Hammer of the Caliphate: The Territorial Demise of the Islamic State—A Small Wars Journal Anthology

Copyright © 2018 by Small Wars Foundation.

ISBN:                  Softcover                  978-1-9845-1720-3

                             eBook                       978-1-9845-1719-7

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Getty Images are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Getty Images.

Rev. date: 04/06/2018

Xlibris

1-888-795-4274

www.Xlibris.com

774465

CONTENTS

Acronyms

Foreword:       CENTCOM Targeting of the Islamic State

Matt Begert

Introduction:   Hammer of the Caliphate

Robert J. Bunker, Dave Dilegge,

and Alma Keshavarz

The Caliphate and Radical Islamist Groups

Chapter 1     Why America Should Care

About the YPJ in Syria

James Burton

Chapter 2     Terrorist Threats to Pakistan’s

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A

Clear and Present Danger

Sajid Farid Shapoo

Chapter 3     Bringing COIN to the

Airport: On the Effectiveness

of the Muslim Ban

Philip Zager

Chapter 4     A Book Review of "Islamist

Terrorism in Europe: A History"

Daniel Sigler

Chapter 5     Remote Controlled Terrorism

and its Implications for

Counter-Terrorism Efforts

Michael Tierney

Chapter 6     ISIL & Drones: Understand the

Network to Defeat the Network

Noah B. Cooper

Chapter 7     CVE Was Doomed to Fail. Under

Trump, It Will Get Worse

Yasmin Faruki

Chapter 8     Will There Be A "Great

Raid" Into Syria?

Gary Anderson

Chapter 9     The War Has Just Begun:

Boko Haram and the Coming

Diffusion of Terror in Nigeria

Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob

Chapter 10   Honor in Hijrah as Expressed

by the Islamic State

Guy Fricano

Chapter 11   ISIS After Trump

Joel Day

Chapter 12   The Two Faces of Terror:

Why the West Loses

G. Murphy Donovan

Chapter 13   U.S. Counter-Ideological Campaign

Ryan Basford

Chapter 14   Returning Foreign Fighters in the

Caribbean: Issues and Approaches

Jaimie Ogilvie

Chapter 15   After ISIL: The Conflict

Following the War

Brandon Whitehead

Chapter 16   There is No Stalemate in

Afghanistan: We’re Losing

Daniel Fisher

Chapter 17   Taking Stock: What the US is

Learning from Europe’s Spate

of Urban Truck Attacks

Cameron Reed

Chapter 18   Trump’s Imaginary Strategy

for Afghanistan

Ehsan M. Ahrari

Chapter 19   Countering ISIL’s Digital

Caliphate: An Alternative Model

Bradford Burris

Chapter 20   Book Review: Nexus of Global

Jihad by Assaf Moghadam

Philip Zager

Chapter 21   Book Review– "Al-Qaeda’s Revenge:

The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings"

John P. Sullivan

Chapter 22   Marketing to Extremists:

Waging War in Cyberspace

Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney

Chapter 23   Salafi Jihadism–An

Ideological Misnomer

Sajid Farid Shapoo

Chapter 24   Al-Qaeda in the Age of ISIS

Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney

Chapter 25   ISIS After The Caliphate

Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney

Chapter 26   An ISIS-Al Qaeda Merger?

Thomas R. McCabe

Chapter 27   The Terrorist Diaspora, its

Returnees, and Disrupting the Rise

of Homegrown Violent Extremists

Conrad E. Orr

Chapter 28   The Fires Next Time: The ISIS

Terrorist Threat in the West

Thomas R. McCabe

Chapter 29   SWJ Book Review of Our Latest

Longest War: Losing Hearts

and Minds in Afghanistan

John Q. Bolton

Chapter 30   SWJ Book Review: A Military

History of the Modern Middle East

Alma Keshavarz

Chapter 31   Giza Ambush Exposes Security

Weakness in Egypt’s Hinterland

Oded Berkowitz

Chapter 32   Unintended Consequences:

How the Global Democracy

and Development Community

Contribute to the Creation

of Violent Non-State Actors

Such as Boko Haram

Christopher Keith Johnson

Chapter 33   SWJ Book Review— "The

Muhammad Code: How a Desert

Prophet Brought You ISIS, al

Qaeda, and Boko Haram"

Jonathan K. Zartman

Chapter 34   General Petraeus on the Battle

After the Battle Against ISIS

Octavian Manea

Chapter 35   Bangladesh: The New Nexus

for Transnational Terrorism

Robert C. Hodges

Chapter 36   The Haqqani Network:

