, it is of prime importance to understand the domestic political rationale of the Turkey debate in different member states, and the main constituencies with a stake in that debate, constituencies which may either generate or diffuse ideas in favour and against Turkeys accession, at times for reasons which are often unrelated to EU-Turkey relations. One key factor influencing the domestic political rationale of the EU-Turkey debate is the extent and manner in which this debate is linked to national identity politics in different member states. Wherever the Turkey question is part and parcel of the debates on national identity, the EU-Turkey question is often an issue in domestic politics. In France for example, the Turkey debate is inextricably tied to the domestic political battle between secularists and Catholics, whereby the former appreciate Turkeys secularism while being wary of the Turkish states control of religion, while the latter highlight Turkeys religion as an argument either in favour of Turkeys accession in a multi-religion Europe or against Turkeys accession on essentialist grounds relating to Turkeys different religion. In Germany, Austria and Denmark instead, the debates on national identity are related to the different views on the role of existing Turkish and Muslim migrant communities in the definition of national identities. In other words, particularly in Germany - the member state with by far the largest Turkish Diaspora in Europe - the debate about Turkeys EU accession reflects the different views about the German identity itself, ranging from Kohls explicit emphasis on Christianity as opposed to Fischers or the Greens emphasis on multiculturalism, the latter being linked in no small measure to Germanys change in its citizenship law in 1999. By contrast, and in view of the small Turkish communities in Finland,
Interests of constituencies in member state

This is not to say that Turkeys accession process and the expected impact of membership is cost-free. It is striking that little attention is paid not only in the EU but also in Turkey to the potential losers of membership in Turkey. The impact of the accession process on ordinary citizens is seriously under-researched, yet the waning support for membership in Turkey (as in other candidates before it) suggests that key sectors of society could seriously lose out from the accession process. Turkish citizens are already being deeply affected by rising living costs and economic restructuring. These changes, while being generally associated to the consequences of modernization and economic globalization, are more specifically linked to the EU accession process. Unless carefully tackled, these costs could seriously undermine the public support necessary for a monumental transformationist project such as EU membership. What explains why some EU and Turkish stakeholders pitch their arguments on one level and not another? Why has the UK focused on foreign policy, Finland and the Commission on conditionality, Slovenia on energy, France on institutions and public opinion, and Germany, Austria or Denmark on immigration? Why was negative public opinion not raised as a source of concern in Austria with respect to Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgarias membership, but emphasized as a prime problem in the case of Turkey? Why is Turkey an issue in public political debate in France, Germany, Austria, Greece or Cyprus and not in Finland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia or the UK?

EU-Turkey debate and national identity politics in member state

The conditioning factors pitching the discourse

When unpacking the discourses in Europe on Turkey and vice versa, three principal factors condition when and why some stakeholders focus on some issues and not on others: interests, perceptions and prejudice. Naturally these three factors are closely interlinked: the underlying interests of different constituencies shape the formation of perceptions and prejudices on Turkey and the EU; those interests in

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Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden or the UK, debates about national identity in these countries have little or nothing to do with Turkey, explaining in part the lack of public debate on Turkey beyond expert elite levels. Yet if the Turkey question were to become an issue in the contested definitions of national identities in these countries, its level of attention in public debate could rise, not necessarily to the benefit of EU-Turkey relations.
Contact with Turkey: level and type

A second conditioning factor shaping the debate on EUTurkey relations is the different perceptions of Europe within the EU and Turkey. Different ideas of what the EU is or should be critically shape the manner in which different actors view Turkeys accession. Simply put, differences in attitudes depend on whether the EU is perceived as a matter of domestic or foreign policy. Where the EU is viewed through the lens of domestic policy, the focus of attention rests on the inside, that is on factors affecting the EUs internal set-up in terms of institutions, society, economics, identity and culture. It is the widespread perception of the EU as a matter of domestic policy that raises the stakes of questions such as Turkeys impact on EU institutions, budget, social cohesion and agriculture. This is especially the case in member states such as France and Germany, as well as in the Commission, whose mandate deals primarily with internal EU policies. The perception of the EU as an internal political project by many in France and Germany also heightens the importance attributed to such issues as Turkeys impact on migration flows within the enlarged EU. Rising and changing migration patterns have implications on the formation of the EUs internal identity, an identity emphasized much by those who focus on the Union as a political project. For others, such as British conservatives, it is precisely the dilution of the European political project entailed by ongoing enlargements that consolidates support for Turkeys accession. By contrast, those who view the EU primarily through the lens of foreign and security policy tend to focus on different issues, with correspondingly different positions on EU-Turkey relations. Many in the UK, Finland, Poland, Slovenia and Turkey itself, perceive the EU as a matter of foreign policy. As such, they are far more inclined to highlight the impact that member state Turkey would have on the EU as an international actor in neighbouring regions such as the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As opposed to those who view the Union as a matter of domestic policy and express concern about extending the Unions identity and borders to Iraq, Iran or Syria, viewing this very fact through the lens of foreign policy encourages different and often more positive views about Turkeys EU membership. Seen from a foreign policy angle, Poles, Germans and Slovenes praise

Different perceptions of Europe within EU and Turkey

Another issue shaping the extent and nature of the debate on Turkey is the level and type of contact with Turkey itself. Again, depending on the degree and nature of contact and acquaintance with Turkey, views on the EUTurkey question may radically change. In countries such as the UK and Poland, the Turkey question is debated predominantly within private elite circles, in which expert discussion encourages a relatively detached and fine-tuned assessment of the pros and cons of Turkeys accession. In other contexts instead, the contacts and interests of specific groups shape the nature of the debate on Turkey. The large Armenian Diaspora in France or the defence establishment in the UK critically feed and generate ideas shaping national views on the EU-Turkey question. Geographical proximity also plays a role in determining the degree and type of contact between different EU actors and Turkey, shaping the interests or non-interests regarding EU-Turkey relations. For obvious geographical reasons, Turkey plays a far more prominent role in the public debate in Greece than it does in Finland. Despite incomparable differences in terms of absolute size and weight, to Finns the expected impact of Estonias accession was far greater than that of Turkey, explaining the differences in the levels of public debate in Finland about the former case compared to the latter. Economic and social contact is also important. The rising trade levels between the UK or Germany and Turkey, growing British and German business and property investment in Turkey, and rising levels of British and German tourism in Turkish coastal resorts, all contribute in diffusing ideas about the expected positive impact of Turkeys accession in Britain and Germany. This contrasts to other member states such as Austria, whose business and trade links with Turkey are still rather low. Finally historical ties also play a critical and often negative role, rendering Austria or Greeces instinctive attitudes towards Turkey far more sceptical than those of other member states.

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Turkey as an asset in promoting Europes energy security; British and Danes emphasize Turkeys collaboration in the fight against terrorism; British argue that EU member Turkey would strengthen EU-NATO cooperation as well as EU-US relations; and security specialists highlight Turkeys contribution to EU defence capabilities, referring to Turkeys participation in European defence efforts in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Macedonia and the Congo. To these actors, the internal dimension of the EU is of secondary importance. Hence for example, even if a Polish security specialist appreciates that Turkeys membership may entail a redistribution of structural funds away from Poland, he/she may well favour Turkeys accession in view of the positive implications it would have for the EU as a foreign policy actor.
Perceptions, misperceptions and prejudices about Turkey

values, beliefs and codes of action. In some instances, these arguments verge on outright racism and xenophobia. This is often the case when the understanding of Turkey as the other is transposed into the realm of security, encouraged by fears about Islamic terrorism. In other instances, these arguments are simply ill-founded. There is no concrete reason why Turkeys integration into the EU should mirror in any way the integration of Pakistanis in the UK, Algerians in France or Moroccans in Spain. Believing this to be the case not only arbitrarily ascribes primary importance to one definition of identity, i.e., religion, but also presumes causal links which simply do not exist. Less frequently, Turkeys otherness is used as an argument in favour of its EU accession. To those viewing the EU as a matter of domestic policy, the integration of Muslim Turkey could aid the integration of Muslim migrants into the EU, regardless of whether these communities have any connection to Turkey beyond the loose link of religion. To those viewing the EU as a domain of foreign policy instead, the integration of a different member state such as Turkey could help the EU confront its security threats and seize the opportunities in the turbulent East. Turkey, the argument goes, could act as a litmus test demonstrating that Islam and democracy can be compatible, and can thus represent a model or an inspiration to other Islamic countries. Premised on the assumption that there is an inherent tension between Islam and democracy, Turkey is mentioned as the quintessential test case demonstrating how this tension can be resolved; Turkey becomes the exception that confirms the rule. To others instead, Turkey can act as a bridge to the Islamic world. Many have suggested that Muslim Turkey could help the Union enter the East, allowing it to hedge and confront the security threats emanating from this region, ranging from terrorism to illegal migration. Yet these positive arguments about Turkeys potential role are based on precisely the same mental categories, the same forms of othering, as negative arguments shunning Turkey in view of its different identity. In other words, the mental categories used are the same, irrespective of whether the arguments are set in the framework of the clash of civilizations or benign variants of an alliance or dialogue of civilizations . In both cases, two main identity boxes are artificially classified and defined, leaving Turkey in the uncomfortable position of having to act as a litmus
Turkeys otherness as an argument in favour of its EU accession

A third conditioning factor shaping views on EU-Turkey relations are perceptions, misperceptions and prejudices about Turkey itself. Particularly after the attacks on 11 September 2001, Turkey is frequently viewed both by supporters and opponents of its EU accession as a Muslim or Islamic country. The current geopolitical context encourages many in Europe and Turkey to highlight religion as a main defining feature of what Turkey is, what it can contribute to Europe and what instead it detracts from it. Yet this essentialist understanding of Turkey makes these arguments, whether in favour or against Turkeys membership, equally problematic. Either way , misperceiving Turkey primarily through the lens of Islam means assuming that Turkey is the other; an assumption which in the long-run could hinder Turkeys European integration. Most frequently, viewing Turkey as Islamic works directly to the detriment of EU-Turkey relations. In a historical moment when civilizational prisms often shape Europes self-understanding, Turkey falls into the wrong category, lumped together with millions of other people, with their respective religions, traditions, languages and cultures, into the black box of the other. Turkeys European integration is resisted by those who associate it to the failure of integrating Muslim migrant communities in Europe. This expected failure of integration fans fears about the negative impact of Turkeys accession to the EU, as well as the inability of EU conditionality to transform the inherently different Turkey into accepting European

