The Nature of Future Conflict

THE NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT

By the Same Author

The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear – A Military History

of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–5.

The Republic of the Ushakovka – Admiral Kolchak and the Allied

Intervention in Siberia 1918–1920.

Military Intervention in the 1990s – A New Logic of War.

Shrouded Secrets – Australia’s Mainland War with Japan 1942–1944

The Battle for Manila, 1945

(with Drs Duncan Anderson and John Pimlott)

Celebration of Victory – VE Day 1945

THE NATURE

OF FUTURE

CONFLICT

Richard Connaughton

First published in Great Britain in 1995 by

LEO COOPER

190 Shaftesbury Avenue, London, WC2H 8JL

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd,

47 Church Street,

Barnsley, South Yorkshire S70 2AS

© Richard Connaughton, 1995

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 0 85052 460 1

Typeset by Phoenix Typesetting, Ilkley, West Yorkshire

Printed in England by

Redwood Books Ltd,

Trowbridge, Wilts.

Dedication

To those who ought to know but who do not know;

to those who do know but do not wish to know;

and to those who think they know but do not know;

this book is respectfully dedicated.

Contents

Glossary

Foreword and Acknowledgements

The nature of the majority of future conflicts will be within states, nations versus nations in civil war and ethnic strife. This sea change in the conflict environment has found the United Nations, established to deal with inter-state conflict, off balance and slow to adjust. In May 1994, there was but one inter-state conflict on the horizon which may have required military intervention and that was with regard to North Korea’s military posturing and nuclear threat. In the West armed forces and equipment have been substantially reduced and military budgets squeezed. For those democratic states without world order responsibilities, it seems a well-nigh impossible task to justify even the most modest of force structures. Although of late there has been a preparedness for states to involve themselves in other states’ conflicts, it is a highly selective process involving careful permutations of interest and conscience. It is also a random process. Even those states that do have international responsibilities by virtue of permanent membership of the Security Council remain uncertain of the circumstances, conditions and environments whereby they might intervene. These fumbling uncertainties are glaringly obvious within the fragile foreign policies of most of the liberal western democracies.

There are three associated truths. First, the international order has been profoundly changed following the upheaval of 1989–90. Secondly, the United Nations and the Regional Organisations may be imperfect but they are the best collective security instruments available. Thirdly, if the UN is going to be used, it needs a brain appropriate to the new demands of the next millenium. The UN is a creature of the 1940s with a world view that is barely relevant today. If it was run as a business, it would already have turned over a number of times to remain up to the mark and competitive. There is an overwhelming need to remodel and restructure it. That involves a rethinking and preparedness to change, to revise interests and to eliminate practices which restrict the organization’s effectiveness.

The forerunner to this book was arguably an academic treatise,* shaking out theories and making the point that enterprises must be governed by rules, principles or understandings. On the basis of recent performances, that message has largely fallen upon deaf ears. This work is more political, a polemical review. While generals in Brussels speak of the fog of war, implying the imponderables, uncertainties and lack of clarity associated with war, the presence of the fog of politics has rarely been in greater evidence. There is a pretence that there is no threat, essentially so that defence budgets may be tapped to feed insatiable social appetites. The fact is that if the powers that still maintain some semblance of capability do not get their act together, the outcome for world peace will be catastrophic. Walk-in armouries are almost as prolific as hypermarket grocery stores. Unless world order comes under some form of structural control, it is destined to fall apart.

No one seems to know where they stand any more. The man who has the courage to stand up and, using an analogy of President Bush’s in the Gulf Conflict, draw a line in the sand is as likely as not to be stabbed in the back by a bystander. But drawing a line in the sand is a function which has to be done and it has to be done internationally. Hence the importance of the UN and its membership providing their unqualified support. Currently no one seems to know the rules of the international game or, indeed, what the game is. The UN must get these ground rules sorted out and develop principles to guide states in the future. This will involve establishing a tariff, a penalty and reward structure whereby miscreants in particular will be fully aware of the world community’s reaction if they cross that line in the sand. If such a system is to work properly, it will depend upon the degree of support provided by the USA. Washington has created difficulties for itself in the past. Finally, there has to be an enforcement mechanism comprising a range of coercive measures to be used as either a deterrent or as a big stick.