International Friends, Local Enemies

Tom Davis

Counter Caliphate and Radical Islamist Group Strategies

Chapter 37   Lessons From Stabilizing Fallujah

Octavian Manea

Chapter 38   Toward an Afghan End State

Gary Anderson

Chapter 39   Building on Reconstruction:

What We Have Learned

and Where to Go Next

John Richard Berg

Chapter 40   Winning Indefinite Conflicts:

Achieving Strategic Success

Against Ideologically-Motivated

Violent Non-State Actors

Mark E. Vinson

Chapter 41   Countering the Daesh Narrative

Cheryl Phillips

Chapter 42   Syria’s Desert Hawks and the

Loyalist Response to ISIS

Lucas Winter

Chapter 43   Clemency and the Sword:

Using Amnesty as a Weapon

to Fracture and Defeat ISIL

Matthew Mullarky

Chapter 44   From Cultural Intelligence

to Cultural Understanding:

A Modest Proposal

Lawrence E. Cline

Chapter 45   Utilizing Society’s Forgotten

Half: The Essential Role of

Women in Counter Terrorism

James Howcroft

Chapter 46   Treating Islamic Violent Extremism

as a Pandemic Super-Infection:

Inverse Darwinist Operations

Line of Operation Explained

Thomas Doherty

Chapter 47   Defining the Model: Understanding

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Models to Develop a Path

Forward in Afghanistan

Samuel J. Ellison

Chapter 48   Afghanistan’s Center of

Gravity: The Taliban and

Case for AFPAK FATA

Victor R. Morris

Chapter 49   A Twist in the Quest for an

AUMF Against the Islamic State

Patrick Ryan Alban

Chapter 50   Government Approaches

to Islamic-Based Militant

Radicalization in Southeast Asia

John Zambri

Chapter 51   Iraq, the Islamic State,

and War Termination

Michael J. Mooney

Chapter 52   Diplomacy and the War on Terror

Stuart Murray and Patrick Blannin

Chapter 53   European Security Threats and

Challenges: An Examination of

Mass Migration, Its Impact on

European Security and Practical

Policy Recommendations

John D. Johnson, Raymond H. Chester

and Felix S. Johnfinn

Chapter 54   Social Media Field Manual: The

Iraqi Ministry of Defense Learned

to Take the War to Facebook

Caroline Bechtel

Postscript:   Islamic State Futures

Andrew Byers

Notes

Notes on Contributors

ABOUT SMALL WARS JOURNAL AND FOUNDATION

Small Wars Journal facilitates the exchange of information among practitioners, thought leaders, and students of Small Wars, in order to advance knowledge and capabilities in the field. We hope this, in turn, advances the practice and effectiveness of those forces prosecuting Small Wars in the interest of self-determination, freedom, and prosperity for the population in the area of operations.

We believe that Small Wars are an enduring feature of modern politics. We do not believe that true effectiveness in Small Wars is a ‘lesser included capability’ of a force tailored for major theater war. And we never believed that ‘bypass built-up areas’ was a tenable position warranting the doctrinal primacy it has held for too long—this site is an evolution of the MOUT Homepage, Urban Operations Journal, and urbanoperations.com, all formerly run by the Small Wars Journal’s Editor-in-Chief.

The characteristics of Small Wars have evolved since the Banana Wars and Gunboat Diplomacy. War is never purely military, but today’s Small Wars are even less pure with the greater inter-connectedness of the 21st century. Their conduct typically involves the projection and employment of the full spectrum of national and coalition power by a broad community of practitioners. The military is still generally the biggest part of the pack, but there a lot of other wolves. The strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack.

The Small Wars Journal’s founders come from the Marine Corps. Like Marines deserve to be, we are very proud of this; we are also conscious and cautious of it. This site seeks to transcend any viewpoint that is single service, and any that is purely military or naively U.S.-centric. We pursue a comprehensive approach to Small Wars, integrating the full joint, allied, and coalition military with their governments’ federal or national agencies, non-governmental agencies, and private organizations. Small Wars are big undertakings, demanding a coordinated effort from a huge community of interest.

We thank our contributors for sharing their knowledge and experience, and hope you will continue to join us as we build a resource for our community of interest to engage in a professional dialog on this painfully relevant topic. Share your thoughts, ideas, successes, and mistakes; make us all stronger.

…I know it when I see it.

Small Wars is an imperfect term used to describe a broad spectrum of spirited continuation of politics by other means, falling somewhere in the middle bit of the continuum between feisty diplomatic words and global thermonuclear war. The Small Wars Journal embraces that imperfection.