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test reconciling the two or as a tenuous bridge between these hypothesized radically different worlds. These arguments are problematic not only because they are superficial and prejudiced, but also because they hinder a deeper understanding between the EU and Turkey, necessary for the accession process to succeed. Many of the arguments presented in this report are closely interlinked. There is a circular relationship between several of the arguments about conditionality, impact and prejudices discussed above. By way of conclusion, several of these interconnections are brought to the fore, indicating the possible vicious and virtuous circles underpinning discourses on Turkeys European integration.
EU conditionality towards

should ideally have taken place before 1999, that is before the political decision was consensually taken by the Union to embark upon an accession process with Turkey. Casting into doubt that primary political decision over the course of the accession process cannot but reduce the effectiveness of the accession process in Europeanizing Turkey. The success of conditionality in terms of its transformation effect on Turkey also affects and may determine Turkeys impact on the EU. As noted above, Turkeys impact will depend largely on which Turkey enters the EU, in terms of its political system, its society, its economy and its foreign policy. A credible and effective EU policy of conditionality can strongly influence whether Turkeys impact on the EU is positive or negative. Conditionality and prejudice are also closely interlinked. The widespread perception in Turkey of anti-Turkish prejudice in Europe reduces the credibility of EU conditionality. Rather than being viewed as the sine qua non of the accession process, EU conditionality, particularly when changing in response to political contingencies, is viewed in Turkey either as European double standards, or as evidence that whatever Ankara says or does, prejudiced Europe will never accept Muslim Turkey into its fold. This deep-rooted belief reduces the effectiveness of EU conditionality, ignites a sense of rejection and alienation in Turkey, reawakens Turkeys Svres syndrome, and in doing so provides ammunition for those in Turkey who abhor the prospect of a Europeanized country. On the other side of the coin, European prejudice against Turkey has put Turkey in the difficult position of having to meet EU standards without EU confidence that it is able to do so. By viewing Turkey as different, European expectations are on the one hand that the Union cannot afford to compromise on conditionality towards Turkey, and on the other hand that Turkey is unlikely to meet the Unions standards of civilization. Hence, any violation of EU values and conditions committed by Turkey, such as the prosecution of novelist Ohran Pamuk or the assassination of journalist Hrant Dink, are seen as evidence of Turkeys incorrigible unEuropeanness; its unbridgeable civilizational gap with Europe. Likewise, when in the run-up to the opening of accession negotiations in 2004, Turkey considered re-penalizing adultery, the event
Conditionality and prejudice

EU conditionality towards Turkey is closely tied to European debates about Turkeys impact on the EU. When the debate about Turkeys impact is framed as an additional condition in Turkeys accession process - a condition that is up to the EU and not to Turkey to fulfil (i.e., the debate about the EUs absorption capacity) then the credibility and effectiveness of EU conditionality diminishes. For conditionality to be credible and effective, it must essentially be viewed as the prime determining factor shaping the evolution of the accession process. When other factors, lying beyond the volition of candidate Turkey, are flagged as determinants of Turkeys European future, then Turkeys incentives to transform in line with EU conditions are dramatically reduced. In this respect, Greeces position towards Turkey, while being amongst the most hardline in Europe, is also amongst the most credible. Particularly since 1999, Greece has credibly demonstrated to Ankara its genuine interest in seeing Turkey enter the EU, albeit following Turkeys fulfilment of conditions that Athens would like to see increasingly framed through EU conditionality. By contrast, the French and Austrian decision to hold referenda on the Turkey question as and when Turkey will have completed its accession process seriously undermines the credibility of conditionality towards Turkey. To a lesser extent, the very debate on the desirability of Turkeys EU membership also hinders the effectiveness of conditionality. Much as the European debate on Turkey cannot be stopped or stifled, that debate does tarnish the Unions credibility in Turkey. The political debate on Turkey

Meet EU standards without EU confidence

Membership and EUs credibility in Turkey

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was widely reported in Europe as irrefutable proof of Muslim Turkeys backwardness, ignoring the fact that the penalization of adultery persisted in Christian Austria until 1997. Turkey is thus trapped between the Scylla of EU conditionality and the Charybdis of European prejudice.
Anti-Turkish prejudice in Europe

Finally, the existence of anti-Turkish prejudice in Europe, as well as Turkish assumptions about European prejudice against it, discredit the value of arguments about Turkeys prospective impact on Europe. Turkeys accession can have both positive and negative impacts on the different dimensions of the EU. So far, debating these impacts has served more to undermine than to enhance Turkeys accession process. Unless these vicious discursive circles are broken, Turkeys accession process is likely to remain at best bumpy and uncertain; at worst it runs the risk of serious setbacks. However, if these public debates on Turkey can be articulated with greater clarity and understanding, they can also bolster Turkeys accession course. Lucidly debating the Turkey-EU question can help both the Union and Turkey identify the areas of possible costs and benefits, in order to work during the accession years to strengthen the former while hedging against the latter. Rather than focussing on static and rather abstract notions such as absorption capacity, a debate about what Turkey and the EU can do so that Turkey can be successfully absorbed and integrated into the Union could significantly raise the likelihood of success of the accession process. A shared public debate across Europe could also increase solidarity between the peoples of the EU and Turkey, that sense of solidarity upon which the European project is founded.

AKP AND SECULAR PILLARS OF TURKISH REPUBLIC

di Kemal Kaya

Ideologies like Islamism, Nationalism and Westernism which continue to effect the intellectual environment in Turkey have deep roots going back to the Ottoman era. Being established after the Independence War following the World War I, the Turkish Republic made a cultural revolution in order to form a new nation. This revolution was made in the context of an unusual nationalist ideology, backed by Ziya Gokalp known as its ideologue, with the main emphasis on rural values. As the only organized power that can pose a serious opposition; religion was suppressed and from changing the alphabet to the rewriting of history, the cultural revolution was realized. The opposition was either scattered by the oppressive policies of the then government or drew back to the underground in some provincial regions that the central authority could not easily reach.

The roots

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Starting from the year 1946, with the end of the singleparty period, democracy began to be implemented. After the 1950 elections, despite some short cessations, the country was ruled by centre-right parties. Nevertheless, the three important leaders of the centre-right; Menderes, Demirel and Ozal focused their policies on economic development and infrastructure problems of the country and almost completely omitting cultural policies from their agenda. In 1971, during the group meeting of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP), as a response to the deputies criticizing the absence of cultural policies of the party, Demirel stated that: Constructing roads, building schools and producing electricity are my responsibilities, not inserting ideas into the students minds. In the 60s and 70s, communism made its way into those minds whom Demirel did not seem to be interested in. In the meantime a primitive nationalism defending rusticity (Nationalist Movement Party -MHP), and Islamism, originating from the Arabic world using symbols such as the salvation of Jerusalem and of turban (National Salvation Party - MSP, Welfare Party - RP and Felicity Party - SP), found its way into the rightist political thinking.
A common point: anti-UE and anti-Usa position

with Europe, TUSIAD turned into a strong supporter of the accession to the EU. However, their persuasiveness and their effect over the public are quite feeble. Corruptness and the economic crises following the high inflation rates resulted in the AKPs victory in the 2002 elections, ruining both the modernist left and right. AKP that emerged as a consequence of the secession of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) and which was founded by the reformist wing of the RP, tried to follow a more moderate way. At least in the first three years of their first term, AKP gave special importance to the EU. However, when the European Court of Human Rights did not give their expected support for the turban issue, AKP lost its enthusiasm in the EU. Still no change can be perceived in the governments attitude towards the EU. The veto right of the former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer functioned as a control mechanism over the AKP. However, the events during the presidential election process in 2007 such as republican meetings, militarys e-memorandum and the like, increased public polarization. Nonetheless, following the AKPs crushing victory in the general elections, government elected Abdullah Gul as the 11th president of the Turkish Republic. Studies related to changing the constitution, recent appointments, the regulation of turban and attempts to promote imam hatip high schools, all show that, despite their promises and statements, AKP would not follow a moderate route in its second term. Imam hatip high schools, originally established in order to educate the countrys imams, increased in number and turned into an institution that supports an alternative education and world view. As the former prime minister and founder of the Milli Gorus movement (A devoted Islamist movement in Turkey), Necmettin Erbakan stated, these high schools are turned into a backyard of the Milli Gorus. AKP is waiting to get a majority in the Higher Education Board (YOK) in order to lift the regulation introduced during the February 28 process, limiting the chances of the graduates of these schools to attend universities. By being preached that the state should be ruled with sharia, and without necessarily holding fanatical ideas, these students turn into natural voters of the Islamist parties. As it was clearly seen during the constitutional amendment about the turban, Turkeys elite class was divided into two;
Division in Turkeys elite AKPs victory in 2002

Today, when looking at the Turkish intellectual life and at universities it can be easily seen that the dominating groups are communists, reactionary nationalists and Islamists. Recently the Kemalist and modernist elite that founded the Republic were also drawn into the group of reactionary nationalists. The only common point among those different ideologies is their stance of being antiEurope and anti-American. In a country reflecting such an intellectual environment, a record percentage of 92% of the population being anti-American can be considered quite a normal result. The elite group defending the countrys position in the western system is left as a minority and their capacity to affect and transform the society is limited. In light of the popular contentions regarding EUs double standards, their power is further diminishing. In the late 70s, when opposing EU membership proposal, TUSIAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) was acting in accordance with the military. But today, realizing that they can only adapt to the more and more globalised world through adhering to the EU and realizing that balancing the Islamic capital flow to Turkey can only happen via the integration

