Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd (HL(E)) [2001]2 AC ‘Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead (at page 200 D) My starting point is feedom of expression. The high importance of feedom to impart and receive information and ideas hasbeen stated so often and so eloquently that this point calls for no elaboration in this ease. At a pragmatic level, feedom t disseminate nd receive information on pliteal matters is essential tothe proper funcioning of the system of parliamentary democracy cherished in this country. This freedom enables those who elt representatives to Parliament to make an informed choice, regarding individuals as wel s policies, and those elected to make informed decisions. Freedom of expression will shortly be buttressed by statutory requirements. Under section 12 of ‘he Human Rights Act 1998, expected to come into force in October 2004, the cour is required in relevant cases, to have particular regard tothe importance ofthe right to feedom of expression, The common lew is tobe developed and applied ina manner consistent with article 10 ofthe European Convention forthe Protection of Human Rights nd Fundamental Freedoms (1983) (Cm 8969), and the court mus take nto secount relevant decisions ofthe European Court of Human Rights (sections 6 ant 2). To be {usifid, any curtailment of freedom of expression must be convincingly established by a ‘compelling countervailing considera to the end sought tobe achieved. and the means employed must be proportionate Likewise, there is no need to elaborate on the importance ofthe ole disc arged by the ‘media inthe expression and communication of information and commen: on political ‘attr. It ie through the mass media that most people today obtain ther information on politcal matters. Without freedom of expression by the media, freedom of expression would be hollow concept. The intrest ofa democratic society in ensuring free press ‘weighs heavily in the balance in deciding whether any curtailment ofthis freedom bears reasonable relationship tothe purpose ofthe curtailment. In this regard it shoul be kept ‘in mind that one ofthe contemporary functions ofthe meds is investigative journalism. “This activity, as much es the traditional activities of reporting nd commenting, is pat of the vital role of the press andthe media generally.Reputation isan integral and important par ofthe dignity ofthe individu, Italo forms the basis of many decisions ina democratie society which ae fundamenta tits well- ‘being: whom to employ or work for, whom to promote, whom todo business with or to vote for. Once besmirched by an unfounded allegation ina national newspaper, 2 reputation canbe damaged forever, especially iF there is no opportunity tc vindicate one's reputation. When this happens, society aswell asthe individuals the loser. For it should not be supposed thet protection of reputation is matter of importace only othe affected individual and his family. Protection of reputation is conducive te the public ‘good. Its in the public interest thatthe reputation of public figures should not he ‘debased falsely, In the politcal fel, inorder to make an informed, choies, the electorate ‘needs to be able to identify the good aswell as the bad. Consistently withthese ‘considerations, human rights conventions recognise tha freedom of expresion isnot an solute right, Its exercise may be subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary ina democratic society forth protection of the reputations of others. ‘The crux ofthis appeal, therefore, lies in identifying the restrictions which re faisy and reaconably nocezcay for the protection of reputation, Leaving aude th exception ‘cases which atract absolute privilege, the common law denies protection e defamatory statements, whether of eomment or ft, proved tbe actuated by male, in the Horrocks ‘Lowe [1975] AC 135 sense. This common law limitation on freedom of speech passes ‘he "necessary" test wth flying colours. This is an scceptble limitation. Freadom of speech doesnot embrace freedom to make defamatory statements out of personal spite or ‘without having a positive belie in their uth, In the case of statements of opinion on matters of public interest, tht is the limit of what {is necessary fr protection of reputation. Readers and viewers and listenes can rmake up ‘heir own minds on whether they agree or disagree with defamatory staterents Which are recognisable as comment snd which, expressly or implicitly, indicate in general terms the ‘cts on which they are based,‘With defamatory imputations of fact the positon i different and more difficult. Those vo read or hear such allegations are unlikely te have any means of knowing whether they are tue or not, In respect of such imputation, «plant's bility to cbtsn a remedy if he can prove malice isnot formally a sufficient safeguard, Malic is notoriously difficult to prove. Ifa newspaper is understandably unwilling to disclose is sources, a plaintiff can be deprived ofthe material necessary to prove, or even allege that the newspaper acted recklessly in publishing as it did without further verification. Thus, in the absence of any ational safeguard for reputation, a newspaper, anxious tobe fist ‘with a “scoop”, would in practice be tee to publish seriously defamatory misstatements of fact based on the slnderest of materials. Unless the paper chose later to withdraw the allegations, the politician thus defamed would have no means of clearing his name, and the public would have no means of knowing where the tt ay. Some further protection {or eputation is needed if thie can be achieved without a disproportionate incursion into freedom of expression. Lord Cooke of Thoradon (at page 220 D) “The existing balance between the right to personal reputation and freedom of speech has been carefully and gradually developed over the years by common law and statutes, Its ‘ruc that the restrictions on freedom of speech that have been thought neessay to give reasonable protection to personal reputation may have a tendeney to chil he publication, not only of untruth, but also ofthat which may be true but cannot be proved to be tue. ‘Bu there is nothing new inthis, Nor a8 faras Tam aware is there any vay of assessing “which tendency isthe greater ~ although experience of libel litigation is sp to generate 8 suspicion that itis the former.Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough (at page 237 H) ‘This case isconcemed with the problems which arise ffom the publication of factual statements which ere not corret~ie do not conform to the truth. This cas is not concemed with freedom of expression and opin. The citizen is at liberty to comment and tae pat in free discussion, Is of fundamental importance toa fee society that his liberty be recognised and protected by the law: “The liberty to communicate (and receive) information hes a similar pace ina fee society butt is important aways to remember that its the communication of information not ‘misinformation which isthe subject ofthis liberty. There is no human righ to isseminate information that is not rue. No public interest is served by puoishing or ‘communicating misinformation. The working ofa democratic society depends on the members ofthat society, being informed not misinformed. Misleading pecpe and the purveying as fics statement which are not true is destructive ofthe democratic society and should form no part of such 8 society. There is no duty to publish wht is not tue: there is no interest in being misinformed, These are general propositions going far beyond the mere protection of reputations.