Just as friendly fire isn’t, there isn’t necessarily anything small about a Small War.

The term Small War either encompasses or overlaps with a number of familiar terms such as counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, support and stability operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and many flavors of intervention. Operations such as noncombatant evacuation, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance will often either be a part of a Small War, or have a Small Wars feel to them. Small Wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from their practitioners. The Small Wars Manual (a wonderful resource, unfortunately more ofte referred to than read) notes that:

Small Wars demand the highest type of leadership directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small Wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.

The three block war construct employed by General Krulak is exceptionally useful in describing the tactical and operational challenges of a Small War and of many urban operations. Its only shortcoming is that is so useful that it is often mistaken as a definition or as a type of operation.

We’d like to deploy a primer on Small Wars that provides more depth than this brief section. Your suggestions and contributions of content are welcome.

Who Are Those Guys?

Small Wars Journal is NOT a government, official, or big corporate site. It is run by Small Wars Foundation, a non-profit corporation, for the benefit of the Small Wars community of interest. The site principals are Dave Dilegge (Editor-in-Chief) and Bill Nagle (Publisher), and it would not be possible without the support of myriad volunteers as well as authors who care about this field and contribute their original works to the community. We do this in our spare time, because we want to. McDonald’s pays more. But we’d rather work to advance our noble profession than watch TV, try to super-size your order, or interest you in a delicious hot apple pie. If and when you’re not flipping burgers, please join us.

The views expressed in this anthology are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, or the U.S. Government, or any other U.S. armed service, intelligence or law enforcement agency, or local or state government.

Acronyms

Foreword

CENTCOM Targeting of the Islamic State

Matt Begert

El Segundo, CA

March 2018

The Hammer of the Caliphate is a formidable, vital, and important anthology. It is formidable because its purpose is to describe a complex, nearly unfathomable set of relationships, circumstances, and actors in both interrelated and interconnected activity with global consequences. It is vital because it compiles perspectives of the present and recent past, intermingles historical events for context, and identifies possible forms of the next Islamic State iteration. It is important because no other compilation to date has been assembled to set a baseline for predicting this future conflict and preparing for it.

The substance of this edited edition is much more than a discussion of the loss of territory. The importance of this work is the picture it paints of the massive complexity of situation and reaction to the Islamic State grab for territory and its subsequent territorial loss. It is also about the myriad and sometimes innovative and entrepreneurial counter-Islamic State responses such as the Women’s Protective League (YPJ) and the change in CENTCOM strategy from reconnaissance/surveillance to direct action intervention. The undercurrent of this change is predicting what the Islamic State will do next. What remains will trickle down a path of less resistance to a new existence, as its extinction is unlikely. The unknown is its next metamorphosis or identity.

The Islamic State appeared suddenly to grab caliphate territory, achieving relative superiority against a modern, well-trained and equipped coalition for a time. Responding, CENTCOM began an air strike campaign in 2014 to degrade Islamic State relative superiority. As Admiral McRaven notes in his book on special operations, relative superiority, once lost, is rarely regained.[1] Historically, a caliphate is defined by its territory, and with territorial loss comes defeat. However, in this modern cyber-world, the Islamic State might redefine some of those historical assumptions, as noted by several authors herein.

Two tables are included at the end of this foreword containing CENTCOM press release data on air strikes on targets in Syria and Iraq. It is a snapshot for the last three months of 2017 and not necessarily representative of the campaign begun in 2014. There are 5 categories of targets based on press release data. Targets of opportunity or choice in both Syria and Iraq tend toward tactical fighting units and positions and tactical vehicles. In Iraq, buildings are more often targeted and reported than in Syria. Roads and other movement over terrain networks in both countries include subterranean (caves and structures) tunnels and logistics targets are not prominent, although more often targeted in Syria than Iraq. Weapons other than individual arms tend to be IED’s and VBIED’s in larger numbers than crew-served weapons or artillery. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) in small numbers were identified and reported in each country.

A review of the targeting campaign tables clearly shows a mismatch between CENTCOM weapons systems and Islamic State targets, with over 3,000 strikes and engagements taking place over even this limited period. The unknown is the degree of effectiveness of a sophisticated US and allied air component designed to achieve air superiority against a symmetrical opponent in an asymmetrical small war situation. In the air campaign against the Islamic State, risk to air assets is manageable but the operational cost is high. Data on engagement effectiveness in the three-month snapshot of Syria and Iraq do not indicate a systematic disruption of Islamic State operations. Most of the reports are of disruption/destruction of small units and isolated fighting positions with periodic hints of better targeting (VBIED/IED factories, weapons caches, tunnels, caves and supply routes). This may indicate several overall results since the beginning of the air campaign, ranging from effective degradation of Islamic State assets to effective deception and evasion by the terrorist and insurgent organization, or most probably, something in-between. Learning how to increase effectiveness through operational analysis may be worthwhile and could help CENTCOM become a better learning organization for future operations. Consistently in conflict with this ability to adapt and change is the inflexibility of a bureaucratic system in comparison to the agility of the Islamic State.

