Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws

PLATO’S CRETAN CITY

A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

PLATO’S CRETAN CITY

A Historical Interpretation of the laws

BY GLENN R. MORROW

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street,

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press,

Chichester, West Sussex

Copyright © 1960 by Princeton University Press;

the new foreword for the 1993 edition is copyright © 1993

by Princeton University Press

All Rights Reserved

321'.07—dc20 93-2271

eISBN: 978-0-691-24285-9

RO

TO GEORGE HOLLAND SABINE

CONTENTS

Analytical Table of Contents ix

Foreword (1993), by Charles H. Kahn xvii

Preface xxix

Bibliographical Abbreviations xxxiii

Introduction 3

PART ONE: THREE HISTORICAL STATES

I. Crete 17

Excursus A. The Minos 35

II. Sparta 40

Excursus B. Plato’s Version of Peloponnesian History 63

III. Athens 74

PART TWO: PLATO’S CITY

IV. Property and the Family 95

The Allotment of the Land 103

Citizenship and the Family 112

Property Classes 131

Industry and Trade 138

Slaves 148

V. Government 153

The Assembly and the Council 157

The Magistrates 178

The Guardians of the Laws 195

The Scrutiny and the Audit 215

Aristocracy with the Approval of the People 229

Excursus C. and 233

Excursus D. The Double Version in Book VI 238

VI. The Administration of Justice 241

Justice Before the Magistrates 242

The Courts 251

Procedure 274

VII. Education 297

Music and the Dance 302

The Training of the Young 318

Festivals 352

Common Meals 389

VIII. Religion 399

Apollo and the Sacred Law 402

Religious Officials 411

The Gods and their Worship 434

The Law Against Impiety 470

Excursus E. The Election of the Exegetes 496

IX. The Nocturnal Council 500

Excursus F. Philippus of Opus 515

PART THREE: PLATO’S PRINCIPLES

X. The Mixed Constitution 521

XI. The Rule of Law 544

XII. The Rule of Philosophy 573

Retrospect 591

General Index 597

Index of Passages 609

Index of Modern Authors Cited 620

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3

The theme of the Laws; its appropriateness to the fourth century and to the interests of the Academy, 3. Plato’s knowledge of Greek law and political institutions, 5; Plato’s influence, through the Academy, upon fourth-century states and statesmen, 7. The legislator a craftsman who knows both the ideal and the materials in which it is to be realized, 10. Knowledge of Plato’s historical materials necessary for an accurate understanding of his political theory, 12.

PART ONE: THREE HISTORICAL STATES

Chapter I. Crete 17

Apparent unimportance but great prestige of Crete in the fourth century, 17. Plato’s part in the revival of interest in Crete, 20. Evidences of his familiarity with Cretan life, 25. Similarity between Cretan and Spartan laws, 32. Importance for Plato of their common Dorian basis, 34.

Excursus A. The Minos 35

Chapter II. Sparta 40

Plato’s interest in Sparta often attributed to his aristocratic connections, 41; but certainly also due to the admiration for Spartan which he shared with practically all his contemporaries, 43. Plato’s admiration, like that of his contemporaries, not uncritical, 45; neither the Republic nor the Laws an idealization of Sparta, 46. The grounds of the common admiration of Sparta as reflected in the ancient writers, 48. The causes of Spartan eunomia as Plato sees them; (a) the Spartan 52; (b) the self-limiting character of the executive in the government of Sparta, 54; (c) the Dorian basis of Spartan life, 58. The contribution of the Dorians to Greek culture, 62.

Excursus B. Plato’s Version of Peloponnesian History 63

Chapter III. Athens 74

The Athenian Stranger the teacher of his two companions, 75. The fame of the ancient Athenian laws, 76. The ancestral constitution of Solon and Cleisthenes, 78. Plato’s admiration of Solon and the ancient constitution, 80. Evidences of his imitation of Solon in his own legislation, 83. His judgment of fourth-century Athens as having lost the moderation that characterized her past, 86; but as still retaining traces of her ancient constitution, 87. His admiration for his native city as a leader and teacher of the Greeks, 89.

PART TWO: PLATO’S CITY

Chapter IV. Property and the Family 95

Physical features and advantages of the proposed site, 95. The sources from which the colonists will come, 100. The importance of regulating property from the beginning, 101.

The Allotment of the Land. Private ownership a departure from the Republic, 103. Conditions of land tenure in Plato’s city, 105; historical precedents for Plato’s system, 107. Ownership of land restricted to citizens, 111.

Citizenship and the Family. One qualification for citizenship membership in a land-owning family, 113; hence descent from citizen parents, 115. Importance of the family in Platonic law, 118. Other subdivisions of the citizen body: tribes, 121; demes, 124; phratries, 126. The meaning of citizenship, 128. The size of Plato’s state, 128. Another qualification for citizenship education by the state, 130.

Property Classes. Four in number, 131. Their purpose to bring about proportionate equality, 132. Their unimportance in determining access to office, 133. Their relevance at other points in Plato’s law, 134. Their relation to the four Solonian classes, 135.

Industry and Trade. Trade and handicraft prohibited to citizens, 138. Greek attitude toward trade and handicraft, 140. Plato’s attitude a mixture of aristocratic disdain and concern for the prior obligations of citizenship, 143. The moral hazards of trade and Plato’s attempt to diminish them for his metics, 144. The protection of the artisan, 145. The metic status in Greek and in Plato’s law, 146; Plato’s modifications of current law and their probable effects, 147.

Slaves. Public and privately owned slaves, 148. The status of the agricultural slave, 149. The historical parallel to Plato’s economy the Attica of an earlier time, 151.

Chapter V. Government 153

The three principles: (a) the rule of philosophy, 153; (b) the rule of law, 154; (c) the mixed constitution, 155.

The Assembly and the Council. The assembly an assembly of citizen soldiers, 157. Its functions as described chiefly electoral, 159. Electoral procedures, 160; the unimportance of the lot, 161. Other functions of the assembly, 164. The council: its prototype the Athenian popular council of Solon and Cleisthenes, 165; its constitution and mode of election, 166. Plato’s reasons for proposing a council organized by property classes, 170. The division of the council into prytanies, 172; their functions, 173. Relation of the council to the assembly left undetermined, 174. The range of competence assigned to the assembly and council, 176.

