D-Day Assault: The Second World War Assault Training Exercises at Slapton Sands

To Bea my partner and Aimee my daughter.

Thank you both for being there.

First published in Great Britain in 2014 by

Pen & Sword Military

an imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street

Barnsley

South Yorkshire

S70 2AS

Copyright © Mark Khan 2014

ISBN 978 1 78159 384 4

eISBN 978 1 47383 729 4

The right of Mark Khan to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

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Contents

Introduction

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1 A History of Amphibious Operations

Chapter 2 1938: An Exercise in Invasion

Chapter 3 The South Hams: An Area Overview

Chapter 4 1940–1942: Invasion Beach for Real and the War in the Air

Chapter 5 Selection of Training Areas

Chapter 6 Compensation – The British Way

Chapter 7 Compensation – The Americans to the Rescue

Chapter 8 Evacuation

Chapter 9 Training for D-Day: Preparing and Planning

Chapter 10 The Exercises

Chapter 11 In Their Own Words: First-hand Accounts from Those who Took Part

Chapter 12 Exercise Tiger – Controversy and Conspiracy

Chapter 13 Handing Back

Chapter 14 Slapton Sands Today 150

Appendix A: Letters Sent to Those Evacuated with Regard to Claiming Compensation

Appendix B: The Compensation Scheme

Appendix C: Posters Displayed Throughout the Area Announcing the News of the Evacuation

Appendix D: The Evacuation Notice Sent to All Those in the Area

Appendix E: List of Major Exercises

Glossary

Notes

Introduction

As a very small boy I used to be taken to Slapton Sands and on one occasion I remember playing on the beach and glanced down to find something lying on top of the shingle. The ‘ something’ I had found was a spent .30 calibre cartridge case. Pleased with my find and curious as to what it was, I took it home. It was my introduction to collecting and to military history, particularly the military history of Slapton Sands. As a schoolboy in the 1970s living in the village of Blackawton, at the weekend I used to walk to the beach at Slapton Sands, a distance of roughly five miles each way. I would scour the beach area for more spent cartridge cases and built up a collection of these and other Second World War related items as well. Often I would be joined by a good friend from school and my big brother.

Over the years my curiosity grew and I began to look for information about how the various items I had found came to be there. Information at the time was hard to come by, even though the Second World War had occurred only thirty years previously.

Local people were often not keen to talk about a period of time that many of them would rather forget. Additionally, the peaceful South Hams, like much of the country in the late 1930s and early 1940s was a very different world than it is today. People were less worldly-wise and lived in many ways a simpler lifestyle. For many the changes that occurred during the war years seemed to be almost too much for them to cope with. Subsequently this seemed to lead to an unwillingness to speak about them.

In time I grew up and left the area, although I returned many times to visit, and eventually to live there again. Meanwhile I read and researched about the area during the Second World War, and became aware of the part it had played and of the many American soldiers who had been based in South Devon and trained at Slapton Sands.

A desire grew to ‘ do something’ with the knowledge that I was acquiring. After many years, the opportunity finally came to do this. Working as a full-time military historian, the idea for this book was formed, to fill the gap in the recording of the true events that took place at Slapton Sands and their significance in relation to the outcome of the Second World War.

My original intention had been to focus on purely the military exercises. Much had already been written about the civilian evacuation of the South Hams, so I had not planned to cover this in any detail. However, once I started properly to research the subject, I became aware that the evacuation was an integral part of the story and needed to be included. It dawned on me how much fortitude had been shown by the evacuees and the important part that they played in unlocking the door of Hitler’s fortress Europe. Further research uncovered stories of Government disdain and Treasury penny pinching towards those who had so willingly and uncomplainingly given up their homes and in many case suffered significant personal and financial loss. There were also those decent and fair-minded individuals who made the straightforward case that the people who had been evacuated must be treated fairly and properly looked after, and the story of how the Americans came to the rescue also came to light.

