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INTRODUCTION

I will now proceed to the outline. One hot issue today is that there are many people who wanted to change the government from
Presidential to Parliamentary. They do not want a President anymore, they want a Prime Minister. Or they do not want a Congress
with two houses, like Senate and the House of Representatives. They want a parliament, only one. We know that the Congress is the
law making body.

Q: Can they pass a law saying that from now on we will abolish the presidential system and have parliamentary form of government?
A: The answer is No. Why? What is the principle? The Constitution does not allow it. The Constitution is saying that we will have a
presidential system. The Constitution as we know is the fundamental law. It is the law that should be followed. So Congress
cannot go against it, Congress cannot change it. Obviously, it can be amended but you will learn later that it is very difficult.

We go to the definition. The first one is:

Q: What is the CONSTITUTION?


A: We usually define it as a written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited, and defined
and by which these powers are distributed among several departments, for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the
body politic. The definition tells us that the constitution disallows an oral constitution; it should be a written documentary.

Q: What are the functions for the Constitution?


A: It establishes power, it limits power, it defines power, and it distributes power.

Q: What are the powers of the government?


A: There are three main powers that are exercised by the government: those are executive power, legislative power, and then you
have judicial power. That is what we mean by the Constitution establishes these powers.

I will go to the next one. The Constitution also defines them. For instance:

Q: What is an executive power?


A: This is the power to execute laws.

What is judicial power? What is legislative power? So the constitution also defines power. It also distributes power. Why? Who
exercises executive power? The president, it belongs to the executive. Who exercises legislative power? It’s only the Congress. That
is why even if there’s a martial law; the president cannot pass a presidential decree anymore.

Q: Who exercises judicial power?


A: It is given to the judiciary.

What about this one? This is strange. Take note that this one actually gives the opposite. The Constitution limits power. What do
we mean by that? You will learn later that not all powers are given by the government, it is not absolute. Why? Because it is
dangerous. For instance the bill of rights would say, “No law shall be passed depriving the people of freedom of religion”. So
Congress cannot say that from now on, we should abolish Islam. The Congress cannot therefore pass a law violating the bill of rights.
It also implies that it does not have absolute power given by the government.

Q: What will happen if we have no constitution? It would be very risky.


A: There will be chaos. It is just a piece of paper but in effect it restrains all of us. It is very important.

Now I go to the second term:

Q: What is CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?


A: It is the body of rules resulting from the interpretation by the high court of the written constitutional instrument in the course of
disposing of cases in which the validity in relation to the constitutional instrument of some acts of government power has been
challenged. In short, it is a body of rules resulting to the interpretation of a high court of a written constitutional instrument.

When we speak of the study of constitutional law, we study the provision and also the cases because they are the ones interpreting
the meaning of the terms. It is also good to understand that Constitutional Law is more difficult to study compared to other laws, like
Revised Penal Code, Family Code. Because, actually the provisions are so specific. There are general issues, but the meaning is not
very difficult to interpret. But when it comes to the constitution, the provisions are too general. That’s why there are too many cases
that will come out. For instance, the Constitution would say, the Philippines is a Republican State. That means a lot of things. What
do we mean by republican state? We will know that the Constitution is stated in general terms. I think that is the ideal for the reason
that; ok later on you will learn the general principles of the state, no specifics. The Constitution only gives us the general principles. It
is up for the Congress to implement them. If the Constitution is very specific, I think it is also dangerous. Because in the end, it will
be too restrictive. The people who will implement it will have little discretion. You will end up following everything literally. (punto
legal gyud!)

The next is the definition of:

Q: What is POLITICAL LAW?


A: In the textbook of Justice Cruz, it was defined as a branch of public law, which deals with the organization and operation of
governmental organs of the state and defines the relation of the state with the inhabitants of its territory.

In the first part of lecture, I think I have explained to you that there are three parts of the government. The executive, the
legislative and the judiciary. So it defines the functioning of these entities. In relation with each other.

Another point is the Constitutional Law and Political Law. That is very confusing. Why? Because when we speak of political law,
it means the subject. When we speak of the Constitutional law, it means the bill of rights. When we speak of Constitutional Law I, we
mean the textbook in Political Law. When we speak of Constitutional Law II, it means the Bill of Rights. Another confusion is this:
when you take the Bar, the first subject is on Political Law. Including in Political law is the subject: Constitutional Law 1,
Constitutional Law 2, Election law, Law on Public Officers. The classic that we use in law school on Constitution I is political law I.
Because if we look at the definition, it is says “the operation and organization of the government”. That is what we are going to study.

Another term that we are to discuss is saying, a branch of public law. You need to understand that if there’s a public law, there
can be a private law. When we speak of public law, it supposes to govern the relationship between the individual and that state. When
we speak of public law, the idea is it gathers the relationship of the individual with another individual. So, Constitution 1 speaks of
the relationship of the individual with the state. Criminal Law actually is more of a political, individual and the state. But in most
indigenous communities, criminal law is a private law.
-oOo-
THE PREAMBLE
We go now to the preamble:

PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

No legal value. The preamble is some kind of an introductory document. It comes from a Latin word “preambulare”, which
means “to walk before”. Most commentators would tell us that the function is to tell us the authorship of the constitution or the origin
and the scope and the purpose. The author is “we”, the sovereign Filipino people.

Q: What is the purpose of the preamble?


A: The purpose is to establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace.

Q: Suppose somebody files a case against you, can you say that “according to the preamble you cannot sue me”?
A: No! Meaning that it has no legal value. And you cannot file a case using the preamble. The main principle is that we say that the
preamble is not a source of right. So if it is not a source of right, you cannot invoke it. The opposite is also true; it cannot be a
source of obligation.

-oOo-

NATIONAL TERRITORY

Now we go to the national territory:

ARTICLE I
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.

First we need to understand that we are told that the definition of our national territory is part of municipal law, not part of
international law. How can we explain that? International law governs the relationship of states. So, for example we have a case
against Malaysia, against Indonesia. So the laws that should be applied will be based on treaties and general principles of international
law. What I said was that the definition of our national territory is not part of international law but of internal law. What is the
significance of this? It means that the definition is only good for us, it is not found in other laws. It binds us only. It does not bind
other counties. You cannot use it when there is litigation with other countries.

Article 1 means that the components of national territory can be divided into three parts. First, is the Philippine archipelago.
Second, all other territories of which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction. Third, the territorial, terrestrial, fluvial, aerial
domain, territorial state, subsoil and insular shelves, and submarine areas.

We are told by commentators that when we speak of the Philippines archipelago, we are saying that it is originally defined in the
treaty between the Spain and the US. They are saying that Batanes is not included. So, if you look at Batanes, it is really part of the
archipelago but the treaty does not state it as part. The point is, when we speak of the Phil archipelago, we mean those territories
defined in the treaty. However, Philippine territory is not limited on the Philippine archipelago. It is saying, all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. What is the significance with this? While we are saying that Batanes is not part
of the Philippine archipelago, it belongs to us because now we exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over Batanes. We have elections
there. Batanes was not occupied by the Spaniards.

How about the third term? It is saying terrestrial. It means plants. Fluvial, pertains to birds. Aerial, that means the air we breathe.
It also includes the seabed, subsoil, insular shelves and other submarine areas. It pertains to water level, the land here under the sea
(underwater extensions of the land).

You will not fully understand the national territory if we will not discuss the other related concepts. We have the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This treaty actually in a sense defines the territories of the state. It also determines on
who can exploit the oceans. These are the terms that are very important under the treaty. We have internal waters, territorial sea,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf.

Q: What is INTERNAL WATERS?


A: It pertains to the waters around, between, and connecting the island of the archipelago. All the waters.

Q: What is TERRITORIAL SEA?


A: The waters within 12 nautical miles from the baseline. Now, we exercise full sovereignty and jurisdiction.

Q: What is CONTIGUOUS ZONE?


A: The waters not exceeding 24 miles from the baseline. So 24 miles from the baseline, we have contiguous zone. When it comes to
this, we only exercise CONTROL in order to protect and punish immigration, and customs laws. Within the territorial sea, all
laws are applicable. However if, what is applicable, we can enforce customs, immigration and sanitary laws.

Q: What do you mean by CUSTOMS?


A: It means to prevent smuggling. Immigration to prevent aliens. Sanitation has something to do with environmental law. Because
we know that the RPC is not applicable up to 24, it is only applicable up to 12 miles, the territorial sea.

Q: What is the EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE?


A: The waters not beyond the 200 nautical miles from the baseline.

Q: What can we do with the EEZ?


A: Very limited. We have the exclusive right to explore, manage and exploit living and non-living resources. Take note that it is
exclusive. Meaning, others cannot use it.

Q: What is the CONTINENTAL SHELF?


A: It pertains to the seabed and subsoil (not less than 200 but not more than 350 miles), which extends throughout the natural
prolongation of the land territory to the extent of 350 miles or to within 200 miles if the natural prolongation does not go beyond.
If you are for instance standing on the times beach, we know that the water level will be like this. Now, what do we mean by
continental shelf? If you will swim under, you will notice that the land is not even, the sand, the rock. When we speak of the EEZ,
we speak of the waters. When we speak of the continental shelf, you are not taking the subsoil, or seabed. The question is, how far
will the continental shelf go? It is saying, it extends up to the natural prolongation.
Q: Suppose, the subsoil, the seabed, or the natural prolongation extends up to 350 miles. What is the continental shelf?
A: Now, it is saying that it extends up to the natural prolongation.

Next question, suppose the natural prolongation is very short. It is says that it is not less than 200 miles. Meaning, if it goes down
within 200 miles, the continental shelf will only up to 200 miles. If we look at the EEZ, it’s at all times 200. But when we speak of the
continental shelf, it can go beyond up to the natural prolongation. After 200 miles, we call it high seas. It belongs to nobody. Anybody
can use. No limit.

BAR QUESTIONS (reference: UP Bar, READ for your health and safety)

1989 # 20
No. 20: What do you understand by the archipelagic doctrine? Is this reflected in the 1987 Constitution?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE emphasizes the unity of land and waters by defining an archipelago either as a group of
islands surrounded by waters or a body of waters studded with islands. For this purpose, it requires that baselines be drawn by
connecting the appropriate points of the "outermost islands to encircle the islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward
side of the baselines regardless of breadth or dimensions are merely internal waters.
Yes, the archipelagic doctrine is reflected in the 1987 Constitution. Article I, Section 1 provides that the national territory of the
Philippines includes the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein; and the waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
1991 – What do you understand by the continental shelf?
2000 – What is the basis to take the spratly island?
2003 – What is outer space?
-oOo-
ARTICLE II

So we will now proceed to Article II, the declaration of principles.

First that we are going to discuss, we will answer the outline. We will define basic terms, some terms will be discussed in later
provisions but I will do it in the opening. Second, we will go over the provisions one by one, trying to explain to the extent that the
explanation might be necessary. One thing more, before I’ll begin discussing, you will notice that almost all the terms appear in the
textbook of Justice Cruz. If you go over the assignment, you would remember that these terms are written down in the third chapter of
his book. So I will not concern myself with the literal definition. It’s for you to remember as much as you can. What I’m trying to do
only is to explain them. Okay! Hoping that things might be clearer compared to what is written down in the book. Ok, so that’s the
only purpose. Before we start with the provisions one by one, you will notice six terms written in the board, and you will also notice
that I put in contrast the thing versus the other so that we will be emphasizing more the distinctions with this concept.

The first term is derived from the title of the Article itself. It says the Declaration of Principle and State Policies. We will try as
much as possible to understand the concepts and the meaning of the term principle & policies. Now I must confess that for me, it’s not
that clear. The distinctions between these terms are not that clear. The first thing that we need to understand here is that, if we try to
look at the 1935 Constitution, there were only 5 sections to this Article. Now when they amended the 1935 Constitution, and we have
the 1973 constitution, I’m not very sure but I think they were around 10 provisions. Also, no distinction: what is principle versus
policies. If you look at the new Constitution now, you will notice that we have 28 sections. If we try to look at these 28 sections, I
think 6 were enumerated as principles and the remaining 22 are enumerated as policies. So it is good that we will understand the
distinctions as much as possible regarding the terms. I need to tell students that I do not like the constitution amended because the
moment it gets amended, I’m sure they will put 50 policies and 50 principles there. So it will become more & more increasing every
year. There will be much more for you to study, much more for you to remember.
As a basic thing, if we try to look at the principles, it appears to me that there are statements of beliefs. Or sometimes, I shall say
that they are very general assumptions. Maybe I can compare this, if you are a Catholic for instance, normally you pray the: I believe
in God. It seems that there is our statement of beliefs. Ok, we believe in Jesus Christ, but this is not a religious class, so if we look at
the Constitution, what is the content of statement of belief there? For instance, we believe in separation of Church and State, we could
see that the Philippines is a democratic & republican government. Ok, so those are fundamental assumptions. So we renounce war,
that is also a very general statement or belief.

Now what about policies? In trying to look at the provisions from 7 to 28, it seems to be that they are statements of goals that they
want to achieve. Usually the nature is economic, sometimes social, and sometimes political. So for instance, if you try to examine the
provisions, if you want to achieve healthful & balance ecology, you want to achieve fundamental equality between men & women so
that is also one goal. I think that is the essence. There is also another, we consider the Family as scared, the sanctity of the family.
There is also an independent foreign policy. Those are part of political goal as a nation. So if we look at the distinction between what
we understand by beliefs & policies, in a sense they are very general but it is a little bit specific than the principles. I will leave up to
that point.

I go to the next term, which is also very important. There are many cases mentioning this. The term is Self-Executing & Non self-
executing provisions. So how do we distinguish these?

Q: Distinction between self-executing and non-self executing provisions.


A: When we speak of a SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION, we consider it to be source of right. If it is NON-SELF-
EXECUTING, it means that they are not source of rights. Ok, so non self-executing provisions are not sources of rights for the
citizens.

Q: What is a consequence of the provision if the provision is self-executing or is it a source of life?


A: It actually means that you can go to the court directly to have it enforced. Ok, if it is violated, you go to court and the court will
say “ okay, there is a violation”.

In fact the most common provisions in the Constitution which are self -executing are the Bill of Rights. For instance, you have the
right to life. Immediately you can demand that you have the right against illegal arrest that is immediately demandable. So when it
comes to non self-executing, since they are not sources of rights, you cannot go to court to have them enforced. Where do you go?
You go to the executive or the legislature. Meaning, you encourage Congress to pass the law implementing this rights. So they are not
immediately available for litigation, the court would say that these are only guidelines for the various departments. They are not
mandatory. The various departments are not compelled to execute this or to enforce this. They have to be implemented. What is
significance of these statements? We have to go back to the general principle wherein the court state that all provisions of Article II
are non self-executing, meaning you cannot file cases directly based on this provision. There’s only one exception, which I will
discuss in a few minutes, Section 16. But all others in a sense, they are not very useful.

So we go to the third term. The term is Democratic & Republican. The only thing that I need to emphasize are the basic
definitions.
Q: Distinguish democratic from republican.
A: When we say DEMOCRATIC and you studied that in college, it simply means rule by the people because I think the word
‘demos’ comes from a Greek word which stands for “people”. So rule by the people. In practice however, we know that we begin
without rule, directions. There are too many of us and people keep on disagreeing, they keep on quarrelling. So in practice, it is
the rule by majority. Some may disagree, only minority, there’s no problem because the rule of the majority… that is the essence
of democracy. So that is the first meaning. Now what about REPUBLICAN? The basic definition is government chosen by the
people. Now this one is obvious, even if it is a rule by the people. We know that we cannot rule directly. We cannot go to
Congress and all of us help legislate. So how do we make things a little bit orderly? We have to choose representatives. That’s
why we call it Republican. We are ruled by the representatives chosen by the people. Now I understand that these terms are very
confusing. I will not blame you if you find it confusing because in some text I know, for instance, how does China call itself?
People’s Republic of China. I think they never elect representatives there. How about Russia? Soviet Socialist Republic. But they
never had elections there. Or in Cambodia, the most brutal government. I think during the time of Paul-Pot, how did they call
themselves? Democratic Republic of Kampuchea. They combined two basic elements, democratic and republican. I think Justice
Cruz mentioned that these two terms actually are redundant. I think one will do but the framers of the Constitution put them
together.

Another item is the one in the textbook. It’s based on Jalandoni and Corolla case. The two terms are De Jure and the other one
De Facto. Remember the textbook’s definition.

Q: But how do we distinguish the two? (de jure and de facto)


A: When we speak of DE JURE, Justice Cruz is telling us that this is the rightful government, one with legislative meaning, it has
the right to power. Another term for a De Jure government is this is the Legitimate Government, the legal government. De Jure
meaning it has the right to it and it is a legitimate government. What about DE FACTO? If the other one has the right to power,
this one does not have a right to it. Meaning, it is an illegal government. But it is the one in power because maybe it has the force,
it has the military, the military power is behind it. So it has no right to it. It maybe assumes illegally but it is the one exercising
power.

So this will be the context. Suppose tomorrow, there will be a coup d'état. The military government takes over. What kind of
government would that be? That would be a De Facto government. It will be the ruling because of courts; it will not be a ruling in
accordance with the Constitution.

Q: In the Philippines, how do we know whether it is a de facto or de jure?


A: Very simple, if it achieves power in accordance with the Constitution, with law, then it is a De Jure. That is legal. That is
legitimate. But if it achieved power through some other means then that is De Facto.

Q: How about the Marcos Government, was it a De Jure or De Facto?


A: Actually you can argue both ways but the point is Marcos is concerned with his term. What he did was he tried to amend the
Constitution. If we look at it, we say he is ruling in accordance with the constitution, which he changed several times. So in the
end, if you look at it, he is still De Jure because he was holding power in accordance with the Constitution, which he changed
several times. So he was very tricky and a good lawyer that’s why it was okay.

Q: Now, what about the Cory Government?


A: Initially, if we look at the Cory Government, she did not achieve power through election. Why? Because before the result of
elections were counted, I think there was people power, the EDSA revolution. The soldiers supported Aquino. Marcos was
thrown out. It was a ruling by means of force. But I think the SC has decided the case. I think it’s in the handout. There’s a
decision wherein SC stated that the people has accepted her government, they are recognizing it. So it seems to be a De Jure one
now.

Q: What about in the Estrada Case?


A: The SC was forced to decide the nature of government of GMA. Why she assumed power immediately. Do you remember?
Because Estrada did not finished his term. There was people power. Was she (GMA) an illegitimate president or a lawful one? It
was answered by the SC by saying that “Estrada resigned”.

If the President resigns, what does the Constitution say? The Vice-President succeeds. Therefore, she is a De Jure President.
Actually these terms are derogatory. If you say somebody is a De Facto, it is an insult. That’s why it is a bad term. There is also one
problem because sometimes, the line between the two would not be clear-cut. Who’s the President of Pakistan now? Actually the
President of Pakistan took over by coup d'état. He was an ex general and he was occupying the position illegally. It seems that after a
few years, people accepted him. No more opposition. The US keeps on negotiating and having arguments with him especially during
the war in Iraq. So people started to believe, “oh you are acceptable”. You are legitimate. So after many years actually, even de facto
government will be forgotten by the people and it will be transformed into a de jure government. It is really what happens. Have you
seen examples in the textbooks? Japanese government is so easy to tell that it is legal. But in many instances, this will not be true.
CO KIM CHAM VS VALDEZ TAN KEH
75 Phil 113

FACTS: Petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No.
3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established
during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending
in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.
And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.

The Proclamation of Gen. MacArthur reads as follows:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control.

ISSUE: WON under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid
and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.

HELD: It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not
the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic
of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the
judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation
of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO


G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor, Chavit Singson, a longtime friend
of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from “jueteng” lords. The
expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001,
by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the
Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to
Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

HELD: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form.
It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving
Malacañang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of
negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The
resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the
country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of
petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed
a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming
the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains
itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by
Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which
was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of
the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case
with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs.
Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which
might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its
existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of
the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They
are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less
directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary
possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907,
which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority
of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

The next term is discussed in the textbook is also a very important term for some purposes. That is the meaning of Constituents.

Q: What do you mean by CONSTITUENTS?


A: The keyword there in the definition is that this is compulsory. Meaning, the government has to do this. If that government does
not do it, it is no longer a government. Meaning, they constitute the very definition of Government.

I think the word used by Justice Cruz is they constitute the bonds of society. Or he uses another term; he is saying that they are the
attributes of the Government. It’s not that clear for the moment but I will explain it.

Q: What about MINISTRANT?


A: He is saying sometimes, these are propriety or functions related to property. Now if they are propriety functions, they are actually
optional and not compulsory. The Government can do it. If it cannot do it, no problem, it will still be a government. So some
activities, the government must do in order that it will be a government. Some others, only for the welfare of society, the welfare
of individual. It can do or it may not do. No problem.

So I’ll give examples… setting up a police force – constituent or ministrant? If you have no police, nobody will obey the
government. It cannot protect the people. So it is compulsory. Right! I think you know Davao City has a slaughterhouse there in Maa.
In putting up a slaughterhouse, ministrant or constituent? If you have no slaughterhouse, you are no longer a government. There are
many things that sometimes, the distinctions will be a bit varied. For instance, the collection of taxes, we know that it’s too basic. You
have the Davao Regional Hospital. Is putting a hospital constituent or ministrant? Even if there is no hospital, still it is a government.
In fact you can leave this activity to the private sector. We have many hospitals which are done by the private sectors but you cannot
leave the collection to the private sector. You cannot leave setting up of police force to the private sector. What about school? You
have UP. Is putting up school ministrant? Yes. So that will be the guidelines. Now before I go to one basic composition, you have to
understand that actually in communist state, everything is constituent because you cannot have any private activities. All schools are
state owned. All hospitals are government owned. But in general, in capitalist society, everything is ministrant. Ok. It seems that the
private sector enters into all private activities. Government has a herd of policy. So that is the distinction. In NACOCO case, the court
stated that the distinction is not relevant anymore. But it’s good to understand that the distinction really exists. This one will be useful
when you go to the last part of the Constitution. They only discussed the doctrine of who are immune from suit. Non-suability. This
distinction is still relevant. In some instances, it is still relevant but in some, it’s not that useful anymore. But remember what
ministrant & constituent functions are. That will help you.

By the way, this is also interesting, my theory that they are now charging. I used to tell students that if you study the history of US
when the American Constitution was in effect, about 90% of employees were not with the SC, not with the legislature, not with
anybody but they were coastal employees because the old coastal employees were regarded as performing constituent functions. Right
now I think you know that Post Office is now a corporation, Philippines Postal Corporation. It has change in nature. Everything in
definition change as time goes on. Ok so that’s it.

The last term that’s found in the textbook is Parens Patria.

Q: What is PARENS PATRIAE?


A: The state is the father of the nation. It comes from 2 Latin words. What is Patria? Actually Fatherland. But it’s the State. Parens
is Parent. So when we speak of parens patria, it means parent of the State.

So if you are saying that ok the government actually acts as parent for all…for the incapacitated, for the insane, for the minors.
Now what is the context of the case Monte De Piedad? Monte de Piedad is the case in the textbook. I think you know that Monte de
Piedad is no longer existing, right? Monte de Piedad is a bank owned by the Catholic. I think its one of the oldest banks in the
Philippines. It used to be owned by the Catholic Church. And at one time during the Spanish regime, there were lots of money
deposited in Monte de Piedad and it was for contribution for the earthquake victims in the Philippines. I think money case from
Mexico & after so many years, the government remembers that it has money, which is supposed to be for typhoon victims. They
wanted to recover from Monte de Piedad. What did the Church say? “No, you cannot get that, that’s not for you”. That is for the
victims of typhoon. You have no business getting the money. The court came up with this doctrine “the State is the parent of the
Nation” it can act for the minors, it can act for the typhoon victims, and they can get the money. So that is importance of this doctrine,
you will still meet this in different context but that is the idea. So I guess we have discussed the literal but that’s the idea.

ACCFA vs CUGCO
30 SCRA 469

FACTS: On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective for a period of one (1) year from
July 1, 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions
started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962
the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on November 26,
1962.

On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA
(Case No. 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the
collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The
ACCFA denied the charges and interposed, among others, the lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case on the
ground that it (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions.

During the pendency of the ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the President of the Philippines signed
into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844), which among other things required the
reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
(ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).

The ACA in effect challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification
election on the ground that it (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions. The Unions join the issue on this single
point, contending that the ACA forms proprietary functions.
Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental
agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture, in pursuance of the policy enunciated in Section 2 as
follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State:


(1) To establish owner-cultivatorships and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;
(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices;
(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity
and higher farm incomes;
(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural wage
earners;
(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land distribution; and
(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society.

ISSUE: WON the CIR has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised
governmental or proprietary functions.

HELD: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions
may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), 4 such as
those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights,
those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating
to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people — these letter functions being ministrant he exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions
of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals," 5 continue to lose their well-
defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity
if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is
undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice.

In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election
sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees
with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon,

We now proceed with the provisions.

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.

I have previously explained the basic concept there. I will not do it anymore. The most important are the terms Democratic &
Republican. Now one more item, I think the textbook of Justice Cruz gives you a very long discussion of what is a state. I will not
trouble myself with that anymore because they are so basic. You studied that in college. What is a State? Territory? People? Let’s just
assume that there is no quarrel anymore. The Philippines is a State.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.

There are 3 items in section 2 which I will explain very briefly. What are the 3 items that we need to understand? The first item is
renunciation of war, the second one is adoption of international law, and third one is adherence to peace & etc. So the point is that, if
you try to outline section 2, there are 3 things. We will try to go over them one by one. Not much with it but the only thing found in
the textbook of Justice Cruz. He is saying that when we speak of renunciation of war, it means aggressive war. We never denounce
war in the form of self-defense but you will know the definition of self-defense in international law becomes too difficult to
understand. What is the main reason? Because you know that US attacked Iraq. Iraq was not attacked by the US & it invokes self-
defense. In the end, it is very difficult actually, as of the moment.

Q: What is exactly the meaning of SELF-DEFENSE in the context of war against terror?
A: The point is we only renounce aggressive war not defensive war.

The second portion is famously known as the ‘INCORPORATION CLAUSE’ because we adopt the principles of international
law as part of the Philippine Law. I told you in the beginning that there is a law governing relationship between the two, we call that
international law as distinguish from municipal law. However, the Constitution is saying now that even principles of international law
are also part of the Philippine Law.

Q: Are all principles of International Law part of municipal Law?


A: No. What principles are regarded as part of international law? Only those, which are generally accepted, meaning if the principle
of international law is not generally accepted or if congress will not adhere to it, we also do not follow it. Because the idea here is
only principles which are generally accepted by the committee of recognition are part of the Philippine Law. If it is not then it’s
not regarded as part of Philippine Law.

So the Constitution stated that in a regarded manner as the SC sometimes could get out of it. Ok so that’s it. Some textbooks will
give you similar illustration on what is a generally accepted principle of international law.

Q: Who determines whether a principle is generally accepted or not? Who will tell ok that is generally accepted? Who will decide
that?
A: Definitely the Supreme Court because it is the only one interpreting the Constitution. It will be the one who will tell okay this one
is generally accepted or the one is not. How? If there is a case.

Q: What are the instances wherein the Supreme Court has declared that something is generally accepted?
A: The first one is the case of Mejoff vs Director (90 Phil 70), a very old one. I think it’s in the handout. This is the story in this
case: It appears in this case that Mejoff is a Russian guy. During the Japanese occupation he went to the Japanese army and he
was captured and he was imprisoned.

MEJOFF vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS


Sept. 26, 1951
FACTS: Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by
the Japanese forces during the latter’s regime in these islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy.
He was handed to the Commonwealth Government. The People’s Court ordered his release. The Deportation Board
found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was illegally staying in this country. The Board of Commissioners
of Immigration declared that he entered the Philippines illegally and that he be deported. He was jailed. After
repeated failures to ship him abroad, the authorities removed him to Bilibid Prison. In the first petition for habeas
corpus, the Court held the detention temporary. After 2 years, this second petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff should be released since it was through no fault of his that no ship or country would take him

HELD: Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein, even if they are stateless. The protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed against the laws of the
land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
The petitioner’s entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces of a
de facto government, whose decrees were law during the occupation.
By its Constitution, the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land.” And in a resolution entitled “Universal Declaration of Human Rights “ and approved by the General
Assembly of the UN, of which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental
rights, as applied to all human beings, were proclaimed.

Pharmaceutical v. Duque III


535 SCRA 205 (2007)

How may international law be made part of Philippine domestic law?

Answer: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which
provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for
it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

Pharmaceutical v. Duque III, id.

What are generally accepted principles of international law?

Answer: Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the
part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. “Generally
accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, i.e.,
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due
process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of
the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

The bar question was asked in 2003. This was the question and I think it was good to understand that in order that you will know
how to study.

BQ: Article 2, Section 3 (1987 Constitution). It states that the Armed Forces of Philippines is the protector of the people and the State.
Describe briefly what this provision means. Is the PNP armed force armed by same mandate?
A: The idea is the provision simply means that the armed forces is the protector of the people not just the President, because during
the time of Marcos the army was used to protect Marcos. If you challenged Marcos, they will shoot you. So that’s why they try to
become emphatic about it. Thus, the armed forces will protect the people, not the President only. Ok! So that’s the idea. The
second fact is this is also to be sure that the armed force will not abuse the people. So I told you a while ago that the PNP is
civilian in character. It’s not covered. I guess that’s the whole in Section 3.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.

I find the first sentence very enlightening. Why? Because in a few years the prime duty of the government is to protect and serve
the people. In 1973 Constitution, the Constitution of Marcos, it was opposite in saying that the defense of the State is the prime duty of
the people. Now the prime duty of the government is to protect the people. It’s a bit strange how fundamental beliefs can change
suddenly because of the experience. But that’s the idea.
Another interesting insertion is, it saying that the citizens may be required by law to render personal of civil service. Now what is
the important insertion here, in the old Constitution, 1935 there was no insertion of Civil Service. It mentioned military service only.
Now I think this is discussed in the textbook of Justice Cruz, I think it is the case of Soza. He is saying that in the old days under the
1935 Constitution, there was somebody who belongs to a religion. He says I don’t want to do that, that’s against my religion. The SC
stated that “no you cannot refuse”. Under the Constitution, you are required to render military service because that is required by law.
So they were having a big problem because they are saying that some people under their religion and in some people, it is really
against their religion to fight, to become a soldier. Ok, so they inserted this. They compromise… you will be for the Civil Service, that
means that you will not forget, maybe you just do the cooking in the barracks. That’s the compromise.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Not much here, I think Justice Cruz is saying that this is like the stage of high school graduate. That is what they say about this
provision. Because it has a lot of words and it means nothing actually.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

I will just give the background here because this is only the general principle. We will stop afterwards because this is now the end
of principles. Tomorrow we will discuss the policies. This is only a general principle and the thing that you remember is this is
addressed to the State, not address to the Church. Meaning that this is a provision on what the State can do. This is not really a
prohibition on what the Church can do because this is a Constitution. This is a limitation on State power. Ok, so remember that. Now,
what we used to understand regarding the separation of Church and State is that this concept is derived from American Constitutional
Law and this is not really a concept, which is founded probably on what’s that, on the accepted values. Why do I say that? Because the
concept of separation of church and state is a late development in Political law. I used to mention in my students in the Bill of Rights
that even in the Bible you combined Church and State. I think for instance you mentioned that King David, King Solomon. They are
religious leaders and at the same time political leaders. So there is no such thing as you only exercise political power, do not exercise
religious power. It is also good to understand that at present even in contemporal reality, this is not really a universal doctrine. Why?
Go to Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. I think we all know that even secular laws in those countries are based on the Koran. You really
cannot separate pure Muslims. You cannot separate Church and State. They are one and same. I think you cannot understand how you
can separate the concept. Ok, but we follow a difficult model that’s why it is not permissible for us to mix the two concepts. So I will
just end the lecture there.

STATE POLICIES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration
shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.

The subject matter on Section 7 is independent foreign policy. That means we are not under the control of other foreign countries.
The case under this is the case of Lim vs Executive Secretary:
Lim was the President of IBP and he challenges the constitutionality of the Balikatan. Balikatan allowed American forces to
conduct operation together with the Philippine Military in the Philippines. What was the issue in the Lim case? --- Was the visiting
forces agreement or the Balikatan authorized American forces to fight with Filipino soldiers in the Philippines? Can they fight with
the Abusayaf? The answer of the SC is No! They can’t fight in the Philippines and cite as one of the reason: Section 7. Why? Because,
we are suppose to develop an independent foreign policy.

Lim v. Executive Secretary,


380 SCRA 739 (2002)
FACTS: Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in
Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1”. In theory, the “Balikatan”
exercises are simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951 between the two
countries, as well as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) of 1999. The latter agreement provides for the mechanism by
which United States personnel may temporarily visit in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether the MDT and the VFA allow American troops to engage in offensive war on Philippine territory?

HELD: No. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits member states from the threat and use of force against the territorial
integrity of another state. In the same manner, treaties and other international agreements must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution. Sec. 2 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies states that the Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adheres to a policy of peace and amity with all nations. Sec. 7 mandates the State to pursue
an independent foreign policy, and stresses the primacy of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right
to self determination in its relations with other states. The aforesaid provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Thus, there is no doubt that US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

We go to Section 8.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons
in its territory.

We can summarize Section 8 as freedom from nuclear weapons.

Q: Does Section 8 prohibit the presence of nuclear weapons in the Philippines?


A: There was one decision rendered by the DOJ on this issue and the DOJ said NO, not an outright prohibition. This is the point: If
we look at the provision, it is saying, the Philippines to be consistent with national interest. The word there is consistent with
national interest. It argues that the word consistent is a conditional statement. Meaning if it happens that having a nuclear weapon
is consistent with national interest then we will have it. If not, then we can’t have it. That is how the lawyers reasoned out.

Proceed to Section 9.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Section 9 is about a just and dynamic social order. It means a lot of things but it is not really a subject of controversies. It is a
general principle.

Tondo Medical Center v. CA


527 SCRA 746 (2007)

FACTS: The DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HRSA) which provided fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals. This allowed the hospitals to collect socialized user fees, among others. Petitioners alleged that the
implementation of the reform had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically
disadvantaged Filipinos.

ISSUE: Whether the HSRA is void for being in violation of Sec. 5, Sec. 9, Sec. 10, Sec. 11, Sec. 13, and Sec. 18, of Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation
for their enforcement because if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by
the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing.
Among these are sections of Art. II which are mere principles not ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

As held in Agabon v. NLRC, “to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such
view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.”
Proceed to Section 10.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

This is the social justice clause. Section 10 is about promotion of social justice – to promote the welfare of the people. We will
discuss this later because this is very important.

BFAR v. COA
562 SCRA 134 (2008)

FACTS: In 1999, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Employees Union, Regional Office No. VII, Cebu
City issued Resolution No. 01, Series of 1999 requesting the BFAR Central Office for a Food Basket Allowance. It
justified its request on the high cost of living, i.e., “the increase in prices of petroleum products which catapulted the cost of food
commodities, has greatly affected the economic conditions and living standard of the government employees of BFAR Region VII
and could hardly sustain its need to cope up with the four (4) basic needs, i.e., food, shelter, clothing and education.” While a
P10,000.00 allowance was approved and given to the 130 employees, on post audit, the Commission on Audit disapproved it.

ISSUE: Considering that no law justifies the allowance, may it be validated under the ‘social justice clause” of the Constitution?

HELD: No. Time and again, we have ruled that the social justice provisions of the Constitution are not self- executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles and policies. To give them effect,
legislative enactment is required. As we held in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are "not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

The subject of Section 11 is human right and human dignity. I will explain it together with 12 and 13.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.

Sanctity of the family will be discussed together with Section 13 but there’s another important item about this. There is a
provision regarding the protection of the life of the mother and the life of the unborn.

Go to Section 13.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage
their involvement in public and civic affairs.

In the hand out, you will notice that there is a case there of PAGCOR also a case of Bayan.

This is the background: PAGCOR is the one who authorizes gambling program of the government like casinos. However, there
are people who wanted to stop gambling. Among those was Kilos Bayan, headed by Salonga, one of the most brilliant lawyers in the
country. He tried to challenge it. Take note that you cannot find the word gambling in the entire constitution. The only way by which
you can challenge an act in the Philippines is that it is unconstitutional. If it is not part of the constitution, you cannot challenge it. So
how did the lawyers argued? They said that it is violative of Section 13. If people will gamble, that will destroy human dignity. That
will destroy the unity and sanctity of the family. Because some people never go home, they stay instead in the casinos. What about the
role of the youth in nation building? The youth will also be affected by gambling. Therefore gambling is to be outlawed. How did the
SC answer? The SC said, go back to the principle that I told last time. The Constitution is not self-executing. So you cannot file a case
based on this. This is not a source of right.
BASCO vs PAGCOR
192 SCRA 52

FACTS: Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order.
Petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and
the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and
therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV,
of the present Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the PAGCOR Charter is unconstitutional.

HELD: P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869).
As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity — the
PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed
revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to
"close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the
creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with
gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD
1896.

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato


246 SCRA 540 (1995)

FACTS: After the Supreme Court nullified the contract of lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corp., the parties negotiated another whereby PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment to
PCSO. The rentals would be paid from the proceeds of the lottery. Kilosbayan, an organization of civic-spirited citizens,
challenges the new contract on the ground that it is substantially the same as the old one and that it violates the PCSO
Charter and it was executed without public bidding.

ISSUE: Whether the act of allowing lottery goes against Sec. 5 (promotion of general welfare), Sec. 12 (development of moral
character), Sec. 13 (role of the youth), and Sec. 17(priority of education) of the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies.

HELD: Sec. 5, Sec. 12, Sec. 13, and Sec. 17 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in any court. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, the rule concerning real party in interest, applicable
to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. It is true that the present action
involves not a mere contract between individuals but one made by a government corporation, but there is no allegation
that public funds are being misspent so as to make the action a public one. This case involves basically a question of
contract law. And in actions for annulment of contracts, the real parties are those who are parties to the agreement. Since
petitioners do not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment, they are not the real party in interest.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.

The subject matter of Section 14 is the role of women. Regarding the role of women it was ask in the Bar, year 2000 number 9:

BQ: What are the conditions of the constitution on women?


A: Obviously your first answer would be Section 14. You need not to memorize it, just state the substance.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

It is regarding the promotion of health. There has been no bar question on this.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
I want to explain this because this is very important because of the Oposa vs Factoran. What is this case?
Oposa was a lawyer, very famous guy now. He was the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and it used to be that
under the 1973 Constitution, if you want to exploit forest resources, you want to become a logger; you get a timber license from the
government. In the 1935 Constitution, the mode of exploitation was concession. Now, timber license agreement is not allowed. But
the Oposa case was this, Oposa was an environmental lawyer and he wanted to stop logging. You can’t find the word logging in the
constitution. His argument was that logging would destroy the environment. He used this section. The Solicitor General argued that “
Ooppss! You can’t do that because Section 13 is part of the declaration of principles and state policies, not self-executing”. According
to court, the right to ecology is not found in the bill of rights. It is found in the declaration of principles, however it is self-executing.
There’s an obligation on the part of the government to ensure that the environment is protected. So, you can file a case based on this.
It would seem therefore that Section 16 is the only section recognized by the SC that it be self-executing. It can be a basis of the cause
of action.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN


224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS: This case was initially filed by minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents and by the Philippine
Ecological Network (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of the environment and natural resources. The defendant, on
the other hand is Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The complaint was instituted as a class suit and it alleged that the plaintiff represented the Citizens of the
Philippines who are entitled to the fill benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure. Plaintiffs move to
prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippines rainforest and prayed for the cancellation of all
existing timber license agreements (TLA’s) in the country and also cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLA’s. It further asserts that the continued trend of deforestation causes
adverse effects, disastrous consequences, and irreparable damage to incoming generation. Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the respondent Judge Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a legal standing and cause of action;
2. Whether or not the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government.

HELD: It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. Commenting on the 2nd par. of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, in his book, Philippine
Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of the
authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for
lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary."

"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."

The case is held to be a valid class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. The petitioner-minors can for themselves, for others or their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of international responsibility in so far as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of 1 party in violation of the legal right
or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant,
and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said real right.
Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

If you try to look at Section 17, it has many priorities - education, science, technology and all other things. There is one case
related to this. This is what happened, I’m not very sure of the caption but the idea is this: A national budget is a law passed by
Congress. It tells you how much money will be spent, what will be the amount and to what purpose. If you look at that budget, much
money was given for the military, for defense. Somebody went up to the SC and said, “Ooppss! Something is wrong, why is it that
the budget for education is very small?” The SC answered, this section is not self-executing, and you can’t file a case based on that.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.

We go to the next one: Affirmation of labor. There is a separate discussion on labor when you go to second year. So I will not
explain further.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

This is about the self-reliant and independent economy of the Philippines. The case of Tañada. I think I mentioned to you last
night a portion of the case of Tañada. What is Tañada?

Tañada challenged the WTO. I think one of the purposes for that is to allow foreign products to be distributed in our market, they
lowered the price. The argument of Tañada is that it is in violation of this section. It is cheaper right? So, in the end it will destroy
Philippine economy. All local producers will be bankrupt. The SC said that it’s not self-executing. You will be surprised, why are
brilliant lawyers keep on filing cases based on this? I am thinking that this is in line with the Oposa case but they never succeed.

Tañada v. Angara, supra

FACTS: The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) to which the Philippines is a signatory requires a
State Party to accord no less favorable treatment to products imported into the country from abroad and to foreign
nationals in various areas related to trade.

ISSUE: Whether this violate Sec. 19, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution which mandates the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos

HELD: No. By its very title, Art. II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” These principles in
Art. II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.

This is not being asked in the bar. But this is very much implemented now. PAL for example used to be owned by the Philippines,
now it has been sold to the private sector.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

This is about Agrarian Reform. Not much because you will take this up in the second year.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.

This pertains to cultural communities or some people would say natives. There is a new law now, which is the IPRA giving the
right of the indigenous people their ancestral domain.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare
of the nation.
Sec 23 speaks of the role of NGO’s and sectoral organizations. There was a bar question asked in the year 2000:

BQ: Is the concept of people power recognized in the Constitution?


A: When we speak of People power, we shall relate that to this section. It means participation of the people that one manifestation is
by recognizing NGOs. This is actually people empowerment.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation building.

Rule of communication. There has been no bar question on this.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

This is autonomy of local government. This implements powers to barrios, barangays, to cities to municipalities. This is
implemented by the local government code.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.

What do you mean by EQUAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICE? This is giving opportunity to everyone to work with the
government. It be an elective or appointive official. It discourages dynasties because sometimes, there are offices, which belongs
only to one family. There is this case of Pamatong vs Comelec:

Pamatong was one of the candidates for president in the last year’s election. Nobody knows him. When he filed his certificate of
candidacy, the Comelec, revoked him from the list for being a nuisance candidate. Pamatong went to the SC invoking this section. The
SC again said, it’s not self-executing.

Pamatong v. COMELEC
427 SCRA 96 (2005)

FACTS: The Commission on Elections refused to give due course to the Certificate of Candidacy for President of Rev. Elly
Velez Pamatong for the 2004 national elections. Along with 35 other candidates, the COMELEC found that he
could not wage a nationwide campaign.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the COMELEC violate petitioner’s right to “equal access to opportunities for public service”
under Sec. 26, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution

HELD: No. There is no constitutional right to run for or hold a public office. Sec. 26, Art. II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. The provisions under Art. II are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the
“equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Art. II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The
disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against
graft and corruption.

Honestly in public service. I don’t have to explain this because nobody believes this anyway.☺

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

I want to explain this; the idea is that policy of full disclosure, meaning that the government should reveal to the public its
decision and the basis for making such decisions. The usual way by which you will hear this in the press, they used another term for
this. They call this the principle of transparency. When something is transparent, you see what’s inside. When somebody wears
transparent clothes, you see what’s inside.
They asked that in the bar. I think in 1999 and 2000. This was the question:
Q: Does the 1987 Constitution provide for a policy of transparency in matters of public interest?
A: Yes, it is. It is stated in Section 28.

I want to review a couple of items. I told you that social justice is an important provision and the discussion I think on the
textbook of Justice Cruz is on page 62 or 63. There is a good discussion on social justice. The case of Calalang. Who wrote the
decision? It is Justice Laurel. How does he define social justice? This is how he defines it. The structure of the definition is somewhat
usual, the first one is negative. It saying what social justice is not so you will not confuse it with others. It says that social justice is
neither communism, nor despotism, nor anarchy.

The next definition he gave us is this: The positive idea. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all people, the
adoption by the government of measure calculated to ensure economic stability.

How do we understand this? What way by which to understand social justice? We say that this is a directive to the government by
the Constitution to promote the welfare of the individual. How should this be done? By passing laws. Why is that important? Because
in the old days, prior to the social justice clause, even in the American Constitution, it’s difficult to pass a law interfering private
rights. The American law would usually say that is illegal. There were laws on minimum wage. I think now it is accepted. Before, the
SC will say, no you can’t pass that law, that is illegal. A person can be allowed to work in any amount that he wants. It’s a contract
between him and his employer, so don’t interfere. However, with social justice clause, it is impossible now to challenge legislations,
which are intended to promote the welfare of the people. Example the labor code, its difficult to challenge that.

BAR QUESTIONS

1994 – What is the state policy on ecology?


1994 – What is the state policy on cultural minorities?
1994 – State policy on science the technology

-oOo-
ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

For tonight, I will start discussing Article 4. The provision on citizenship and obviously I won’t finish discussing the entire article.
So, I will limit myself only to Section 1 and 2. Before I go to the test of the Constitution on the first part of the outline, you will notice
the topic “ people”. This is only an introduction so I think you are familiar with why they study those concepts.

If we try to categorize people in the Philippines, you have:


 natural born citizen
 naturalized citizen
 dual citizens
 aliens – When it comes to aliens, there are 2 types:
o Resident aliens meaning those who are permanently residing in the Philippines; and
o Non-resident aliens, when we say non-resident usually they were issued only a tourist visa, they stayed only for
temporary purposes and they cannot do much.
 Stateless individuals. Stateless individuals meaning they are individuals who belong to no country. Ok.

Q: Why is it necessary to make a classification?


A: The reason is this, the right of a person on political law will be determined based on what category he belongs to. What do I mean
by that? For instance, political positions generally are reserved for natural born citizens. So for instance, if you want to become
President of the Philippines, if you want to become Congressman, if you want to become Senator…. in these positions, you have
to be a natural born citizen. A naturalized citizen cannot become President; they cannot become Chief Justice or Justice of the SC.

Now, naturalized citizens. Although citizens but they are denied certain rights. For instance, they cannot hold constitutional
position you can become an RTC judge that’s permissible, you can exercise profession but you cannot hold constitutional position.

What about dual citizens, actually dual citizens are citizens but under the LGU they are supposed to be denied certain positions.
Actually there was a decision that you cannot become Mayor if you are dual citizen but that is no longer true now because of the
Manzano decision.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO

FACTS: A petition was filed based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with
the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did
not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In
other words, he holds dual citizenship.

Respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born
Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time
of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel
document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an
alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence
of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37
years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

ISSUE: Whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
HELD: The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath
of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of
his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner's contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of
this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Now what about aliens? Aliens have very limited rights in fact even if you stayed in the Philippines for so many years you cannot
own land in the Philippines that is not allowed. Ok! So this is so limited. In the case of stateless individuals I think they are of the
same category as aliens but they possess other rights, they are mentioned in other specific provision. So that is the only point that I
want to explain. This is so that you will understand that this is very important for us to know whether somebody is naturalized, natural,
dual, alien or stateless for the reason that you will know what are the rights that he enjoys under the constitution under Political Law.
Ok. If you are an alien, can you vote? No. So after that I will now begin to discuss the provisions one by one.

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:


[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The following are citizens of the Philippines:


[1]
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

If you look at the outline we are trying to answer who are citizens of the Philippines but the answer is so limited, it is based only
on the Constitution. It is not exhausted because persons who repatriated are also Filipino citizens but they are not mentioned here. But
according to the Constitution, the first paragraph is saying those who are citizens of the Philippine at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. The provision is significant and they put that for purposes of continuity, meaning that if we check the 1935 and 1973
Constitution the same provision appears. “Those who are citizens at the time of adoption”.

If we adopt the Constitution, you’ll wake up one morning and discovered that you are no longer Filipino. That’s why every time
they adopt the Constitution they said, “this moment when we adopted the Constitution those who are citizens will be considered
citizens also. So that is the importance of the provision for the sake of continuity.
[2]
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines

[3]
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority

Take note the word use now is “or”. In 1935 it was “and”. Meaning if one parent is Filipino it is sufficient to make you a Filipino.
Ok! That’s the formula. One more item, in the Philippines we adopt the jus sanguinis principle meaning citizenship by blood. We do
not adopt the jus soli.

Q: Why do we say that we adopt the jus sanguinis, the reason is because the section is jus sanguinis principle?
A: Because it is saying that those whose fathers or mothers are Filipinos. So if one parent is a Filipino, by blood you are also a
Filipino. So this clearly shows that this is a jus sanguinis principle.
Ok! So that is the relevance of that.

I want to discuss very briefly the case of Lim and Fernando because it is relevant to the provisions “ whose mothers and fathers
are citizens of the Philippines”:
Lim was a female person from Iligan City and it appears that she was an illegitimate child. Her mother was Filipino and the father
was an alien. The question was: does the provision whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens apply illegitimate children? The
answer is YES. It does not matter whether you are legitimate or illegitimate. So that was the decision of the Court. In the old days it
was now a bit revised by Section 8…in the old days, there was a belief that maybe some pronouncement of the court, that the child, if
it is difficult to say who is the father. In many instances even if the person is really the real father he denied that he is the father. So
that is why if you are illegitimate the formula: you follow the citizenship of the mother.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM


GR No. 153883 (Jan. 13, 2004)

FACTS: Respondent was born on Oct. 29, 1954. Her nationality was entered Chinese when in fact her father and mother
never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina.
It was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been
described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Lim needs to comply with the legal requirements for election of citizenship before it can
be change from Chinese to Filipino.

