Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War

Introduction

Few, if any, campaigns have been attended by so much controversy as the Zulu War of 1879. Books without number have been produced purporting to set out true and accurate accounts of the operations; but no description of the campaign could be either complete or entirely reliable unless founded on the documentary evidence contained in the private, demi-official and official papers preserved by Lord Chelmsford, who commanded the British Forces throughout the war.

These highly important and immensely interesting documents, which in the year 1906 were carefully classified and authoritatively annotated by General Gossett, one of Lord Chelmsford’s Staff in Zululand, have only now become available for biographical purposes.

After completing his voluntary labours, which in view of the enormous number of documents involved must have been arduous in the extreme, General Gossett wrote to the present Dowager Lady Chelmsford² as follows:

"7 June, 1906.

Dear Lady Chelmsford,

I am sending off the two boxes with the papers to-morrow and also the keys.

I enclose a statement of the manner in which I have arranged the papers and I hope it will be satisfactory to yourself and Fred.³ I am writing to him by this mail enclosing a copy of the statement and I would suggest that your copy should be put in one of the boxes when read. I have read every letter and telegram, and annotated most of them. In some cases I have given additional information from my own knowledge and journals. I need not say that it has been a pleasure though a painful one, to read the records of that time, but the perusal of them has still further raised Lord Chelmsford in my estimation. His foresight, his consideration for everyone under his command, and his zeal for the public service, and the brave front he opposed to calumny and misrepresentation all show what a great and good man he was. I hope some day, when the principal actors in those days are gone, that justice will be done to his memory.

Yours very sincerely,

Matt Gossett."

That justice may at last be done to Lord Chelmsford’s memory is the purpose of this work.

His conduct of the campaign became a subject for bitter controversy, following the British reverse at Isandhlwana; since when a great deal of criticism and even abuse have been directed against him from time to time.

Little more than a year ago the attacks previously made upon him were maliciously repeated in a book for which complete accuracy was claimed, but which in reality had been founded for the most part on the worthless tittle-tattle of prejudiced correspondents.

Not until now, however, has the opportunity arisen to collate for publication the facts embodied in this unrivalled material, with the aid of which the true story has been set down as concisely as possible, having regard to the immense mass of documentary evidence revealed by Lord Chelmsford’s papers.

The following quotations seem especially appropriate to a work of this nature, striking as they do at the very root of criticism of military commanders after the event:

Where war is concerned few men in command would stand acquitted, if any after knowledge of facts and circumstances were brought in argument against decisions of the moment and apparent exigencies of the occasion.

(Political and Military Episodes)

The book [presumably that from which the above quotation is taken] contains many facts of much interest and many good reasonings mixed with others that are prejudicial and erroneous, arising from that mistake so common among authors who give accounts of military campaigns, of grounding accusations against a general for gross errors in his manoeuvres, upon circumstances which though thoroughly known to the writer subsequently, the general at the time was necessarily in ignorance of, and without allowance for the numerous matters of detail that frequently prevented him imperatively from doing what he could wish.

(Field-Marshal Burgoyne)

Service in South Africa, including the Zulu campaign of 1906, may perhaps be advanced by the author as some qualification for embarking upon this complex though none the less pleasurable task.

2  General Lord Chelmsford’s daughter-in-law, formerly the Hon. Frances Guest, eldest daughter of the first Lord Wimborne.

3  Third Baron (afterwards Viscount) Chelmsford, then Governor of Queensland.

Chapter One

Previous Service

Frederic Augustus Thesiger,¹ eldest son of the first Baron Chelmsford, was born on May 31st, 1827.

His father, after serving as a midshipman in the Navy, abandoned the sea and entered upon a legal career, being called to the Bar in 1818. Eminent service in the successive offices of Solicitor-General and Attorney-General earned for him the highest judicial honour when, in 1858, he was appointed Lord High Chancellor and raised to the peerage as Baron Chelmsford of Chelmsford, Essex.

He married in 1822 Anna Maria Tinling (mother of the General), a niece of Major Peirson, the gallant defender of Jersey.

On finishing his education, Frederic Thesiger, whose mind was set upon a military career, hoped to obtain a commission in the Grenadiers, for which regiment his name had been entered. Difficulties as regards a vacancy, however, stood in his way, for on July 22nd, 1843, the Duke of Wellington, writing to the then Lord Chancellor,² said:

"My dear Lord Chancellor,

I have received your note of the 18th with its enclosure from Mr. Thesiger.

