The American Expeditionary Forces in the Great War: Meuse Argonne 1918: Breaking the Line

Introduction

After the Germans had spent so many of their resources on the Spring Offensives, which started on 21 March 1918 and ended with the Second Battle of the Marne on 6 August 1918, they fully realised that the initiative would now be with the Allied side.

Marshal Foch, the allied Supremo, in 1918. (Author’s collection)

The Allied front lines between 26 September, the start of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, and 11 November.

A combined French, British, Belgian and American offensive, under the overall direction of a French general, Marshal Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929), the Allied supremo, appointed to the newly created position during the dangerous days of March 1918, started on 26 September 1918. It was an all-out and coordinated effort on the Western Front to force the German Army out of France and Belgium and to bring the war to a conclusion, ideally before the end of 1918. The offensive followed on successful major attacks, first by the French and then by the various Armies of the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) in July and throughout much of August. For the renewed offensive, the American Expeditionary Forces were assigned the southern part of the line, stretching from the Argonne Forest in the west to the River Meuse in the east, a section of front some thirty-five kilometres in length and which became known as the Meuse-Argonne sector. In passing, it should be mentioned that several AEF divisions took part in offensives elsewhere along the Western Front at this time, but under British or French command.

This attack was to be the biggest in which the AEF had engaged; a few weeks earlier it had fought a successful battle in the St Mihiel Salient, further to the east; now it was given a greater challenge.

General John J. ‘Black Jack’ Pershing, the C-in-C (Commander in Chief) of the AEF, the American Expeditionary Forces, was pleased to be given this significant task. The primary objective was the strategic line of communication railway system that ran from Metz to Sedan and on northwestwards. A significant rupture of the German lines in the Meuse-Argonne would have jeopardized the entire German defensive front. As such, the defending troops were exhorted from all levels of command to hold out and contest every foot of ground. The Germans were in absolute terror of having that railway line cut. To the rear, to the north east and east was an area that included rich coal and iron deposits, as well as a major railway line, all of which were of great importance to the German war effort. Due to the effective British naval blockade of Germany, it had become vital to the Germans that they have continued access to these deposits as they provided some seventy-five per cent of the raw materials needed for their steel production. This second objective area was due to be attacked by the US Second Army, with the aid of the First Army, on 14 November; but by which time the war had come to an end.

German railhead near Sedan, March 1918. (Author’s collection)

Another, medium term, target of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive was the city of Sedan, a name that still provoked bitter memories of the humiliation imposed by the Germans on the French during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Sedan was the city where Napoleon III surrendered to the King of Prussia, the soon to be Emperor of Germany, Wilhelm I. The next time Germany invaded France, at the beginning of August 1914, Wilhelm’s grandson and namesake, Wilhelm II, had been on the German throne for just over twenty six years.

Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany. (Author’s collection)

In 1918 Sedan was crucial to the Germans; it was a major rail centre and as such would play an important part in their plans should they be forced to retreat to the River Rhine. The only other line of retreat lay over the Ardennes, terrain not easily passable in winter. If the Americans could take Sedan, the German Army would be trapped. Eventually, Sedan was taken by the French on 11 November 1918, on the day that the war ended with the Armistice.

Setting the Scene: The Meuse-Argonne 1914-1917 1914

On 2 August 1914, the Germans invaded France and Luxembourg and declared war on Russia. Two days later, the German army crossed the Belgian border. This attack on Belgium was immediately followed by the British declaration of war on Germany. The Germans needed to strike at the heart of France to end the problem of fighting a war on two fronts. They calculated that once Paris was in German hands the French would surrender, after which the German Army could turn its attention to Russia. After a series of unanticipated setbacks in Belgium, within weeks the Germans had made adequate progress in France and threatened Paris. Between 25 August and 5 September the French Army had been pushed back on a wide front from the Franco-German border, back as far the city of Verdun. However, this ‘great retreat’ ended when the French managed to stem the tide and outflank the Germans armies threatening Paris, which had made significant errors in their axis of advance. As a consequence of what proved to be the most significant fighting of the opening stages of the war, the Battle of the Marne (5 to 12 September), the Germans were forced to retreat to about sixty-five to ninety kilometres north of the capital. The opportunity of forcing France out of the war by a massive early strike was gone.

