Responsible Belief: Limitations, Liabilities, and Melioration

Responsible Belief

Limitations, Liabilities, and Melioration

Robert M. Frazier

Responsible Belief

Limitations, Liabilities, and Melioration

Copyright © 2015 Robert M. Frazier. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in critical publications or reviews, no part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without prior written permission from the publisher. Write: Permissions, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 199 W. 8th Ave., Suite 3, Eugene, OR 97401.

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Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Frazier, Robert M.

Responsible belief : limitations, liabilities, and melioration / Robert M. Frazier

xii + 196 p. ; 23 cm. Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 13: 978-1-4982-2500-7

EISBN 13: 978-1-4982-2501-4

1. Knowledge, Theory of. 2. Belief and doubt. 3. Critical thinking. 4. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 5. Philo of Alexandria—Criticism and interpretation. I. Title.

BD215 F71 2015

Manufactured in the U.S.A. 11/23/2015

Scripture quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version Bible, copyright © 1989 National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

Table of Contents

Title Page

Preface

Chapter 1: The Waywardness of Belief

Chapter 2: These are the Generations

Chapter 3: Psychological Insights on the Formation, Modification, and Holding of Beliefs

Chapter 4: Gnothi Seauton and Quaestro Mihi Factus Sum

Chapter 5: Toward a Responsibilist Model of Believing

Chapter 6: Cosmic Beauty and the Ethics of Inquiry

Conclusion

Bibliography

In memory of our mothers, Mrs. Sarah Fiorillo and Mrs. Clara Frazier

Preface

This book on responsible belief was a long time coming. By that I mean that the ideas behind it and my interests in the question of belief, its formation and revision, and the problems associated with it began back in college in the seventies. In a class on epistemology, I read Dr. Elton Trueblood for the first time and pondered how he understood belief. Soon after I read Dr. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s short treatise, first edition, entitled Reason within the Bounds of Religion. That small book got me hooked on the problems of belief, the degrees of belief, and the control that some exercise over others. I must say that Nick’s book was the catalyst behind my thinking and interests; although familiar with Locke’s discussion of the degrees of belief, Wolterstorff’s treatise made such sense to me because it carried the discussion beyond the mere strength by which one holds a belief into the deeper terrain of how beliefs relate to each other.

In my first graduate seminar at the University of Buffalo, I took a class entitled Belief Systems and in it read Milton Rokeach, whose influence on this book is clear. Rokeach, along with Quine in Web of Belief, contended for a structural framework for belief that made great sense to me in light of Wolterstorff’s triad of belief. This was followed by work in the ethics of belief and the significant movement identified as naturalized epistemology, which brought me into contact with a number of other scholars like Hillary Kornblith who seemed to be doing serious work on belief formation. Studying Charles Saunders Peirce’s article called the Fixation of Belief provided the in-depth analysis of the tenacity of belief that made sense of my other musings and in many ways, with Wolterstorff, became the inspiration behind what I wanted to write about then and in this book. Reading Plato and Aristotle on belief and virtue only deepened my interests in this area. And so I wrote a dissertation applying the insights of these and others to a more practical area called critical thinking or informal logic that was an important topic in the philosophy of education at the time.

Although I benefitted from the work I encountered in the scholars listed above, I was still not satisfied with the account. Wolterstorff’s perspective still had much in it that intrigued me, and his formal move into the epistemological perspective known as Reformed Epistemology provided much more by way of a fuller account. Given my theological orientation and my commitment to an Augustinian account of the life of the mind, I realized that some more robust explanation was required for the limitations and liabilities I had come to see in my engagement with belief formation and revision. Augustine’s position on the noetic effects of sin supplied an explanation that was respectful of the materials I had previously encountered, but gave so much more in figuring out this thorny issue. Augustine’s perspective gave a reason for the intellectual humility I learned about by reading Plato’s Socratic dialogues.

I learned firsthand the lesson of intellectual humility from Professor Grady Spires at Gordon College when, in a class on historicism, I raised a question about the application of merkabah (chariot) mysticism to our topic. The question really had nothing to do with historicism, but like many sophomoric college students, I wanted to impress Grady with the little bit of insight I had acquired. Grady did the difficult; he asked me to tell him about merkabah mysticism. He was humble enough and, longing to learn, he placed himself in the position of learning from me. He showed me the virtue that all scholars need: intellectual humility.

My interest in virtue, intellectual virtue primarily as it bears on the interest in belief formation and revision, began in the first ethics class I had in college with Dr. Malcolm Reid, mentor and friend. Malcolm guided the class through the Nichomachean Ethics, another area that lives with me in that I offer a course on Aristotle at my college. In graduate school, my work in naturalized epistemology afforded me the chance to look at Aristotle on intellectual virtue before the flurry of books were written on it. I give an account inspired by Aristotle and Ernest Sosa in the pages that follow.