His son’s name was placed on my list of candidates for the Grenr. Guards some time ago and I will not lose sight of his Father’s wishes; but there have been very few vacancies lately and there are still more names I am sorry to say before his. Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

Wellington."

On this account he was first gazetted to the Rifle Brigade, with seniority from December 31st, 1844. Less than a year later, however, he was able to purchase an exchange into the First or Grenadier Regiment of Foot Guards, with the rank of Ensign and Lieutenant.

He was promoted Lieutenant and Captain in 1850, Major in 1855, Captain and Lieutenant-Colonel in 1857, Lieutenant-Colonel in the 95th Regiment in 1858, and Colonel by brevet in the ordinary course of promotion in 1863. In 1868, he was honoured by being made an Aide-de-Camp to Queen Victoria, was given the temporary rank of Brigadier-General in 1877, promoted Major-General the same year, and in 1878, on being appointed to command the British troops in South Africa, received the local rank of Lieutenant-General.

From February to November 1845, he served with the Rifle Brigade in Halifax, Nova Scotia, returning to England on being gazetted to the Grenadiers. After some years of regimental duty at home, he was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Viceroy of Ireland, Lord Eglington, in February 1852, and later served in a similar capacity on the Staff of General Sir Edward Blakeney, commanding the troops in Ireland.

In May 1855, he proceeded to the Crimea, serving first with the 3rd Grenadiers, then as Aide-de-Camp to Lieutenant-General Markham, commanding the 2nd Division, and finally as D.A.Q.M.G. on the Headquarters Staff.

For his distinguished services in that arduous campaign Captain Thesiger was mentioned in despatches, received a Brevet Majority, and was awarded the Crimean medal, with clasp for Sebastopol, the Turkish and Sardinian medals, and the Order of the Medjidie (5th class).

Two letters written by him in the Crimea to his brother-in-law, Sir John Inglis,³ then commanding a brigade in India, are of exceptional interest, especially that containing a vivid description of the storming of the Redan at Sebastopol:

"Headquarters 2nd Division,

August 5th 1855.

My dear Jack,

As I know you will be glad to hear how General Mark-ham is going on, I take advantage of a very wet day which precludes our going out till late, to write you a letter. I shall not think of apologising for not writing oftener as being such a bad correspondent yourself, you will have a fellow feeling for me. The General when he first landed here, was very ill indeed, as he was suffering from a severe attack of rheumatic fever, which he brought with him from ‘Peshawar,’ as the doctor at that place though he cured him for the time, could not be able in four days, which was all the time he had, to remove it from his system altogether. However he is now much better and will I am sure before long be stronger than he has been for years, as this is really a very fine climate and must be a Paradise compared to India. I lead the jolliest life possible, as I am vain enough to believe that I and the General hit it off very well, and you who are one of his oldest friends, know under those circumstances what a charming companion he is. King of the R.H.A. is my brother A.D.C., he is brother to the poor fellow who died out here, and is very nice, and agreeable, and More of the 43rd is the extra one. I only met him one night at dinner as he went off next morning to buy his kit at Constantinople and has not yet returned. We have a very fair plot of ground as a Compound but as it was utterly neglected by those who lived in it before, it will take some time before we get it as we wish, but when this is done, I think it will give the go-byes to most of the others. We manage to live very well indeed and are very lucky in having found a very fair cook, who is not above being taught. Our Division, 2nd, is a very good one, but I wish it were a little stronger as I fancy we could not at the outside take into the field more than 5000 men, most of the Brigadiers however in our own, as well as in the other divisions, are sad muffs, and ought to be comfortably pensioned off, giving up their places to younger, and more active officers (such as yourself for instance) who would really move about, and see what their brigade is about. We cannot have everything all at once and must be contented with having got a fair number of divisional chiefs who are not yet past work. Nothing transpires as to what is going to be done, and I have some suspicions that the chiefs of the allied armies do not see their way very clearly. The French have sapped up quite close to the ‘Malakoff’ but do not quite fancy another assault, and without the ‘Malakoff’ we cannot progress. The Sardinians are losing half their army from sickness and the Turks are doing nothing at all. Our men are wonderfully healthy considering how often the duty in the trenches comes round every 3rd night but we have great numbers of casualties daily, owing to the large numbers of working parties employed, and that tells upon our numbers very much. A week ago we had three days of the hardest rain I ever saw, and at the end of the third day there was so strong a stream running down the two roads, which lead to our right attack, that in one of them an officer and two men were taken off their legs and carried 20 yards before they could recover themselves, and in both the water was above the men’s knees. The water in the trenches was in some places above their waists. One comfort is that the trenches soon dry and 12 hours’ fine weather makes them passable again.

