The 1914 Campaign

Introduction

Another book on the 1914 campaign, surely not. Are there not enough out there already? What does this one tell me that the others do not? Well, some concentrate on the background to the war, others cover the whole campaign, of which the British Army was only a small part, while some concentrate on the personal experiences of the men who fought and died. This one concentrates on the British Expeditionary Force’s experiences during the three-month campaign.

It briefly covers the background to how Great Britain became involved in the European war and how it went to war. But the bulk of the narrative is concerned with the battles and what happened in between. It gives equal coverage of all the major battles: Mons, Le Cateau, the Aisne, Ypres, Messines Ridge and those between Armentières and La Bassée. It also covers the minor actions on route including Elouges, Le Grand Fayt, Etreux, Villers-Cotterêts and Néry. You will also find accounts of the lesser known actions along the Grand Morin, Petit Morin and Marne rivers.

The information came from many sources. The backbone of the narrative was created from the Official History, the two 1914 volumes forming part of the twenty-nine volume series complied by Brigadier General Sir James Edmonds. The first volume of Military Operations: France and Belgium was printed in 1922 and it covers Mons, the Retreat to the River Seine, the River Marne and the battle on the River Aisne; the month-long open warfare campaign. The second volume was published three years later and it covers the siege of Antwerp and the early days of defensive trench warfare at Ypres, Messines, Armentières and La Bassée.

The Battleground series of books, which are part narrative and part travel guide, has several volumes dedicated to the 1914 campaign. The quality of information inside the books varies from the minimum to an overwhelming amount of detail, but they all contribute something. They also helped to confirm, or in some cases contradict, the Official History. I say contradict because the official version often smoothed over what sometimes happened by omitting the mistakes, problems or pure bad luck which prevented success.

The same goes for divisional histories and regimental histories, the majority of which were printed around the same time as the Official History, but published on behalf of the units. Their quality varies enormously with some giving the bare details of a unit’s accomplishments while others are virtually a copy of the daily unit War Diary. But most provided additional interesting detail omitted from the Official History. They usually gave explanations of what went right and what went wrong although, naturally, units tend to blame the actions of others, rather than their own.

Virtually all the regimental and divisional histories can be accessed for an annual or individual fee at www.militaryarchive.co.uk. You can also access medal rolls, army orders, army lists and get assistance with the location of biographical details, awards and photographs of individuals. Joining the archive gave me prolonged access to all this for the same cost as a day visiting the London archives. If you are interested in printed histories and medal rolls this is the website for you.

Having checked the Official History and the printed histories, you are right to ask why did I not consult the war diaries in the National Archives held at Kew, London? In my experience the early 1914 war diaries are very limited in their scope at best, because there was little to learn from experience during the mobile early days of the war where every day was completely different. Although every unit was supposed to keep one, they only wrote the bare minimum. They did not expand into the detailed accounts, which are sometimes backed up by the maps and diagrams we see after trench warfare has set it. The comprehensive War Diary really was the product of trench warfare when there was a need for reporting and regulations.

Another decision I took was to buck the Army trend of describing deployments and events from right to left. We read text and look at maps from left to right. So I chose to write the narrative from left to right unless the sequence of events dictated otherwise such as the Battle of Mons.

One thing I hope will help you understand the campaign is the inclusion of many maps, nearly sixty altogether. The line goes ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ and I believe the same goes for maps. There are many military history books out there with page after page of battle accounts and only a couple of small-scale maps to help; and they usually do not help. My inspiration was Noah Trudeau’s book A Testing of Courage about the Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War. I had read several books and watched numerous documentaries on this huge three-day battle but I was still confused as to what went on. Trudeau’s book changed that because it had a clear large scale map every few pages, illustrating the development of the day-by-day actions, often over the same ground. It helped me understand the unfolding battle when I visited Gettysburg.

I wanted to do the same for the 1914 campaign. The Official History maps are sometimes cited as good examples but the level of detail and clarity diminishes rapidly over the course of the campaign. Although the maps in the two extra volumes give a lot of information for Mons, Le Cateau and the Aisne, those covering the Ypres Salient are hard to read and confusing. If you just have the two text books, it is the same old problem: too few small scale maps.