German 15cm howitzer during the Battle of the Marne. (Author’s collection)

Soon after the Marne the war of movement came to an end at the Aisne; the belligerent armies started to dig in. In the Meuse-Argonne region, the French Army had managed to hold on to the defence lines around Verdun. The Battle of St. Mihiel, from 12 to 15 September, was a further German attempt to capture Verdun by an outflanking advance. Some twenty-five kilometres south of Verdun, the Germans reached St. Mihiel but failed to encircle the French Army north of the town. During the course of the war the front changed little in this area. For four years, St. Mihiel formed a salient in the French lines, serving to block transport lines (notably rail) between Nancy and Verdun. Almost four years later, the pinching out of the St. Mihiel Salient in September 1918 was the first independent battle of the AEF.

The Germans were pushed back along both flanks of the Argonne Forest due to the pressure being exerted by the French Army, but around 15 September the retreat came to a standstill on a line running from Montfaucon via Varennes to Vienne-le-Château. Heavy fighting in the Argonne Forest started as both armies attempted to occupy the high ground. The armies adapted to the new conditions very quickly. This war was not only fought in primitive trenches running across the wooded hills and through valleys and ravines, but also underground. Both sides dug under enemy strongholds in order to place explosive charges and as a result sections of trench lines were blown sky high. Just four months after the outbreak of war, this was the kind of warfare into which it had developed. Soon the idea of a war of movement with a quick and decisive victory was proved a delusion and the misguided hope of being home by Christmas was in tatters.

1915

The war on the Meuse-Argonne front had developed into stalemate. The German lines were under continuous attack by the French, who were only holding rudimentary lines themselves. They believed stationary warfare was just a phase that would change into a war of movement again after a brilliantly executed breakthrough. Meanwhile, the Germans were constantly improving their lines and positions by launching small scale attacks. Both armies quickly adapted to the fighting in the forest. On both sides, a huge amount of energy was spent in tunnelling and mine warfare. The potential of the underground war became an important offensive weapon in the area and was widely in use until the first half of 1916. Today, it is possible in many places to follow the front line of 1915 by tracking the line of huge craters that still run through the forest. The most poignant example of underground warfare is without doubt the Butte de Vauquois, Vauquois Hill, a pronounced hill in the foothills east of the Argonne Forest. It was abandoned by the French in September 1914 and subsequently taken over by the Germans, who found in it an ideal observation post. Realising their mistake, the French launched attack after attack on the hill until, finally, in March 1915, they managed to retake the southern slope; the Germans remained, however, still firmly in control of the northern slope. Both sides started to build offensive tunnels and each tried to blow the other off their positions on the hill. This situation lasted throughout the war until Vauquois Hill, or what was left of it, was liberated by the U.S. 35th Division in September 1918. For three and a half years the Germans and French had fired over 500 mines on this one hill; seventeen kilometres of tunnel were built at three different levels that were not only used for waging this strange form of warfare but also provided underground medical facilities, shelters, workshops and kitchens.

French troops in front of the entrance to an underground shelter in 1915. (Tom Gudmestad)

Mine warfare to the extreme: the sad remnants, if any, of Vauquois in 1918. (Author’s collection)

It was impossible for both parties to fight non-stop along the entire length of the Western Front, there were simply not enough soldiers. In comparison, the occupied area from the River Meuse to the Argonne Forest – with the exception of some fierce fighting initiated by the Germans in the spring of 1915, that succeeded in further complicating French transport links to Verdun – was a relatively quiet area. There was occasional shelling, but the Germans were mainly an occupying force and busy with the construction of all kinds of infrastructure, notably railways and narrow gauge tracks. In many villages electricity and running water had already been installed.

However, during 1915, armies were expanded, factories were built for the production of the enormous quantities of ammunition that would be needed on a daily basis, whilst efficient logistics system for mail, food, clothes, wood, corrugated iron, horses, weapons and ammunition were created. In spite of considerable shortages of ordnance, particularly of suitable guns to overcome increasingly sophisticated defensive systems, massive offensives were launched during 1915. Amongst the many battles fought that year were those at Neuve Chapelle, Second Ypres, offensives in the Champagne and Artois and Loos; and, away from the Western Front, on the Eastern Front, at Gallipoli and the Isonzo. Generally, gains were small and hundreds of thousands of lives were lost.

1916

Two of the most horrific battles of the Great War were fought on the Western Front in 1916, two battles which soon achieved iconic status, the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme. Both battles took a terrible toll in human life and suffering; the total number of casualties at Verdun and the Somme is almost mind-boggling - 1,700,000.