I enjoy myself very much and in health was never better in my life, I only trust it may continue. The General goes out for a two hours’ ride in the morning, and then we do ample justice to a very good breakfast, cheese and port wine at 2, ride again at 3, and dinner at ½ past 7. Not so bad for campaigners, is it? Markham tells me that he thinks Col. Brooke has no intention of taking any leave so I hope that you will be able to get home this year, depend upon it there is a good deal to be picked up now-a-days if one is only on the spot to apply for it and as long as Lord Hardinge is C. in Chief, my father will almost be able to get anything he applies for. I look forward to the time when D.V. we shall have a great family meeting entirely, and shall be able to tell such tremendous stories one against the other. Tell Julia that I got her letters forwarded to me, and that there is therefore no necessity for her writing direct to me, as I know she must have plenty to do already in keeping up her present correspondence. I hope my photograph arrived safely, as it was a very satisfactory one, and a good likeness. I am now bearded like a pard and have all the appearance of a bronzed veteran. Markham sends his love to you, and kind regards to Julia.

Believe me ever,

Yours affectionately,

Fred Thesiger."

"Sebastopol, September 20th.

My dear Jack,

I have delayed much longer than I intended in giving you a description of the last and final affair with John Bonsky, but I have been so occupied since it took place in accompanying the General to inspections, that I have really only had time 1 to send my usual letters to the family abroad. On the afternoon of the 7th we were told that the French were to attack the ‘Malakoff’ the next day and that in the event of a succès we were to try our luck again at taking the ‘Redan.’ The 2nd and light Divisions were accordingly told off for that agreeable duty on the morning of the 8th. We were all in our places k in the trenches by 11 o’clock, Sir W. Codrington who commanded the whole, and my General who was second in command being placed in Egerton’s pit which was immediately in front of the ‘Redan’ and with a good view of all the ground in front. Sir William, however, took it into his head to go down to the most advanced parallel with only one A.D.G. and there he remained during the whole fight nobody knowing what on earth had become of him, this I think was mistake No. 1. Markham was of course tied by the leg and could not leave his post besides being left in a very awkward position E owing to the absence of the Head as he could give no direct orders for fear that Sir William might be doing something different. About 12 o’clock we heard a sharp firing on our right and very shortly after we saw the French in swarms inside the ‘Malakoff,’ having evidently met with no opposition at the first as the Russians could not remain in the front part of the work owing to the tremendous shelling it underwent for about 3 hours before the attack. The French had no sooner succeeded thus far than the signal succéès assuré was given in the shape of a tricolour flag from the ‘Mamdon’ although at the time there were two divisions of Russians drawn up in the rear of the ‘Malakoff,’ this I call rather sharp practice, of course at the signal our covering and ladder party rushed out of our trenches and went across the open in beautiful style, closely followed by the supports of the Light Division led by Brigt. Unett of the 19th who was mortally wounded. They got their ladders up capitally and went up them like men, but as ill luck would have it on the crest of the parapet a line of gabions from which the earth on our side had been knocked away by the round shot offered a tempting cover to the leading men, who immediately took advantage of it, the rest got behind them and fired over their heads and through this means the first batch of stormers became comparatively useless. Directly after the Light Division came our supports and when they got near the top instead of filling the empty space to the right which their leader Brigt. Wyndham wanted them to do, and from which they could have charged the enemy, they like corks in a basin joined the batch on the left and were therefore rendered useless. Now was the time when two formed regiments would have been invaluable, but they were not to be got, the reserves were all mixed up in the different approaches and parallels, and there was no place big enough for a company to form, this was the fault of the engineers who ought to have made a place D’Armes directly they knew the ‘Redan’ was to be assaulted, or otherwise have sapped up, as the French did to the ‘Malakoff’ within 10 yards of it. Neither was done however, and our men had to run 280 yards before they got to the ditch. Our reserves never went out at all but remained much against their officer’s will to be ignominiously knocked over by grape in the trenches. The men already on the ‘Redan,’ having a very small front, and a very large rear, made but little impression on the Russians, lost 40 men for their one, and finding no fresh troops arriving, and their ammunition getting low, and not having the dash in them to kick down the gabions and charge the Russians, had but one thing to do, namely to retire, which they