HELD: Respondent need not comply those legal requirements. Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,provides
that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the provision in
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 requires that the legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate
children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth
without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

Now here comes the case of Fernando, the Tecson case( Tecson vs COMELEC). Fernando is illegitimate but it is now the reverse
because his father was Filipino but the mother was American. When he filed certificate of candidacy they challenged him. They stated
“ Ooops! The formula is an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the mother”. The mother is American so therefore he is
American. Therefore you are not qualified to run for President. The SC came up with the decision saying that the constitution does not
distinguish. Ok! It does not matter whether you are legitimate or illegitimate. It does not matter whether it’s the father or mother who
is a Filipino. It is sufficient that one is Filipino. Therefore there is no problem when it is the father or mother who is a Filipino. Ok!
You will be considered Filipino also. Now, if we try to examine the decision, the court was convinced with the argument of Fr. Bernas
that it will result to discrimination. Why? Because it will turn that if the mother of the child is Filipino, the child is Filipino, but if the
father is Filipino, the child is an alien. So, it discriminates people by the fact of who is the mother or father. It’s not good. That’s the
reason why the court now is thinking that we should put them in equal footing. It does not matter whether it is the father or mother of
the child who is a Filipino. All of them will be regarded as Filipino. Ok, that is the Fernando case.
Before I proceed further. I want to explain to you some bar questions related to sub paragraph 2. Citizenship by birth.

Bar question
2003 # 4

A was born in China to a Chinese father and Filipino mother. His parents met in Shanghai, they were lawfully married just 2 years
ago (2001). Is he a Filipino citizen?
No problem coz the Constitution is saying those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino, are also considered Filipino. So, in this
case his mother is a Filipino. She married for instance a Japanese. So at the time of marriage she is Filipino.
In the old law if you married an alien in many cases you also become an alien. You are no longer a Filipino. So that brings up to
another possibility.

The third topic about citizenship is by election. First, it is saying that it applies only to those who were born prior to January 17,
1973. That is the cut-off. Jan 17, 1973 was the date when 1973 Constitution took effect. So election is no longer required if you were
born under 1973 Constitution, it applies only to those born under the 1935 Constitution. The last person born under 1935 Constitution
was born on January 16, 1973. Ok! So if you were born on January 16, 1973, with the new constitution took effect in Feb 2, 19 89.
How old are you? You are still a minor. Right! So it is very important to put this constitution to issue a treat those who have not yet
elected will have time because nobody will be benefited by it.
1. Who can elect under the provision?
2. When should you elect?
3. How should you elect?

I’m not interested in the first question because in the principle, it was not emphasized. I’m not interested in other point. The first
principle is simply saying that it applies only to those who have Filipino mother prior to the electivity of 1973 Constitution. But there
is a more problematic legal issue here. When we speak of those whose mothers are Filipino citizen, at one point your mother is a
Filipino. So that is the most problematic one. Why? Because it is possible that in most cases, your mother is Filipino at the time of
marriage. She married for instance a Japanese. So at the time of marriage, she is a Filipino. In the old law, if you married an alien in
many cases you also became an alien. You are no longer Filipino. So that brings up to another possibility.

Q: Is it a requirement that before you can elect, your mother is a Filipino when you made election?
A: Your mother is still a Filipino otherwise you cannot elect.

The third possibility is that at the time of election, because take note that there are several years allowed for you to elect after
reaching the age of majority. It is necessary that your mother is a Filipino at the time you made the election. Now there was a
conflicting decision that was criticized. The Villahermosa decision but the answer of commentator is very simple. They were saying
that it is sufficient that your mother is Filipino at the time of marriage. It is immaterial that after marriage she becomes an alien also. It
is immaterial that when you reached 18 she is already alien. Ok! Just look at the time of the marriage. So that is the point when you
look at the issue of citizenship of the mother. Because I think the reason of some commentaries that the SC did not agree is that
reasoning of the commentator that if you have to ensure that the mother is Filipino at the time of the election or at the time he reach
the age of majority, the provision will be useless because the law before will make a woman who made an alien an alien also. So
nobody can choose. That’s why they said that this would be the point--- time of marriage.
Now we go to the next question.

Q: When do you elect? What did the Constitution say?


A: Upon reaching the age of majority, very simple formula.

Now if that is the language we should have no problem because under the law, you reach the age of majority when you reach 18.
Now, the problem is, in a decision the SC, they change it to “within a reasonable time” upon reaching the age of majority. Take note
that reaching the age of majority is different from within a reasonable time upon reaching the age of majority. The court actually made
it elastic because reasonable time might be 2 years, 3 years or after whatever because they made it for qualifications. So, in light of
some decisions the court stated that 3 years after the age of majority is still reasonable. That’s why in one case; the person was 21
already, so that is 3 years after he reached the age of majority. The court stated that, it is still reasonable because they added the
qualification within a reasonable time. But the other case is interesting. That the case of Ching:

He took the bar and he passed. He was denied to take the oath because only Filipinos can become lawyers. They discovered that
he was not yet a Filipino. He did not elect. And I think he was already 34 years old something like that. The question is, is that
reasonable time? The court stated” No that is no longer reasonable time because 14 years after reaching the age.”

It seems to me that 3 years is the longest period allowed by the court to call the concept of reasonable time. Ok, so it’s a bit elastic
actually. Obviously four years is not allowed because 3 years is the cut off.

Q: How do you elect Philippine citizenship?


A: The best election to be made is by express election. Meaning you do it verbally. But the law provides for procedure now.

The procedure is that upon reaching the age of majority you secure sworn statement, meaning a statement under oath. You state
that I want to become a Filipino, my mother is a Filipino, my father is an alien, I chose to become a Filipino. So you execute a sworn
statement.

Q: What will they do with it?


A: They are to deposit the copy to the office of civil registrar.

Q: What about if you are in a foreign country?


A: The law is saying that if you are in a foreign country the same procedure, execute a sworn statement however in a foreign country
instead of depositing in office of civil registrar, you deposit it to the Philippine diplomatic or consular officials in a foreign
country. The Philippine embassy, that’s where you put your sworn statement.
Q: Is it possible to elect Philippine citizenship impliedly?
A: There are confusing decisions here, but the latest is the Ching decision. What is the whole thing in Ching? This was the argument
of Ching: Maybe I did not execute a sworn statement, maybe I did not deposit to the civil registrar because there was no sworn
statement. But impliedly, I have chosen Philippine citizenship, why? He stated that actually I voted in all elections. Voting is only
reserved for Filipino. There is my cedula and other documents and I put there Filipino, then he also stated that I became a CPA.
CPA is reserved only from Filipinos. He stated that I am a councilor of Bataan for 2 terms. That is only reserved for Filipinos.
You cannot become a councilor if you’re an alien. He argued that actually I choose Philippine citizenship impliedly. What did the
court say? There is no such thing as implied election though it contradicts the decision in Co vs Electoral Tribunal. The principle
now is Philippine citizenship has to be done expressly by means of a sworn statement. No such thing as implied election.

IN RE: CHING
316 SCRA 1 (1999)

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On July 17, 1998, Ching after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examinations. In a resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Ching passed the bar but because of his questionable
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.

ISSUE: Whether a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority

HELD: Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.


1.) When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Sec. 1(3) of
the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. (Ching
has inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.) CA
No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election.

2.) However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made...Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done within a “reasonable time”
after attaining the age of majority.

Cuenco v. Sec. of Justice: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the
age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that 3 years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. (In Cuenco case, petitioner
was allowed to elect 7 years after attaining the age of majority.)

3.) The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his
intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing
“upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship.

4.) Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship.
As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

CO vs. HRET
199 SCRA 692 (1991)

FACTS: In 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar and obtained a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China but after
10 years, was brought by Ong Te to Samar. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. He was
baptized into Christianity and later married a natural born-Filipina, Agripina Lao.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948. The private
respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store in Samar. The father
of the private respondent filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar of application for naturalization on February
15, 1954 and was granted a certificate of naturalization. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned. After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

After college he took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971,
his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born
citizen was challenged but he was declared by the Convention as one. In 1984, the private respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and voted there.

In 1987 he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar and won. The petitioners,
who were among those who views for the same position, filed election protests against private respondent on the
ground that he is not a natural-born Filipino. The HRET declared Jose Ong, Jr. as natural-born Filipino.

ISSUE: Whether or not Co is a natural-born Filipino citizen

HELD: Co is a natural-born Filipino citizen. We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves
formal manifestations of choice for these persons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case
about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part
of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How
can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? It was the law itself that had already elected Philippine
citizenship for him.
[4]
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

When we speak of naturalization, it is sometimes adoption. I think you know adoption. There’s a child who is not a member of
the family and now he becomes part of it. He gets all the right also like the ordinary child. The same is true in naturalization. When
you naturalized an alien, you also adopt him. You gave him the rights of a citizen. But not all rights because you cannot run for
President. You can become councilor, mayor, governor but not Congressman, Senator and President.
We will discuss very briefly the procedures.

Q: What are the ways by which you can get naturalized?


A: Under existing laws now there are 3 ways by which you can get naturalized as Filipinos.
 Judicial Proceeding
 Administrative Proceedings
 Legislative

One is through judicial proceeding. When we say judicial, you go to court. The term judicial is equated with court. You file a
case in court.
Or it can be administrative. When we speak of administrative, you go to some tribunals or agencies created by the government
which are not manned by judges. Usually, administrative proceedings are faster. It is not very strict.
Finally, you have also a legislative procedure. I will discuss them to you one by one.

1. Judicial
The first mode of naturalization is judicial. This is under Commonwealth Act 473 - procedure for judicial naturalization: It is very
expensive now; even the filing fee is P 10,000. Lawyers might charge you P 100,000 for handling the case.
This will be the procedure:
a. The filing of a declaration of intention with the Office of the Solicitor General. You just have to write a letter telling that you
want to become a Filipino. I have the intention to become naturalized. When do you file the declaration of intention? That is
one year before you file the petition. So it takes time. We say that this is judicial because you now go to court and file the
petition.

Q: What court will have jurisdiction over this proceeding?


A: It is the RTC. This is the only court, which can have jurisdiction over this case.

b. Filing of the petition


c. The next is publication of the petition in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation. The publication of your
petition for small matters. If your names have errors, such as the spelling, then, you go to court and have it changed.
Publication is required.
d. Following the publication you have the hearing. It is the time that you present evidence of our qualifications. There’s a
requirement that between the last publication and the hearing, there must be a lapse of 6 months from the time of the last
publication. The requirement is there must be a gap from the last publication up to the hearing. If the judge grants your
petition, they will have a re-hearing.
The problem is that there is a requirement that there must be a gap of 2 years from the time of the hearing up to the time of
the re-hearing. It takes a long time.
e. The last one is, suppose during the re-hearing you are seen to be qualified, you will take your oath. The essence is that you
renounce your foreign allegiances and you support the Constitution. It is the oath taking that makes you a Filipino and not
anytime before.
Even if there will be no postponement, it takes a long time. It will take you in the minimum of 3 and half years. But you still
have an additional requirement: Residency of 10 years and another 3 and a half year.

The case of Frivaldo: Frivaldo wanted to become a Filipino in a fast manner because he wanted to run for governor. Because he
was a Filipino and became an alien, he wanted to be naturalized again. It the election is coming, he can’t wait for 3 and half years. So
they tried to have a short cut proceeding. And the SC said, “ No, it can’t be done, it can’t be done”. One good argument of Frivaldo
was this: You should be kind to me because I’m not an alien originally, I was a Filipino. So try to relax the rule. But the SC said “No!
We have to follow the rules.”

REPUBLIC vs. DELA ROSA


232 SCRA 785 (1994)

FACTS: Raul Lee filed a petition for certiorari to annul the Court’s decision of re-admitting private respondent, Frivaldo, as
a Filipino citizen and to nullify the oath of allegiance he took. A repatriation applicant should have published his
petition for hearing for 3 consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. And the
last publication of which should be at least six months before the said date of hearing. There is even a mandatory
two-year waiting period prior to the taking of the oath of allegiance.

On Frivaldo’s case, the hearing was conducted ahead of schedule. Frivaldo alleged that the deadline for filing the
certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set on
March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24. Thus, the above rule was not followed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid

HELD: Frivaldo is declared not a Filipino citizen. Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru
naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said
law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely,
are applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law
does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a
citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino
citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition.

The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set
ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the
petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner
was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of
allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the
Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision
(Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the applicant has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.

2. Administrative
The second mode of acquiring citizenship is administrative. A while ago I mentioned that a proceeding is administrative if it is
not done usually in a court of law. Administrative form is rather new under RA 9139. This means that you only file a petition with the
special committee in Malacañang. It is called Special Committee of Naturalization. They will study the case first and if they find that
you deserve to become a Filipino citizen, they will just grant it immediately. No more trial proceedings like you go to court. You don’t
have to wait for years. You can become a Filipino a matter of days by resorting to the procedure.

Q: If it is easy to become a Filipino through administrative proceeding, why would you still wait for the judicial proceeding.
A: The reason is only very few are qualified to this proceeding. Why? What’s the requirement? First, you must be born in the
Philippines. Second, you are 18 years old and you have been residing in the Philippines during the past 18 years.

There is something interesting about the law, if you try to look at it, it would seem to be a money making devise. Because the law
is saying that if you want to apply, you pay 100T. Yes, under administrative proceeding.

3. Legislative
Last item is legislative. Meaning legislative or by law. If you look at the Constitution those who are naturalized in accordance by
law. Congress will pass a law directly only for you. It has happened before. It would seem that lots of people had done good things
for the country, like foreign missionaries. They resided in the Philippines for too many years so Congress will pass a law saying that “
Ok! We will make you a Filipino directly”. I think for the last 20 years, I have not known anybody who had become directly by means
of a law passed by Congress. During the time of Marcos there were many, because Marcos noticed that there are many aliens who
wanted to play in the PBA. So, it is permissible under the Constitution.

Proceed to Section 2.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Who are considered NATURAL BORN? It is very important to know who are natural born because these are the guys who can
occupy constitutional positions. I will first go to the second part, it is saying, those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 Section 1. What is the background of this provision? I told you that if your mother is a Filipino, and your father is an
alien, you have to elect Philippine citizenship. Now, there are many decisions before and it was not clear. The court would say that if
you elect Philippine citizenship you are not natural born because you already performed an act to perfect your citizenship. Some
decisions would state that you are a natural born. So to remove all doubts, anyone who elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution is now considered natural born. So, they can occupy Constitutional positions.

The problem is this: suppose, you know that the Constitution took effect in February 1988. Suppose you made your election in
1960, are you considered natural born now? YES.
NATURAL BORN CITIZENS are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth, having not performed any act to perfect
their citizenship.

Q: Suppose you are a Filipino, and you become an alien, and you decided to apply for repatriation. Are you a natural born or not?
A: Father Bernas was saying in his textbook the citizenship once lost, can never be regained. The status of a natural born once lost
can never be regained. In fact he compared it to virginity, once lost it can never be restored no matter what you do. But when the
court decided Bengzon, SC stated No! The SC said, if you re-acquire it through repatriation, then you are considered natural born.
Meaning you are restored to your original status.

BENGZON III vs. HRET


GR No. 142840 (May 07, 2001)

FACTS: Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac,
on April 27, 1960 of Filipino parents. On Nov. 5, 1985, however, he enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA 63, Sec. 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt remained regarding
his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection w/
his service in the US Marine Corps. On May 17, 1994, he reacquired his Phil. citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Rep. of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in May 11, 1998 elections over
petitioner Antonio Bengzon III, who was then running for reelection. Petitioner filed a case for quo warranto ad
cautelam w/ HRET claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution. The HRET however, dismissed the said
petition. Hence this present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US in 1985, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation.
He insists that Art. IV, Sec. 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. Respondent on the other
hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from
birth" in Art. IV, Sec. 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristics of being a natural-born citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born citizen who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship?

HELD: There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship corresponds to the kinds of citizens, the natural-born and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
time of his birth is a citizen of a country is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizen are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under CA 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law w/c repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act 2927), and by RA 530.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
CA 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Phil citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization; (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of the Congress.
NATURALIZATION is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Phil. citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, it is governed by CA 473, as amended. On the other hand, as a mode for
reacquiring Phil. citizenship is governed by CA 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Phil. citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in sec. 4
of CA 473.

REPATRIATION, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. Desertion of the armed forces;
2. Service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. Service in the Armed Forces of the US at any other time;
4. Marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. Political and economic necessity.
6.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where
the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angara vs. Rep., we held: . . . "Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA 965 & 2630] the person
desiring to reacquire Phil. citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do
was to take an oath of allegiance to the Rep. of the Philippines and to register that fact w/ the civil registry in the
place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.”

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Phil. citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of US.
However, he subsequently reacquired Phil. citizenship under RA 2630 w/c provides: Sec. 1. Any person who had
lost his Phil. citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the US, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the US, acquired US citizenship, --may reacquire Phil citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the republic of the Philippines and registering the same w/ Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Mangantarem, Pangasinan in accordance w/ the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status w/c he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Phil. citizenship. Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable.

Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before Jan. 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include "those who elect Phil.
citizenship in accordance with par. 3, Sec. 2 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) in the 1973
Constitution. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising
therefrom, respondent --being clearly and concededly not naturalized --is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire their
original classification before the loss of their Phil. citizenship. In the case of respondent, upon his repatriation in
1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born citizen,
nothing less.

Q: However, suppose you acquired your citizenship by some other means, for instance you got naturalized, can you run for
President?
A: No! Because you are no longer natural born, you are naturalized. So it will depend as to the manner you acquired citizenship.

CO vs. CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA


GR No. 138496 (Feb. 23, 2004)

FACTS: Petitioners were born in the Philippines. Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was
born on May 19, 1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and
Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.

Thereafter, their father, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. This was granted and he was
conferred Philippine citizenship under PD No.1055.

On Aug. 27, 1998, petitioners filed a petition for the correction of entries in their certificate of birth. They pray that
their citizenship should be change from Chinese to Filipino as they have acquired it through derivative
naturalization. They alleged in their petition that at the time of their birth their father was still a Chinese citizen that
is why entry in their respective birth certificates as to their fathers citizenship was Chinese.

In our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 535 provides: “Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof.”

However, LOI 270 does not have the any proviso that provides for the same beneficial effects with respect to minor
children of the applicant.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still minors at that time naturalization was granted
to their father became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization.

HELD: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the Philippines.
While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while LOI No.
270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to enable
aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the
Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted
Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more
expeditious, less cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able
to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and political
well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any
express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as
an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the
grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270.

KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA
526 SCRA 353

FACTS: On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an
appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy
created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was
reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.

Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is
patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and
that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as
Annex “H” to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on
May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese.

Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted eleven years after respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally
granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality
as “Chinese” at birth.

ISSUE: WON respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen

HELD: In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under
O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar
because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han
Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he,
too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth
certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth
and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a
Chinese citizen. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that
this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer.

It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. He is
not a natural-born Filipino. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.

Bar Question
2003 # 4

Q: Juan Cruz was born of Filipino parents in 1960 in Pampanga. In 1985, he enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and took an oath of
allegiance to the United States of America. In 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen. In 1994, he was repatriated under
Republic Act No. 2430. During the 1998 National Elections, he ran for and was elected representative of the First District of
Pampanga where he resided since his repatriation. Was he qualified to run for the position? Explain.
A: YES, because he is now considered natural born. He got repatriated.

One more item I forgot to discuss in relation to Section 2. A couple of years ago, I think in Compostela Valley there was
somebody who ran for congressman. I think his name was Lou Uy. This is what happened to him. His parents were Chinese, both of
them. When he was still a minor the parents elected Philippine citizenship. So he became a Filipino because he was a minor, he was
benefited. In the 1998 or 2001, I’m not very sure anymore, he ran for Congress which the position requires to be natural born. So he
was challenged. He was told, “Ooppss!! You cannot, you are not a natural born.” The question is, is he natural born or not?
What’s the definition, a natural born is one who acquired citizenship without having to perform any act in order to complete or
perfect his citizenship. The problem was that the case was pending before the COMELEC but he loss the election. If he loss the
election, it becomes moot and academic because anyway after the decision you will not serve. That case was never decided by SC. So
until now it is still not clear. But it is possible to argue both ways. You can argue that he is natural born because he did not perform
any act in order to complete or perfect his citizenship. He was a baby at that time.

Normally if you are of age, you take an oath in order to perfect your citizenship. But if you are a baby, you cannot expect a baby
to raise his hand. That’s why you can argue that he never performed any. He was automatically elected but the argument will have a
problem also, why? Because, what does Justice Cruz called this type of citizenship? If you follow the citizenship because of
naturalization he calls it “derivative citizenship” meaning you derive it only from your parents. If you view the case as natural
born it can result to absurdity. Why? Because the parents are only naturalized, he derived from his parents. So it’s a bit strange, he can
have no rights on his parent. That’s why the other side would have view that, ok! He is also naturalized because he is like his parents.
Ok! Anyway, as I’ve told you it has never been settled by any decision.

We’ll now proceed to the outline.

Sections 3-5
1. Loss and reacquisition
2. Effect of marriage
3. Dual Allegiance

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

If you try to look at Section 3 you will notice that there are two (2) items mentioned. One is how is it lost? The other one is how is
it reacquired? When it comes to loss the Constitution is saying very clearly that it can be lost in a manner provided by law. So take
note that the manner for forfeiture of loss has to be founded in law. The SC cannot just invent one. Anybody cannot just invent one.
For instance, you cannot tell somebody that you have not returned to the Philippines for 20 years, you have automatically lost it. No,
that is not for a reason that it is not a ground mentioned by the law.

So, the question therefore is this: what are these mentioned by law? The one mentioned in textbook of Justice Cruz which needs
to be modified is naturalization in foreign country. Ok! Why do I say that? Because in the old days, the law provided that once you are
naturalized in a foreign country automatically Philippine citizenship is lost. Ok! It is an automatic result of acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Now the question is, is that still proving now? The answer is “No”. Why? Because I assigned to you RA 9225 and the title
“An Act Making Citizenship of Philippine Citizens who have Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent Amending for their for their
Purpose CA 63 as Amended as to the Other Purposes.”

Actually this is very confusing but the point here is this: It’s saying amending CA 63, what is the significance of that? Because
the statement I gave you that it is lost upon acquisition of a foreign citizenship is found in that law. And the more accurate title is the
one found in Section 1, it is saying “ citizenship retention and reacquisition act”. Retention therefore comes here. The comment that
you’ll get naturalized in a foreign country, it does not mean necessarily lost. It can still resolve to retention provided, what do you do?
What’s the requirement of the law? Take an oath of allegiance to support the constitution of the Philippines, the laws of the
Philippines as provided in the law.
Valles v. COMELEC
337 SCRA 543 (2000)

FACTS: Rosalind Lopez was born in Western Australia in 1934 of a Filipino father and an Australian mother. At the age of
15, she settled in the Philippines and later on married a Filipino. It appears that in 1988 she was issued an
Australian Passport. She also applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence. In 1982, she was elected as Governor of Davao Oriental.

ISSUE: Whether Lopez effectively renounced her Philippine citizenship as to disqualify her for the position

HELD: No. The mere fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian Passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Her application for an alien certificate of registration and her holding
of an Australian passport were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship. Thus, at most, she had dual
citizenship—she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Petition for Leave…,
540 SCRA 424 (2007)

FACTS: Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship which
was approved in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), Dacanay reacquired his Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: WON Dacanay lose his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004?

HELD: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens
save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof
terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

[Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating
and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the
completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh
the his knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s
oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Go v. Ramos
598 SCRA 266 (2009)

FACTS: Jimmy Go was sought to be deported on the ground that he was an alien misrepresenting himself to be a Filipino.
He claims, however, that his father, Carlos, having elected Philippine citizenship, is a Filipino from whom he
derived his Philippine citizenship. In the proceedings to deport Jimmy Go, is his father an indispensable party? If
not, may his father’s citizenship be determined in the case against Carlos? If yes, would the determination bar
subsequent proceedings against his father on the same issue because of res judicata?

HELD: Jimmy’s father is not an indispensable party because he does not stand to be benefited or injured in the proceedings
to deport Jimmy Go. However, since Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship hinges on the citizenship of his father,
it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. Whatever will be the findings as to Carlos’
citizenship will in no way prejudice him. There is also no bar to institute proceedings against him to determine his
citizenship. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as
a matter of course. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

Grounds for loss of Philippine citizenship:


a. One is naturalization in a foreign country, except when you take an oath of allegiance in accordance with RA 9225 in which can
see, you will retain Philippine citizenship. This is now qualified. Not all naturalization can result to loss.
b. The second possibility of losing it is through express renunciation. What do you mean by this? When we say express
renunciation, you do it verbally. You do it in writing or maybe orally. You say that “I hereby renounce my Philippine
citizenship. I do not want to become a Filipino anymore”. That is express renunciation of Philippines citizenship. Normally, that
is done before if you acquire alien citizenship. Usually the other country will tell you also to renounce Philippine citizenship.
Maybe it only states of a situation in which you expressly renounce it, without acquiring any other citizenship. In this case, you
might end up stateless.
c. The third one is subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the law and Constitution of another country. When you acquire an
alien citizenship, you say the “I promise to obey the law and Constitution of this country”.
d. The fourth one is rendering service in the armed forces of foreign country. That is accepting a commission in an army of a foreign
country. I think your textbook will tell you that there’s an exception here that is if you have a defense treaty with the other
country. For instance, you have a defense treaty with the US. Then, you join the US marines. You will still remain a Filipino.

Now, my question is why is it that Bengzon, when he joined the US Marines, why was he considered to have lost his Philippine
citizenship? Actually in that law which allows you to retain your Philippine citizenship by joining the armed forces of other country,
there’s a requirement that you have to get the consent of Philippine government. He did not get it. That’s why he lost it. Obviously,
he also acquired American citizenship after serving the US Marine.
e. The fifth one is cancellation of certificate of naturalization. What do we mean by this? This applies only if you are naturalized
because this can be cancelled. Actually, this is a proceeding instituted by the Solicitor General. We call this “denaturalization”
proceeding. Now, if you are natural born, you cannot be denaturalized. Your citizenship cannot be cancelled. So, this applies only
to those who have been naturalized.

By the way, it has been asked twice in the bar. For instance, for how long can the proceeding be suppose you get your citizenship
now? What is the period for the government to institute denaturalization proceeding? The answer is FOREVER. It has the right. The
most significant thing to remember is this: generally, decisions become final if you do not appeal it. So, for instance, if a criminal is
convicted, he might say that the decision is wrong but you forgot to appeal within 15 days. Then, it cannot be challenged anymore. He
will end up spending the rest of his life in jail if the penalty is life imprisonment. But when it comes to naturalization proceedings, we
say that prescription does not apply. The principle of res judicata, which means the judgment becomes final, does not apply to
naturalization proceedings. The effect there is this - at anytime in the future, the Solicitor General can cancel your citizenship. It
defines any ground. Maybe you misrepresented facts and they discovered that you put there lots of lies. In the future, 20 years, after he
can file a case in court in order to remove your naturalized status.

f. The next one is you can also loss it if you a deserter in the Philippine armed forces in times of war. The context of desertion here
is desertion actually in an international war, not fighting the Abu Sayyaf nor fighting the NPA. Desertion there does not result to
loss of Philippine citizenship.

Those are the grounds for loss. I want to explain the case of Labo vs COMELEC . The case of Labo is very old but it is still
significant. Labo used to be a favorite of Marcos and he won as Mayor of Baguio. He was a faith healer at that time, a famous one at
that time. He could cure people in serious diseases. On account of his famous faith healing, it seems that he married several
foreigners. I think he has a Japanese wife. In the actual case, he has an Australian wife. Because of his marriage to an Australian, he
was given Australian citizenship by a shortcut. It’s a shortcut proceeding. It seems that it is that sometimes he would say that I am
Australian because he is really an Australian and when he won as mayor his opponent questioned him saying, “Oopps, you are not a
Filipino. You cannot be mayor”.

How did he argue that he is still a Filipino? Effect of marriage does not mean that you will loss Philippine citizenship. Marriage
has no effect on citizenship unless you do some other things. Now, when it reached the SC, SC stated that “wait, how did you get your
citizenship in Australia”? Now, there were documents presented that actually he was really naturalized. It was not given to him for
free. The proceedings were shortcut considering that he was married to an Australian giving him some benefits. After the proceedings,
he was also required to take an oath of allegiance to support Queen Elizabeth. She’s the honorary head of the British Commonwealth.
In fact in his oath, it is also mentioned “I hereby renounce all other allegiances”. So when it reached the SC, the court stated that you
are no longer a Filipino, not because of marriage, but actually by these 3: You got naturalized in Australia, you renounced your
Philippine citizenship, and also you subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the law of Australia. In fact, anyone of this can
result to loss of Philippine citizenship. For you, its worst because you performed all 3 of them. That is why he was not allowed to
serve as mayor.

The decision of SC in Aznar vs. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) appears to be rather strange. Aznar involves Osmeña, very
prominent guy. The problem is that he has two (2) passports. He has a Philippine passport to show that he is a Filipino and it seems
that he was also carrying an American passport, which proves that he is an American. In fact, he carried his certificate of alien
registration. Every time he came to the Philippines, he really declares that I’m an American. When he won as governor, his opponents
stated that “Oopss, you cannot be a governor for the reason that your passport is saying that you are an American”. When it reached
the SC, the SC stated that “No, you can still be governor.“ Why? The reasoning of the SC is found in the evidence because according
to the Court, the facts and the records are not clear on how you became an American. It does not say that you got naturalized there. I
am thinking that possibly he was born a dual citizen. Maybe he was born in the US, which follows jus soli, of Filipino parents, which
follows that he has two citizenship. But the reasoning of SC is very simple - is there really evidence that he got naturalized in the US?
None. Was there express renunciation? None. Did he subscribe to an oath of allegiance to support the laws of the other country? None.
No evidence that he rendered service, no cancellation, no desertion. So, considering that you committed none of the acts mentioned in
the law as ground for loss, then, you are still a Filipino. The problem is lack of evidence on how he got his American citizenship
because SC is correct in saying that the fact that you have an American passport does not mean that you are no longer a Filipino. If
you are both an American and Filipino at the time, you can still be a mayor, governor because what is important is you are a Filipino.
It does not prohibit.
Reacquisition
I will spend a little time on reacquisition. The other side of Constitution, the Section is saying that Philippine citizenship may also
be reacquired in a manner provided by law.

Procedures for Reacquisition:


1. One is you can acquire it by naturalization. I think this is what Frivaldo did. When he was given a shortcut, that was the
procedure. He applied for naturalization in a judicial proceeding.
2. Then you can also apply for repatriation. This one is shortcut.

By the way, when it comes to repatriation, not everyone can get repatriated because the law is clear that it applies only to some
individuals.

Who can get repatriated?


a. One is, if a Filipino woman who lost it because of marriage to an alien because in the old days, if you marry an alien, you
acquire his citizenship. You also become an alien.
b. Then, if you lost it as I mentioned a while ago, because of desertion, you can also be repatriated.
c. Then, because of RA 8171, if you loss it because of economic necessity, you can also be repatriated. What is economic
necessity? Maybe you went to Sabbah because you are too poor here, or maybe Malaysia or maybe a DH in Hongkong. In
order to keep your job there, you acquire citizenship. You will be allowed to recover it through repatriation.
d. The other whom maybe allowed to get repatriated are those who loss it on account of political necessity. The best example of
somebody losing it through political necessity is Frivaldo. He was an opponent of the Marcos regime. He went to the US. He
hid there. In the process of staying, there he acquired American citizenship, maybe to allow himself to prolong his stay there.
So, he can get repatriated.
e. Now, if you went over the case of Bengzon, he was repatriated. Why was he allowed to be repatriated? Because he lost it
through service in the armed forces of another country.

Take note that not everybody can get repatriated; only these people mentioned in the law are subject to repatriation.
TABASA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 125793 (August 29, 2006)

FACTS: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years
old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization
(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization),
petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a “balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested and detained. On May 29, 1996 he was ordered to be deported to his country of origin. He,
however, was temporarily released on bail.
On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be
deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.

HELD: The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b) Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or
economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a
naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his
natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the
benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by
the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity
to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for
repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his
father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship.
Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos
who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the
time of his “repatriation” on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age
at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly,
he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his
father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The
decision was his parent’s and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the
natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and
economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly
reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic
Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

ALTAJEROS vs. COMELEC


GR No. 163256 (Nov. 10, 2004)

FACTS: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He was
a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration issued on November 3, 1997, and an
Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
his opponent alleged that he committed a false representation in his certificate of candidacy.
But petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the
May 10, 2004 elections because as early as Dec. 17, 1997 he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
However, his certification from the City Civil Registration Office of Makati City was received and registered by the
said office, on February 18, 2004, which was after he filed his application for candidacy as mayor.

ISSUES: Whether or not the registration of repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration
a prerequisite in effecting repatriation;
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for mayoralty position.

HELD: The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, thus: SEC. 2. Repatriation shall
be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the
pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen.

The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil
registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was
registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau
of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he
filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

On the other hand, since citizenship qualification applies to the time of proclamation of the elective official and at
the start of his term. The court cited Frivaldo vs. Comelec that ruled that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of
one’s application of repatriation. Then, petitioner was qualified to run as a mayor.

3. The third way by which you reacquire your citizenship is by direct act Congress. Justice Cruz mentioned this. In the same way
that you can be naturalized directly, you can also reacquire Philippine citizenship by direct act of congress.
4. Now there is fourth way added by RA 9225 - by taking oath of allegiance. This is a new one covered by the law. Can a Filipino
citizen who lost his citizenship because of marriage reacquires Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance? What does
it say? Who can reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance? Only natural born Filipino citizens who lost it
because of naturalization in a foreign country. This means it does not apply to any of these people. The law is very clear that it
applies only to one set of people. That is those who lost Philippine citizenship because of naturalization in a foreign country.
Maybe you got naturalized in the US in 1960, you want to recover it, you go back to the Philippines and take an oath of
allegiance. It’s unlimited law.

We go to Section 4.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or
omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.

The formula is very simple. Marriage whether you are a man or a woman does not result to loss of Philippine citizenship. So why
is that significant? It is significant because in the old days there was a law saying that if you marry, the woman marries an alien, in the
process you are given a citizenship of your husband’s country… you lose Philippine citizenship. Now it does not matter, you marry an
alien and they give you citizenship of your husband’s country: no problem you still remain a Filipino. So in effect you can become
dual citizen because of marriage. So that is now the provision.
So what do you mean by a statement that unless by their act or omission they are deemed under the law have renounce it.

Q: What do you mean by act or omission, which can result to loss?


A: The answer is the one and listed earlier. After marriage you got naturalized; after marriage you renounce Philippine citizenship;
after, you took your oath of allegiance; after marriage you deserted from the armed forces but normally do not do that. The point I
think is very simple. Marriage by itself has no effect. What will result to loss is if you do any of the things mentioned in the law as
a ground for loss of Philippine citizenship. Ok! So that’s the principle. Got it!

I will just discuss the bar questions a few minutes. I think I asked some question here, especially in the light of Lomantan
decision? What happens is the reverse question.

Q: When an alien woman marries a Filipino does he become Filipino citizen?


A: The answer in Moya Liam is yes you become a Filipino impliedly which was acknowledged also in Lomantan. But the point here
is this, when an alien woman marries a Filipino she become a Filipino provided that you do not have any of the disqualifications.

Q: What are these disqualifications?


A: Actually these disqualifications are negative traits mentioned in the law. I think you remember Cruz. Who cannot become Filipino
citizens for instance? If you are suffering from mental alienation, mental disease because you cannot have crazy aliens becoming
a Filipino. Disqualification is overthrowing the government. Those who believe in bigamous marriage, they are disqualified. So
the point here is this, if you do not belong under those category and you marry a Filipino, you will become a Filipino also because
you possess none of the disqualifications. The Court did not say, because if you want to become a Filipino through naturalization
what do you do, you put there qualification.

Qualifications are difficult to prove. Qualifications are difficult to add. If you marry a Filipino you may not have the
qualifications. For instance, what are the qualifications mentioned in the textbook of Justice Cruz? 10-year residency is one, how can
you become a Filipino if you married your penpal, he comes to the Philippines you meet and you marry. You need not possess any of
the qualifications. Able to speak Filipino, that’s the qualification. If you are married to a Filipino, you need not have that because what
is required is you possess none of the disqualification. It is easier. The proceedings become very simple if you marry, you need not be
naturalized anymore. What do you do simply according to the procedure now is execute an affidavit; you say that I am now married to
a Filipino, I am an alien but I married a Filipino. I do not have any of the disqualifications then you attach a marriage contract. You
submit it to the BID. Will the Commissioner of Immigration still say, maybe he will investigate and he finds out that you are really
married to a Filipino, you possess none of the disqualifications then you will be allowed to take your oath as a Filipino. So very simple
formula. If you go over Lomantan vs Domingo. Lomantan case was this: there was this Filipino who works in Indonesia. The Filipino
guy was married to a Filipino. Then when he went to Indonesia he got converted to Islam. He became a Muslim. There he married
another woman because under the Islamic law you are allowed to marry more than one. The guy lost his job and he went back to the
Philippines and brought the woman with her. He told his first wife that she’s only my friend. I think there were 2 or 3 children; I did
not know how he was able to explain when the children looked like him.Ö I think several years after the first wife discovered that they
were more than friends, what she did was, she filed a case for deportation for the woman, for bigamy against the husband. When she
sought to deport the woman, the woman stated that, “ I am a Filipino because I’m married to a Filipino how can you deport me? “.
Because I become a Filipino also. No! When an alien man marries a Filipino he does not become a Filipino citizen. What benefits
does he get under the law? We studied that in Cruz. According to Cruz, I told you, I mention that a while ago that when you want to
apply for citizenship in the Philippines, 10 years. If you are married to a Filipina, 5 years only. So in effect, you are not Filipino
immediately, you can apply for naturalization and you only need to satisfy 5 years residency requirement. You are getting a discount.
It’s a bonus when you married a Filipino. Why is it that it was shortened to 5 years? I usually give them a common answer that, that is
intended to console the alien for his misfortune. (Toink!!)

Last provision.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
If you look at the Constitution, the emphasis is in dual allegiance not dual citizenship. Some authors and some decisions try to
distinguish the two because they are saying that dual citizenship actually is being a citizen of two countries. In dual allegiance, you
need not be a citizen of the other country but in a sense you still owe an allegiance.

In the debate in the framing of the Constitution, Ople stated that you might really be from Taiwan. You have grew up there. Then,
suddenly you decided to become a Filipino but you maintain close relations with Taiwan. So, in the sense, you still owe loyalty to
Taiwan even if you are a Filipino. So, that is what we mean by dual allegiance. Take note that the Constitution does not say that it is
illegal. What does it say? It’s saying only that Congress will pass a law in order to implement this meaning. This is not a self-
executing provision.

Q: Has Congress implemented this?


A: The answer is this YES, it did in the LGC of 1991. The provision is Sec 40 of the LGC. Section 40 is saying that the following are
not qualified to run for any elective position, meaning, you cannot become a mayor, governor, councilor, barangay captain, if you
are a dual citizen.

LGC RA 7160: SECTION 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx

The first guy who encountered that problem was Edu Manzano. It turned out that he has two citizenships. He was a Filipino and at
the time, he was also an American. The other person who encountered that problem was Gov. Rosalind Lopez of Davao Oriental
because it seemed that she is a Filipino, born of Filipino parents but she was born in Australia. So, she was also Australian at the same
time.

When Edu Manzano won as vice mayor and Rosalind Lopez won as governor, they were challenged based on this argument. The
SC went back to a very strange explanation of the law in order to qualify them. I do not like the explanation. But this is the
explanation of the court. According to the Court, when you look at the Constitution, the Constitution is thinking of dual allegiance
because that is the language. If you look at the LGC it is thinking of dual citizenship it is saying dual citizens are not allowed. That’s
the term used now. Now according to the Court, dual allegiance is voluntary, meaning that it is your choice. It is your freewill. But
dual citizenship is involuntary. You have no choice. Why? You are a Filipino born in the US. You cannot determine where will you
be born. It’s your parents who give birth to you. Or maybe your mother is Filipino and your father is American, still, you have no
choice. You end up with dual citizenship because it is not your choice. So, the court stated that the LGC actually does not disqualify
people with dual citizenship. They want to disqualify people with dual allegiance. According to the Court, once you run for public
office, there is a statement in the certificate of candidacy “citizenship”. Once you put there Filipino, that means you renounce your
alien citizenship. Automatically, you are qualified. You are no longer dual. But you are not renouncing, you actually put there
Filipino.

Take note that under the new law, if you are a Filipino and you got naturalized as an American, you can retain Philippine
citizenship if you take an oath of allegiance. You are now dual, right?

Q: Can you run for public office?


A: You will not be covered by the Manzano decision. According to the Court, YES, you can run but you must renounce expressly
your alien citizenship. This means that you put it in a sworn statement that you want to be Filipino only because you’re running
for this position. I think few people would go to that extent because they have remained in a foreign country. It is different in
Manzano because he did not renounce this. He just put there Filipino. He remained an alien.

One question that I asked is this, according to Valles vs. COMELEC, if a person with dual citizenship registers as a voter, it will
result to renunciation of his foreign citizenship. FALSE, why? What will result to renunciation? When you fill in your certificate of
candidacy and you put there Filipino, that will result to renunciation. It did not say that if you registered to be a voter because voter is
applied to all of us. We register as voters and that is not renunciation. It is actually the filing for the certificate of candidacy for the
position. Conditional renunciation is not allowed.

VALLES vs. COMELEC


G.R. 137000 Aug 9, 2000

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. The citizenship of private
respondent was raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998
elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles. His petition was dismissed by
COMELEC. Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen

HELD: The respondent is a Filipino citizen. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the US governed the country. These were
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Among
others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco,
was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in
the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to
be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for
the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently
retained under the 1973. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And in the 1987 Constitution, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Thus, the respondent is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then
at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that
the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration and her Australian passport is bereft of
merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of Mercado vs.
Manzano and COMELEC. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not
militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the
same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Try to listen to this: In 1989, Ely Sinco married Liezl Dyes, a national in a State of Congo. Under the laws of Congo, an alien
woman marrying a Congo national automatically acquires Congo citizenship. After her marriage Zeny resided in Congo and acquired
Congo passport. In 1991 she returned to the Philippines and wanted to run for Congress. Is she qualified? Yes. Is she dual or not?
DUAL.

-oOo-

ARTICLE V- SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year, and in
the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy,
property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a
system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the assistance of
other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission
on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

AKBAYAN VS COMELEC
355 SCRA 318

FACTS: Invoking this right, herein petitioners representing the youth sector seek to direct the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to
21. According to petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000
deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.

Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the Committee on Electoral
Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation, through a Letter dated January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a
public hearing for the purpose of holding additional two days of registration. However, the Comelec in a resolution
issued on February 8, 2001 disapproved the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8
of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-
election activities.

Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et al. filed
before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set
aside and nullify respondent COMELEC’s Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional
insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001

HELD: In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime niche in the hierarchy of
rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised within the proper bounds and framework of the
Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all
intents and purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and preserve the
democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils of opportunism, debauchery and
abuse.

To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the
exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural
requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be
qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is
obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
“Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.”

Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For registration is
part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus, contrary to
petitioners’ argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet
generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a
realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.

Domino v. COMELEC
310 SCRA 546 (1999)

FACTS: Domino ran and won as Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Saranggani in the May 11,
1998 elections. He was not proclaimed because earlier his opponent filed a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
before the COMELEC on the ground that Domino was not a resident of the District. On Jan. 18, 1998, however, the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City decided in an exclusion proceeding that Domino was a resident of Sarangani and
ordered the transfer of his registration to Alabel, Saranggani.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the court on the residency of petitioner conclusive on the COMELEC?

HELD: No. Under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to cancel a certificate of candidacy,
which includes the power to determine whether false representation was made in the certificate of candidacy, including
the matter of residence. The proceeding for exclusion of voters in a trial court is summary in character, and the factual
findings of the trial court on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not
conclusive upon the COMELEC. Except for the right to remain in the list of voters or being excluded from it for the
particular election, the decision of the trial court does not operate as a bar to any action concerning the subject passed
upon. Moreover, the trial court of Quezon City exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered the transfer of Domino’s
registration to Saranggani because it is limited only to determining the right of a voter to remain in the list of voters. That
power belongs to the Election Board as provided under Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 8189.

Velasco v. COMELEC
575 SCRA 590 (2008)

FACTS: Velasco was born in Sasmuan, Pampanga in 1952. In 1983, he moved to and worked in the United States of
America where he subsequently became a citizen. In 2006, Velasco applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. His application was approved on July 31,
2006. On September 14, 2006 he returned to Pampanga and has not left since. On October 13, 2006, he applied for registration
as a voter of Sasmuan, Pampanga, and eventually ran for election as Mayor.

ISSUE: WON Velasco qualified to vote in the 2007 local election

HELD: No. Velasco could not register as a regular voter because he did not possess the residency requirement of one-year stay in the
Philippines and six-months stay in the municipality where he proposed to vote at the time of the election. The records show
that he arrived in the Philippines only on September 14, 2006 and applied for registration on October 13 of that year for the
election to be held in May of 2007. When he acquired his American citizenship, he lost his residency and domiciliary status
in the Philippines and his sojourn can only be via a visitor’s visa. However, since he is a dual citizen, he possesses the right to
vote in Philippine elections through the absentee voting scheme under Republic Act No. 9189. Absentee voters are exempted
from the constitutional residency requirement for regular Philippine voters. By law, however, the right of dual citizens who
vote as absentee voters pertains only to the election of national officials, specifically: the president, the vice-president, the
senators, and party-list representatives.

-oOo-

ARTICLE VI- LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT


Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.

The Constitution tells me that it is vested in Congress, delegated in Congress.

Q: What is LEGISLATIVE POWER?


A: It is the power to make laws.

Q: Only make laws?


A: It is also the power to amend and repeal laws.

Some commentators will try to distinguish or classify. They are saying that it can be classified as original & derivative. When
we speak of original that is the legislative power exercised by the people. Why? Because Section 1 is only delegating legislative power
to Congress. So originally, legislative power belongs to the people. Why is it that it belongs to the people? Because sovereignty
belongs to the people. We are the sovereign and law making is the highest expression of sovereignty. Why? What about derivative
power? This is the one exercise by Congress because in Section 1, this is delegated legislative power… the one exercised by Congress.
That is how we distinguished original from derivative.

Now we proceed to the second classification. We have ordinary & constituent. What is ordinary legislative power?
Ordinary legislative power is the power to make ordinary laws. What are ordinary laws? RPC, VAT, Family Code… these are
ordinary statutes that’s why we call this exercise of ordinary legislative power which under Section 1, belongs to Congress also.

Q: Can people exercise ordinary legislative power?


A: Yes because of the provision in initiative and referendum, which was not present in the previous Constitution.

Now, legislative power is delegated to Congress, ordinary law making power but to the Constitution it also has initiative and
referendum. Also the power to make laws directly because of the provision of initiative and referendum which you will also study
towards the last part of Article 6 Section 32. Now what about constituent legislative power? It is the power to repeal, amend and to
revise the Constitution. This is the highest because this is the fundamental law. Now take note the word Constituent. I think you know
that if you read newspapers, you’ll notice that Congress will say we will convert ourselves into a constituent body. What does it mean?
This is the body preparing amendment or revision of the Constitution. That is the essence of the word Constituent.

Another principle regarding legislative power is that we say it is plenary.

Q: What is the ordinary meaning of PLENARY?


A: It means it is without limitations. Legislative power suppose to be plenary, it is full.

The question normally asked by people is this… Can Congress pass a law saying that this law is permanent? No, because we
say that the powers of Congress is plenary. If we say that a law cannot be repealed, so that is a limitation to the Congress. That’s why
no law can be passed, which is not subject to repeal because it will serve as limitation on the power of Congress. Laws can be put in
equal footing. Congress can pass, repeal, and amend because that is part of Congress.

Now we go to another point. I guess it’s one of the basic principles that generally suppose to be the power of Congress is
subject to no limitations because that is the idea of being plenary. However if you study decisions there are also limitations in the
power of Congress. Ok! What are these limitations? I think I told you about GATT.. WTO, the president entered into a treaty with
other countries because it is multinational treaty and the comment is saying that Congress will have to pass law to implement the
treaty. So how will Congress implement it? For instance because it is GATT WTO, it will pass those lowering tariff products. Take
note that it is the treaty commanding Congress to do it. Now when Tañada went to SC, he is saying that it cannot be done. Why?
Because you are making Congress subject to foreign powers. You are now saying that Congress is limited. So you say… do this, do
not do that… it is no longer absolute. It is subject to the commands of others. Can that be sustained? SC answer that when they signed
treaties, in effect Congress agrees also to limit its police power, its power of taxation, its power of eminent domain. So now, we have
to conclude that the power of Congress is also limited by International law particularly the treaties that the President entered into with
another countries. The second one is, there are also limitations imposed in the Constitution itself. Ok, because take note that the power
of Congress is derived from the Constitution. So by logic the Constitution also is free to put limits. Right! Because that is the source of
power.