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secular and anti-secular. The secular centers criticized AKP, which introduced the amendment using the freedom of education justification, about having intentions of turning the state into an Islamist one. Even though this conflict is not as grave among the public as it is among elites, the stakes are as high as they can be. The practices of AKP show that the concerns of the opposition are not without foundations. During AKPs first term almost no one whose wife did not wear the turban or that did not have a religious reference was promoted to higher levels of bureaucracy. This trend is continuing towards the lower class even in the provincial regions. regions This policy turning step by step the society into a more conservative and Islamist one is evolving and is becoming a natural process.
Arab Islamist movements

of Treasury, Unakitan, who was known for his close relationship with Erdogan. Sener, being separated from one of the important props of the economy, slowly pulled away from the rest and did not put forward his candidacy in the 2007 elections. He started then criticizing the party administration on various economic and political stands. Arinc, during his term as spokesman of parliament, focused on the environment in many occasions through his ideological statements. In the new government he had to be content with a commission presidency. Though he still retains some influence over Erdogan, he lost his power within the party. In the 59th government Gul had an influence close to that of the Prime Minister. However, the presidency of Gul at the end of a stressful period, considering the neutral character of the post holder, minimized the effectiveness of the institution which previously functioned as a control mechanism over Erdogan. With a 47% support rate in his 2007 victory, Erdogans position improved being without question the one man both in Turkey and in the party. The absence of serious political or institutional rivals in the political arena has further strengthened Erdogans position. Erdogan, who opened the floor to discussing matters such as ordinary workers salaries during the establishment process of AKP, was long gone and another Erdogan, who was intolerant to any criticism or suggestion either from inside or outside the party, emerged. It can be noticed that many deputies, except those closer to the Prime Minister, even lacked the courage to demand an appointment from Erdogan. The group meetings of the party turned out to be a stage for Erdogan whose deputies did not have the right to speak or ask questions. The same applied for the Council of Ministers. Back then everyone spoke of only what Erdogan wanted to hear. Similar circumstances prevailed during the turban crisis too. Liberal deputies could not raise their voices, let alone that they did not approve to include the issue in the agenda. Even Abdullatif Sener, who now ceased to be politically active, considered the placement of the issue on the agenda to be premature. Nevertheless, no one could
Erdogans position

The roots of the majority of Islamist movements in Turkey originate from Arab Islamist movements. Concerning foreign policy, the concept of the Muslim brotherhood holds more importance vis--vis national interests in general. The motion to allow US soldiers to use Turkish soil to reach Iraq was rejected even though AKP had a majority of 360 seats in parliament. During the voting process the most devoted Islamist wing of the party and some of the Kurdish deputies voted against the motion. Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister at the time, even said to the deputies in the parliament corridors when asked about what to do, that the motion was brought to the agenda by the government but that they could do whatever they wanted to. This statement was understood by those neutral deputies as the permission to vote against. Although the matter was not publicly discussed, that occasion gained prominence as it has prevented the possible shedding of some Muslim blood. Even though AKP is trying to support the stance of Turkey vis--vis the USA and EU, its ideological roots draws it close to Arabic and Muslim countries.

The founding quartet

During the 59th government the founding quartet shared the important positions among themselves, taking posts in the government and parliament. Erdogan became the Prime Minister, Gul became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif Sener became deputy Prime Minister responsible from the economy and Bulent Arinc became the spokesman of the parliament, which needed a neutral position. The first crack among the four occurred by the hand over of the privatization administration from Sener to the Minister

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affect Erdogans decision and he continued to enforce his own strategy. Except for secular circles, in general people remained silent. Public and political circles were so suppressed that the centerpiece of the political agenda became the wearing of turbans in universities rather than the place of turban in Islam. Since the election of AKPs, the Turkish secular establishment stood against its policies. Finally on March 14, 2008, the countrys top prosecutor filed the lawsuit to close the ruling party and to ban Prime Minister Receb Tayyib Erdogan and 70 other politicians from holding political office for 5 years for allegedly undermining Turkeys secular regime. Probably the Constitutional Court will accept the case and in at least six months a final decision should be taken.
The effects on Turkey internal situation

Even before the courts decision is declared, it is clear that in the coming months political tension will increase in Turkey and that it will adversely affect its economy, its political stability, its foreign policy and as a result its international image. Only a ruling in favor of the accusations may constitute the self-criticism of both parties about their approach to secularity that will grant them a new chance to establish consensus on the definition of secularity. Otherwise, Turkey may fall in a long term of political instability.

NEW DIRECTIONS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: A RADICAL SHIFT FROM ANKARAS WEST POLITIK?
di Matteo Fumagalli

The first decade of the twenty-first century has been an extraordinary period in Turkish politics. It has witnessed the advent of power of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP)1, a new political party rooted in the countrys Islamist movement (from which it distanced itself ) which has dominated the domestic political scene since winning elections in 2002. Not only is the AKP the most significant political force in the parliament, but - unusually for the Turkish political context - it leads a single-party majority government and has provided the country with governability and, at least until recently, political stability. At home, the AKP has introduced a wide range of reforms that have (partly) set the country on course towards EU accession. Military influence in politics has been decreased, and measures to

Movements in Turkish politics in the first decade of 21st century

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safeguard minority rights introduced. The civil and penal codes have been (partly) reformed. With regard to foreign policy the AKP-led government has promoted a strong (and effective) pro-European agenda. It has undertaken a degree of activism in foreign affairs that the country had not seen since the leadership of former president Turgut zal in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, the country has developed cosier relations with Russia, on whose energy supplies it depends, and - more controversially - with Iran and Syria. This, along with its opposition to the war in Iraq, has put strains on its traditional ties with its Western allies, leading some observers to question Ankaras commitment to its Westpolitik. The last couple of years have witnessed considerable domestic turmoil. A number of public scandals and tensions between the secular establishment and the AKP due to the former fear that the secular order may be under threat by the latters allegedly secret agenda to carry out a creeping Islamicization of the country2. The political conflict between the government and the secular opposition culminated in the 2008 court trial which in the end fined but did not ban the partys leadership from public life. At a time when the experience of the longest-serving government led by an Islamist party nearly came to an abrupt end following legal battles and political acrimony, precipitating the country into deep domestic turmoil, it is important to evaluate its achievements, shortcomings and set it in broader historical perspective. This paper evaluates the AKPs experience in government by focusing on its conduct of external affairs. In particular it asks if Turkeys foreign policy during the 2002-2008 period has distanced itself from the traditional path undertaken in the Kemalist era. The paper examines Ankaras new foreign policy initiatives (with Russia, Iran and Syria), asking whether this amounts to a radical shift in Ankaras foreign policy (and traditionally western) orientation. It concludes that most of the new relationships are instrumental and do not amount to a u-turn in Turkish foreign policy. While closer relations have indeed been pursued with the Muslim world, the AK party has not abandoned, let alone downgraded, its relations with the West.
Introduction

Secularism and westward orientation, Soner Capagptay notes, have been the siamese twins of Turkish politics in the republican era (2007). Both, he maintains, have been jeopardised by the advent of the AKP to office in the earlier

part of the decade. Gradually, but steadily, the argument goes, the partys leadership has promoted an encroachment of the Kemalist values at home (through controversial policies such as the lifting of the ban in universities, its support of Islamic schools), and abroad, by causing tensions on Ankaras longstanding alliance with the West (the US primarily), in favour of a warming-up of relations with Russia (whose relations with the West are now chilled at best), or even Iran and Syria, raising more than one eyebrow in Washington as well as Jerusalem, another traditional ally of Ankara. That Turkey has diversified its foreign policy initiatives and has added new dimensions to its erstwhile exclusive Western ties is beyond doubt. What is disputed is the rationale behind this apparent re-orientation, as well as its impact on the countrys western orientation. This paper evaluates the AKPs experience in government by focusing on its conduct of external affairs. In particular, it asks if Turkeys foreign policy during the 2002-2008 period has distanced itself from the traditional path undertaken in the Kemalist era. By looking at Ankaras relations with its traditional allies (EU and US), and recent partners (Russia, Iran, Syria), the paper concludes that most of the new relationships are actually instrumental and do not amount to a radical u-turn (let alone an ideological re-orientation) in Turkish foreign policy. While certainly closer relations have been pursued with the Muslim world, the AK party has not abandoned, let alone downgraded, its relations with Western powers. For reasons of space the paper cannot and does not aim to be an exhaustive examination of the drivers and implications of Turkish foreign policy3. The major limitation of this contribution is that it affords little space to considering Turkeys links with the EU and US, an issue which is discussed elsewhere (Fumagalli, 2007). What it seeks to achieve, instead, is the provision of a brief illustration of how Turkish foreign policy has evolved in recent years and how this can be explained with reference to the ascent of the Justice and Development Party to power and its espousing of Ahmet Davutolus Strategic Depth Doctrine4. The paper is structured as follows. First a brief background to the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy is provided. Next, attention concentrates on the foreign policy doctrine and conduct of the AK party, in government since 2002. The paper then turns to how relations with Russia and Iran have developed in recent years, to some extent to the detriment of Ankaras western ties. Final remarks conclude.

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The end of the Cold War

The changes brought by the end of the cold war were admittedly wide-ranging: a super-power had collapsed on Turkeys eastern borders; ethno-political conflicts started to erupt in the South Caucasus (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia); NATOs role appeared to be in question; the perennial doubts surrounding the relationship with the EU continued to define Turkeys relations with European powers (Robins, 2003, p. 1). These events have radically questioned Turkeys place in the world, and its continued strategic relevance to the West. Close alignments to the West and isolationism (reluctance to becoming involved in its regional neighbourhood) had guided Turkey through the Cold War. A policy trying to pursue peace at home [and] peace abroad had driven Turkish foreign policy since the early days of Kemalism, especially since the late 1940s. Maintaining close ties with Western powers has been a constant driver of Ankaras foreign policy. Throughout the Cold War Turkey, a member of NATO, was considered a strategic partner for the United States. Turkeys largest and most significant neighbour (the Soviet Union) may have imploded, but Ankaras neighbourhood has grown far more complex and less predictable than at any time since World War II. Turkeys policy-makers have not always been prompt in adjusting to the evolving realities. To be sure, on two occasions Turkey embarked on a new activism in foreign policy. Turgut zals solemn, though premature, announcement that the twenty-first century will be Turkic in the early 1990s led to greater engagement (or desire to do so) in the former Soviet states, both in the Caucasus (especially in Azerbaijan), and in Central Asia. A second key moment took place in the second part of the decade when the Islamist Refah (Welfare) party was voted into office (1996-97) and its leader promoted an Islamist agenda (often rhetoric overshadowed actual actions5). Whether this was real or not, it generated a pre-emptive strike by the Turkish military establishment that essentially forced Erbakan to resign and signalled the end of the Refahs experience in government and existence as a party (see later). About five years later another party culturally rooted in the very same experience of the Turkish Islamist movement (Milli Gru6) attained a stunning electoral success. In the 2002 parliamentary elections, the AKP obtained 34% of the votes but due to the Turkish electoral law which sets a high 10% threshold for parties to enter parliament, it found itself with about two thirds of the seats (the only opponent being