As I worked on this book, the things I learned, taught, and thought about for so many years just did not seem to be complete to me. The account of belief formation and revision coupled with the explanatory power of the notion of the noetic effects of sin and the alternative model of intellectual virtue I offered required something more. I pondered in light of the problems and limitation, and structural confusions I advanced, why anyone would go about revising beliefs. The importance of wonder I had learned from the works of Rabbi Joshua Heschel in my classes with Dr. Marvin Wilson came alive to me again as I gave lectures on wonder at my college in an academic convocation and in my classes in Plato, Aristotle, and the humanities. I discovered middle-Platonism around the same time and this has become a primary area of scholarship and writing for me and a source of interest in beauty. And the study of middle-Platonism has given me the opportunity to marry my interest in classical philosophy with Jewish writers of the middle-Platonist period like Philo of Alexandria and Aristobulus. And so the final turn in this book took shape as I engaged Philo on wonder and beauty.

My concern for beauty was cultivated, one might say, in a class I teach at Geneva College. This class is an invitation to the humanities, and teaching in it with my colleagues is and has been one of the most enriching experiences of my academic career. Through the presence, friendship, and lectures of my colleagues, Dr. Shirley Kilpatrick and Dr. Eric Miller, I have learned what beauty and excellent pedagogy are and how encountering wonder and beauty fosters the kind of disequilibrium needed to see beliefs modified and new beliefs emerge. Our other colleagues in the class coupled with the outstanding TAs we have been blessed to have create for us the loving, learning community of mutual esteem and marvel every semester. Judith Dinsmore, who has assisted me in the mechanics of this treatise and to whom I am deeply grateful, was one of those really bright students who came alongside of us in the journey of humanities. My friend Judith and her fellow TAs have demonstrated time and again the contours of the life we cherish as humanities professors.

There are so many people I wish to thank who have been so instrumental in my own development. Dr. Byron Bitar, who was my colleague in philosophy at Geneva prior to his death in 2003, was a dear friend and conversation partner. My colleague at Geneva in philosophy, Dr. Esther Meek, reminds me of the enthusiasm for learning that must accompany the academic life, and she has been a wonderful support for me in this endeavor and others. For those who have taught with us in humanities, I am deeply indebted and to the others who are my colleagues on the faculty of Geneva that have served as examples. My students in philosophy have been a great blessing to me through the years and have sat through my attempts at clarifying the issues in this book. I have received scholarship grants from the college for many years now and appreciate Geneva’s generosity in providing these. I am thankful for the sabbatical the college gave me in the fall of 2014 that allowed me to bring this book to completion. My son Timothy spent countless hours reformatting work from my dissertation and I am grateful to him for this loving expression and the conversations about philosophical issues we enjoy. My son-in-law Brent Weatherly has bailed me out far too many times on the computer issues that have plagued me and so I thank him. Robin Parry, Ian Creeger, Matthew Wimer, and Brian Palmer from Pickwick Publications have been so kind and encouraging in bringing this book to publication.

I had the good fortune to meet a beautiful young woman forty-two years ago, my wife Marina, and her love and grace have sustained me through the years of schooling, child bearing, and child rearing and for her I am truly grateful. Marina has lived through the years supporting me without qualification as I struggled with these problems and as I served in pastoral ministry and in the professoriate. I have four wonderful children, Megan, Abby, Tim, and Daniel, who walked this journey with me and encouraged me along the way. My four precious grandchildren, Chase, Cadence, Emma, and Sophia cause me to continue to wonder and marvel at their brightness and beauty as they reflect the excellence of the God who gives life. These children, my own and my grandchildren, are the joys of my life.

This book is dedicated to the greater glory of God for God’s grace. It was that grace that placed my feet on the path of becoming a learner as I sought to understand God’s Wisdom/Word, God’s eternally begotten Son Jesus Christ. In the last fourteen months, Marina and I both lost our mothers as they passed from this life. I wish to dedicate this book to our moms, Mrs. Sarah Fiorillo and Mrs. Clara Frazier. Ma Fiorillo welcomed me into her family as a young twenty-year-old and always cherished me as more than a son-in-law, but as a son. She and I were very close, and Ma never failed to encourage and support me in the midst of the cares of life. It is hard to capture in words the love, joy, and encouragement my mom, Clara, was to me through the years. We sang musicals together before my baseball games to calm me before I played and she provided the unwavering support I needed through the years both as an adult and a child. Mom was always more concerned with my welfare than her own. I deeply miss both of my mothers and my only sorrow in completing this book is that they are not here to enjoy with us the project they encouraged for so long. In the communion of the saints, I bless the memory of their lives and love.

