The Anti-Federalist Papers

DOVER THRIFT EDITIONS

GENERAL EDITOR: SUSAN L. RATTINER

EDITOR OF THIS VOLUME: JIM MILLER

Copyright

Copyright © 2020 by Dover Publications, Inc.

All rights reserved.

Bibliographical Note

The Anti-Federalist Papers, first published by Dover Publications, Inc. in 2020, is a new compilation of speeches, essays, and letters from 1787–88 concerning the ratification of the United States Constitution. They have been reprinted from standard sources. The Introduction and explanatory notes preceding each section have been specially prepared for this edition by John Grafton. Spelling, punctuation, and style vagaries, like inconsistent capitalization, derive from the original eighteenth-century sources.

International Standard Book Number

ISBN-13: 978-0-486-84345-2

ISBN-10: 0-486-84345-9

Manufactured in the United States by LSC Communications

84345901

www.doverpublications.com

2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1

2020

Contents

Introduction

Constitutional Convention Debate – 1787

Qualifications for Suffrage

August 7, 10

Citizenship for Immigrants

August 9

Slavery and the Constitution

August 21, 22

Election and Powers of the President

September 4, 5, 6

Opposition to the Constitution

September 7, 10, 15

Objections to the Constitution of Government formed by the Convention

November

Essays/Letters/Addresses – 1787/1788

Richard Henry Lee, Letter to Edmund Randolph with Objections to the Constitution

16 October 1787

John DeWitt, Essays I, II, and III

22 October 1787 / 27 October 1787 / 5 November 1787

Anti-Federalist No. 1 General Introduction: A Dangerous Plan of Benefit Only to the Aristocratick Combination

Boston Gazette and Country Journal

26 November 1787

The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents

18 December 1787

Centinel, Number I (Anti-Federalist No. 47)

5 October 1787

Federal Farmer, Letters I and II

8 October 1787 / 9 October 1787

Brutus, Essays I, II, VI, IX, X, XI, XII, XV, and XVI:

18 October 1787 / 1 November 1787 / 27 December 1787 / 17 January 1788 / 24 January 1788 / 31 January 1788 / 7 & 14 February 1788 / 20 March 1788 / 10 April 1788

Letters of Cato, IV, V, and VII

8 November 1787 / 22 November 1787 / 3 January 1788

Speeches of Patrick Henry

5 & 7 June 1788

Speeches of Melancton Smith

20–27 June 1788

Introduction

WHILE THE WAR against England still raged, the thirteen original colonies drafted their first Constitution, officially named The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, during the Second Continental Congress in 1777. The Articles of Confederation took force on March 31, 1781, after having been ratified by all thirteen United States, a slow process that began with Virginia’s endorsement in 1777 and ended when Maryland finally joined the fold on February 2, 1781. Eight months later, the British surrender at Yorktown brought the Revolution to a successful close.

It did not take long for the problems inherent in the Articles to become clear to many of the new nation’s leading political figures. The Articles were essentially a treaty linking the independent states, not a blueprint for a national government. It provided only for a national legislature; no executive or judicial branches were created. Crucially, no powers to tax were included—funds had to be requested from the states, which generally didn’t provide them very generously, and seldom in a timely manner. Because of this, the debts incurred during the Revolution couldn’t be paid, and an ongoing national defense could not be financed. Individual states could issue money, which quickly lost value, as did the currency issued by the weak central government. Foreign trade regulations were left to each individual state, so potential foreign trading partners could not be dealt with on a unified basis, and American shipping could not be defended in international waters. Complicating this, each state had one vote and any change to the Articles required unanimous agreement, always hard to obtain, and any major legislation required nine of 13 votes to pass, also hard to obtain. Events such as Shays’ Rebellion, an uprising of angry Revolutionary War veterans and other citizens against aggressive state tax collectors in Massachusetts in 1786–87, while eventually put down after a struggle, convinced many that these concerns were not simply theoretical, and a way had to be found to provide for more effective government.

A crucial step was taken when delegates from five states—New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia—met at Mann’s Tavern in Annapolis, Maryland, in September 1786, to discuss improving conditions caused by the trade barriers between states which were widely seen as stifling the growth of commerce in the new nation. All the states had been invited to send representatives to Annapolis. Several sent delegates who were, however, unable to get to Annapolis in time for the meeting, and others took no action at all. The ones who were there unanimously sent a report back to the national Congress calling for a larger convention to be held the following May in Philadelphia, and expressing the hope that more states would send delegates then and that perhaps more items could be discussed than just trade issues. From this beginning the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was called into existence.