I chose to create a map for each division in the first two major battles and for each corps for the Aisne battle. There are maps for most days in the Salient and they concentrate on the main German attacks and breakthroughs. Where possible a section of trench map has been used in the Salient because they are clear and are well known to anyone with an interest in the First World War. Their grid system is a standard size of 1000 yards (914 metres) for each large square and 100 yards (91 metres) for each minor graduation. The main advantage of a trench map is that the terrain is virtually the same today as it was a century ago. Contours, roads, watercourses and woods have not altered and villages have changed little; only the trenches have gone. It means the maps can be used to help visitors to the battlefields find the places they want.

There is no talk of politics and little on the relationship between the War Office and GHQ. The same goes for the relationship between Field Marshal Sir John French and his subordinates, Generals Haig and Smith-Dorrien; also between French and Field Marshal Joffre, who had overall control of the Allied campaign. There is also little information on the German units involved in the battles but there is information on their offensive plans and tactics and how they impacted on the British.

You will not find quotes from personal diaries, letters or printed histories in the narrative either. The ones you often read have a similarly depressing theme of mud, blood and a desire to be somewhere else, and the ones with the bleakest outlook are usually chosen to set the soberest tone as the norm. The few quotes given were chosen for their eloquence in writing, their pride in the men’s determination and their dark humour.

There are few mentions of casualties unless they were disproportionately high or low. I felt it served little purpose to keep reeling off the numbers after each action. Records are also incomplete so it would be inappropriate to mention some units and not others. Casualties were always high and both sides suffered.

I did consider listing the grave locations of those named in the text but a short survey illustrated it was not practical in a way I had wished. Many of those named in the narrative survived to fight another day while equally as many survived the 1914 campaign only to die later on, maybe in the 1915 campaigns, on the Somme, at Arras or Ypres, or during the huge 1918 campaigns. It does make you wonder how many of the ‘Old Contemptibles’ survived over four years of fighting.

Some of the casualties lost during the Retreat from the Mons and the Advance to the Aisne were buried in isolated locations or village cemeteries. Only a few scattered graves can be found today and they are rarely visited. Most have no known graves and they are remembered on the Ferté-sous-Jouarre Memorial on the River Marne, usually many miles from where they fought and died.

Many of those who died on the Aisne or in the Ypres Salient also have no known graves for another reason. The areas were fought over for another four years and the early cemeteries were often obliterated by the endless fighting. Again those who died on the Aisne are remembered on the Fertésous-Jouarre Memorial. The Ypres Salient casualties are remembered on the Menin Gate Memorial and the names of those who died south of Armentières are carved on the Le Touquet Memorial.

A large number of those who have known graves are not buried in their original location. Their remains were moved during the post war clear up in which many small cemeteries were closed and the graves moved to the large concentration cemeteries. Finally, we have those who died of their wounds. They were either buried behind the lines by the dressing stations and casualty clearing stations, near the coast at one of the base hospitals, or in the United Kingdom having been sent home to recover. The bottom line was very few casualties were buried close to their place of death and most of the graves of those who were have been lost.

So what will you find in the text? You will find plenty of information on the reasoning behind each battle and the objectives. There is discussion on German attacks, British counter-attacks, artillery bombardments, tactical innovations, the terrain and an attempt to understand the successes and failures of each attack. Where possible the men who made a difference are mentioned, the men who led the desperate defensive battles, drove the Germans out of captured trenches and those awarded the Victoria Cross.

Two important things become apparent as you read the narrative. The first is that the men of the British Expeditionary Force were men of their generation; tough men who fought for their regimental traditions and their comrades. Time and again they shouldered their rifles and stopped the enemy before they got too close or fought them off with bayonet and rifle butt. Then when trench warfare set in, they dug deeper and did it all again.

The BEF also learnt a lot about defensive warfare during the 1914 campaign but it cost them a lot. Britain’s Regular Army was decimated in twelve weeks and many of the Reservists, recalled to the colours, became casualties before the end of the campaign. But the lessons they had learnt were remembered. Many of the battalion and brigade officers would be promoted to a higher rank as the Royal Navy’s toast to ‘A bloody war or a sickly season’ came true. Many of the injured junior officers would become involved in training the New Armies, passing on tales of their exploits and experiences to the men who had volunteered for the New Armies.