A: So what now are the limits imposed by the Constitution to the legislative?
Q: We classify it under two meanings. Those which are procedural and those, which are substantive.

What are PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS? We will discuss many of them as we go along. But for now, I will cite you
examples. You will learn later on that before a law can be pass and take effect as law, its has to undergo 3 readings in 3 separate days.
If Congress passes a law without following that, the law will be null and void because that is a procedural limitation on the power to
make laws. Another also is for instance before a law can be passed, it must be approved by both Houses. You cannot have a law
approved only by one house because that is procedural requirement that it must be approved by both houses because we are a
bicameral system. So that is procedural limitation.
CITY OF DAVAO VS RTC
467 SCRA 280

FACTS: A Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld the tax-exempt status of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) for the years 1992 to 1994 in contravention of the mandate under the Local Government Code of
1992. The RTC concluded that notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its
exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the exemption granted in Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, was
effectively withdrawn upon the enactment of the Local Government Code, particularly Sections 193 and 294
thereof. These provisions made the GSIS, along with all other GOCCs, subject to realty taxes. Petitioners point out
that under Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code, even special laws, such as PD No. 1146, which are
inconsistent with the Local Government Code, are repealed or modified accordingly.

The RTC rendered its Decision concluding that notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the
GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981,
which mandated such exemption.
The RTC conceded that the tax exempting statute, P.D. No. 1146, was enacted prior to the Local Government Code.
However, it noted that the earlier law had prescribed two conditions in order that the tax exemption provided therein
could be withdrawn by future enactments, namely: (1) that Section 33 be expressly and categorically repealed by
law; and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as
an essential factor for the solvency of the GSIS fund. The RTC concluded that both conditions had not been
satisfied by the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WON the GSIS should still be tax-exempt by virtue of Section 33 of P.D. 1146.

HELD: It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition
against the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best
senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance promotes an unhealthy
stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to the times. As
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once observed, “[t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change.”

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind
the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as
they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and
a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.

It might be argued that Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, does not preclude the repeal of the tax-exempt
status of GSIS, but merely imposes conditions for such to validly occur. Yet these conditions, if honored, have the
precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Thus, the same rationale for prohibiting irrepealable laws applies
in prohibiting restraints on future amendatory laws. President Marcos, who exercised his legislative powers in
amending P.D. No. 1146, could not have demanded obeisance from future legislators by imposing restrictions on
their ability to legislate amendments or repeals. The concerns that may have militated his enactment of these
restrictions need not necessarily be shared by subsequent Congresses.

League of Cities v. COMELEC


Dec. 21, 2009

FACTS: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities Into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, it enacted into law RA No. 9009
which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Five years later, 16 new
cities were created by the 13th Congress. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. Considering that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
requires that no local government unit shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established “in the local
government code.

ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid

HELD: Yes. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a
much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied
in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified
income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no
different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the
criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

The second one is that which are SUBSTANTIVE. Meaning on the content of the law itself, not in the procedure for passing.
We classify substantive limitation into two. Those, which are express, and those, which are implied. It is very important to know what
is express and what is implied. But in ordinary term when you say express, it is either done in writing or orally. You know it. If
implied you only infer it from certain facts. So how do we explain that? It’s very easy to illustrate. For instance, I used to tell student
that when somebody gives you a chocolate, you could make a conclusion. Maybe this guy loves me. That is only implied. Why?
Because you infer it from his action. You infer it from set of facts. But if he tells you “I love you”, that is really express… there’s no
room for doubt. So that is meant by what is express and what is implied. Now what are examples of express limitations?

Most of the express limitations are found in the Bill of Rights, which you will study next semester. But I can give you
examples. For instance, you will see in Section 5 of Bill of rights: the statement “No law shall be pass abridging freedom of religion”.
Sometimes Section 3 will say that the right to free expression cannot be abridged. That is an express provision of the Constitution. So
that is an express limitation. Now what about implied? Implied is a limitation which you cannot see in textbook of the Constitution but
you know its there. So for instance, the first one will be those matters that come out, out of its powers. You will learn in In Re:
Cunanan case later on that the power to admit people to the bar belongs to the SC. So that’s why it is the SC who gives examination
for lawyers. Sometime in 1950, Congress wanted to interfere with that. Why? Because you know Congressman also has children in
the law school and many of them are dumb people and they cannot also pass. Congress passes a law saying that the passing rate for
bar examination for 1942. They tried to lower it to 70. SC said you couldn’t do that because the power belongs to the SC. The
separation of powers. Ok! So that is an implied limitation. In some way that Congress cannot declare martial law. Martial law is law
but the Constitution has given it to the President. There are also limitations brought by the concept of non-delegation. You remember
the term ‘what has been delegated cannot further be delegated.

Our limitation on the power of Congress is the principle of non-delegation. Meaning there is a term what has been delegated
cannot be further delegated. What is the reason for this? Because if you delegate something, you cannot delegate him further. So that’s
why another delegation is prohibited. So if you try to look at it I told you that legislative power belongs to the people because we are
the sovereign, we are in support to the power to pass laws. We pass it to Congress by virtue of Section 1, in theory that is limited
because that is delegated power. The problem is that in some instance we cannot avoid it and the Supreme Court sustained it. Now
what are these delegations? One is the delegation to the President because of another position in the Constitution, which allows it.
That is the delegation of tariff. I think in the true or false I asked in the question:

Q: Can congress delegate in the President the power to increase income tax?
A: No, because the Constitution is saying that only the tariff export, it’s so limited.

Actually if you try to examine this, they pertain to relationship with other countries, import, export. Now what about Local
Government. You all know that LGU, in city, municipalities also pass some laws. For instance they say that in Davao City you cannot
smoke in public places. That is in exercise of law making. Because you go to jail if you violate it. But it’s allowed for Local Govt
Units because certain places, it cannot be the same as other municipalities. So it’s difficult for Congress to pass with respect to all
that’s why it’s allowed.

The third one is the Congress is allowed to delegate in administrative bodies. What are administrative bodies? Usually bodies
under the executive. They are not covered. For instance, NLRC, DOLE are administrative bodies. In actual practice this is what
happened, Congress will pass a law, very general. What did they do? They say that ok you try to pass implementing rules. What is the
reason why it is allowed? Because it will be too much for Congress to do everything. You cannot let Congress do everything that’s
why they delegate it to administrative bodies.

Problem over delegation. There are two cases of KMU and Echegaray. What is KMU all about? Congress passes a law
allowing LTFRB to be the one in charge in increasing fares. LTFRB authorized the provincial bus operators to increase it. Take note
here, from the people, to Congress, generally that should be the end…. but SC allowed it one more LTFRB. But if LTFRB delegate it
to the others that is now over delegation. In all cases it should stop here. Ok! Because you cannot delegate what has been delegated.

Now the case of Echegaray vs Secretary (297 SCRA 754 – 1998). Congress passes the lethal injection law. From the people,
to the Congress to DOJ. The rules in the lethal injection law was prepared by the Director of Prisons. That’s going too far. What did
the court say? No, we allowed it; the reason is that, Bureau of Corrections is the agency of DOJ. It’s under DOJ. If you look at
implementing rules passed by the DOJ there is no statement that they will review the work of the director. So we will not allow it. But
generally what the case is saying is that, if it is further delegated by the agency under it is permissible provided they will review it. But
if no review, it is no longer allowed.
We will go to another point.

Q: How do we know that the delegation is still valid? A: There are two tests given in the handout. What are they?

One is the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. I will not discuss very much the completeness test but the
meaning is stated in the textbook. The law must be complete when it reached the legislature. All laws passed by Congress are really
complete. The other one is sufficiency of standard. What is a standard? How do the standard appear? How do they look like? Do they
look like flowers? If we try to examine this, these are just words. Sometimes phrases. Words in the law saying that these are the limits
in the exercise of the power. In many instances these are very clear but sometimes not. They are very general. But the SC sustains it.
What is the purpose of quality for the standard? What the textbook says? So that you know when the delegate is abusing his power.
Ok! Since the standard say that’s still covered. So for instance I just want to cite example, in the case of Chiongbian, who was given
power? It was the President. Right? What power was given to the President? Power to transfer one city to another. What was the
standard? If you look at the law itself there was none, but the Supreme Court stated there’s another similar law. There’s a standard that
is used. What standard was given? These are the words, “ to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government service”.
What did the Court say? Is it sufficient guide? The court stated it’s enough it can guide it.

Eastern vs POEA. You know that the amount that you can recover is very good, very large. It’s better to die. What is the
reason for that, the reason is that POEA in accordance with law pass this contract. If you are employee, you have to sign this. The
reason why POEA was allowed to the contract was that, there must be a law giving them the power. But the law did not say that it
should be P102,000. It was only POEA who gave the amount, that this is the amount to be given to the family of the victim who died.
What was the standard? How did the POEA arrive at such amount? What was the basis? If we look at the case it is saying to promote
fair, and equitable employment practice. Only that. It’s a bit vague but the court stated though giving 102, 000 Php is one way of
promoting fair and equitable employment practice.

You remember the case, which involve LTFRB? What was the standard given by LTFRB in increasing or lowering the fares?
What did the court say? You can increase not more that 15% official rate or not less than 15% official rate. If it is increased, a big
amount… this no longer valid. If it increase 20% no more. So this is a perfect standard. But in some cases it’s too general.

I’ll give you other examples. The negative ones. The case of Pelaez is in the textbook. Who was the delegate in Pelaez? What
authority was given to the President in Pelaez? The authority, the power to create municipalities. In fact they created municipalities.
The standard that was given to create municipalities. What did the Court say? Is that a good standard? No. Because it will not guide
you. Because the President will just create a municipality composed of 10 people. What will be the best standard here that we know
we create municipalities every now and then? The standard is given is LGC to prevent abuse. For instance, you can only create a
municipality now if the income is about 20M every year. So if you create a municipality which do not reach the income you violate
the standard. Another one is this, the place should have 50,000 people population, less than that you violate the standard. Another one
is the area. I forgot the exact area, I think 20, 000 square kilometer. So there are very good standards.

Another is the case of Dacuycuy. Who was the delegate in Dacuycuy? The Court was given the power. What power was
given? To impose imprisonment. What was the standard given by the Court? They stated only, you can impose imprisonment at your
own discretion. This is not a standard because it will result to abuse. Maybe there are many cases but just take note who was the
delegate? What power was given? What standard was use? So very simple.

PEOPLE VS DACUYCUY
173 SCRA 703

FACTS: Private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of
Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of
Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein
private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally
moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the
penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on
June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On
September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the
same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional.

Respondents averred that the said section is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power as it
is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a
minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty
of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.

ISSUE: WON Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative
power.

HELD: The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:


Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than
one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to
P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable
penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the
discretion of the court.
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in
cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a
discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and
which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.

In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erroneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment
has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within
specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as
an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.

CHAVEZ vs. ROMULO


GR 157036 (June 9, 2004)

FACTS: Ebdane, chief of the PNP issued guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of
residence. The implementing rule also prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures under which
exemption from the ban maybe granted. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR
has been issued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Hence, this petition.
Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can withhold his right to bear
arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle
and arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess, the legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed guidelines.

HELD: The power to make laws, the legislative power is vested in Congress. Congress may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that "delegata potestas non potest delegari" that is "delegated power may
not be delegated."

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing
power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors,
bureaus and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislature’s tendency
was always towards the delegation of power. First, it was delegated upon the governor-general (now the president).
Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his
authority to the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP chief) authorizing and directing the chief of constabulary to
act on his behalf in approving and disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. Executive
Order No. 215, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the
Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license,
but also the authority to revoke the same. Subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section
2 specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm "shall first secure the necessary
permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary." With regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3
imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as
he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." These provisions are issued
pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the decree. At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law
governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative power.
Clearly, the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed guidelines.

Now we go to the third one. Another problem area under number 3 is it expands power. Now there is one case there but I can
cite you a better example which did not reach the Supreme Court yet. I think you all know that we have the coconut preservation law.
If you cut the coconut, you own a tree at your own backyard without permit you go to jail from 1 year to 6 years. Ok! Because the law
says that you need a permit from the PCA, you have to obtain one. It’s very problematic.

Anyway, if you look at the law passed by Congress it is saying that you can be punished of cutting coconut. In the PCA
implementing rules they stated that you could be punished for cutting. You can also be punished for transporting coconut lumber
without permit of PCA. Now that is not the law. It happened when I was still a prosecutor; I’ve tried cases involving people
transporting illegal coconut. I heard that they say that we are authorized to pass implementing rules. Actually they are expanding the
power, the power only is to penalize. There is no sense in penalizing transport. So that’s the idea.

The other one is based on PCA. What do you mean by legislative policies. You know that most policies are found in the
Constitution. Sometimes in some areas, it is Congress. That sets policies in the absence of Constitution. So this is it, the gov’t actually
before we use to regulate everything. And there’s a law regulating the coconut industry. I think right now, they say that in order that
they can monitor I think it is very specific that if you put up coconut processing plant, like desiccators like the one in Santa Cruz, you
need a permit. Suddenly PCA stated that we no longer want to regulate the industry. We will deregulate it. From now on do not
anymore report to us, if you want to put up dessication for coconut no need of getting a permit. The policy is to regulate, the delegate
cannot change legislative policy.

The classic case is Tatad vs. Secretary (281 SCRA 330 – 1997). Tatad I think is about deregulation in industry. President
Ramos was allowed to advance it, used two standards. This is the context. In the Constitution for instance, the President can declare
martial law if there is subversion, invasion and rebellion. Now suppose I am the President, this is about using standard. I state, I
declare martial law because there is invasion and there is also rebellion and third there is a coming typhoon. Can I pass the standard?
If you look at Tatad this could not be done. You cannot add a standard. Why not add? Because we do not know where you get the
standard. It’s not the one given by Congress. Maybe the president declares martial law because 90% of its reason is that it’s because of
the typhoon. It cannot be.

Tatad v. Secretary
281 SCRA 330 (1997)

FACTS: R.A. No. 8180 mandates the Department of Energy, upon approval of the President, to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. The law sets as standards for the Department to
time the deregulation “as far as practicable” when prices of crude oil and petroleum products are “declining” in the world
market, and the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar, “stable.”

ISSUE: Whether the standards contained in the law sufficient?

HELD: Yes. The law can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that the Congress
expressly provided that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event and the
President has no authority to postpone it for any cause. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before March 1997. The words “as far as practicable,” “declining” and “stable” need not be defined in the law.
The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines
“practicable” as meaning possible to practice or perform, “decline” as meaning to take a downward direction, and “stable” as
meaning firmly established. The fear of respondents that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that
will run riot is thus groundless.

Chiongbian vs. Orbos


245 SCRA 253 (1995)

FACTS: Congress passed RA No. 6734 [1989] or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which
called for a plebiscite in certain areas of Mindanao. During the plebiscite, four provinces voted in favor of creating the autonomous
region. With respect to those that did not vote in favor of the Autonomous Region, the Act provided that they remain in the existing
administrative regions, but it allowed the President to merge existing regions. Pursuant to the law, President Aguino issued EO
No. 429 which reorganized administrative regions by moving some provinces and cities from one region to another.

ISSUE: WON the law contain sufficient standard to guide the President in the reorganization?

HELD: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law
challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy
underlying the grant to the President in RA No. 5435 [1968] of the power to reorganize the Executive Department to wit, “to
promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with the national goals
for accelerated social and economic developments and to improve the service in the transaction of public business.” It is
logical to suppose that when RA No. 6734 authorized the President to “merge the existing regions”, the purpose of Congress
was to reconstitute the original basis for the reorganization of administrative regions.

Beltran v. Secretary
476 SCRA 168 (2005)

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 or “National Blood Services Act of 1994,” provides:

Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.

ISSUE: Is there a valid delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Health?

HELD: Yes. Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several
measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of
public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has
conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.

The final question is general regulation. It’s a bit funny but it happened. President Quirino who was a lawyer got a mistake.
The question is this: can the delegate issue implementing rules and regulation providing penalties? Generally no , but there’s an
exception. The exception is if it satisfies the ff requisites:
1. the law itself authorizes the imposition of penalty;
2. the penalty itself must be contained in the law;
3. There must be publication. Once the 3 requirements are complied with you can go to jail actually for violation of regulation.

Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

There are few items here.

Q: Can Congress pass a law making a number of Senators to 30?


A: No, because the number provided by Constitution is not subject to amendment by Congress.

There’s a statement here as may be provided by law but it does not refer to the number .Ok the next question is:
Q: Can Congress pass a law saying that from now on to ensure equal representation we will have 8 Senators from Mindanao, 8 from
Visayas and 8 from Luzon?
A: No, commentators are saying that it cannot be done; requirement is you have to be elected at large. Ok! As may be provided by law
here does not qualify the at large.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

The first one is natural born, then at least 35, third is you can at least read and write, then registered voter, and fifth is two
years residence in the Philippines. I will explain each very briefly. First is remember that all positions created by Constitution signified
that a person must be natural born.

The second one is 35 years old. They are saying that on election because of the Aquino case, I need not explain that.

Third is you must be able to read and write. The question is this:

Q: Suppose my father is Russian, my mother is Filipino. I am Filipino also, then I have been all my life in Russia, then 2 years before
election I transfer residence to the Philippines, I cannot speak any language except Russian, I can write only Russian. Now can I run
for election in the Philippines?
A: Take note that our Constitution does not have a language qualification. No language requirement.

Fourth, is a registered voter, no problem? Then 2-year residency. Now what is 2-year residency here? I’ll explain it in the
context of another case but we need to understand that this is domicile, meaning you are permanent residence of the Philippines so that
even if you are out for as long as you have the intention to return then it is not a problem. For as long as the Philippines continues to
be your domicile.

Q: Suppose you have been a green card holder. Can you run for Senate?
A: Take note that I told you that I can vote because of the absentee voting act but the absentee voting has amended this. So if I am a
green card holder and permanent resident in States I cannot run for Senate. Ok because the principle is a person might only have one
permanent residence.

Pimentel v. COMELEC
570 SCRA 410 (2008)

FACTS: Senator Pimentel, a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections, seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution 6486 implementing it for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution. The provision states:

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

ISSUE: Whether the provision is constitutional

HELD: The provision is unconstitutional. A candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as
sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated
in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. Whether or not the drug-free bar
set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be
of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than
two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.

There are few items here also.

First regarding the term. We have to understand that this is not really a term limit. This is only a restriction. What do you
mean by that? You can run for two terms, then you can stop, then, you can run for another 2 terms. So, in fact, you can go on if you
like because the Constitution does not put any limit. It puts only restriction.

Q: How long will you rest?


We need to understand that after we elect Senators, suppose you complete your term this year, must you wait for 6 years or 3
years is sufficient?
A: They say that 3 years rest is enough, after which, you can run again. You need not count the entire term as resting. That’s it!

The other point is regarding voluntary renunciation. Take note that this is only intended to ensure that politicians do not get
wise, meaning that they will resign, and say that I did not complete my term, I will run again. That’s not allowed. I’ll explain that
further when we discuss one bar question in a few minutes.

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

First is take note here that Constitution provides for 250 members. I think one question I asked is:

Q: Can Congress increase the number?


A: Yes, Congress can provide, unless otherwise provided.

Q: Can Congress increase it this year?


A: That was answered by Mariano decision. This is the idea; you know that from time to time Congress creates city or a new
province. I think Compostela Valley was created about 6 years ago. Samal was created about 6 years ago. Panabo was created for 4
years or 5 years ago, Tagum and Kidapawan also. In the course of creating cities, as what happened in Makati, Congress adds one
seat. I think it added one seat in Compostela. So in Mariano, it was challenged. The first argument was that Congress must pass a law
registering the entire Philippines and now come up with a change in the number of seats for the entire country. That is one or two.
What did the court say? It can pass a law increasing it, 1,2 or 3. Now what is the reason? Because according to the court if we look at
the constitution it is saying unless provided by law, that the Constitution does not distinguish whether it is general law or special law
adding one or two seats. Anyway they are still law. Ok! So that’s why the Court justifies it.

Section 5. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Ok! Few items here also. The last item is regarding a prohibition of party list coming from religious sector. You have learned
regarding the separation of church and state and that is why they put that “it cannot be that part of it is coming from religious sector”.
Ok! That is the first one. Now, regarding the party list, it is saying 20%. I do not know the exact number because from time to time
Congress passes 1 seat here. 1 seat here, 1 set there so in the end I do not know exactly how many. But it still remains 20%. Now
assuming that there are 20 seats, the first question ask in one case is this, the Akbayan case:

Q: Is there requirement to fill in the 20% seats?


A: No requirement, because this is only the ceiling. You can have less. In fact according to the Court anyway, what is important is the
Congress is at form.

By the way you have to take note that beginning 1998 we no longer have sectoral representatives because sectoral
representatives were appointed by the President. All people in Congress now are there by election. Now the second is this:

Q: Can banker for instance textile exporters, hacinderos form a party list?
A: The answer of the Court is No. Why? Because the requirement of the Constitution is you have to be marginalized.

Q: What do you mean marginalized?


A: I think in political term, when you have a piece of paper usually this is the margin when you say somebody is marginalized he is on
the margin, he has no power, he has no influence in society. So that is the idea. Now the other question that was raised is this, can
political parties participate in the party list? Yes, but you have to qualify, not all political parties. Some political parties, which are
already well represented, not under represented and they are not marginalized, they cannot. All who can run as political parties that is
only if you are under represented, maybe you have number of representatives who got your way through election and secondly your
by laws are working for the underprivileged.

There is another item here. You know that there is Supreme Court resolution saying that within 3-5 years 40% of the bar
exams questions will be by multiple choices. So when you take the bar, 40% will be multiple choices. If you look at the law on party
list especially the case mentioned there that 2%, a party reach 2% before it can be entitled to a seat, but there’s a limit also not more
than 3 seats.

In one case, the case of Ang Bagong Bayan vs. COMELEC (June 26, 2001), this was the question, where do you base the
2%? How do we do it? So for instance, I think in the regular election the body who voted for the party list was only 7 million.
However those who voted for the party list ran for about 15 million, the other votes became useless because they are not valid. How
many voted in the election? I think about 20 million voted. The question that was asked is there: where will we base the 2 %? We
based it on the valid votes cast for the party list only so it’s only 7 million. Why is that important? This one will increase the number
of people who cast in the party list because if you base it in the 25 million, you can’t make it because if you base 2% in 15M you need
at least 500T.

Q: Is it possible that in an election, nobody wins in the party?


A: Possible because I think during the last election about 154 are under the party list. So it’s possible that everybody gets 1% that is
nobody sits as representative in the party.

Formula: Additional seats not to exceed 2 which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to the number of votes
of the first party in relation to the total no. of votes for the party list system.

Pimentel v. COMELEC, 570 SCRA 410 (2008)

Senator Pimentel, a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections, seeks to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution 6486 implementing it for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators
in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution. The provision states:

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Held: The provision is unconstitutional. A candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as
sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-
drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged
provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Section 5. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Regarding the last paragraph (4) there is a command within 3 years beginning 1987. So what is now the basis for election?
That is at the end of the Constitution because when they pass the 1987 Constitution at the same time there was that index saying that
this place is the number of representative.
Q Do you know how many seats were allocated to Davao City?
A: 3. It is saying that a province should have at least 1 seat. There’s no problem because if you look at it, you can create only a
province if 50,000 that’s why entitle 1 seat.

Q: What about cities?


A: I think some cities are too small, like Panabo and Samal. They share 1 representative with the other town because there’s no
provision that a city must have one (1). We go to the other points here. Have you seen in the textbook the term:

Q: “GERRYMANDERING”. What is it?


A: A creation of district that favors a political party.

Q: Is there a prohibition in the Constitution on gerrymandering?


A: The Constitution is only saying that a district should be adjacent, contiguous, and compact. Is that a prohibition? What is prohibited
is if it favors a political party because it supports one party but it is not a prohibition as it on gerrymandering because it’s possible that
I create a district here, it is compact, it is adjacent, it favors to a political party. Is it prohibited? No, so the prohibition is not directed
as gerrymandering as it is. Who are from Compostela Valley here? Nobody? Anybody from Maco Pantukan? Ok, Pantukan and Maco
are all going to Mati. When you are from Mabini, Maco you pass by Tagum, which is a part of another province Davao del Norte, you
pass by Mawab. If you go there some people are complaining because, they pass those places but it is not prohibited because the
places are adjacent.

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

This Section contains the qualifications of members of the House. You have to be 25 years old, natural born because this is a
constitutional position, able to read and to write, a registered voter and finally residence of the district of 1 year. What about if you are
running under the party list system, because it is saying that unless you are elected in the party list. What are the requirements for
party list? Do you have to be natural born? Yes because it is a constitutional position. How about the age? Those who have turned 25
to 30. If 30, not qualified. If you run at 27 or 28, you have to constitute until your term ends. What about registered voter? You have to
be registered voter. Because this is the party list you have to be a member of the party that you want to represent. So citizenship
applies, age applies, literacy applies, then registered voter, with respect to residency requirement you need not be residing in a district
where you want to run but you only need to be a member of the party you want to represent. So those are the qualifications, I just want
to explain this further.

Q: What is the meaning of residence in the context of discretion?


A: This is one very important because of 3 cases. One is the case of Imelda Marcos, the other one is the case of Butch Aquino and the
third one is the case of Domino.

In the case of Marcos, what happened? Imelda Marcos was born in Leyte. She stayed in Leyte for sometime, but later on she
lived in Manila, married Marcos and live in Malacañang, live in Ilocos and live in Hawaii. When Marcos died, she returned to Leyte
and immediately started filing a certificate of candidacy as a member of Congress. The other side challenge her because they say that
you are not a resident of Leyte for 1 year prior this election because for 40 years you were out. What did the court say? You are
qualified because we understand residence her to mean domicile. So it does not mean actually presence in the place what is important
is you intend to return to that place even if you are out. Meaning if you are out for 40 years and you really do not want to abandon
your domicile. Then you satisfied the requirement of the Constitution.

Aquino is the entire opposite. In Aquino, he was born in Tarlac. He lived in Tarlac for 22 years and one day he decided to run
in Makati. What is his evidence, that he was a resident of Makati? He has a lease contract of a condominium for more than 1 year.

The same with Domino, he live all his life in Quezon City but he wanted to run in Sarangani and he produced actually a lease
contract also for more than 1 year. What did the court say? That does not show that you’re become a permanent resident of this place.
I asked one question in True or False, suppose Domino or maybe Aquino was able to prove they have the actual residence of
Sarangani maybe for 3 or 5 years. Can they run? If they put only actual residence, the answer is No. Why? Because the principle is
residence for purpose of information means only domicile. So personal, actual presence in the place does not necessarily established
residence. Is it possible that they could have transferred there? Possible. For instance you abandon your house and you go to other
place. You stay for 1 year you say I have abandoned that place I have now a permanent resident. Ok! So the idea is you must establish
a new domicile not just physical presence. So those are the things that we need to understand about residence.

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300 (1995)

FACTS: In 1938, when Imelda Marcos was 8 years old, she transferred to Leyte from Manila and lived there with her family for the
next 14 years. She studied in the place from elementary until college, taught school, and moved to Manila only in 1952. In 1954,
she married Congressman Marcos and registered there as a voter. In 1965, following the election of Marcos to the Presidency, she
lived in Malacañang and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. In February 1996, following the People’s Power, they left for
Hawaii and she returned only in 1991. In 1992, she ran for President and in her Certificate of Candidacy she indicated that she
was a resident voter of San Juan Manila. In August 1994, she returned to live in Tolosa, Leyte, and ran for the House of
Representatives.

ISSUE: Whether she is a resident of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 election

HELD: Yes. In election law, the term “residence” is synonymous with “domicile”. What is therefore required is fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning, not actual physical residence. Applying this principle, Marcos
remained a domicile of Leyte during the last 40 years, despite her marriage and physical absence. Even of she held various
residences for different purposes, they do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Leyte. All throughout,
she kept close ties with Leyte by celebrating in the place important personal milestones, instituting projects and establishing a
political power base with her close relatives. To acquire a new domicile, there must be: 1) an actual change of domicile; 2)
bonafide intention to abandon the former place and establish another; and 3) acts which correspond with the purpose. In this case,
there is no evidence of the concurrence of all 3 requirements.

Aquino v. COMELEC
248 SCRA 400 (1995)

FACTS: In March 1995, Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the newly created Second Legislative District of
Makati. He stated that he was a resident of the district for “10 months” preceding the election, but later amended it to “1 year
and 13 days”. When his residency was challenged later, he presented a lease contract he had for a condominium unit in Makati
dated April 1, 1994.

ISSUE: WON the residency requirement should not apply to him because the district where he ran was only 4 months old.

HELD: Aquino has failed to prove that the district is his domicile of choice for a period of one year at the time of the election. He
was born in Concepcion, Tarlac, and in 1992 his Certificate of Candidacy showed that he was a resident of the place for the last 52
years. There is no showing that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati. While the 2-year lease contract may
be indicative of his intention to reside in Makati, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
his original domicile because he also admitted that he has other residences in Manila or Quezon City. Nor is his
argument that it is legally impossible to comply with the residency requirement because the district was newly created,
tenable. A new political district is carved out of an existing geographic area.

Domino v. COMELEC, supra

FACTS: Domino ran and won as Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998
elections. His opponent, however, questioned his qualification on the ground that he was not a resident of the district at least one year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections. It appears that he ran for and lost the position of representative of the 3 rd
District of Quezon City in the May 8, 1995 election. However, he has a lease contract dated January 15, 1997 over a house and lot
located in Sarangani and the statements of neighbors that he lives there.

ISSUE: WON Domino is a resident of Saranggani

HELD: No. The term “residence” as a qualification for elective office means “domicile” which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The lease contract entered sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support the assertion of a change of
domicile. While it may be indicative of his intention to reside in Sarangani, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of the original domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease, i.e. January 15, 1997, cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning point of the one-year residency requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of
intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as a voter in Quezon City on June 22,
1997, which registration was eventually ordered transferred to Sarangani.

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

1996 Bar Question

There’s a member of the HR who serve 3 consecutive years in the house. In June 1996 that was during his 3 rd term he was
appointed Secretary of National Defense. Take note that if you accept appointment it will forfeit the position in the house. The
question is, can he run for election, suppose he resigns as Secretary, can he run for election in Senate in 1998 election? Yes, take note
here that what the constitution prohibits re-lection for more than 3 terms. What is prohibited only is running the same office
Try to answer this one. Number 5: during his 3 rd term, a member of HR was suspended from office for the period 60 days. In
the next succeeding election he filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The opponent files an action for
disqualification on the ground that his candidacy violated Section 7 which provides that no members of the HR shall serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms. He answered that he is not barred from running again for that position because his service was interrupted
by his 60 days suspension, which was involuntary. Can he still continue his candidacy? No, the main point here is even suspension
does not suspend. When it comes to suspension, you do not cease to be a member of the body, you cannot only exercise the powers.
The same if you were suspended from the law school, you just cannot attend the classes but that will not mean that you are no longer a
student at that time. Ok! So this will not be considered an interruption of the term. Suppose you say in this manner, he was on his third
term, on the third then he was expelled, take note that the house can expel him. Ok! This is involuntarily removing somebody. So he
runs for the fourth term. Can he run again? Regarding the statement that voluntary resignation cannot be considered interruption of the
term. They did not mean actually to exclude involuntary removal in some instances.

That emphasis on voluntary renunciation is only intended to ensure that politicians do not get wise resigning 3 days before
the end of his term and say that this is not included because I resign before. If you answer the question: yes you can run, it will result
to absurdity. Why? Because for instance you have this guy, he runs for the 1st term, 2nd term and 3rd term. Ok, this guy is very honest.
He attends all sessions, he participates in all debates. He’s active in legislation. He always attends sessions on time. You’re a good guy
you can’t run for the fourth term. Then you have this guy, he is not participating sessions, he’s always late so third term they say, we
will suspend or remove you. Then you say you can run again. So in the process you will be rewarding the bad guy and punishing the
good one (cya nga naman!). You cannot run again because it would result to absurdity. Because good people will be punished and bad
people will be rewarded by the other term. But remember that voluntary resignation is put to ensure that politicians do not get wise. It
is not intended to exclude involuntary removal. There’s another one here. I think we will learn later on that there can be a special
election when a vacancy occurs in the Senate or the House. Say for instance in the House, the regular Congressman dies. You won in
the second, on the third term you lost but the winner died. There’s a special election and during the special election you won and you
will be able to serve for maybe more than 2 years.

Q: Can you run for another term?


A: No more. Why? The idea is this if you serve and you won in the special election, you will serve the term remaining, that is already
regarded as full term.

Lets go over Section 8.

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

I think that you will understand that it is synchronize. The election for the president, senate and even local officials except
barangay elections.

Q: Can Congress pass a law changing the date of the election?


A: YES, it says unless otherwise provided by law. Ordinarily, it is second Monday of May.

Q: Suppose to be, assuming that in 2007 the second Monday falls on May 11, can Congress pass a law saying that for the next election
2007, we will have it on August 20, 2007. Can you do that?
A: It can’t be, if you look at the other provision, we are told that the terms: in June 30 following the election and for all constitutional
positions, meaning that when the constitution says that your term will end, it will end. If it ends June 30 and you will have the election
on August 20, there will have a time when there is no president, no senator, no Congressman. It appears that when the Constitution
speaks of allowing Congress to change it, it can do it earlier than May 11 or maybe later but not beyond June 30 in such a way that
you have no official in that day because that is the day when the terms begin.

We go to the next one. Section 9.

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called
to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Do you remember of any special election for the House? Have you experience having special election? How about the
Senate? I think few years ago, Senator Fernan died but we never had one. I think for instance you know that at one time, while he was
still an incumbent, Congressman Jalosjos conviction become final, he was sent to Muntinlupa but we never had a special election.

Q: What is the procedure for special election?


A: This is garnered by one special law passed by Congress; there are two requisites before it can be done:
One is there must be a resolution certifying for the existence of the vacancy. Meaning if the vacancy is in the Senate, the
Senate will issue a resolution certifying that there is now vacancy.

The second requisite is this, if it is in the House, the vacancy must determine 12 months before the next regular election. In
the Senate, 18 months. So first the procedure is there must be a resolution from the house concern for the Senate that there is a
vacancy and second, the vacancy must determine in the senate 18 months before the next election and in the house 12 months before.
Why is it that you have this period? Because for instance you only have one week before the end of the term, somebody died, I think it
would be a waste of money and resources if we will still have a special election within the one-week. Because according to the SC you
will only have to serve for the balance given in your term. I think in the case of Honasan he only have three years. So that is the
reason why there’s a time element.

Q: Can anybody for instance he wants to have an election to be done in his district. Can he go to court and compel the holding of the
election?
A: That is answered by Lozada case. This involves vacancy in the Batasan. Somebody I think went to Comelec and prayed that an
election be conducted. And SC said you have no standing, you can’t compel with no reason to call the House of Senate or
Representatives to call a special election because they are actually separate and co- equal departments.

Tolentino v. COMELEC
420 SCRA 438 (2004)

FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President. Congress confirmed the nomination and Guingona took his oath as Vice-President on Feb. 9, 2001.
Following Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on Feb. 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of the
vacancy in the Senate and called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.”, which ended
on June 30, 2004.

ISSUE: Whether the special election was validly held

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 9, Art. VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate “in the
manner prescribed by law.” Under RA No. 6645 which implements the provision, in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election with notice to the voters of the office or offices to be
voted for. While a survey of COMELEC’s resolutions reveals that it gave no notice that it would hold a special election for a single
three-year term in the Senate simultaneously with the general elections, the election is valid. Sec. 2 of RA No. 6645 itself provides
that when the special election for a vacancy in the Senate is to held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on
May 14, 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by
law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

If you understand Philconsa vs. Mathay you can answer what the provision means. I think we had election last May 2004.
Then we assume that on July 2004, they passed a law saying that from now on Senators will have a monthly salary of one million.
Members of the House will have a monthly salary of one hundred thousand.
PHILCONSA vs. MATHAY
18 SCRA 300 (1966)

FACTS: On June 10 1964, Congress passed RA 4134 providing, among others, for the increase of the annual salary of the
Senate president and of the Speaker of the House; and that of Senators and members of the House. Sec. 1 of the Act
provides that "the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
constitution;" and Section 7 thereof provides "that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the
Speaker of the House shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators." In
1965, RA 4642 (Budget FY -1965-66) implemented the increase pursuant to RA 4134, approved just the preceding
year. The PHILCONSA, an association whose members are Filipino citizens and taxpayers, questioned the
constitutionality of the law implementing the increase as being violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the Constitution
which provides in part: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase." According to
petitioner, the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, will expire only
on Dec. 30, 1969, while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired
on Dec. 30,1965. In this petition for prohibition, petitioner seeks to permanently enjoin the respondent officials
from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries before December 30, 1969.

ISSUE: Does Sec. 14, Art. VI requires that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators
who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Does it allow the payment of the increased compensation to the members of the House who were elected after the
expiration of the term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the
terms of office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?

HELD: The Court agrees with the petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
Dec. 30, 1969, when the full term of all the members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will
have expired. Consequently, appropriations for such increased compensation may not be disturbed until Dec. 30,
1969. Insofar as RA 4642 authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it
also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void. The expiration of the terms of ALL the members
approving the increase is required before such increase can take effect. This conclusion stems from careful analysis
of the language of the pertinent constitutional provision. The latter refers to all members of the Senate and the House
in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the
terms of office thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both Houses for the purpose as indivisible
components of one single legislature. Moreover, such disregard of the separate houses, in favor of the whole,
accords with the fact that the enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire Legislative body: Responsibility
therefore, is not apportionable between the 2 chambers.

Q: If it was approved on July 24 and July 10 2004, it was also approved by the President and it was published immediately, when will
it take effect? Give me definite date.
A: It will take effect June 30, 2010, that will be at 12 noon.

Q: What is the reason?


A: Because for those in the House who were elected on May 2004, all of them, the term in the House will end 3 years after that is June
30, 2007. Now, with respect to the Senate, the terms, the 12 who were elected previous to that, will end on this date. But you have a
problem with the 12 others. The 12 others elected on that date will have their terms ended on June 2010. And that will be noon of
June. So the increase of the salary will take effect on that date. That is the meaning of the Philconsa case.

We go to the next provision.

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof.

You follow the outline in your textbook, the provision has two parts. One is immunity from arrest then the second one is
freedom of speech and debate.

Q: Can Congress pass a law saying it will increase our immunity from others? It will now cover offenses with the punishment of 8
years imprisonment. Can the law be valid?
A: Congress cannot increase it

Q: Suppose this is the situation, Congress will say, ok we will not increase. From now on you can’t charge legislatures in court with a
penalty of less than six months. Will the law be valid?
A: No! Why? The reason is that what does the Constitution guarantee? It speaks only that they are immune from arrest, it does not say
that they be immune from prosecution. So they cannot say that you cannot charge us. The constitution only guarantees that for small
offenses, you cannot be arrested. This is not an immunity statute. Even if the Congress is in session for any offense even if the penalty
is 10 days, you can charge them. The only thing is don’t arrest them when Congress is in session because it is not allowed by the
Constitution.

If you try to look at it, regarding the immunity from others, there are two requisites before it can work. The first requisite is
that the penalty for the offense is six year or less. In criminal law we call this, prision correctional. Because prision correctional has
the maximum of six years. So prision correctional or less, you cannot be subject to the arrest.

The second requisite is Congress is in session.


Q: What do you mean by SESSION?
A: For instance, a congressman committed an offense; he was issued a warrant for a penalty for only 1 year. Then you go to his house
and say: Ok, I will now arrest you because Congress is no longer in session. Can you do that? The idea is when we talk of session or
recess we do not mean coffee break. When they are having coffee, you can arrest them because Congress is in recess.

You have to go back to the concept of session. Session begins on the fourth Monday of July and goes on and on until 30 days
before the next fourth Monday of July. We assume that it is about June 15. Because there are exclusive Sundays, Saturday and
holidays: During that period, they cannot be immune from arrest if the offense is small. Take note that sometimes Congress holds a
recess, sometimes during Christmas, during holidays. If that happens, you can arrest him. Ok!

Q: If Congress will not hold a recess, what will happen?


A: You will have to wait for the compulsory recess as required by the Constitution. So during that period, you can arrest him.

But the problem is this; we know that during recess, the President can call for special session. If the President will call for a
special session, you cannot arrest him again. The effect is the court cannot proceed because the court does not apply jurisdiction over
him. What if there’s a recess called by Congress, then I arrested him, I am the policeman, and then Congress immediately say: Oh,
release me now because we hold session. Can he do that? No. Because the Constitution does not guarantee that you will be released.
It is only saying that do not arrest him when Congress is in session. What he can do is he has to put a bond, a bail. But if it is death
penalty, he cannot also put a bond.

Let us go to freedom of speech and debate. It becomes an issue in the light of the tape recording, which were played by the
House (Referring to the Garci tape). The second one actually speaks of immunity from prosecution. Meaning you cannot be arrested,
but paragraph 2 stated a situation which you cannot be charge in court. In the sense, we call this immunity from prosecution.

Under the second category, actually you cannot be charge criminally, you cannot also be filed civilly meaning somebody
cannot claim for damages. You cannot also be charge administratively before the Ombudsman. So under paragraph 2, you are really
immune from civil and administrative cases. But when will it apply? Take note of the decision in Jimenez vs Cabangbang. The
scope is limited, so first when it apply to expression made by a legislature in the performance of his official functions. Such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast. He is immune for the expression in the performance of his function such as
speeches delivered, statements made and votes cast. What I mean by this? The scenario is very simple; we know that Congressmen
deliver speeches from time to time in the House or Senators. Sometimes they deliver a privilege speech. Sometimes they call someone
as corrupt. Now, if you are affected by these charges you cannot go to court and file a libel case because they are covered actually by
parliamentary immunity.

JIMENEZ vs. CABANGBANG


17 SCRA 876 (1966)

FACTS: Plaintiffs instituted an action for damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of Cabangbang. The
latter moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if it
were, said letter was a privileged communication. Said motion was granted. The second ground raised by
Cabangbang stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, he is
privileged from arrest during attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same,
and for any speech or debate therein, which shall not be questioned in any other place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

HELD: The question to be determined is whether said publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate”.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharged of their duties as members of congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines when Congress was not in session, and which defendant caused to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines. Defendant was not performing his official duty either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.
However, the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiff’s actions for damages.

Statements are almost similar, but the votes cast are a bit strange. What do you mean by votes cast? In the constitution, when
the legislature votes, they are asked to explain why do you vote yes, why do you vote no! So, you might make an explanation, you
attack somebody. It is a valid privilege. It is of course for the purpose that he can freely say what he wants to say without any
interference of anybody.

Now the second scope is this: bills introduced in Congress whether Congress is in session or not. What do you mean by that?
I think you know what a bill is. It is a proposed law. It is sponsored by a Congressman or a … whereas, it is possible in that part that
you libeled some people. You attack their integrity, their reputation. Even if you file, when Congress is not in session, the
Congressman or the Senator is actually immune from suit.

The third one is broader and this is the most significant one. Other acts performed by congressmen either in congress or
outside the premises, housing or its offices in the discharge of their offices.

Other acts performed by legislature, whether in Congress or outside the performance of their function.

Q: What do you mean by ACTS PERFORMED OUTSIDE THE CONGRESS?


A: I think you know that from time to time you have legislative hearings, committees. A few years ago, some Congressman held a
hearing in Central Bank. I think it happened involving one student in Ateneo who insulted them. But its not the issue, the point is,
suppose he fights back and libels you and slanders you. You cannot file a case against him but he can file a case against you. Why?
Because even if it is done outside the Congress, he is performing his functions conducting a legislative inquiry.

Q: Suppose a Congressman is invited in the Rotary’s Club of the Knights of Columbus, which they usually do. In the process they
libeled you; can you charge him in court?
A: Yes, because he can’t claim that he is performing his duty. Those are private engagements. Not covered.

We have to go back to what is happening now. You know that we have the Garcillano tapes. If you look at the anti-wire
tapping act, possessions of these tapes will send you to jail. Playing of these tapes, which are actually taken in violation the right to
privacy under RA 4200, it is covered. They wanted to play that in Congress but some people threatens them and tells them that if they
do that, they will be charged. Question: are they covered by the privilege? If you look at the column of Fr. Bernas, it will fall to “other
acts” in the performance of their function. So they played the tape, because it is covered.

During the Estrada impeachment, there was a Congressman who slapped the Sgt. At Arms. The Sgt. At Arms happens to be a
retired military officer, did not fight back:

Q: Can he file a case for physical injuries against the Congressman?


A: Yes he can. Take note here that maybe that is another act but they cannot claim that it is in discharge of his function. Slapping is
not the function of the Congressman. So I think he was being charged. I’m not sure of the outcome, but I am talking here of
prosecuting the Congressman in court in such a way to send him to jail.

Suppose this is what happened, during the privilege speech, he attacks you, he tells you that you have aids. You cannot file a
case against him criminally; you cannot ask for damages, you cannot go to the Ombudsman. What is then the remedy? You look at the
provision. The provision is saying that no member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place. Take note of the word in
any other place. So, it is saying only that you cannot make held outside the Congress, in court. You can be held liable within the
house itself or within the Senate. So the remedy is, you file a complaint against that Senator in the Senate or House and take note that
they can expel him, they can suspend him. Because they are not immune actually from discipline within the body.

People v. Jaloslos
324 SCRA 689 (2000)

FACTS: Accused is a member of the House of Representatives who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
convictions for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts are pending appeal. Accused filed a motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted on the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

HELD: Accused, having been convicted of an offense punishable by an afflictive penalty, is obviously not entitled to the privilege of
parliamentary immunity. It was never the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to shield a member of Congress from the
consequence of his wrong-doings. To allow accused to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the
privilege from arrest bestowed by the Constitution. Such a situation would be a mockery of the purpose of confinement, whether
pending appeal or after final conviction, which is public defense.

Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr.


556 SCRA 471 (2008)

FACTS: Following the “Oakwood Incident, Trillanes was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Close to four years later, while
detained, Trillanes won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term. Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests

ISSUE: Whether Trillanes a mere detention prisoner entitled to presumption of innocence be allowed to attend Senate sessions

HELD: No. The distinction is not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It is impractical to draw a
line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited
than those of the public. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. The presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
597 SCRA 1 (2009)

FACTS: After the Judicial and Bar Council announced that only current Members of the Supreme Court would qualify for
consideration as Chief Justice, Senator Santiago, an applicant for the position, delivered a privilege speech in the Senate
which partly stated:

x x x I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in
the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

ISSUE: Can the Senator, who is also a lawyer, be subject to disbarment or other disciplinary proceedings?

HELD: The complaint should be dismissed. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter. We would be remiss in
our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without
fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.

Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office,
make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.

This is the situation, you own many businesses, then you win as Senator, you win as Congressman:

Q: Can you be required to stop engaging in business?


A: No, what is the obligation? The obligation only is not to involve in business of the government, you having interest therein. You
are not required actually to engage in business. This is very important because when you go to or when you accept position in the
cabinet, you cannot engage in business anymore. If it is a Senator, no problem, there is no such requirement.

Regarding the second one, this is how I try to explain it. There are actually two provisions regarding Section 13. The one is
the prohibition from holding an incompatible office and the other one is about prohibited appointments.

First is regarding the prohibition, take note that you cannot hold any other office or employment in the government or in
subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). You cannot hold position in
the army, you cannot hold position in the GSIS, you cannot hold a position as the Secretary of National Defense, even as Clerk, it is
prohibited.

The other problematic areas are this; do you know what is a GOCC? Example is Landbank of the Phils. When we say that it
is controlled by the government, 51% of the shares of stocks belong to the govt. What about the subsidiary, what do you mean by a
subsidiary? It actually means a private corporation but the shares of stocks are owned by the govt. So the very example before was
PAL. PAL is incorporated. There was a time when the majority of the stocks belong to the SSS, GSIS, and Landbank. In that sense,
we say that it is a subsidiary because this is a corporation owned by other gov’t corporation. So it is clear that the Constitution is
saying that you cannot own any office there. So the prohibition actually is blanket.

Regarding incompatible office, take note here that there is no distinction whether it is an elective or appointive office. For
instance you are a Senator, you want to become a barangay captain for instance. Can you do that? You cannot. Which would you like
to choose, barangay captain or senator? Take note that it will be your seat in the Senate that will be forfeited it’s not your seat in the
barangay.

Another point is this, a few years ago, there was this opinion rendered by the Department of Justice. This is what happened,
you have Congressmen who are very good lecturers, some Congressmen where invited as lecturers, in the seminars they will be
lecturing there.

Q: Can they accept this job as lecturers?


A: The SC stated: No you cannot. This is not an office, but is an employment. Take note that the Constitution is saying: you cannot
own an office or an employment. When you go as lecturer, it is employment. That would be regarded as incompatible office.

The other portion is this: I think you understand that in number one, there is no problem when I resigned as Senator and
become a barangay captain, no problem! There is no problem if I forfeit my seat as a Senator and become Secretary of National
Defense. Why? Because it will no longer be incompatible, you already forfeited one seat.

Now in one situation, it happens that even if I resign I cannot get appointed. That is covered by the next sentence: if the office
is created during your term. It is actually Congress who creates an office. Suppose the Congress passed a law creating the office of the
wire tapping services. If I am a Senator, I cannot resign and work on that office. That is not allowed.

Another way is this: There was this old office but Congress passed a law increasing the salary, so I cannot also resign and
accept the position if the salary was increased during my term. But after my term: no problem! I can again occupy the office.

Suppose, we know that from time to time Congress creates provinces.