Our debate opens with an historical analysis. This is not to imply that history repeats itself, but it explains how we got where we are, and how it has influenced opinions and attitudes still to be found in place today. At the same time, it provides an opportunity to study the interrelationship of the main players, both politically and within developing military coalitions. The macro considerations examined in this chapter will have parallels to varying degrees in any form of armed conflict. The central question is, what is the nature and scale of future armed conflict? The conclusion is that the majority of armed conflicts will be fought in the lower-intensity regions, yet there is a caution not to give up the capability to fight general, regional wars. It is a matter of striking the right balance.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has opened the reform debate with his Agenda for Peace. It is not, and was not intended to be, a comprehensive prescription. It has had the benefit of lengthy consideration and is scheduled for review in early 1995. Our discussion also looks in detail at the higher political question of reform of the Security Council and takes a positive stand in proposing the rehabilitation of the moribund Military Staff Committee. Naturally the earlier prescribed rules, or principles, are discussed in an intra-state context, as are the methods whereby UN-sanctioned military operations may be commanded and controlled. The military technological revolution is examined and its place in the conflict scenario discussed. The two principal conclusions are that it has a disproportionate influence in holding down today’s manning levels and is not sufficiently structured to address future requirements at the lower conflict levels.

The lessons are drawn together in the concluding chapter, ‘October 1993’. Historically, it will not be a month quite as important as August, 1914, yet it was a month of pivotal importance with regard to the future of the international order and the part the USA will play within that order. The media’s coverage of the killing of one American soldier in Somalia on 3 October, 1993, had tremendous significance which unrolled into following months. As a comparison it had a similarity, albeit a lower order of similarity, to that of the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June, 1914. The experiences in Somalia are developed as a case study to run throughout the book, complemented, where necessary, by the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.

Given the dramatic pace of change in the international arena, the obvious question is, why a book? The media performs a key function in the information process but the nature of the news that they choose to report comes in what could be described as a dot format; short, sharp and related to a specific point. It is the episodic function of a book which can be employed to join up such a random array of dots in order to produce a clearer, continuing picture of events.

The reader may perhaps find within this text one or two areas where observations arising could be construed as criticism and perhaps worse, the occasional criticism which comes with the benefit of hindsight. By the same token, it might further be perceived that there exists a bias in the drift of such observations to the prejudice of some states. That may well be true, for it would be nugatory not to target such comment where contemporary power resides. The future of global order is dependent upon the existence of functioning internationalism. That cannot be achieved unless the important powers make essential concessions with their national sovereignty in order to allow internationalism to function effectively. Yet within the fields of high politics and diplomacy, unashamed pursuits of national interest are often conducted through the instruments of international organizations to such a degree that these organizations are blatantly manipulated. The United Nations in particular is used selectively as a tool of convenience for achieving national interests which cannot be achieved by other means. Arguably, it was ever thus and indeed, if the outcome proved to be favourable to the world community, then the voices of protest would be muted. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Haiti, however, are examples of conflicts which have been badly mismanaged by the important powers. Many of the episodes which unfold through the course of this book were most unfortunate but, to repeat them would be inexcusable.

The purpose of this book is to examine the nature of future conflict with a view to establishing collective experience and knowledge for the benefit of those called upon to make real-time decisions.

I should like to acknowledge the help and mental stimulation received from the following organizations and individuals: ActionAid; The Conflict Studies and Research Centre at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; The Centre for Defence and International Strategic Studies, Lancaster University; The Development Studies Association; Christopher Greenwood of Cambridge University; Professor Carey B. Joynt of Le High University, Pennsylvania; The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington; The National Defense University, Washington, particularly for their sponsorship of some of the non-controversial ideas which are developed in this book; the staff of Library at the Staff College for their never failing interest and help; The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute; Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, for being at the leading edge of military thinking; the United Nations Association in the United Kingdom; and finally, to Gina, an assistant without equal. Having said that, I alone am responsible for the ideas and conclusions which appear in this book.

*

Military Intervention in the 1990s – A New Logic of War

1

The Historical Perspective

Today’s study of conflict involves the unavoidable convergence of the social sciences and history. While the social sciences have a habit of automatically finding their own level, there is an element of selectivity in determining the part history is to play in the analytical and decision-making processes. Of course, in the past, key players have looked to history in the hope of finding their way while individuals have had their outlooks conditioned by history. In fact, it is not so much history itself that matters quite as much as the perception of history. The purpose of this opening chapter is to help in the development of these perceptions, beginning with Marlborough and concluding with Schwarzkopf.

Unlikely as it may seem, such a wide span conveniently empasizes that, for example, in terms of generalship, the wheel has turned full circle. The theme is developed later in the Command and Control chapter but, essentially, we are now witnessing a return to the days when political generals were at the face of conflict.

The central purpose of this chapter is to set out a continuum, an overview from the eighteenth century to explain how we got to where we are now. The established principal states of Europe and those which emerged on to the international stage at the beginning of the twentieth century have been influenced by the ebb and flow of their power relative to one another but, essentially, they are still in place today. Over that period, through the medium of coalitions and alliances, they have fought among themselves and with others. The lessons and experiences of these past coalitions are the stuff from which to learn for a future in which coalition operations will be the rule rather than the exception. It was as a result of the manner of the ending of the Second World War and the execution of a victors’ justice, consigning Germany’s and Japan’s military capabilities to an international sin bin for almost fifty years, that the United Nations has been left facing one of its most intractable, political dilemmas. However, it is for reasons of their own history that the rehabilitation of Germany and Japan is as much a national as an international problem.