did much to our disgust and came back helter-skelter into the trenches whilst the Russians lined the parapet of the ‘Redan’ and blazed at them, but did not offer to advance further, even then it was not U.P. and had the Highland Division who were in the rear been sent at it, they would I am sure have done the business as they were older soldiers and had not had much trench work to demoralise them. The Authorities, however, thought otherwise and seemed content with the beating. The French all this time had been fighting very hard and had complete possession of the ‘Malakoff’ although they had plenty of work to hold it, they were also fighting very hard at the little ‘Redan’ which is down near Canning (?) Bay and there they lost a great number of men, and failed to take it in the end. At the same time that we attacked the ‘Redan’ the French also made an attack on the extreme left which failed also, so that the only part which succeeded was the ‘Malakoff’ which was really the only part we wanted as it commands the whole, and was in reality the key of the place. Pelissier (?) however was in such a fright of failing that he insisted on our attacking the ‘Redan’ in order to take the enemy’s attention from the main attack so we were sacrificed to save the French. In the middle of the night I was woke up by a great talking outside my marquee, and I found that the Russians had set fire to the place in several parts, and were evacuating the town as quickly as possible. I went up to Cathcarts Hill, about ½ past 3 a.m., and certainly the sight was very fine and at the same time very satisfactory. Whilst I was there a great explosion took place and during the night upwards of 14 took place showing that they were in real earnest as regarded their evacuation. The same morning after breakfast I rode down with the General to the ‘Redan’ and from there to the ‘Malakoff.’ In the latter the Russians had made a most determined resistance, as the heaps of dead of both nations too truly showed. It was immensely strong and every means had been taken to destroy the effect of our shells, by building traverses and bombproof caverns. They were all however of no effect and the Russians were fairly driven from their guns by the shower of shells which fell upon them. Our loss was 156 (?) officers and 2,400 men killed, and wounded, the French loss I do not know, but it was something very large. The French and English have divided the town by which we get what is called the Karabelnain (?) district which includes all the Dock Yard and the French have got Sebastopol proper, which as far as I can see contains nothing but burnt and roofless houses. There is a mixed Commission who go about arranging the division of the plunder, and settling any other matters relative to the town which may come before them. There was some talk a few days ago about a forward movement by the way of ‘Baidar,’ but I do not think it likely as the weather is already very unsettled and should the rain begin in earnest it would be impossible to move a yard. Several think that the Russians will evacuate the north side before the winter, if so it will make us very comfortable here. The men are in capital health and spirits, but want a good deal of steady drill as more than half are complete boys. The General is not as strong as I could wish to see him, and says that if he does not get right very soon, he will apply for two months’ leave to go to England, which will be the best thing he can do as in the winter he will not be wanted here, and in the Spring he will want good health and strength in order to be able to take the Field. Give my best love to Julia.

Believe me,

Affect, yours,

Fred Thesiger."

After two years in England, Colonel Thesiger’s keen anxiety to get out to India for service against the mutineers was rewarded by his appointment to the Second Lieutenant-Colonelency of the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment, which was then taking its share of the heavy fighting in Central India.

Arriving at the seat of war in June 1858, he served with the 95th to the conclusion of hostilities, and although taking part in no general engagement; received a mention in despatches and was awarded the Mutiny medal.

There followed a long period of Indian service, extending to the year 1874.

From November 1861 to January 1863, he was D.A.G., British Troops, Bombay Presidency, and after a term of five years in command of the 95th Regiment, towards the end of which he married Adria Fanny, eldest daughter of Major-General Heath, Bombay Army, was selected by Sir Robert Napier⁴ as D.A.G. on the Staff of the Abyssinian Expeditionary Force (1868).

Colonel Thesiger’s conspicuous services throughout the campaign, including the capture of Magdala, were fully recognised by Sir Robert Napier who, when mentioning him in his despatches, alluded in glowing terms to his great ability and untiring energy.

In addition to receiving the Abyssinian medal, he was awarded a C.B.

A brief period at home was followed by his selection, early in 1869, for the highly important position of Adjutant-General on the Headquarter Staff in India, in which capacity he was employed until March 1874, when he returned to England and shortly afterwards assumed command of the troops at Shorncliffe.