Q: What if, during my term we created new province, then a special election is held? I said I want to become a governor. I will resign
as a Senator in order to become a governor of the province. Can I do that?
A: Yes. Why? Because you look at the Constitution, it is saying only that you can’t be appointed. Take note here that in number one, it
says you cannot hold, so it applies to an elective or appointive position. But in second, it is saying only that you cannot be appointed.
So, it means that you can be elected.

Take note of the Dimaporo vs Mitra (202 SCRA 779 – 1991) case. This ruling was based on the Omnibus Election Law,
because that was the time when the Congress said that the law must be this: When you are a Senator, a Congressman, or any politician
holding an elective position and you file a certificate of candidacy, you are deemed to have abandoned the previous one. Take note
here that it is different from the Constitution. Because the constitution is saying only that you cannot hold. If you file a certificate of
candidacy, you are not yet holding because you might lose. But Congress held otherwise. I think about the year 2003, Congress passed
a law removing that. So right now, there’s no problem if you have an elective position. I think this is what happened to Lacson. Even
if he filed a certificate of candidacy, you are not deemed to have abandoned the previous one. If you do not win, you go back to the
previous one. But there is still a law saying that if you hold an appointive position automatically you are removed by the act of filing.
So that is the rule.

What are the ways that a Congressman can lose his seat? So in the Dimaporo case, these are ways by which you can forfeit
your seat. One is under Section 7. I think we studied section 7 a few weeks ago. Meaning you lose it by voluntary renunciation. The
second one is under Section 13, the one you are studying right now. What is it? If you hold any other position orvholding an
incompatible office. Then you can also lose it under Section 16 par 3, what is it? You can be expelled if somebody files a complaint
against you in the house or in the senate. So, by expulsion. And finally, under Section 17. Somebody files a case against you,
challenging it before the Electoral tribunal, because that is an election protest. If you are deemed to be the loser by the electoral
tribunal, then you also lose your seat.

Summary:

1. Section 7- Voluntary Renunciation


2. Section 13- Holding an incompatible office
3. Section 16- Expulsion
4. Section 17- By the decision of the electoral tribunal

It was asked in fact in the bar in 1993, how will the following be removed from office? Senators and Congressmen?
Obviously that would include number 1. Because the question is how may the following be removed.

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.

I will just explain Section 14 very briefly and go back to the bar questions, I think in the true or false. I ask the question on
whether Senator or Congressmen can practice law. Commentators are telling you that you can still practice law, it’s not prohibited.
What is prohibited only is appearing in courts. I also ask the question, can a congressman or Senator file a case to challenge the
constitutionality of a law? Yes, what is the example for that? I think there are many cases I assigned to you. Tanada vs. GATT. They
are actually members of the Senate at the time they file their cases. So it’s not really prohibited. I also mentioned to you bar question
number 3. I want to go back to this because this is the part of the question:

“A certain person faces a dilemma: should he accept a cabinet appointment or run later for Senator. Having succeeded in law
practice as well as his business where he and his wife has substantial investment, he now contemplates from his service without
loosing the flexibility engaged in corporate affairs or participate in professional activities with unethical grounds. Taking into account
the prohibition and emission of public. He runs to you for advice to resolve his dilemma, what is your advice? Explain.

I think the first one that we answer before is regarding business. What will you advise him? He need not divest himself if he
becomes a Senator. What about being a lawyer? So what will you tell him? You will tell him that he still can continue practicing your
profession but you cannot appear in courts. When we say you can still practice law that means actually that you can do other things
other than appearing in court. So for instance giving advises; you can you teach law. Ok! In theory actually teaching law is not
practice of law. Maybe other subjects will tell you what is practice of law but they are saying one element of practice of law. It is as if
it is a client-lawyer relationship. I think I have no client-relationship with you. So that is not a practice of law but I will be barred also
from teaching because of the other prohibition, Ok!

The other one is the other prohibition of Section 14, it is prohibition on conflict of interest but the most important portion
here is the prohibition from engaging, entering into contract with the government. Now this is obvious. So the main example is:
actually many Congressmen own contracting firms. I think Construction Company. So they can continue but they cannot for
instance…for the construction of the highway because that will be contract of the government ok! Also for instance construction of
municipal building, city halls. That is prohibited. But with private sector no prohibition, it can still be done. What do we mean by
conflict of interest? Now the actual scenario is this, there’s a conflict of interest when for instance you are occupying 2 positions and
in this position, it is your function to advance the interest of this 2 entities, meaning for instance I am mayor. If I am a mayor, I am
supposed to attend to the funds of the city. Meaning I should not spend it unnecessarily. I should exert some efforts to ensure that it’s
not wasted, or it is spend as economically possible. Suppose I am also a contractor and I contract in the city. What is my obligation as
contractor? Obviously I want also to reserve profits to increase the profits of the company. As mayor as a contractor, which will I give
preference? Ok! So that is a case illustration of conflict of interest. Ok! Which should I give priority, my being a mayor, or should I
give priority to being a contractor. So that is what we mean here by avoiding conflict of interest. (mismo!)

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may
determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays,
and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
What we need to remember here would be the definition of regular session and special session and I think it’s defined in the
textbook. How do we define regular session? REGULAR SESSION is the one that starts on the 4 th Monday of July. Ok! I think it’s
about to start now. It’s the command of the Constitution to start on the 4th Monday of July and continues on and on until 30 days the
next regular session meaning 30 days the 4th Monday of July. But they also say excluding Saturdays, Sunday, and holidays. So its not
30 days, it may be about 40 days.

What about the special session? The SPECIAL SESSION actually is the session called by the President while Congress is in
recess. Obviously when the President does not call Congress to have special session, there’s no session, I think it makes no sense,
when is the special session be called? Usually it will call, because 30 days before 4th Monday of July it will have to a called recess. If
the President wants to keep reporting he can call special session. Now is this the only time when a special session can be called? No.
Why? Because it’s possible that sometimes Congress may call temporary recess in a short period. If a President wants them to keep
working then it can call a special session. So practically it is possible for the Congress to be in session the entire year without a break,
if the President calls it before there’s no constitutional prohibition in having session all the time.

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.

There are 2 Constitutional positions regarding the Senate and the House. The Senate President and the Speaker of the House.
There are other positions, which we are aware of but they are not found in the Constitution. For instance, majority floor leader,
minority floor leader. It falls under those, which each House may elect actually. They are not made in the Constitution but the election
can be made by either house. The other point that I want to emphasize for the moment is, if you look at the Santiago decision as well
as the Avelino decision, what the court seems to be telling us is this: when it comes to the election of officers, the Supreme Court will
have a hands-off policy. I think that is the tenor of the decision. Because sometimes there’s an election and they go to the Supreme
Court to complain about the matter. In fact Santiago went there to complain about the definition of what is majority and what is
minority. But the Court say that separation of power, we will not touch it; leave it to the House of the Senate to settle these things.
Generally, the SC would not touch on matters regarding election for the reason that this is a political question.

Santiago v. Guingona
298 SCRA 756 (1998)

FACTS: When the 10th Senate convened on July 28, 1998, its composition was as follows: 10 – LAMP; 7 Lakas- NUCD; 7
independent or coming from political parties with only one elected senator. By a vote of 20 to 2, Fernan won as Senate President
over Tatad. Ople was chosen as president pro tempore, while Drilon was majority leader. The seven Lakas-NUCD senators
likewise nominated Guingona as minority floor leader. Tatad now challenges the nomination of Guingona, claiming that those
who voted for Fernan constitute the majority, while those who voted for the losing candidate [Tatad] belongs to the minority.
Thus, he argues, he is entitled to the position of minority floor leader.

ISSUE: Whether the court have jurisdiction

HELD: Yes, it is within the power of the Court to inquire whether indeed officials of the Senate gravely abused their discretion or
violated the Constitution. The petition alleges violation of Art. VI, Sec. 16 (1), which states that the “Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its members.”

However, petitioner is not entitled to relief. His interpretation of the terms “majority” and “minority” finds no clear
support from the Constitution, the laws or the rules and practices of the Senate. There is nothing that says that those who did not vote
for the Senate President shall ipso facto constitute the “minority”. History would show that “majority” refers to the party to
which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while “minority” refers to a party with lesser number of members. But in a multi-
party system, this “minority” is not easy to identify. Likewise, the Constitution is silent on how a minority leader is to be
elected. To the Court, the method of choosing who will be such is merely a derivative of the exercise of the Senate of the power to
choose its officers. This Court has no authority to interfere with that exclusive realm without violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Section 16. (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide

Q: What is a QUORUM?
A: That is 50% +1. The normal way is we base it on constitutional number. So for instance, in the Senate you have 24 so 50% +1 is
13, meaning 13 can function, 13 can pass legislation because that is already a quorum. They can do business. What about in the
House? If we assume that the number is 250 that will be about 196.
Now the problem is this, if you look at Avelino vs Cuenco, the court is saying that we do not necessarily base it on the
constitutional number. Meaning we do not base it on 24 or 250. What is the reason? What will happen is this. We should base it on the
actual number. Ideal is 24 but in some instances we do no base on 24 but on the actual number. What is the reason? For instance, we
know that a few years ago Fernan died, so in the end you only have 23, so you cannot base it in 24 because that is not the actual
number. You also have Guingona becoming vice-president, he vacated in his position. If it happened at the same time, it will only be
22. We also have a decision in Avelino vs Cuenco (83 PHIL 17 – 1949). The SC stated that if you are out of the country you are not
included in the quorum. It’s a bit strange, this decision has been criticized, but if you are out of the country, the court stated that you
couldn’t be included in the quorum, what is the reason? Because according to the court you cannot be subpoena. Processes of
Philippine government have no extra-territoriality. So it’s possible actually. I think this happened during impeachment that is 2/3
because Barbers is out. The SC was not able to decide it because the proceedings were terminated because of the problem of the
envelope. What I’m trying to tell you is, in holding we do not base it on the constitutional number, I think some people are ringing the
issue, suppose you are in jail because one time it happened that Jaloslos was in jail. Was he included in the quorum? Actually he’s
included in the quorum for the reason that the person in jail is still a member until such time they dropped him. At one time they
dropped him. But while you have not been dropped actually, you continue to be a member. So therefore he should be included in the
quorum. Obviously he cannot go out but the process, I think Congress will have effect even inside jail. Suppose you are suspended, do
we include you? Ok, I told you the principle that when you’re suspended, you continue to be a member, but you only cannot exercise.
What about if you are expelled, I can say this time you are no longer a member, so we do not include you in the quorum.

Q: Suppose you are in the hospital, you are sick, are you included in the quorum?
A: Yes.

Those are the things that you need to know who are included and who are not included.

Q: We assume that you are a Senator you are in the session, only 3 of you attended. Can 3 do anything legally? What can 3 people do
under the Constitution?
A: It’s answered by the provision, what does it say? But a smaller number can compel the absent members. That means therefore that
suppose there are only 3 of you, you can order the arrest of the others, in effect the 3 becomes the majority for purposes only of
compelling the attendance of other.

Section 16. (3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty
of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.

There are several things I want to discuss here. One is regarding the rule of its proceedings; the second is the disciplinary
matters. It is saying here they can determine the rules of proceedings. The classic case to illustrate the issue on the rules of proceeding
is the Arroyo case. One time you have this committee report. That’s already on appeal, passed by both houses and to be reconcile. I
think the Speaker brought it to the house and at one point somebody stated, I moved for the approval of the bill and the Speaker asked.
“ any objection? ” I think Arroyo said “ Teka, objection objection”. But the speaker said, “ Ah wala, approve, approve, approve!” No
objection. And after that the speaker signed the bill saying that it has been approved without objection. So Arroyo went to the
Supreme Court saying something is wrong, I was still objecting. I want to argue but their silence means yes! So it was not validly
approved. What did the Courts say, the court stated, and no! Separation of powers, that is enrolled bill, we cannot inquire into the
conduct of the other house, so the question that was raised was this, because Arroyo said that the house violated its own rules in the
approval, it did not follow the procedure, what did the Court say? The court stated that “oopss holahoops” the rules drafted by the
house. Ok! So it is the concern of the body that drafted it and is not our business. The body that pass the rules has the prerogative, they
have the right also to set it aside and you cannot question it before us (pakialam namin dyan mga hunghangs!) The court however
stated that when the body concerned which formulated the rules disregards it, there is an instance wherein it cannot be disregarded.

Q: When can the house or the Senate cannot disregard its internal rules because internal rules where drafted by the house or the Senate
concerned? A: It’s very obvious; it cannot be disregarded when the rule itself is a rule of the Constitution.

Q: What do we mean by that? Because rules definitely some portion will repel important provisions of the constitution and they will
add. The Supreme is saying that they can be disregarded except when the rule itself is also in the Constitution. So example is this, the
constitution requires that a bill can become a law only upon 3 readings on 3 separate days.

The other point here is this, I told you before that when a Congressman in the discharge of his function, you cannot sue him
anywhere, but I also told you that he can be held accountable within the house itself and these are the possible penalties. One is, he can
be suspended or he can be expelled. I think somebody is raising the issue of Gonzales, can it imposed a lesser penalty or other penalty
beside expulsion and suspension? The answer is yes, it can. I can reprimand, maybe it can fine. What is the reason for this? Because
when a body is given the right to impose a higher penalty it follows that a lesser one is included. But the only difference is, what about
the vote. What is the vote for suspension and expulsion? 2/3 very high. What about if reprimand. The Constitution does not say. So the
rule is this, generally it is very rare in the constitution that it will be 2/3. The general rule is if the constitution is silent, the vote
requires is simple majority, meaning of all those present, I think I’ve told you that 13 Senators should constitute a quorum. 50+1%, if
7 will vote to reprimand you, will that be valid? Yes, because that is simple majority of those present constituting a quorum. Suppose
10 of them only participated, can they decide to suspend you? Never because it needs actually 2/3 votes of all the members. Actually
the practice is even the presiding officer can vote except I think the Senate President. Except only when there is a tie. But in legislation
they all vote, there’s no provision in the constitution that they should not vote.

Bar Question # 1

Are there instances when the SC can possibly review the decision of the House or the Senate when it comes to discipline of
its members? In the Pendatun case, the answer is yes there are. For instance, after deliberation, only 11 people voted you can go to the
SC because the Constitution is very clear that you need 2/3. The Court can easily decide it in just counting the votes. The other
possibility is this, the Osmeña case. Suppose this is for 90 days, you can easily go to the SC, because they have this standard to apply.
The court says, that the constitution states only 60 days, it cannot be 90. But in the Osmena case, the SC stated that you couldn’t
simply say, it was very disorderly in that session. The Court will say what is disorderly behavior is not for us to decide the house will
decide it because it was committed in the house itself. So, the only thing is generally the SC will not review disciplinary measures
imposed by the House or the Senate except when there are violations of constitutional provisions. So that’s the rule.

Bar Question # 2, 2002

Paredes case. I think he is a Congressman in Agusan, he was in the house. Lacson the same thing, Sandiganbayan suspended
him. The Court stated that the suspension in the Constitution is distinct from the suspension in the Anti-Graft Law. In the Anti- Graft
Law, it is imposed by a law passed by the Congress itself. You were the one who passed it, you cannot say, it does not cover you. But
another distinction is this, when you look at the suspension imposed by the House or Senate, it is really a penalty; it is intended to
punish you. The suspension in the Sandiganbayan is what we call preventive. It is not intended to punish you; it is only intended to
ensure that you cannot influence people. The Court stated that this one is punitive, intended to punish you. The one is that Anti-graft
law is only preventive, they are really distinct. The provision in the Constitution regarding suspension is not exclusive. It does not
mean that other entities authorized by law may not be allowed to punish you.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
277 SCRA 268 (1997)

FACTS: When the bicameral committee submitted its report to the House of Representatives on what later became RA No. 8240, the
following transpired:

Mr. Albano: Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
The Deputy Speaker (Mr. Daza): Any objection to the motion?
Mr. Arroyo: What is that Mr. Speaker?
The Deputy Speaker: There being none, approved.
Mr. Arroyo: No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker…

Thereafter, the session was adjourned. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and duly certified by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into
law by the President. Petitioner now claims that the law was not validly enacted because its passage was “railroaded” and certain
internal rules of the House on the enactment of bills were violated.

ISSUE: Whether the law is valid

HELD: Yes.. First, the internal rules of procedure are subject to modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
With their observance the courts have no concern, and their non-observance will not affect the validity of a law. Second, the
established practice in cases involving the approval of a conference committee report is simply for the Chair to ask if there are
objections to the motion for approval of the report. If nobody objects, it means a unanimous action by the House. Third, under the
enrolled bill doctrine, the signing by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the Secretaries of both Houses
attesting that the bill was passed is conclusive of its due enactment. Moreover, the due enactment of the law is also confirmed by the
Journal of the House which is also conclusive with respect to the matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.
Dela Paz v. Senate Committee
579 SCRA 521 (2009)

FACTS: On Oct. 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport
departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00] found in his
luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly equivalent to P2,970,000.00). Detained for
a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government
confiscated the euros. Subpoenaed to appear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, they filed a motion to quash
on the ground that the Committee has no jurisdiction to conduct the investigation since the matter did not involve foreign
relations.

ISSUE: Whether the committee has jurisdicition to conduct the investigation

HELD: Section 16(3), Article VI of the Constitution states: “Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” The
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate.
The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that, in Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to this constitutional grant of
virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may
see fit, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. Thus, it is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly
a question of policy, an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
356 SCRA 636 (2001)

FACTS: Senator Santiago was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The charge was based on alleged bad faith and manifest partiality in approving the legalization of the stay of several aliens
while she was still Commissioner of the CID. Pursuant to the provision of RA No. 3019, she was suspended “from any government
position” for 90 days.

ISSUE: Whether the order of suspension encroach upon the power of Congress to discipline its members pursuant to Sec. 16 (3),
Art. VI, of the Constitution

HELD: No. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of RA No. 3019 is the statute itself. Once the information is determined to be valid, it is the ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension. The suspension prescribed by RA No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks. The suspension contemplated in the Constitution is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the House, whereas the suspension prescribed by RA No. 3019 is preventive. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself
may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from RA No. 3019. The maxim simply recognizes that each
of the 3 co-equal and independent branches of government has exclusive prerogatives within its own sphere of influence and
effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of another.

Section 16. (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question
shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also
keep a Record of its proceedings.

Ok! This one is very important; I just want to explain few things here. First, there are 3 terms found in the textbook of
Justice Cruz and the 2 terms are also found in the Constitution itself. The first one is the record; this is the word for word translation
of the deliberation of Congress. So the most important to consider here is the idea of word for word translation. The other one is the
journal, it is defined as the record in summary or abrogated from of what transpired during a legislative session, the most important
word there would be summary or abrogated form. The third one is the enrolled bill, a bill which has been duly introduced finally
passed by both houses, signed by the President, by the proper officers of each and approved by the President. So, if you look at it, the
enrolled bill is one approved by 3 people, meaning the officers of each House, that means the Senate President. Then the Speaker of
the House and finally the President of the Philippines.

When we speak of word for word translation. In the court actually everything is recorded. In fact they say overruled, it is
recorded. That is the definition of the record. It is the word for the word. So the idea is that it is really the work of the stenographer.
The stenographer writes anything. The journal is the summary. For instance you are chosen as the secretary. When you’re a secretary,
you write the minutes. When you write the minutes, it’s not word for word. You only try to summarize things. In fact if you try to look
at the journal it is really the minutes of the proceedings of the House of Senate. What about the enrolled bill? It is saying that it is
signed by the Senate President, the Speaker of the House and the President. So the idea is that, actually it is now the law. Maybe it’s
not yet the law, it’s not yet published, it’s not yet effective, but the fact is it has been approved by the proper officers. Ok! So that’s it.

We will go to the cases now. First is the case of US vs Pons (34 PHIL 729 -1916), a very old one but it illustrates the
importance of the journal. This was a prosecution of Dangerous Drugs Law. The offense was that he is saying that this law is null and
void because the law was passed when Congress is no longer in session, A bit strange. How can Congress pass a law when it is not in
session? So this was his argument: He stated that actually, I think I told you before that Congress must hold compulsory recess, 30
days before the 4th Monday of July. At this point, Congress was supposed to hold compulsory recess. It was midnight but they have
not yet finished the law and they want to finish it before going to a recess. Somebody suggested, “Why don’t we just turn back the
clock, make it 10 o’clock, e-magic na lang natin ang orasan, oh ano mga pare!” The other replied, “ Ok, so that we can continue,
para maaga ang inuman. Put it in a journal that it’s 10 o’clock, ora mismo! “ I think they did that. So they continue deliberating and it
was already 2 o’clock, they pass the law. The law is null and void. So what SC say: , you look at the journal and if you look at it, it is
saying that they pass it on time. What did the court say? The journal is conclusive upon the court. We do not inquire into the validity
of the law. When we speak of conclusive, meaning you cannot present evidence at all.

The next case is Mabanag vs Lopez (78 PHIL 1 – 1974). Somebody was being taxed based on the law. If you look at the
final version of the law, this is the tax for urea formalyhyde. But they try to argue that actually when Congress was deliberating on
this, they wanted to tax two elements; urea and formaldehyde. They are saying that I am having a business for this. Ok! It’s not subject
to tax when Congress deliberates it. This is no longer the intention of Congress and I am going to prove it because if you check the
journal it seems that it is really the intention of Congress, not to tax me but to tax on other people who are engaged business with this
and 2 chemicals. Now what did the court say? This is already an enrolled bill. Urea and formalyhyde is what appears in the law and
the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the court meaning I will not inquire into its substance, you will not inquire how emission got there
because that is already conclusive evidence. You cannot use this evidence as evidence. Ok! The court says that maybe the journal in
the enrolled bill is superior. You cannot question this anymore also.
Take note here the cases of Tolentino, PJA vs Prado, and Farinas case: arguments of these 3 people are common, Tolentino
tried to argue that this provision of law was not voted by Congress. The SC stated that “ We are not policemen; we are not NBI, it’s
not our function to find out how something got inserted there. It is already conclusive upon us. If you do not want it, go to Congress
and have it amended but we cannot say that these things are not supposed to be there, (intiendes?)” The next question is when the SC
says that the enrolled bill is conclusive, conclusive as to what? The Court stated that it is conclusive on 2 things. The first one is, it is
conclusive as to the procedure of its enactment. Second, it is also conclusive as the substance or the content of the bill. Why do we say
that it is conclusive as to the procedure of the enactment of the bill? The answer is go back to the Arroyo case because Arroyo says
“objection objection” and the speaker says “approve!”. When it reached the SC, SC stated that we cannot question the procedure for
passing, it is an enrolled bill, and it is conclusive. What about the substance? The Tolentino case, they say that that is not supposed to
be there. What did the Court say: You cannot question the substance of the law. That is also conclusive. In most cases, what are the
exceptions given in jurisprudence. Only 2. One is the case of Astorga vs Villegas (56 SCRA 714 - 1974). What happened there?
There was a law, I think somebody proposed a law and there was too much debate on it. Tolentino proposed a lot of amendments. It
seems that all the amendments that he introduced were carried. The bill was substantially changed. After all these amendments were
taken the bill was printed, I think there was an error because what they printed was the original draft. Now, everybody signed it also
without reading (mga tanga!). So the bill was printed, published and become effective. Later on they discovered that they printed the
wrong one, they approved the wrong one, these people withdraw their signature. So when it reached the SC, SC stated that there is no
more an enrolled bill because there was a withdrawal of the signature.

The second one is not easy to understand. This was given in Tolentino. What did the court say? The enrolled bill is
conclusive except as to matters required to be entered in the journal. How do we explain that? This is it, suppose a bill is passed, it
becomes a law. This is approved, it is published. Then you come to the court and invoke that such a bill has not been properly
approved, only 11 people voted for it. Take note the provision that the yeas and nays have to be entered in the journal. So if that is
your question, you can check the journal and count the votes. So the court would say that this is an exception because these matters
required by the Constitution to be entered into the journal. But other matters the court will not use this.

Tolentino v. Secretary
235 SCRA 632 (1994)

FACTS: Petitioners, among others, claim that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions in the final version
of RA No. 7716 (Value Added Tax Law), which were not found in the Senate Bill or House Bill. They point out that in the last
two days of its session, the Committee met behind closed doors.

ISSUE: Whether the Conference Committee validly add provisions not found in either the version of the House or the Senate after
the third reading of the bills

HELD: Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of RA No. 7718 must be resolved in its favor. Our jurisprudence
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. The rule is not absolute. But where the allegations that the constitutional procedure have not been observed have no more
basis than an allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the other departments of our government.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary


417 SCRA 503 (2003)

FACTS: Petitioners are challenging the validity of RA No. 9006 [An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices] which lifted the ban on the use of media for election and
provided for the elimination of unfair election practices. They contend that irregularities attended its passage like the failure to
provide copies of the conference committee report before its approval on the floor, the fact that the conference committee never
met, and some provisions were surreptitiously inserted in the bill.
ISSUE: Whether the law is valid
HELD: Yes. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases
reveal consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved internal rules of Congress. The Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal rules of Congress. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of RA No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.

Section 16. (5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Justice Cruz is saying only that this is to ensure that 2 houses will act in a formulated manner.

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

We will discuss not the electoral tribunal. I will discuss only two items. One is the nature of the tribunal and second is the
function. Before we go to the more problematic one : the first question asked:

Q: How many electoral tribunal is there?


A: 2, you have one in the senate, one in the house. The one in the senate will decide cases involving senators. The one in the house
will decide cases involving congressmen.
Q: What about if you file a presidential protest?
A: We will study later on and if you are reading the papers, you will notice that it is the Supreme Court sitting as the Presidential
Tribunal.

In the old constitution the composition used to be 3 justices, 3 from the majority. And 3 from minority. Now why is it
significant? The reason is under old constitution we had a 2-party system. Meaning other parties can run but they are not encouraged.
So that if there are 5 parties in the Senate or in the House the other will not be presented for the reason that you have 3 in the majority,
3 in the minority. It was much easier under this set up because you will learn later on especially if you study the Bondoc case that the
people from the parties are really political animals. In all cases they vote for their companies. There was no problem under the old
system because the 3 will vote for their companion the other 3 will also vote for their companion. So in the end the 3 SC justices will
decide the case. If we look at the new constitution it is more problematic because what is the membership? You have 3 justices and the
others are based on the proportional presentation depending on how many Senators you have. Based on how many senators the party
has in the Senate. So sometimes it happens that one party controls 5 and 1 from the other party. Only 1 will sign in the end it will be
the party who will decide the controversy. Ok! So with that background we will now go to the outline.

First we will discuss the nature of the Tribunal. Regarding the nature, it is designed by the framers of the Constitution that it
is intended to be an independent body. So the next question is this, independent of what? Independent of whom? If we try to study the
cases it appears that it is intended to be independent of Congress and secondly intended to be independent of the Supreme Court to a
certain extent. So what illustrates this independence of Congress?

I’ll go over them one by one very briefly. The first one is the case of Bondoc vs. Pineda (201 SCRA 792 – 1991), which
involves a Congressman. That was Congressman Damasura and apparently this is a very independent guy because there was election
protest involving his party but it turned out that he was voting for the other side all the time. The house issued a resolution removing
him from the Tribunal and the matter reaches the SC. And the issue was: Can a party remove its representative in the tribunal in order
to influence the outcome of the election. So the court stated that the Congress itself has no right to change the membership in order to
influence the end of your term. Because according to the court if you allow the party or the Congress itself to change the membership
then the tribunal will no longer be independent of Congress. It will be manipulated all the time. Does that mean that you cannot be
removed for any cause in the tribunal? No, because it is possible that you resign to a party. You cannot claim that you will still
represent your party in the tribunal if you are no longer a member of that party. But the court simply stated that you couldn’t be
removed anytime if that seems to be no valid cause. Such as disloyalty!

The second case is the Lingating case. The Lingating case is simple. If you look at the Omnibus Election Code, it is provided
there that protest in election cases maybe filed within ten days. Now if you look at the rules of the tribunal, especially the house
electoral tribunal you can file the protest within 15 days. So you have a problem here because take note that the Omnibus Election
Code is a law passed by Congress. So it is the Congress itself acting such.

Q: What about the rules of Tribunal? Who enacted it? A: You only have 9 people who enacted it. That is the member of the tribunal
itself.

Q: Which will prevail, the law passed by Congress or the rules passed by 9 people?
A: The SC established that the rule of the tribunal shall prevail because, it is intended that they will be the sole judge of election
protest involving the members of the house or the senate. So if you try to look at it, while the membership comes from the House or
the Senate, the tribunal actually is not a picture of the Congress. It’s really a picture of the constitution and it is really independent of
the Congress so its decision is not subject to review by the House.

We go to the second point. If you look at the outline we are saying also it is intended to be independent to the SC. The first
case is Garcia vs. HRET. The case is very simple, the protestant failed to deposit Php 5,000. Take note here that in other cases even
before the COMELEC, the matter about deposit is construed liberally. Meaning when you say something, you can deposit it later no
problem if you are delaying. But in this particular instance, they imposed the election protest. Now the person challenged the dismissal
before the SC, and SC stated that “ Hell, no! We will not disturb it because the tribunal actually is the sole judge. It is independent of
us. We will not review its decision”.

The same thing happen in the case of Libaan, Libaan was still very active now. The quarrel simply was if you look at the last
election, at the back of the ballot has to be signed by BEI, it’s a requirement. One issue is that, what do we do with the ballots which
were not signed, do we exclude them or include them? The tribunal decided to include them and this was challenged before the SC.
The SC stated “ Again, we will not disturb the finding conclusion of the tribunal because it is independent”. So the idea is, if we look
at the tenor of the decision, it appears that ordinary errors of tribunal would not be subjected to review by Supreme Court because it is
an independent body. They can make errors and the SC will not substitute its judgment.

Independence of the tribunal has its limit that is found in the Arroyo decision. The Arroyo decision was the protest by Arroyo
against Sioco in the Congressional district of Makati. Sioco is a very rich guy; he kept on running in Makati but never won. I think
right now he run in Iloilo and he won. He is now sitting as Congressman in Iloilo. But in the Arroyo case he was proclaimed the
winner. Arroyo filed a protest. The problem was that it seems that they keep on throwing ballots away, falsifying the records, tearing
the ballots belonging to Arroyo that was the work of the employee of the tribunal. So when they study the decision, the 3 justices of
the SC were so worried on how the counting was being done. The matter reach the SC, because Arroyo went to SC, Sioco argued that.
“No, you cannot review the decision of the tribunal”. What did the court say? “Isa ka pa, makinig ka hah! While it is independent, the
independence has limits because in this instance you have given abuse of decision. You have clear violation of the rights of Arroyo
under the constitution.

If we try to summarize it, generally the decisions of the tribunal are not subject to review it may commit errors in
understanding the law. It may commit errors in appreciating evidence. That is not subjected to review by the SC.

The next point is this, if you look at the constitution, the function given to the tribunal is the sole judge of election cases
involving the House and Senate particularly with respect to qualification election returns. The first thing that we need to understand is
this. There are 3 possible types when you file a protest when you challenge your opponent in an election. The first possibility, you are
filing a certificate of candidacy and the other one files also a criminal case, that is not qualified. You notice that maybe he is under
age, maybe he is an alien. If that happens, before proclamation, you do not file it before the tribunal but you file it before the Comelec.
That is the one in the cases of Aquino vs. Comelec; Marcos vs. Comelec, the reason was that the protest was filed before
proclamation. Why is it that the tribunal will not decide the case before proclamation? The reason is, it is the sole judge of the
qualification of the members. If you are not yet proclaimed, you are not the member of the House or the Senate therefore the tribunal
has no business deciding the protest against you. So that is before proclamation. Now what about proclamation? After proclamation,
you become a member; the context is you are challenging the one who has been proclaimed. So if it happens actually after
proclamation because after that the Comelec has no more jurisdiction over the protest. The next question is this, suppose you notice
after 20 days that the other guy is not qualified, or maybe after 1 year you notice that the other guy is Japanese. There is no more
opportunity to file it before the tribunal because the tribunal will have no more jurisdiction but it appears that based on the old
decision itself: The SC stated that “ Ok. If there is a question as to qualifications of a member after the period provided to protest is
over then it will be the body itself either the House or the Senate who will still have jurisdiction. Where does that power come from?
Take note that it is not mentioned in the Constitution but the court stated that it is inherent that a body has the right to inquire into the
fitness of its members. So therefore the House has the right to inquire whether a member is free to serve such. So it will be that one
who will throw you out.

The case of Dimaporo vs. Mitra, why Mitra? Mitra was the Speaker of the House. Now this is what happened, Dimaporo has
been sitting for a long time then he filed his certificate of candidacy. So nobody can file a protest against him before the tribunal. So
that is the reason why the House itself issued the resolution removing him. So in the end he has to file a case against Mitra because
Mitra was the speaker of the house.

There was this old case of Sampayan vs. Daza, 1989 decision. Daza was a very prominent politician in Leyte, he used to be
against the Marcos Regime and he was one of those who stayed with Aquino. After the election he won in Leyte as Congressman then
somebody questioned his qualification. He noticed that he did become an American because he was naturalized but they found out
late. What did they do? They file a case before the SC questioning his qualification, can the SC intervene in the case? No, because it
will have to follow procedure, take note however that eventually if you file a case before the Comelec or maybe before the tribunal or
maybe during the term before the Senate itself, in the end it will reach the Supreme Court. But take note that it will reach the Supreme
Court because of appeal. But Daza contends that you cannot go directly to the Supreme Court, it will be dismissed because the
jurisdiction will be here originally.

Ok! Take note also the decision in Fariñas. Fariñas raises a very simple point. They were challenging the qualification of one
congressman. I think if you look at the Constitution there are qualifications, which are to be regarded as constitutional. For instance
age, residence, nationality. But in the Fariñas case they were not challenging this one. They were challenging the qualification not
found in the constitution but based on the Omnibus Election Code. Based on the Statute. The other guy tried to say that the tribunal
pertains only to Constitutional qualification and not qualification found in a statute. What did the court say? Does the tribunal also
have jurisdiction on qualification find in the statute? Yes, the constitution does not distinguish. So the tribunal can entertain protest on
matter of qualification not only found in the Constitution.

Tolentino v. COMELEC
420 SCRA 438 (2004)

FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President. Congress confirmed the nomination and Guingona took his oath as Vice-President on Feb. 9, 2001.
Following Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on Feb. 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of the
vacancy in the Senate and called on the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.”, which ended
on June 30, 2004. Petitioners, as voters and taxpayers, filed a petition seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from proclaiming the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as winner in the special election.

ISSUE: Whether the Court has jurisdiction

HELD: Yes. While under Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the qualifications of the members of the Senate, the petition does not seek to determine Senator Honasan’s right in the exercise of
his office as Senator. What the petition is questioning is the validity of the special election on May 14, 2001 in which Honasan was
elected. Petitioners’ prayers are: (1) a declaration that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections
on May 14, 2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won a special election; and (3) to annul 2
resolutions of the COMELEC insofar as they proclaim Honasan as the winner of the special election.

Limkaichong v. COMELEC
583 SCRA 1 (2009)

FACTS: Limkaiching was proclaimed as Representative of the First District of Negros Occidental. Her qualification,
however, was challenged on the ground that she was not a natural-born Filipino citizen. It appears that while at the time
she was born her father had been naturalized as a Filipino citizen, her opponents argued that there were defects in the proceedings
which rendered the naturalization void. But they were not able to question her qualification before the HRET within the
period provided in its Rules.
ISSUE: After the lapse of 10 days from proclamation, may the citizenship of a member of the House of Representatives be
questioned before the HRET?

HELD: The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases based on
citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of Representatives must be natural- born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a
member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding. However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. It can only be done “upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the
Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal.” In other words, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, who may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election
case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days
of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Q: How many Commission on appointments do we have?


A: Only 1, unlike the tribunal who have 2 but here we have 1.

The powers of the Commission will be discussed when we go to the executive because this power of appointment is selected
commission with the President. We will discuss it there. But just a few basic points here.

Take note here that you have 12 from the house & 12 from the Senate, so you have 24 plus the Senate President, you have 25.
The members here is based on proportional representation meaning it will depend on how many Senators a party has, how many
Congressmen does a party have in trying to determine the composition of the commission. The question is this, in the Senate, how
many Senators should a party have in order to get one seat in the commission? 2, if you have 2 Senators you are entitled to one seat. If
you have 10 you are entitled to 5. That’s based on one case. There is a more difficult question asked in the Bar. Suppose there are 202
members of the HR, of these number 185 belong to PPP while 17 belongs to CP how would you answer this question regarding
representation of the house in the commission on appointments. It seems that under the circumstances the ratio is a party needs 16 to
be entitled to 1 seat. CP definitely will have 1, PPP will have 11, and it can never be 12 because that will now exceed the limit allowed
by the constitution.

I think 11 x 16 will be 176.


176 + 16 will be 192.
202 – 192 = 10. There are 10 people who are excess actually meaning they are not represented.

Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty
days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions
as are herein conferred upon it.

First is this, we are told by the Constitution that the Commission on Appointments cannot meet while congress is in recess.
That is the reason why we have later what we call “ad interim appointments” because sometimes Congress is in recess, the President
appoints but nobody can confirm. So there were definite rules for that.

Q: Can the tribunal meet when Congress is not in session?


A: Yes, why because the Constitution does not prohibit, only the Commission on Appointment is prohibited from meeting when
Congress is not in session. There’s one item that I want to discuss which I forgot last time. I told you before that the Congress would
have to call a recess 30 days before the 4th Monday of July. There was a case on this because if you remember during the past election,
they canvass the votes for Presidents & Vice-President & the opposition was dropping it. It took time. I think the lawyers were
dropping the canvassing & there was too much debate so that if you try to look at it, what happened was this: it was already about
June 20 & they have not yet finished. Under the constitution they have to have a recess but they continue canvassing. Pimentel went to
the Supreme Court & he filed a case which was captioned Pimentel vs. Congress. He wanted to stop the canvassing on the theory that,
you cannot do the counting because under the Constitution you should be in recess. How did the Supreme Court resolve it? The
Supreme Court came up with explanation. Even Congress is in recess the committees can continue performing non-legislative
function, meaning function, which are not related to legislation. For instance counting of votes, canvassing of votes is not legislative.
So the Court stated that “Relax Lang, it can be done”.

Impeachment; even if Congress is in recess impeachment can proceed for the reason that that is a non-legislative function.
Ok! A few weeks ago there was another question, because somebody asks a lawyer they were quarrelling about this. A few weeks ago
they wanted to listen to the tape between Gloria and Garcillano. Some Administration Senators and Congressmen wanted to stop it
because they do not want that the tapes should be opened to the public or the Congress will listen to it. So they wanted stop it by
saying that we cannot listen to tapes because Congress is no longer in session. You cannot use this argument because take note here
that canvassing is non-legislative but listening to the tapes is in aid of legislation. I was surprised actually because I heard another
opinion but in the end they continue. So I am thinking that they consult the authorities. I am thinking that the argument is this: he
would say that if congress is not in session the committees could proceed. It is a bit strange because actually it’s only the committees,
which proceeded. Committee on Justice, Committee on Impeachment. Ok! Congress as a body cannot operate anymore because it’s
required by the Constitution to be in recess but the committees can function. So that seems to be the theory under which they operated,
that’s why they were able to listen to the tapes even if Congress was not in session anymore.

Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.

Ok! There’s only one thing you need to remember here. In the beginning of the lecture there was a provision, the last
provision of the declaration of principles was about the principle of full disclosure on matters of public concern and I told you that it
has been asked twice in the bar. So the first question would be: What are the constitutional provisions supporting the principles of
transparency?
So the first answer is that one and the second answer is this, the records and books of accounts of Congress shall be open to the public.
Ok! So this is intended to enhance the principle in transparency.

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.

Based on jurisprudence these are the requisites in which you can have a valid legislative investigation. First is in aid of
legislation; second is in accordance with published rules; third, the rights of persons are respected & finally there must be no pending
case involving the same matter. Ok! I will explain them one by one. When we speak of requisites, the moment one of this is absent
you cannot proceed on the investigation. The moment one of the element is missing the investigation is illegal.

The first requirement is that the investigation must be in aid of legislation. What do we mean by in aid of legislation? I think
we need to understand that because I notice when I was correcting papers I ask a question: Can the Senate or any of its Committee
conduct investigation to find out who killed somebody? Some people put in parenthesis, TRUE then put there if in aid of legislation.
Definitely you are contradicting yourself because when we speak of in aid of legislation, trying to discover who is a criminal is not in
aid of legislation because that is the job of the police, it’s not for Congress. Ok!

So what then do you mean by IN AID OF LEGISLATION? So the Supreme in one case defined it by saying that it can
cover in any of the four situations. One is the examination of civil law. What do we mean by that? There must be an old law & maybe
the Congressman or Senator wants to introduce amendments. They can say that I want this. We should conduct an investigation
because I’m planning to amend that law. So that is the re-examination of an old law or any law. The second one is broader. It is saying
in connection with a proposed legislation. What do you mean by that? There is no existing law but he said that I am planning to pass a
law on this so I will conduct investigation. Again that is justifiable because he is doing it in relation to a contemplated law to be
passed. When we speak of proposed legislation, the possibility is this; there is actually a pending bill. So somebody is proposing a bill,
there is now a bill maybe presented in the committee & he conducts an investigation in connection with the bill pending in Congress.
That’s why they say it’s a proposed legislation. The third one is the broadest, there is no old law, and there is no pending bill but
they’re saying that I am planning to pass something in this area. So the Supreme Court has justified that also as in aid of legislation.

Ok! So the situation is there must be an old law, he wants to amend a bill pending in the committee; he wants maybe to
improve it or finally there is no law at all, there’s nothing pending but he is contemplating on passing something. The fourth one is
very broad because the Supreme Court added this element; it’s saying that if it is in the exercise of any of its powers by the
constitution. It can still be justified as in aid of legislation. So for instance, what are the powers of Congress under the Constitution,
which are not legislative.

I told you last night about canvassing of votes for the President & Vice-President, impeachment also. So they are free to
conduct actually any hearing in connection with the possible impeachment of GMA because that is its power under the Constitution.
Solving a crime is not its power under the constitution. So it cannot do that. Ok! So you have to be cleared actually regarding this.
There’s another one we will learn later on that when the President declares martial law, Congress can review it, it can shorten it or
extend it. So it can conduct also legislative investigation because it is in the exercise of any of its power under the Constitution. So
those are the most important things that you need to understand. What is in aid of legislation? You will notice that in the actual
practice it is very much abused. About 10 days ago Justice Cruz in his column in Inquirer was writing about this & his saying that this
is very much abuse because in the past Congress have investigation, for instance, I think many of you were still very young. There was
this scandal about Brunei beauties. I think there were ladies going to Brunei, & they are saying that it was for purposes of prostitution.
It was investigated by Congress. I think there was also a judge who committed suicide & they conduct the investigation. I think if you
remember there was a plane that crashed in Samal & they also conducted an investigation also. They called people from ATO to
testify in Manila. So it is very difficult to challenge Congress. I am not saying it’s impossible to challenge it but it is very difficult
because they might say that we are planning to improve an old law. So that’s why they can easily satisfy these requirements. In fact
Justice Cruz is saying that sometimes this is used by legislators as a form of grand standing because they got a lot of television
exposure if they conduct this investigation. Actually some people are saying that this is not in aid of legislation, it is in aid of
election.☺

The next requirement is, it is saying it must be in accordance with its published rules. What do you mean by that? This goes
back to Tañada. If you all remember Tañada it is saying that all laws actually are to published. It is a requirement; it is in accordance
with published rules & regulations.

The third one is the right of persons appearing are respected. What are these rights which are to be respected? There are 2
possibilities now. It seems that the first one is the right against self-incrimination. What do we mean by self-incrimination?
Incrimination, you will notice that it’s related to the word criminal. Ok? When we speak of self-incrimination that means that the
question is intended to make you a criminal or the question is intended to subject you to a penalty. So for instance you are asked, did
you rape X? Congress cannot force you to answer because that is really incriminating. It might send you to jail. That is the reason
Gen. de Guzman; the investigation did not proceed because he is saying that I refuse to answer the question because it might
incriminate me. For instance, how much money do you have in the bank? That might prove that he has a lot of money. That’s why it
cannot be. I think you remember that there was supposed to be an investigation on Jose Pidal. Iggy Arroyo was supposed to be
investigated & he is saying that I will not answer question because that will affect my right to privacy. The Supreme Court does not
act upon this but we have to understand that the right to privacy is also recognized by our Constitution. So this is one limitation. You
cannot refuse to answer questions based on the grounds for instance you cannot say that the question is embarrassing; you might
discover that I spent all my times in hotels. So that is not a ground to object. If you insist in refusing to answer a question asked by
Congress, as a consequence you can be jailed. The decision in Nazareno, if you try to study the Nazareno decision, he was jailed. 3
years later he was still in jail, there was another case: He went to the Supreme Court asking that he will be released. Supreme Court
said that, you have the key to your own liberty. Just answer the question you can immediately go, but if you don’t want to answer
Sorry! You stay there. To refuse to answer is an act of disobedience. You are showing disrespect to a legislative body. Take note here
that it can apply to a committee or to the entire Senate or entire house. Ok! Committee can hold you in contempt. I am thinking that it
is very difficult to involve religion in this context because I do not know any religion, which teaches the doctrine that “do not answer a
question”. Because when we speak of freedom of religion, there is a requirement actually that it should be part of the teachings of the
religion. So for instance I am going to the US. There are religious doctrines, which say, “do not fight”. So you can say that I will not
join the military. They respect it in the US because that is part of the teaching of the religion. But if you are a Muslim you cannot say
“I do not go to war”, it’s against my religion. I think Muslims… they are not prohibited, they go to war. So what I’m trying to tell you
is very simple, you must really establish that it is against the teaching of the religion.

I think I am now discussing the right of a person that should be respected. Now I want you to go back to another point I told
you. In the Arroyo case, I told you that the Supreme Court stated that the House or the Senate which drafted the rules or procedure is
free to disregard it. Ok! I told you there is one exception; when it is a rule in the Constitution.

There is second exception; the house or the Senate is not free to disregard its own rule if it will affect the right of persons
appearing in the investigation. So you cannot change the rules if it will affect the right of third person. When we speak of third
persons, that is non-member of Congress who are required to appear.

The fourth one is based on Bengzon case. There is a requirement that there must be no pending case. The court is saying that,
in the Bengzon case the person was charge in court. Before Sandiganbayan for sum of money and he asked to appear in explanation to
answer a question. He answered “no” The Supreme Court sustain. According to the Court if a case was pending in court the legislative
investigation must stop because there is a possibility that Congress will have another conclusion and the Court will arrive at another so
leave it to the courts, do not proceed. More recently another issue was raised, suppose case is pending before the Ombudsman. That
was the case because the lawyer there Atty. Flaviano refused by saying that there was already a case pending. What did the court say?
This will apply only in cases in courts not to complaints filed before the Ombudsman. Ok! This can proceed.

I will try to summarize, I think and I’ll try to discuss the bar question on this. One question asked was this:

Q: Suppose there is an investigation, can the Supreme Court entertain questions whether or not in aid of legislation or is that a political
question. Can the Supreme Court say you find what is the purpose here? Is it in aid of legislation or not?
A: You have mixed answer again. That was the case of Bengzon. What did the court say? We have the power to find out whether it is
really in aid of legislation or not. How did the Supreme Court do it in the contest of Bengzon case? The court looks at the speech of
Enrile because he is the one who provoked the investigation. According to the court Enrile was not proposing any explanation so we
cannot say it is in aid of legislation that’s why the Supreme Court stops the investigation.

There is a problem regarding the case in Gensan the Maruhom case because in Gensan the judge stops the investigation. The
Supreme Court stated, no you cannot stop it because that is an independent body. If you try to look at the Gensan case you will not
raise the issue whether it is in aid of legislation or not. It was really in aid of legislation because according to the court the RTC has no
business stopping it because the Senate is separate independent body. So that’s it! I guess I have exhausted things. (huh!)

Neri v. Senate
549 SCRA 77 (2008)

Must the invitation addressed to a head of an executive department to testify in a legislative investigation contain the questions the
witness would be asked to answer?

HELD: Yes. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute which prompted the need
for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof.”
Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the Constitution. This must be so to
ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by
virtue of the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent Committees did not
send him an advance list of questions.

Garcillano v. House
575 SCRA 590 (2008)

FACTS: Petitioners sought to restrain the Senate from conducting a legislative investigation on the ground that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

ISSUE: Is there a need to publish the Rules again in a newspaper of general circulation despite the fact that they have not
been amended since 1995 that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at
the Senate’s internet web page?

HELD: Yes. Considering that the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body, the Rules of Procedure must
be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs that the Senate or
its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The publication of the Rules of
Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada
v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules “shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation,” precluding any other form of publication.

Standard v. Senate Committee


541 SCRA 456 (2007)

May a witness refuse to appear in a legislative investigation by invoking his right against self-incrimination?

HELD: No. Concededly, the right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has consistently been held to
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law; and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not. However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected
by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies. Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before
respondent, although they may invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.

Bar Questions

1992#8
A case was filed before the Sandiganbayan regarding questionable governmental transaction. In the course of the proceeding,
the name of De Leon was link for the scandal. Senator de Leon took the floor of the Senate to speak in the matters of personal
privilege about his honor against those malicious accusations. The matter was referred to the committee on accountability of public
officers, which was given to conduct a legislative inquiry. The committee asked Mr. Ledesma a businessman linked to the transaction
and now respondent before the Sandiganbayan to appear and testify before the committee. Mr.Ledesma refused to appear and file a
suit before the Supreme Court to challenge the legality of the proceedings before the committee. He also asked if the committee has
the power to require him to testify. The question was this? Identify the issues and resolve them. Why is that difficult because it asked
you to ask your own question and also to answer your own question. If you ask the wrong question definitely you also have to give the
wrong answer. So it is saying answer the issues. Actually it’s not very difficult to answer because if you are asked to identify the
issues you simply know the requisites. So you simply ask: When is the investigation still in aid of legislation? You take note here that
he was only tying to clear his name. So that is no longer in aid of legislation. Ok! Then maybe you can ask. Does Mr. Ledesma have
the right against self-incrimination? Can he refuse to answer question on the ground of self-incrimination. Ok! So that is the issue
because the right of a person has to be respected. Considering that there is a case in the Sandiganbayan, can the investigation proceed?
The answer is No! Because there’s a pending case. Ok!