Having a good place to stay while touring is an important part of any visit to the battlefields, particularly after some of the long days on the road I had following the 1914 campaign. I would like to thank David and Julie Thomson for looking after me when I stayed at ‘Number 56’ in La Boisselle, a ‘bed and breakfast oasis on the Somme’ during my Western Front research trips – a great place to base yourself and great people to spend time with.

It is eight years since I studied the early months of the First World War and I enjoyed the return to this fascinating period of history. Researching about the events of the summer and autumn of 1914 has fulfilled a longstanding ambition of mine; to increase my understanding of the campaign. I have enjoyed writing about the 1914 campaign and I hope you enjoy reading about it.

Chapter 1

A State of War Exists – 28 June to 22 August

Diplomacy and Mobilization, 28 June to 1 August

After four decades of diplomacy and politicking between the European powers, the situation exploded on 28 June 1914 when Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife, Sophie, in Sarajevo. The government retaliated by arresting 5,500 Serbs and organizing attacks on Serb communities. A month of negotiating known as the ‘July Crisis’ followed between Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain.

Austria-Hungary believed Serbian officials were implicated in the attack and an ultimatum was given to Serbia to provoke a war and end their meddling in the Bosnian region. The ten demands were intentionally unacceptable and when Serbia only agreed to eight, Austria-Hungary declared war on 28 July.

The British Government ordered the Home Fleet to their war stations the same day, as their test mobilization came to an end. The following day the British Army’s General Staff put precautionary measures into force, putting Regular Army troops on standby and recalling everyone on leave. The Belgian Government placed its army on a ‘reinforced peace footing’ the same day.

The political situation was also intensifying. The British Ambassador in Berlin had been asked to give assurance of Great Britain’s neutrality if Russia attacked Austria. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, refused to entertain the proposal.

Matters took a turn for the worse on 30 July when Russia mobilized her four Southern Armies. Germany responded by threatening to mobilize unless Russia stopped. The situation deteriorated when Austria-Hungarian artillery began shelling the Serbian capital, Belgrade. The following day both Austria and Russia mobilized all their forces, forcing Germany to warn of an ‘imminent danger of war’ as it introduced martial law, suspended civil rights and called up six classes of the Reserve.¹ Germany’s ultimatum to Russia demanded she immediately cease mobilization or Germany would mobilize on both frontiers. Turkey also began mobilizing her troops.

Grey asked both France and Germany if they would respect Belgian neutrality and while France said it would, Germany did not give a direct reply. So far the British Government had not committed itself and when France and Germany ordered a general mobilization on 1 August, it was still free to decide whether to get involved in a European war or stay neutral.

The British and French General Staffs had made a peacetime plan for deploying a British Expeditionary Force to France. They agreed four infantry divisions, one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade² would cross the English Channel and concentrate between Avesnes and Le Cateau in northern France. They would be able to advance on day sixteen after mobilization, a few days after the French were ready.

The British General Staff suggested moving troops as quickly as possible to the embarkation ports, cancelling the imminent annual summer training and deploying Territorial Force units to guard the railways. But the government waited until the ultimatum to Germany expired at midday on 1 August. The following day Regular Army manoeuvres and Territorial Force training were cancelled but still no mobilization orders were issued. The Cabinet consulted Parliament the following day, confident in the knowledge that the Home Fleet was at its war station, ready to meet any threat posed by the German Fleet in the North Sea or the Channel.

No Turning Back, 2 to 4 August

The German Minister in Brussels presented a note to the Belgian Government on the evening of 2 August. It explained that the German Government believed French forces intended to march through Givet to Namur, to the Meuse River. The move would violate Belgian neutrality and Germany wanted free passage for her troops so they could counter it. Although the content of the note sounded feasible, it had been written on 26 July and then sent to the German Minister in Brussels three days later with instructions not to open it until instructed. The Belgian Government had only been given twelve hours to reply but they stated they would resist any French or German troops crossing their borders. Belgium also declined French help while mobilizing her own army.

On 2 August German troops crossed the French border at four points and entered Luxembourg. Germany’s deployment plan, Aufmarsch 1, was a development of the 1905 Schlieffen Plan.³ It called for seven armies to rapidly conquer France whilst one army delayed the Russians. The idea behind the plan was that the armies could defeat France and be transported east before the Russians completed their mobilization.⁴ A single army crossed their eastern border with Russia on the same day.