In January 1877, he moved to Aldershot and took over an infantry brigade with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, whilst two months later he was promoted Major-General with ante-date to November 10th, 1868.

In January 1878, he was given the local rank of Lieutenant-General on being appointed to succeed General Sir Arthur Cunynghame in command of the British troops in South Africa.

At the time of his appointment, Cape Colony was in the grip of a native rebellion, which had been in progress nearly four months and was causing considerable trouble, anxiety, and expense to the authorities. He must, therefore, have welcomed the advice and information given to him by so experienced a soldier as General Sir John Michel, who had been engaged in suppressing a Kaffir rising as early as 1851.

In a letter dated January 28th (1878) he wrote from Ireland, where he was commanding the forces:

"My dear Thesiger,

I only heard yesterday evening that you were going to the Cape.

I have written a little memo for you, which you may burn if you like.

I am going out to-day so I cannot say a word to you more about your prospects or other matters. But will give you another line to-morrow, as I may think of two or three things that may be useful to you.

Yours,

J. Michel.

I wish you joy. The best climate in the world.

Do not hamper yourself with staff, they are useless, as Colonels of Regts. do all the work, with an efficient D. Assistant, or Brigade Major.

Old fellows, not worth their salt, or pipe clays, or fighters for fighting sake."

Again, a day or two later, he wrote:

"My dear Thesiger,

Our letters yesterday crossed on the road.

In my memo. I spoke nothing of strategy. The fact is the word is unknown in Caffre⁵ warfare.

I am not aware at this moment how the tribes and Fingoes are respectively located. But I believe the Fingoes are principally across the Kei. But if you have to aid these Fingoes across the Kei, your force must be as strong in horsemen as you can well spare with a couple of guns for a standing camp.

No plan or operation of yours can in any way circumvent the Caffre. He is your master in everything. He goes where he likes, he does what he likes, he moves 3 miles whilst you move one, he carries no commissariat or only a day’s supply. You possess only the ground you stand on. All you have got to do is to take cattle, annoy him by burning his kraals, and eventually destroy his crops.

You will scarcely believe that I who always commanded about half the Army, who was everywhere and saw everything, who nearly always commanded the whole patrol I was out with, never saw 30 Caffres together in my life. I believe that we lost more men than they did, and nothing could exceed the care I took of my men. I say this to show you how difficult the warfare is. You will see there Mr. Brownlee (the Caffre Agent), an honourable man. He will tell you generally how we acted. I am of opinion that you cannot too carefully instil into comdg. Officers and they their juniors, that in no case are they to move without their flanks fairly covered, unless where danger is not to be feared. At the same time, no flanking party can march with a column: a flanking party means a small body taking possession of a small wooded eminence 30 or 40 yards to the flank, where neighbouring eminences or flat woods can be seen. Great judgment and great care must be taken by a good officer [in choosing these spots.

The removal also of these flanking parties must be carefully carried out. Speed is not a matter of much importance.

If the Gealekas and Gaikas are what they were when I knew them, and are really all in arms against you, they will give you a long tedious campaign. The want of efficient Mounted Infantry will be a sad thorn in your side. The more you can have the better, but one efficient Hottentot of the old stamp would be worth half a dozen white faces.

You must work this side the Kei with regular Infantry and Fingoes, with also as many Cavalry as you can spare, when trans Kei is provided for.

The country is glorious, the weather nearly always charming, tents never used, except for a time – across the Kei, say for half your regular Infantry.

You cannot be too stingy of your tents, if they are ever used.

At the Colonial side of the Kei tents should never be used, except such as officers can carry on their own pack pony. The patrol tent is excellent, only suited to one, about 3 to 4 feet high, weighing about 4 or 5 lbs. Officers should all carry revolvers, not swords.

I recommend you not to try night surprises. Ask Brownlee about my last, he was with me. It was most dangerous, and I ought to have suffered for it.

If you pursue my tactics, and have no butcher’s bill, you will probably lose kudos and perhaps credit. But you will know that you are right.

The 74 and their gallant commander who was killed, was always worsted by foolish soldiering, gained great kudos for a butcher’s bill, when hardly a man ought to have been killed.

Yours, my dear Thesiger, is a command of great danger to your reputation. The two best Generals, Sir P. Maitland and Sir H. Smith, were dismissed, that is superseded, both most unjustly.