Regarding the rights of third person because there are other possibilities. Suppose you are asked to appear before the Senate
or the House and you are thinking that you will incriminated and you say I will not attend, I will just send a letter. I will not appear
before the body because I might be incriminated. Can you do that? The answer is no! Your only recourse will apply to criminal cases;
you have to go there because if you do not go you will be cited for contempt for disobedience. So you go there and you will answer
the question asked. When the question sound incriminating that’s the time you say I will not answer it but it’s not proper for you not to
go. You cannot say you will not go because in the first place you do not know what will be the question to be asked. They might ask
what is your name? I don’t think that is incriminating. That’s why you are ordered to attend the hearing and answer the question.
There’s a principle in international law that the process of one country does not have any extra territoriality. Even warrant of arrest.
You cannot order to arrest in the US. They cannot send a police to look for you in New York. So there is limitation on enforcement.
So the same is true with subpoena.

SENATE vs. MAJADUCON


GR 136760 (July 29, 2003)

FACTS: Senator Vicente C. Sotto III filed Resolution No. 160, “directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment portfolio of the Armed
Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings conducted by the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos City, for
P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with
the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter. The
Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and
testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City. The trial court, applying the ruling of Benzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon granted the Temporary Restraining Order
and subsequently denied the motion to dismiss petition filed by the committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

HELD: The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the
Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the
others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify
before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it
did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent to
appear and testify before it.

The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, does not apply in this case. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was
involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature. More specifically, the investigation in the said case was an offshoot of the privilege speech of then
Senator Enrile, who urged the Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by
the relatives of then President Corazon Aquino. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose,
as stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate Committee was directed to look into the reported
misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect
the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, in Bengzon, the
case was already pending with the Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided to conduct its
investigation. In short, the issue had already been pre-empted by the court. Unlike in the instant case, the complaint
against respondent Flaviano regarding the anomaly in the sale of was still pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman when the Committee served subpoena on him. In other words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over
the matter. Thus, there was as yet no encroachment by the legislature into the exclusive jurisdiction of another
branch of the government. Clearly, there was no basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in Bengzon.
Hence, the denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition amounted to grave abuse of
discretion.

SENATE vs. ERMITA


GR 169777 (April 20, 2006)

FACTS: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to
appear before them as resource speakers in a public hearing on a certain railway project. On September 28, 2005, the
President issued E.O. 464 in that Section 1 and Section 3 of the said order require the officials covered by them to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. Also on September 28, 2005, Senate
President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him
"that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will
not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials
have not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the
hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on
National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of
National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings
without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to
any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

HELD: Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any
official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not
made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI.
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the
power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation."

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the
power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight
function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is
mandatory.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress
is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials
of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section
2 “Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege," it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the
determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under
executive privilege.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted.
It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress
to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

IN RE: SABIO
GR 174340 (Oct. 17, 2006)

FACTS: Feb 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res.
No. 455), "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors."
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman
Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation. He invoked sec 4(b) of E.O 1, issued on February 28, 1986 by former Pres.
Aquino. Section 4(b) provides that:. "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance." Thereafter, Sabio was served with subpoena ad testificandum but he still refused to appear
reiterating the same reason. He further alleged that Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power
of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure
the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter and that E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had
not been amended, repealed or revised in any way. Because of such refusal, he was arrested for contempt of the
Senate.

ISSUE: Whether Section 4(b) runs counter with Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: SC find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and
staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that
concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis. A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles. Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress'
power of inquiry). In this case SC declared Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Since the
Constitution as the highest law of the land is "the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid,
however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution.

Section 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.

I want to explain this very briefly because this one is disputed. First in Section 21, the one that we discuss earlier refers to
ordinary witnesses who were summoned before Senate or House or committee. Section 22 speaks of less than ordinary people. It
mentions the members of the cabinet, those who occupies the position of Secretary. The SC in Senate vs Ermita, the main distinction
between 21 and 22 is under section 21 you have to attend if you are called. This is compulsory. Meaning that if you are summoned in
a legislative investigation you must attend otherwise you will be held in contempt. You must answer questions. Exception is when you
have a valid executive privilege. But the executive privilege shall apply only to members of the cabinet, those who are the members of
the presidential staffs of the President, etc. By the way, under Section 21 there are other people who cannot be summoned: the
President, Justices of the Supreme Court. Reason is separation of power.

Section 22 is not compulsory. Meaning that members of the cabinet who are invited can refuse o attend with or without
reason. According to SC, they are not required to appear and the purpose is not legislative investigation. The purpose only is to update
how laws can be implemented because take note that the implementation of the law is executive

The problem with the provision is this: Suppose a Secretary of Finance is asked to appear under Section 22. Can he say I will
not attend? Can he refuse to attend? The problem with this is, if you look at the book of Justice Cruz, he is saying that they can be
compelled to appear. But if you look at the textbook of Father Bernas he is saying No! It’s only optional. Ok! I am thinking that I
follow Fr. Bernas for the reason that Fr. Bernas was a member of the Constitutional Commission then it seems that it’s also supported
by the language of the Constitution. Why? It’s saying “the heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the consent of the
President.” So it seems to be only optional. If the President would say do not appear, he cannot be forced to appear. You cannot hold
him in contempt; you cannot send him to jail. That seems to be the tenor.

During the height of the investigation regarding the Garcillano tape, I also got a text message. A lawyer asked me, why do
you not summon the President to appear before the Senate or the House in order to answer the question regarding the tape. Ok! We
will have a problem because here under Section 22, it mentions only heads of departments who might not even be forced to appear. In
no reason can you not force the President to appear under this Committee under legislative investigation because again we go back to
the doctrine of separation of powers. If you remember, there’s this scandal regarding the Davide impeachment. I think they all wanted
Davide to appear in one committee prior to filing in an investigation of misuse of judicial funds. Davide refuse to appear invoking
separation of powers. I believe the President can also invoke it. Ok! So he cannot be forced, he cannot be compelled to appear. I think
there is a question asked in the bar, what about, suppose you are asked to appear in the city council because the city council conducts
investigation in aid of legislation, on any committee. Can you say, I will not appear? If you will not appear they might put you to jail.
Ok! That was answered by one case, and the Court stated that the LGU including the city council does not have contempt powers
when it comes to legislative investigation, it belongs only to Congress. The LGC is not given that power, they can issue invitations,
and invitation can be refused. So that is that the distinction between the legislator itself and other bodies.

Another problem in this section. It is provided in the rules that the written questions shall be submitted 3 days before the
scheduled appearance. If you look at the text in section 21, it is not stated. But if you study the Neri case, SC stated that under section
21 there should be a copy of questions given to the witness beforehand. It is a new rule. Neri had been asking for a copy of questions
but he was not given. SC stated that he should be given a copy.

Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

I will discuss two items here. The first pertains to powers of Congress and the second one pertains to the emergency power
given to the President. Regarding the first: dual power. Take note here that the Constitution seems to think that this is a very important
power because there are 2 requirements here: One, there is a very high vote required, 2/3 in the Constitution, we will discuss later on
that there are those impose for different acts of Congress and it is very rare actually when you mean 2/3 because it is very difficult in
most cases to get 2/3. It is also saying it shall be in joint session. As a rule actually when you study later on the two houses end
together. Ok! This is a bicameral body and they always do their work separately but when it comes to the declaration of a state of war,
they require to be jointly and they listen to each other during the debate. The other point that I want to discuss is the matter of national
emergency. If you try to look at this emergency, sometimes they call this emergency powers given to the President, it appears to be
something which is very awesome or something which you might think goes out of ordinary. Like martial law. But in actual practice it
is not really like that because in actual practice, I think I remember there was one time Congress granted emergency powers to Ramos
and it was very specific. I think it happened only because of the power problems in Metro Manila because there was a time when there
was too much brown out, I think in 1992 or 1993, Congress gave Ramos the power to solve the power crisis. The normal practice is
this, if you try to put up infrastructures, put power plants it goes through a lot of requirement in the bureaucracy. It takes too much
time. So when they gave power to Ramos, it appears he was given a free hand. He can immediately institute reforms.

DAVID vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO


GR 171396 (May 3, 2006)

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP (Presidential Proclamation) 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. The proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the alleged conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s
Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. The
issuance of PP 1017 led to the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary of Edsa
People Power 1, revocation of permits to hold rallies, arrest of certain persons and search and seizure of some media
organization. Authorities even warned to take over facilities including media if they would not conform to the
standard set by the government during the state of national emergency.

ISSUE: Whether PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency power.

HELD: SC drew a distinction between the President’s authority to declare “ a state of national emergency” and to exercise
emergency powers. To the former, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power. Article VI, Section 23(2)
refers not only to war but also to “other national emergency”. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was
to withhold from the President the authority to declare a “state of national emergency” pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President
before he can declare a “state of national emergency.” The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But when it comes to the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, it requires delegation from Congress.

Section 17, Article XII which states that “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest,” refers to Congress, not the President. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.

While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide
whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that
should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

Bar question
1997

What are the provisions under which Congress will grant emergency powers to the President? So how do you answer that?
Actually the examiners are asking you only to state the section, what are the requisites. So for instance it’s saying it must be in times
of war or any other national emergency. That’s the first requisite. Right! What else? It should only be for a limited period. There’s also
a requirement that Congress should hold restrictions. Ok! Subject to such restrictions. So Congress is required to put restrictions.
Finally, it can be done by Congress by means of resolution. Those are the requisites or deliberations regarding the grant of emergency
powers to the President.

I mention a while ago that the constitution requires different voting requirements in a rare situation. In fact if you’ll notice
here, it appears that there are 4 types of majorities in the Constitution. One is simple majority, then you have absolute majority, then
2/3 majority and finally only one instance you have ¾ majority, ok! I will try to discuss them one by one.

Q: What do you mean by SIMPLE MAJORITY?


A: Simple majority is majority of those present provided there is quorum. I’ll just illustrate it in the context of the Senate because the
members are manageable, very difficult to compute when it comes to the house. Suppose only 13 are present. I think I told you last
time that 13 is already a quorum because 50%+1. So simple majority will be 7. So in effect actually it is possible for 7 people to the
Senate if the others are absent because that is now simple majority.

Q: In what instances you need simple majority?


A: The answer is in all instances, except when the Constitution provides otherwise. Generally what are these all instances I am
referring. In effect actually almost all laws can be pass by the vote of simple.

When we speak of ABSOLUTE MAJORITY that means actually that is majority base on the total membership, not only of
those present. So for instance you have 24 Senators, 13 votes to be valid. In what instances are these required by the Constitution?
You will study this when we go to the executive that it’s possible when there’s a tie between 2 Presidents elect. Maybe both of them
got same votes. Actually the Congress will break the tie. You need absolute majority meaning all the members not only those present
but the total membership.

We will try to study later on that the President can declare martial law and Congress can revoked it or extend it. Now what
vote is required? That is the majority of all the members of each House.

Third is we study this last night. When you elect a Speaker or Senate president, the Constitution is saying you need majority
of votes of the members not only of those present. Ok! If Congress pass a tax law what is required is also simple majority however
when they give you a tax exemption the law now requires absolute majority. So it is easy to pass tax law but it’s more difficult to pass
tax exemption because the constitution required a very high vote.

The other is this, when you study this, this is a hot issue. The way to amend a constitution, one is to call a constitutional
convention. Now it is possible that Congress will decide the issue. It is possible for Congress to say we will call a constitutional
convention but it need high vote. But if it cannot get a high vote. How did you do that? It is just to submit to the people whether or not
to call a constitutional convention. Congress decided to ask whether to approve the calling of constitutional convention or not, it will
need only absolute majority. I told you that 13 in the Senate is a quorum. Right! Suppose you pass a tax law. Can you pass a tax law?
Yes. Suppose you want to give tax exemptions? Can you do it? Yes you can, provided all of them will not vote to the tax exemption
because there is now absolute majority.

There are several instances in the Constitution when you need 2/3. 2/3 in the Senate would be 16. What are the instances?
When you want to suspend or expel a member. I told you that when you want to reprimand a member, what vote is required? The
Constitution does not say it, Generally, when the Constitution is silent you follow this. When you want to overrule a presidential veto
you need also 2/3, very high. Then, I think we studied this a few minutes ago; when Congress wants to declare a state of war it needs
also 2/3. Then, sometimes the President might be disabled and Congress is given the chance to determine whether he is disable or not.
It needs also 2/3 of vote.

I told you earlier that Congress can submit a question on whether to call a constitutional convention or not. It will need only
absolute majority but if it passes a law calling for constitutional convention it will need 2/3, more difficult. Ok! What about
impeachment? I did not put it there because actually when it comes to impeachment it needs 2/3. Why did I not put here because it
involves only the Senate.

This is the only instance in the Constitution when you need 3/4 majority. The Congress does into call a convention. It does
not submit the question to the people but it will sit as a convention. This is what they are planning now. They might introduce
parliamentary form of government. To save money, we will be the one to act as constitutional convention. They can do that. But the
problem, it is very difficulty. Why? They will need 3/4 votes. Chances are they cannot get it.

We have studied one kind of majority last time. 1/3 majority. Where does that come in? Remember it? That is upon the
request of 1/3 of the members.

Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.

We have a bicameral body. For a law to be valid, it must be approved by both bodies. It must pass here, it must pass there. A
law can pass anywhere. It can pass to the House afterwards it will go to the Senate. Some will come from the Senate and it will go to
the House. Some in fact can go together at the same time. No problem. Because the Constitution does not provide for most laws. So
they can start anywhere or they can start at the same time. However, the Constitution is very clear that a type of law must start in the
lower house, otherwise, it will be null and void. What are they?

1. Appropriation
2. Tariff/Revenue Laws
3. Increase of Public Debt
4. Those of Local Application
5. Private Bills

Q: What are the types of appropriation bill?


A: There are 2 types of appropriation: one is general & the other one is special.

Q: What is the GENERAL APPROPRIATION BILL?


A: We have one every year. We cannot do without it. Budget Act of 2005, Budget Act of 2004 that is a general appropriation law.
Only one per year.

Q: What about SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL? So for instance they pass a law for the typhoon victims of Surigao (a place
where superstars are born). They are authorizing the release of funds for the victims of typhoon in Surigao for the victims of Mt.
Pinatubo that is actually is special appropriation bill.

Q: What about REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL?


A: That’s the opposite because appropriation authorized the release of money while tariff & revenue bills are the one authorizing the
collection of money from us. These are tax laws. Bills authorizing the increase in public debt, I am thinking that since this is only way
in which the government borrows money from the public is the release of treasury bills. For instance you buy for 10,000 from
Treasury bill and they gave you one after 2 years they will repay it from you maybe for 12,000. Ok! So in effect the treasury bill is an
evidence that the government owes you something.

BILLS OF LOCAL APPLICATION can take in many forms. So for instance a bill for the creation of a city, a bill for the
creation of Cospostela Valley Province. That is actually a bill of local application. Sometimes it can be a bill for instance for the sole
purpose of putting up a power plant in Iligan. That is also a bill of local application in a sense that only certain locality will benefit.
Private bills, I think justice Cruz give only one example. He is saying that example is a law granting citizenship to an individual.

Now we go to this. What do you mean by the word “A BILL MUST ORIGINATE IN THE LOWER HOUSE”. That has
been answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Tolentino. What do you mean by that? This is what happens in Tolentino? The
value added tax was presented in the House and it undergoes first reading, it continues on second reading & it comes up with the final
House version. After it comes out, the Senate introduces its own version and underwent the same procedure & afterward considering
those two versions, the committee was asked to reconcile. The version seems to have nothing to do with the House version, very little
to do with it because the version of the Senate was the one followed.

Tolentino went to the Supreme Court saying that the law is null and void because it has very little to do with the House
version therefore it did not originate in the House. What did the court say? The court stated that according to the Constitution it is only
the bill that must originate from the house, not the law itself. The bill actually is the draft, the one that started in the House but the law
itself is the final product. The court is saying the Constitution does not require that the law itself must come from the house. So
meaning, it is possible actually that the House will make its own version, come out with the final version and afterwards the Senate
will have it and start making its own version. Nothing is wrong because the court is saying that there’s no requirement that the final
version will be similar to the one presented or being advocated by the House. Not only that it started there.

Another one is the this, suppose there’s a version decided in the House, it underwent second reading they are debating on it,
suppose they are still debating on it and it did not undergo third reading, and the Senator introduce his own version in the Senate. I’m
talking here actually of what do you mean by originating in the House. It originates in House it is possible that they delegating
somebody in the senate or must the senate wait until they are finished. It was discussed in Tolentino. So, the court stated it is this
manner, there is no prohibition, if a bill is introduce in the senate even if the house is debating its own version provided the senate
should not act as a body that is the language of the court. Provided the senate should not act as a body in the version introduced to it.
What do you mean by that? When you say the senate act as body it is on second reading because this is the time when the debate are
taking place, so you can introduce one in the committee. No problem. But do not start debating because the moment you debate w/ it
& the house is not yet finished w/ its own version that will now be unconstitutional. Ok! So that is definitely the decision.
Bar Question

A bill originating from the Senate which provides for the creation of the Public Utility Commission of any public service &
appropriating the initial fund. Valid? It’s valid. Take note of the law here. The primary purpose is creation of Public Utility
Commission to regulate Public Service Company & appropriating initial fund. The appropriation is only incidental because if you say
that the moment the bill appropriate it has to start w/ the house. So for instance the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform, there is nothing
to do with appropriation but there’s always money needed for that incidentally. But the important word is primary & specific.

Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
Ok! The prohibition is about jabling of funds, meaning you appropriate money for this & you spend it for this. Sometimes
they say it is about technical malversation. Generally funds are not to be transferred, if it is for this purpose you spend it for that
purpose. You have no right to say spend it for this, spend it for that because the Constitution generally prohibits it. But take note that
this is not a blanket provision. In some instance, it is permissible.

Q: When it is permissible?
A: Before I will try to explain it listen to this situation. It’s a law passed by Marcos when he was still exercising legislative power &
this is how he explain it. Ok! “I hereby authorized myself as President of the Philippines to transfer funds from one department bureau
or office to another within the executive branch”. Is the law valid? Take note, if we look at the Constitution there are requisites before
transfer of funds to be valid. The first requisite is authorized officers must do it. We speak of Chief Justice, the Speaker, and the
Senate President and the heads of the 3 Constitutional Commissions.

I am thinking that we might include the Commission on Human Rights, a commission but not with the same level of the 3
commissions. When you speak of 3 they are the Civil Service, Commission on Audit and COMELEC. The second, requirement is,
there must be a law. Third is according to the Constitution it must come from savings. The fourth purpose is to augment an item.
And finally it is within the same department. Meaning if it is within the executive, it is only within the executive. What about the
one I read to you? The decree passed by Marcos at that time he was the President and he say I authorized myself as the president: why
he did not satisfy it? Why he did not say it would come from savings in this item, which I will use to augment that item. The Supreme
Court stated, that couldn’t be done because that is movement of funds without any restriction. So what do you mean by law here? The
normal practice is it is within the body of law itself. What do you mean by that? For instance, what will happen is this, the budget
law…. (I think I am explaining sub-paragraph 2). Ok, this is it, the normal practice is this, when Congress passes a law, for instance it
will say Section 25, they put there for the AFP, 20M, then for the equipment they put 1M. Then within the budget law itself, Congress
will put there Section 26, the funds for the equipment is insufficient, you can get something from this item. That is what we mean by
law.

The bar question of 1998: but this came from the PCA case. Try to answer the question. This was the provision in the budget
law. The chief of staff of the AFP is authorized subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense; to use savings… take
note to use the savings, in the appropriation therein, to augment that pension fund being managed by the Armed Forces. Is the law
valid? No. Why? Because, who was authorized here. The one authorized here is the Secretary of National Defense subject to the
approval of the Chief of Staff. Who should approve it? The President.

There’s one item, Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
government as specified in the budget. What do you mean by that? When it comes to the budget law, the normal practice is, it is the
President. There’s one item: Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the
government as specified in the budget. What do you mean by that? When it comes to the budget law, the normal practice is, it is the
President who prepares the budget bill. Ok! Because it is a budget bill. He prepares the budget bill. Now, the President obviously
cannot introduce in the Congress maybe a Congressman to do it, because the budget bill must start from the lower house. Ok! So a
Member of the House should vote for it. Now in the budget bill, everything is detailed. So this would be the context. Suppose the
budget bill of the President is saying that for the year 2006 the total budget is 260M. That would be itemized. For instance he will say
that for the AFP 2M then for the equipment 2M. This will be presented to Congress, and definitely the two Houses will debate on this
because it’s only a proposal. The Constitution is saying do not increase. So after the debate Congress would say, we will need 261M,
that’s not allowed. Ok! That’s open thing, Congress cannot increase the total proposed by the President.

But the second meaning is found in the Administrative Code. This is the second meaning. Suppose during the debate
Congress is saying that you don’t need too much for this, we need only 1M. Can Congress say ok, 1M we will give it to education?
We will give it to the salary of teacher. No, because the Admin Code is saying that the moment there is decease in the item there must
also be a corresponding increase in the budget for the department and in the overall total. So the effect therefore is no increase in the
item, and any reduction in the item must also be reflected in overall total. Ok! So that’s the meaning.

Atitiw v. Zamora
471 SCRA 329 (2005)

FACTS: President Aquino created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) through EO No. 220 pursuant to the
exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. In the General Appropriation’s Act, however, Congress
reduced its appropriation to P18 million with a Special Provision stating that: “The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to
wind up the activities and operations of the Cordillera Administrative Region, including the payment of separation pay and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees.”

ISSUE: For apparently repealing a previous law, is the provision a rider or an inappropriate one?
HELD: No. There was no repeal of a previous law since CAR was not abolished with the reduction of its appropriation. What took
place was only a discontinuance of the programs and activities. In fact, EO No. 328, the implementing rule of the questioned
provision provides only for the deactivation of the CAR bodies upon the lapse of its operational period as provided in the EO.
Specifically, it provides that all the regional offices and agencies of the national government established in the region shall continue to
function and serve the CAR. There is a distinction between abolition and deactivation. To deactivate simply means to
render inactive or ineffective, where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant.

Section 25. (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

Ok! I think this Section is the most difficult in the entire provision. Actually I will explain this when we go to veto power. It
looks so simple but it is complicated in the light of several decisions. The only point I want to mention tonight is this: as a general
principle the subsection is saying only, that the appropriation law or the budget law must speak of nothing else but appropriation. Do
not include anything there which has nothing to do without appropriation. If you put something there which is not for appropriation we
call this a “rider”.

Section 25. (3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure
for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

Not much in this provision. I really do not know they put this. I am thinking that Congress want to ensure that they follow the
procedure.

Section 25. (4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

Regarding this provision what is special appropriation bill? These are the requisites for special appropriation bill: One is
specify the purpose and it must be supported by funds actually available and finally if there are no funds available, you must also
include a proposal of House and Senate.

Section 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
PCA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)

Two provisions of the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 state:

4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. – A member of Congress may realign his allocation for operational
expenses to any other expense category provided the total of said allocation is not exceeded.

Section 2. Use of Savings. – The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of National
Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund being managed by the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 P.D. No. 361.
It is claimed that the provisions violated Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI, of the Constitution.

Held: Under the provision applicable to Congress, the members of Congress can only determine the necessity of the realignment of
the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they know whether there are
savings or whether there are deficiencies in other items needing augmentation. However, it is the Senate President or the House of
Representative who shall approve the realignment. But the two officials must see to it that: 1) The funds to be realigned or
transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and 2) The transfer or realignment is
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.

But the provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by
the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of the Constitution. While Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI allows as an exception
the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the executive branch, such right must and can be
exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific law.

Section 25. (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.

Generally in the budget, you are supposed to start with the purpose of the amount of the item. In certain instances to ensure
flexibility, they allow discretionary funds because if you put everything in there, there might be an emergency and they cannot act
anymore because you have to go back to the law makers and ask for more money. That’s why they allow it. This was asked in the bar.
I think I was discussing that Mecca question. Remember the Governor in Tawi-Tawi, the word appropriated money from discretionary
for the use of pilgrimage in Mecca.

One question is: is that valid? It is answered by the provision. It is saying that discretionary funds should be for public use.

Section 25. (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year
shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed
by the Congress.

The provision has been asked in the bar. Very simple question.

Bar Question
1998 #11

Suppose the President submits a budget, which does not include the provision for CDF popularly known as Pork Barrel, and
because of this, Congress does not pass the budget. Would that mean paralization of government operation in the next fiscal year for
the appropriate law? No!

Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
The section is very short but it speaks of two things. There are two items here to take note. One, is the requirement that a bill
must have one subject only, at the same time it is saying that the subject must be embraced in the title. Ok! So, two requirements for a
valid bill.

Take note that while the Constitution is saying “bill”, this sometimes is referring to the law itself: It is telling only “bill”, but
the law itself must have one subject and also it should be embraced in the title. There are many cases I assigned to you but the thing to
remember here is, it is very difficult to challenge a law based on the title because the Supreme Court has given it a very elastic
definition on what this means.

We go over certain things here.


Q: Why is it that it is placed as a requirement of the Constitution?
A: So the answer of the Supreme Court is to prevent deception on the part of the legislature.

Q: What do I mean by that?


A: In one case, the SC has taken judicial notice; the people in the Congress are lazy. So usually, what will happen is that they go there
and they look at the title and “hey, I vote yes, yes, no”. The SC is saying therefore, if you do not give them everything in the title,
these people will be deceived. I was saying a while ago that the SC has given it a very elastic meaning. So, that it is very difficult to
challenge a law based on information. If you look at the cases, the statement of the Court is this, according to the court; it is enough
that the title will summarize the content. There is no need that everything is reflected in the title. What is the reason for that? The
Court stated that if you require everything to be reflected in the title that will tender lawmaking impossible. Why impossible? Because
you will have a title that is as long as the body of the law. Everything is in the title. So that the Court stated that it will be too much,
just ensure only that things will be summarized.

I will go over very briefly the cases. The Videogram case is this: The title of the law is saying “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board to Supervise and Regulate the Video Industry”. One provision stated that the business can be taxed
30%. So, those who were taxed challenged it by saying that the tax is not mentioned in the title anymore. What did the Court say?
Valid, anyway, it is not inconsistent.

PJA vs Prado (227 SCRA 703 – 1993). This is the law creating the Philippine Postal Corporation. The title is “An Act
Creating the Phil. Postal Corp. Defining its Powers, Functions, and the Responsibilities Providing for Regulation of the Industry for
Other Purposes”. I think one provision is to remove the franking privilege of the judges. Anyway, the title is “An Act Creating the
Philippine Postal Corp…” but it removes the privilege of the judiciary in free mailing. So, it was challenged before the SC, SC stated
that it is still valid because according to the Court, the removal is connected with the title. Very elastic.
The other one is also very elastic. The title of the law is “Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao”. On
one provision, we studied this before, authorized the President to move one province to another. Again, this was challenged, it did not
say it in the title. But the Court stated that “No problem, anyway, it is germane to the purpose of the law.” When we say germane, it is
relevant. So the terms used are very elastic.

There are very few cases where the SC stated that it’s no longer valid. I think, two are the most illustrative. One is the case of
Ramirez. The title of the law is “An act to amend and compile those connecting two lands in the public domain and to other
purposes”. One section of the law mentioned about private lands. So this was challenged. What did the Court say? The Solicitor
General argues that it is saying for “other purposes”, the private lands are included. The Court stated, “No, because the law is about
public land, you have no right to infer something about private land.”

The other classic case is the Lidasan case. I think it’s in the hand out. Lidasan was about an “Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Norte”. The law created one municipality. But according to the decision of this law, I think,
include some barangays in the province of Cotabato, and it seems they did not see it in the title, that the Congressman from Cotabato
was not informed. I think it is the classic case, he voted for the law not knowing the Municipality created includes some areas of his
province. The Supreme Court stated that “No, not allowed because this is the classic case of deceiving the legislature. It’s’ no longer
found in the title.”

So, to summarize things, it is very difficult based on this, except only in two instances. One is when it results to fraud of the
legislature and, secondly, when the content is unrelated in the title.

Before we end the lecture, there are two things that you need to understand, some terms that we need to define. One is the
concept of log-rolling legislation.

Q: What is a LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION?


A: A legislation that contains more than one subject and is unconstitutional and it is not allowed.

The other, is the concept of pork-barrel legislation. You hear this almost every week. What is a pork-barrel legislation? Ok,
this is the legal meaning. A legislation that authorizes subsidies that promotes business or promotes employment in a district.

Q: Is a pork-barrel legislation unconstitutional?


A: It appears to be constitutional because it is intended to boost rich men in locality, so in a sense it appears to be of local legislation.

BANAT v. COMELEC
595 SCRA 477 (2009)

FACTS: RA No. 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent
National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for
the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes.’” Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34 (official
watchers) , 37 (authenticity of certificate of canvass), 38 (pre-proclamation controversy) and 43 (prosecution), are neither embraced in
the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA No. 9369.

ISSUE: Are the provisions valid?

HELD: Yes. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the
title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law
does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise
nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. Clearly, the subject matter of RA No. 9369 covers the amendments to RA No.
8436, BP Blg. 881, RA No. 7166, and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility,
fairness, and accuracy in the election.

Section 26 (2). No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
I told you last night that some bills must start in the House.Ok! There is no bill that must start in the Senate. Some bills can
start at the same time, no problem. Some bills can also start in the Senate.
There are two types in our system: one in the House. When we speak of House bill, which is the bill that is introduced in the
House. The second one is the Senate bill and that is the bill introduced in the Senate.

If you study all decisions there was a term Cabinet bill. A Cabinet bill is no longer present now.
Q: What is a CABINET BILL?
A: You found it under the Parliamentary system during the short time that we had it under Marcos. This is the bill introduced by the
Members of the Cabinet. Now, you have to understand that under the Parliamentary system, the members of the Cabinet are also
members of the lawmaking body. But right now, in our system, there’s only a House and a Senate bill.

Q: Suppose there is a bill that is introduced in the House. What will happen?
A: So, if you look at the textbook of Justice Cruz, this is the first thing. First is, it will undergo first reading. What happens in the first
reading? Only the title of the bill is read and it will be referred to the appropriate committee.

Q: What do you mean by APPROPRIATE COMMITTEE?


A: There are many standing committees; they really exist since the term of Congress starts. You have Committee on Justice that is the
one in-charge on impeachment, Committee on Defense, Committee on Health. Suppose they introduce a bill on more CAFGU, a bill
increasing the number of CAFGUS to 1 million. So they will read the title and they will forward it to the Committee. Most likely it
will go to the Committee on Defense. Ok! What happens in the Committee? At the Committee there are many things that can happen.
Sometimes there are other bills with similar problems so they will consolidate or sometimes they conduct hearings. I think, sometimes,
you know that Committees would come to Davao City and conduct hearing. They call that now a legislative investigation because that
is now in consideration of a pending bill. Sometimes they do nothing about it. So, a bill might sleep in the Committee for 500 years.
That means nothing will come out of your bill. So there is no provision in the Constitution that you have to act on the bill. There are
matters that you will study later on. At the Committee, what will happen? The Committee will come out with a report. The report is
some kind of a proposed, this is now the revision or maybe the revised version or maybe the same version. Now, what will happen is,
they will now forward it to the House for the second reading. What happens during the second reading? Debate, but the first thing is
you have to read the entire bill and there will be debate.

The normal practice is this, so for instance they are proposing the Civil Code of the Philippines. A bill proposing to enact the
Civil Code of the Philippines, so they will go over first Section 1, ok? So there will be debates, somebody would say I want it
amended, the other would say I don’t want it amended. So there will be debates actually, and after the debate, the in-charge would say,
“who is in favor of this amendment. So, there will be voting. If you get the majority, ok, Section 1 is amended. Sometimes, it takes
years for a law to be passed because of too much debate. We assume that they have debated, they approved section by section. What is
the next stage? According to the Constitution, final copies will be printed and distributed to the members three days before the 3rd
reading. What happened during the 3rd reading? It appears that if you look at the textbook the Constitution is saying that no more
amendments will be introduced. Ok? So more debates to come in. So what will happen is, they will come up with the present version
and say who is in favor of approving this bill? Take it or leave it! If you say you do not want it, you say “No”, if you say “Yes’, then
ok. Suppose the “yes” wins over the “no”. That means that the bill is approved. It is possible that while the House is debating,
assuming that this is not a tariff, or this is not appropriation, there is another version going on the Senate, but it is possible that there is
no version going on. So, what will happen is this, they will forward the House version in the Senate and it will undergo the same
process. So it will take years. It will undergo first reading, refer to the committee then, so on… because there is the requirement that
the two Houses have to approved the bill before it becomes a law. Next is, you now have the House version, it’s almost impossible
that the two versions will be the same because there’s a committee, everybody proposed a different version. What will happen is it will
be forwarded to the conference committee for reconciliation. Now, what is this Conference committee? It is not like the other because
in this committee we know all the members in the standing committee. But the conference committee is an ad hoc body. Meaning, it
was created at the heat of recess. If there is a bill there’s something to be reconciled so they form a conference committee. The normal
practice is this; they get the sponsors of the bill in the House and also get the sponsor of the bill in the Senate. And they will be the one
to form the conference committee. Usually they get their own first because they have these people who know actually much more
about the bill since they were the one who introduced it.

Ok! So, the conference committee again will debate in it and come up with a reconciled version. So that’s it! Suppose they
now have the conference committee report, the reconciled version. What do we do with it? Do you present it again for 3 rd reading, 2nd
reading, 1st reading? No more. Is that already a law? No. It is to undergo 3 rd reading. That is the context of the Arroyo case. Somebody
said, Mr. Chairman I now move for the approval of conference committee report. Meaning, he was carrying it now to the Senate. It
will undergo only 3rd reading because it will be too much; too waste of time if you allow it to undergo 1st reading with different
committees. It will undergo the same process again. That’s why according to the Court you need only 3 rd reading. Ok! In fact, that was
challenged by Tolentino. He said that it must undergo 3 readings. But the Court said, “No, only one reading”.

There is a question that I want you to answer.


Q: Suppose the President certify a bill as urgent. What will happen?
A: I think we have the Constitution saying, it is saying that, except when the President certify to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet public calamity or emergency. So, meaning, a lot of the procedures should be done away with.

Q: What are the things that should no longer be followed if the bill is certified as urgent?
A: According to the Court the first one is there is no more 3 readings on 3 separate days. What do you mean by that? It appears that
what the Court simply means is, by the way, first we need to understand that when we speak of 3 readings the Constitution is very
clear that you cannot do it in one day. It is a requirement that you do it on 3 separate days. So, it can be done in one day and the law
could be valid in this case. So for instance, what will happen maybe, it will undergo 1 st reading. They will not debate on it. Then it will
undergo a 2nd reading afterwards you say, “No I tend to refuse”. Then they approved. In one reading you have a bill and the final
House version approved. That is the definition when the bill is introduced as urgent.

According to the Court, it seems that another requirement in the Committee is there is no more printing because it’s urgent.
You need not print anymore the final version of the bill. No more printing. Considering that there is no more printing, there is nothing
to distribute 3 days before the final reading. I think, that is obvious because you need not print anything there is no need also to
distribute anything. Why did the Court say we need not comply with the other procedures? I think it is obvious also because if you
comply with all these procedures in the end after it became a bill, the calamity is gone. So, there’s nothing for the bill to do anymore.
That’s why the Court stated that we could do it in a fast version.(mainam na mainam!)

Q: If the President certifies a bill as urgent, can the President veto it?
A: Definitely yes. You might think that it is inconsistent. He certifies it then he vetoes. Why? Because when he certifies it, in the
debate they keep on introducing amendments. You cannot stop the Senate and the House in introducing amendments. So, the final
version has nothing to do with what he certifies. He says I do not want this version, veto. Ok, because there is no assurance that if the
bill certified by the President as urgent, it is the same version that is certified because they still debate on it and you cannot limit the
power of the Senate and the House to introduce amendments because that is given to them by the Constitution.

Q: If the bill is certified as urgent, is there a requirement for publication before it becomes effective?
A: Yes, you still have to publish. Why? Because take note that, what is done away is only the printing for the distribution of its
members. What does Tañada say? All laws have to be published except x x xxxxxx. (alam nyo na yan!)

The Constitution is very clear that only the printing is done away with, because you have to distinguish between the printing
and publication. Ok. The second question is this. In the Tolentino decision, they certify the bill. What is the bill in Tolentino? The
VAT law. Why did the President certify it as urgent? What is the reason why he certifies it as urgent? He stated that because of the
problem of budget deficiency, we need to enact a new tax law, new tax measure to raise money in order to meet this problem of
budget deficiency. Tolentino went to Court saying that, that is not a calamity or emergency as discussed by the Constitution, because
budget deficiency has been in fact a long time, it was present during the time of Magellan and until now it was still alive! So how can
we say that there is calamity? So, what did the Court say? In the question that Tolentino is raising, can the SC review the factual basis
over the determination by the President that there is calamity; therefore there is a need to enact it into a bill. What did the Court say?
No, we cannot review. It is a political question. Why? According to the Court, the President, the Chief Executive who belongs to a
separate department certified it as urgent. Then the House acted on it and then the Senate acted on it. So therefore, the Court, because
of separation of power, has no right to inquire whether these two Houses, the President acted correctly. It is a question left to this
departments.

By the way, you may ask what is a political question? We will discuss more of it when we go to Article 8. So the point
simply is when we say it is a political question that is a question entrusted to another department, which the Court generally should not
intrude into. So, the declaration of the President that the bill in order and there is a calamity is not subject to judicial review because of
the separation of powers.

The 3rd question is this: Can they add new matters not found in the version of the House and the Senate? Yes. What do we
mean by that? In the House they propose a law. They say, this is the law, Section 1, Section 2, only 2 sections. Then the Senate
debated on it and says ok, Sections 1 and 2 are ok. Then they added Section 3. Take note now that there is disagreement because the
Senate has 3 sections and the House has 2. So the Conference Committee will report. So, the committee will say, ooh, a very good
law. It added Sections 4,6, up to 10. Can the committee do that? What did the Court say? Yes. What is the reason why they can do
that? It’s the Tolentino decision. The court stated, that cannot be done and they cannot review it, but it is not an enrolled bill. Take
note, after it comes out on 3rd reading. It was approved, signed by the Senate President, signed by the Speaker of the House and
approved by the President. So, if it is an enrolled bill, the Court will not inquire into the content or the procedure of its passing. It is
deemed conclusive upon the Court. In the end, therefore, the Committee is free to add more provisions not subject to any
disagreements by the two bodies. Committee becomes powerful.

Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President.
If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting
for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law
as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

There are two requirements before a bill becomes a law. And the first one is approval by both houses. And when it is
approved, it depends upon what the act is. That is the voting requirement. The second one is the approval of the President. The main
distinction is this: when it comes to the approval of both houses, it has to be done by means of a positive affirmative act because they
vote for it. But when it comes to the vote of the President, it can be implied. We know that when the President does not act with the
bill, it results to approval. In case of both houses, if you will not act on the bill, no law will come. In the sense therefore, there are
three ways that bill becomes a law: One is suppose it has passed both house, when the President approves it, the President vetoes it,
but Congress overcomes the veto. Generally, when Congress passes a law, it needs only a simple majority. However when the
President vetoes the law, then you need a higher vote, because now the two houses are required with two-thirds vote before it becomes
a law. So, it becomes higher. The third way is when it is submitted to the President and he fails to act with it within 30 days from the
time of submission. So thirty days from receipt. Along this line, if you go over the books of Mendoza:

Q: What is POCKET VETO?


A: It is not present in the Philippines but actually taken from the American Constitution saying that if the President fails to return the
bill after Congressional adjournment, then as if he vetoes it. If after thirty days after adjournment he still did not act on it, it is
considered vetoed. In the Philippines, what will happen? If he will not act on it, it is considered approved. Therefore this provisions is
opposite on the provision of pocket veto, we do not have pocket veto. Because under pocket veto inaction by the President is also veto.
In the Philippines, inaction means approval.
We will now go to the most problematic area that is the concept of veto.
Q: What the ordinary meaning of VETO?
A: It means disproval. When the President vetoes a bill, he disapproves it.

Q: Can the President veto a provision of an ordinary bill? You have the RPC presented for approval, you say that I don’t like section
21, I disapprove the section can it be done?
A: The answer is the President can’t veto a provision in an ordinary law. According to Justice Cruz, take it or leave it, all or nothing.

Q: Can the President veto an item?


A: The answer is yes but only when it applies to tariff, revenue, and appropriation. It is difficult because tariff and revenue laws are
those that authorize the coming in of money in the treasury because they are tax laws.

Appropriation law is the opposite because this is the authorized release of money by the government. In these two instances
only that you are allowed to have an item veto.

Q: Why is an item veto allowed? Why do we allow veto in this case?


A: The answer is: all or nothing or take it or leave it policy will not work. Now for instance appropriation, there is fund for say 2006,
if you don’t allow the President to veto certain item, that will give Congress to insert matters the President does not want. Obviously
the President can disapprove everything saying that we have no money.

Q: What is an item veto in the context of appropriation laws?


A: That was illustrated in the case of Bengzon vs Drilon (208 SCRA 133 – 1992). I think this is the budget for the judiciary: 50M, the
funds will be used for obligations, salaries of personnel, personnel benefits. When it reached President Aquino, she vetoed this
provision. I like everything, but I don’t like this portion personnel benefits. Q: was there a valid veto? A: No, Why? Because we have
to look at the definition of an item in the context of an appropriations law. An item is a sum of money dedicated to a particular
purpose. If that is the sum of money, according to the court, then there is undue restraint on it. Why? This does not refer to the sum of
money. So what could have the President validly vetoed? Meaning that will veto the entire 50M. Meaning everything will be
disapproved here. They cannot hold the portion. The item referred to the veto is a sum of money dedicated to a particular purpose, so
that means that you should veto the entire 50M.

BENGZON vs. DRILON


208 SCRA 133 (1992)

FACTS: On June 20,


1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This
was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Identical benefits were
also given to the Members of the Constitutional Commission under RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595. President
Marcos signed PD 578, on Nov. 12, 1974, which extended similar retirement benefits to the Members of the Armed
Forces giving them also the automatic. readjustment features of RA's 1797 and 3595. However, on Jan. 25, 1975,
President Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec. 3-A of RA's 1797 and 3595 which authorized the adjustment of the
pensions of the retired justices of the SC, CA, Chairman & Members of the Constitutional Commission and the
officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Significantly, while the
adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces was restored by President Marcos, those of
the retired justices of the SC and CA, were not. This led to the passage by Congress of House Bill 16297 for the
reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA's 1797 and 3595 restoring the said retirement pensions and privileges
of the retired justices and Members of the Constitutional Commission. President Aquino, however vetoed House
Bill 16297, citing the policy on standardization of compensation as reason for such veto.

Prior to the instant petition, however, some retired justices of the CA filed a petition dated April 22, 1991 asking this
Court for a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with RA 1797, contending that PD 644 repealing
the latter law did not become a law for lack of publication.

The Court acted favorably on the request in a resolution dated Nov. 28, 1991. Pursuant to such resolution, Congress
included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill No. 34925) a certain appropriation for
the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired justices of the SC and CA. On
Jan. 15, 1992, the President vetoed some portions of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 4 of the Special Provisions for the SC
and the lower courts, some portions of Sec. 1 and the entire Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the CA, and some
portions of Sec. 3 of Art. XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (General Appropriations
Act, FY 1992). Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners as retired Justices of the SC and CA questioning
the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the SC and CA. The petitioners assert that said
veto is not an item veto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, relating
to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the SC and CA, is unconstitutional.

HELD: The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations
Act are valid and subsisting.The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, the executive must
veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes.

However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the
machinery of the government and it cannot veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The
President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to
an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items
may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the item.

The Presidential veto is unconstitutional because:


a) The President did not veto the "general fund adjustment" which is an item which appropriates P 500-M to enable
the government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific
items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government. What were vetoed
were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials
would be paid when they fell due;
b) An examination of all the sections and the underlined portions which were vetoed will readily show that portions
of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvested parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed;
c) The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS. They are PROVISIONS. Thus, the AUGMENTATION of specific
appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of
appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to
another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.

In the same manner, the provision which states that, in compliance with decisions of the SC and the COA, funds still
undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund
adjustment" itself which is the item. It was not vetoed.No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35
years before his term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of the
SC through the exercise of veto power.

The problem in the Philippines is we do not have this what we call line budgeting because it is different when for instance
hold amount for this, 1M here 1M there, because that will now become an item. In our budget law, we used this big amount that’s why
if we want to exercise the veto power for an item, you have to veto the entire amount. It is called line item. The next question, what do
you mean by item in a tariff or revenue law. Take note here we mention what is a tariff or revenue law, it is about tax law. Generally,
there’s no amount of money in a tax law because it mentions only, this will be the rate of the tax: 1% of the value of the property. So
what do we mean of an item in the concept of a tariff or a revenue law? Actually there is no amount of money mentioned. That was
decided by the SC in the case of CIR vs Court of Tax Appeal. The tax law stated: Hotels, Motels, Rest houses, Cabarets, etc. they put
there 20% of the gross income. When President Ramos vetoed it saying that I have no problem with tax to cabarets, but I don’t like it
on motels, hotels and rest houses, he vetoed this portion.

Q: Is this a valid item veto? The SC said, do not confused an item in an appropriation law with the item in a tax law. Because
the meanings are different. The item in a tax law is defined law in a revenue law: It does not refer to an entire section imposing a
particular kind of tax but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rates.

So take note that here there are several items, the President can therefore veto any of the subjects: hotels, motels, cabarets,
and cockpits. That will apply actually to the tax rates. Because each one of this is regarded as separate item.

We now proceed to a more difficult question. Can the President veto a provision in an appropriation law? What is a
provision? Have you seen an item in the Civil Code? No. Because there’s no mention of money, of tax, etc., in the family code. They
are all provisions therefore, so when we speak of provisions, those are the one written in words, phrases and sentences. In effect, all
things in the RPC are all provisions.

Q: What about the provision in the appropriation law? Take note that in an appropriation law, they are items and provisions because it
is impossible to have an appropriation law without words and phrases. What is the provision in the context of an appropriation law?
A: For instance this is 15M, if you have some statements … this funds will be used for buying the equipments to modernize the AFP,
those are the provisions, the one in sentences. Usually they are statements about the limitation, the use, the restriction, and the purpose
to the funds. Those are the provisions.

Q: Can the President veto this provision in an appropriation law?


A: The answer of course is you have to distinguish: According to the Court the President cannot veto if the provision is appropriate.
This one is very very important. And yes he can veto if the appropriation is inappropriate.

The only textbook that father Bernas post is the doctrine of inappropriate provision, and he’s the only one discussing it. It is
well discussed in the PCA case. First you can’t veto the provision if the provision is appropriate and he can veto it if it’s inappropriate.
How do we determine if the provision is appropriate or inappropriate? Before I go, somebody go over again section 25 par 2:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

The first is this; this is what happened in the PCA case. Congress will pass a budget law, being the President, I forgot the
amount but it stated that ok, there’s 50M of use, and it puts there, use of the funds. This is the provision. The appropriation shall be
used for the compensation act law including the separation benefits not exceeding a certain amount. Simply this is it, the Congress
stated, ok! 50M for you, use this for your separation pay. Now, this was vetoed by the President because he wanted more CAFGUS.
Q: Is that a valid item veto? Held: We have it because law created it; it was created by an old law right after Cory Aquino assumed
office. And there is no question that we can amend the law, we can replace it, we can increase the members, but the SC held that it
can’t be done, Congress has no right: If you decrease the number of your CAFGU’s you are actually amending the law. Congress can
do that but you can’t amend the law through a public law. You want to amend, pass a special law. Do not insert it in a budget law.
Why? Because that will be considered inappropriate provision. One example of inappropriate provision is a provision that amends or
repeals a prior law. Why? If you want to amend or repeal it, pass another law, don’t include it in the budget law. Because the budget
law, speaks nothing but a budget law. So it is inappropriate to put it there.

The second one is this; this is based on the Gonzales decision. This was the provision: in one budget law. You have to
imagine what a budget law looks like. It has many sections, sometimes the first part, sections 1-20 it deals with the budget of the
executive, then other sections for other departments, they put there various amounts. Afterwards, you have the budget for Congress
and thirdly, maybe a budget for the courts. Now in one budget, in the case of Gonzales, Congress after providing all the section it put
one on the last part. It puts there, whenever during the debates in any portion, Congress decided to decrease the amount suggested by
the President, then the President is not allowed to amend it. Take note what I told you when could the President augment the other
funds. So was the prohibition valid, when it was presented to the Pres he vetoed it. Q: Was the veto appropriate? Held: This one is the
appropriation that is inappropriate because it does not relate to a particular item. Another example therefore is when the provision does
not relate to a particular item, it is considered inappropriate. Why? Because such section is related to almost all items that might have
been decreased in the debate. It is not related to one item. Go back to Section 25 (2):
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.

Got it? This provision states that the provision must relate to one subject only. Therefore the exercise of the veto power of the
President is valid.