the nationalist CHP, Republican Action Party)7. Firmly in control of the parliament and government the party began to implement its agenda. This, in foreign policy, meant two things. First, it pushed for a strongly pro-European stance which led to the rapid adoption of a number of reform packages. The ultimate goal was to achieve the recognition of candidate country and begin accession negotiations with the EU, the polar star of Turkish foreign policy since the early 1960. Second, it also began to undertake a diversified foreign policy. Relations warmed up with its eastern neighbours, namely Russia, Iran and Syria. Relations with the United States started to take a downward turn. What does this all mean for Turkeys international orientation? Has the post Cold War period led to a realignment of the country? What are the implications? In short, is Turkeys Westpolitik under threat? Assessing whether these two processes amount to a radical u-turn in Turkish foreign policy constitutes the focus of the present paper. The main contention put forward is twofold. First, the paper rejects the thesis that Ankaras activism constitutes a novelty given the two precedents in the late 1980s and 1990s (zal and Erbakan). Second, while there is no doubt that Turkey has adopted a more diversified foreign policy, this amounts to no radical shift. Relations with the West have undoubtedly gone through a phase of considerable chill, whereas relations with Russia and Iran are cosy. However, the paper argues that this arises more out of mutual disaffection with the West, opportunism and energy dependence, than out of some form of ideological convergence. Davutolus Strategic Depth Theory may have sought to provide an ideological underpinning to Turkeys foreign policy activism, but has not led to an international re-alignment. That the AKPs foreign policy underpinning is rooted in geopolitical thinking rather than in Islamic discourse may appear puzzling at a first glance. The previous experience of an Islamic party in office in Turkey had a distinctively religious flavour. By contrast Ahmet Davutolu, formerly professor of international relations at Beykent University, and current senior foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdoan, has refrained from making reference to it, and made extensive use of traditional geopolitics, as well as constant reference to Turkeys pre-Kemalist period. The neoOttoman movement (Yeni Osmanciler) dates back to Turgut zals premership and presidency, but the popularity of all

The new activism in Ankaras foreign policy

Strategic Depth Doctrine

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things Ottoman and the growing cultural influence of this movement suit the current strategic reflection of the AKP government and its supporters (Murinson, 2006). Links to neighbouring Middle Eastern countries, enhancement of the countrys regional role and the responsibility to intervene when necessary were previously taboo in Turkish politics and are now more freely discussed. In his academic work (which has later informed foreign policy thinking and making) Davutolu has developed what he terms a Strategic Depth Doctrine. According to the theory, which moves from acknowledging the dramatic shifts that took place in the international system and therefore in Turkeys proximate neighbourhood, Turkish foreign policy should avoid entanglement (and entrapment) in its traditional ties with the West and move on to a multidimensional approach to foreign policy. Strategic depth, according to Davutolu, is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth (Murinson, 2006 p. 947). As a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey possesses great geographic depth; this, in other words, places Turkey at the centre of a number of areas of influence (Balkans, Middle East, Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia). Unlike Kemalism, which pushed the country towards isolationism, the Strategic Depth Doctrine calls for an activist engagement in all the regional systems Turkey is part of. This constitutes a conceptual rupture from Kemalist thinking which insisted that Turkey should not remain entrapped in its neighbourhoods. In this sense, Murrison contends that this doctrine is in line with the sensibilities and precepts of the neo-Ottoman cultural movement mentioned above. Civilizational revival and strategic competition become the two pillars upon which the doctrine is built. In practice this means moving away from one of the dogmas of Turkish foreign policy: its westward orientation (or Westpolitik). The doctrine does not call for an unrealistic severing of ties with the west, and neither for a complete re-alignment of the countrys international posture. Rather, Turkey should not wait forever at the EUs door, and instead seek to play a role on multiple levels (including, albeit not exclusively, with the West). What is important to note here is that, despite the obvious specificities of Davutolus theory, this was not the first time that some of the pillars of Kemalism were questioned. In the mid-1980s and early 1990s the then Prime Minister who later became President, Turgut zal, sought to reposition Turkey in the international system. To a smaller extent

even AKPs (Islamic) predecessor in government (led by the Refah party, headed by Necmettin Erbakan, a historical figure of Turkish political Islam), had sought to develop closer relations with Ankaras Middle Eastern neighbours. This, along with controversial domestic policies, however, led the military to resort to what is commonly referred to as the 28 February process. This, also known as a postmodern coup, in essence ousted a democratically-elected government by hands of the military without resorting to a traditional military coup, with an overt intervention by the army. The government found itself with no alternative but resigning. The foreign policy impact of the Erbakan government was marginal, unlike zals and, especially, that of the governments led by the AKP since 20028. The key question that the reminder of the paper addresses is the following: to what extent has the Strategic Depth Doctrine had an impact on Turkeys foreign policy orientation? Did it lead to a re-orientation of the countrys international orientation? The next section reviews some of the most important new directions and initiatives to assess whether an international re-alignment has in fact taken place. The section focuses on Turkish relations with Russia, Iran and Syria, as these well illustrate the extent and diversity of Ankaras engagement in some of the regional systems it is part of, as proposed by the Strategic Depth Doctrine. This is followed by brief remarks on the extent to which these new ties have impacted on Ankaras traditional western ties. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the RussianTurkish rapprochement that has evolved in the postCold War period. This is certainly astonishing in light of the centuries of old rivalry between the two powers. The Ottoman and Tsarist Empires have engaged in a number of wars over the past three hundred years (1710; 1736; 17681776; 1787; 1806-1812; 1828-29; 1854-56; 1877-78; and World War I). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, however, the two countries have begun to see eye-to-eye in a number of issues. So, what drives the Turkish-Russian rapprochement? As Torbakov notes (2007), the shifts that have taken place in Eurasias geopolitical landscape over the past two decades have opened the way for closer cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. In particular, the disappearance of the Soviet threat has paved the way to the deepening of relations. The rapprochement builds on three specific areas: economic cooperation;
Turkey, Russia, Iran and Syria

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shared regional security concerns and disenchantment with US foreign policy. Cooperation in the energy sphere currently defines the relationship; however, more than a partnership, the relationship, extremely unequal, sees Russia as the patron (the energy provider) and Turkey as the client, given that Ankara received three quarters of its gas from Russia9, and given that Turkish gas demands are bound to increase dramatically over the next decade (55bcm in 2010, 82bcm in 2020), the relationship appears solid. Moreover, commercial ties outside the energy sphere (e.g. Russian arms sales to Turkey) are also flourishing. In addition to economic and energy cooperation, Russia and Turkey share security concerns. Both lay a great price to issues of state sovereignty and territorial integrity10, an issue of great significance to both due to the constant fears that Kurdish separatism may ignite the Middle East and that separatism in the post-Soviet borderlands may spill over into Russian borders (at least this was the Kremlins position until the Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008). More broadly, the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey has originated in their respective estrangement from Washington. Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar have referred to this as an axis of the excluded (2006), where the relations between the two erstwhile rivals have warmed up as a result of their growing opposition to US foreign policy and being left out from the new US-imposed arrangements in Iraq and elsewhere. While this is true to some extent, one should recall that the rapprochement is not rooted in any ideological convergence between Ankara and Moscow. Both countries are experiencing a growth in nationalist and anti-western sentiments, but the very origins of their opposition to the US in particular are remarkably distinct and thus justify no close alliance. Turkeys tensions with the US have a more regional dimension (the multi-dimensional Kurdish issue, in Iraq, Turkey and the broader Middle East), whereas Moscows tensions with the US (and Europe) are more global, and are a result of Russias perceived humiliation following the end of the cold war and the implosion of the Soviet state. Moreover, Russias recent intervention in the Caucasus (during the South Ossetian war in August 2008) is certainly not something that Ankara has welcomed. Not only has Russia ultimately supported separatist entities in the region (countering its earlier stance on the issue), but it has also cast a near-fatal blow to one of the few alternatives to Russias monopoly on energy transport routes. The BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was closed for a few days during

the war, casting doubts over the political viability of such non-Russian options. This, along with Turkeys awareness that excessive dependence on Russias supplies may equal entrapment, have led Turkish policy-makers to explore possible ways in which gas supplies could be reduced (and it is in this light that links between Tehran and Ankara should be understood) and ultimately Ankaras role as eastwest energy corridor could be enhanced, to the benefit of Europe (interested in reducing its own dependence on Russias oil and gas) and Turkey itself. The Iranian obstacle remains, of course and unless a deal with Tehran is struck this alternative (Turkmen and Iranian gas supplies) appears destined to remain on paper, blocked by US opposition to and political conflict with Iran. To summarise, relations between Russia and Turkey have without doubt gone through a period of considerable rapprochement due to the simultaneous disenchantment with the West and western foreign policy as well as common commercial interests. However, this has not led, and is not likely to lead, to a strategic partnership due to the fact that in the long run energy interests are competing rather than complementary and that Turkey has no interest in alienating its ties with the EU (due to the significant trade turnover, among others) and the US. Among the most surprising initiatives undertaken by the AKP government in foreign policies (a conduct upsetting many traditional allies) has been the intensification of ties with two important neighbours: Iran and Syria. The improvement of relations with Iran has been among the most controversial foreign policy decisions of the AKP government, especially since they occurred under President Mahmud Ahmadinejads presidency defined by his fiercely anti-western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. The root causes of the rapprochement between Tehran and Ankara are essentially three. First, is the convergence in the security sphere. Containing Kurdish nationalism, a traditional Turkish concern, is now supported by Iran as a result of the Cooperation and Security Agreement which identifies the PJAK, a Kurdish militant group active in Iran, as a source of cross-border instability11. The two countries also share a concern for the possible instability spilling on their respective territories from neighbouring Iraq12. A second driving factor behind cooperation is commercial. The two economies are complementary and bilateral trade has boomed in recent years, growing from US$2.4bn in 2003 to US$8bn in 2007 (the first quarter of 2008 already reported a significant US$2.1bn).
New directions in Turkish foreign policy