I shall earnestly trust you may have better fortune, and I shall not forget to put in my voice if I find events placed to your discredit.

The weather when you land will be glorious, the extreme heat having subsided. I shall write to Hume for a distribution of the Caffres, so that I may trace your steps, and perhaps may write you a line when I have got it. If the Fingoes have possession of the Amatolas⁶ and the Waterkloof you will be in a much safer position than I imagine. One of your holsters ought always to have chocolate – and something to put on the fire and drink out of. The Caffres will supply you with cows. I mean this when you choose to go yourself on a patrol in the mountains.

If you use a patrol tent ever, mind and put a waterproof under you, and have your site chopped with a little hatchet first to lie down on. This will not take five minutes, and your bed becomes eiderdown. On the waterproof, 2 blankets and some cover. In winter I always had some skin, tiger, bear or old horse, this with a very soft one foot pillow, rolled up every day – in 3 minutes, was a heavenly bed. I hated my hut afterwards.

Now, good-bye, God speed you. I have spoken of lots of . trifles, but the world is made of trifles.

I should never take for my men spirits, coffee and tea far better. As for cooking, your men will take some time before they can cook à la Caffreland. Probably home cooking has demoralised them. As however every man shortly becomes independent perhaps they will last out 2 or 3 months ‘babyhood.’ … Be careful to carry a revolver yourself. I never had a sword in the War of 51.

Yours,

J. Michel."

The mention of danger to General Thesiger’s reputation and the unjust supersession of two commanders in an earlier Kaffir war is of special interest having regard to subsequent events.

In his memorandum, prepared for General Thesiger’s guidance, Sir John Michel wrote:

"1. At present disregard all information from Caffreland, in respect of what they term successes and destruction of Caffres. For 100 slain read 5 or 6.

2. In the country to the West of the Kei, Caffres are never seen, except in parties of 5 to 20 men, and those only momentarily in the bush. To the East of the Kei, the country is more open, but the Caffre is not to be got at with Infantry, and except when protecting his cattle, seldom with Cavalry.

3. At present there are no mounted men of much value at the Cape. The Englishman and the Dutchman are of little worth; I mean the Mounted Police except in the open.

The Hottentot Cape Corps were most excellent and very injudiciously in my estimation were disbanded after the war 1851–2.

The Burghers are in no way to be depended on.

British Cavalry utterly valueless.

However no warfare can be successfully carried on without a strong body of efficient Mounted Infantry, so it is imperatively necessary that every exertion should be made immediately to form a demi-disciplined body of mounted men if possible of the exact type of the old Hottentot Cape Corps.

I am afraid Hottentots now could not be procured, at the same time I believe it would be a wise measure again, if possible, forming such a Corps.

At the present moment, even some of the old Hottentots might be serviceable as mounted guides, etc. etc.

Any Corps now formed should consist of small, active, intelligent men fighting as well in the bush as on horseback. If possible acquainted with the fastnesses and country West of the Kei.

They should be armed at first with carbines for short range, and when good horsemen with revolvers. These latter are absolutely necessary to close fighting in the bush.

Swords to be utterly abolished as never used and a weapon which would entirely take away from the power of moving in the bush which is a daily necessity.

4. A Caffre war means raids of a few Caffres capturing cattle, and on the other hand patrols of a thousand strong, a mixed force of British and Fingoes, acting for a similar purpose.

In order to reach these cattle, they must be pursued for miles and cut off from the bush by mounted men.

But as the cattle have a good start, and travel almost as fast as mounted men, and as the whereabouts of the British force is always known, so the cattle are generally near some wooded ravines into which they are immediately driven, and cannot be followed except by Infantry who are miles in the rear.

The Hottentot Mounted Infantry were the only mounted troops who could venture in pursuit a short way into these fastnesses.

The Fingoes are not fond of pursuing the Caffres into their wooded fastnesses.

The Caffres never fight except for their cattle, or should the officer commanding on a march commit some grave imprudence.

5. There are only two modes of action for concluding a Caffre war. One, large captures of cattle, which as before said, cannot be made without a most efficient body of Mounted Infantry. Secondly, cutting their crops when nearly ripe. The last, the most certain of success and the easiest West of the Kei, but it cannot be carried out until December or January.

This cannot be done East of the Kei, as the crops are too extensive, and cattle lifting easier.