The Magistrates. Generals and other military officers, 178. The and 181; their functions analogous to those of such officers at Athens and elsewhere, 182. The their organization, their duties, their mode of life, 186; their relation to the Spartan and to the Athenian 189. Probable needs of the treasury in Plato’s state and sources of public revenue, 191. The omission of archons, 194.

The Guardians of the Laws. Their duties: (a) to supervise the other officers, 196; (b) to act as a legislative commission, 200; (c) to act as administrators in special areas, 202; (d) their judicial functions, 203. The manner of their election given in two versions, 204. The election procedure described in the earlier version, 206. Qualifications for this office, 208. in fourth-century Greece, 209. Plato’s institution an imitation and adaptation of the Athenian Council on the Areopagus, 211.

The Scrutiny and the Audit. The in Athenian law, 215; and in Plato’s law, 217. The in common Greek law, 219. Plato’s introduction of a special body of peculiar dignity to conduct it, 220. The election of the 222; their number, duties, and honors, 223; their liability to prosecution for abuse of their powers, 226. Relation of the euthynoi to the other high officers, 227.

Aristocracy with the Approval of the People. The incompleteness of Plato’s constitutional law, 229; yet Plato’s basic intentions are clear, 230. Plato’s innovations based largely upon Athenian experience, 231. Possible explanation for the incompleteness of his constitutional law, 232.

Excursus C. 233

Excursus D. The Double Version in Book VI 238

Chapter VI. The Administration of Justice 241

Distinction between magisterial and court proceedings, 241.

Justice Before the Magistrates. Judicial powers of the minor officers, 242. Collegial action assumed with, however, some departures in other respects from Attic law, 244. Plato’s remedy for magisterial injustice a civil suit against the magistrate, 246; this a novel provision, but with analogies and prototypes in Greek law, 247. The judicial powers of the euthynoi, 248; and of the guardians, 249. All magistrates responsible without exception, 250.

The Courts. The supremacy of the popular courts in Athenian justice, 251. Plato’s criticism, 253; yet acceptance of them as expressing one of the prerogatives of citizenship, 254. His system a mixture of popular and select courts, 255. The courts of first instance: neighbors and arbitrators, 256. The courts of second instance: tribal courts, analogous to the Athenian popular courts, 257. The court of third instance: the court of select judges, 261. The court of the demos, 264; its analogy with the Athenian ecclesia, 265. The court for capital offenses, 267; its uncertain relation to the court of the demos, 269. Military and family courts, 270. General estimate of Plato’s system of courts, 271.

Procedure. Private prosecutors the chief agency for bringing offenders to account, 274; but the distinction between private and public suits clearly marked, 276. The filing of suits, 279. The preliminary examination by the magistrate, 279. Trial procedure: (a) the presiding magistrate to have greater control over proceedings, 280; (b) an inquisitorial examination of charges and evidence to be made at some stage of every case, 281; (c) the party oath, the challenge to the oath, and the challenge to the torture prohibited, 283. Witnesses, 285; the suit for false testimony, 286. Open voting, 288. Discretion of judges in fixing penalties, 289. A judge’s decision to be rendered under oath, 290. The responsibility of the state in the execution of judgments, 291. Devices for discouraging excessive litigation, 292. General estimate of Plato’s procedural law, 295.

Chapter VII. Education 297

The education of its citizens the responsibility of the city, 297. Plato’s adoption and modification of the Spartan 298.

Music and the Dance. Importance of choral singing and dancing in Greek life, 302; especially at Sparta, 303. Value of music and the dance as means of molding the character, 304. Their mimetic function to be consciously directed towards the presentation of the good, 307. The procedure of enchantment, 309. The chorus of elders, and its function as guardian of philosophically educated taste in the musical arts, 313. Dionysus the patron of this chorus, 315. Its difference from its alleged Spartan prototype, 317.

The Training of the Young. Education in music, gymnastics, and letters common at Athens and elsewhere, 318. In Plato’s state such education to be compulsory for all, and directed by the state, 322. The office of educator, 324; other educational officers, 326. Training of the infant, 327. Equal education for boys and girls, 329. The program of studies: (a) gymnastics, 332; (b) dancing, 336; (c) letters, 337; (d) playing the lyre, 340; (e) mathematics, 343; (f) astronomy, 347. Higher studies, 348. Comparison with the content of the Spartan agoge, 350.

Festivals. Importance of festivals as educational influences, in Greek cities generally and in Plato’s state, 352. Canons of songs and dances necessary, 354. Tradition and change in music, 355. A variety of dances to be permitted, 358: (a) the pyrrhic dance especially favored, 359; (b) certain kinds of Bacchic dances viewed with disfavor but not actually excluded, 362; (c) 365; (d) comic dances, 370. Comedy to be witnessed by citizens but performed only by foreigners, 373. Tragedy to be permitted, if its teaching does not contradict the law, 374. The organization of musical contests, 377. The officers of athletics, 380. Contests in running, 381; for women as well as men, 382. Omission of wrestling, boxing, and the pancratium, 383; and substitution of hoplomachy and peltastic contests, 386. Races on horseback, 386. Comparison of Plato’s program with the Olympic program and with Spartan customs, 388.

Common Meals. A characteristic feature of Spartan and Cretan life, 389; relics of them found elsewhere in Greece, 391. Their moral and social importance as seen by ancient writers, 392. Their existence taken for granted in Plato’s city, but no explicit legislation in Plato’s text, 393; difficulty of bringing them into accord with the other institutions of Plato’s city, 396.

Chapter VIII. Religion 399

Plato’s adoption and reinterpretation of the religion of his countrymen, 400.

Apollo and the Sacred Law. The necessity of preserving ancient traditions, 402. Importance of the oracles as interpreters of the will of the gods, 403. The supremacy of Delphi, 405. Distinction of religious from secular law, 407. The recognition of the authority of Delphi not an abdication of the legislator’s function, but an aid in accomplishing it, 409.

Religious Officials. Temples and their treasurers, 411. Priests and priestesses, 413; and caretakers, 415. Religious functions of secular officers, 416. Expert interpretation of religious law to be provided by official exegetes, 418. Exegetes in fourth-century Athens, 420. The Pythioi at Sparta, 423. Duties of the exegetes in Plato’s city, 423. Soothsayers, 427; Plato’s attitude toward their professed art, 429; and his measures for preventing abuses of it, 430.