First contact with London was made when King Albert telegraphed King George V to ask for Great Britain’s diplomatic intervention. On 3 August Grey visited the House of Commons which approved his decision not to become involved in the Serbian situation. They decided the fleet could be used to help France but also agreed Great Britain would stand by her promise to guarantee Belgium’s neutrality. However, there was no resolution.

Grey then read out the German note to the Belgian Legation and explained that a German attack was imminent, if it had not started already. As a result the House agreed to mobilize the Territorial Force and the Naval Reserves, confident their reserved approach to the European situation had conserved the unanimity of the nation. It had also achieved the goodwill of neutral countries.

But events were moving fast on mainland Europe as the British politicians and military leaders conferred. When Germany declared war on France on the evening of 3 August, Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance,⁵ declared her neutrality. The following morning Germany declared war on Belgium and two cavalry divisions and several brigades of infantry were crossing the border within hours.

On the afternoon of 4 August, the British Government ordered the mobilization of the Regular Army and the Foreign Office issued a statement the following morning:

‘Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty’s Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty’s Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11pm on the 4 August.’

The Siege of Liège, 4 to 16 August

While the British Government was making its final decisions, the situation in Belgium and along the French frontier was developing quickly. By the night of 3 August it was clear the Germans intended to cross the Belgian border the following morning. The Belgian plan was to use one division to delay the German advance in front of Liège’s fortifications while four divisions advanced to the River Gette,⁶ screened by the army’s cavalry division.

German cavalry did cross the Belgian frontier on 4 August only to find the River Meuse bridge north of Liège had been blown up while Belgian troops were waiting along the river bank. Two regiments headed north and forded the river at Lixhe, 10 miles north of the city, and when the Belgians retired behind Liège’s ring of forts; they followed.

General Otto von Emmich’s demands for free passage through Liège were refused, because General Gérard Leman was sticking to King Albert’s orders to ‘hold to the end with your division the position which you have been entrusted to defend’. So six German infantry brigades prepared to attack while a cavalry corps assembled on standby. After an attempt to kidnap Leman failed, Emmich ordered a night attack towards the town and citadel while demonstrations were made against the outer forts.

The attack was a disaster. The two brigades to the north and north-east lost their way and while most battalions fell back with heavy losses, one battalion entered the town and was captured. The central column fell back after a tough fight and had to be stopped by Major-General Erich Ludendorff, Second Army’s Deputy Chief of the General Staff.⁷ One column to the south fell back with heavy losses while the second panicked and units fired on each other in the dark.

Ludendorff made sure the attack was renewed the following morning and the centre column advanced within a mile of Liège before making a dash for the citadel. The discovered that the Belgian garrison had withdrawn, leaving the fortress troops behind to face the German guns.

While the German Cavalry Corps worked round the west side of the fortress, the German artillery shelled Fort Barchon into submission on 8 August. Fort d’Évegnée and Fort de Lantin surrendered on 11 August, their garrisons incapacitated by fumes. Then the crunch came when huge 420mm howitzers came into action on 12 August and began battering the remaining forts. Fort de Chaudfontaine, Fort d’Embourg, Fort de Fléron and Fort de Pontisse fell on 13 August and Fort de Boncelles and Fort de Liers surrendered the following day. Then on 15 August a shell hit one of Fort de Loncin’s magazines and 12 tons of munitions exploded, killing most of the fort’s garrison. Fort de Flémalle and Fort de Hollogne surrendered the following morning, bringing the siege to an end.

Making Plans, 5 to 9 August

On 5 and 6 August British Cabinet Ministers, including Field Marshal Lord Horatio Kitchener,⁸ met leading members of the Armed Forces to discuss the disposition and employment of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). They agreed that two corps, each of two divisions, would immediately move to the agreed assembly area around Le Cateau and Avesnes. The question was, where could they sail to? They could not sail to Antwerp because part of the Scheldt River was Dutch, and Holland was a neutral country. Ostend was also ruled out because the BEF could get separated from the French if the Germans kept advancing through Belgium. So the decision was delayed until the French had been consulted.