Despite having the support of a nine-hour barrage, with 1,200 guns of all calibres, the Germans could not achieve a decisive breakthrough in Verdun on the right bank of the River Meuse. So, on 6 March they tried a renewed offensive, this time with the main thrust of the attack on the left bank of the river. Now all of the Meuse-Argonne region was involved in the heavy fighting. Both sides started to intensify the shelling of enemy occupied small villages and their installations in and behind the front line. Villages like Nantillois, Montfaucon, Haucourt, Malancourt, Béthincourt and Forges were utterly destroyed. Due to the ever-worsening conditions, the terrain became marshy and boggy, making it very hard for the troops even to get to the front, much worse once they had arrived. As a consequence, many villages that had served as billets for the troops were evacuated, the original inhabitants having been removed months before. Both sides built hutted camps in the forests, where they were safe from prying eyes. Sometimes these camps became very substantial and could house over 5,000 soldiers; even in small camps there were services like blacksmiths, tailors, armourers to repair weapons, a post office, delousing facilities, bakeries and cafés. Both sides quickly adapted to the new situation.

December 1916: thirty-five kilometres from Verdun, the main street in Nantillois. (Author’s collection)

Meanwhile, in the Argonne Forest the underground and trench war continued through to the middle of 1916. On 1 July, the situation on both the Verdun and Argonne fronts changed dramatically. The British and French launched a massive attack on the German positions in the Somme area. Originally, the offensive had been scheduled for a later start, but at the insistence of the French the British agreed to begin the attack earlier than they wished, in large part to relieve the pressure on the French Army in the Verdun area. On the Eastern Front, the Battle of Lutsk, 4-6 June, marked the beginning of the Russian Brusilov Offensive, which was initially very successful. Within days, the Germans were in urgent need of fresh divisions, guns and ammunition to relieve and support their troops on the Somme and in Russia and, just as the French had hoped, these divisions were in large measure taken away from the Verdun front. Whilst attempts to maintain the offensive at Verdun continued for a few weeks, the French then took the initiative there; by the time the battle came to an official halt in December, and after ten months of fierce fighting, the French largely succeeded in pushing the Germans back to their starting positions. The shelling and fighting associated with the battle substantially destroyed a large part of the Meuse-Argonne area; this would cause very significant logistical problems for the Americans in 1918.

French troops passing through the ruins of Verdun, 1916. (Author’s collection)

1917

When the Battle of Verdun ended in December 1916, the Germans found themselves more or less back on the same line from which they had started ten months earlier. Only parts of Mort Homme and Cote 304 (Hill 304) were still in German hands, but even these were recaptured by the French Army in August and September 1917. By the autumn of 1916 the German High Command realized that the country could no longer sustain costly campaigns fighting on two fronts. The war had changed from a war of annihilation – ie utterly destroying the enemy’s ability to fight by knockout blows – into a war of attrition, an industrialized war, or war of materiel, that had become an insatiable monster, a seemingly bottomless pit into which all resources disappeared.

Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of Staff until August 1916. (Author’s collection)

Field Marshal von Hindenburg and Quartermaster General Ludendorff; they replaced Falkehayn in late August 1916. (Author’s collection)

When the Battle of the Somme ended on 18 November 1916, the Germans had been pushed back several kilometres but at a tremendous cost to the allies. German failure at Verdun and an inability to deal adequately with the allied attacks on the Somme led to the dismissal of Falkenhayn (the straw that broke the camel’s back was the Roumanian declaration of war in August 1916) and his replacement in late August by the duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. They summoned a conference of senior commanders to Cambrai, to the east of the Somme, on 5 September, where the decision was taken to build a new defensive line well behind the Somme front and which would link into the extensive system of defence lines to the north and south. This new defensive system would shorten the front line so that fewer soldiers would be needed to hold it. The new commanders also took the very controversial decision to lay waste the ground that was being given up; villages, farms, roads (by cratering them), railway lines, water supplies (by poisoning wells through the simple expedient of dumping dead animals in them), felling trees and so it went on – all that might be useful to the advancing allies was systematically destroyed. At least two of the Army commanders, Gallwitz and Prince Rupprecht, seriously considered resigning over this scorched earth policy. However, it had to be admitted that from a military point of view such extreme measures made sense – the British would be forced to create an extensive infrastructure almost from scratch before a force sufficient to undertake an attack against the new line could be sustained.

This new line, called by the British the Hindenburg Line, was to be built from Arras to St. Quentin, with another new line between Verdun and Pont-à-Mousson. In fact the use of the word line is misleading, as the Hindenburg Line was in fact a complex defensive system with a number of lines. These lines were intended to limit any Allied breakthrough and to allow the German Army to withdraw on another part of the system should there be any substantial breakthrough of the front line.