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Relations with the West: US and Turkey

Trade is lopsided in Turkeys favour, with Ankaras export amounting to US$6.6bn worth of products, and Turkish imports at US$541m (Talbot, 2008, p. 2). Last, but definitely not least, is energy cooperation. Turkey is seeking to reduce its dependency on Russia for its energy supplies and Iran offers an economically viable option. The obvious complication with this option is the political repercussions that making deals with Tehran have on relations with the United States. Nevertheless deals have been signed for the development by Turkish companies of three gas fields in South Pars, which could provide Turkey with ca 20bcm, roughly two thirds of Turkeys energy needs (Talbot, 2008, p. 2). Turkey has also committed to build two pipelines and hydro-power stations as part of the closer cooperation between the two countries. While cooperation has grown stronger over the years, some clouds have occasionally appeared. What is concerning for Turkey, for example, is the three-week suspension in gas delivery which occurred in January 2008, leaving Ankara wonder about its neighbours reliability as energy supplier. An additional concern lies of course in Tehrans nuclear program. Turkey is adamant about its opposition to a possible strike to destroy Iranian facilities, but is also opposed to a nuclear race in the Middle East. As to Syria, over the past five to six years Turkey has managed to solve the three issues that had plagued bilateral relations for decades: the disputed sovereignty over the former Hatay Sanjak, water management of the Euphrates river, and Syrias support for the PKK, over which Turkey threatened Syria with a military attack. Since the AKPs advent to power, relations have considerably warmed up, with the resolution of the territorial dispute (in Turkeys favour), and the development of a better working relationship with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. In this sense Turkey has sought to carve itself a role in the indirect talks between Syrians and Israelis. Similarly to the case of relations with Iran, Turkeys ties with Syria have an important economic dimension. Turkish exports to Syria, in fact, have risen dramatically from US$184m in 2000 to US$798 in 2007 (Talbot, 2008, p. 3). The development of ties with Syria and Iran responds to a strive towards closer ties with Middle Eastern countries is of course the result of the greater political weight that the AKP has assigned to its ties with the Muslim world. It is unsurprising that the closer ties with Damascus and Tehran have come to the detriment of Ankaras traditional links with Israel. More generally, they have put strains on Turkeys relations with the West, particularly the United States.

Closer relations with the West have been a pillar of Turkeys foreign policy in the post-World War II period. However, since the end of the Cold War gradual estrangement has defined the relationship between Washington and Ankara, and to some extent with Europe during the AKPs second term in office. In this sense the 1 March 2003 vote where the Turkish parliament voted against the deployment of Turkish troops to Iraq and against allowing US troops the use of Turkish territory for its use during the Iraq war, marked no watershed, despite the drama that the vote entailed both domestically and internationally. Rather, it was the latest (at the time) episode of two actors which struggled to redefine their relationship (which both till then took for granted). US-Turkish relations were defined by stability during the Cold War period, where the US provided Turkey with a security guarantee against the Soviet threat, and Turkey constituted a Western stronghold in a rather unstable area (or in fact at a cusp between different potential hotspots). While the 2003 vote took the relationship towards a negative turn, the origins of the deterioration in the relationship date back to the first Iraq war in 1991. Occasional cross-border operations of Turkish troops in northern Iraqi territory have begun in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish entity. Incursions into Iraqi territory intensified after the US-led invasion of Iraq, giving rise to a number of embarrassing incidents (for both sides), such as the so-called Sulemaniyah incident in July 2003, when US forces apprehended Turkish troops believing these were possibly al-Qaeda militants. More recently, Turkey led another operation in northern Iraq in February 2008 (Jenkins, 2008). Alongside the opposition to the war itself, Turkey has a long-standing fear that Iraqs territorial integrity may be under threat from Iraqi Kurdistan (which has de facto existed as a semi-independent entity since the early 1990s), this leading to a domino effect in the region which may well lead to similar requests by Turkeys own Kurdish community. The PKKs decision to resume its operations (after a short period of apparent demobilization) earlier in this decade, launching incursions into Turkish territory from bases in northern Iraq, is a situation which Ankara finds unsustainable and which it has sought to tackle unilaterally (and with only limited success). What has contributed to straining relations with Washington is a perception from the Turkish side that not only the US may rely too much on their Kurdish allies in Iraq, but also that this leads to closing more than one eye to what happens in

Iraqi conflict

The Kurdish issue

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the northern part of the country (especially the connivance between local Kurdish authorities and the PKK militants). The Kurdish issue had an impact on Turkish-EU relations as well, as shown below. At a time when the relationship with Washington was going through a frosty time13, Turkeys relations with the EU for some time seemed to improve significantly, at least for an initial period (20022005). EU accession was the AKPs priority in government (itself a reversal of the Islamist movements traditional antiEuropean stance). The introduction of wide-ranging reforms that contributed to transform the Turkish political system and reduce the influence of the military in politics were unprecedented. By all accounts the AKP-led government has been the most effectively pro-European of the republican period. Pro-Western and pro-European rhetoric certainly abounded even before 2002, but the number of reform packages introduced, and eventually the attainment of the status of candidate country and the opening of accession negotiations, speak volumes about the success of the first term in office of the AKP. More recently, however, (both in the lead-up to the 2007 parliamentary elections and during the start of the AKPs second term in office) relations with the EU have also slowed down. This can be essentially ascribed to two factors. On the one hand, is an understandable reform fatigue that has followed the earlier part of this decade until 2005, when Turkish governments (AKP and its predecessor in power) introduced a wide-range of reforms touching crucial aspects of the Turkish state to bring it in line with the required measures. It was somehow inevitable that the pace of reform could not continue indefinitely. On the other hand, it can be explained by the bitter debate in the country over its secular nature, namely the opposition between government and opposition over human and minority rights as well as freedom of speech and religion. All these issues have not only plagued the countrys domestic stability over the past two years or so, but have to some extent tarnished the image as a European conservative party that the AKP had successfully managed to convey. Do the ups and downs in the relations with the West amount to a re-orientation of Turkeys foreign policy priority, also in light of the warming up of relations with other countries, as outlined above? This appears premature at best. Both American and Turkish leaders have ensured that frequent official visits mended earlier tensions. As to the EU, the two aspects that contributed to slow down the

reform process in Turkey is the EUs own reconsideration of the enlargement process which seems to be put off for quite some time (with the only possible exception of Croatia), as well as the continued political conflict over Turkish identity and political dominance between the secular forces and the AKP. An area where relations could improve is that of energy security. Both Turkey and EU countries largely depend on Russians oil (and to some extent gas) supplies. The attempt to reduce Russias monopoly on the energy transport corridors is of course an area where Turkey, the EU and the US see eye-to-eye. Turkey has gone through turbulent times over the last couple of years. The most immediate effect of the legal battles and clashes between the AKP and its opponents are that first and foremost domestic turmoil has paralysed the countrys domestic reform agenda as well as its foreign policy (especially in terms of the EU accession process, now stalled). The AKP leaderships majoritarian understanding of democracy has de facto polarised the country between the supporters of the secular establishment and the AKP itself which sees its political dominance of the main institutions of the state legitimised by popular support. Having said this, there are more general considerations that can be made in relation to the impact of the AKP government on the Turkish political system, especially with reference to its international orientation. The AKPs first term in office has been defined as the most pro-EU orientation any Turkish government has ever witnessed. Speculations over the genuine or instrumental rationale of this policy aside, what remains is the series of reform packages introduced between 2002 and 2005. This, to be fair, was followed by a reform fatigue in the second term, when the government failed to show an equal amount of Euro-enthusiasm and became embroiled in a number of domestic disputes. Relations with Washington have gone through ups and (frequent) downs. The March 2003 vote, the political conflict over Iraqi Kurdistan and the renewed attacks by the PKK, have put strains on the relationship. Washingtons failure to understand and respond to Ankaras concern over the use of camps in northern Iraq by PKK militants have contributed to friction. The paper has put forward two arguments. First, that the current cosy relations with Russia and Iran do not reflect a common strategic vision of world affairs, but are built in (by
Countrys domestic reform agenda and foreign policy paralyse

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no means less firm) trade and energy cooperation, as well as frustration with US foreign policy in the region. Second, the AKP has not dramatically altered Turkish foreign policy, and neither has this progressive engagement of the Middle East constituted a radical break or an innovation in Turkish foreign policy conduct, since a relatively recent precedent can be found in the late presidents Turgut zal activism in foreign policy. In sum, the paper finds that the AKPs imprint on Turkish foreign policy is much more multifaceted and complex than a facile analysis and contraposition of Islamic foreign policy versus pro-western orientation would suggest. Ankara has not reneged its Western orientation, but has - following frustration with both US and European policies - added a new dimension of political and economic engagement of its important neighbourhood.

RESOCONTO DELLA TAVOLA ROTONDA DOVE VA LA TURCHIA. LA PERCEZIONE DEL PAESE NEI MEDIA TURCHI E ITALIANI
di Stefanella Campana

1. On the origins of the AKP and its foreign policy implications, see Bilgin (2008). 2. For some background see Turkeys ruling party escapes ban (BBC News, 30 July 2008) and Deep State Trial polarizes Turkey (BBC News 23 October 2008). 3. On the evolution of Turkish-US relations see Daly (2008); on Turkey-EU relations see Robins (2003 and 2007); finally on the rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow see Torbakov (2007). 4. See Murinson (2006) for a discussion of the doctrine and Davutolus own academic work (Stratejik Derinlik: Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkeys International Location, 2000). 5. For an analysis of the discrepancy between the partys rhetoric and actions see Bilgin (2008). 6. See Bilgin (2008). 7. In the 2007 elections the AKPs share of the vote increased to 46.6%, but because other parties reached the 10% threshold its number of seats decreased. 8. Initially, due to a pre-existing ban on political activities and a jail sentence on Recep Teyyip Erdoan, it was Abdullah Gl who became the prime minister. Subsequently, Gl became foreign minister and eventually, since Summer 2007, the countrys president. 9. Gas supplies increased from 2bcm in 2003 to ca. 16bcm in 2008 (Blue Stream pipeline). 10. At least until August 2008 when Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 11. Talbot (2008). On the Kurdish issue in and around Turkey see Kirisci (2007). 12. For an evolution of Turkeys role in Iraq see Frappi (2006). 13. For more pessimistic accounts of US-Turkish relations see Daly (2008) and Cagaptay (2007).