The ministers and generals also discussed how to protect Great Britain’s coast. One brigade of 4th Division was already at Colchester and could deploy along the Suffolk and Essex coast. Another brigade would deploy along the Norfolk coast while the third brigade would cover the Lincolnshire and Yorkshire coasts. Five cyclist battalions were also sent to the east coast.⁹ Two brigades of 6th Division would remain in Ireland while the third moved to the Edinburgh area to cover Scotland’s east coast.

The meeting also agreed three resolutions. Firstly, four infantry divisions and the Cavalry Division would begin to embark first while a fifth division would follow as soon as possible. Secondly, troops would be recalled from South Africa.¹⁰ Thirdly, two Indian divisions would be moved to Egypt to protect the Suez Canal while the Indian Government would be urged to send a division to German East Africa to capture Dar es Salaam.¹¹

Field Marshal Sir John French was appointed Commander-in-Chief, British Forces in the Field and his command was split into two corps; Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig with I Corps and Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson with II Corps; Major General Edmund Allenby was appointed commander of the Cavalry Division.¹²

When the generals said the Territorial Force units were already en route to their annual training camps, the Cabinet delayed embarkation until 9 August to allow them to return to depot. Otherwise the Army was ready and its whole mobilization plan was carried out according to the ‘War Book’. Every last detail for organization and deployment had been worked out. Each unit had been issued with a set of general instructions for mobilization and a set of specific orders for deployment. It meant officers knew what was expected of them when the order was given.

Deployment to France, 9 to 19 August

The rail network also had a strict timetable to work to and 1,800 special trains travelled across Great Britain and Ireland in only five days; eighty trains carried troops into Southampton Docks on the busiest day. Each train load was planned to carry a complete unit or part of a unit complete with its transport so everyone could march as soon as they arrived at their destination.

Ships were allocated to carry either personnel, horses and vehicles, motor transport or stores and an average of thirteen ships a day sailed for Havre, Rouen and Boulogne. They sailed day and night, leaving port as soon as they were loaded, as Royal Navy ships protected the Channel. Troops on the mainland embarked at Southampton while 5th and 6th Divisions moved to the Irish ports of Belfast, Dublin and Cork. Some motor transport and fuel sailed from Avonmouth, near Bristol while the rest were loaded at Liverpool. While frozen meat was delivered to Liverpool, other stores and supplies were loaded at Newhaven, East Sussex. A few details sailed from Glasgow.

The ‘War Book’ did its job as the mobilization of nearly 100,000 men and the assembly of 120,000 horses¹³ went ‘according to plan’.

Early French Moves, 6 to 20 August

The French Army had spent many years studying their deployment plans. They were based on an advance into the ‘lost provinces’ of Alsace and Lorraine which had been annexed following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. They had made many alterations and they were on their 17th revision by August 1914, hence the name Plan XVII.¹⁴

But despite all the forward planning, Field Marshal Joseph Joffre had to change them because they did not include an attack through Belgium. On 2 August Joffre choose new concentration areas for Fourth and Fifth Armies, extending the left wing north to cover the threat. The following day General Sordet was ordered to move his Cavalry Corps east of Mézières, ready to enter Belgium.

The French Army was not due to complete mobilization until 18 August but General Joffre decided to make a preliminary attack with his right according to the original plan. On 6 August the Army of Alsace crossed the frontier only to run into large forces around Mulhausen,¹⁵ so General Pau was forced to withdraw.

The same day Sordet’s cavalry crossed the Belgian border with King Albert’s consent, heading east towards Neufchâteau before turning north towards Liège. Joffre’s plan was to delay the German columns moving west across Belgium but Sordet fell back towards the Meuse when it was clear the Belgian Army had withdrawn from Liège. His cavalry had discovered little and had caused no disruption.

By now it was clear the Germans were advancing through Belgium. Joffre ordered General Lanrezac to advance from the Charleville-Mézières area on 12 August ‘to oppose any attempts of the enemy to cross the Meuse between Givet and Namur’. Fifth Army marched north along the Meuse and stopped German cavalry crossing near Dinant three days later.

The combined forces of First and Second French Armies advanced towards Mulhouse again on 14 August but events to the north changed everything. The following day the Belgian Army reported 200,000 German troops were crossing the Meuse 10 miles north of Liège, next to the Dutch border. Joffre was also about to find out that the German centre was advancing through Metz, Thionville and Luxembourg, towards the French centre.

Joffre’s plan took shape when it became clear the main German advance was