The Gods and their Worship. The Olympians, 434: Hestia, 435; Zeus, 436; Athena, 438; Apollo, 438; Hera, 439; others, 440; Dionysus, 441. Plato’s censorship of current mythology, 443. Did Plato regard the Olympians as gods? 444. The astral gods, 445; their relation to the Olympians, 447. The Chthonioi, 449. Plato’s admission but segregation of chthonic rites, 450. Pluto admitted to the twelve, 451. Demeter and Persephone, 452. The afterlife not to be dreaded, 454; except by the wicked, 455. The worship of daemons, 457; and heroes, 459. The cult of ancestors, 461. Funeral rites, 462. Influence of the dead upon the living, 465. Reverence to be paid to living parents, 467. Religion to penetrate all areas of life, 468. The religion of Plato’s state the religion of his people, into which he has infused a deeper conception of the meaning of worship, 469; and a loftier idea of the divine nature, 470.

The Law Against Impiety, a serious offense at Athens, 471; covering a wide variety of offenses in words and actions, 472. Offenses against religious law punishable in Plato’s state, 474. The law against impious opinions designed to fill a noticeable gap in Attic law, 475. The prelude to this law, 477. The fallacious doctrine of the modern wise men, 478. The primacy of the soul in nature, 481; and of rational soul in the heavens, 482. Refutation of the denial of the gods’ providence, 484; and of the belief that the gods can be bribed, 486. The ignoratio elenchi in Plato’s argument, 487. Statement of the law against impiety, 488; impiety a delict of opinion, 488. Plato’s penalties compared with those of Attic law, 490. The prohibition of private rites, 492. Plato’s law follows the law of Athens, 494; and is an attempt to stay degeneration in the religious life of his time, 495.

Excursus E. The Election of the Exegetes 496

Chapter IX. The Nocturnal Council 500

Its intimate relation to the rest of Plato’s plan, 500. Its constitution, 503; and educational purpose, 505. Its archetype Plato’s Academy, 509. Its powers primarily moral, not legal, 510; hence its existence not inconsistent with the rule of law, 511; instead it is an important agency in supporting the rule of law, 513.

Excursus F. Philippus of Opus 515

PART THREE: PLATO’S PRINCIPLES

Chapter X. The Mixed Constitution 521

The political mean, 521; a mixture of two extremes, 523; viz. monarchy and democracy, 525. The monarchical element in Plato’s constitution, 526. Inadequacy of Aristotle’s interpretation of it as a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, 528. Plato’s economy a mean between wealth and poverty, 530. The middle way in education and in religion, 532. The mixture of Dorian and Ionian, 533. Other evidences of mixture, 535. The doctrine of mixture in the Philebus as the secret of excellence and stability, 535; in politics the proper mixture a balance between authority and liberty, 537. — The special doctrine: the mixed constitution a balance of powers within the executive, 538. Confusion of the special with the general doctrine in later thought, 540.

Chapter XI. The Rule of Law 544

This principle the salvation of the state, 544; but difficult to make effective, 545. Basic conditions it presupposes taken over by Plato from Attic law: (a) written law, 546; (b) courts, 547; (c) liability of magistrates, 548. Plato’s special devices for making the higher officers responsible through mutual checks, 549. — Institutions for producing eunomia in the citizens, 552. Persuasive preambles to the laws, 553; which often include nonrational means of persuasion, 557. — Morality and law two species of a common genus, 560. The end of law to produce virtue in the citizen and order in the state, 561. — Distinction between right law and positive law, 563; right law to be discerned by nous, 564. — The art of legislation involves the formulation of the laws in rational and systematic form, 565; and insight into the end of law, 567; and is dependent upon the lessons of history and experience, 567. — The sovereignty of right law, and of all law that imitates it, 569. The process of amendment to be under the guidance of nous, 570. — The scope and profundity of Plato’s doctrine, 571.

Chapter XII. The Rule of Philosophy 573

Philosophy present in the Laws and intended to be important in Plato’s city, 573. Philosophy and law interdependent, exercising a joint sovereignty in philosophically formulated law, 576. Comparison of this conception with the teaching of the Republic; law not excluded from Plato’s earlier work, as is sometimes said, 577. The philosopher-guardians to be guardians of the laws, 582; hence their rule implies the rule of law, 582. But the Republic lacks legal devices for holding rulers responsible, and an orderly process for amending the law, 583. — The antithesis between science and law in the Politicus, 584. But law is necessary in any form of rule, however scientific, 586. The distinction between positive law and right law implied, 587; science antithetical to much positive law, but not to right law, 588. — The rule of philosophy implies the presence of law, not its abolition, 589.

Retrospect 591

Plato’s political ideal not an irrelevant creation of philosophical imagination, but rooted in the soil of Greek history, 591; and of Athenian history in particular, 592. The Laws a message prepared for Plato’s own people, but delivered too late to have its intended effect, 592.

FOREWORD (1993)

Charles H. Kahn

The publication in 1960 of Morrow’s work on the Laws was a landmark in Platonic scholarship. For the first time it was possible for the modern reader to appreciate the nature of Plato’s achievement in his last and longest dialogue. The Laws is so different from the Republic in every respect that it had been largely neglected; the interest in Plato’s political philosophy was focused almost exclusively on the Laws' more brilliant sibling. If the situation has changed in the last thirty years, that is in good measure due to Morrow’s work, seconded ten years later by Trevor Saunders’s excellent Penguin translation.¹ What Morrow succeeded in doing was to clarify the sense of Plato’s proposals in the Laws by comparing them at every point with the historical institutions of Greece. This has made it possible for us to distinguish what is specifically Platonic from what is traditional in this mass of detailed legislation. Morrow’s work was done so well that it will in all probability never need to be done again. Every informed interpretation of Plato’s Laws in the last thirty years has built on the foundation that he provided.

What I propose to do here, by way of introduction, is first to summarize the insights which Morrow’s study gives us into Plato’s design of political institutions in the Laws, and then apply these insights to the controversial question of the relation between the scheme of the Laws and that of the Republic. Finally, I will indicate what I take to be the limitations of Morrow’s account of Plato’s political philosophy.