The 1787 Philadelphia Convention got off to a slow start when delegates from several states were unable to arrive in time for the planned May 14 opening. By May 25, a quorum of representatives from seven states had arrived and the proceedings could begin. The venue was the Pennsylvania State House, also known as Independence Hall, where the Declaration of Independence had been signed 11 years before. George Washington was elected President of the Convention, and it was decided to keep the proceedings confidential until the end. Despite the heat of the Philadelphia summer, the windows were nailed shut to preserve the total privacy in which the delegates wanted to have their debates.

It became clear early in the discussions that there was momentum to go beyond the idea of trying to fix what the Articles of Confederation had created, and toward the forming of a new national government. Many of the delegates came with experience in this area: individual states had each drafted new Constitutions of their own during the period of the Revolution, and delegates had previously grappled with many of the same issues on the state level that now arose on the national scene.

New York’s Alexander Hamilton and Virginia’s James Madison were the leading proponents for the creation of a document that would create a whole new federal government. Madison’s Virginia Plan, circulated early in the proceedings, outlined a new federal government with three branches--executive, judicial, and legislative. In midsummer, a logjam was averted by the Connecticut Compromise, which proposed that the composition of the new national legislature’s lower house, the House of Representatives, would be determined by the population of each state—the larger states therefore having the most representatives—while the upper house, or Senate, would give each state, regardless of population, the same number of members. As the days and weeks went by, many other contentious issues were gradually dealt with—would there be a single chief executive, or a panel of more than one in charge?—how would slaves be counted?—how would the President be elected, and how long would members of each legislative body serve?—how would judges be appointed, and would there be an impeachment process?—any many more. After weeks of debate and many compromises, large and small, the new Constitution was signed by 39 delegates, representing a substantial majority, on September 17, 1787.

This volume includes a number of excerpts from the debates at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 as recorded by James Madison in his Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, first published in book form only in the 1830s. Madison’s Notes are an essential source for the thinking then current on both sides of the great national debate, and reading them allows us to go back and follow the Convention’s progress issue by issue, throughout the long summer. The Federalists on one side argued for the benefits a more powerful national government would bring; the Anti-Federalists on the other side, concerned about the freedoms the original states and individuals might lose under the new Constitution, argued against it.

The national debate over all of these issues provoked an immense war of words, a battle, essentially, of dueling newspaper columns in every city and state throughout the new republic, and in many smaller towns as well. This battle went into high gear as the nation as a whole started to consider whether to ratify the new Constitution that the Philadelphia Convention had brought forth. The Federalists and their leading advocates made their case not only in the justly famous series of Federalist Papers by Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay, which have been widely read and studied since they first appeared in the newspapers during the battle over ratification, but in many other articles and essays during those contentious years. The spokesmen for the anti-Federalists were less organized and more diffuse than their Federalist counterparts. They didn’t function as an organized group or coordinated committee, but they also made their case, and made it effectively in newspaper pieces of their own, many of which raise points that still resonate with considerable numbers of American voters even today, and which certainly had an impact on the outcome of events at the time. The anti-Federalists didn’t win the immediate battle—after an arduous and lengthy process, the new Constitution which came out of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention was ratified on June 21, 1788, when Rhode Island became the ninth state to sign. Following the necessary elections, the new government of the United States opened for business in New York on March 4, 1789. However, the greatest victory of the anti-Federalists was yet to come.

During the debates at the Philadelphia Convention, there had been many arguments for and against what came to be called the Bill of Rights. Three delegates who were present on September 17, 1787—George Mason, Edmund Randolph, and Elbridge Gerry, refused to sign the new Constitution, largely because it lacked a bill of rights. Federalists generally argued that a bill of rights wasn’t needed because the Constitution only granted to the Federal Government the powers it specifically enumerated; anti-Federalists felt an explicit list of rights reserved to individuals was necessary to protect the freedoms they had fought for in the Revolution.

As the ratification process continued in every state, the argument over the Bill of Rights took a primary role. Some states ratified the new Constitution while expressing that they did so in anticipation that such a Bill would soon be forthcoming. At a crucial juncture one of the wisest of the Founding Fathers, Virginia’s James Madison, originally an opponent of the idea of a Bill of Rights, came to the realization that the Federalists needed to get out in front of this issue before the whole Constitutional effort was jeopardized. Madison, then a member of the House of Representatives, drafted 17 proposed amendments to the Constitution, taking as a primary source the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason. The Senate whittled the list down to 12. By December 15, 1791, three-fourths of the States had ratified 10 of these amendments, and so they took their place in the Constitutional framework of the new nation as the Bill of Rights. Now explicitly protected were freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition, the right to keep and bear arms to maintain a well-regulated militia, the right to due process of law, and freedom from self-incrimination and double jeopardy.

Admirers of the Bill of Rights can certainly thank the anti-Federalists for having made this process necessary and for working to bring it to a successful conclusion. It was surely their greatest legacy. This unequivocal establishment of the rule of law and every citizen’s entitlement to these vital protections was a victory for the anti-Federalists even as the Constitution they first opposed took effect as the Federalists planned. In a sense, both sides won, a rarity in history.