The advisory note of this work is that there will be an Islamic State future in one of several forms. Indicators and warnings are that this conflict will continue in a different way, perhaps in a very different form, driven by an organization that learns and adapts to the causes and conditions to which it is exposed. Hopefully, from a reading of the many works found in this Small Wars Journal anthology related to both the threat the Islamic State and related groups represent and counter-Caliphate strategies discussed, we can proactively position ourselves for this future.

Table 1. CENTCOM Targeting of the Islamic State in Syria—2017

Dataset compiled from the CENTCOM Press Releases related to the Military Strikes Continue Against Daesh Terrorists in Syria and Iraq. See http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/.

Table 2. CENTCOM Targeting of the Islamic State in Iraq—2017

Dataset compiled from the CENTCOM Press Releases related to the Military Strikes Continue Against Daesh Terrorists in Syria and Iraq. See http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/.

Introduction

Hammer of the Caliphate

Robert J. Bunker, Dave Dilegge,

and Alma Keshavarz

Claremont, CA, Largo, FL, and Thousand Oaks, CA

March 2018

The Small Wars Journal (SWJ) anthology, Hammer of the Caliphate, is a continuation of previous works on the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and their affiliate groups. The anthology title is a play on words related to the 15th century treatise Malleus Maleficarum (‘Hammer of the Witches’). Given the Islamic State’s predisposition for engaging in heinous acts and barbaric atrocities in the name of their apocalyptic god, derived from a perverted version of mainstream Islam, declaring IS anathema to our modern world seems only fitting. Essentially, the international community is promoting a policy of extermination against the territorial Islamic State and its hardened fighters. U.S. CENTCOM coordinated airstrikes—combined with allied ground operations—represent the majority component of the destructive process-taking place. This can be seen in the front cover of this anthology drawn from a poster found in the magazine Rumiyah—one in which the lone Islamic State fighter, while taking a heroic and defiant stance, is literally about to get ‘hammered’ by Western airpower. While the Islamic State has attempted in its propaganda to emphasize the fact that this will only serve to increase its troops in faith and submission, the reality is that martyrs—even those who have been posed with smiles on their faces—have been removed from the battlefield as effective military assets. While the U.S. and her allies can’t ‘kill their way’ to complete victory over the Islamic State, such annihilation policies—when combined with other synergistic strategies—have their place in our war planning in securing the lands conquered by this organization.

As can be thus seen, this work covers writings on the Islamic State’s territorial loss and strategy in a post-ISIS era in the Middle East. Since the publication of the last anthology, estimates indicate that the Islamic State has lost over 95 percent of Mosul. Raqqa, the de-facto capitol of the group in Syria, has also been liberated. In large part, the terrorist and insurgent group has lost its physical caliphate. However, as the professional writings compiled in this anthology show, the group still has the potential to relocate to weak or vulnerable states in the region for a possible resurgence. The so-called ‘cyber caliphate’ also still exists but has since weakened with the loss of territorial strongholds. As many of the contributors suggest, the likelihood of an Islamic State revival is high and it would be prudent to understand the lessons from recent history.

This new 600-page anthology is composed of an acronym listing, a foreword, this introduction, fifty-four chapters containing articles, a postscript, notes, and lastly, information on the contributors. The work represents the 5th volume in a series of radical Islamist anthologies focusing on the Al Qaeda and Islamic State networks drawn from Small Wars Journal writings. While the past volumes covered writings from the 2007 through 2016 period, comprising of over 3,000 pages of text, this volume is focused on the 2017 time period. The foreword written by Matt Begert—a career veteran of the US Marine Corps with operational experience in infantry, aviation, and small units—provides a brief analysis of CENTCOM press release data on airstrikes on targets in Iraq and Syria for the last three months of 2017. Begert points out that, taking account of the over 3,000 strikes and engagements, the majority of the reports are of disruption/destruction of fighting positions and terrain networks. As the author suggests, the outcome that is being witnessed as of this writing may be a combination of diminished Islamic State resources and deception on the part of the Islamic State. As is the overarching theme of this anthology, there is room for improvement and active learning from these campaigns to better prepare ourselves for the future of the Islamic State and others who will follow. The postscript by Dr. Andrew Byers—a visiting assistant professor of history at Duke University who has served as an intelligence and counterterrorism analyst and is a co-founder of the Counter Extremism Network—concludes the anthology with an analysis of the Islamic State’s potential to reemerge in Iraq and Syria, a recognition of the reality of other groups learning from the Islamic State, and suggestions on how reinforced counterterrorism capabilities can help curb the resurgence.