Partecipanti Marco Ansaldo: inviato di Repubblica Cengiz Candar: columnist di importanti media turchi, tra cui il Reference Daily Mimmo Candito: inviato de La Stampa e Presidente italiano di Reporters sans Frontires Seyda Canepa: corrispondente dallItalia della Tv turca NTV Yasemin Taskin: corrispondente dallItalia del quotidiano Sabah e TV ATV Ha coordinato Francesca Sforza, responsabile degli Esteri de La Stampa Saluti di: Renato Lattes, Presidente di Paralleli Emmanuela Banfo, giornalista Ansa e Segretaria Ordine Giornalisti del Piemonte

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Attorno alla Turchia, sotto osservazione fin dal 1999 come paese candidato allUnione europea, il dibattito si spesso caricato di implicazioni di varia natura dove non mancano disinformazione e pregiudizi. Forse anche per questo lopinione pubblica europea sembra per il momento poco favorevole alla sua entrata tra i 27 paesi. Nello scacchiere politico internazionale attuale la Turchia al centro di un acceso confronto-scontro, tra il veto dellasse Sarkozy-Merkel e il consenso del presidente americano Obama favorevole a legare la Turchia allOccidente attraverso Bruxelles, con lItalia nel ruolo di mediatore. Ma tutto questo come viene percepito e raccontato sui media turchi e italiani? Cruciale per la sua posizione geopolitica a met tra Oriente e Occidente, dove convivono laici e filoislamici, ma anche per la sua economia in forte sviluppo, la Turchia resta ancora un paese da conoscere e capire meglio. Con questo intento Paralleli ha organizzato un incontro tra giornalisti italiani e turchi. La tavola rotonda, aperta dai saluti di Renato Lattes (a cui va il mio riconoscimento per la sua amicizia e il suo sostegno alle attivit dellarea Media di Paralleli), convinto sostenitore dellentrata della Turchia nellUnione Europea e dellimportanza di far emergere anche il punto di vista di un islm europeo, si inserita nel programma di iniziative Due penisole, un unico mare che ha visto, tra laltro, la collaborazione di Paralleli ad una ricerca promossa dallo IAI (lIstituto Affari Internazionali) sugli orientamenti dei principali stakeholders europei e turchi. Ricerca che ha avuto tra i suoi obiettivi il raggiungimento di una strategia di comunicazione per favorire il dibattito pubblico, chiamando in causa il ruolo importante che possono giocare i giornalisti per comunicare meglio la Turchia allEuropa e lEuropa alla Turchia. Domanda quindi pertinente quella della tavola rotonda: Dove va la Turchia?. Le risposte dei giornalisti che qui riferisco - e che vanno ovviamente contestualizzate - sono state approfondite e per niente scontate. Di certo aiutano a capire e offrono molti spunti di riflessione. Pochi giorni prima della tavola rotonda la magistratura turca aveva chiesto alla Corte Costituzionale di accertare se il partito Giustizia e Sviluppo (AKP) del Premier Erdogan stesse attentando ai principi laici del kemalismo dopo la legge che autorizzava le donne osservanti a coprirsi il capo con il turban anche nei luoghi pubblici, come ad esempio lUniversit. Cerano state accese manifestazioni in piazza per il timore

del ripristino della sharia. Mentre scriviamo, la Turchia vive unaltra stagione politica. Dopo il disastroso risultato del voto del 29 marzo 2009 (lAKP ha perso 8 punti), Erdogan stato costretto a cambiare la sua squadra di governo. Tra le teste cadute quella del ministro della Giustizia Mehmet Ali Sahin, grande artefice dellemendamento dellarticolo 301 del codice penale che puniva loffesa allidentit turca e che ha portato davanti ai giudici molti intellettuali, fra cui il premio Nobel Orhan Pamuk. Dove va la Turchia? un interrogativo che si pongono gli stessi turchi, rivela Cengiz Candar, noto columnist di importanti media turchi. Persone che come me sono note nel mio paese grazie alla televisione e agli altri mezzi di comunicazione, vengono persino fermate per strada dai passanti, i quali chiedono: dove va la Turchia? In quanto intellettuali, opinion maker, si suppone che abbiamo una risposta a questa domanda, ma non labbiamo. Viviamo in un periodo molto particolare, nel quale il futuro prossimo della Turchia estremamente incerto. Unincertezza in cui pu farsi strada anche un timore, come quello raccolto da Francesca Sforza in un viaggio in Turchia, in una serata con alcuni diplomatici europei, imprenditori e rappresentanti del governo turco in cui si ventilava una possibile agenda segreta di islamizzazione del paese. Ci che ha subito escluso Yasemin Taskin: Non credo che il partito del premier Erdogan, lAKP, abbia unagenda segreta. un partito conservatore di stampo islamico, con una propria agenda politica. Lislm fa parte della sua cultura ed quindi inevitabile che, come la Democrazia Cristiana in Italia faceva riferimento ai valori cristiani, cos in Turchia un partito di questo tipo abbia nel suo programma lapplicazione di valori islamici. Ma non credo che sia possibile un ritorno della sharia in Turchia; si pu parlare semmai di un modello di democrazia per i paesi islamici, di un islm moderato. Il problema vero, fa notare Yasemin Taskin, che manca lopposizione di altre forze politiche e sociali che possano riequilibrare il peso dellAKP nella societ, forze che, in questo momento, sono assenti in Turchia. Manca un vero partito di sinistra: lo stesso Chp [n.d.c. Partito Repubblicano del Popolo, attualmente il principale partito di opposizione in Turchia], rappresentato da Deniz Baykal, in base alle proprie argomentazioni e ai valori che difende nella politica e nel sociale risulta in realt un partito di destra. Si pu parlare in tal senso di un vuoto politico e sociale in Turchia dovuto, a mio avviso, anche

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al colpo di Stato del 1980 [n.d.c. si tratta del terzo colpo di stato militare nella storia della Repubblica con il quale una giunta guidata dal generale Kenan Evren prendeva il potere per mettere fine alla guerra fratricida che da anni insanguinava il paese] che ha sradicato in Turchia le forze politiche-sociali di sinistra. Questa situazione, a sua volta, il prodotto del precedente colpo di Stato, fatto che ha creato un circolo vizioso dagli esiti negativi. Secondo Yasemin Taskin, vanno poste altre domande: in ottantanni di repubblica laica turca, quanto le riforme di Atatrk hanno raggiunto il loro scopo? Quanto sono state assorbite e accettate dalla societ? C stato un reale dialogo tra la componente tradizionale islamica della popolazione e quella laica? Credo che la Turchia laica non abbia fatto i conti con la componente tradizionale islamica della sua societ - osserva Taskin. Fin dallinizio, la Repubblica turca ha conservato la propria laicit con la forza e la stessa democrazia sotto la tutela dei militari. Abbiamo subto quattro colpi di Stato e sono stati chiusi 25-26 partiti, di cui due a vocazione islamica. Credo che per noi sia arrivato il momento di affrontare questi problemi. Prima di venire qui pensavo alla Turchia come ad un camion che difficile frenare e che corre verso un muro. Questo muro rappresenta i nostri tab, la nostra difficolt di affrontare il problema curdo con cui conviviamo da 30 anni e quello riguardante la posizione dei militari, il loro potere ed il loro ruolo nella democrazia turca. Resta da capire com cambiata in questi anni la percezione della Turchia in Italia e in Europa. Marco Ansaldo, partendo da una disamina della stampa italiana, la considera abbastanza bipartisan riguardo allingresso della Turchia in Europa, e con unattenzione maggiore rispetto al passato non solo per la quantit delle notizie pubblicate ma anche per i molti corrispondenti inviati in Turchia. Ansaldo, da giornalista che vive molto allestero e particolarmente in Turchia, nota anche una forte attenzione della stampa turca nei confronti della questione europea, addirittura a livelli eccessivi, nel senso che qualsiasi frase di un ministro europeo o di un funzionario di Bruxelles, viene sviscerata, analizzata in maniera esasperata al punto che sembra che non si parli daltro in Europa. Secondo me, i colleghi turchi dovrebbero capire che in realt non cos. Illuminante lanalisi di Ansaldo di un articolo del Turkish Daily News che mette in evidenza la manipolazione fatta con questo titolo sul premio Nobel turco: Pamuk tifer

Turchia in Europa (due giorni dopo si sarebbe giocata la prima partita calcistica della Turchia). Il titolo allinterno invece: Pamuk tifer Turchia sul campo europeo, come se il grande celebrato scrittore turco non dovesse tenere per la Turchia. Lultima volta, questo lattacco del pezzo, che Orhan Pamuk ha parlato alla stampa europea ha causato un grande caos in Turchia, riferendosi a unintervista dello scrittore a un quotidiano svizzero nel febbraio del 2005: aveva detto che un milione di armeni vennero uccisi nel suo paese. Pamuk fu processato secondo larticolo 301 del codice penale per insulto alla turchit. Un caso che ha fatto scalpore, che ha attirato lattenzione sulla Turchia. Per questo, secondo Ansaldo, la comprensione dei due paesi pu essere molto aiutata anche dalla letteratura. Questo un compito che gli intellettuali devono assolutamente svolgere per far comprendere meglio due paesi e due realt, quella europea e quella turca, perch c un abisso di ignoranza, soprattutto da parte nostra nei loro confronti. I nostri amici turchi adorano e amano lItalia, magari non sono mai stati nel nostro paese ma ladorano, lo conoscono, parlano perfettamente la nostra lingua. Esiste un gap culturale, di conoscenza che dobbiamo assolutamente riempire. Cengiz Candar a spiegare perch la Turchia si senta non capita, non rispettata e non accuratamente valutata nelle opinioni pubbliche europee: Abbiamo bisogno di riflettere e ridefinire chi siamo e dove stiamo andando. Prima della fine della guerra fredda, per esempio, la Turchia godeva di una situazione molto favorevole, essendo membro della NATO; difendevamo la civilt occidentale sulla frontiera dellUnione Sovietica, confinando con due paesi del Patto, lUnione Sovietica, appunto, e la Bulgaria. Nessun altro membro della NATO aveva una frontiera in comune con due paesi del Patto. Al termine della guerra fredda, e con linarrestabile avvento della globalizzazione, la Turchia nel 1999 entrata ufficialmente nella lista dei paesi candidati ad entrare nellUnione Europea, sotto un governo considerato islamista da alcuni, o per lo meno con referenze indubbiamente islamiche. Proprio quando era pi vicina che mai allintegrazione con lUnione Europea, sotto un governo quasi-islamista e lo scontro delle civilt era dibattuto in tutto il mondo, la Turchia si trovata in una posizione politica ed ideologica rilevante. La Turchia un paese di accesso allEuropa, controlla il passaggio tra il Mar Nero ed il Mediterraneo, nonch quello tra il Caucaso ed i Balcani ed la strada pi breve dal Medio