If we thought we had seen the end of history, what is happening in the world today with a revival of many of the features of the old order, appears to represent a decided turn around. In fact, Francis Fukuyama was wrong: the great ideological struggles of history have not been defeated by idealism. One region where history has emphatically never ended is the topical area of Eastern Europe. For countless years, eastern nations have nurtured grievances at having become victims of Empires and oppression, and of having forfeited their birthright and lost their land by theft. The current Balkan conflict is a vendetta aimed against history. That it does appear to those in the West as so irrational, even distant, has resulted in the conflict increasingly being surrounded by an international ‘curtain of indifference’. A region characterized by convoluted logic and thinking, where the feeding hand is not spared being bitten is not one where multilateral military intervention has much prospect of success. It is important that we learn from our history that justification for coalition military operations does not go far enough. In addition, allies who embark upon military operations require a clear understanding of how to measure success and, of equal importance, of what constitutes failure.

Coalition or alliance warfare is not a new phenomenon but has been a recurring feature of past conflicts through the centuries. A coalition differs from an alliance principally in degree: the latter tends to be more formal and enduring. Coalitions are often an ad hoc response to an unforeseen crisis. Both are relatively short-term agreements which will come under pressure from internal conflict and decay once the danger wanes. Sovereign states enter into alliances and coalitions in order to pursue national objectives unachievable outside the framework of the alliance. Coalitions in particular are easy to start and much more difficult to sustain. It was Winston Churchill who commented upon the difficulties of fighting wars with allies but added that wars were more difficult to fight without them.

History reveals that few coalitions survive the disappearance of the threat they were formed to combat. That is why NATO is experiencing such difficulty in finding a meaningful and precise role for the future. After 1945 there was an assumption in some places that the sinking of ideological differences that had been so essential if Germany and Japan were to be defeated would be perpetuated in the peace.

Warfare in the eighteenth century was not subject to speculation but was meticulously planned during the close season of the winter months. Rarely did more than one quarter of the Duke of Marlborough’s army originate from the United Kingdom. In those days it was traditional to form a coalition with troops drawn from the states of Europe for a campaigning season which fitted conveniently between the spring and autumn. Successful generals had a flair for diplomacy and politics. Indeed, Marlborough was a past master in the manipulation of the kings and princes of Europe as well as controlling and commanding his representative foreign generals. It was no easy task, requiring exhaustive diplomacy. Marlborough’s wars, for example, were the subject of 131 separate treaties. State representatives took (and continue to take) the view that as far as the right to command the coalition is concerned, the majority shareholder votes the majority of the stock. Certainly, the British were outnumbered by the Dutch and it was from this quarter within the Alliance that the English general’s principal difficulty arose. In this case, however, the quality of generalship overrode the consideration of relative quantities of participants. Generals of Marlborough’s calibre only appear once or twice in a century. Planners must studiously avoid the recommendation and adoption of structures which only a Marlborough can make work.

In the close season Marlborough worked with the political committees in London to ensure that he would want for nothing when the improving weather presaged the resumption of hostilities. As ever, good quality intelligence was a primary consideration. In this age it was most common to oil the wheels of diplomacy with the presentation of substantial gifts and blandishments to national leaders. Marlborough was an exception. He was naturally cautious with his money. Only in one area did he permit himself the unrestricted outlay of capital and that was in the field of intelligence. Marlborough employed as his spymaster James Craggs, an individual about whom little is really known. However, British intelligence had carried off a remarkable coup in obtaining the services of a spy within Louis XIV’s inner circle – Le Conseil d’en Haute – a close grouping of no more than a dozen of France’s most influential courtiers and diplomats. This was the great age of alliances and coups, where espionage was an accepted tool with which to destabilize states both internally and externally.

The existence of that Versailles mole is a passing reminder to us of the vital importance of so-called human intelligence, and that inadequacies here will undermine the effectiveness of military operations. In view of the current emphasis placed upon technical intelligence, it is an excusable digression to add that in the case of the 1963 Cuban Missile Crisis, the detection of the launch sites from the available imagery would have proved difficult had not the intelligence agencies had the benefit of the hand drawings supplied by Oleg Penkovsky.