This anthology is split into two sections that address the abovementioned topics. The first section—The Caliphate and Radical Islamist Groups—is composed of thirty-six articles and covers the Islamic State in its post-territorial loss phase and its connection to affiliates. A common argument is the likelihood of the Islamic State reestablishing itself in sanctuaries and returning to guerrilla roots as it continues to support attacks abroad. An article by Michael Tierney—a Senior Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Investigator— (Chapter 5: Remote Controlled’ Terrorism and its Implications for Counter-Terrorism Efforts) discusses this notion of the Islamic State calling on its followers abroad to conduct attacks in their home countries instead of travelling to join the Islamic State. This is what Tierney calls remote-controlled attacks in which leaders in Iraq and Syria use Telegram and other social network applications as tools to guide followers in plotting and carrying out attacks at home. Dr. Joel Day—an international security specialist and a visiting research scholar at the Joan B. Kroc Institute of Peace and Justice at the University of San Diego—penned ISIS After Trump (Chapter 11) discussing the nature of the Islamic State’s ambitions after the loss of territory. The article addressed the group’s Plan B in creating a network of affiliates throughout the Muslim world to fulfill their apocalyptic war. As the author indicates, the nature of any Islamic State remnants is what needs to be understood rather than being preoccupied with what is left of Iraq and Syria. A new generation of terrorists will likely emerge and will not necessarily be contained regionally, as has been evidenced by the domestic terrorist organizations in the Philippines that have pledged loyalty to the Islamic State. Groups like these give the Islamic State local knowledge and capital in the form of revenue and fighters and will likely evolve into the new generation of terror. Cameron Reed—an analyst and independent researcher who has worked in the US, Europe, and the Middle East for various think tanks and policy institutes on globalization, foreign policy, and counterterrorism issues (Chapter 17: Taking Stock: What the US is Learning from Europe’s Spate of Urban Truck Attacks)—and Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney—a counter-violent-extremism analyst, co-founder of Talon Intelligence and a co-founder of the Counter Extremism Network (Chapter 22: Marketing to Extremists: Waging War in Cyberspace), respectively—discuss how regional groups based in other countries outside of the Islamic State’s area of influence in the Middle East have been following the Islamic State through their propaganda effort. This is a feature that the group has maintained at a high level even after losing physical territory. Another article co-authored by Dr. Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney, titled ISIS After the Caliphate (Chapter 24) explains the possible resurgence of Al-Qaeda as the leader among terrorist organizations as the Islamic State loses territory. There are several motivations for this. The authors explain that Al Qaeda relies on franchises and affiliate groups to remain relevant and, with the possibility of Hamza bin Laden replacing Ayman al-Zawahiri in the future, Al Qaeda is adapting to strategies and building a support base while the international community is focused on what is left of the Islamic State. This notion of other groups rising to the occasion as the Islamic State fades is a common theme in the first section of this anthology.

The second section is appropriately titled Counter Caliphate and Radical Islamist Group Strategies, which focuses on the lessons learned and how to plan for the future. John Richard Berg—a civil engineer and foreign area officer in the United States Air Force and currently assigned to the Inter-American Air Forces Academy as a Professional Military Education instructor—authored Building on Reconstruction: What We Have Learned and Where to Go Next (Chapter 39), explaining that the post-Caliphate era requires more than just military options. Rather, stability operations or stabilized activities, such as security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance are required. This whole-of-government approach would necessitate the U.S. Department of State to take the lead in these efforts. Additionally, there is the need for language and cultural training to prevent an Islamic State 2.0 from emerging. Mark E. Vinson—retired U.S. Army Colonel after 27-years of service in various command and staff positions who has worked for the Institute for Defense Analyses, conducting joint studies and analysis, and providing joint concept and capability development support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the United States Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staff on a number of joint and multi-national projects since 2005—(Chapter 40: Winning Indefinite Conflicts: Achieving Strategic Success Against Ideologically-Motivated Violent Non-State Actors) and Dr. Lawrence E. Cline—an adjunct professor with Troy University and a part-time contract instructor with the Defense Department Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, where he has taught in over 40 countries—(Chapter 44: From Cultural Intelligence to Cultural Understanding: A Modest Proposal), respectively, discuss the importance of this concept. Vinson explains that there is a need for strategic and operational success to countering violent non-state actors (VNSAs) which mandates trained regional partners and local police in order for them to better maintain local security. He argues that the military needs improved intelligence capabilities to better understand the local and regional populations in order to assess the root-cause issues that exist. Likewise, Cline builds on this argument, but tailored to an understanding of the Afghan people.