Chapter 1

The Waywardness of Belief

Introduction

I have long been perplexed about the fixation of beliefs. I am afraid that Peirce was correct: once beliefs are established, it is quite difficult to see these revoked. By fixation of beliefs I mean the tendency of humans, once a belief is formed as a part of someone’s belief system, to have and hold it tenaciously. Humans form beliefs and pack these away in the reservoir of habit and inclination such that the conscious repudiation of these is quite the formidable task. We humans interpret new experiences in light of whatever beliefs are held by us and find it hard to retreat from our positions.

I am sure my anxiety is two-fold. One reason for such perplexity and anxiety as this is that the Enlightenment taught us that if someone holds a belief in an uncritical fashion, that individual is irresponsible, even unethical. Locke suggested that a proposition ought to be assented to in accordance with the strength of the argument and evidence for it. To do less is a grave error of human judgment. Not only have rational beliefs in education and in the realm of religion been problematic for me, but assenting to beliefs in general as well. I am struck with a sense of insecurity that maybe I am the origin of false belief among persons I instruct and that this false belief led to action that was not altogether right. The ethics of belief, which asks whether one rightfully ought to hold a belief and queries how one in authority ought to communicate it, is most serious for one who feels messianic impulses, like most clergy persons, professors, and social activists. Hence for me, a dark pilgrimage occurs each time I consider my own beliefs and which ones to communicate.

In this book I hope to evaluate and articulate a perspective that wishes to fix the fixation of belief that troubles my soul so intensely. It seems to me that if the fixation of belief is going to be overcome, then one will need to develop the character traits necessary to generate questions that will lead to the revision of these tenaciously held beliefs. And further, as Peirce and Dewey held, the tendency to generate questions will emerge within the confines of inquiry itself. I mean that a model of inquiry needs to be developed that allows for the cultivation of questions that somehow circumvent the problems of the ways in which beliefs are tenaciously held.

Philosophers have long been interested in the issue of the fixation of beliefs. Since Descartes, philosophers have largely addressed belief fixation in the language of epistemology; that is, they sought to develop an epistemic model that would grant certainty in believing. These accounts treat belief fixation as a problem of justification; if one is justified in holding a belief, then fixation will be less of a problem. Even if one holds strongly to a particular belief, the very fact of justification renders it acceptable. They also had great confidence that once a method or model of inquiry was found that would grant certainty of belief, the model would be self-correcting. By this I mean that through application of an epistemological method to belief, the problem of misguided belief would be solved. But, as I will argue later, these accounts provide little by way of establishing the cognitive conditions that make up believing.

The educational application of the issues of justification and the concern for non-fixated beliefs is most clearly seen in what is known as the critical thinking movement. Before I discuss specifically how the critical thinking movement addresses the epistemological problems of fixation, however, the political context of education is in need of mention. There is a great concern over the status of education in the United States. Persons throughout the society wonder about what and how our children are learning and whether their lack of understanding will compromise our intellectual and political stance internally and internationally. Some wonder if this country’s children will be able to engage the complexities of modern and future life. There are those who continually denigrate the state of education in the U.S., proposing that unless the educational status quo changes, these children, ours, will not be able to enjoy the privileges and blessings we currently possess.

Michael Scriven, in an article entitled Critical for Survival, echoes this concern and places it in the context of the need for a renewed emphasis on critical reasoning in our schools. Scriven, as others in the critical thinking movement, is dismayed by the lack of attention given to the development of liberated minds in education. Far too easily education has come to focus on mere memorization and repetition of standard formula. These perpetuate the demise of the liberated mind. Without liberty of thought culture is doomed to failure. Culture and civilization will be undermined without an emphasis and engagement of the conditions that permit the fostering of a liberated mind. The liberated mind is characterized by rationality and the ability to justify one’s beliefs. Israel Scheffler passionately appeals to this emphasis as well. He writes, Whatever we do, I believe we ought to keep uppermost the ideal of rationality and its emphasis on the critical, questioning, responsible free mind.¹

The continuation of culture and civilization is a primary concern of education. The educational system transmits, socially and epistemically, the culture of its educators. It may do so through indoctrination, through socialization, intimidation, or through providing the conditions for liberty of thought, to hearken back to Scriven. But just how liberty of thought emerges and is sustained is not an easy question to answer. What must a person know or experience to demonstrate liberty of thought? What things ought to be excluded from the curriculum in education given that they may foster indoctrination or socialization is of utmost concern for one who wishes to create the atmosphere for the cultivation of the liberty of thought.