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Oriente allEuropa, un corridoio dove transitano uomini e risorse. Ha una frontiera comune con lIraq, lIran e la Siria un paese che cerca di riconciliare due diverse parti del mondo, in un contesto di scontro delle civilt. Lanalisi di Cengiz Candar sulla situazione attuale del paese molto lucida, ma piuttosto pessimista. Certamente ci aiuta a capire meglio la Turchia di oggi. Il mondo intero si sta confrontando con un futuro incerto, in un periodo in cui nessuno riesce a dare una chiara definizione di dove stiamo andando nel XXI secolo, quale sia il paradigma del nuovo millennio, e proprio tali domande hanno implicazioni sulla situazione interna della Turchia. Il paese da cui provengo sta vivendo una polarizzazione molto pericolosa, specialmente in queste settimane. Stiamo affrontando una crisi istituzionale circa la separazione dei poteri: il giudiziario, lesecutivo ed il legislativo sono totalmente in disaccordo. Potete immaginare un paese in cui il partito di governo, che ha il sostegno di quasi la met della popolazione e che ha raccolto il 47% dei voti appena 10 mesi fa, attualmente sotto inchiesta da parte della Corte Costituzionale, ed il cui Primo Ministro, diventato una figura internazionale e con un seguito molto forte allinterno della stessa Turchia, tra due mesi potrebbe essere bandito dalla politica per 5 anni. Lesecutivo ora debole in Turchia. Lorgano legislativo, il parlamento, che ha il potere di emanare le leggi e di emendare la Costituzione, o approvare una nuova Costituzione, e che controllato dal partito di governo, ha finito per essere svuotato di senso con ci che alcuni di noi in Turchia, incluso il sottoscritto, chiamano un colpo di stato giudiziario. Ci per via degli alti organi del giudiziario, che ha alle spalle un esercito formidabile. Solo la scorsa settimana hanno preso la decisione, interpretata allo stesso modo in Europa e in Turchia, di bloccare lemendamento sulla questione del velo. Tutti capiscono ed interpretano correttamente che ha qualcosa a che fare con il liberare quelle giovani donne, dar loro la possibilit di iscriversi alluniversit, ma da un punto di vista strettamente giuridico non esiste alcun punto nella Costituzione che contenga la parola velo. Seppure io continui a mantenere la mia posizione dissenziente, il Parlamento aveva il diritto di emendare la Costituzione o di fare una nuova Costituzione, e quando la Corte Costituzionale interviene, come ha fatto la scorsa settimana, bloccando lemendamento, usurpa il potere del Parlamento e si pone al di sopra di esso. dunque impossibile emanare una nuova Costituzione, fare legalmente delle riforme in questi organi in Turchia, con lattuale Corte Costituzionale,

con lattuale Corte di Cassazione e con lattuale Consiglio di Stato, che costituiscono il potere giudiziario. Non si pu pi parlare, in un senso europeo, di cambiare il paese con mezzi legali, attraverso misure parlamentari, per mezzo dellautorit eletta e dipendente dalla maggioranza parlamentare per lemanazione delle leggi. impossibile finch abbiamo questo potere giudiziario e questa Corte Costituzionale, diretta emanazione della Costituzione del 1982, che a sua volta un prodotto diretto del regime militare. Stiamo quindi attraversando unimpasse politica da cui nessuno sa come usciremo. Questo il motivo per cui la domanda, dove va la Turchia? mi rivolta dai miei stessi compatrioti. Io non lo so. E non lo sappiamo anche perch in Turchia noi non siamo solo osservatori, siamo i catalizzatori del cambiamento. Ma ci che sappiamo su dove sta andando la Turchia incerto. Tornando alla domanda, sulla percezione dei media rispetto alla Turchia in Europa, Cengiz Candar si sofferma sulla complessit del suo paese: Ci che vorremmo avere una giusta percezione di noi stessi e una precisa analisi della nostra situazione, anche se schizofrenica; chiediamo solo che ci prestiate la vostra attenzione e cerchiate di capirci. Ma potreste obiettare che se voi stessi turchi non vi capite, come potete aspettarvi che noi vi capiamo? Bene, uniamoci e facciamolo insieme, perch quello che la Turchia sta compiendo un esperimento molto importante ed interessante, non solo per i paesi islamici: il mondo occidentale ha sempre rimarcato che la Turchia un esperimento di democrazia unico in tutto il mondo musulmano. Sarebbe un bene se la democrazia in Turchia avesse successo, non solo per il mondo islamico in qualit di buon esempio, ma per il mondo intero. un esperimento molto importante per lEuropa, perch lislm ormai la seconda religione in termini demografici, in termini di popolazione di immigrati ma anche di cittadini europei: in Francia, in Gran Bretagna come in Germania; i musulmani non sono solo immigrati come in Italia, sono cittadini di quei paesi. Lislm diventato la seconda religione e lo sar ancora di pi con lallargamento dellEuropa, che un movimento inarrestabile e che assorbir, secondo me, i Balcani occidentali, la Macedonia, la Bosnia Erzegovina, ed altri paesi che sono considerati di popolazione musulmana. Non potete quindi lasciare la Turchia. La Turchia in Europa, storicamente, geograficamente, demograficamente, economicamente. Se lesperimento

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avr successo non sar importante solo per il mondo islamico, sar molto importante per il futuro dellEuropa. Quindi, per concludere la risposta alla domanda, molto valida, posso solo dire: prestateci la vostra attenzione, e facciamolo insieme! Mimmo Candito, forte della sua lunga esperienza come inviato de La Stampa fa affiorare i suoi ricordi di reporter che lo portano a condividere la tesi del collega turco. Alcune volte andando in Turchia, in questo straordinario, affascinante paese arrivai alla sua punta estrema a Oriente. Mi pare si chiamasse Sen, se non ricordo male, e cera un piccolo minareto con una piccola moschea e con i tappeti appesi fuori allaria ad asciugare; sulla punta estrema, in mezzo alla vegetazione rigogliosa, cerano due soldatini col loro elmetto in testa e il fucile in spalla che vigilavano sullEuropa che stava loro alle spalle. La Turchia in Europa, il suo corpaccione per il 90% si trova in Asia, nellAsia Minore, ma l lEuropa non voleva finire; la Turchia, la Tracia Europa ed Europa come tutto quello che c dallaltra parte. Su questo non v dubbio. Quindi quando Cengiz dice la Turchia Europa anche la geografia e limmaginario ci dicono che la Turchia Europa. E quando nel settembre dell80 - io mi trovavo l in vacanza, ci fu il colpo di Stato, il giornale mi mand un telex e fra mille difficolt e avventure in un territorio dove cera il coprifuoco e non si poteva viaggiare, riuscii ad arrivare ad Ankara e a raccontare cosa stava avvenendo - vi fu il giuramento del generale Evren, linsediamento ufficiale come Presidente della Repubblica dopo il colpo di Stato. La cerimonia, invece di essere preceduta dallinno nazionale turco, fu preceduta dalla sinfonia di Beethoven. Tutti ci guardammo perplessi per questo segno che voleva rivendicare, nel ricordo del generale Atatrk, unidentit europea allinterno di una situazione fortemente di crisi e destabilizzata comera quellautunno dell80. Candito si dice ottimista per la Turchia di oggi proprio perch ho raccontato tante storie drammatiche e tragiche del mondo e ho sempre visto anche nel pi atroce dei conflitti un barlume di speranza. Qui il conflitto non evidentemente militare, un conflitto di interessi, di culture, di civilt. E a proposito di identit Candito ricorda Tzvetan Todorov, che discutendo delle radici cristiane dellEuropa, si dimenticava che ci sono radici, storie e segni profondi romani, greci, ebraici e musulmani. Il riferimento a quellidentit europea che nasce dal secolo dei Lumi in cui per la prima volta il pluralismo sostituisce

il dogmatismo della religione. Questa lidentit europea - sottolinea Candito - comprende quindi le connotazioni musulmane con riferimento a quella larga parte dellidentit che fa della storia della Turchia un mondo sicuramente islamico al di l di ci che di cambiamento, rinnovamento, trasformazione vi ha portato Kemal Pasci. Credo che ogni realt, quella turca soprattutto, sia complessa ed sicuramente difficile raccontarla da parte dei media, siano essi turchi o italiani, francesi, tedeschi. A chi accusa i media italiani di scarsa attenzione, Candito - pur critico nei loro confronti - replica che se in Italia ci fossero 10 milioni di turchi come in Germania, probabilmente anche la Repubblica, La Stampa e il Corriere, come ha fatto la stampa tedesca, dedicherebbero pi di una pagina a questo problema. Quanto allidentit possibile, al riferimento islamico, dicendo per esempio che il partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo di Erdogan un partito che potrebbe essere assimilato alla nostra DC, Candito sostiene che il parallelismo soltanto di superficie, perch lislm non il cristianesimo: lislm ancora oggi connota in termini assolutamente di autoreferenzialit, identit religiosa e identit politica. Nel mondo occidentale, nel mondo europeo, segnato dalla presenza cristiana, la rivoluzione dei Lumi e quella francese hanno portato una netta distinzione fra il tempo e lo spazio della religione, della privatezza, ed il tempo e lo spazio del pubblico e della politica. Quindi, il parallelo lascia immaginare certamente che il partito di Erdogan sia una DC, ma allinterno di una connotazione identitaria molto diversa, sulla quale tutti dobbiamo riflettere, perch altrimenti non si capirebbe perch vi sia tanta perplessit. Candito chiaramente favorevole alla Turchia in Europa e lo spiega cos: Con la polarizzazione nel mondo doggi, non v alcun dubbio che sia un ponte straordinario col mondo islamico, del quale lEuropa dovrebbe avere la capacit di cogliere opportunisticamente tutti gli elementi di vantaggio. La Turchia in Europa, la Turchia parla come nessun altro con lislm e lEuropa, che ha bisogno nel futuro molto pi di oggi di parlare con lislm, dovrebbe tenerne assolutamente conto, se non per rispetto della propria storia, certamente per la difesa dei propri interessi. LEuropa deve avere la capacit di cogliere anche in senso opportunistico i vantaggi che nascono dallascoltare con forte attenzione quello che viene dalla Turchia, e dare spazio e sensibilit verso le incertezze di cui parlava Cengiz. Noi europei - insiste Candito - possiamo avere un ruolo molto importante per risolvere positivamente