Indeed, the Middle East experienced a tumultuous year in 2017 at the hands of the Islamic State and its affiliates. The following timeline created by Cameron Glenn—a Senior Program Assistant, Iran & Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace—in cooperation with the Wilson Center outlines the major Islamic State activities in Iraq and Syria as well as the liberation of Islamic State held territory. It has been shortened to address the most significant attacks by the Islamic State and campaigns that reclaimed caliphate territory in 2017:

January 1: The Islamic State says it carried out a bomb attack on the Syrian coastal city of Tartus and killed two security officers, according to an online statement by the group.

January 1-2: A gunman opens fire at a nightclub in Istanbul, killing at least 39 people. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack.

January 5: Iraqi forces have recaptured around 70 percent of eastern Mosul from the Islamic State, according to an Iraqi general.

January 8: Iraqi special forces reach the eastern bank of the Tigris river in Mosul for the first time in the campaign to capture the city from the Islamic State.

January 16: The Islamic State launches an assault against besieged Syrian government territory in the city of Deir Ezzor. At least 82 people are killed in the fighting, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

January 22: The Islamic State blows up the landmark Mosul Hotel in western Mosul to prevent Iraqi forces from using it as a base in their advance to capture the city.

January 23-24: Iraqi officials say government forces have taken complete control over eastern Mosul from the Islamic State, 100 days after the start of the campaign. Iraqi forces are preparing an offensive to capture western Mosul from ISIS, according to an Iraqi commander.

February 2: ISIS fighters attack a military airport northeast of Damascus, killing at least 14 Syrian soldiers, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

February 7-8: A suicide bomber attacks Afghanistan’s Supreme Court in Kabul, killing at least 20 and injuring another 41. The Islamic State claims responsibility.

February 8-9: The Israeli military says its missile defense system intercepted several rockets fired from Egypt toward the southern Israeli city of Eilat. The ISIS-affiliate known as the Sinai Province claims responsibility for the attack.

February 16: A suicide bomber attacks a Sufi shrine in southern Pakistan, targeting the women’s wing, killing at least 72 people, including 30 children, and injuring dozens more. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack on its Amaq News Agency. A car bomb kills at least 51 people and injure 55 in southern Baghdad. The Islamic State claims responsibility in an online statement.

February 23: U.S.-backed Iraqi forces capture Mosul airport from the Islamic State.

March 1: U.S.-backed Iraqi forces take control of the last major road out of western Mosul from the Islamic State.

March 6: Iraqi forces recapture the main government building in Mosul, the central bank and the Mosul museum from the Islamic State.

March 16: Iraqi government forces besiege ISIS fighters in Mosul’s Old City.

March 22: A vehicle strikes people walking on Westminster Bridge in London and crashes near the British Parliament. The driver attempts to enter the Parliament, stabbing and killing a police officer before being shot and killed by police. Three people die and more than 40 are seriously wounded in the attack. The Islamic State claims responsibility on its Amaq News Agency.

March 26: U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces retake a military air base in northern Syria from the Islamic State.

April 5: ISIS fighters use police vehicles and uniforms to enter and attack Tikrit in northern Iraq, killing 31 and injuring more than 40. The Islamic State claimed responsibility via its Amaq News Agency.

April 11: The Islamic State, which controlled 40 percent of Iraq at its height, has lost most of its territory in Iraq, according to an Iraqi military spokesman,

April 18-20: A gunman kills a French police officer and injures two in an attack in central Paris. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the shooting via its Amaq News Agency.

April 21: A gunman kills two in an attack on a regional Russian Federal Security Service office. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack, according to SITE Intelligence Group.

April 26: Conflict Armament Research (CAR), an arms monitoring group, says ISIS militants have developed an improvised explosive device (IED) that can launched from rifles or dropped from drones.

May 3: A suicide bomber kills eight civilians and injures 25 after attacking a NATO convoy of armored personnel vehicles in Kabul. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack on its Amaq News Agency. The head of Europol, the European Union’s policy agency, says Islamic State militants are developing their own social media platform to avoid security suppressions on their messaging and propaganda.