Morrow interprets the Laws primarily as a system of legislation rather than as a work of theoretical philosophy. He rightly insists upon the concrete nature of the proposed constitution and upon the practical bent of Plato’s thought as a whole. Unlike the Republic, the Laws does not describe a utopia but a Cretan city with a definite location in time and space, not an ideal state but as good an imitation as Plato thought possible in fourth-century Greece. By making clear exactly what historical material Plato was working with, Morrow’s study permits us to see how Plato transformed this material to his own purpose.

The central thesis of the book is that Plato was an Athenian first and last, that Athens is the city he has constantly in mind, and that the Spartan influence on his political scheme was secondary and subordinate. The Athenian quality of the Laws is borne out in detail by Morrow’s comparison of nearly every institution in this Cretan city with the historical legislation of Athens. Morrow does not deny, of course, that Sparta (and, to a lesser extent, Crete) provided the model for the state control of education and marriage, the conservative system of music and gymnastics, the minimum land allotments, and the common meals. Above all, he emphasizes that Sparta by its long freedom from tyranny and civil war presented an unparalleled example of constitutional stability and respect for law, which Plato sought to reproduce in his own state. But the devices by which Plato does so, and the legal forms in which his proposals are expressed, are nearly always drawn from an Athenian precedent, even where the Platonic institution itself is an original creation. Thus the property classes, the presence of metics (resident aliens), the system of private slavery, the education in letters and mathematics, the law against impiety, the civic tribes, the popular council, the elected generals and minor officials, the courts appointed by lot—all these and a hundred more features of Plato’s city are based upon an Athenian model, not on Sparta. Morrow points out that even the inalienability of the family lot, which is at first sight a Spartan feature, probably had its counterpart in archaic Athens, that the Athenian family system so dominates Plato’s imagination that the institution of common meals is never fully integrated within his social scheme, and that the more barbaric aspects of the Spartan educational program—the youth packs, the organized thievery and floggings—are entirely absent from Plato’s state. In some cases, of course, the lack of parallels outside of Athens may be due to the scarcity of information concerning other Greek cities. But the cumulative weight of Morrow’s documentation seems overwhelming: It is not a Hellenic city in general that Plato draws for us, but an idealized Athens (p. 592).

Morrow makes clear that this is an idealization based more often on archaic than on contemporary Athens. In this respect the Laws carries out in a detailed and constructive way the flattering portrait of early Athens which the Timaeus and Critias had sketched. The attitude of Plato in these last dialogues reflects the fact that Athens is not only the home of extreme democracy, but also the city of Solon and Socrates, and of Plato’s own Academy. It is, of all Greece, the land best suited for the production of philosopher-kings. And Plato’s last comment on his native city is the figure of an Athenian stranger legislating to two Dorians.

Complications begin when we ask what Morrow means by an idealized Athens. By insisting that Plato’s ideal itself is rooted in the soil of Greek history, and that his political craftsmanship consists in divining within the historical materials the immanent purpose which they imperfectly serve (p. 591), Morrow runs the risk of underestimating the great originality and boldness of Plato’s political thought. In a sense, of course, Plato’s ideal is also historically conditioned. But its essential novelty shows up precisely at the point of contrast between his legislation and the Greek material out of which it is composed.

The relationship between Plato’s city and Athens is perhaps clearest and most decisive in the field of government. The political organs and offices of the Laws fall into two distinct categories. On the one hand are the institutions that parallel those of Athens: the popular assembly, the popular council, the municipal officials (astynomoi and agoranomoi), and the rural officials (agronomoi). On the other hand are the institutions that are not Athenian at all, but entirely Platonic: the law-guardians, the superintendent of education (chosen from the guardians), the examiners (euthynoi), and the Nocturnal Council. Plato’s innovations can be seen in the treatment of the first group of offices, but above all in the addition of the new elective magistracies, characterized by long tenure and advanced age: the guardians and examiners are both to be over 50, and to serve until 70 and 75 years of age respectively.

Plato’s transformation of the Athenian offices consists primarily in clipping the power of assembly and council (by transferring much of their competence to the guardians) and in adding an oligarchical element in the form of property qualifications. The use of four classes based on wealth is clearly oligarchic, or plutocratic, and Morrow’s partial denial (pp. 170f.) does not carry conviction. But it is certainly not true to say (as Barker does) that Plato turns the rule of wisdom into the rule of the rich.² The council and the market-wardens do not rule Plato’s city. On the other hand, property qualifications play no part whatsoever in election to the higher offices, or in appointment to the rural police, which may be considered as the preparation for high office. In his limited use of property classes, Plato’s motive seems to be what he says it is: to avoid class hostility by balancing the factor of wealth against that of mere number (V.744C 3; cf. VI.757E 4, 759B 6–7).

Plato is free to reconcile democracy with oligarchy in his lower offices precisely because they will not be the object of any real struggle for power. The essentially aristocratic character of the state is guaranteed by the concentration of supreme authority in the hands of the law-guardians and examiners. The guardians exercise the principal executive power; the examiners stand above them, at the summit of the civic structure, with overriding negative power to check and punish all other magistrates for misconduct. Morrow has perhaps not made sufficiently clear this hierarchical superiority of the examiners. It is marked not only by some unspecified legal power over the guardians,³ by the unique honors associated with their election and their memory after death, but above all by their automatic inclusion in the Nocturnal Council, a privilege granted to only ten out of the thirty-seven guardians. The superiority of the examiners is due precisely to the fact that they are the final device for assuring the subordination of all human rulers to the rule of law. The negative character of their supreme powers is a guarantee that these will not be abused. And there is nevertheless a special provision for the examination or answerability even of an examiner: any private citizen may bring a suit against him for abuse of his office (XII.947E–948A).

Such a mixed constitution can be described only in terms of paradox. Morrow suggests Plato’s own formula from the Menexenus: aristocracy with the approval of the people. More precisely, it is an elective oligarchy. The long tenure of the guardians and examiners will make them unresponsive to the popular will and give them the fixed status of a governing class.

As for the element of democracy in Plato’s mixture, it is real though limited. The election of even the highest magistrates and the existence of popular, lot-appointed courts show that Plato has gone as far as he could to make a place for the Athenian tradition in his city, and to unite freedom with wisdom (represented by the higher magistrates) and friendship (i.e., class harmony) in the three-fold goal of his legislation. But farther he cannot go. The popular courts must be reviewed by the select judges, just as the popular assembly and council must be supervised by the venerable guardians and examiners. For otherwise the second-best city would not even be an imitation of the first.