*    *    *

What is often viewed as a great British victory over the French at Waterloo in 1815 was achieved by the Duke of Wellington with only thirty-eight per cent of his force originating from the British Isles. It had been a typical European alliance although the Iron Duke did not experience Marlborough’s command and control problems so acutely. With the military victory behind them, the successful allies determined to secure Europe’s future and frustrate the feared revolutionary tendencies through political means. The solution was to produce an international organization, something which, with the exception of the war years, 1914–1919, has remained in being since 20 November, 1815. From out of the Congress of Vienna there emerged a European states system, a controlling oligarchy accompanied by the essential alliance machinery. The bonding agents between states were reasonable equality, propinquity, the absence of an external threat and the presence of a common background.

The Quadruple Alliance, or, after France’s admission in 1818, the Quintuple Alliance, and known as the Great Powers, maintained a form of control over world affairs for almost a century. There were problems, not least Czar Alexander I’s desire to maintain a condition of autocracy through the means of the Holy Alliance. Modern historians see in the Holy Alliance rather more than was seen by Castlereagh, who described it as ‘a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense’. There were also wars. Russia’s sparring with Turkey led to the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. There were also a number of short wars in Europe which tended to contribute to equilibrium rather than to further disorder.

The forces which had eventually gathered to blow the Great Powers off course were those of liberalism and nationalism. German nationalism, one of those crucial forces, took the form it did largely by chance. Bismarck’s primary aim was to prevent the expansion of German nationalism in a state. He did not want a unified Germany. He was first and foremost a Prussian nationalist rather than a German one. The North German Confederation created in 1867 was intended to be a buffer between France and Prussia, yet it served to intimidate France into declaring war against Prussia. Having easily defeated France, Bismarck reluctantly absorbed the three states of the North German Confederation and thus established a German Empire of which he became Chancellor. The juggernaut thereby created and set on a path towards war was an accidental creature of circumstances. What German unification had achieved was Bismarck’s confessed ‘nightmare of war on two fronts’. Germany now had common borders with two potentially hostile states, France and Russia. From 1871, her aggressive foreign policy was devoted to overcoming these unwelcome facts of geography.

The belated formation of the German Empire had important industrial significance. At a time when British industry was failing through lack of innovation and direction, the new Germany embarked upon her own industrial revolution with an emphasis on high technology. But Germany was not alone. Emergent technology had strengthened the power of great states. Externally, radio telegraphy served to break down the hegemony of Europe, whilst nationally it served to link and co-ordinate activities in the dispersed regions of the United States and Russia. Often in tandem with the telegraph was the significance of the coming of the railway and the promise of realizing economic potential. In 1914 the output of manufactured goods in America was greater than that of Britain and Germany combined.

The truth is that Britain never did become a technical industrial society. Her industrial muscle in the late nineteenth century evolved around coal and steel – industries which did not require skilled labour. When her pre-eminent position came under threat, she did not face up to the challenges but dodged them, either by seeking out untapped markets further afield or by developing so-called ‘invisibles’, that is to say shipping, banking, stocks and shares and insurance. She allowed herself to be lulled into a false sense of security while those states with greater resources closed the gap. The period of so-called ‘splendid isolation’ is more appropriately described as ‘dangerous isolation’. Germany’s growth within Europe had altered the power base within a Europe whose hegemony was now contested by both the US and Japan.

By 1914 the states of Europe, lacking the strength to act independently, had shaken out unwillingly into a series of alliances. On one side were the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy against France and Russia. Britain chose to enter into an alliance with Japan. The rationale for this lay outside Europe and was due to Britain’s concern for the future of China and the Russian threat to Manchuria. With Japan as her ally, Britain could face Russia with greater confidence and thus a defensive alliance was formed in January, 1902.

The prime reason why groups of states were facing up to each other as a prelude to a devastating war was because nationalism had been allowed to run out of control. The British Foreign Office took the news of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination by a Serb in Sarajevo in their stride. There was recognition that Serbia would face some localized difficulty, but that was not an unusual occurrence. Germany encouraged Austria to take action against Serbia, which in turn prompted a precautionary move in Russia, whereupon Germany declared war upon both France and Russia. The great turning movement of the Schlieffen Plan violated Belgian independence to which Britain was commited, and Britain and the Dominions were thereby drawn into the cauldron of Europe. Meanwhile, the United States’s relations with Europe remained firmly based on non-involvement in Great Power politics. However, in effect she became a passive belligerent.

The suddenness with which Europe had been thrown into war required an urgent assessment of the established alliances. Circumstances had contrived to bring together in a new alliance the traditional enemies, Britain and France. Both states had fought one another six times between 1707 and 1815. Both had last fought together in the Crimean War where, it is said implausibly, General Raglan, commander of the British forces, referred to his French allies as ‘the enemy’. The reason for the Entente Cordiale was derived from France’s fear of an expansionist Germany. Britain was an obvious counterbalance but, for the past twenty years, France and Britain had squabbled over colonial possessions in North East Africa. What happened in 1904 was an agreement to resolve the African difficulties