May 7: ISIS suicide bombers attack a military base in northern Iraq where U.S. military advisers are stationed, killing at least two and injuring six. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack.

May 18: Islamic State militants attack a village between Aleppo and Homs, killing at least 20 people.

May 22: A suicide bomber strikes outside of Manchester Arena in England at the close of an Ariana Grande concert, killing at least 22, including children, and injuring 59. The Islamic State claims responsibility.

June 3: Three men drive a van into pedestrians on the London Bridge and stab onlookers on the street and in nearby bars, killing at least six and injuring another 30. Authorities shoot and kill the attackers. The Islamic State claims responsibility.

June 7-8: Suicide bombers and gunmen attack the Iranian parliament and Ayatollah Khomeini’s mausoleum in Tehran. At least 13 people die in the attack. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack and threatens more. Iran says the attackers were Iranians who had fought with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

June 9: A female suicide bomber kills at least 31 people and injures 35 at a market in the Iraqi town of Musayab. A second suicide bomber kills three and wounds 15 at a bus station in the Shiite holy city of Karbala. The Islamic State claims responsibility for both attacks.

June 13: The military chief in Jakarta says ISIS has a presence in almost all provinces in Indonesia. After observation, we see that in almost every province … there are already IS cells, but they are sleeper cells.

June 29: Iraqi troops capture the Grand al Nuri Mosque in Mosul after an eight-month campaign. Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declares the end of the Islamic State’s caliphate. U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces close [the] last route into the Islamic State’s capital of Raqqa and completely encircle the city.

June 30: ISIS fighters withdraw from their last territory in Aleppo province after Syrian government forces retake the Ithriya-Rasafa road.

July 3: U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces breach Raqqa’s Old City.

July 7: Suicide car bombs kill at least 23 Egyptian soldiers and injures another 26 at two military checkpoints in the Sinai Peninsula. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack, which is the deadliest in the Sinai Peninsula in years, according to security sources.

July 9: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declares victory over ISIS in Mosul.

August 4: U.S. special envoy for the coalition against the Islamic State, Brett McGurk says about 2,000 ISIS fighters are still in Raqqa. The [coalition] has cleared about 45 percent of the caliphate’s capital.

August 12: Syrian government forces and its allies seize the last major town in Homs province held by the Islamic State.

August 17-22: At least 13 people are dead and over 80 injured after a van drives down a pedestrian area in Barcelona. A second vehicle attack was foiled by Catalan police in Cambrils, a town 70 miles south of Barcelona. Five suspects are shot and killed and six civilians and one police officer are injured. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the van attack. A suspect says the cell had planned major bombings against churches or monuments as well.

August 20: Iraqi security forces launch an offensive to take back Tal Afar from the Islamic State in northwest Iraq.

August 22: Iraqi forces breach the city limits of Tal Afar, the last Islamic State stronghold in northwest Iraq.

August 25-26: A man attacks two soldiers in Brussels with a knife. The attacker is shot and killed. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack on its Amaq News Agency.

September 14: ISIS militants attack a police checkpoint and two restaurants on a highway near Nassiriya in southern Iraq using stolen vehicles, car bombs, and suicide vests. At least 60 people are killed and more than 100 are injured in the three suicide attacks. The Islamic State claims responsibility on its Amaq News Agency.

September 15-19: A bomb explodes, but fails to fully detonate, on a morning commuter train at Parsons Green station in London, injuring 30 passengers. British authorities arrest five men in connection with the bombing. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack via Amaq News Agency. British and U.S. government sources say there is no evidence linking the bombing with a recognized militant group.

September 21: Iraqi forces launch an offensive on Hawija, one of the last territories under Islamic State.

September 23: U.S.-backed forces capture the Conoco gas field from the Islamic State in Syria’s Deir Ezzoz province. The gas field is the first liberated in the campaign to capture areas east of the Euphrates river from ISIS.

October 1: Two women are stabbed to death in a knife attack in the southern French port city of Marseille. The attacker is shot dead by a soldier and said to have shouted Allahu Akbar. The Islamic State claims responsibility for the attack via Amaq News Agency.

October 1-7: Hundreds of Islamic State militants surrender to Kurdish authorities after being driven from Hawija, its last stronghold in northern Iraq.

October 1-23: The Islamic State kills more than 60 civilians in a Syrian town in central Homs province before the Syrian army recaptures it. Over 100 others are missing, kidnapped or killed, according to the Homs province governor.