We go to the third situation, more confusing, this is the PCA vs. ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA 506 -1994), this was I think 86
billion, there was a provision saying use of funds. This was the language of the Congress. The appropriation authorized therein shall
be used for payment for the principal and interest of foreign indebtedness provided that any payment in excess of the amount
appropriated therein shall be subject to the approval of the President provided further that in no case that this fund be used to pay for
the indebtedness of the Central Bank Board of Regulators. President Ramos vetoed the entire section. Q: Was the veto valid? Held:
There are actually 3 provisions involved. According to the SC you look at them one by one. The appropriations authorized therein
shall be used for payment of principal and foreign interest to foreign indebtedness. According to the Court, the appropriations
authorized therein. What do you mean by the provision authorized therein? Means 86 billion, therefore it is appropriate. Why? Both
the section and provision relates to an item in an appropriation, that can’t be vetoed.

What about the second one, provided that any payment in excess of the amount appropriate therein shall be subject to the
approval of the President. Does it relate to an item? The SC said, something is wrong with the provision. It does not relate to an item.
Why? That any payment is excess of the amount? What do we mean by that? What do we mean by in excess of the amount? Meaning
in excess of the 86B, so that is no longer appropriate. So the court added the third situation: that is when it extends its operation
beyond an item because it’s not beyond the 86B.

What about the last one? That in no case shall this fund shall be used to pay for the liabilities and indebtedness of the Central
Bank…. Appropriate because it relates to an item in the provision, therefore it can’t be the subject of veto. So in the end what
happened? Because some veto is invalid? The effect is that this one, the veto is valid, so what happened to the law? So that is the
doctrine of inappropriate provision. It is simply saying that in an appropriate provision, the President may veto an item or a provision
if it is inappropriate.

Inappropriate if:
1. It amends or repeals a prior law
2. It does not relate to particular item
3. Extends its prohibition beyond an item.

I am not saying that these are the only exceptions, because there can be other. This is only based on the decided cases.

Take note of the meaning of legislative veto. There are two cases: Miller and the second one is the PCA case also. If you look
at the Constitution, there is no such thing as legislative veto, but what we only have is a Presidential veto. How does the legislative
veto come under the language of the law? If you look at the PCA case, in our country, it is the Congress who will propose a law and
the President disapproves it. But here we have a reverse situation, it is now the President proposing and the Congress approving and
disapproving. In one case, the SC said that it is unconstitutional. That is why it is called legislative veto which is not allowed in our
system.

The other term is the concept impoundment of funds. I go back to the illustration of the CAFGU go over with the case. The
Congress said, ok here’s 50M, used this for retired CAFGUs; the President does not want the CAFGUs to retire. So when we speak of
impoundment of fund, it relates to the refusal by the President to spend money made available by the Congress. The question is: Is it
valid? Some is saying no. But actually it is answered by the legislative code. A legislative code is a law passed by Congress. It is
saying that in its judgments, the public interest requires the President to suspend or stop and expenditure of funds. So, Congress itself
has given the power to the President not to spend the fund. So it is allowable.

Q: When does a law take effect?


A: It is 15 days after publication, but we have to be aware also that the Congress can pass a law making the period longer or shorter. If
the law is silent, you follow the 15 days.

Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

True or False
Can the President fix tariff rates without a law passed by Congress? No. “…may by law.” Meaning, the Executive
Commission cannot implement when there is no law.

Suppose Congress provided the President the power.. the Constitution, can Congress revoke that law? Yes. Congress cannot
pass a law which is not subject to revocation. If they passed a law, that have all the right to revoke it.

What are the powers that can de delegated? Can Congress delegate the power to the President to fix the VAT? No. The
powers that can only be delegated to the President are tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other
duties or imports. Definitely, income tax is not included. Real property tax are not included.

Abakada case. Congress delegated the power to the President regarding VAT. SC held that the President can schedule it this
time but the rate itself will be determined by Congress because it cannot be passed on the President.

Q: Can the President limit the amount of goods that are being imported to the country?
A: Answered by the Constitution. That is what we mean by import and export quotas.

Q: Can the President bar altogether? Not only limit. When we say limit, “every year we will only allow 100M of import of sugar.”
Can we say no more imported material? Can that be done?
A: Southwing case. Yes, it can. That is permissible. In certain instances, that is allowed.

Q: Can the President do that without any law? (ban the imports)
A: Southwing case. SC held that we will recognize the authority of the President to bar the coming in of secondhand. Because there
are three laws authorizing the President to do that:
1. National … Code
2. All Network Act
3. Omnibus Investment Code
Without any law, the President cannot do that because the Constitution is clear that there must be a law to authorize him to do
that.

Q: Can Congress delegate the power to fix the tax not to the President but to the Secretary of Finance or Agriculture?
A: Yes. Secretary is considered as alter-ego of the President. It can be delegated to the people with the ranks of Secretary.

Q: Can tax exemption be enjoyed by churches without any law passed by Congress?
A: It is a constitutional exemption. With or without any law it is self-executing.

Q: Can Congress withdraw the tax exemption?


A: No. Constitution states that it cannot be removed by Congress, otherwise, the Congress will be amending the Constitution. In some
instances it is permissible. Some of the provisions of the Constitution will tell you that “in accordance with law as Congress may
provide.” Tax exemption is automatically enjoyed and Congress cannot modify it.

Q: Under the provision, can the income of AdDU from the tuition of students be exempted?
A: No. It is saying only charitable institutions, churches… it speaks only of property tax exemptions. It has nothing to do with the
income. Improvements used for charitable buildings shall be exempt from taxation. It has nothing to do with the income of the school.
It is only about the property, the building owned by the school.

Q: Suppose you have a building in the ground floor… the entire building is not exclusively used for charitable purposes. Should the
entire building be taxed?
A: No, it is only of the portion used for non-educational purposes.

The only way to authorize the release of money is by means of a law. When it comes to local government, it comes through
an ordinance.

LUNG CENTER vs. QUEZON CITY


GR 144104 (June 29,2004)

FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity. It is the registered owner of a
parcel of land located in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung
Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small
store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics for their patients
whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the building
along is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right side is being leased for commercial purposes to a private
enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients.
It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying
patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the
amount of P4,554,860. On August 25, 1993, the petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with
the City Assessor, predicated on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner alleged that under Section
28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum
of 60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital operation
is to serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real
property taxes.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of 1987 Constitution;
Whether the real properties of petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.

HELD: On the first issue, the answer is in affirmative. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity
or not, the elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its
constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the character of
the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of the properties. The test
whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable
or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage.
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes
simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives
subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object
which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution.

As to the second issue, SC ruled that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not
exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The
effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from tax payments must be
clearly shown.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the
petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real
properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. “Exclusive” is
defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and
“exclusively” is defined, “in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.” If real property is used
for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
The words “dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for the words “used exclusively” without doing
violence to the Constitutions and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and immediate
and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not
the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt
purposes. The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are
being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a
private individual for her business enterprise under the business name “Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.”
Indeed, the petitioner’s evidence shows that it collected P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for
1992 from the said lessees.

Thus, the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to private
individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and
portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or
of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.

In the beginning of the Constitution, we discuss the principle of separation of church and state this provision is intended to
ensure separation between church and state. It’s saying that you cannot use money for the support of any religion. I used to tell
students that this one appears to be being copied from the American Constitution because I think several years ago when I was
teaching this subject there was a German lawyer who came for legal aid and I ask him to sit on my class and afterwards, he told me
that, “actually in Germany its different because the State collects taxes to be given to the church.” For us actually the separation is so
strong, that you can never do that. You cannot collect and give it. Sometimes they call it religious tax. Take note only that, there are
certain instances when you are allowed to give money for a priest but it is so limited. Meaning give money to a priest, to an imam or
to a religious minister, a pastor or used for in with religion. What are these instances? Very limited.

It is saying only, that he should be assigned as armed forces chaplain. Second, is he is assigned to a penal instruction. Third,
government orphanage, maybe DSWD, if there is a chaplain there, you can receive money as your salutary probably and finally in a
leprosarium. Take note here that, for instances you serve as chaplain in a government hospital, can you get money, can you ask for
salary? No, it’s not allowed by the Constitution because it’s allowed only on those four instances. But that’s the subject matter of
many questions, very strange. Take note only that the prohibition of payment to a religious person is saying “as such”. So for instance,
Father Bernas was a member of the Constitutional Commission. We are sure that he receives money. He will not tell us how much but
we are sure because it’s not a prohibition because he is not being paid as such priest but in another capacity. So the prohibition only is
“as such”.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

Most taxes are for general purposes. Income tax, what’s the purpose why the government collects income tax? We do not
know for what it will be used. They give it to the Congressman as pork barrel. You also do not know actually for what it will be used.
I do believe you know only of one law, which is for special purpose: Special tax law.
I think some of you own properties and you pay real property tax every year. But in addition to that, what do you mean by
that? It’s something like special support for education fund. I cannot remember but it is educational fund. So that is a tax actually
where the money is segregated and it can be used only for that purpose. All other taxes, we do not know, how they were issued. I think
its better that we collect taxes for special purpose so that we know where they are going.

Brillantes, Jr., v. COMELEC


432 SCRA 269 (2004)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution 6712 titled General Instructions for the Electronic
Transmission and Consolidation of Advanced Results in the May 10, 2004 Elections. The project would cost about P55
million. However, in the General Appropriations Act for 2003 there was no appropriation for the conduct of an unofficial quick
count.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution is valid

HELD: No. The resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that “no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” By its own terms, the transmission and tabulation of the election results is
“unofficial” in character, meaning ”not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or government body.”
The implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring of additional manpower, technical services and
acquisition of equipment. Hence, it would necessarily involve disbursement of public funds for which there must be a
corresponding appropriation.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

Take note here that the provision is a bit tricky also. What does it say? By the way, who can pass laws conferring
jurisdiction? The answer is Congress. It is Congress who will say that, the MTC can try this, the RTC can try this, the CA can try this,
the Sandiganbayan can try this because it is the Congress who has authority to apportion jurisdiction. What does the Constitution say?
Congress can increase, it does not say it cannot increase the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it only states that it cannot increase the
appellate jurisdiction. You know what’s an appellate? There are two types of jurisdiction. When we say original jurisdiction you can
go directly to the Supreme Court. Very few cases. For instance you rape somebody. The rape will not be tried immediately before the
Supreme Court even if you are the Senator. Ok! Because you have to go to the procedure. The court will only entertain it on appeal.
We call it appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution does not say that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be increased
without its consent. It’s only saying that only the appellate jurisdiction cannot be increase. So meaning, Congress can create a new
remedy and say that this can be followed by the Supreme Court. But it cannot say that the decision of the Ombudsman will be
appealed to the Supreme Court. That cannot be done unless the Supreme Court will say, ok, we consent.

There are two cases on that now. The cases of Fabian vs Desierto and another case. The Congress passed a law saying that
appeal from the Board of Investment will be filed before the Supreme Court. The other one stated that appeals from the Ombudsman
would be filed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court stated null and void. You did not get our consent first. In the end you
will have to file the appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Constitution does not say that it cannot be done; it’s only saying that, get
the approval of the Supreme Court first.

Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.

I really do not know the relevance of this for the moment because it seems that we no longer pass laws, making, asking… and
whatever. I really do not find the relevance here but it seems that some commentators are saying that this is also a topic from the
American where they were under British Rule. So they want this to be added in the Philippines but for us it has very little relevance. It
has not been ask in the bar but I just want to call your attention. There is one bar question related to that. Try to link that with the
article; we will not discuss this article because it is part of Civil Service Law. Article 9-B Section 8. That was the one ask in the bar
not this one. What is Article 9 B? I used to tell students that when this came out in the bar (9B8). I was thinking that it was gone
because 9B8 keeps on moving. In the 1935 Constitution, that provision was in the declaration of principles. Then when they change
the Constitution, 1973 they put it in the Bill of Rights. Then in the 1985 they put that provision on the Civil Service that is Article 9
now. So it’s good to remember it because when it comes out, they say that it’s no longer there, that has been removed long time ago.
But when I scan the Constitution under the Civil Service provision which I am teaching, I noticed that it is stated there. What does it
say? No appointee for elective official shall accept without the consent of Congress any present, emolument, office of title of any kind
from any foreign government. Title of any kind can refer to title of royalty. So for instance you go to England, they say you are now a
Jew… now the Constitution is saying that before you accept it, get the consent of Congress. The one we are studying now is a bit
different. That is title from the Congress itself.

I have a student who asked me because sometimes we have this Kadayawan Festival. Sometimes some Congressman will
come here and the Manobo Tribe or the Bagobo will give them title. They say datu so and so… somebody asks, is it not prohibited by
the Constitution, that the Congressman will be receiving title of datu? No it’s not. What is only prohibited is a law passed by Congress
or maybe a title given to you by a foreign government not by the local tribes here. So it’s permissible.

Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.

Legislative power is delegated to Congress but Section 1 is saying it has reserved certain portion to the people through
referendum and initiative meaning that if we try to look at it Congress can pass ordinary laws but “we” the people can also pass
ordinary laws under Section 32. Now, this is the first time in the 1973 Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution we don’t have that power
because all laws have to be passed by Congress. Ok! This is to strengthen people power, people’s participation in government.

The next question that is asked is this. There are two parts in Section 32, one is the initiative, and the other one is referendum.
Which do you think is stronger of two powers?

Before answering that, look at how the Constitution describes them.


Q: What does it say about INITIATIVE?
A: The power to propose or enact.

Requirements:
1. In the proposal stage, the proposal must be supported by 10% of the number of registered voters. 3% of each district.
2. Second stage, the COMELEC will determine the authentication of signatures. Very difficult.
3. Assuming you have the no. of signatures needed, third stage will be referendum or voting stage.

Q: Can Congress repeal a law by initiative?


A: No. Once a law passed through initiative, it is impossible to be repealed. The only way for it to be repealed is by another initiative.

Q: What about REFERENDUM?


A: The power to reject or approve.

So which is stronger now? In initiative the entire process is in the people. For instance we want to pass a law making a crime
the abandonment of women, abandonment of your wife. Congress does not pass any law. It’s actually in the mood of passing it
because most of the Congressmen also abandon their wives.Ö We propose it and at the same time we enact the law. That’s why we
call it initiative. What about referendum? Referendum is only approval. So meaning somebody must have started it. Who started it?
Congress. We prepare a law then we approve it. Yes or No. So that is what we mean by referendum.

In the old days in 1992, if you look at the Constitution, one possible way by which it can be extended is if there is referendum
submitted by the people and the people approves to it. So it is a requirement. The other one is this; in the provision of the Constitution
we can change the name of the Philippines. We can change it to Magellan or whatever. If that happens Congress will have to pass a
law and the people will have to approve. So meaning you subjects it to a referendum. The process starts with Congress in a
referendum and we only approve or reject it. This one assumes that Congress does not want to do anything. So meaning go to the
entire process. The Constitution is saying that Congress should pass a law and Congress has done that. The law is actually is RA 6735.
It was approved August 4, 1989. So it’s an old law now.

When referendum is required:

1. Organic Act of the Autonomous Region of Mindanao


2. When you create a new municipality or city
3. When Congress would like to adopt a new name for the Philippines and a new national anthem

I will just discuss the provisions, which are significant. Section 5 in the provision of the Constitution is saying that if we want
to legislate a law, you need the support of 10% of the voters in the entire country. Now this is a big demand. I think in the Philippines
now there are around 10 million registered voters. You must have at least 10%. I think it’s almost impossible for an initiative on a
national legislation. I think you have seen many cases about initiative in small municipalities and small cities. For instance you want
to have an initiative on an ordinance. It’s possible it’s too small. But in this case it is very difficult. Several years ago they tried this.
But it is impossible. It is easy to get within Davao City. But try getting 10% in Basilan, in Tawi-tawi or in Jolo kung saan kahit bala
ng baril kinakain, oh laban?

Some items we need to discuss are these:

Q: Can we pass any law through initiative? For instance I am thinking of repealing the Rape Law so that there is no more crime of
rape. Can I propose that? Can the people approve it?
A: No.

Or I do not want to pay taxes; we just abolish all the tax laws. Actually it can be done. Everything can be done because if you
look at RA 6735 it is saying that prohibited measures Section 10, the following cannot be subject of initiative and referendum. One is
technical, no petition in more than one subject that goes back to one subject to one bill. The second one is the more substantive, no
initiative or referendum on statutes involving emergency measures. You remember what emergency measures, if you look at it the
Constitution is saying Congress can give emergency powers to the President. So this seems that it cannot be the subject of initiative
meaning it cannot pass and say that you’ll give emergency powers to the President. The Constitution is saying that only Congress can
do that. It is not given to us. So no other limitation. If we try to look at it, it seems that generally, anything can be passed, anything can
be repealed, and anything can be amended through initiative and referendum. The other question is this, suppose you decide a law
through initiative, can Congress say, Oh we do not like the law you passed, we will repeal. Because take note that Congress has
plenary power, it can repeal any law. If you look at the law, it appears that there is no grant on the part of Congress to repeal a law
passed by the people through initiative. I think it makes sense, why? Because the principle in which we are the sovereign, we hold
legislative power, we only delegate the power to Congress. So I think it makes no sense that we pass a law, Congress will repeal it,
otherwise, our power through initiative will be useless. That’s why it’s given to us. Another one is this, suppose we pass a law in
initiative can the President say “ ah …veto, veto, veto”, No more. A law passed through initiative is not subject to presidential veto. In
fact there is no requirement of the signature of the President. I think the answer to the bar question is inadequate. There seems to be
instances when a law can become a law without the veto by the President and that is a law passed through initiative. When does it take
effect? The law is saying 15 days after publication.

Local ordinances may be repealed only after it effectivity. Before the six months period, you cannot. After three years, you
can no longer repeal. A local sanggunian can repeal a local ordinance passed by initiative but only after six months up to three years.
Before or after that, you cannot.

Q: Can you go to SC and say that a law is unconstitutional?


A: Yes, you can. This is only an exercise of ordinary legislation. The principle is all laws must comply with the Constitution. You can
do it but only through amendment of the Constitution.
-oOo-

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

I will explain the provision very briefly. First we will discuss executive power and second we will discuss the meaning of
presidential immunity.

The first question is we go back to the basic thing. What is the executive? It is the power to execute laws. The next question
is, suppose there is no law, suppose there is no constitutional commission authorizing him to perform something? Can the President do
something not specifically authorized by the constitution not granted to him by the provision of a statute? Yes or No? The answer to
that question is not that easy. The first case that answers to that question is the case of Marcos vs. Manglapuz (177 SCRA 668). In
order to understand the case the first question is this: What was the power being exercised by the President? Who was the President at
that time? Cory Aquino. This is what happened. Marcos was out of the country. He wanted to return. What did Cory do? She stated
that …

“ Porbida! do not return to the Philippines”. Therefore she was invoking the power to bar or prevent the return of a citizen of
the Philippines. Ok. So it’s simple as that. So the issue therefore is …… because if you try to look at the Constitution, there is no
provision saying that the President can bar the return of people to the country. Congress at that time did not pass any law saying that
the President has the authority to stop people from coming back in the country. So the issue is:

Q: Can the President bar the return of people to the Philippines in the absence of any law or provision of the constitution?
A: The answer of the SC is yes he can do that.

Q: What is the basis of that power? Where did that power come from if we do not find it in the law?
A: First is this, look at the President. The President is the Chief Executive, second she is also Commander in Chief, and third, as such
she is also responsible for keeping the peace and order of the country. So out of these things, there are powers that maybe concluded to
exist in her office. Now what do you call this power according to the court? The court called this power as Residual Powers. Meaning
power not stated and not found in the Constitution and statute. What else? What did the court describe it? The court said that it might
be called implied powers. Meaning implied from the fact that he is Chief Executive or President. What else? What are other terms
used by the court? The court also described it as inherent power. Meaning, the power that is inherent in the office of the Chief
Executive without need of any specific Constitutional plans. So these are the terms used by the court for the powers of the President
not found in the Constitution.

Meaning if you try to look at the case the SC is saying only that when the President does something, there is really no
requirement that what he/she does is authorized by a provision of law or maybe authorized by a provision of the Constitution. Now we
go to the other cases. What is Laurel vs. Garcia (July 25, 1990) case? What was the power invoked by the President? The President
wanted to sell properties belonging to the Philippine government in Japan. The power is the authority to sell property belonging to the
Philippines. The issue therefore is, because it is not found in the statute nor the Constitution, can the President sell property without
any specific constitutional plan or authority from the statute? No. Take note that the court arrived at two different conclusions. In the
first case it stated that the President could do something not authorized by the Constitution. In the second case it states that the
President cannot if it is not authorized by the Constitution. What about the third one, Ople case. Who is the President there? Ramos.
What did Ramos do? The President wanted to impose this national ID system. Take note that the problem is that there is no law
authorizing him to do that. So Ople, a Senator went to the Supreme Court saying that “you cannot do that because we have not yet
passed a law allowing you to do that”. Does Ramos have the power to do that? The court arrived at a negative conclusion. The court
stated that “your job is to execute and implement the law, there’s no law to implement, so how can you do that, wait for Congress to
pass a law first”. So again these two cases are very restrictive interpretation of the executive power.

The other one is the expanded interpretation of executive power. The answer to the question, can the President do something
not authorized by law or a statute? Sometimes no, sometimes yes, it will depend if the Supreme Court will have to decide.
OPLE vs. TORRES
293 SCRA 141 (1998)

FACTS: Petitioner is challenging the validity of A.O. No. 308 issued by President Ramos entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System”. Among others, he claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but
a law, and hence beyond the power of the President to issue.

ISSUE: Is the issuance of A.O. No. 308 within the scope of the executive or administrative powers of the President?

HELD: No. The executive power is vested in the President. It is the power of carrying laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. The President is likewise granted administrative power over offices under his control to enable
him to discharge his duties. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by the proper governmental organs. To this end, he can issue administrative orders.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out legislative policy. A.O. No. 308, however, establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies—the primacy of national
security and the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by the government. As A.O. No. 308 does not merely
implement the legislative policy of the Administrative Code or any particular law for that matter, it is evident that it deals with
an issue that cannot be a subject of a mere administrative order.

REVIEW CENTER vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


583 SCRA 428 (2009)

FACTS: Following the leakage in the June 2006 Nursing Board Examination, President Arroyo replaced all the members of the
PRC’s Board of Nursing. The President also ordered the examinees to re-take the examination. She then issued Executive
Order No. 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in
the Philippines. Considering that under RA No. 7722 the mandate of CHED extends only to public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting programs in post-secondary educational institutions, is the executive power valid?

ISSUE: No. The executive order is a usurpation of legislative power. The scope of EO No. 566 clearly expands the CHED’s
coverage under RA No. 7722. The CHED’s coverage under RA No. 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post- secondary educational institutions. EO No. 566 directed the
CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an institution of
higher learning as contemplated by RA No. 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The
President may not amend RA No. 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.

We will discuss very briefly Presidential immunity.

Q: What do you mean by IMMUNITY? Freedom from being sued?


A: That means that simply that you are not subject to jurisdiction of courts or tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies.

Q: Does the Constitution provide for immunity of President from suit?


A: No. There is nothing in the Constitution saying that he is immune from suit.

By the way, it’s interesting that in the 1973 Constitution, they put there the provision the President is immune from suit: I
went over this afternoon the draft proposal of the new constitution prepared by Abueva and they expanded the immunity. They are
saying that Members of the Cabinet and Prime Ministers are also immune from suit. It is not found in the new constitution but the
Supreme Court is saying that even in the absence of a Constitutional provision, it appears that the Chief Executive is not subject to
jurisdiction of any court. Now take note that this is also the first time in international law. Ok. Meaning that if a chief executive from a
foreign country comes into the Philippines, no matter what he does he is outside jurisdiction of any Philippine courts. You cannot sue
him.

Q: What was the reason why the Court gave the President immunity?
A: According to the court to avoid distraction or disturbance in the performance of his functions. I think it’s easy. If you try to look at
this principle I am thinking that if that is the reason it would appear that the immunity is blanket.
For instance you cannot sue him criminally. For instance he rapes you then he accepts it. You cannot sue him because he
enjoys immunity from suit. The same with administrative cases. Meaning you cannot sue him in the Ombudsman to suspend him or to
remove him from office. If he happens to be a lawyer, you cannot disbar him. If he is a doctor, you cannot go to the PRC and let them
remove his license. If we try to look at it he is the only guy who seems to have a very nice privilege in the Philippines. I mentioned a
while ago that Chief Executives of other countries are also immune from suits. Ambassadors as well as consuls. If they do something
against you, you better stay away from these people because they enjoy immunity.

Q: What about the vice president? Is the VP immune from suit?


A: This one is rather problematic why because there is still no jurisprudence, even no commentator addresses the problem on whether
the VP is immune from suit. What is the reason why they gave the President immunity is so that he is not disturbed in the performance
of his function. What does the VP do? It is simply waiting for the President to resign.☺

Q: Can the immunity be waived? Meaning can the President give consent to be sued? A: The court stated that this is a personal right
so therefore it is subject to waiver.
Q: Who can waive it?
A: Definitely, since he knew the right he is the only person who can waive it not you filing a case against him or not you being sued
by him in return. In Beltran I think the President sued him and he tried to invoke immunity. The court said “No you are not the one
who should invoke it. It should be the President.”

The Estrada case brings the argument further. What this all about? They sued him for plunder. What did Estrada say? “
Excuse me, you cannot sue me because I am the President”. What did the Supreme Court say? “ Tanga! you resigned”. So the
principle in Estrada is after your term, when you are already a non-sitting President, you cannot invoke immunity. You’re subject to
suit.

Ok! So a non-sitting President is no longer immune from suit. Actually that was the same argument used by Marcos when he
was sued in New York and when he was sued there, he tried to invoke Presidential immunity. What did the American Supreme Court
say? “You are no longer the incumbent” . Even in international law you cannot claim immunity. The only cure against this people is
what? In order to sue them, the first thing you have to do is remove them. And the only way to remove him is through impeachment.
So far as long as he is not impeached he is still immune.

Q: What about if she cheated in the election? Can you sue her?
A: No, the solution is to remove her, impeach her and after that sue her. That is the only way.

Q: What about after the term?


A: In criminal cases, the court stated after your term you are subject to suits for the reason that when you commit the crime that is no
longer in the exercise of your functions. What about civil cases? When it comes to civil cases, you have to distinguish. For acts in the
exercise of your function and for acts which are not in the exercise. For instance you are my Secretary of Foreign Affairs and I dismiss
you. You cannot sue me during my term for damages. But after my term you sue me. I would say that no because it was in the exercise
of my functions as President. It is my prerogative, maybe the dismissal is erroneous but I can do that because that’s in the exercise of
my function. Suppose I borrowed 1 million from you during my term. You have a problem that you cannot sue me during my term.
What about after my term? Yes, because it is no longer related to my function.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO


353 SCRA 452 (2001)

FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial and the resignation of majority of the members of the cabinet and the defection
of the military and the police, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, Vice-President Arroyo was sworn into Office as President of the
Philippines, while President Estrada with his family left Malacañang. In the days that followed, various criminal complaints
were filed against Estrada before the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Estrada, a non-sitting President, still immune from suit

HELD: No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involved plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder, which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. There is no decision licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

GLORIA vs. CA
338 SCRA 5 (2000)

FACTS: In 1989, petitioner was appointed Schools Division Superintendent in Quezon City by the President. In 1994, the
Secretary of Education recommended her reassignment as Superintendent of Marikina Institute of Science and Technology which
was approved by the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Secretary of Education. In 1995,
upon petitioner’s instance, the Court of Appeals nullified the reassignment on the ground that it violated security of tenure.

ISSUE: Did the petition which questioned the order of reassignment approved by the President violate presidential immunity
from suit?

HELD: No. The petition was not directed against the President, but against the Secretary of Education and the Regional Director
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the
President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

Take note of the qualifications.

1) A natural born because this is a constitutional position. What about if you are a dual citizen? No problem, for as long as you
are natural born because there is no prohibition in the Constitution from becoming President if you are a dual citizen.
2) Registered voter. No problem with that. Able to write and read. Again the Constitution imposes no language qualification. It
does not say what language.
3) 40 years old for you to become President.
4) The last requisite is Residency of 10 years. Residence here means domicile. You need to be actually present for 10 years. If
you are out but you have the intention to return.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be
elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner
as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.

This is not difficult to understand. The first sentence is saying only that the Vice President shall have the same qualifications
as of the President because if the President dies, he will become the President. So it’s obvious that he should have the same
qualification.

So the second sentence is saying how he will be removed.

The third one is regarding appointment of Vice President as Member of the Cabinet. What do you mean Member of the
Cabinet? It means the position of Secretary.

Few years ago, Guingona was the Vice President. He was appointed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The last sentence was
about confirmation. We will discuss it later but he is the only person in the cabinet actually who requires no confirmation. All others
require confirmation. We will study the confirmation later when we go to Sections 15 and 16.

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six
years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall
end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No
person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May.
xxx

These are small items that I will just try to mention.


First is, remember the beginning and the end of the term. It is always uniform including of local officials. That is June 30
noon and it ends also in June 30 noon. So it’s all synchronized.
Take note on the term that they are allowed to serve. For the President, only once and then no more.

Q: Can Ramos become President again or be Prime Minister?


A: Definitely for our Constitution, he can be for the Prime Minister for the reason that, that will now be under the new Constitution.
It’s not the one we are using now. That’s why people are suspecting it. Once admitted, he wants to be Prime Minister.

Q: So what about the Vice President?


A: The Constitution is saying serve two terms. Suppose you ran one term for 6 years then another term for 6 years…Can you stop,
then run again for another 6 years term as VP? YES, because what is only prohibited by the Constitution is consecutive terms. So after
having 2 consecutive terms you can stop then you can run again. It is not prohibited. Suppose you are a President, can you run as VP
next election? Yes, because there seems to be no prohibition also. Maybe VP will have no problem when President dies because he
becomes the President. But the problem is, that is not by election. You got there by succession. So there seems to be no prohibition
regarding running again for the position of VP.

The second paragraph is the one applicable to Gloria. Gloria was the VP and then she became the President. The period she
served was less than 4 years, so she was able to run again. Next problem is, suppose she serves for exactly 4 years…no excess. Can
she run again? Yes. The Constitution is saying only that when you serve more than 4 years, you cannot run. If you serve for exactly 4
years, then you can still run again. That’s how they put it in the Constitution.

xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or
city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

First is the issue of Canvass. Second, what happens if there is a tie? Third is the jurisdiction of Presidential Electoral
Tribunal. We go over them one by one. First is regarding the canvass.

Q: Is the canvass the same as “counting of votes”?


A: No. “COUNTING OF VOTES” is when you count the ballots one by one. But in “canvass”, you only add the election return
usually that is by province or city. Take note here that when it comes to the Member of the House, the one canvassing the votes will be
the COMELEC. But when it comes to the President and the VP, it is the Congress. The Constitution requires that it should be in joint
public session.

Q: What do we mean by JOINT PUBLIC SESSION?


A: When we studied the provision of the Constitution in the Legislature, we learned that they act separately. It is a rare instance where
they are required to meet jointly. The provision is saying that they are supposed to meet when the Congress itself question to canvass.
There was a big problem during the last election. If you remember, they were canvassing the votes between Gloria and FPJ…and
between Legarda and de Castro. It appears that the position is constitutional but the counting is very slow. You have 2 houses and
everybody raise the objection. So if you allow the counting to go on in the 2 houses, it appears that it will be finished next year. What
they do is they form canvassing committees. They chose people from the Senate, opposition and also the body of administration and
people from the House. If we try to look at it, it is problematic because it is saying that it should be the Congress in joint public
session. So how come they did it in canvassing committee? The SC eventually would say that the Congress have the discretion if it is
given by the Constitution to do the canvassing then they should have the power to determine how it should be done. Since it is their
power which is full in nature then maybe you can sustain the possibility for the act of Congress when it decides to form committees
because the Constitution anyway calls no limitation here.

We go to the next item… regarding the tie. Tie is very rare but the language of the Constitution is not that clear that people
have different explanation regarding this. We have no problem, you have 2 candidates. We assume that the 2 got 10 million. I think it
is very difficult to get this. But the framers of the Constitution were very worried about this.

Q: How should they break the tie?


A: There are two explanations here. The explanation given by some people is, it will be Congress that would break the tie. Some
people would say that you have to win in the house. So for instance, it is A & B, the house would say that okay, A should be the
President. Then the Senate would also say that it should also A who should be the President. Eventually, you win in the two houses
separately. Now, I find it a bit problematic because it can always happen that the house is controlled by one party and the other is
controlled by the other party. They supported other party. So what do we have is A wins here, and B wins in the other house. It
appears that we will have no President at all. That is not covered by the Constitution. So what do we have? Do we have an election?
So I am thinking actually that my position is that we should tally the votes together and whoever gets the majority in the vote in the 2
houses combine should become President. My main reason for this is definitely we are not passing laws because in passing laws, the
law must get a majority of both house. But this time you are only acting as board of electors. We should tally the votes together. The
other reason is it can result to a big problem.

Suppose you have somebody winning in the house and losing in the other house. Ok. So we will end up with no President at
all. So my interpretation is that we just do it together. (punto legal gyud)

I’ll go to the third one. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which is created by the Constitution. Take note that the PET is
also the SC by another name. It uses that name when trying to resolve election contest between 2 Presidential candidates and also
between VP. There are many things to understand here. First is the decision involving Fernando. We know that when Fernando filed
his Certificate of candidacy, he was questioned because they were thinking that he was American. There were cases filed against him
to disqualify him. That was during the campaign. So what happened was this… Three cases were filed before the COMELEC and
three of those cases were filed before the SC sitting as electoral tribunal. Suppose you are challenging the qualification of a
Presidential candidate…that is during the election, where will you file the case? The answer of SC is we have no original jurisdiction
when it comes to qualifications of candidates in the position of President and VP. The reason is that because it speaks of an election
contest. So this presupposes that somebody has been proclaimed. If we try to look at the language, ‘qualifications of President and
VP.’

So meaning if you are still a candidate you are not yet President or VP, therefore it will be the COMELEC and its general
committee to administer laws that should entertain the question. So this is what happened. The three cases were filed directly to the SC
and the three cases were filed in the COMELEC. The three cases filed in SC were in favor of Fernando. They appealed to the SC.
What did the SC do? SC stated we will dismiss the cases filed before us. We have no jurisdiction because no one has been proclaimed
yet. But we will entertain the three cases filed before the COMELEC. What is the reason? We are exercising our appellate jurisdiction.
We are only reviewing the decision of the COMELEC, which is allowed. It was fortunate that there were many cases filed because if
all cases were filed in the SC. They would not have an occasion to rule on what is the citizenship of Fernando.

The next question that we will discuss is this regarding election protest. These are the things that we need to discuss about
election protest.

First is, election of cases given for President and VP pending before SC can be rendered moot and academic. Meaning before
a SC can resolve it, it may be useless to decide it because of certain developments. What are these possible developments? We will go
to the more uncontroversial one.

The first one is definitely is expiration of term. It has happened several times. What do you mean by expiration of term? I’m
challenging the election of Gloria but the SC is very slow to decide because sometimes the protestant will challenge all the contents of
the ballot boxes. We will have to recount them. It actually involves probably several thousands of boxes. SC will have no time usually
after 6 years, sometimes the COMELEC does that, after 6 years, the SC will say it is moot and academic because even if you win, you
cannot serve anymore because your term has expired. That happened actually in the case of Digos. It is a very interesting case because
he won for many terms as mayor when Digos is still a municipality. Then he stated that, it’s a city. I can run for another term. So he
ran again for fourth term and there was a protest. But the SC is very slow and the decision came out two weeks before the end of his
term. What I mean simply is, the protest will be rendered moot and academic if the term for which you are filing the protest has
expired.

The second one is this; apparently it appears that appointment to another position in a permanent capacity will render the
protest moot and academic. What do I mean by that? I have a protest against GMA. I was a candidate for President and afterwards I
will be the Secretary of Defense. If I accept the position, that will render my protest moot and academic. There is still no decision to
the President but there are other cases involving the same principle. Lower position…the court would say that acceptance to another
appointment in a permanent capacity will render the protest moot and academic.

The next one is the Santiago vs. Ramos (February 13, 1996) case. This one is a bit different. What is this case? You have
Ramos and Santiago both running for President. Santiago did not win. Santiago filed an election protest against Ramos but during the
protest, she decided to run as Senator and she won. And she assumes the position. What happened in her protest? SC stated that the
protest will have to be dismissed. Why? It seems that if we try to look at it, the principle seems to be that running and assuming
another position will render the protest moot and academic. I doubt it. Suppose you run and you lost? I am thinking that there’s no
problem. You run and you won but you did not assume…you said that I want to continue with my protest. I think it is really possible.
But if we try to look at the language of the SC, the court is very clear that you run, you won, and you assume. That is the instance
where you cannot continue with the protest. You cannot continue with the protest because it will be rendered moot and academic.
These cases are very important because Santiago is also an authority in Constitutional Law. She has books. She was using old cases
where the SC stated that when it comes to election contest, we should know who won. The fact that I run, I won and I assume should
not render my protest moot and academic. After the winner is proclaimed, then I go out. But the SC stated that you couldn’t abandon
it. This one is considered as abandonment of protest.

We will try to outline the principles:


1993 Run and lost è NOT moot and academic
1994 Run, won and did not assume è NOT moot and academic
1995 Run, won and assume è Moot and academic

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. RAMOS


253 SCRA 559 (1996)

FACTS: Santiago ran for the Presidency against Ramos in the 1992 Presidential election. She lost and filed an election protest
before the Supreme Court acting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In the May 8, 1995 election, she ran and won as Senator and
assumed office as such on June 30, 1995.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santiago’s protest can be dismissed

HELD: Yes. The term of the office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides
with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 election. The latter would be protestant Santiago’s
term if she would succeed in proving that she was the true winner in the 1992 election. In assuming the office of Senator,
Santiago has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or at the very least, abandoned her “determination to protect and
pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.” Such abandonment or
withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of the protest would serve public
interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election.

Last March 14, you have another problem. The case of Fernando. There are two protests between GMA and FPJ for the
position of President and at the same time there is also a protest between De Castro and Legarda. We all know that during the protest
between GMA and FPJ, FPJ died.

Q: What is the effect of the death of the protestant in the protest?


A: We have to be very careful about this because there are too many cases where SC stated especially positions of Mayor, Governor…
the jurisprudence is too well established that the death of the protestant will not render the protest moot and academic. Also the death
of the protestee will not render the protest moot and academic.

What is the reason? For instance in the position of President, if the protestant die, the protestee continue because he have the
interest to find out who really won. Suppose it turned out that the dead man won. What happens is, you have no President. But who
will replace him? It would be the VP by succession. Suppose this is what happened, the protestee dies, the protest will not be rendered
moot and academic because it may turn out later that the protestant really won. Then he will become President.

We will go back to the case of FPJ. This is how SC resolved it technically. March 29, 2005, this is the case of FPJ and GMA.
After FPJ died… so no more protestant. What did Susan Roces do? She filed a Motion for Substitution. Okay! So the problem is this,
if you try to look at the Rule of Electoral Tribunal, it is saying only the registered candidate for President or VP of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President. Only the real party in interest in an
election contest for President is the person who got number 2 or 3 votes. So in this contest, it is only FPJ. If you only get number four,
like for instance Roco, he has no authority to file the protest. The one who filed the motion for substitution was Susan Roces, so in
effect, she has no personality. Why? Because she will not be benefited. Even if it turned out that FPJ won, the wife cannot become the
President because there was no law saying that it will be the wife who will succeed in the event that the husband dies. We cannot
allow you to substitute. As a rule, according to the court, the protest die…no party has substituted on time so therefore the protest
cannot continue. So the principle is saying that death does not render the protest moot and academic provided that there should be a
proper party who will substitute. Now in this context, who would have filed a proper motion for substitution? I am thinking that
Lacson would be too far. The first one who should file is De Castro. He is the proper party in interest because if it turned out that FPJ
was actually the one who won, he will be the successor. What about Legarda? Legarda could have been a proper party to file for a
motion for intervention. She would say, actually it was FPJ who won, and I also won over De Castro. So the protest was dismissed not
because of the death of Fernando but because there are no proper substitution of party. That’s it.

POE, JR. vs. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO


454 SCRA 142 (2005)
FACTS: On June 24, 2004, Congress, acting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
the winner in the May 10, 2004 Presidential Election. Poe, who garnered the second highest number of votes, filed an
electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. On Dec. 14, 2004, however, before his protest could be resolved,
Poe died.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the protestant rendered the protest moot and academic;
Whether the Motion to Intervene as Substitute for Deceased Protestant filed by his surviving spouse be given due course;

HELD: As to the first question, death does not render the protest moot. While the right to a public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such
that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. However, under the rules of the PET,
only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. The provision of the Rules of Court on substitution cannot
apply because public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible upon death. The widow cannot
claim to be a real party in interest. Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be
determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting
President shall take the following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or
Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In
case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].

I think there is not much to the provision to be explained. If you will notice. There is a portion, which is inside the
parenthesis. The purpose is, it seems that because in some jurisdiction usually they do not want to mention that in the Constitution for
the reason that it is taking a position in or that it favors a religion. So that is why they are open to a possibility of having a President
who does not believe in God and if that happens they can go on without mentioning, “So help me God”. They want to ensure that the
freedom of religion is also safeguarded.

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President
shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was
approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.

Ok! Nothing very difficult. But first is, if you try to look at the first sentence, the Constitution is clear that the President has
an official residence (Malacañang). But when it comes to the VP, the Constitution does not mention anything. So we can conclude
actually that the President and VP do not enjoy the same privilege. While they are required of the same qualifications it does not
necessarily follow that they are entitled to the same privileges. That is why I am not very sure regarding the issue of non-suability or
immunity of the VP. It seems logical to argue that the VP does not enjoy it also. Ok! So this is one limitation.

The next item is regarding salary. I think all positions in the government when it comes to salary, it’s always determined by
Congress. So we have no problem with that. It’s determined by law. If you remember the provision in the legislative it was very
specific that it can be increased but it will not take effect during the term.

Q: What about decrease?


A: You will notice that in the provision on the legislature there is no prohibition on decrease but in the provision in the President there
is a specific prohibition that it cannot be decreased.

I think the reason is obvious because anyway Congress is the one passing the law regarding increase and decrease so there
should be a provision included in the President but not when it applies to them because it’s obvious that normally they will not
decrease their own salary.(tumpak!) Now, the very important item that you need to understand is that they are prohibited from
receiving any salary or compensation from the government or any other source.

What is the “significance of any other source”? This seems to apply from private sources, meaning that they cannot be a
consultant of corporations, they cannot hold maybe a sideline in any other job. Why is it important? Because if you notice there is no
equivalent prohibition if you are a Member of Congress. The prohibition there, only applies government corporations, subsidiaries and
government subdivisions or agencies but nothing on the private sector. The prohibition in the executive is more stringent than when
you are occupying a position in the legislature because there seems to be a total prohibition for any other job if you are President or
Vice President. Take note that the VP can be a Member of the Cabinet. I think you know that. So the present provision is telling us
that he cannot get additional income even if he holds a position as a Member of the Cabinet because there’s a prohibition here. So
that’s it.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect
shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
xxx

Sections 7, 8 and 9 are regarding succession. Section 7 is a bit different from Section 8 because usually we describe it as at
the beginning of the term.

Q: What do you mean by at the BEGINNING OF THE TERM?


A: The answer is June 30 because this is the beginning of the term. We know that there is supposed to be a counting of who is
President. The situations covered by these sub-paragraphs were this: When does the VP become President? When we speak of VP
here, we mean actually the VP who has just been elected. We do not mean the VP who was elected 4 years ago because we know that
as of June 30 the term of that guy ends. So the Constitution speaks of the VP who had just been elected. When will he become
President? We say that this is only temporary. The first situation is when the President fails to qualify? When you go to second year
when you study the law of Public Officers, the word qualify has two meanings and only one applies to us. Qualify means taking the
required oath. If you have not yet taken the oath on any position of the government, it means that you have not yet qualified. The other
context in the law on Public officers on the word qualify is posting a bond. There are other positions in the government where you
have to post a bond before you can qualify but we do not have that in the office of the President or VP. So obviously the only situation
contemplated is that you have not yet taken your oath.
It’s a bit confusing because sometimes when we speak of qualification we mean different things. We mean, what is the
qualification of the President? You have to be 40; you have to be a Filipino citizen. That is not what we mean because it will become
absurd. So for instance you cannot say, the President is only 39; he will be 40 so he will sit. Definitely, that is not what we mean by
qualified. Ok! Qualify simply means that he has not yet taken his oath. We do not know how that can be. Maybe the counting is not
yet finished, or maybe he has been proclaimed but he has not yet taken his oath for the position. So the VP elect will become
President.

Now I mentioned that this is only temporary. Temporary in a sense that once the person qualifies or takes his oath then he
comes in. So the VP goes back to his position. The second one is, the President, shall not have been chosen. This one was the problem
during the last election. I think there was a counting but some people are delaying the counting. So it’s now June 30 and no President
yet, nobody is proclaimed so that the President should have not yet been chosen. It’s a bit strange because usually when the President
has not yet been chosen it always follows that the VP has also not yet been chosen because the votes for both offices are counted
together and at the same time. But anyway, it seems to be that the VP has been chosen but there is still no President, maybe there are
protests going on. The third one is a bit different. It is also the beginning of the term but the President elect died or become
permanently disabled.

Now we say that this is a bit different because the VP becomes President up to the end of the term. Ok, so he will serve the
entire term. So that is the difference between the first two and the third one.
Section 7 (paragraph 5&6)

xxx
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President
or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph.

The question is, when will the Senate President or the Speaker of the House become President? Take note that only one
occupies the position. There is no simultaneous occupancy. Meaning, if the Office of the President and VP is vacant, it will be the
Senate President who will become President. The speaker does not become VP at the same time. If the Senate President is not
available, it will be the Speaker who becomes President. So there is no simultaneous occupancy of positions under these situations.
The first one is no President or VP has been chosen or qualified. That is what I mentioned a while ago. Suppose it was June 30 and the
counting is not yet finished in the year 2004, who would have been President there? Drillon, would have been the one who would
benefit because he was the Senate President at that time. The Senate President has the priority. The next scenario is the President and
VP die or become permanently disabled. I think it’s easy to imagine. The last scenario is suppose you kill all of them. The President,
the VP, the Senate President, the Speaker what will happen? Who will become President? What does the Constitution say? Congress
will pass a law to answer the eventuality. So the framers of the Constitution worried about the scenario.
Q: Will the Senate President continue until the end of the term?
A: No. The Speaker of the House will take over when there’s no Senate President. Only one at a time.

Q: What will happen when the Senate President is acting President? What will happen in the Senate? Must he sign the bill twice?
A: No. When the Senate Pres is acting Pres there will always be an acting Senate President. You cannot sign the bill twice.

Q: What happens if at the beginning of the term the Pres or VP/Senate Pres or Speaker of the House will die? Who will take over?
A: Congress will pass a law to answer the situation. Until now, they have not yet done it.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the
Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or
resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting
President.

When VP becomes President permanently:


1. President dies.
2. President is permanently disabled (moral, mental, physical)
3. Resignation
4. Removal

What distinguishes Section 8 from Section 7? If we try to look at it, it seems to answer the same question. The VP becomes
President and this one is permanent. Another distinction is Section 7 applies to beginning of the term and Section 8 is in the middle of
the term.

Q: What then do we mean by “IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TERM”?


A: Do not take this literally. That simply means that the President has started serving and he dies. We call it in the middle since it is no
longer Section 7, what will come in is Section 8. There are four situations covered here. The President dies, I think it’s easy to
understand. Then permanent disability, the Supreme Court has defined it.

Q: What do you mean by PERMANENT DISABILITY?


A: Prior to the discussion in Estrada most of us are thinking that disability means physical disability. Maybe you become insane. But
when the Supreme Court decided Estrada’s case it stated that permanent disability can be physical, it can be mental or it can be moral.

Q: Why did the Supreme Court expand it?


A: Because actually if we try to look at Estrada he was never physically incapacitated. We know that the entire cabinet resigned, the
Arm Forces withdrew their support. So under this situation you cannot expect him to run the government even if he was still
physically able. No cabinet anymore, no police, no army, so it’s practically useless. So the court expanded it by saying physical,
mental or moral.

The court actually did not specify what applies to him. Some people suspected it is mental.☺ Anyway that is the meaning of
permanent disability.

The next one is removed and I think you know the only way to remove is by impeachment. Then resigns, that there are only
four situations when the VP becomes President permanently and we also have situations on when the can the VP becomes President
temporarily. One question that was raised was this; I think you know that during the time of Ramos he used to go out of the country.
He travels. If he goes out of the country can you invoke that the VP will succeed. The answer is that the Constitution does not provide
for it.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO


353 SCRA 452 (2001)

FACTS: Following the jueting scandal, at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, Vice-President Arroyo was sworn into Office as
President of the Philippines, while President Estrada with his family left Malacañang. Shortly thereafter, criminal cases were filed
against Estrada. Claiming that he did not resign but is temporarily unable to discharge the duties of the Office, Estrada now prays
that the Court declare Arroyo as an Acting President.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Estrada actually resigned

HELD: Yes. The validity of resignation is not governed by any formal requirement. It can be oral, it can be written. It can be
implied. In this case, it can be determined from his acts before, during and after January 20 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence that he resigned. These evidences include the diary of Senator
Angara which provides a window to the mind of Estrada during the period of crises. Estrada’s proposal to hold a snap election
wherein he would not be a candidate, his negotiating position that he simply wanted a transition period of 5-days, and
finally the aborted draft agreement wherein it was stated that he would resign January 20, prove this. His resignation was
confirmed by his leaving Malacañang, during which he did not say that he was leaving simply due to a kind of inability and that he
was going to reassume the presidency as soon as it disappears.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was
elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 9 is what happens during the time of Estrada. There was a vacancy in the Office of the VP because when Macapagal
became President definitely there was a vacancy in the Office of the VP. Is she required to nominate somebody from the Senate as
what she did because we know that the one chosen was Guingona. He was at that time Senate President. The Constitution does not say
that you have to nominate somebody from the Senate. You can also nominate somebody from the House, no problem. In fact you can
nominate an ordinary member of the House. No problem. In fact you have to be confirmed by the two houses. How should the
confirmation be done? You have to get the majority from the House and also majority in the Senate. What’s the language? “All the
members.” Meaning, absolute majority. What happens for instance you get absolute majority in the House and not in the Senate? You
do not become President. The President will again nominate somebody until such time that the two Houses will concur in the
nomination. So it is not a very difficult procedure. There is no such thing as breaking the tie anymore.