We see, therefore, in what sense the government of the Laws represents an idealized Athens: it represents a compromise between Athens and the Republic. The rule of philosopher-kings has been integrated within the traditional framework of the polis. But Plato has not abandoned the central tenet of his earlier doctrine, as the institution of the Nocturnal Council makes perfectly clear.

It has often been felt that the reappearance of these philosophic councillors in the twelfth book of the Laws forms an inorganic appendix, an afterthought ultimately incompatible with the eleven preceding books.⁴ It is one of the greatest merits of Morrow’s work to have resolved this contradiction. He has shown that, far from undermining the other institutions of the city, the Nocturnal Council completes them by giving them their specifically Platonic sense. It is not the task of the Nocturnal Council as such to govern or control the city. Its members do in fact exercise such control, for they include the examiners and the senior guardians—the inner circle of the ruling class. As a council, however, their function is not so much government as education and research. The Council constitutes the device by which an elective aristocracy is transformed into something that resembles the rule of philosopher-kings.⁵ The true model for this council, as Morrow says, is Plato’s own Academy: it is a school for the advanced study of philosophy as the source of rational law.⁶ What distinguishes it from all other schools or learned societies is that its membership is drawn from the supreme magistrates of the city, and that it has some (not fully specified) responsibility for the completion and possible revision of the law code.

There is really no question of the Nocturnal Council being set above the laws. Legally, its powers are largely defined by the individual duties of the officials who compose it. The only two legal prerogatives explicitly granted to the council itself are: (1) the admonishment of atheists, and (2) the hearing and judging of citizen travellers returning from abroad. Not everyone will agree with Morrow that these responsibilities are obviously of minor importance (p. 510). They constitute in fact the most delicate—and most alarming—feature of Plato’s entire legislation. But they do not constitute rule of the city. On the contrary, they confirm the philosophic rather than governmental competence of the Council. It is precisely because these questions involve matters of theology and comparative legislation that the guardians and examiners are called upon to deal with them as members of the Council, rather than in their usual capacity as magistrates.

Thus Morrow has succeeded, against nearly all previous writers, in showing that there is no fissure in the system of the Laws, no sudden reversion from the second-best to the first constitution. We are still in the second city, but the philosophic training of the rulers is simply not a principle that Plato is prepared to sacrifice. The fact that this training is not clearly specified until the very end of the exposition suggests, of course, that it might be omitted, at least temporarily, if conditions were unsuitable. There is no mention of it, for instance, in the constitution which Plato proposes for Syracuse in the Eighth Epistle, and which otherwise bears such a close resemblance to the scheme of the Laws. This is presumably what Plato means by the statement that he is ready to propose not only a second-best but even a third-best constitution if necessary (V 739B, E).⁷ But only a philosophic council, authorized to improve the lawcode in the light of further knowledge, can provide the link that will draw these copies as close as possible to their original.

Morrow is obviously right in emphasizing the connections between the Laws and the Republic—in looking, for example, to Republic VII rather than to the un-Platonic Epinomis for a fuller statement of the higher education of the rulers. In fact, all of the most controversial features of the Republic (with the exception of the system of three classes) reappear in the Laws, at least in the form of aspirations. The equality of women is proposed again, though never fully worked out (VIII.804D-805D). On the other hand, the community of property, women, and children is given up as unrealizable, and Plato accepts the family with its land allotment as the basis of his social order (V.745C and passim). Yet the vision of a society where everything is common—where not even sensations or actions or thoughts are private—still stands before him as a model, which Plato now admits to be beyond human nature in its present form, but conceives of as a city of gods or children of gods (V.739D-740A). The perfect unity of such a heavenly city is mirrored in his Cretan polis only by the symmetrical proportions of the number of land allotments. Morrow’s utilitarian explanation of the number 5,040 (pp. 129f.) is correct as far as it goes, but fails to take account of Plato’s symbolic use of this unchanging number with its symmetrical subdivisions as an imitation of unity, as close to immortality as possible (739E 4).

In the case of property and the family, Plato’s retreat from the position of the Republic is obviously made with reluctance and regret. If the city of the Laws is a second-best, it is because Plato is now prepared to widen the gap between the model and its realization: the model itself has not changed (V.739E 1). That is equally true in the case of the other chief contrast with the Republic, the shift from the discretion of the philosopher-king to the supremacy of written law. On this point, Morrow’s dissent from the usual interpretation seems to blur an essential distinction. He points to the passages in the Republic which imply the sovereignty of law, and suggests that the only difference in the Laws is that what had been a moral desideratum has now been made into an enforceable rule by the provision of legal safeguards against the irresponsible use of power (pp. 582f.). But this statement of the case does not reflect the profound change in spirit between the two dialogues. The Republic is built around the figure of the philosophic ruler, freely molding the state in the image of his own vision of the Good. The Laws, on the other hand, consists of one prolonged endeavor to restrict the future discretion of the guardians by the whole body of written law. Plato himself is aware of this contrast: he suggests that the final decision in favor of the rule of law is due to the keener vision of old age (IV.715E 1)—to an insight not unlike Lord Acton’s principle of the corrupting influence of power upon its possessor.⁸ The transition from the rule of Reason to the rule of Law is prepared at length by the discussion in the Statesman, which still argues for Reason, but hints at the new solution in the cosmic myth: the unchecked rule of Reason belongs to an earlier world period, when the rulers of men were of more divine nature than at present. Characteristically, however, Plato’s statement of the new principle is combined with a reaffirmation of the old ideal: if the right man could be found, he would have no need of laws above him; neither law nor any other arrangement deserves to rule over true knowledge and reason (IX.875C-D). Plato has reconciled himself to the weakness of human nature, not to the rejection of his original ideals.