Slapton Sands is often mentioned in relation to the exercises that took place during January and May 1944. Unfortunately, this often focuses on the events of the night of 28 April 1944 when two landing craft where sunk and one badly damaged in Lyme Bay whilst en-route to take part in Exercise Tiger, resulting in a tragic loss of life. The story of the loss of the landing craft has become synonymous with Slapton Sands, and in the process the real story of the evacuation and the exercises and training that took place in the South Hams has become lost. The contribution that both the people and the area made to the success of the Normandy landings is often unrecognised, overshadowed by conspiracy theory, conjecture, plain misunderstanding or sometimes a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts. This book is an attempt to redress this and to tell the story of the area and its people and also to fully recognise the contribution they made to the success of D-Day and the subsequent victory against Nazi Germany.

The story of D-Day is well known and is not detailed in this book, having been covered in great detail elsewhere. To the men taking part, it had been a long journey. Mostly citizen soldiers, they fought together alongside their friends and comrades, providing mutual support to each other. Many were injured and many killed in the battles to liberate Nazi occupied Europe. Some of the story of D-Day may be better understood once this book is read; how it was shaped by the events that took place during the training, experimenting and the many assault landing exercises that took place at Slapton Sands and its hinterland. D-Day itself was an enormous task. It was not only a brilliant triumph on the day and the days that followed it, but also in its planning and preparation beforehand. The assault training was a major component of this.

Visiting the South Hams area today it is difficult to imagine the events that took place in 1944. It is a beautiful area with much to see and do. Its people are friendly, courteous and helpful. If reading this book informs, educates and entertains I will have done my job as an author. I would aspire to go one step further by encouraging people to visit the area and enjoy meeting the local people. The countryside is wonderful and there are many attractions to visit. If whilst visiting and after reading this book they also take a moment to think about the events of 1944 in their true context, free from controversy and conspiracy then I have truly succeeded in what I set out to do.

Acknowledgements

No author is capable of producing a book without significant help from others. This has been said many times; it is now my turn to do so!

My first thanks must go to my wonderful partner Bea, who has supported me so well, putting up with the view of my back for hours on end while I have been connected by a seemingly invisible umbilical cord to my computer. Thanks also for taking my monosyllabic responses so well without appearing to get offended.

My good friend and colleague Martin Mace, has also been a fantastic source of support, advice and inspiration. Without it, this book would not have happened. John Grehan has also provided sterling service by acting as a sounding post and helping provide good advice. I must also thank Matt Jones at Pen and Sword for his patience in having to deal with me, and performing politely and professionally at all times. Thanks also to my editor, Barnaby Blacker, grandson of one of my all time heroes Lieutenant-Colonel Latham Valentine Stewart Blacker OBE.

My last thanks must go to my mother Ursula Khan. Not only was she responsible for ensuring that I arrived on this planet, but if it had not been for her decision to move the two of us to South Devon in 1968, I would never have had the reason to write this book. A writer herself, she died just before this book was completed.

Chapter One

A History of Amphibious Operations

Examples of Military operations involving landing from the sea can be traced back to ancient times.

In 490 BC the Persians invaded Greece. Successfully landing by sea, the numerically superior Persians were defeated at the battle of Marathon – a bad result for the invading Persians.

Many years later, the Norman invasion of England would ultimately result in victory for the invading army of Duke William II of Normandy over the English army led by King Harold II – a better result this time for the invaders.

In the twentieth century, first amphibious operations occurred during the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 when a Japanese landing took place at Inchon in Korea, where forty-six years later another more famous amphibious landing would take place during the Korean War.