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices
of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held
not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and
shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph
4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.

The only question that we are trying to discuss is when is there is snap election. Some people would say that snap election is
illegal. I think it’s not. The Constitution allows a snap election. When we say snap election that is an election for the office of the
President and VP, which is not a regular one, not the one scheduled by the Constitution. There is only one possibility when you can
have a snap election; even now it’s possible. But there are requisites that must concur. One is there must be a simultaneous vacancy in
the Office of the President and VP. Take note that it has to be simultaneous. Why? Because if the Office of the President only
becomes vacant, we do not have special election. The VP becomes President and also if only the Office of the VP becomes vacant we
still cannot have special election because the President can only nominate somebody from the house or the Senate to fill in the
vacancy.

The first requisite therefore that the two offices must be vacant at the same time. The second is that the vacancy occurs 18
months before the next regular election. Take note that it is the vacancy that must occur within the period not the election because the
election usually will be held two months after. What is important is that the vacancy happens more that 18 months prior to the next
election.

Definitely when GMA resigns there can be no special election because De Castro will come in. If the two will resign
definitely what will happen is Drillon will only become President temporarily because the vacancy occurs more than 18 months before
the next Presidential elections. So there is no way that Drillon can become President until the end. The only time when VP becomes
President until the end is when the two positions become vacant and it is less than 18 months because he will finish the term.

We know that voluntary renunciation insofar as the President is considered also consummation of his term. What about De
Castro? He runs again. Why? Because he is entitled for 2 terms anyway.
Q: Is calling for the resignation of the President unconstitutional?
A: Actually it is not exactly unconstitutional. It is sometimes extra constitutional because you are forcing her to resign. But there is
nothing wrong if she resigns. The principle is this: resignation is constitutional. If you pressure her to resign by people power, that is
now extra-constitutional. People power is beyond the ambit of the Constitution and it’s not illegal because we are the sovereign.

By the way, take note that there is one thing I want to emphasize here. In the event that the Office of the President and VP is
vacant you have the Senate President acting. You need a law calling for special election. If you try to look at it a law calling for
special election is exempted from any requirement which we study in passing a bill. So for instance there is no more reading on 3
separate days. If you look at it the Constitution is only saying that you have to read 3 times but it need not be on separate days. So it
has to be read 3 times but not necessarily within different days. I think I have explained to you what the instances are when a bill
becomes a law without the signature of the President. What are the instances? That is when there is an override. In this situation the
acting need not sign it anymore? In fact he cannot veto it because it will become problematic because if he vetoes it, what will happen
is, he will become President until the end. That’s why he is not given the power to veto a bill calling for special election. So I guess
that’s the most important topics that we need to understand regarding the procedure. A bill certified by the President as urgent.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and
until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged
by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in
accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

The provision is very elaborate but it is only saying a very simple matter. First is, why was this introduced in the new
Constitution? The reason is the problem during the time of Marcos when it seems that he was dying. Every time there is a report that
he was dying, Malacañang would come up with a statement that he was writing a book. So to avoid that kind of problem they have
this provision who will determine whether the President is disabled or incapacitated.

The first one is, it belongs to him. He will transmit a written declaration that he is unable to perform with his function. What
if he is comatose? How can he do it? They are saying that it will be the Members of the Cabinet who will also determine it. Second
choice. What vote is required? Majority. They are worried about disagreements between the two. Who will determine if there is
disagreement? It will be the Congress who is given the power. Take note that the voting requirement is very high, 2/3.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health.
The members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.

I think in the True or False, I asked the question: the Secretary of Health is given access by the Constitution to find out if the
President is sick. There are no specifics mentioned. The Secretary of Health in all cases is a doctor but he is not included.

Q: When the President is sick, should the Secretary of Health be allowed to fill in?
A: Not mentioned in the Constitution.

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

The first thing that you need to understand is the scope of the prohibition because this is actually prohibition regarding some
appointments. The first thing that we need to understand is suppose I am an officer of Custom. Do I fall under the prohibition in
Section 13? NO. That is why it is good to understand what this section tells us, the scope of four officials covered by Section 13
regarding having additional office. Definitely, a Commissioner of Custom is not covered.

Section 13 only covers:


1.) The President;
2.) The VP;
3.) The members of the Cabinet - meaning those with the rank of Secretary and also Deputies and Assistants of the
members of the Cabinet; and

4.) Assistant Secretaries.

These are the only officials covered by Section 13. So if you are a Commissioner of Custom, you do not fall under any of
them. When we speak of the members of the Cabinet, I think you only have around 30 to 40 people. When we speak of deputies and
assistants, you have many because sometimes a Cabinet Secretary will have 2 or 3 deputies or they will have also 4 or 5 assistants. It’s
very difficult to count actually the people under # 4 but we know their titles… deputy or assistant secretary.

What are the prohibitions regarding them? This one is very important.
The first one is they cannot hold any other office. What the Constitution therefore is saying, if you belong to the enumeration
under the executive, you cannot hold only one position. Is that an absolute prohibition? NO because it is saying unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution. In the CLU case, the SC stated that Congress couldn’t pass a law authorizing them because the exception
is only found in the Constitution. In a few minutes, I will tell you what are these exceptions found in the Constitution. What else are
they not allowed? They are not allowed directly or indirectly. It is very important here that it’s saying indirectly because some people
would do something to their spouses. That will be indirect, it is also prohibited.

What are the others? They cannot practice their profession. You remember what I told you? If you are a Congressman, can
you practice your profession? YES. But if you are a member of the Cabinet and deputy or assistant, you are not allowed to practice
any profession. Absolute.

You are also not allowed to participate in any other business. Take note, any other business. Why is that important? When
you study actually the prohibition on members of the Constitutional Commission, for instance, members of the COMELEC… the
prohibition is you are not allowed to participate in any other business that will be affected by the function of your office. So meaning,
only ‘business affecting the functions of your office’…but here it is saying ‘any other business’…period! So that means you cannot do
anything anymore.

The other one is you cannot be financially interested in contracts with the government.

Q: Can you enter into a contract with, for instance, the City Government of Davao only not the national government?
A: Look at the Constitution. It says some divisions are covered. In fact, Corporations formed by the Government are covered also. It
seems that this is a blanket prohibition if there is also conflict of interest. So that’s it.
I mentioned a while ago “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution”. Meaning the Constitution can allow you to hold other
position. What are these instances? The exceptions:

The first one is VP can become Member of the Cabinet.

The other one which we will study later on is the Secretary of Justice is allowed to be a member of Judicial and Bar Council
because it is required by the Constitution.

The third one is not found in the Constitution but it is allowed by the SC in the CLU vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194
SCRA 317 – 1991) case. That is when you hold a position as ex-officio capacity. What do you mean by EX-OFFICIO? That means
that you are not appointed anymore to the other position. So the best example I will give is this…some of you are officers of this
class...President and VP. If you are the President and the VP of the class, you are automatically a member of the Student
Council…meaning you are not appointed anymore to the other position. You hold it only until such time that you hold the main
function. If you lose the main position, you automatically lose the other one. The SC stated however that it is very important that in
ex-officio capacity it is without additional compensation.
Q: Why is an ex-officio allowed?
A: It is allowed because according to the SC, when you hold the other office in an ex-officio capacity, that is not another office. That
is only additional work…that is only additional function. That is why it is allowed.

But take note also that when it is ex-officio, it must be related to your main function. For instance, I am the Secretary of
Education, I am also a member of the Board of BSP… it is related. I am the Secretary of Labor; I am also a member of the Board of
the National Manpower Council… that is related.

Q: What about allowances? What about per diems? What about bonuses? Are they entitled?
A: That was answered by the NAC and Bitonio Cases. What did the SC say? According to the SC, you are not allowed to get
compensation, you are not allowed to get allowances, you are not allowed to get per diems or any money or anything… you cannot get
it because that is prohibited by the Constitution. It means only additional work without anything in return.

BITONIO vs. COA


425 SCRA 437 (2004)

FACTS: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 (RA 7916) designated the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
or his authorized representative as a member of the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. The law further authorized
members to receive per diems of not less than the amount equivalent to the representation allowances of the members of the
Board.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner, who attended several board meetings as representative of the Secretary, entitled to per diems

HELD: No. Sec. 13 of Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibits Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant
Secretaries from holding other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensations therefore, except where the Constitution expressly provides. It must be noted that petitioner’s presence in the PEZA
Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted,
there was no separate or special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the
Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The prohibition from receiving extra compensation applies, whether it be in the
form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other euphemism.

NAC v. COA
437 SCRA 655 (2004)

FACTS: National Amnesty Commission is a government agency created through Proclamation No. 347 to process amnesty
applications. It is composed of 7 members, including the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government
as ex officio members. After attending the initial meetings, the ex officio members turned over their responsibilities to their
representatives.

ISSUE: Whether representatives of the Secretaries lawfully receive honoraria for attending the meetings of NAC

HELD: No. Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution prohibits the President, Vice-President, the members of the cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, from holding any other office during their tenure. In
addition, paragraph 2, Sec. 7, Art. IX-B bars all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions.
The NAC ex officio members’ representatives, who are appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary, are not
exempt from the prohibition because there is no law creating a new office and authorizing additional compensation. In addition, the
ex-officio members’ representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his
official family. They are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from receiving.

Suppose I am the Secretary of Justice…then I am a member in an ex-officio capacity of something. I will say I am too
busy… I will allow an ordinary worker to attend. Can you say that, “ Okay, I will get my allowances”. The SC stated that even
subordinate employee who is a Secretary or Asst. Secretary is also prohibited from getting any allowance. The reason is if the
principal does not have the right…with more reason will a subordinate does not have the right. So that’s it. That is also the decision in
Bitonio and NAC cases. So that is insofar as the first portion is concerned. We will go further:

The second portion contains as prohibition on appointments of relatives of the President. Who are covered?
1. The spouse – (Mike Arroyo in the case of GMA);
2. The relatives within the fourth civil degree by affinity or consanguinity – first cousins will be the last one in the fourth civil
degree. After that, it is already permissible. By the way, what is the legal term when you appoint your relatives? Nepotism.
What are the positions that these people cannot be appointed to? These positions are members of the three Constitutional
Commissions which are the COMELEC, CSC, and COA;
3. The Ombudsman – they cannot be appointed as Secretaries and Undersecretaries; and
4. The broadest is the Chairman and Heads of Bureaus.

By the way, some positions will not be designated as a Bureau but they are of the same rank. Now can you appoint them in
lower position? If you are appointed as teachers or principal…can you do that? As a matter of Constitutional law, you have no
problem. But as a matter of Civil Service Law, you will find a problem. You will find problem because of a law not because of the
Constitution.

PUBLIC INTEREST VS ELMA


G.R. No. 138965 (March 5, 2007)

FACTS: Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) on
30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

ISSUE: WON the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold the position of Chief Presidential Legal Counsel

HELD: The crucial test in determining whether an incompatibility exists between two offices is whether one office is
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other. In this case, an
incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of the various
executive departments and agencies, as well as other presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the
CPLC.

Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the
elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

First is this, there are four kinds of appointments described in the Constitution:
1.) Appointments made by the Acting President (sec 14)
2.) Midnight appointments (sec 15)
3.) Regular appointments (sec 16)
4.) Ad Interim appointment (sec16)
These are the four kinds of appointments mentioned by the Constitution.

Before we discuss, the power to appoint is executive in nature. It belongs to the President but you will learn later on that the
Constitution authorizes other officials to appoint to ensure independence. For instance, in the Judiciary, they can appoint their own
officers. The usual practice is this, Congress creates an office…when you create an office…you need a law. Congress will also give
the qualifications. But the task of giving it belongs to the President. In some cases, Congress would create an office and say that this
person is appointed. The Court would say, No…that cannot be done. Congress has no business appointing. It belongs to the President.
There is another case where Congress gives a very narrow qualification in the case of Gordon. The case is I think Torres vs. Drilon.
But this is what Congress did… we hereby create the offices of SBMA. Then they stated that the person that should be appointed in
the office is the Mayor of Olongapo. Take note that there is only one Mayor in Olongapo. The President appointed somebody else.
The SC said null and void because the power to appoint is discretionary. The President can exercise discretion.

SC told us that when the Congress will lay down the qualification for the office, it must be general in such a way that any
people can fit in. it cannot create an office with a very specific qualification in such a way that only one person can fill because if that
is the case, the appointing power will be severely limited.

Section 14 is very simple. This refers to the appointments made by the acting President. So in the exam we had that question
on when can we have an acting President? Answer is when the President is temporarily disabled. Section 14 is saying that we have in
some cases, we only have an acting President and the Constitution is saying that he can make an appointment. But the principle is, an
acting President can only make temporary appointment. Can it become permanent? Yes, if the President does not revoke it within 90
days from the time he assumes his position. It is interesting to know that I am thinking, if you look at the Constitution, this is the only
time when the power of the Acting President is circumscribed…is limited. Some students would ask me, could the acting President
declare Martial Law? I have not seen any limitation because the only time that the Constitution limits the power of the Acting
President is when it comes to appointment. The Constitution is only saying that you cannot make a permanent appointment. All other
are silent. I am thinking that if the Constitution is silent, you can do anything because this is the only time when they limit the power.

What is the reason anyway that we should consider it to be temporary only?

Generally, these are the people who will work for the President. So these people who have been appointed will have the trust
and confidence of the President. That’s why the acting President cannot make permanent appointment because they will be working
with them permanently. So the authority is given to the President whether to make them permanent or not.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

We call this midnight appointments. Why? Justice Cruz tells us that this is midnight appointment because this is what the
President does before he leaves office. It will be dangerous for the country if you allow him to do that because in the end it will be his
political power who will be given office before he leaves. So he will not leave jobless. He will not be jobless when he comes back.

One question that I asked in the True or False was the prohibition of the President from making midnight appointments for
60 days only? False. How long does it last? Almost 4 months not only 60 days. The President cannot make an appointment 2 months
before the next election. Usually, the election is second Monday of May and until the end of his term. When does his term end? June
30. So that will be from March 11 up to June 30. Actually, its not only 2 months but it would last for about 4 months. Suppose the
Chief Justice dies within the prohibition…can the President say that it is for public service so as not to disrupt public service, I will
exercise my power to appoint a Chief Justice within the prohibition. Can he do that? Take note, what will be permissible under
exercising public service. Appointments only to executive position, it is good to understand that. Meaning is does not apply to the
Judiciary. It does not apply to the 3 commissions because the rule is its only executive position. It’s good that we clarify that.

If you look at the Constitution, whenever a vacancy in SC occurs now, the President must file it within 90 days. That is the
requirement. Suppose there is a vacancy in the MTC, RTC, CA… it is required by the Constitution that from the time the Judicial and
Bar Council submits the list…the President must appoint within 90 days from the time of submission. This is what happened during
the time of Ramos. The JBC, the list to be appointed. Note that the prohibition to him is about 120 days or about 4 months. And they
give him the name until that prohibition. So Ramos stated that, I have to appoint because if I do not appoint…I will be guilty of
culpable violation of the Constitution. If he appoints, he will be guilty of violation of Constitution. If he does not appoint, he will also
be guilty because he said that I have to fill it within 90 days. When the matter reached the SC, this is how SC resolved it. According to
the SC, if vacancy in the Judiciary occurs within the period of prohibition, you have no obligation to fill in because this is considered
to be a specific prohibition. The 90 days period will only come when the midnight prohibition does not apply. In all other cases, if the
midnight prohibition, you have to fill in within 90 days. Take note of the De Rama decision. De Rama was a mayor who was about to
leave office. Does the prohibition on Midnight appointments apply to the local executives? Governor…Mayor? No. According to the
SC, this applies only to the President. It applies only to appointments made by the President himself.

Take note that the Constitution does not make an absolute prohibition because we are told that there are exemptions. So these
are the exemptions. These are the requisites.
1. The appointment must be temporary.
2. To executive positions – it can refer to two things:
a. The executive department only because you will learn later that the President can appoint people also in the
judiciary like judges and justices.
b. It applies to higher positions compared to a lower position.

What about the COMELEC, can we have temporary appointments in the COMELEC? The answer is definitely no because
take note that we mention that before, the COMELEC is considered to be an independent body. That does not belong to the executive
department. In fact you will learn later that it is a direct prohibition on temporary appointments in the COMELEC. That is why you
cannot make temporary appointments in the COMELEC at any time.

3. The third one is a bit general. It is saying that continued vacancy will prejudice public service. Take note here, it does not tell
us what other position. It will simply be a general prescription. The requirement is continued vacancy will prejudice public
service. So it is very difficult to tell it outrightly. The most we can imagine probably is that we have a war. The Secretary of
Defense should be appointed. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs will also be necessary. Those are possible positions that will
endanger public service or public safety if you will not fill it in immediately.

It refers to executive positions. The other appointments of the President which are not in the executive, this pertains to the 3
Commissions: the COMELEC because they are appointed by the Commissions. Congress, they are appointing their subordinates and
also, Judiciary. So it seems that it is limited only to the executive departments. Take note also of the positions that can cause problems
in public service – Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the like.
Take note also of the Villanueva decision. President Ramos appointed the Judge of RTC during midnight period. What is the
reason? If there is a vacancy, if somebody dies, it has to be filled in immediately. That is the rule of the Constitution. But the problem
is, suppose it falls within the 4 months, must the President appoint? The SC answered no. Take note, judges of the SC or judges of the
judiciary is not an executive position. So you are not allowed to make appointments during midnight period. So that is an absolute ban
for you.

There seems to be a conflict in the Constitution. The statement is saying, do not make a midnight appointment, on the other
hand, make an appointment within 90 days. So the SC stated that we will consider the 90 days requirement. Generally, make an
appointment within 90 days except when it falls within the midnight period. So that is how they tried to harmonize the provision. One
is the general rule, the other is the exception.

DE RAMA VS COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 131136 (February 28, 2001)

FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter
dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen
(14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of
the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of
Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

ISSUE: WON the said employees were “midnight appointees” proscribed by the Constitution.

HELD: The constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Categories:
1. The President shall appoint the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, etc… and other officers whose departments are
vested in him in this Constitution.

2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
- The Congress creates an office but it does not tell us who will fill in that office. So it will be the President who will fill it in
even if the law is silent.

3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.


- The Congress creates an office, it tells us that the President will fill it in.

4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest the in the President alone.
- What separates it from others is the word alone.

“In the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” – they are not presidential appointees anymore.

Which will require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments? SC answered only no. 1. If you belong to other
categories, 2,3,4, the President alone can appoint you without any confirmation by the COA.

Requiring Confirmation:

1. Heads of the Executive Department


It does not say members of the cabinet because there are some people who are members of the cabinet but are not heads of
executive departments. That will be the rank of Secretary – Secretary of National Defense, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of
Education and the like. Take note that it does not take assistants and deputies.

I have asked in the true or false, suppose you are appointed as the Asst. Secretary of Foreign affairs, are you privileged for
confirmation? No. Because what is required is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Members of the Cabinet.

2. Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.


These are officials in the Foreign Service. When we talk about ambassadors they are actually the heads of diplomatic
missions and in almost all countries in the world, we have a Philippine Embassy where there are ambassadors. There are officials in
the Foreign Service but they are not covered by the confirmation, for instance you have the charges de affairs. The other term is “other
public ministers”. In Congress, this has been part of the British Commonwealth Empire. Consuls are regarded as commercial
representatives of the Philippine Government. In one country you have one embassy but it happens that we have several consulates,
for instance in the US. I think we have in San Francisco and other states. That is in so far as the Foreign Service. I am thinking that
vice consuls need no confirmation because the constitution is saying only consuls.

3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel/naval captain.

You need to understand that when the Constitution speaks of the Armed Forces, it really means the Armed Forces. I assigned
to you one case, the court stated that the PNP even if you are the Director, that is equivalent to several stars, but requires no
confirmation because he is not part of the Armed Forces. The rank of admiral in coast guard also requires no confirmation because
they are not part of the Armed Forces.

When we speak therefore of officers of the Armed Forces, we mean the Phil Army, those are the armed forces, it will apply
also to the Philippine Air Force, and also to those in the Philippine Navy. There is a distinction that is a bit strange when it comes to
the land forces and the air force; you start with the rank of colonel, meaning Lt. Col is not covered because that is lower than colonel.
With respect to those in the navy, you start with captain. So the people are saying that in the navy if you are a captain that is
equivalent to colonel. This one is still not good enough, it does not conclude. Because if you look at, it is not that high position
compared to a police general but it requires no confirmation.

4. Other officers whose appointments are vested on him by the Constitution.


There are some positions that require confirmation even if appointed by the President under the Constitution. So who will
require confirmation? Members and the chair of the three constitutional commissions, meaning CSC, COA, and COMELEC. 3 in the
CSC, 3 in the COA, and 1 in COMELEC, so that covers around 7 people. Take note that the Commission on Human Rights is not
included. They do not require confirmation. That is the decision in Bautista vs. Salonga.

5. Regular members of the judicial and bar council.


There are seven members in this; the others are ex officio, for instance, the Secretary of Justice, they are required for
confirmation. Then you have Supreme Court Chief Justice, another one is member of Congress but the others they are appointed by
the President, they are now ex officio under required confirmation, who are they? Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
then Professor or Law, Retired Justice of the Supreme Court, then finally representative from the private sector. All appointed by the
President and they require confirmation. I told you that sectoral representative requires confirmation, but this is no longer controlling
because you have now the party list. In 1999 they asked one bar question: Enumerate the positions requiring confirmation with the
commission on appointments, so the answer will be this one.

It is good to understand that there are people who are appointed by the President but they don’t need confirmation. Who are
they? Justices of the SC and all the judges of the lower court. The problem is you don’t pass through the Commission on
Appointments because you already passed through the JBC.

Next, the Ombudsman and his deputies. One ombudsman and five deputies. One from Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, one
overall deputy and one for the military. So there are 6 people in the Ombudsman. They do not require confirmation from the
Commission of Appointments. These are the people who are presidential appointees under the Constitution but they require no
confirmation from COA.

Case of Singson. Singson is appointed in the Central Bank as Governor. If you look at the Bangko Central Act, you have to
be confirmed. But SC said, null and void. Why? Because Central Bank Governor is not one of those listed in the Constitution. What
about Sol-Gen? No. It’s only under the Secretary of Justice. It is only an adjunct agency.

Another case: Members and chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission. Congress passed that they need
confirmation. SC said that it is unconstitutional. Soriano case – people in the Philippine Coast Guard (commodore, etc.) Court said
that they are not part of the military but of DOTC.
SORIANO III vs. LISTA
399 SCRA 437 (2004)

FACTS: Respondents were appointed by the President to various positions in the Philippine Coast Guard. Their positions ranged
from Naval Captain, Commodore, Rear Admiral and Vice Admiral. Their appointments were not confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.

ISSUE: Whether respondents can assume their position without violating the Constitution

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Coast Guard is not a part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines nor is it
under the supervision and control of the Secretary of the Department of Defense. It is under the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC). Thus, the appointment of respondent officers or the PCG or any PCG officer from the rank of
captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution applies only to appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces.

Congress cannot pass a law adding to the list because the law will be null and void because according to the SC you cannot
expand the powers of the Commission by an act of Congress. The Constitution itself must take the power.

True or false. Can the President add to the list as the Chief Executive? SC answered NO. That is the decision in the case of
Bautista.

Bautista was the chairman of the Commission of Human Rights but what did Cory Aquino do? “I would like to share my
power to the Commission. Try to confirm this woman.” The condition of the appointment did not confirm. The President waived her
power. SC said null and void. You cannot expand the powers of the Commission. None is given by the Constitution.

Go over section 16, paragraph 2:


The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

1. Congress is not in session because if it is in session, it will be a regular appointment.


Remember, COA cannot meet if Congress is not in session unlike the Electoral Tribunal. Electoral Tribunal can meet even if
Congress is not in session. So that is the reason why we have an ad interim appointment because there will be nobody who will
confirm the appointment.

2. The position must require confirmation.


Are all appointments made by the President while Congress is in recess ad interim? No. Not all recess appointments are ad
interim. So the second requisite: It must be for a position required for confirmation, meaning the appointment was made for this
position.

What do you mean by that? It is good to understand that there are many appointments made by the President but many of
them do not require confirmation. I think they refer only to positions requiring confirmation. For instance, all Regional Directors are
appointed by the President also all city provincial prosecutors and their assistants are all presidential appointees but they require no
confirmation. So suppose you are appointed as city prosecutor while congress is not in session, they cannot be considered ad interim
for the reason that it does not require confirmation. That will fall to regular appointment. Remember the two requisites.

How can ad interim appointment be terminated? What are the two ways in which it will be terminated?
1. If it is disapproved by the Commission
Appointments are very political in nature so you can control the Commission on Appointments, the presidential appointee
can easily pass.

2. If Congress adjourns without acting on the appointment.


Sometimes there are so many pending appointments so they are not able to act. When Congress starts to meet, it calls for a
recess but the commission did not act on your appointment. Your appointment not being acted upon, it is considered terminated.

Next question, suppose you are appointed by the President as a Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and then the commission meets
and disapproves. Can the President say I will nominate you again to the position; they might change their mind. Can it be done? No.
Suppose I will nominate you to another position, I will put you for example in defense, can it be done? There is no prohibition. Why?
Because you might not be qualified in the foreign affairs but you might be good in defense.
Suppose Congress adjourns without the commission acting on the appointment, can you be nominated again? This time yes!
Because anyway the commission did not disapprove it. Maybe they are too busy. So that is not an express disapproval.

What distinguishes ad interim appointment from a regular appointment? Regular appointment is one done while Congress is
in session. Ad interim the congress is in recess. Ad interim appointment is effective immediately. If you accept it, you can start
serving. If it is regular, it will take effect when you will be confirmed, so you can’t start serving. Ad interim- we consider it to be
permanent. Why? Because there are some appointments in the government which are temporary. So meaning in ad interim, you will
enjoy security of tenure as long as the President appoints you unless you want to resign.

FOUR GROUPS WHOM THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT:


i. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution.
ii. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
iii. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
iv. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

“other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the Constitution” – are the regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council,
the chairman and the members of COA, CSC and COMELEC, members of the Regional Consultative Commission.

There were many presidential appointees who were actually not acceptable to the members of the Commission. So I think
many of them have not been serving for a long time. They were introduced to the Commission. So one time, the President issued them
acting appointments. Senate went to Court saying that “you cannot issue an acting appointment. If you issue an acting appointment, in
the end, you are defying the political power to make the confirmation.”

SC said that the President must appoint the people whom he trusts so he’s allowed to appoint anyone. Also, SC said, “look at
the Administrative Code, it is provided there that the President can actually designate people in temporary capacity in the executive
branch.” Take note here that this only applies to executive branch. Meaning that there is statutory authority given by Congress to the
President to make acting appointments. So you cannot challenge that provision of the Constitution. I would like to emphasize that this
applies only to executive branch. Meaning that in all cases you cannot appoint temporary appointments in the judiciary. The
Constitution prohibits that. You are not also allowed to make temporary appointments in the Senate. So this applies only to executive
department. These are the people who are working for the President.

Bar Question
2005
Distinguish an appointment between an acting capacity and ad interim appointment.

It is good to understand that an ad interim appointment is permanent. However, an acting appointment is temporary (OIC). So
an acting appointment is temporary in nature but an ad interim is considered to be permanent but only subject to confirmation. If we
look at it also from the Administrative Code, an acting appointment cannot exceed for 1 year. An ad interim will only be effective if
Congress approves or adjourns. An ad interim terminates upon disapproval or the Commission failing to act upon the appointment.

It is very easy to understand in the context of Congress. Ople before was a senator. Ople was extended an appointment as Sec
of Foreign Affairs. Suppose you are extended an ad interim appointment and you have accepted, take note that ad interim takes effect
immediately. Once you hold it, you are now holding an incompatible office. If you are holding an incompatible office, you are said to
have forfeited your seat in the Senate. So if you are not confirmed as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, you cannot go back to the Senate.
You have abandoned it by holding another position. If Ople was extended a regular appointment, no problem because he has to wait
until confirmed. If he was not confirmed, no problem. He does not abandon his position in the Senate.

SARMIENTO VS MISON
G.R. No. 79974 (December 17, 1987)

FACTS: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of
Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality
of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE: WON Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs was unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and express intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President,
without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16,
Article VII.

Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lower-ranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears
to be redundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over
the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of
the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads
of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 83216 (September 4, 1989)

FACTS: On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to
Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. On April 18, 1988, the above-
mentioned sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the
Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three other sectoral
representatives- appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due
to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or
assume office as members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE: WON the appointment of petitioner as a sectoral representative in the Lower House needs confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

HELD: Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment
by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The appointment needs confirmation as the officer belongs to the class “and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in the Constitution”, in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

CALDERON VS CARALE
G.R. No. 91636 (April 23, 1992)

FACTS: This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by
the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant
to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

ISSUE: WON the permanent appointments extended by the President to the respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments
for confirmation pursuant to Article215 of the Labor Code is valid.
HELD: To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.

Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function.
The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec.
13 of RA 6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16,
Art. VII thereof.

MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036 (April 2, 2002)

FACTS: On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,
and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all expiring on February 2,
2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason
likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the
President submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for confirmation. However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on said
appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same
positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths of office for a
second time. The Office of the President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their appointments. Thus, on June 8,
2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to
the same positions. The Office of the President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments. They took their oaths of office anew.

ISSUE: WON the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of
its Chairman and members.

HELD: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim
appointment is utterly without basis.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The first thing we need to understand here is we try to distinguish supervision and control.

Q: How do we define the POWER OF CONTROL?


A: This is the usual way to put it: This is power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duty and does not issue the judgment of the former to that of the latter.
Q: What about the POWER OF SUPERVISION?
A: This is the authority to see to it that the subordinate officer performs his duties. In order to understand the two terms the first
question is this: Which of the two is a form of gaining power? Which is the stronger power? It is the power of control. It is stronger in
the sense that it is saying that you modify, substitute judgment. So meaning if somebody put things legally, lawfully, I do not like it,
you say you do it this way. The power of control it is permissible.

Q: Which has the more compelling power?


A: Power of Control. And that is the one that the President exercises over the executive department. It refers to the Dept. of Education,
Foreign Affairs, and all those departments.

So for instance, I am a teacher. I make an exam in the form of T or F questions. If it is a power of control, somebody who has
the power of control over me can tell me that do not ask T or F questions, ask essay questions. There is nothing illegal about T or F but
since he has control over me, he can compel me to change my judgment. What about supervision? It only means that if I’m doing
things illegally, unlawfully, that’s the time that they can come in because its power is to see to it that I’m doing things legally.

It is good to understand that another provision in the Constitution that the President only exercises supervision over local
government units. He does not control local governments but in the executive department he controls them. Which one is compelling?
For the reason that you can order, nullify, modify or set aside the decision. Meaning that the decision might be correct, nothing’s
wrong but “I” don’t like it, I want my own decision to take over. That can be done. But when it comes to supervision, they cannot
substitute the judgment because what the provision simply means is that the power to see to it that they perform their duties. Meaning,
they do it in accordance with law. The President cannot say to the mayor that do it this way. He does not have the power to control. So
he cannot substitute his judgment to that of the mayor because his role is simply to supervise, supervise to make sure that he is not
abusing, not doing things illegally.

Q: What kind of power does the President exercise over the Mayor?
A: It is only supervision. So it’s lesser power because for the reason that the LGU exercise autonomy. If you look at the Constitution,
the President exercises only the power of supervision over LGU.

Q: What about to the members of his cabinet?


A: The Constitution is saying that he has control.

Q: What about with respect to the SC, what power is exercise by the President?
A: Nothing because they are independent bodies. Neither supervision nor control is exercised by the President over them.

The other item that we need to understand regarding Section 17 is the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. All executive
and administrative organizations are subject, adjuncts or extensions of the executive department. The head of the various executive
departments meaning those with the rank of Secretary are assistants of the Chief Executive and the executive and administrative
functions of the Pres are performed by and to the executive depts. except when it’s required by the Constitution or law to act in person.
You got it. There is rare sentence also which I want you to go over. It’s saying the acts of Secretaries performed and regulated in the
regular course of business and unless disprove by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the Chief Executive. First is this, when
we were discussing the legislative, the principle is when it comes to the legislature, the act or passing laws cannot be delegated to
anyone. No delegation. Congress has to act directly by itself; it cannot delegate legislative power to anybody subject to very few
exceptions.

Now when you go to the executive department now under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency the principle is reversed.
Everything can be delegated. Because what does the definition say? The heads of the executive departments are alter egos of the
President. So if they act, they do anything, and it is regarded as if it is the President acting to them. They can be Presidents themselves
in effect, they can modify judgment, but if he does not modify the judgment it is presumed to be his own act. Ok! So the principle
therefore is, when it comes to the executive department everything can be delegated except when the Constitution provides otherwise.

When it comes to the legislature nothing can be delegated except under circumstances. So you have the reverse. Now why is
it that you have the reverse when it comes to the executive department? The reason is that if you look at the implementation and
execution of laws it all belongs to the executive, there’s so many things to do. You cannot expect one person to do that. So in the end,
that’s why it is delegated to various members of the cabinet. The cases under the Textbook of Justice Cruz explains it. But there are
two ways by which this will have into action. So for instance, Congress will pass a law saying that Secretary for blah blah is required
to do.

Now there are certain cases wherein the Secretary himself will not do it and it was the President who did it. Is that valid? The
SC says that he is only an alter ego. If the President does his work no problem. Sometimes it may be the reverse. Congress will say
that the Pres will do this, that the Pres does not do it; it is the Sec who does it. Will that be valid? Again the Court say, no problem
anyway he is the alter ego of the Pres; everything can be delegated to him. It is valid for as long as the Pres does not revoke it. So that
is what we mean by the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. The case of Bermudez. Bermudez is a good case which illustrates this.
If you look at the Administrative Code, the Admin Code is a law. It is saying, who can be appointed as City Prosecutor or Provincial
Prosecutor. Under the Admin Code, he has to be recommended by the Secretary of Justice and his presidential appointees. In the
Bermudez case this is what happened. I think that Secretary of Justice recommended him. Unfortunately Ramos appointed B. He went
to the Court and said the appointment of B is not valid. Why? He has no recommendation from the Sec of Justice and can be ignored,
anyway he is only an agent of the President. What for instance are the power of the President that cannot be delegated to the
Secretary? The power to declare martial law. I think you cannot say that under the doctrine of QPA the Secretary of National Defense
will declare Martial Law because the Constitution says that do it yourself. So those are instances where things cannot be delegated to
anybody. I think pardon is also another because you’ll study on that it’s the President who issues pardon. It cannot be passed to
anybody.

BERMUDEZ vs. TORRES


311 SCRA 733 (1999)

FACTS: Bermudez was recommended by the Secretary of Justice for the position of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac.
However, it was Quiaoit who was appointed by the President to the position. But the Revised Administrative Code of 1987
provides that – “All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon recommendation
of the Secretary.”

ISSUE: Whether the appointment is valid

HELD: Yes. Sec. 9, Ch. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted as a mere advise,
exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom
it is made. The President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of
the Secretary. He can assume directly the functions of any secretary in the executive department and in so doing cannot be said
as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. In addition, when the Constitution or the law clothes the President with
the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample
discretion of whom to appoint.

Recent case, it happened in Marbel. The Secretary moved the offices of the autonomous regions from Cotabato City to
Marbel. Under the Administrative Code, only the President can do that. SC said that the president cannot rebut it. The act of the Sec.
of DENR is said to be the act of the President.

In the case of Constantino, the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It was delegated to the Sec. of Finance. No
problem.

CONSTANINO, JR. vs. CUISIA


472 SCRA 505 (2005)

May the President delegate his power to guarantee and contract foreign loans in behalf of the Republic to the Secretary
of Finance?

HELD: Yes. The power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the exceptional class of cases
which may not be delegated. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin
to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the
established functions of governance. Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated
alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter
of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by the
alter ego will definitely have binding effect.

In the case of Southwing, Congress can delegate to the President the power to fix tarrif rates. It can be done by the alter-egos
of the President.

True or False
Can the President delegate the power to negotiate treaties? It is done all the time. The President cannot go out all the time to
negotiate all those treatises. Otherwise we will have nobody left in the Philippines. That is why we have the Sec. of Foreign Affairs
and ambassadors in foreign countries.
In the case of Garcia, SC held that you cannot create an office that is totally independent. Why? You deprive the president of
the power to control.

Bodies independent from the President:


1. Constitutional Offices – CSC, CoHR, Ombudsman
2. Quasi-Judicial Bodies – Congress created the bodies but they can be independent. They are bodies that decide cases. They
cannot be under the control of the President otherwise the decisions will be subject to politics.
3. Local Government Units – they are independent because the President only exercises supervision, not control.

Therefore, Congress cannot create an entity which will be independent of the SC or the legislature. It will violate the idea that all
executive offices will be under the control of the President. So that is part of his control.

LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. VS PANO


21 SCRA 895

FACTS: In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in
Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and
interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff. On April 13, 1954, the portion
Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural
land. On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants 2 applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of
the released area.

On March 29, 1955, plaintiff-corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area.
This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of
the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the
conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and
dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.

On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his
companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to the
President of the Philippines.

On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy,
modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who
depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2)
directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao,
with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It
may be well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted
upon the facts as found in said decision.

Plaintiff-corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be rendered
declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and
(2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.

Plaintiff's basis for its averment that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force
and effect is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to
questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Plaintiff's trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President.

ISSUE: WON the Presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary as it is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act on the matter.

HELD: It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct,
however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the
Constitution does not command that he perform in person. 11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The President
is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the
Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is
that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

The Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is
to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted.
For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless
the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," that remains the act of the Chief Executive,
and cannot be successfully assailed

MMDA VS VIRON
G.R. No. 170656 (August 15, 2007)

FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of
Greater Manila Mass Transport System. As stated in the “Whereas” clauses of the E.O, the primary cause of traffic
congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the
different transport modes; and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus
terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. The E.O.
thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila
Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus
terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila.
Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their
existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope,
extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes."

ISSUE: WON the designation of the MMDA by the President as the implementing agency for the project is valid,
considering that the President, as the Chief Executive has the duty to implement the laws.

HELD: It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which
is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the
promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits
of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

MALARIA VS EXECUTIVE
G.R. No. 160093 (July 31, 2007)

FACTS: Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 providing for structural changes and
redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health.
Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected
employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint, docketed as
Civil Case No. 00-98793, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No.
157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O.
No. 102.
Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as it allegedly violates certain provisions of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522.

ISSUE: WON the reorganization of the DOH by the President is valid

HELD: The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we held that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. 8 While
the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the
executive branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws.

VILLALUZ VS ZALDIVAR
G.R. No. L-22754 (December 31, 1965)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment of back salaries in a
petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964. He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May
20, 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; that in a letter
dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman
of the Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of the
findings made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by petitioner
in the Motor Vehicles Office.

On February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the
Motor Vehicles Office. After conducting an investigation on the allegations leveled against petitioner, the President
of the Philippines thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner.
Petitioner claimed that the President of the Philippines has no jurisdiction to investigate and remove him from
office.

ISSUE: WON the President has the power to remove petitioner from office.

HELD: There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and is such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due
hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Such is what we ruled in the recent
case of Ang-Angco wherein on this point we said:

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to
investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not
with regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the classified service for as to them that inherent
power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that the
"Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the head of departments" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., L-
17169, November 30, 1963).

The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against
petitioner because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal
can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which
classification petitioner does not belong.

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the
civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall
be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

This is a very long provision but the thing that we need to understand is this: the product of martial law of Marcos.

Even the framers of the Constitution were so worried that the same thing might happen during the time of Marcos because we
know that when he declared Martial Law he continued running the country even if the Constitution has already ended his term. To
ensure that experience is avoided, they put a lot of safeguard when it comes to the power to declare martial law. We will try to go over
them very briefly.

The first is this: Commentators call this as a Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President. Section 18 deals with the power
to call out Armed Forces. Second is the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Third is the power to declare
Martial Law. Finally, emergency which we will discuss earlier when we studied the legislature because you remember Congress grant
emergency powers to the Pres.

The first one: relatively minor. That simply means that when there is a rebellion and there’s a disturbance. For instance in
Jolo, in Tawi-tawi, the President can call out the soldiers and army.

First question is this: Under our Constitution, can Congress review the power of the President to call out Armed Forces? No,
the Constitution does not say that it can be done when it comes to the power to call out armed forces. Next question: What about the
SC? If you look at the Constitution, does it say that the SC can review the power of the President to call out armed forces? No,
because if you look at the power of the Constitution itself, it does not say that it can be done because it is saying only that what is
subject to review by SC is the power to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Father Bernas said that this is not subject to review by the SC but the SC has come up with different interpretation. What did
the court say? If there is a grave abuse of discretion, we will review it. Meaning that if the President sends soldiers to Jolo, the SC
could say “Magsibalik kayo. Send back the soldiers”.

Regarding the power to call out Armed Forces what is the standard of review? When will the President call out Armed
Forces? What does the Constitution say? Take note that the Constitution allows him to do that under the following situations: First,
there must be invasion, rebellion or lawless violence. So you can’t call out the army without these situations. But that is not there is all
to it. The second qualification is when it becomes necessary. This is very difficult to measure because it is always within the judgment
of the President. The point is that not all rebellions might require the calling out of the armed forces. The standard is when it becomes
necessary,

Now we go to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. You will study
this more in the Bill of Rights, but this is the situation: When a policeman arrests somebody, you know that under the Criminal Law,
the policeman should file a case. If the policeman does not release him from jail what will happen, the detention is illegal. What is the
remedy of the person detained? He should file a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS is an order directed to the policeman to produce the body and explain why he is
detained. If the explanation is not good, the judge will release, the police cannot argue. This one is very important; it is based on the
Constitution. That writ cannot be suspended because if this is suspended and the police will bring you to jail you cannot be released
anymore, there’s no other way. The only way under the Constitution is you file a petition for issuance of the writ. If the President
suspends the writ, you end up in jail, you have no recourse. That is why during the time of Marcos, Ninoy Aquino was staying in jail
for more than 10 years because he cannot file a petition for the writ. The SC say, the writ is suspended, Diokno stayed in jail for so
many years. That’s why you must be very careful now when this can be suspended and for how long because this is very important for
the liberty of the individual. Only the writ of habeas corpus is found in the Constitution and it is not subject to repeal by Congress and
not subject to abolition by the SC unlike the writ of amparo and habeas data.

You can only suspend it for the grounds of invasion or rebellion. Take note that it is narrower, there is no lawless violence.
Second, when public safety requires it.
What will be the effect of suspension? First, it applies to persons judicially charged for rebellion or directly connected with
invasion. If they are charged of common crime, nothing to do with rebellion, the suspension will not affect you. Second, it applies
only to persons who are charged with national security offenses.

MARTIAL LAW is very difficult to define but when we speak of martial law this is an exercise actually of some of the
emergency power of the President. The President actually in a sense exercises some kind of emergency powers in order to preserve
law and order. Its so limited now under the new Constitution. We go back to basic things, when the President suspends or declare
martial law. For how long? The period given by the Constitution is 60 days. Take note however that it can be increased by Congress
and it can also be decreased. That is what I mean by subject to review. It can be increased or decreased. This was not so during the
Marcos time, because what did Marcos do. Congress is hereby abolished. Who can question it? No one because Congress has been
abolished.

Next point is this, try to look at the Constitution, is there a distinction in the procedure regarding increasing and decreasing
the period. What’s the distinction? When it is for increasing, the increase can only be done upon the initiative of the President. If there
is no initiative from the President, Congress cannot increase. What about decreasing the period? Congress can do it without any
initiative from the President. So in the exercise, this is one referred to as a legislative veto. The President declares martial law.
Congress vetoes it by saying we annul it. So this is the only time in the Constitution when you have a reverse exercise of power. It is
the President that is proposing and it is Congress exercising the veto. That is not however the only form of review. Why? The second
form of review is, it is by the SC. Who can file the petition? Take note here that it is saying, any citizen. Now, it appears that not all
persons of the Philippines can question it because definitely if you are an alien you are not qualified because it is saying only citizens.
Is this an improvement? This is an improvement actually because when martial law was declared before, people will file a case before
the SC. An argument of the soldier is “no you cannot file it unless you are a taxpayer”.

Another one: The problem before during the time of Marcos was this, because we know that the Marcos court was composed
of his classmates, it’s very difficult to challenge the declaration of martial law. So what happened was this: when people went to the
SC and file the case, the SC would say, that’s a political question, it is not for us to review. That is given to other departments. That
has been a repeated doctrine. In order to avoid that problem, they revise the Constitution. They stated that ok! The SC will not
consider this a political question. It can inquire whether there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President in declaring
martial law or suspending the writ. Now, it is now subject to judicial review unlike during the time of Marcos.

There are other things for instance, when Congress revoked it, it’s saying you need absolute majority. Right! The framers of
the Constitution put this to ensure that it is easier to revoke the declaration. Another item is this, regarding suspension of the writ what
is the effect? One effect is in criminal law because in criminal law I think I told you a while ago when you arrest somebody, you have
to file a case against him within 12, 18, 26 hours. If the writ is suspended how long must you file? If the writ is suspended the police
has more time to detain you because it only becomes illegal if it exceeds 72 hours or 3 days. It is saying also that suspension of the
writ however will only apply to people who are judicially charged with rebellion. The crime of invasion. Why it did not say invasion
or charged with invasion? Why is it that it stated people who are charged with rebellion but it did not say people who are charge with
invasion? Why? The reason is if you study the entire RPC, invasion is not a crime. Rebellion is a crime but invasion is not. Why?
Because actually that goes to international law. If you invade a country, you cannot be tried in court. You will be treated as prisoner of
war and you are subject to a penalty. That’s why there’s no such thing as the crime of invasion.

The other question is this: when martial law is declared, will people be tried by military tribunal or court martial? This one
was a bit problematic because during the time of Marcos he created a military tribunal and thousands of people, were sentenced to
death. But the problem is if you have military tribunal usually it’s a “ kangaroo” court because it is under the military. So that’s why
they are saying now that civilians will not be under the jurisdiction of military courts even during martial law. There is an exception
however, that is where civilian courts are no longer open or functioning. The only situation I can imagine is in the battlefield. There’s
actual fighting. You cannot go to a civilian judge. So that’s the only time when the civilian is caught committing a crime you might be
sentenced in the military court. But in other instances, that cannot happen.

In fact Ninoy Aquino was sentenced to death in military court. Another one is this, if martial law is declared, can the
President issue Presidential Decree in the place of Congress because we know that during martial law, Marcos exercise legislative
power. Take note here what does it say? It’s very clear now; a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies. Meaning, Congress can still continue to function and operate.
The result is no longer the same as during the time of Marcos. The President can no longer issue Presidential Decrees which will have
the force of law. So, it will be entirely different. That would be a new kind of martial law now.

Right now, the provision will tell us what will not happen during martial law to ensure that martial law will not be abused.

1. The operation of the Constitution will not be suspended.


People cannot be arrested now without warrant. They cannot raid houses. Take note that the Constitution will not be
abolished. It will continue to exercise its right.
2. The functioning of civil courts will not be affected.
Courts can continue to function so it will not be abolished. Meaning, you can still file cases until such time.

3. The operation of the legislative assemblies will continue to function.


We use the terms legislative assemblies so it will not apply only to Congress because Congress is a legislative body but we
also have the city council, municipal council… so they will continue to work. In the time of Marcos, he abolished Congress so they
cannot pass laws so he issued Presidential Decrees. But right now., because Congress can continue to function, the President cannot
issue laws.

4. Military courts will have no jurisdiction over civilians.


During the time of Marcos, civilians were tries by the military courts. They have no lawyers there. Generals are the one
presiding. In the end, you go to jail most certainly. If you go to the barracks, you will be arrested also. In the end, if yo u commit
crimes you will be tried by the civilian courts which are more objective except when civilian courts are no longer functioning.

Bar Questions
1997
What will be the effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
2000
The President decided to place Basilan under martial law. Is it permissible? Yes, it is saying that the Philippines or any part
thereof. So there can be partial declaration of martial law. That’s allowed.

IBP vs ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 (August 15, 2000)

FACTS: National Police (the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in violent
crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered
the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the “AFP”), the Chief of
the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said
order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B.
Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the “LOI”) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the
leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the
deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN THAT SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY
THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS
UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD
REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.

ISSUE: WON the President’s deployment of the Marines in Metropolitan Manila to aid in civilian law enforcement is
unconstitutional.

HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers
and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no
evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such
a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of
this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is
to sustain.

GUDANI VS SENGA
G.R. No. 170165 (August 15, 2006)

FACTS: On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear
at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled
on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio
excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.

Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among
the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing.
Because of the invitation, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to the
Superintendent of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA
Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga.[5][5] Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the
Senate Committee hearing on 28 September 2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing.