If there is something lacking in Morrow’s book, it is a full statement of these ideals in all their naked and shocking originality. It is, I think, misleading to suggest that most of us would accept the validity of the principles that Plato wishes his citizens to live by, and I do not see that most of his moral doctrine is completely obvious (p. 559). It is true that there is a large measure of overlap between Plato’s moral principles and those of any civilized society. And in certain important respects Plato’s proposals for reform are more democratic (in our sense) and more liberal than the corresponding institutions of Athenian democracy. (Thus Plato’s law courts come much closer to what we count as due process, and his preference for election over the choice of magistrates by lot is more in line with modern notions of democratic rule.)⁹ But what is specifically and uniquely Platonic is the foundation of all morality and all politics upon a metaphysical vision of what is really true and good—a vision which, in concrete terms, is expressed by a community whose members all think and feel and act and speak alike.¹⁰ Because of its concreteness, the Laws shows even more clearly than the Republic the dangers inherent in using such a celestial model as a blueprint for political action. If the state is conceived of as a realization of supreme goodness and truth—if, in other words, it is treated as an instrument for saving souls or (what often comes to the same thing) for saving society—then its intervention into every corner of the individual’s life will follow as a matter of course. The existence of privacy, of free thought and speech, of autonomous creativity in literature and the arts, depends upon a conception of the state which need not be merely negative, but must at least be limited. The liberal conception of government requires that there be a place beside the common good for other goods—personal, private, and social—with an independent status. In the political sphere, Plato’s unitary conception of the Good means in practice that the public interest will swallow up all the rest. Paradoxically enough, it is not Plato’s metaphysical dualism but his teleological monism that accounts for the elements in his political theory that are most unacceptable from a modern point of view. As Rawls and others have emphasized, the liberal conception of the state ultimately depends upon respect for normative diversity, that is to say, upon pluralism with regard to judgments concerning the good.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this unitary conception of the good in Plato’s thought, since the very rule of philosophy is based upon it. It is modified and reinforced by another principle, the nostalgia for an archaic, stratified, unchanging social order, exemplified by Plato’s admiration for the fixed canons of Egyptian art. These two principles, archaism and the unitary Good, account for most of the repugnant features of Plato’s legislation. The law of slavery may serve as a case in point. There can scarcely be any doubt of Plato’s natural humaneness: this is evident, for example, in his conception of the early stages of education as a form of play, and even in his general remarks on the treatment of slaves (VI.777D). Yet his humane sentiments are so utterly overruled by his sense for order and hierarchy that he proposes a slave legislation harsher and more retrograde than that of his own time. In this connection, one wishes that Morrow had drawn more freely on his own admirable study of Plato’s Law of Slavery. There is almost no mention in the present work of those passages in the slave law which, as Morrow put it, "do not make pleasant reading.¹¹ Nor is there much said here about the preliminary population purges, nor the implications for home life of Plato’s system of marriage inspectors. On the other hand, in regard to education, literature, and freedom of expression, Morrow does not hesitate to underline the features of Plato’s constitution which are most incompatible with our own conceptions of a liberal society. But he is more concerned to reveal another side of Plato’s political personality: the student of comparative jurisprudence and the advocate of rational reform. Never before has Plato appeared so clearly as the spiritual heir of Solon, in the application of philosophic wisdom to a radical reform of the institutions of his ancestral city.¹²

When Morrow wrote, the controversy surrounding Karl Popper’s attack on Plato as father of totalitarian ideology was still in its polemical stage, and Morrow preferred to avoid the quarrel.¹³ From our perspective today it is easier to separate what was insightful in Popper’s critique from what was exaggerated or distorted by Popper’s fixation on the very real totalitarian threats in his own lifetime.¹⁴ No one today would regard Plato as an apostle of liberalism, but we might be more inclined to emphasize his unparalleled insistence on the equality of women in education and politics. And we might well prefer Plato’s class system in the Republic to Aristotle’s modifications of it in Politics VII, where the class of producers—the largest and richest class of citizens in Plato’s city—are disenfranchised by Aristotle, deprived of property rights, and transformed into slaves or serfs. How progressive or reactionary Plato’s politics appear will largely depend upon the angle selected for comparison. His gift for innovation is just as radical as his nostalgia for the more stratified society of pre-imperial Athens.

Morrow’s book has the great merit of reminding us of the centrality of politics in Plato’s conception of philosophy. It is no accident that Plato’s three longest dialogues—Gorgias, the Republic, and the Laics—are devoted to the impact of moral philosophy upon the life of the polis. The Seventh Epistle tells us that Plato, until the age of forty, had aspired to a public career of political reform. He ultimately chose the life of philosophy as a continuation of politics by other means. The vision in the Republic of a harmonious society enlightened and governed by wisdom is the climax of Plato’s lifework. The Laws, coming at the end, stands as his legacy to mankind. With the death of Dion and Plato’s own approaching death, the prospects for a philosopher-king were no longer realistic. Under these circumstances Plato’s most effective contribution to the cause for which he had lived became the detailed, mundane construction of a second-best city.¹⁵

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

We are indebted to Trevor Saunders for a comprehensive Bibliography on Plato's Laws 1920-70, with additional citations through May 1975 (New York: Arno Press, 1976). The second edition (1979) covers 1920-1976, and has additional citations through March 1979.

R. F. Stalley’s Introduction to Plato's Laws (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 190-97, has a more selective list of suggested readings on specific topics. G. Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory (New York and London: Methuen, 1986), has a useful bibliography (pp. 245-55). The most up-to-date bibliography known to me is in T. J. Saunders, Plato’s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy and Reform in Greek Penology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Plato bibliographies are also published regularly by L. Brisson in Lustrum (1977, 1983, 1988, 1989).

Other relevant recent publications (kindly brought to my attention by Trevor Saunders) include:

D. Cohen, "The Legal Status and Political Role of Women in Plato’s Laws," Revue Internationale des Droits de l ’Antiquité 34 (1987): 27-40.

G. Klosko, "The Nocturnal Council in Plato’s Laws," Political Studies 36 (1988): 74-88.

K. Schopsdau, "Der Staatsentwurf der Nomoi zwischen Ideal und Wirklichkeit: Zu Plato leg. 739A 1-E 7 und 745E 7-746D 2," Rheinische Museum 134 (1991): 136-52.

T. J. Saunders, Penal Law and Family Law in Plato’s Magnesia, in Symposion 1990: Papers on Greek and Hellenistic Legal History, ed. M. Gagarin (Bohlau Verlag, 1991), 115-32.