At the end of September 1916 work started on the Hindenburg Line. Withdrawing to the new line was not an easy decision and the German High Command struggled over it during the winter of 1916–1917. So many lives had been sacrificed to hold on to certain parts of the conquered territory and now they were going to give it away to the enemy. However, during the months of February and March 1917 the Germans retreated to the new line. One of the biggest problems for the German Army was that they had simply run out of sufficient soldiers to man the front in the manner that had been the case in the first years of the war and before both sides had vastly increased their artillery capability. In the event of a large scale Allied attack in the spring of 1917 on the Somme they knew they could not hold the line as it ended up at the end of the battle, in November 1916. Although the new lines were far from perfect yet, they were much shorter and improvements in their capability were constantly being made.

The Hindenburg Line in the Somme area. Note the broad belts of barbed wire on the left. (Author’s collection)

Keeping in mind the hard lessons learnt on the Somme, the Germans thought it practical to implement the same approach in the Meuse-Argonne. Therefore, plans were made to build four different defence lines, along with several intermediate positions. The defence system was about fifteen kilometres in depth and over time was a formidable layer of anti-tank ditches, trenches, bunkers, shelters, deep belts of barbed wire and machine gun, artillery and trench mortar positions. Of course, the Germans did not know this at the time but they had almost two years to build and improve the lines. Indeed, it was here at this point in the seemingly impregnable Hindenburg Line that the poorly prepared Americans fought their bloodiest battle, when laboriously and ever so slowly they liberated the Meuse-Argonne. After the initial surprise of the American attack, some 65,000 Germans managed to stop an estimated 300,000 men of the AEF and then kept the Americans fully engaged over the next six weeks.

1918: The Meuse-Argonne Offensive - The Americans take over

After fighting and training alongside both the French and British Armies for many months, the St. Mihiel Offensive was the first real baptism of fire for the AEF. Although supported by 110,000 French troops, St. Mihiel was to be the first time that the AEF, under the command of General Pershing, would fight in their own sector as an independent American Army. The attack started on 12 September 1918, and by 16 September the St. Mihiel Salient had been successfully pinched out and the Germans had suffered substantial casualties. It should be noted, however, that the Germans were already evacuating the salient to shorten their lines; it gave the Americans, and most notably their commanders, a false sense of superiority.

St. Mihiel, a considerable morale boost, was a relatively simple operation in comparison to the assignment that the Americans were then given by the Supreme Allied Commander, Marshal Foch. In terms of the scale of the operation, the number of men, terrain to be covered and supplies needed, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive was a gigantic operation for an army that just eighteen months earlier had only consisted of 200,000 soldiers and by now had expanded to over 4,000,000 men. By the end of the war, some 1,100,000 U.S. soldiers had been actively involved in the fighting in Europe, with 1,000,000 men in reserve in France and another 2,600,000 men back home in the U.S. training in military camps and waiting for action.

Wounded German prisoners being treated by American soldiers after the Battle of St. Mihiel. (Signal Corps)

First phase: The initial attack, 26 September-3 October 1918.

On the morning of 26 September, nine U.S. divisions, 193,000 men, attacked the Germans along a line that was thirty-five kilometres in length. The first two lines of defence were lightly held by the Germans, who were by now following the well established principles of an elastic defence. As a result, the Americans made rapid progress; but after a few kilometres, it seemed that with every hundred metres gained German resistance was stiffening. At nightfall on 28 September, the Corps objectives had been realized, but over the next five days only slight progress was made. The slowing down of the advance, which eventually led to a halt in the fighting in front of the German main position, the Hindenburg Line, was due to four factors.

First, the increasing resistance put up by the Germans had slowed down the advance to such a point that the Americans could advance no further. Secondly, the congestion of the roads and poor planning proved to be a major obstacle in trying to resupply the fighting men. It was almost impossible to bring supplies and guns to the front, but, more seriously, the provision of medical care and the evacuation of the wounded was severely impeded. Thirdly, the inexperience and lack of sufficient and relevant training of the Americans, at all levels and in all arms, made itself evident and resulted in the inability of most American divisions to exploit their success, due to lack of experience and training. Fourthly, artillery played a vital role in the German defensive strategy. They were the masters of the battlefield and managed to destroy many American attacks before they even had a chance to materialize.