However, on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA
Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows: PER INSTRUCTION OF HER
EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR
SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC
ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.
The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that “no approval
has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” before the hearing scheduled on that day.
Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the
conduct of the 2004 elections. Because they testified in the Senate against the President’s instruction, Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in
relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline.

ISSUE: WON the President can prohibit military officers from appearing and testifying in legislative inquiries.

HELD: We hold that the President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of
the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of
the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo


489 SCRA 160 (2006)
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

I…do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.

ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 1017 a declaration of Martial Law?

HELD: No. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such,
it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a
perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures
without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where
there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

Everybody has heard about pardon or amnesty. I will just go over them one by one. The literal equivalent of pardon as used
in ordinary language means forgiveness. It is an act of grace which extends to the offender from punishment which the law inflicts.
You will not suffer the consequences. Why is pardon allowed? The reason is practical because sometimes the law is too harsh.
Sometimes you cannot avoid also committing errors. So you cannot reverse a decision that is already final. So the only remedy is just
a pardon from the President. So that is to mitigate the harsh consequences of the law and the errors of judges. That is the main reason.

True or False
Can the President pardon a close relative? No problem. If you look at the appointing power, the President cannot appoint
relatives within the fourth civil degree. But when it comes to pardon, the Constitution does not say that he cannot pardon a relative.

True or False
Can you pardon a rebel? Yes.
Can you grant pardon to a rapist? Yes.
Can you grant amnesty to people who commit rape? No. it cannot be subject to amnesty because it is a common crime.

According to Justice Cruz, pardon can be absolute or conditional. Absolute pardon cannot be refused. You are given pardon
subject to no condition. Conditional pardon can be refused because the condition will not be to the liking of the person.

Take note of the Constitutional limitations of the President. Justice Cruz here emphasized the limitations in the Constitution
because there are other limitations found in statute.

1. Not allowed in impeachment.


This is an absolute rule. What is impeachment? It is the proceeding of removing high officials in the government – president,
vice president, members of the commission, and justices of the SC. The main penalty is removal. The President cannot pardon you so
that you cannot be restored to be qualified again.

Q: Suppose Estrada is convicted of plunder. He is on trial now before the Sandiganbayan. Can he be granted pardon?
A: Yes (he was in fact been pardoned) why? You have to distinguish impeachment from plunder because impeachment is only the
proceeding to remove you. If he is removed he cannot be pardoned in a sense that he will be restored from the office. But if prosecuted
criminally for other crime, if he is convicted of other offenses aside from impeachment, he can be pardoned because the limitation
only is on impeachment.

2. Election offenses need COMELEC recommendation.


It is saying that the President can exercise her power for executive clemency on election offenses like vote buying. It can be
done by the concurrence of the COMELEC. Otherwise, it will be null and void.
If you go to Article 9 section 5, it says no pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws
and also regulation…

If we try to analyze it, it is not pardon that is only limited. It included in the provision – pardon, also amnesty for election
offenses will not be allowed without the recommendation from the President. So amnesty, paroles, and suspension of sentence. Take
note here that parole and suspension of sentence are not among the powers given by the Constitution to the President. But the
President exercises not because of the Constitution but because of the statutes. Actually, every now and then, parole will be granted
but that is usually done in the form of pardon. I think you studies parole in the criminal law. For instance, your sentence is 5-10 years.
When you reach 5 years, you are entitled for parole. Meaning you can go. The second sentence applies to minors only because you
cannot be jailed unless you acted with discernment. It is given to lesser officials, not anymore to the President.

3. Pardon, reprieve, commutation and remission of fines/ forfeitures cannot be availed of before final judgment.
It’s not only pardon. No pardon, no reprieve, no commutation and no remission of fines/ forfeitures unless there is final
judgment.

Q: When is the judgment become final?


A: When there is no appeal and the period of 15 days has lapsed. So you were convicted by the MTC, you did not appeal. After the
lapse of 15 days, the judgment becomes final. You are now eligible for pardon.

Q: Suppose it is decided by the Supreme Court, when will it become final?


A: If you don’t file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days also.

Tricky Question: Can Congress grant reprieve, commutation, forfeiture of fines when it comes to election offenses without the
recommendation of the COMELEC?
A: Yes, because the language only covers pardon, parole, suspension and amnesty. So that’s it!

What about reprieve? It is the postponement of an execution to another day. Sometimes the President is allowed to postpone
it. Instead of death penalty tomorrow, it will be next week, 2 weeks away or 1 month away.

Q: Can the President grant mass reprieve? A: Right now it’s going on. The President issues a Moratorium for the death penalty,
meaning no execution.

Q: What is COMMUTATION?
A: Limitation but more ordinary term is reduction of sentence. You have studied fines, remission of fines. That includes fine: BP 22.
By the way, to whom is fine given? Who receives the fine? It goes to the government.

Q: What is FORFEITURE?
A: If you kill somebody, bang bang bang! with a 45 caliber, what will happen to the gun? Forfeited. So that’s it!

Amnesty. I think you’ve heard amnesty so many times before.

Q: Can you grant amnesty to people not paying taxes? Why?


A: Yes, tax amnesty. Because tax evasion is an offense against the state so it’s possible that you can grant tax amnesty.

Can you grant pardon in civil cases? Because when it comes to civil cases people are quarrelling, that has nothing to do with
the State. I borrowed 1M from you then you lost the case, the court stated you pay 1M. The President cannot say I will not repay your
1M that I borrow from you. If you try to look at it, usually these are penalties good for imposition in favor of the state.

Q: How do we distinguish pardon from amnesty?


A: PARDON is a private act and AMNESTY is public act. Why is it a private act? Generally pardon is an act of the President, while
amnesty requires the concurrence of Congress. What do you mean by courts do not take judicial notice in pardon while in amnesty the
court takes judicial notice? What do you mean by judicial notice? When we say judicial notice that means that you need not present
evidence anymore because the courts know it. It is assumed conclusively that the Court knows it. So for instance, when you claim on
the law of gravity or I will just demonstrate that this is the law of gravity. No need! Because when it comes to the laws of nature,
courts take judicial notice. You need not present evidence anymore. So that is the same with the amnesty. Courts are assumed to know
that. But when it comes to pardon, if you claimed that you have been pardoned, you need to present evidence because that is not
within the judicial notice of courts. There’s a requirement in pardon that you can do it after final judgment but there is no requirement
when it comes to amnesty before or after. In pardon it is individual while the other is in the class of offender.

We normally say that AMNESTY is granted to a class of people, a group of offenders. But the actual practice is this; the
President will say I hereby grant amnesty to all army rebels. Then the 2 houses will pass resolution not laws. They issue resolution.
We concur with the amnesty granted by the President. If you are a rebel does that mean you now go down from the mountain and avail
amnesty? How do you avail amnesty? When you avail the amnesty you apply separately. While it is granted to a class of offenders,
you avail of it individually. That’s why if you study cases about amnesty, still granted to individuals one by one. We just cannot say
that all rebels are granted amnesty. You cannot go out from the mountains carrying your firearms, you are free. That’s not the case. So
that’s it.

You need to understand, the reason requirement that you can be granted amnesty, you have to admit first – guilt. So if you are
a rebel and you apply for amnesty you will be asked to execute an affidavit admitting all the crimes that you have done. There will be
now an admission because if you will not do that, according to the Court you are being inconsistent. You are asking for amnesty, you
need to admit your guilt. But that does not apply to pardon. In pardon, you are convicted by final judgment so there is no point
anymore for admission. Pardon does not result to automatic reinstatement, it needs deliberation of innocence.

You are convicted and you served the sentence. If you served the sentence, you are automatically dismissed from service
because you cannot go one place anymore while you are on jail. Suppose you have pardon. What will happen? Your guilt has been
wiped out. You can now apply for a job in the government. You can apply for the same job. You might be accepted or not. But the
point is you are now eligible to rejoin the public service but you will not be automatically reinstated for the reason of that pardon.
However, there are instances that you actually did not commit the crime. Sometimes when the judgment has become final, the only
way to be released is he will get pardon from the executive. After the deliberation of innocence, you get back to your job immediately.
You are automatically reinstated. In fact, you can get back your wages during the time you did not work. Why? Because you will be
restored to your former status and would be given recognition of the injustice that has been to you. You get back your wages and also
get back your job without applying for it anymore. That is really a rare situation.

SC told us in the case of Garcia that there can be executive clemency in administrative cases. Remember that Garcia was a
governor and was ordered to be suspended for 90 days. But the President stated that after 30 days you go back. We will pardon you.

What is an administrative case? It is a case decided not by court, not by SC. It is by administrative bodies. According to the
court, the President can pardon you also even in administrative offenses. Say you are a government employee; you will be removed by
the ombudsman. That is an administrative case. You might be removed by the Civil Service. That is subject to pardon. Where the
President can pardon people in administrative cases, he cannot do it for the employees of the judiciary. Reason is that you violate
separation of powers. Meaning that you are a court employee and you have been removed by the judiciary, you cannot be pardoned by
the executive. So pardon in administrative cases can apply only to those of the executive and other departments but not to the
employees of the judiciary because of separation of powers.

Another principle - the determination whether you have violated the terms of pardon. The one who pardons you is the
executive. You are pardoned provided you do not commit any other crime. Once you commit another crime, you will be arrested and
you will continue serving the sentence. Many instances people violated their pardon and they are arrested by the executive. According
to the SC, the power to determine whether you have violated the condition will belong to the executive, the pardoning authority. So
courts will have no business whether you have violated your pardon.

In criminal law, there is a crime for violation of the terms of pardon. It is another offense. So if you are charged under the
RPC, it shall be determined by the judiciary because it will now be a separate crime. Example - You are pardoned for the crime of
robbery. One condition is do not commit any other crime. Later on you committed estafa. The executive will arrest you. You will
continue serving your sentence. Meaning, instead of 15, it will be 20 years. However, they can also charge you with violation of the
terms of pardon because that is a crime under RPC. You will be tried for violation of the terms of pardon and if you are convicted, you
will suffer the sentence for the new crime. But you also committed estafa. They will try you for that. There are now 2 violations. The
pardon here is conditional.

Bar question 1995


Lucas, a ranking member of the NDF was captured by policemen while about to board a passenger bus bound to Sorsogon;
charge with rebellion, he pleaded not guilty. Before trial he was granted absolute pardon by the President to allow him to participate in
the peace talks between the government and communist rebel. Is the pardon valid? No, because it is before trial. Assuming that the
pardon is valid, can Lucas reject an absolute pardon? This one is covered by American cases that there are two kinds of pardon. One is
absolute and the other one is conditional.

When you say absolute, there is nothing for the person pardoned to do. So when you are pardoned, you cannot say, “ Ayoko
nga! I do not want to be pardoned I just want to stay in jail forever! “. If it is conditional you can refuse. So for instance there’s a
condition that you should not go to the cockpit anymore. So some people likes going to cockpit, so they would rather stay in jail. So he
say,” Gusto ko sa cockpit ang saya-saya. I will not accept the pardon. angal?” So if it will be possible that you do not like the
condition so you can refuse it.

Q: Instead of pardon, may the President grant the accused amnesty if favorably recommended by the National Amnesty Commission.
Can he be granted amnesty instead of pardon if recommended by the National Amnesty Commission?
A: No, take note that he is a rebel. That is a political offense but the problem is who recommends when it comes to amnesty?
Congress, not the National Amnesty Commission. So that is the effect. While it can be given before or after conviction the problem is,
the concurrence is from Congress.

Q: May the accuse avail of amnesty despite the fact that he continue to profess innocence?
A: No, if you want to avail of amnesty you must actually admit the offense.

Q: Can you avail of pardon despite the fact that you continue to say that you admit it?
A: Yes, it is a requirement that you admit the crime.

Bar Question, 1991


In connection with the 1997 Election, Luis Millanes was prosecuted for and convicted of an election offense and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 6 years. In April 1991, the President granted him absolute pardon on the basis of strong
recommendation from the Board of Pardon and Parole. Is the pardon valid? No, it will be the COMELEC who will recommend.

A City Assistant Treasurer was convicted for Estafa through falsification of public document. While serving sentence she
was granted absolute pardon by the President. Assuming that the position of Asst. City Treasurer has remained vacant, will he be
entitled to a reinstatement without the need of appointment? No. If later the same position becomes vacant could he reapply and may
be appointed? Yes, what the principle here? While you are not automatically reinstated to the position, that you lost because of
conviction, you can restore to your qualification. You become qualified again.

In what situation will pardon result to automatic reinstatement? When there is an express declaration.

MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
G.R. No. 78239 (February 9, 1989)

FACTS: In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then
assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P3,500. Subsequently, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which
she accepted on December 21, 1984.

By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former
post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry
of Finance for resolution in which the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also
directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.

Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the
full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that
she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

ISSUE: WON petitioner can be ipso facto reinstated in office by virtue of the absolute pardon granted her by the President of
the Philippines.

HELD: The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the
party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on
the finding of guilt. 17 But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man",
and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found
guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction."

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction
for it can be required." 20 This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay
for lost earnings and benefits.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason
of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.

People v. Patriarca
341 SCRA 464 (2000)

FACTS: Accused, a member of the New People’s Army, was convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 347 of March 25, 1992. His application was favorably granted by the National
Amnesty Board. What happens to his appeal?

HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal. Amnesty commonly denotes a
general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. The conviction of
accused is therefore reversed, and he is acquitted of the crime of murder.

Echegaray v. Secretary
301 SCRA 96 (1999)

FACTS: After the death sentence on accused was affirmed by the Supreme Court and the schedule of execution set by the trial
court, accused petitioned the Supreme Court for issuance of a temporary restraining order. Pointing to the possibility of the
repeal of the Death Penalty Law, the Court restrained the execution until June 15, 1999, unless it became sooner apparent that
no repeal was to be made. Did the Supreme Court intrude into the authority of the President to grant reprieves?

HELD: No. While Sec. 19, Art. VIII of the Constitution bestows on the President the power to grant reprieves, pardons and
commutations, this provision is simply the source of power. It cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who had been convicted by final judgment
still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate court. For instance, a death convict who
becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death
sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though
its effect is the same. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that the Congress can amend the law by reducing the death
penalty to life imprisonment. But by not stretch of the imagination can the exercise by the Congress of its plenary power to
amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction.

People v. Casido
269 SCRA 360 (1997)

FACTS: Accused applied for and was granted conditional pardon by the President while their appeals were pending before
the Supreme Court. After release, they filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court which the latter
denied. Meanwhile, their applications for amnesty were also favorably acted on by the National Amnesty Commission.

ISSUE: What is the status of their pardon?

HELD: The pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment, and therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. Any application for
pardon should not be acted upon or the process towards its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
The pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran that the acceptance of a pardon amounts to an abandonment of the appeal
rendering the conviction final is an obiter dictum. The members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release
or Pardon are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duty to save the President from
embarrassment. However, since amnesty, unlike pardon, may be granted before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and even after conviction, the release of accused was valid on the ground of the amnesty extended to them.

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar
year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or
guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the
effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
Regarding the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans just take note of what are the requisites. There are two.
One is prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and the second one is any subject to limitation as may be provided by law.

Two things: contracting and guaranteeing. When we say contracting, the Republic is borrowing the money. Guarantee –
usually a private entity. A private business group. They can borrow money but sometimes the foreign bank will not allow it.
Sometimes the President will allow it. He is allowed to do that. In that instance, what is required only is the concurrence of the
monetary board. Take note also that SC stated in Constantino that it is not just a matter of guarantee, not just a matter of borrowing
money but in includes… buying-back scheme – if you cannot pay immediately, they will restructure it. SC stated that other concepts
related to the loan are also covered under the authority of the President.

Since it is not a treaty, section 20 tells us that it needs no Senate concurrence. But you must have prior concurrence from the
Monetary Board. Monetary Board is composed of Sec. of Finance, some other officials of the government. But the point simply is that
it still needs prior concurrence.

Section 20 is not self-executing. Congress will still provide, pass a law, providing for the limitation. Without that law, it
cannot be done because we keep on borrowing a lot of money, we assume that Congress put a limitation on the borrowing power of
the President. This provision is new. They put this provision so that people will know compared to what happened during the Marcos
regime.

It was asked in 1999 in the Bar # 1. The question was that: What is the restriction in the President in obtaining foreign loans?
How much do we owe now in foreign countries? It was too much. I think it follows during the time of Marcos, and in order to save
that he put restriction but it is still the same, nobody can stop that anymore, so a big problem, but we are not the only country having
that problem.

Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia


472 SCRA 505 (2005)

FACTS: Saddled with foreign debts, the Aquino Administration decided to enter into a Financing Program aimed at extinguishing
portions of the country’s pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond- conversion. The buyback approach
essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond- conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the
obtention of a new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the
original loan.

ISSUE: Whether the schemes constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated by Sec. 20, Art. VII, as among the
powers of the President?

HELD: Yes. Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the property and where
customarily, the latter promises to return the property after a specified period with payment for its use, called interest.[ On the
other hand, bonds are interest-bearing or discounted government or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the
bondholder a specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal amount of the loan at maturity. The
language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous
than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the
President. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic
act.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

The first thing that we need to understand is, when it comes to foreign affairs, we follow the same statute in US. I will say
that the sole organ of foreign relation is the executive. The SC has no participation; Congress has verbally no participation except only
under #2. But take note here that is into Congress itself who participates. Its only Senate and the participation of the Senate is also
very limited. It comes only when you enter into treaties. I think I ask in T or F. Suppose the Pres wants to terminate a treaty, will he
need Senate concurrence? No, because that power is not given by the Constitution to the Senate. The power is very specific, it is
saying only if you want to enter into treaties you need Senate concurrence. It does not say that if you want to terminate a treaty you
need Senate concurrence. Its only one sided.

Under the Constitution, the president is given the power:


1. To negotiate treatise and international agreements
2. To appoint ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
3. To receive ambassadors – this is not listed in the Constitution but it is agreed that the President has the power. Actually it is more
symbolic because it seems that if you are an ambassador from a foreign country, before you can discharge your functions you have to
go to the Malacañang and the President will receive you. So it is more ceremonial and symbolic than actual.
4. To contract and guarantee foreign loans
5. Deport aliens – not in the Constitution but given by law. it is an issue of foreign affairs for the reason that if you deport aliens, the
other country may get angry. So it is the President.

The other problem is this: In the old Constitution of 1935 it was very specific that only treaties need Senate concurrence but it
become a problem in actual practice. Why it becomes a problem? Because usually the President will enter into a treaty and say that
this is only an executive agreement, it need not need your consent. How did that happen because that is the practice in the US. The
practice in the US is that if it is agreement you do not need Senate consent. If it is a treaty you need Senate consent. Now, to do away
with the acts of President by passing the Senate, they decided to put everything together saying that treaties, international agreements
need Senate concurrence. But the problem is it does not involve anything.

What does that mean? If you look at the case (CIR vs. GOTAMCO 148 SCRA36 (1987) case), it is saying that not all
international agreement or international executive agreements need Senate concurrence. We have to distinguish. What’s the
distinction? Those which are permanent in nature or which establish policy require Senate concurrence. Those which are transitory in
nature need no Senate concurrence. This one is very important. So even now, despite of the wordings of the Constitution, the actual
practice done by the President is if the international agreement is permanent in nature, when it established policy it gets Senate
concurrence. However if the agreement is only transitory in nature, maybe it’s only the implementation of a treaty, you need no Senate
concurrence. There is still a dispute sometimes between the Senate and the President.

The best example is the one I assigned. What happened there was, the President entered into an executive agreement with
World Health Organization exempting him from treaties, tax. Where will that fall #1 or #2? What did the court say? It falls only under
#2. Take note here that the WHO is considered to be an international entity. WHO is only an organ of the United Nation? Now we
have treaty with UN. We call it a UN chapter. They sign it. Under that UN Chapter they are suppose to grant privileges to
organizations under it. So that they will perform their function. So the court, say, WHO is only a part and organ of the UN. So when
the Pres give tax exemption, he is only implementing the terms of the original treaty, treaty with UN. So there is no need of Senate
concurrence. Ok!

CIR vs. GOTAMCO & SONS


148 SCRA 36 (1987)

FACTS: The World Health Organization (WHO) is an international organization which has a regional office in Manila. As
such, it enjoys privileges and immunities which are defined more specifically in the HOST Agreement entered into
between the Republic and the said Organization on July 22, 1951. Section 11 of the Agreement provides, among
others, that "the Organization, its assets, income and other properties shall be: (a) exempt from all direct and indirect
taxes xxx." The WHO decided to construct a building to house its own offices stationed in Manila. The construction
contract was awarded to respondent Gotamco. Subsequently the WHO issued a certification stating that the bid of
respondent should be exempted from any taxes in connection with the construction of the WHO building in
accordance with the HOST Agreement. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, demanded from
respondent the payment of P16,970.40, representing the 3% contractor's tax plus surcharges on the gross receipts it
received from the WHO in the construction of the latter's building. Respondent Gotamco appealed the decision to
the CTA which reversed the Commissioner's decision. The CTA decision is now before the SC for review on
certiorari. In his petition, petitioner questioned the entitlement of the WHO to the exemption, contending that the
HOST Agreement is null and void, not having been ratified by the Philippine Senate as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HOST Agreement is validly concluded between the Philippine Government and the WHO.

HELD: We find no merit in the contention. While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution,
less formal types of International Agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding
without the concurrence of the legislative body. The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is valid and
binding international agreement even without the concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and
immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been recognized by this Court as legally binding on
Philippine Authorities.

GO TEK VS DEPORTATION
G.R. No. L-23846 (September 9, 1977)
FACTS: In December, 1963 certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office located at 1439
O'Donnel Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit of the "Emergency Intelligence
Section, Army of the United States" and that among those arrested thereat was Go Tek an alleged sector commander
and intelligence and record officer of that guerilla unit.
It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek's possession and that, therefore, he had violated
article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed that after
trial the Board should recommend to the President of the Philippines the immediate deportation of Go Tek as an
undesirable alien, "his presence in this country having been, and will always be and a menace to the peace , welfare,
and security of the community". Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint was premature
bemuse them was a pending case against him in the city fiscal's office of Manila for violation of Article 168, RPC.
He contended that the board had no jurisdiction to try the case

ISSUE: WON the State as the power to deport undesirable aliens.

HELD: The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed.
960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action
necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation Justice Johnson's is that there the Chief Executive
rinds that there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The Deportation Board is an agent of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable
aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein." The Board has jurisdiction to
investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake dollar checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) in spite of
the fact that he has not yet been convicted of illegal possession thereof under article 168 of the Revised Penal Code
and notwithstanding that act is not the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated in section 37
of the Immigration Law. The charge against Go Tek before- the Board was not premature.

What are things which are considered to be permanent in nature or which established policy? For instance the President
would want to enter into a defense treaty with China. That is something new. For the last 100 years, we never had a defense treaty
with China. Another one for instance, the President goes to other countries from time to time. He goes to Moscow. Then sometimes he
enters into a cultural agreement. We will send Filipino folks dancers. Cultural exchange maybe a Russian will come to the Philippines.
Now that is not really considered to be a policy making matter because when it is transitory that is a one shot bill. So that needs no
Senate concurrence. That’s not political in nature.

OK! I think another illustration is the Balikatan. What only needs concurrence is only the VFA. But Balikatan only
implements VFA. Balikatan will be on how they conduct military exercise here because this is a treaty. You can say that is only
implementing the treaty. So that will be how it should come into play. It’s not that very clear because until now sometimes the two
will still quarrel. The Senate and the President will still quarrel or what needs Senate concurrence.

First you have to understand that when you deport an alien. Sometimes the state where he comes from will react. It might
also end up deporting Filipinos back in to the Philippines. So that it’s a matter of foreign relations. That is why even if the Constitution
does not mention this is accepted that it belong to the Pres, ok! So he is the one who deport aliens. The requirement now when you
deport alien is they are saying that there must be a valid ground and a requirement also of due process. You need hearing, notifying.

Q: Who does the President deport?


A: Usually it will come under the term undesirable aliens. They have committed crimes in the Philippines, suspected of being
phidophiles, etc.
Just remember that deportation is not much in the news because when we deport people nobody thinks much on them but the
one that is in the news usually is the other power. That is of extradition.

Q: How do you distinguish deportation from extradition?


A: In EXTRADITION, usually, there is a treaty. When do we extradite an alien? If another state asks for him. The usual practice is
he commits crime, if he is an American, he commits it is the US. He stays in the Philippines. The US actually cannot send the marines
to capture here in the Philippines. They will invoke a treaty. What do we do? We catch him and send him back to his own country to
face in his country. That is what happens in Jimenez. He committed crime in the US. Now they are facing an issue about Garcillano.
What we need to do is we file a case against him in the Philippines, then issue a warrant then after that extend the copy of the warrant
and he will be arrested and send back to the Philippines for trial. That is how it works.

The President of the Philippines authorizing the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to negotiate and sign a loan
agreement with the German government for construction of a dam. The resolution asks that the agreement is submitted to him for a
declaration. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs advises the Secretary of DPWH not to comply with the request. Must the President
submit the agreement for ratification by the Senate? No, it is under contracting loan agreements with a German government. What you
need is the monetary board concurrence not the Senate.
Bayan v. Executive
342 SCRA 449 (2000)

FACTS: On Oct. 5, 1998, President Estrada ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United
States of America. The VFA provides for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and
defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The President submitted the Agreement for concurrence by the Senate
under Sec. 21, Art. VI instead of Sec. 25. Art XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Considering that the agreement is not a basing agreement but covers only temporary presence of troops and facilities, is
the President correct?

HELD: No. Sec. 21, Art. VII, applies to treaties in general regardless of the subject matter or coverage. In contrast, Sec. 25,
Art. XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
the Philippines. It is not right to argue that the latter section is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no
permanent placing of structures for the establishment of a military bases, troops or facilities. “The conjunction is “or”. Stated
otherwise, the provision applies to entry of troops without any foreign bases being established.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Office


462 SCRA 265 (2005)

FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court with power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. While the Philippines signed the Statute on
Dec. 28, 2000, the Office of the President did not ratify it in accordance with its terms and did not transmit it to the Senate for its
concurrence.

ISSUE: May a petition for mandamus lie to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the DFA to bring the signed copy to
the Senate for its concurrence?

HELD: No. The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is
the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states. Nonetheless, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to
refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.

Abaya v. Ebdane
515 SCRA 720 (2007)

FACTS: Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines entered into a
Loan Agreement whereby the former lent Y79,861,000,000 to the latter for various infrastructure projects throughout the
country. The agreement was reached after negotiations between diplomatic representatives of the two countries, and was later
formalized into the Exchange of Notes dated Dec. 27, 1999.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for mandamus lies to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the DFA to bring the
signed copy to the Senate for its concurrence?

HELD: The Court holds that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement. The
Exchange of Notes expressed that the two governments have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to
the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts. Under
the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the Japanese Government. Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-
P204 is indubitably an integral part of the Exchange of Notes. It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such that it cannot be
properly taken independent thereof.
Akbayan v. Aquino
558 SCRA 468 (2008)
FACTS: Petitioners sought to obtain from the government the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto. During the pendency of the petition, the agreement was made public, signed by the President and forwarded
to the Senate for its ratification.

ISSUE: Whether the documents pertaining to the offers and counter-offers during negotiations exempted from public disclosure on
the ground of executive privilege

HELD: Yes. While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to
be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their
offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that
Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter
Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an
area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

Secretary v. Kuroga
586 SCRA 513 (2009)

FACTS: Kuroga was an American citizen who was convicted of attempted possession of illegal drugs. The Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the
Bureau of Imigration (BI) ordered him deported, which order was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the order, reasoning, among others that while conviction is a ground for deportation, Kuroga was convicted in the United States, not in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether courts review the decisions of the BOC?

HELD Yes. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alien, and that the BOC has
jurisdiction over deportation proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested the power of judicial review in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts, as established by law. Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their own
judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with
grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

Domingo v. Sheer
421 SCRA 470 (2004)

FACTS: Herbert Scheer, a German national, was granted a permanent resident status by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation in 1986. In 1995, however, it was discovered that he had police records and financial liabilities, as well as a pending
arrest warrant in Germany so that he was ordered deported from the Philippines.

ISSUE: Is the power of the President to determine whether an alien may be deported from the Philippines subject to judicial
review?

HELD: The authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relation is vested in the political department of the
government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and to be executed by executive authority, except insofar as
the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. Although the
courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch, the court may resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has been made with
grave abuse of discretion, when the act violates the law or the Constitution. In this case, it is alleged that the Board of
Commissioners acted with grave abuse of discretion in causing Scheer’s arrest and detention. Indeed, it deprived him of due
process in issuing the order of deportation without even conducting a summary hearing. The BOC merely concluded that Scheer
was involved in “illegal activities in Palawan” without affording him the right to be heard.

Bar questions
1996
Can the HR take active part in the conduct of foreign relations particularly in entering into treaties and international
agreement? Absolutely HR has no participation at all in foreign affairs.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular
session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

Congress opens 4th Monday of July. Right! So within 1 month the President shall give the appropriation bill. Remember, we
discuss that 2 months ago. There is a statement in the Constitution saying that Congress cannot increase the appropriation
recommended by the President but it can decrease. So the President submits it. It is not subject to increase.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time.

That is the famous SONA. In the US they call the State of the Union Address.
There’s nothing in the executive anymore and I will discuss some questions in a few minutes. First, we know that they are
proposing a change of the Constitution. If that happens all that you learned tonight will be useless. In fact I will also be jobless.☺

If you try to look at it now, the most popularly proposed will be for a federal parliamentary system. What do you mean by
that? Basic things only. First is, we know that we are not parliamentary form of government. What are we? We are Presidential. You
also know that we are not federal. What are we? We call ourselves unitary govt.
There are two items here. Federal-Unitary and Presidential- Unitary. When we speak of a unitary government that means
actually that there is only one central authority. When we speak of federal government, power is divided among various states under
the federal government. The example is the US. You have the federal government plus various states. Now they are proposing that we
follow this in the Philippines. In fact if you try to look at the proposal they want to divide the Philippines into 13 states. That might not
be good for us. One day some of you will become Chief Justice of the one State.

If you look at the federal government we can say that you have several central authorities. Each state will be in a sense an
independent entity. Then we have the central government, what we are trying to tell you is, powers are divided between the State and
the federal authority.

What about in a unitary system? There is a prohibition of power. All powers belong to the central government. If you look at
the power in the unitary government. The power enjoyed LGU are so limited and there is really no division of power. They are only
delegated.

Do barrios and cities and municipalities pass laws? In a sense, yes but it is limited. Ordinances only. The reason why they can
pass ordinances is because powers are delegated to them. What is the problem with delegation? If it is delegation it is very restricted.
You can only exercise the powers delegated to you. Can the City of Davao pass a law allowing divorce? No, because the central
government will not allow it. Suppose the central government is saying that gambling is allowed. Can DC say that we will not allow
gambling here? No, not allowed because it only exercise delegate power. But in a federal government, each state will have a law on
person and family law. I am sure that some states will allow divorce. How do we divide the power? The normal practice is usually
Foreign Affairs is always given to the general govt. Defense in most cases is also given to the Central authority.

In the US, they have only had one US army. The issue on peace and order is usually given to various states. So you have
local police forces. When we speak of federal government, we only mean the vertical relationship between the national authority and
the component state. When we speak of a parliamentary system we mean actually the horizontal relationship among branches. So
there is no problem actually, for instance you can have Federal- Presidential. The best example is the US. You can have Federal-
Parliamentary. England is one of federal-parliamentary. You can have parliamentary-unitary. The best example is Singapore because
it is very small. It has a parliament but it is too much to divide Singapore into several states. Because it might happen that there will be
10 people for every state there.

You can also have unitary-presidential. The best example is Philippines.


What about the debate regarding parliamentary and presidential system.
Q: What is the essence of a presidential system?
A: There is a separation of powers. Powers are divided into executive, legislative and judiciary.

Q: What about parliamentary system?


A: This would be the structure. You have the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Executive and legislative are used together; they are
exercised by the parliament who is headed by the prime minister. Why do I say that they are now? This is what will happen. Who will
elect the prime minister? In all cases actually it is the parliament. In a parliament system, if the parliament does not want the President,
no confidence. What will happen is they put another guy. So in the end, it is unstable because you can have several prime minister for
one year. What is the other side? It is possible that the prime minister does not like the parliament. What does he do? Dissolved.
About 2 weeks ago, what happened was that Prime Minister of Japan disclosed the parliament calling for an election. What
was the issue? He wanted to privatize the postal service. Parliament does not want it. But he is thinking that if he dissolves the
parliament and the new election will be held the new people elected will be supportive of him. In the Presidential, is very stable but
the problem is if you have a bad president, very difficult to remove because that would go to the process of impeachment. So it will
take time. Right now that is what's happening. In the parliamentary it is easy to remove but the problem is it might be not so stable.

We go now to what system will be the best. In all of them, nobody conquers the judiciary. The judiciary is always
independent even if you are a parliamentary system.
I am thinking that I am more of the presidential system. Maybe there are many problems but we know the problems. Then we
go to something which we are not familiar with. So we have to start from the bottom again.
-oOo-

ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights, which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Section 1 of Art. 8 is not that easy to understand, however, I am happy that when I gave the quiz on this many of you got
perfect. That shows that I do not have to explain much actually. Actually, it is very conceptual.

First, we will try to answer the basic questions. Try to answer the question on where judicial power is vested. I asked you in
the T or F, only Supreme Court exercise judicial power? The answer is false because we know that it is the Supreme Court as well as
other courts. Meaning that includes the lowest court like the MTC. So it is not the exclusive power of the Supreme Court.

We go to the next item, the second paragraph.

By the way, please memorize Section 1; this is the only provision of the Constitution I will ask you to memorize. This is very
important because so many bar questions can be answered by just memorizing this provision. So, try to remember it so that even if
you get amnesia you can still memorize it.

The second paragraph tells us how to define judicial power because judicial power is exercised by the court exclusively. Two
aspects: Standard and Practical. Practical or usual definition states that judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Example, you borrowed money and you did not pay,
you go to court. The court will judge it. The new definition states that it is to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of any branch or any other instrumentality of the government.

The cases in the textbook of Justice Cruz intend to suggest that the Supreme Court exercise two types of jurisdiction.

When we speak of JURISDICTION we mean power. One is the ordinary jurisdiction and the extraordinary jurisdiction.

When we speak of an ORDINARY JURISDICTION that refers to the first half of the sentence of the second paragraph.
What do we mean by that? When we speak of ordinary jurisdiction, the sentence is saying judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Up to that point, that is
what we mean by ordinary jurisdiction. Sometimes they call this a traditional meaning of judicial power. Why do I say that it is a
traditional meaning? Because apparently only the system would include that as the meaning of judicial power.

In fact, that was the only meaning of judicial power under the 1935 Constitution. Specifically, what do we mean the power to
determine controversies involving rights which are legally demandable? That refers to ordinary cases; I file a case against you for
collection of 1M. That calls for the exercise of judicial power because there’s a controversy between us. You charge me for murder or
rape. So the court will try to determine whether I really commit the crime. So that is an ordinary issue of settling actual controversies.
These are questions which are justiciable, meaning that no court should refuse to entertain these cases because that is the meaning of
its ordinary power.

Q: When do we know that the question is justiciable?


A: The answer is when the issue calls for the legality or constitutionality of something. Can you go to court, suppose you are
quarrelling on the question on, which is really correct, is the sun going around the earth or is it going around the sun? Can you go to
court and say” Oy judge we have a problem, try to resolve this controversy”. We know that it is not a matter for judges. Why?
Because there is no law to be applied there in trying to arrive an answer. If the judge will try to answer that, he will be studying the
textbooks in science. He will no longer be studying laws passed by Congress for the Constitution. So that is not justiciable. When the
question is justiciable, the court will end up applying laws or the Constitution because we have to understand that in our system this is
the only thing applicable to controversies. You cannot apply the Bible or any other textbook on that matter. When Marcos declared
Martial Law and he stopped the SC to discuss. The problem is that, the SC refused to entertain many cases. So, for instance people
will go to court saying that we do not believe that the President can declare Martial Law. We do not believe that he can suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus indefinitely. What will the court say? “Ooh, that is not justiciable”. That is a political question.
We cannot pass on that. You pray that Marcos will stop Martial Law because that is not justiciable. So to avoid that problem, we are
now dealing with the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court. Meaning, these are areas when there is no clear law applicable. We are
through with the Constitution that the court can pass upon it if there is grave abuse of discretion. That is now the second portion added
in the 1987 Constitution. Not found in 1935 and 1973.

The portion is saying, “to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. I’ll go back to that in a few minutes.

Q: What do you mean by THE COURT EXERCISE IN ITS EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION?


A: That means that there has been grave abuse of jurisdiction. Normally, we call these questions as political questions. Why political
question? Because in the controversy there is no law to be applied. There is no constitutional provision violated. So, in the end
actually according to commentators since we are not challenging the constitutionality, you are now challenging the wisdom of the act.

Do not look at wisdom as a very exclusive term. It can mean many terms. Many people in the government do not have that
wisdom. When we speak of wisdom, when the issue is about the wisdom of an act, we really do not mean the term because it can take
other forms. So, for instance, we are told with… you are dealing with the issue of maybe, “is the act economical?” That pertains to
wisdom. “Will the law be advantageous”, that is also an issue of wisdom. In other cases, the question is political, “is it timely to have
that law now or should we do it next year?” Timeliness is not also an issue of legality because normally it’s “do this today, do this
tomorrow.” Also practicality. Is the measure adopted by Congress or by the legislature practicable? So those refer to wisdom. Another
way of looking, normally what defines political questions is questions which are address to the wisdom of an act, not the legality or
not the constitutionality. Another way in which we define it is this, when we say that the question is political we mean actually that the
question according to the definition, full discretionary authority is not given to the courts but given to these two entities. The power to
decide, or the political departments, not to courts. That means, that it is a political question.

DENR vs. DENR Employees


For instance in the DENR case, is it valid to move office from Cotabato to Marbel considering that it is Ramadan? The Court
stated that the issue is the wisdom – the practicality. Is it economical? Nothing to do with legality or validity.

DENR v. DENR Employees


409 SCRA 359 (2003)

FACTS: After the transfer of the provinces of South Cotabato and Saranggani from Region XI to Region XII following a
plebiscite held within the proposed area of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, the Secretary of the DENR issued an
order to move the Regional Office from Cotabato City to Koronadal City. The employees of DENR Region XII whose families
would be dislocated by the transfer sought to prevent the implementation of the order arguing against its timeliness.

HELD: It may be true that the transfer of the office may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no building yet to house the
regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are
already enrolled in Cotabato City. However, these concern issues are addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its
legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the
executive or legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid
of authority to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made
by other departments.

The Supreme Court told that there are 2 political questions – one that is assigned to a political department and secondly, one
that is assigned to people in their capacity. They are the ones who will resolve the issue.
What examples of questions, which are reserved to the people with their sovereign capacity? So for instance, amending or
revising the Constitution. I think we know that we amend or revise the Constitution; the people will have to do it in a plebiscite. So,
that is reserved to the people.
Another is, issues about recall. I think you are not familiar about recall because it is only found in the LGC.

Another matter which is reserved to the people is initiative on legislation. We pass a law that is in exercise of our sovereign
power. So that is reserved to the people.
What about the other kind of political question? Those are questions reserved by the Constitution for the political depts. not
the judiciary.

Q: What are the political departments?


A: Those are actually the executive or the legislative. We call them political dept’s for they are the one who really exercise power.

Now, if we try to review the Constitution, there are many questions which are for instance reserved to the executive. For
instance, the power to pardon. Who can pardon? It is the President. What are the matters reserved to the legislature? So for instance,
impeachment. I think impeachment is purely in the House and the Senate during the trial.

Others are mixed. For instance, the power to enter into treaties. We know that it is executive with concurrence from the
Senate. So, it is still with the two political departments. So, in theory we call this political question that should be outside the
jurisdiction of the courts.

We go back to grave abuse. A few minutes ago, I told you that, apparently in the new Constitution, even if a question is a
political question, if you alleged grave abuse of discretion, the court could no longer say we will not entertain because it is now
authorized by the Constitution to review and determine whether there is really grave abuse. Take note here that the Constitution is not
concerned with abuse. I emphasize this by saying that; we know that government officials abuse everyday. But that is not the one that
is supposed to be reversed by the judiciary because the Constitution is saying that the kind of abuse that can be reversed is really
GRAVE ABUSE. It is really a very serious term. Ok! So that is what the Constitution means. When you claim grave abuse usually the
court will entertain and say, “oh, there is an allegation of grave abuse, we will try to assume jurisdiction”. But the problem is, it is a
general matter to be established if there is really a fact of grave abuse because the moment you alleged the court will entertain. I have
not really seen an actual case where the SC reverses the political dept’s on the ground of grave abuse only. I have not seen because if
you look at the impeachment, they reversed Congress in the impeachment of Davide. But we will study that later. But in the end,
actually, the SC did not reverse it purely on grave abuse. The COMELEC is always the praying of grave abuse in the SC, but the
others I have not really seen the actual reversal case of grave abuse. I think I discussed to you the case of protest of Congressman
Arroyo where the electoral tribunal was reversed by the SC on the ground of grave abuse. But if we try to look at it, the Court seems
not to rely only on grave abuse. It stated that there was cheating by the people counting the votes, tampering of ballots. So it stated that
the tribunal violated due process. Due process actually is a constitutional principle. It’s not just plain grave abuse. I am thinking
actually that the SC is always willing to reverse something when we say grave abuse. If we try to look at the Constitution, the grave
abuse of discretion applies only to this one. It is saying only to determine whether there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality. What is the implication of that? I believe you cannot challenge the act of the people based on grave
abuse. I think that’s too obvious. For instance, we decide to amend the Constitution or revise it. We say that we are tired of
Presidential, we want a Parliament, we want a Prime Minister. Then in the plebiscite, the parliamentary decision won. You cannot go
to court and say that the people abuse their discretion; they are wrong in voting the parliamentary. It should be reversed. That cannot
be done. In fact, there is one case about this. There was a public official, a mayor, who was recalled in a local recall election. He went
to the SC and say, people abuse their discretion. They should not have recalled me, I am a very honest politician, I am very handsome.
So there is no basis. They committed grave abuse of discretion. The court stated, “No, we cannot review the act of the people because
that is purely a political question”. That is the substance to the changes brought about by the new Constitution.

True or False
Whether or not the President committed a mistake in declaring the state of emergency. If you are the SC, will you review it? -
When you say he has committed a mistake, that is not grave abuse. Because we commit mistakes.

Political or Justiciable?

Whether or not the WTO will improve the economy of the Philippines. – Political. What will be good for the economy or not
is a matter for the President or Congress. It is not for the SC because SC’s job is to apply the law.

Whether or not the oil deregulation law will lower the petroleum products. – Political. These are questions on economics. The
SC are not economists. It is a matter for Congress or President. Even economists quarrel on what is good for the country.

Whether or not the oil deregulation law will violate the constitutional prohibition on the monopoly of trade. – Justiciable.

Whether or not it is too early to regulate the oil industry considering the local investors are not ready. – Political. It is related
on some factors which are not found in the Constitution.
Whether or not it is better to start with public agricultural land before proceeding to private lands in implementing land
reform act. – Political.

Whether or not the Senate gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the treaty. – Justiciable.

Whether it is timely to move the … of the Autonomous Region to Koronadal during Ramadan? Political. Timeliness,
wisdom, practicality, economy.

True or False
In trying to determine whether there is a grave abuse of discretion, can the SC look at the evidence? Factual matters? –
Remember Martial law, what does it say? To determine… the SC will now have the power to examine factual basis. So SC can look at
the evidence because without the factual basis, the court cannot say “that is grave abuse.” So that is what we mean that SC can
examine the evidence of the decision of the other departments.

Bar questions
1994
What is the difference if any between the scope of judicial power under 1987 Constitution on one hand and 1935 and 1973
Constitution on the other?

1997
Q: To what extent has the 1987 Constitution affected the political question doctrine?
A: It has affected in the sense that the court is now allowed to review if there is grave abuse of discretion even if the question is
political. But it will reverse only if there is in fact grave abuse.
Martial law is to the President but the Constitution itself has stated that is there is grave abuse of discretion it is subject to
review.

1989
Where is judicial power vested?
You memorize 1st paragraph
What are included in such power?
You have to memorize the 2nd paragraph

TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 (May 2, 1997)

FACTS: On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
(Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations
(Final Act, for brevity).
Petitioners contend that (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the
constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, and therefore assails the WTO Agreement for
violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
The petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the members of the Senate who concurred with the
WTO Treaty as said treaty allegedly contravenes the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the controversy.

HELD: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
“The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”

The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987
Constitution, as follows: “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.”

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department’s duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.
As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not
only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”

Buac v. COMELEC
421 SCRA 92 (2004)

FACTS: In April 1998, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood law (RA No. 8487)
proposing the conversion of Taguig from municipality into a city. The results of the voting showed that the negative
votes won. Petitioner filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the results alleging fraud and irregularities in the casting and
counting of votes. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction concluding that the case
should have been filed before the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether a regular court have jurisdiction to annul the plebiscite results

HELD: No. The invocation of judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Sec. 1, Art. VIII
of the Constitution defines judicial power as including “the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The case at bar assailing the
regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power. It
does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in this
case. There is no invocation of a private right that has been violated. Rather, the issue is the determination of the sovereign
decision of the electorate. Thus, it cannot come under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.

Brillantes, Jr., v. COMELEC


432 SCRA 269 (2004)

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution 6712 titled General Instructions for the Electronic
Transmission and Consolidation of Advanced Results in the May 10, 2004 Elections. The resolution was purportedly issued
in relation to RA No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting
and canvassing of votes. Petitioner claims that it violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution since it intrudes into the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for the President and the Vice President, as well as Art. VI, Sec. 29 (1) for authorizing the release
of funds without prior appropriation.

ISSUE: Whether the controversy is justiciable

HELD: Yes. The issue raised in the petition does not merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on its
alleged disregard of applicable statutory and constitutional provisions. In other words, the petition is questioning the legality
of the COMELEC’s administrative issuance and it will not preclude the court from exercising its power of judicial review to
determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Administrative issuances
must not override, supplant or modify a law. Where the grant of power is qualified or conditional, the issue whether the
conditions or limitations have been met is justiciable.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

The question to apply the provision is: Who determines whether a case for rape should be filed before the SC or
Sandiganbayan or CA? Who decides that? It is the Congress. This is the matter about jurisdiction. It is Congress passing the law
saying that all cases against public officials can be filed before the Sandiganbayan. Rape cases should be filed by the RTC. Claims for
the sum of money not exceeding a certain amount of money is in the MTC. That Constitution is saying that, it is Congress who
determines jurisdiction of the courts. What is the exception? The exception is that in some instances, which we will study, the
Constitution also determines jurisdiction. For instance, the SC will entertain these cases. So that is given by the Constitution. On the
jurisdiction of the courts, it is found in two sources. The Constitution, or the laws passed by Congress. No other.

Can Congress decrease the jurisdiction of the SC? We come up with two items. I asked in the examination, can Congress
increase? It can increase only if there is consent by the SC. I told you that original jurisdiction can be increased even without the
consent. Now, we are now in the reverse. Can Congress decrease? The answer is, if the jurisdiction was given by the Constitution
under Section 5, it cannot be decreased, but if the jurisdiction was given by Congress by means of a law, because it can do that under
the same section, then it can be decreased. So you have to distinguish because if the jurisdiction was only given by the Congress, it
follows that it can be withdrawn anytime but if it is the Constitution, it cannot be withdrawn. What are the powers under Section 5?
We will discuss that tomorrow. But in Mantruste vs. CA (179 SCRA 136 – 1989) case, Congress passed a law saying that the SC
should not issue TRO for infrastructure projects. Congress stated that if the government is guilty the SC couldn’t say that “stop that for
the moment, there’s a case pending.” The question is, is that valid? Can a law be passed by Congress prohibiting courts from issuing
TRO? Yes, if you went over the Mantruste case, according to the SC, if you look at Section 5, there is no mention of TRO. Therefore
you are not removing the power of SC given by the Constitution under Section 5 because that is not an absolute prohibition.

MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS vs. CA


179 SCRA 136 (1989)

FACTS: Petitioner Mantruste Systems, Inc. (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement with the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) - owner of the BAYVIEW PROPERTY -- wherein the former would operate the hotel for 3
months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by the latter. Subsequently,
the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 50-A under which the Bayview Hotel properties were
among the government assets identified for privatization and were consequently, transferred from DBP to the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating their contract of lease.
However, MSI refused to turn over the properties on the ground that it has acquired a priority right to the purchase
of the Bay view property over and above other interested parties. The APT opposed this claim and the properties
were eventually awarded to the highest bidders, without the MSI participating in the bidding conducted for the
purpose. Thereupon, the MSI filed a complaint with the lower court and prayed for the issuance of a restraining
order to enjoin APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the properties to the highest bidders and from
ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease.

The CA nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary injunction for being violative of Sec. 31 of Proclamation No.
50-A which expressly prohibits issuance of restraining orders and injunctions against the Trust in connection with
the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. It rejected the opinion that the said provision is
unconstitutional because it impinges upon the judicial power as defined in Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
It held that, in view of Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the
lower court against the APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power, i.e., the power to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, for MSI does not have a legally
demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel. In any case, judicial power is "not unqualified". It may
be regulated and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII) and by law, and the law in this case (Proclamation
No. 50-A) provides that judicial power may not be exercised in the form of an injunction against the acts of the APT
in pursuance of its mandate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A infringes the inherent power of courts defined under Sec. 1, Art.
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent
power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec. 1, Art. VIII)

The reasons are as follows:


1) The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature,
except that it may not deprive the SC of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, Art. VII