For general discussions of Plato’s Laws since Morrow’s book appeared, in addition to Saunders’s introduction to the Penguin translation and the works of Stalley and Klosko mentioned above, we have substantial chapters in P. Friedlander, Plato III (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), and W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). For three quite different approaches see A. B. Hentschke, Politik und Philosophie bei Plato und Aristoteles (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1971), M. Pierart, Platon et la Cité grecque (Brussels: Académie royale de Belgique, 1973), and L. Strauss, The Argument and Action of Plato’s Laws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). There is also a somewhat eccentric translation and interpretation by T. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

¹ Plato: The Laws, translated with an introduction by T. J. Saunders (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1970). See also Saunders’s Notes on the Laws of Plato (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1972). Saunders’s translation in turn inspired R. F. Stalley to produce a very lucid philosophical Introduction to Plato’s Laws (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). Morrow’s work also serves as the basis for G. Klosko’s discussion of the Laws in chapters 12 and 13 of The Development of Plato’s Political Theory (New York and London: Methuen, 1986). For further literature, see the Bibliographical Note.

² Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors (Methuen/Barnes and Noble, 1950), p. 397.

³ Klosko (Development, p. 217) complains that the law-guardians are virtually immune from examination. But he himself recognizes that the examiners are given the power to pass sentence on offending magistrates (p. 216). See XII.945C–D; 946C 6: They will examine ... all offices of the state (pasas tas archas . . . elenchontōn).

⁴ G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Thought, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 85: in the last few pages of the Laws Plato adds to the state another institution . . . which . . . contradicts the purpose of planning a state in which the law is supreme. Similarly, Barker, pp. 406-8: "Plato, when he wrote the last book of the Laws, was not of the same mind as when he wrote the earlier books" (p. 408, n. 1). Cf. T. A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 205f.

⁵ This is what Plato implies by his concluding remark that the city should be entrusted to the Council (XII.969B 3). Their practical decisions (including the completion and possible revision of the law code) will be informed by their philosophical studies in the same way as the philosopher-kings’ political insight is keener when they return to the cave.

⁶ Cf. Klosko, Development, p. 218: The nocturnal council is envisioned as a kind of ongoing seminar. Its main purpose is to achieve a theoretical understanding of the laws of the state. In his 1988 paper, however (see Bibliographic Note below), Klosko has emphasized the loose threads and inconsistencies in Plato’s reference to the Nocturnal Council and in his suggestions for revision of the lawcode. I think it is an exaggeration to speak of "a fundamental break in the argument of the Laws," as Klosko does in his later paper (p. 85). The inconsistencies do point to an unresolved tension in Plato’s thought, but it is not a tension between the rule of law and the unfettered rule of philosophy (i.e., between the scheme of the Laws and the scheme of the Republic). That tension, characteristic of the Statesman, has been resolved in the Laws by the decision against any form of uncontrolled power. (Even the examiners can be called to account.) What Plato has not fully worked out is a balance between (a) the need for a fixed and stable body of legislation, and (b) the possibility of rational improvements in the light of new knowledge and deeper understanding. This is a genuine dilemma and an enduring problem, as we can see from contemporary debates about the strict interpretation of the United States Constitution. Now a modern constitution will specify a formal procedure for amendment. But the problem is more complicated for Plato, since he can in principle approve of a process of amendment only if it is guided by philosophic wisdom. (Compare Statesman 300D-E.)

⁷ For parallels between the second-best state of the Laws and Plato’s proposals for Svracuse in Epistles VII and VIII, see Klosko, Development, p. 239.

⁸ Acton seems to have been conscious of the debt. He writes that in "the history of political science, the highest and the largest place would belong to Plato and Aristotle. The Laws of the one, the Politics of the other, are, if I may trust my own experience, the books from which we may learn the most about the principles of politics. See The History of Freedom in Antiquity," in J.E.E.D. Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power, ed. G. Himmelfarb (New York: Meridian, 1955), p. 74.

⁹ For Plato as a democratic elitist, see Stalley, Introduction, pp. 120-22.

10 Republic V.462A-E; Laws V.739C-D.

¹¹ G. R. Morrow, Plato’s Law of Slavery in Its Relation to Greek Law, Illinois Studies in Language and Literature 25 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1939), p. 126.

¹² In this connection Saunders cites the complex arrangements for a ‘mixed’ constitution, the reforms of legal procedure, the enlightened theory of punishment, the persuasive legal preambles, and the provision for a continuing review of the legal code by a specially trained body as constituting an impressive program for the reform of society by the rule of law, informed by the insights of research and philosophy (Plato: The Laws, p. 37).

¹³ Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

¹⁴ See the balanced survey in Stalley, chap. 16: "The Closed Society of the Laws." See also Klosko, Development, pp. 134—36, 149f., 166-68.

¹⁵ Major portions of this commentary on Morrow’s work were originally published in my review of Plato’s Cretan City in the Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (1961): 418—24. Reprinted by permission of the Johns Hopkins University Press.

PREFACE

NO WORK of Plato’s is more intimately connected with its time and with the world in which it was written than the Laws. The other dialogues deal with themes magnificently independent of time and place, and Plato’s treatment of them has been recognized as important wherever human beings have thought about the problems of knowledge, or conduct, or human destiny. But the Laws is concerned with the portrayal of a fourth-century Greek city—a city that existed, it is true, only in Plato’s imagination, but one whose establishment he could well imagine as taking place in his day. The materials of which it is composed are the political and social institutions characteristic of a small but talented people living more than two thousand years ago in the eastern Mediterranean; and it is pervaded throughout by the concepts and incentives that guided their actions and gave meaning to their lives. With the passing away of this people for whom it was intended, and the substitution of other horizons for those within which they lived, the Laws has tended to become a closed book, formidable in its contents, and at first sight offering little reward for the effort involved in mastering them.

But the interpreter of Plato cannot afford to leave the Laws out of account. There are many aspects of Plato’s thought, to be sure, that may well be understood without it; but we cannot really understand Plato the philosopher without recognizing the central position he assigned to the guidance of life and the molding of the institutions in which life is lived; political philosophy was for him not an appendage, but the crown and goal of philosophic thought. Nor can we be content to rely upon the Republic alone for understanding his political philosophy. The very bulk of the Laws is evidence of the importance Plato himself attached to this later statement of his political aims. Whether it is a repudiation of his earlier principles, or a development and exemplification of them, can be determined only after a careful analysis of the later work. Compared with the Republic, the Laws has the special value of presenting its principles not in the abstract, but in their concrete reality, as Plato imagined they might be embodied in an actual Greek city.