The First World War would feature the first major amphibious operation of the twentieth century at Gallipoli. By the time of the First World War the technology of warfare had reached an advanced state. The days when an invader simply had to run off a boat on to the shore had long gone. Modern artillery enabled targets to be accurately engaged, bolt-action rifles enabled high volumes of accurate rifle fire to be directed on the enemy, and the development of the machine gun could make life very difficult for an attacker. Advances in gunnery technology had made coastal guns a formidable opponent. Often looked on as a bit of a white elephant, coastal gunnery was a highly technical trade, many elements of which were eventually taken up by the gunners on land. The great Gunner and writer on artillery matters, Ian V. Hogg, visited the Coast Artillery School at the Citadel in Plymouth during the early 1950s as part of the Long Gunnery Staff Course he was attending. On the first day during the opening address, the instructor observed that the going rate in ammunition fired, for anti-aircraft artillery to hit a target, was approximately 1000 rounds per aircraft, field artillery invariably fired a few ranging rounds before getting on target; but coastal artillery hit the target with the first shot fired. Disinclined to believe this, Hogg describes how ‘the next day we were taken to Renney Battery and watched a 6-inch gun blow a fast moving target out of the water with the first shot¹’.

Today, the recognised requirements for a modern amphibious operation are:

Sound, unambiguous political and strategic direction.

Well-practiced joint staff procedures and careful selection of officers for key appointments.

Well-trained and equipped land forces.

Adequate weaponry and munitions.

Thorough attention to logistics.

Reliable intelligence based on the availability of good maps and charts and on thorough reconnaissance.

Accurate assessment of enemy capabilities based on the foregoing intelligence.

Appreciation of geographical and hydrographical factors affecting the projection of power over what may be extended distances².

At a higher level, the basis for military strategy is based on two concepts: manoeuvre and attrition. Manoeuvre is based on the ability to shatter your enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight by striking with shock and surprise and disrupting his will and ability to fight by hitting at the weakest point when he least expects it. Attrition is based on the idea of the reduction of an enemy force by causing loss of personnel and equipment.

Amphibious operations fit the manoeuvrist approach to warfare. They can also be broken down into two types of operation:

Invasion – the intent to seize, hold, exploit, then advance into enemy territory.

Raid – a short-term operation with a distinct aim resulting in a planned withdrawal.

Amphibious operations during World War Two can be split into two distinct theatres of operation, The European, Middle East and African theatre; and the Central Pacific Theatre. The operations carried out in these theatres varied dramatically and adopted distinct styles. Broadly speaking many were frontal assaults on heavily defended enemy territory. Some however were carried out deliberately avoiding frontal assaults. The specific manner in which all were carried out varied considerably and were dependent on the many factors affecting each one separately. There was no ‘one size fits all’ solution. In some cases, the desire for shock and surprise was defined by the manoeuvrist approach, was initially met during the initial landings, but turned into a campaign of attrition. To understand the context of Operation Overlord – the Normandy Landings – it helps to understand the history of amphibious operations up to that time. To that end I have detailed a brief history of amphibious warfare in the twentieth century up to May 1944. The concept of an amphibious invasion, whilst incredibly complex to plan and achieve basically comes down to two easily expressed problems:

To get ashore, and to stay ashore.

Amphibious Operations in the First World War

The major amphibious operation commonly identified with the First World War is the campaign at Gallipoli. Launched due to the need for indirect action against the Central Powers and the Ottoman Empire and to aid a struggling Russia, the operations at Gallipoli have become synonymous with failure. The reasons cited for the failure of this operation were: a lack of a main aim or end point, appalling unsanitary conditions ashore, lack of security compromising the operation from the start, lack of concentration of force, poor inter-service integration, logistic unsustainability, lack of training, poor intelligence, and lack of control of the sea³.

Recognising that this operation was not going to succeed, a highly successful withdrawal was achieved

On the night of 8–9 January 1916, 17,000 British soldiers were evacuated. In just over a week 35,000 soldiers, 3,689 horses and mules, 127 guns, 328 vehicles, and 1,600 tons of stores had been taken off. The failure of this campaign led to serious repercussions for its major proponents and for those in command.