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questa incertezza, ma ci possibile solo se si riconosce che la Turchia Europa. Quindi per concludere posso dire: Quando i miei interlocutori apprendono che sono turca mi dicono sempre che non lo sembro. Questa la reazione pi consueta, perch nellimmaginario dellopinione pubblica europea c tutta unaltra rappresentazione, e con questa andiamo su tanti giornali europei. Quando si parla della Turchia mettono, nel 90% dei casi, la foto di signore che hanno il capo coperto. Forse anche giusto cos dal momento che oltre il 70% delle donne in Turchia si copre il capo, tuttavia, a differenza di quanto si crede, la maggior parte di queste lo fa per motivi tradizionali. In Turchia come in tutta lEuropa, ci sono molte pi difficolt per le donne nella vita quotidiana rispetto agli uomini, ma non si parla mai del fatto che il corpo docente al 50% sia costituito dalle donne, n delle tante donne manager. Si parla sempre, forse giustamente, del velo. Ma la religione non un affare dello Stato, un affare privato. In Turchia i sostenitori pi accaniti del diritto di portare il velo nelle universit per le ragazze, non sono i circoli islamici bens quelli laici liberal-democratici, perch interpretano questo come il diritto di esercitare la libert di espressione. Attenta osservatrice della realt e dei media italiani, Seyda ritiene che la passione, la curiosit nei confronti della Turchia da parte dellinformazione spesso non coglie tutte le sfumature che offre il suo paese. Non so se lo sono anche i politici, ma lopinione pubblica europea sicuramente preoccupata per quello che sente o legge sulla Turchia. Infatti, se diamo unocchiata ai recenti sondaggi, lostilit nei confronti di una Turchia in Europa cresciuta incredibilmente: alla domanda secca volete i turchi in Europa? il no nei paesi pi ostili come la Francia qualche anno fa erano il 40%; adesso il 70-80%. Mi domando come siamo arrivati in cos poco tempo ad una percezione a tal punto negativa di un paese che cerca di completare il suo cammino per diventare un paese normale, come gli altri paesi europei. Di fronte ad unopinione pubblica cos scettica naturale che i governi europei siano sempre pi reticenti a dimostrare il loro appoggio esplicito nei confronti della Turchia, pur sapendo benissimo che una Turchia in Europa creerebbe meno problemi che una Turchia al di fuori di essa. Ci non solo per motivi strategici, di sicurezza, di sicurezza energetica ma anche per il ruolo chiave che la Turchia, paese di popolazione musulmana, svolge come esempio per altri paesi musulmani che hanno una democrazia pi

zoppicante. Perch siamo arrivati a questo punto? Ormai sappiamo che per lopinione pubblica europea lentrata della Turchia una fonte di preoccupazione, se non in alcuni casi addirittura una minaccia, ma non in termini economici, bens in termini socio-culturali. Gli europei si domandano semplicemente: se i turchi entrano in Europa, il loro modo di vivere quotidiano compatibile con il mio? Voglio avere un turco vicino di casa? Voglio avere studenti turchi nelle nostre scuole pubbliche? Voglio che i miei figli facciano amicizia con i turchi? Chi sono i turchi? Come vengono percepiti? In tutto ci conta moltissimo - sottolinea la giornalista turca - la situazione che si creata dopo l11 settembre, non solo nei confronti della Turchia, ma nei confronti di tutto luniverso islamico, che viene percepito in un modo molto pi negativo rispetto al passato. Seyda Canepa sottolinea un aspetto contradditorio rilevato sui media. Una notizia di cronaca nera su un cosiddetto delitto donore compiuto da un padre nei confronti di una figlia perch non rispetta i codici di comportamento del paese di provenienza, fa molto pi effetto di mille statistiche che dimostrano i casi di integrazione dei musulmani. Inoltre, in questi casi si compie una generalizzazione: che si parli magari di un indiano, un pachistano, un turco, indifferente. Il riferimento sempre al mondo islamico, anche se un indiano a compiere un delitto donore, e il 90% degli indiani non musulmano. Questo, a mio avviso, uno dei principali motivi per cui lopinione pubblica europea sempre pi diffidente nei confronti della Turchia. Tutto quello che di negativo si percepisce sullislm, sul mondo musulmano, si riversa addosso alla Turchia. Un paradosso enorme, perch la Turchia tra tutti i paesi di popolazione musulmana nel mondo, pi di un miliardo di persone, lunico le cui fonti di diritto si basano sul diritto positivo: la religione e lo Stato sono due entit totalmente separate. Semplicemente gli europei non sanno che in Turchia la religione nella vita quotidiana viene vissuta come un fatto privato; nessuno lascia il lavoro se impiegato pubblico perch deve andare a pregare, nessuno va a sposarsi nella moschea, nessuno fa matrimoni religiosi. S lo fanno forse, per non riconosciuto dallo Stato. Il modo di vivere dei turchi non lontano da quello degli europei, per questo non viene percepito. Convinta europeista, Seyda Canepa sottolinea che la Turchia istituzionalmente un paese europeo, non governato dalle leggi islamiche com percepito dallopinione

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pubblica europea. Il motivo per il quale la Turchia vuol fare parte dellEuropa non esportare la propria cultura, ma convivere con quella europea che sente vicina. Non si tratta di un paese che vuole invadere lEuropa con milioni di lavoratori che vogliono rubare il lavoro. La Turchia vuole semplicemente crescere ed abbracciare i valori universali della democrazia. Negli ultimi dieci anni in Turchia sono state promosse riforme importantissime che altri paesi europei hanno realizzato in secoli. Queste riforme, come le regolamentazioni delle relazioni tra il potere militare e quello civile, sono state realizzate anche grazie alla spinta dellEuropa, alle condizioni che questultima ha posto per iniziare le trattative per lintegrazione della Turchia. Forse non sono ancora sufficienti per qualcosa fatto, ma nonostante ci lostilit nei confronti della Turchia e dei turchi continua a crescere, e non solo in Europa. C laltra faccia della medaglia. Racconta Seyda Canepa: Se si chiede ai turchi: volete entrare in Europa? due anni fa l80% diceva di s, adesso la stessa percentuale dice no. Questa forse una dimostrazione dellorgoglio ferito: se i turchi dicono no significa semplicemente che se tu non mi vuoi, io non ti voglio. una reazione nei confronti di unEuropa che non dice di s ma non dice di no, parla di una membership non a pieno titolo, una sorta di amicizia particolare, privilegiata. Seyda non nega le difficolt attuali. Le turbolenze nella politica interna, la grave crisi istituzionale tra potere esecutivo e giudiziario, sono fatti che mettono ancora pi in difficolt il cammino verso lEuropa. Ma come si svolger questo cammino dipender molto dallEuropa, dai governi europei ma soprattutto dai giornalisti europei, dagli opinion-makers che comunicheranno allopinione pubblica le notizie provenienti dalla Turchia. Come ha detto un giornalista turco, bisogna conquistare sia le menti sia i cuori. Cosa possono fare i colleghi europei, italiani? Semplicemente andare, come ha detto Cengiz Candar, a tastare il terreno, capire, portare la testimonianza, le sfumature. Bisogna capire se quella percepita dagli europei una Turchia vera oppure virtuale. Insomma essere dei veri e bravi giornalisti, per lappunto.

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Note sugli autori

Matteo Fumagalli Assistant Professor presso il Dipartimento di Relazioni Internazionali e di Studi Europei della Central European University di Budapest e Honorary Fellow in Politics presso lUniversit di Edimburgo. Tra le sue pubblicazioni pi recenti: Lo stallo euro-turco (Nomos&Khaos, Roma 2007) e La trasformazione del sistema politico turco (in M. Torri, a cura di., Il Grande Medio Oriente nellera dellegemonia americana, Milano, Mondadori, Milano 2006). Fulya Atacan professore presso il Dipartimento di Studi Politici e Relazioni Internazionali della Yildiz Technical University in Turchia. Tra le sue pi recenti pubblicazioni: Radical Islamic Thought in Turkey (in Current Turkish Thought, 1991, n 64, pp. 1-21) e Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP (in Religion and Politics in Turkey, Eds. B. Rubin, A. arkolu, Routledge Curzon, London 2005). Kaya Kemal rappresentante dellItalian Center for Turkish Studies (ICTS) in Turchia. Tra le sue pi recenti pubblicazioni: La questione curda costringe Erdogan a spostarsi verso la destra (Occasional Paper ICTS n 8, Dicembre 2008), La Turchia nel Consiglio di Sicurezza dellONU: Che ruolo pu giocare? (Occasional Paper ICTS n 6, Novembre 2008). Nathalie Tocci Responsabile di ricerca dellArea Europa dellIstituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) e Associate Editor de The International Spectator. Tra le sue pubblicazioni pi recenti: The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia: Hindering EU Potential Through the Political Management of Contractual Relations (in Journal of Common Market Studies, forthcoming, 2008), Conditionality, impact and prejudice in EU-Turkey relations (IAI-TEPAV report, Roma 2007). Stefanella Campana giornalista, responsabile dellarea Media dellIstituto Paralleli. Tra le sue pubblicazioni Quando lorrore donna. Torturatrici o kamikaze. Vittime o nuove emancipate? (con Carla Reschia, Editori Riuniti, Roma 2005). Rosita Di Peri ricercatrice in Scienza Politica e responsabile dellarea Culture dellIstituto Paralleli.

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