Since at least the time of Descartes, Westerners have thought that if one could find a way of securing true beliefs and then enable persons to generate true beliefs for themselves without dependence on epistemological authorities, then the conditions most likely to produce liberated minds would occur. Not to be overly simplistic but this tradition has advanced epistemology as the queen of philosophical endeavors and the key to fostering and facilitating a free culture. Epistemology has been concerned with discovery and justifying true beliefs. In the twentieth century, epistemology’s claim to philosophical preeminence solidified, particularly in the advent of the analytic tradition.

Epistemological Emphases

In this book, I am going to focus on three epistemological models for critical thinking and will show how these models fail to address some central concerns in overcoming the issue of belief fixation. The first, proposed by Robert Ennis, is an example of an emphasis on achieving rational belief throughout the exercise of right strategies. The second approach is advanced by John McPeck and concentrates on the knowledge that one possesses and how this enables thinkers to manifest free minds.

A third perspective is corrective to both Ennis and McPeck, and its author is thought to be the chief spokesperson of the critical thinking movement, Richard Paul. He wishes to introduce what he calls a strong sense of critical thinking and to formulate a new theory of knowledge. I am going to explore each model, beginning with Ennis, discussing how each reflects some of the ongoing problems of epistemology. Much of what I see as wanting in these approaches is due to what one might call the aspychological dominance of contemporary epistemology. As such, these accounts are inadequate in their treatment of the ways in which beliefs are structured by humankind. Without attending the question of the psychological structure of beliefs and their complexity, the epistemological melioration promised by the critical thinking movement falls fallow.

Historically, epistemologists have focused on ideal thinkers; unfortunately none is to be found. Far too often cognitive limitations are ignored and relegated to the field of psychology, assuming that these are epistemologically unimportant. I think one needs to develop much more of an interdisciplinary approach to the question of belief fixation. This approach would take seriously the historic interest of epistemology in providing norms for belief holding and revision and at the same time would consider the effects that cognitive operations actually have on how one believes. The approach that I wish to develop has a healthy respect for the normative aspects of belief formation/revision and yet takes into account the complexity and limitation of belief systems revealed for us by several theorists with a psychological perspective. In particular, we will explore the work of Rokeach, Tversky, and Elster and inquire into how their viewpoints remedy the deficits of theories of belief formation that are primarily epistemic in orientation. But I also see these limitations rooted in a deeper problem that exists in humans, and that is the problem of the noetic effects of sin. The good design structure that one possesses by creation and the norms that govern our cognitive systems has been affected by sin, which from an Augustinian account such as this, is the vitiation of God’s shalomic design. And so I will explore St. Augustine’s conception of the noetic effects of sin as a viable explanation for the cognitive failures of humans. My attempted suggestions for melioration are founded in these concerns.

Strategic Critical Thinking and the Problems of Rational Belief in Robert Ennis

Historically, a major figure in the critical thinking movement has been Robert Ennis, Professor of Education and Philosophy at the University of Illinois. Ennis has primarily attempted to articulate what constitutes a critical thinker and what critical thinking is. His article in 1962, A Concept of Critical Thinking was an attempt to identify clearly the features, what Ennis called aspects in the 1962 piece, of critical thinking. More recently Ennis has authored two other definitive articles that advance and extend his 1962 position. These articles are A Conception of Rational Thinking² and A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities.³

Ennis’ conception of critical thinking separates an epistemically, normatively based model from psychological concern by contending that critical thinking is performance. For performance to be judged or assessed good or bad, weak or in need of improvement, Ennis’ model requires the projection of an ideally competent thinker. One’s critical thinking ability is judged by one’s performance in tasks defined by epistemic competence. Subsequent to identifying what stands for performance and competence, I will explore the modifications that he makes from his earlier attempt at definition and argue that although some language has changed, the basic epistemological orientation remains constant. I want to examine some of the ways that belief formation and fixation are developed and how questions are asked, and I will then offer criticism of his perspective.

Ennis’ Definition of Critical Thinking: Competence and Performance

Each of the three above-mentioned articles has a particular and distinctive definition of critical thinking. In paper one, Ennis declared that all previous attempts to define critical thinking lacked precision and clarity. He suggests, There has been a lack of careful attention to the concept of critical thinking,⁴ and that education has simply followed the lead of psychology in its attempts to define critical thinking.⁵ Ennis wants to elaborate the basic notion of critical thinking through a classification and a logical analysis of the dimensions of critical thinking.⁶ In paper one, Ennis assays what constitutes a clear definition of critical thinking.

Ennis defines critical thinking as the correct assessment of statements.⁷ This definition exposes Ennis’ central concern; critical thinking is about the performance task. The language of assessment points to a