Who were the anti-Federalist writers? It was a mixed group: some were famous, some were virtually unknown, most preferred to publish anonymously, and some of those have been able to retain their anonymity indefinitely and are identified by scholars today either not at all or only conjecturally. They were from the North and the South, farmers, soldiers, and merchants, richer and poorer, slave owners and not. This volume includes speeches by Patrick Henry, famous revolutionary orator, planter, first Governor of Virginia, and Melancton Smith, a New York merchant, a man fairly well known in his time but not to many casual readers of history today. Many of the Anti-Federalist essays which appeared in newspapers during the ratification debate and are reprinted in this volume were published under pseudonyms, often pseudonyms referring to characters in Roman history. The best evidence holds that the essays first published under the name Cato were by Melancton Smith, those by Brutus were likely by Smith, or Robert Yates, a New York attorney, or John Williams, a General in the New York militia; those by Centinel were by Samuel Bryan, a figure in Pennsylvania politics; and those by Federal Farmer were by Smith, or Richard Henry Lee, a leading Virginia political figure, or Mercy Otis Warren, a Massachusetts political writer. Also included in this volume are some essays published during the Constitutional ratification debates under the name John DeWitt. This pseudonym was an homage to a famous seventeenth-century Dutch patriot Johan De Witt (1625–1672) who defended the rights of citizens against an oppressive government, but the actual identity of the eighteenth-century American DeWitt remains a mystery.

The concerns of the anti-Federalists centered on freedom and power. Having fought a war for independence from what they considered a despotic monarchy answerable to no one, the anti-Federalists feared creating a central power in the new United States that might come to resemble another version of the British crown they despised. Dividing power among the 13 original states seemed like a better idea than concentrating it in the hands of a stronger central government. No doubt the universally respected George Washington’s decision to run for President, and his well-known total lack of interest in becoming anything like a British king, allayed some, but not all, of those fears. The anti-Federalists were concerned that the individual states would eventually give up all of their rights to the new central government—no doubt investing in states’ rights seemed like a surer way to guarantee individual freedoms. This debate has resonated throughout American history, and still goes on in the twenty-first century.

JOHN GRAFTON

QUALIFICATIONS FOR SUFFRAGE

August 7, 10

The proposition was debated that qualifications for voting for members of the House of Representatives in the new Congress should be the same in each state as the qualifications for voting for the part of their own legislature that had the most members. Gouverneur Morris of New York tried to pass a resolution limiting the right to vote for members of Congress to freeholders (landowners). It was defeated by a wide margin, 7–1.

MR. WILSON. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard and disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the National Legislature.

MR. GOUVERNEUR Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Governor and Representatives; in others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection against the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the National Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.

MR. ELLSWORTH thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the National Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances and temper of their own people.

COLONEL MASON. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders, what will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.

MR. BUTLER. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.

MR. DICKINSON had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; and the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence against the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property and without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.

MR. ELLSWORTH. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy and dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants and manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burdens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them—taxation and representation ought to go together.

MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of Aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an Aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics and manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure and faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier against aristocracy?—He was as little duped by the association of the words taxation and Representation. The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant and the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining freeholders to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. Nine-tenths of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merchants, etc., if they have wealth and value the right they can acquire it. If not they don’t deserve it.

COLONEL MASON. We all feel too strongly the remains of ancient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, and hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to and permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights and privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? Does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment? Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.

MR. MADISON. The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, the rights of property and the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence and ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England had been misconceived [by Colonel Mason]. A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities and boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the United States and it was in the boroughs and Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, and the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted.

DR. FRANKLIN. It is of great consequence that we should not depress the virtue and public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America and Great Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliament subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors and hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.

MR. MERCER. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people can not know and judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virginia as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; and by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.

MR. RUTLEDGE thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people and make enemies of all those who should be excluded.

The debate continued on August 10 with discussion of the qualifications for serving as members of Congress. There was a strong faction for having a wealth requirement for membership in Congress, but the members were unable to foresee any possibility of agreeing on what would be a suitable amount. Benjamin Franklin is recorded as having opposed the whole idea, pointing out that some of the worst rogues he had ever encountered in his long life were the richest . . .

MR. PINCKNEY. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the National Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the National Legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property: and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them independent and respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would have not only important causes between Citizen and Citizen but also, where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the United States and individual States as well as between one State and another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of the National Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion was that the President of the United States, the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a cleared unincumbered Estate to the amount of ——in the case of the President etc., etc.

MR. RUTLEDGE seconded the motion; observing that the Committee had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory by making them low.

MR. ELLSWORTH. The different circumstances of different parts of the U.S. and the probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either