But these details of constitution making and legislation cannot themselves be rightly understood apart from their setting, the life of fourth-century Greece from which they are drawn or adapted. The significance of some casual phrase, some detail of election procedure, for example, or some prescription regarding sacrifices and dances, can escape us if we do not know—as Plato’s readers did—the practices to which he is referring or which he is modifying. Still less can we grasp the larger features of his construction without knowing the common institutions of the Greek city-state and the motives that actuated the citizen—a knowledge that Plato takes for granted. Unfortunately even the best-informed reader of today is unable to do more than approach the understanding that Plato could assume without question in his readers. This means that the Laws will always remain in some respects obscure to us, just as many passages in Thucydides or Herodotus defy understanding; but no Platonist should rest content until he has diminished the obscurity as much as he can. And anyone who attempts to do so will be rewarded by discovering that much in the Laws which has hitherto been condemned as confused, or contradictory to something Plato has said elsewhere, turns out upon examination in its historical context to be lucid and in order.

This book, then, attempts to set forth in some detail the main institutions of the state described in Plato’s Laws, and to interpret them by comparing or contrasting them with the historical laws and social institutions of Plato’s Greece, and in the light of the concepts and traditions current in his day. Part One examines the nature and extent of the major historical influences upon Plato’s design, following the clue provided by the dramatic structure of the dialogue; in Part Three I venture an interpretation of his political principles in terms of the concrete legislation that embodies them; and Part Two provides the confirmation of my interpretation of the influences and the basis for my interpretation of the principles.

It was my former teacher and lifelong friend, George Holland Sabine, who first suggested to me, more than thirty years ago, the value of such a comparison of Plato’s Laws and the historical institutions with which Plato and his readers were familiar; and the inquiry proved to be so fascinating that it has been the center of my scholarly interests and publications during almost all the intervening years. This book is therefore fittingly, and affectionately, dedicated to him; though it must be added that he would probably, nay certainly, dissent strongly from some of my interpretations. He cannot, therefore, be held responsible for anything here expounded; but only for the ideal of sober and dispassionate inquiry which has guided me, and to which I hope I have been faithful.

In a study that ranges as widely as this over almost all aspects of Greek life I cannot hope to have avoided errors. But the mistakes of fact or emphasis that I have unwittingly made can be—and I hope will be—corrected. It will be gratifying if this effort at synthesis acts as a challenge to others to set the picture right where my hand has gone astray.

My indebtedness is great, as my footnotes show, to the many scholars before me who have dealt with portions of this task, and without whose individual labors this undertaking would have been impossible. I acknowledge also the help of the many friends who have read parts of this work in manuscript and have given me the benefit of their advice—my colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania, Lloyd W. Daly, Paul Schrecker, and Francis P. Clarke; A. E. Raubitschek of Princeton University; L. A. Post of Haverford College; and Sir David Ross, Richard Robinson, and A. Andrewes of Oxford University. None of these men can be held responsible for the work as it stands, or for any part of it; but it is certainly less imperfect than it would have been without their counsel, and for their interest, their corrections, and their suggestions I record my sincere gratitude. I am grateful also to my former secretary, Mrs. Richard Parker, for valuable aid during the early stages of this work. But above all I am indebted to my wife, who has been my constant ally and aid from the beginning, in editing, in criticizing, in typing and retyping my numerous drafts, and in keeping a watchful eye on all the other humdrum details involved in a work of this sort.

To the Guggenheim Foundation I express my sincere thanks for the interest shown in this project from its beginning, and for the financial assistance without which it could not have been undertaken nor carried through; and also to the Fulbright Commission, on both sides of the Atlantic, who made it possible for me to spend a year at Oxford among colleagues especially sympathetic toward my study. Finally, I acknowledge with deep appreciation the hospitality and facilities afforded me by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, where this book was begun, and by Oriel College, of Oxford University, where it was brought to completion.

GLENN R. MORROW

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

July 1959

ADDITIONAL ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I acknowledge the permission of the University of Illinois Press to reprint in Chapter IV several pages of my earlier monograph on Plato's Law of Slavery. I am indebted also to James L. Celarier, who rendered valuable help in checking references and in the preparation of the indices; to the anonymous readers of the Princeton University Press for important suggestions and corrections contained in their reports; to the officers and staff of the Press for their work in designing and producing this book; and to Miss Miriam Brokaw, in particular, for her warm interest, her sage advice, and her competent superintendence of the progress of the work through the press.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in the footnotes, and occasionally in the text, for authors and works frequently cited.

AJP. American Journal of Philology.

Apelt. Otto Apelt, Platons Gesetze. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1916.

Barker. Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors. London, 1918.

Bonner and Smith. Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle. 2 vols. University of Chicago Press, 1930, 1938.

Burnet. John Burnet, Platonis Opera. Oxford, 1901-1906.

Bury. R. G. Bury, Plato: Laws. Loeb Classical Library. 2 vols. London and Cambridge (Mass.), 1942.

Busolt-Swoboda. Georg Busolt, Griechische Staatskunde, Pt. 1, Munich, 1920; Pt. 11 edited by Heinrich Swoboda, Munich, 1926.

Cassarà. Antonino Cassarà, Platone: Le Legge. Padua, 1947.

CQ. Classical Quarterly.

Des Places. Edouard des Places, Platon: Les Lois, Bks. I-VI. Vol. XI of the Budé edition of Plato, Paris, 1951.

Diels-Kranz. Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 6th edn. by Walther Kranz. 3 vols. Berlin, 1951-1952.

Dies. Auguste Dies, Platon: Les Lois, Bks. VII-XII. Vol. XII of the Budé edition of Plato. Paris, 1956.

DS. Charles Daremberg and E. Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines. 10 vols. Paris, 1877-1919.

England. E. B. England, The Laws of Plato. 2 vols. Manchester University Press, 1921.

FGH. Felix Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Berlin and Leiden, 1923-1958.

FHG. Karl and Theodor Müller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum. 4 vols. Paris, 1841-1851.

Gernet. Louis Gernet, "Les Lois et le droit positif," in the Introduction to Vol. XI of the Budé edition of Plato. Paris, 1951.

Gilbert. Gustav Gilbert, Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthümer. Vol. 1, 2nd edn., Leipzig, 1893; Vol. 11, Leipzig, 1885.

Hignett. C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B. C. Oxford, 1952.

IG. Inscriptiones Graecae.

JHS. Journal of Hellenic Studies.

Jowett. Benjamin Jowett, The