6. Each war of 46 and 51 lasted above a year.

The first finished as both sides were tired.

The second, the crops being cut, the Caffres were virtually compelled to make peace. When the crops are cut by the Caffres, the grain is stored and hidden in ravines and other unapproachable places, and can seldom be found except by the Fingoes who are rather chary of looking for them.

7. Staff officers of rank, without Caffre experience, are not valuable, active, young, intelligent D.A.G.’s more useful.

The Commissariat officers should be well versed in Caffre proceedings.

In the war of 46–47, 7 Staff officers were sent out of rank: 5 of the 7 were useless burthens.

8. In the last war, West of Kei, used artillery but once or twice and then found burthensome and utterly useless.

East of the Kei 2 or 3 guns might possibly be used to aid in protection of small standing camps in plains, when garrisoned with only a few men. These guns, however, should be of light calibre, to be used for case, etc., etc.

9. Wagonage built in England could hardly be used, and would probably be put into store, except two or three for hospital purposes.

10. As respect fighting in the bush, the modus operandi is soon understood. At present, I would presume to say, if it is proposed tormenting the Caffres by destroying their huts, this can only be done with safety with judicious skirmishing thro’ the bush, and never appearing within shot in the open.

11. The Caffres will retire before you, but when the huts are destroyed you must then retire.

Your rear and perhaps your flanks will be attacked. In Caffre warfare, when attacked in the rear, I deem it very injudicious ever to have a permanent rear guard. Before retiring in the bushy country, I always consider it advisable to have 3 or 4 companies according to the ground at intervals of from 200 to 400 yards on the proposed line of retreat. One company then takes up the rear guard in skirmishing order, passes through the other, and so each consecutively. The soldier of the rear guard then holds the ground longer if desirable, and knows that if wounded he will not fall into the hands of the enemy: he has perfect confidence that he is safe after a retirement of 2 or 300 yards.

In a short time the Caffres give up the pursuit as hopeless.

This may appear very trumpery, but as all your fighting is by companies, as retirements take place very frequently, so it is a very essential element in Caffre warfare. Whenever a bush has no long back of wood, in fact whenever a Caffre has no safe retreat he will not be found.

No man should carry anything except a haversack containing biscuit, a towel, and if on long patrol a pair of boots, and again a great coat or blanket. Of course a water bottle and his mess tin.

Each officer should have immediately a patrole jacket, made after the pattern of the Officers of the 6th Regt. in 46, which was the original pattern of the patrole jackets of the British Army. It is probably yet in existence at the Cape.

If you have a long war, all the men’s clothing will be destroyed in 3 months, and they had better clothe themselves in patrole jackets also.

The cattle captured, when sold and the money distributed to the men will pay for this, as also for the great expenditure of boots.

Caffre warfare is very fatiguing and pipe-clay Colonels are apt to worry their men with inutilities, not recollecting that skirmishing is everlasting and no other manoeuvre used.

All bivouacks at night should be half way up eminences, away from bush. The top and bottoms are too cold.

The sentries should always be near enough to the top to look at the sky line, so that the Caffres cannot fire at your bivouack.

As respects wars generally in Caffreland, they will never cease until the Caffre keeps sheep, and uses wagons. The sheep property renders him powerless.

J. Michel, Genl."

Soon after receiving this valuable advice, General Thesiger with his Staff sailed for South Africa in the mail steamer America.

Typical of his thoroughness was the way in which during the voyage he carefully investigated the composition of the various drafts sent out with him, and lost no time in voicing opinion on them by means of the following strongly worded letter to the Adjutant-General:⁷

"On board mail steamer America en route to

Cape of Good Hope.

Feb. 15th, 1878.

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you will bring to the notice of H.R.H. the F.M.C. in Chief⁸ the very large proportion of untrained soldiers in the draft, which has been embarked on board the above named vessel.

Out of a total number of 88 in the detacht, of the Buffs, 45 are under 4 months’ service, 62 have not been through recruits’ musketry course and 77 have not been dismissed recruits’ drill.

Out of 102 of the 88th Regt. 5 are under 4 months’ service, 35 have not been through recruits’ musketry course, and 39 have not been dismissed recruits’ drill.

Thus in a detachment of 190 men, 116 are absolutely untrained for all practical purposes of active service and, in the event of their Battalions being in the Field, would be likely to prove a source of embarrassment instead of