Another lesser-known operation, Operation Albion, the invasion of the ösel and Moon Islands, was carried out by the Germans in September 1917. Located in the northeast Baltic in what is now Estonia, these islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga. Fortified by the Russians, they prevented German naval forces attacking the strong Russian naval forces that operated from the Gulf. This amphibious operation was part of the German strategic offensive during 1917 to knock out a faltering Russia. A clear directive issued: ‘To secure control of the Gulf of Riga and to guard the flank of the Ostheer, the islands of ösel and Moon are to be taken through a coordinated attack by land and sea forces and the passage of enemy naval forces through Moon sound is to be blocked⁴’. On 12 October 1917 after a preliminary bombardment, the German assault force landed at Tagga Bay on the northwest of ösel, and simultaneously near Pamerort a little further to the east.

The operation was a complete success. The Islands were captured in what was described by Brigadier General James Edward Edmonds CB CMG, responsible for the post-war compilation of the twenty-eight volume History of the Great War, as ‘a model enterprise of its kind⁵’. Despite never having carried out an amphibious operation before, the Germans managed successfully to land a large force ashore in the face of opposition and quickly achieve their objectives. This operation proved that a successful amphibious operation could be carried out.

Another amphibious operation, Operation Zo, better known as the Zeebrugge Raid (and a raid rather than a longer-term landing), took place in April 1918. Early in 1917 the Germans had launched unrestricted submarine warfare, which produced extremely successful results with 800,000 tons of shipping being sunk by just 75 U-boats in April 1917. The convoy system was introduced in April 1917 to counter the U-boat threat. The Germans switched their U-boat attacks from deeper waters to shorter sea passages to Ireland or inshore coastal passages, particularly the English Channel where shipping was vulnerable whether sailing in or out of convoy. The majority of U-boats making attacks in British waters sailed from the port of Bruges, which was eight miles inland and connected to the coast by a series of canals, eventually emerging into the sea at Zeebrugge. Operation Zo was planned to block the Bruges canal and also to cause as much damage as possible to the port facilities at Ostend. The old cruiser HMS Vindictive, in company with other ships, was used as an assault vessel, and block ships were planned to be sunk to block the canal entrance. The attack took place late on 22 April. The attack was a failure as the block ships were not positioned to fully block the canal. The British experience of amphibious assault however, was added to.

In the years after the First World War, the main focus of the development of amphibious warfare switched to the Pacific. Increasing expansionist imperialism drove the development of amphibious warfare in Japan, engendering a counter-focus by the Americans, with their long Pacific west coast and other interests in the Philippines and Pacific bases.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the first major amphibious operation was the German invasion of Norway. Operation Weserübung took place in the early hours of 9 April 1940. Taken by surprise, the British and Norwegians failed to successfully counter the attack. Despite the despatch of a joint British, Polish and French force to Norway, the campaign ended in success for the German invaders. The success of the German operations can be attributed to: unified planning and command, command of the air, having the necessary specialist troops and equipment to carry out the operation, the speed of decisions made during the operations, and the speed of the execution of the operation. It has been recognised that there was a significant risk to carrying out the operation, but good intelligence and a good logistic plan had helped mitigate these risks.

The next planned major amphibious operation was another German enterprise. Operation Sea Lion – the invasion of Mainland British Isles. This of course never took place. The failure of the Luftwaffe to obtain command of the air, the might of the British Navy, and the destruction of German amphibious capability by Bomber Command during the ‘Battle of The Barges’,⁶ ensured that this operation was defeated before it even started.

During 1941 and 1942 a number of raiding operations were carried out, notably to the Lofoten Islands (Operation Claymore), Spitsbergen (Operations Gauntlet & Anklet) and Vaagso (Operation Archery). Amphibious operations were now under the banner of Combined Operations. Initially they were commanded by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes from 17 July 1940 to 27 October 1941, and then by Lord Louis