October 14-15: Around 100 Islamic State fighters surrender in Raqqa and are removed from the city, according [to] Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman Colonel Ryan Dillon. A group of Islamic State fighters also evacuate Raqqa overnight, using civilians as human shields.

October 17: U.S.-backed militias declare victory over the Islamic State in its capital Raqqa after a four-month campaign. But the U.S. military says that it could only confirm that 90 percent of Raqqa had been retaken from the group. Around 100 ISIS fighters still remain in Raqqa and the [militias] are expected to face some resistance, according to Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman Colonel Ryan Dillon.

October 20: U.S.-backed Syrian forces declare victory [over] the Islamic State in its former capital Raqqa after a four-month long campaign. Suicide bombers attack two mosques in Afghanistan, killing at least 72 people, including children. The Islamic State claims responsibility for both attacks without providing evidence.

November 2-3: The U.S. carries out its first airstrike against the Islamic State in Somalia, killing several terrorists, the U.S. military says.

November 3: The Syrian government declares victory over the Islamic State in Deir Ezzor, the largest city in eastern Syria and the epicenter of the country’s oil production. Iraqi forces capture al Qaim, one of the Islamic State’s last territories, according to Prime Minister Haid al Abadi.

November 4: The Islamic State claims responsibility for the New York City truck attack that killed eight people on October 31 in its weekly issue of al Naba newspaper. ISIS described the driver as one of the caliphate soldiers.

November 5: A suicide car bomber kills 15 and injures 20 after detonating at a security checkpoint in the south Yemeni port city of Aden. The Islamic State claims responsibility.

November 8: An Islamic State faction in northern Somalia has grown from a few dozen to 200 members over the last year, according to a new U.N. report. Security officials fear it could become a safe haven for ISIS fighters fleeing Iraq and Syria.

November 21: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi says the Islamic State has been defeated militarily but will only declare a final victory over ISIS after fighters are routed in the desert.

November 24: Militants attack a Sufi mosque in a remote northern town in the Sinai Peninsula, killing 305 people and injuring at least 128 others. It is the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt’s modern history. No group has officially claimed responsibility for the attack, but one militant reportedly carried an ISIS flag.

December 9: Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi declares victory over the Islamic State.[1]

Throughout 2017, the Islamic State lost strategic cities across Iraq and Syria and eventually lost over 90 percent of its territory by the start of 2018. However, there are still active fighters in vulnerable states like Yemen, Egypt, and Libya along with strong affiliate groups in Southeast Asia. The following two maps provided courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) are Islamic State sanctuary maps from February 2017 and May 2017, respectively. The first map from 26 February 2017 shows Islamic State control, attack, and support zones. During this time, the Islamic State lost gains in Syria’s Homs province and districts in Mosul, Iraq. Its affiliate groups, Liwa al-Aqsa and Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Walid carried out attacks in Damascus, near the Syrian-Jordan border.

Courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War[2]

The Islamic State found itself struggling in the midst of U.S. and Coalition air strikes that targeted fighters and terrain networks. In January, the group targeted the Deir ez Zour district in Syria with major assaults. They also claimed responsibility for the attack in Istanbul, Turkey. They were forced to shift attention outside of Iraq and Syria’s borders with a string of attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya.

The second map is from 10 May 2017. A comparison of the two maps indicates that the Islamic State ceded a large amount of territory in northern Syria over a three-month period. Most significant during this was that they were further pushed out of Mosul and Raqqa. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recaptured the strategic city of Tabqa near Raqqa as the Islamic State lost more territory in southern Syria, including Suweida and the Qalamoun mountains.[3]

Courtesy of the Institute for the Study of War[4]

An analysis of the maps shows that the Islamic State lost many strategic towns in Aleppo, Palmyra, and southern Damascus. With these losses, the group continued to attack targets abroad, such as the London Bridge attack in Great Britain, Chechnya, two incidents in Bangladesh, and an attack against a NATO convoy in Kabul, Afghanistan.

While the Islamic State is no longer in control of large swaths of territory, their virtual presence has not been fully degraded. IS cyber propaganda continues to encourage followers to attack at home. Social media platforms like Telegram that offers encrypted services not only represent a cyberspace capability to guide followers on how to carry out an attack, but serves as a means to facilitate the purchase of necessary arms and explosives. The Islamic State remains a threat through its virtual caliphate by continuing its recruitment and propaganda. However, there is also the very real concern as to what will become of former members who have been pushed out of Iraq and Syria. Indeed, many may return to their home countries and possibly engage in