The Effectiveness of Airpower in the 20^Th Century: Part Three (1945Ý2000)

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

AIRPOWER IN THE 20TH

CENTURY

Part Three (1945-2000)

Captain John F. O’Connell,

USN (Ret.)

iUniverse, Inc.

New York Lincoln Shanghai

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIRPOWER IN THE 20th

CENTURY Part Three (1945-2000)

Copyright © 2006 by John F. O’Connell

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced by any means, graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or by any information storage retrieval system without the written permission of the publisher except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

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Contents

Preface

Introduction

Korean War (North Korea/China—UN Forces) 1950-1953¹

• (Phase I) Invasion, and subsequent UN force retreat to Pusan Perimeter (25 June-1 August 1950)

• (Phase II) Preparation for Inchon landing and UN breakout from Pusan Perimeter (2 August-15 September 1950)

• (Phase III) UN forces (X Corps) land at Inchon and capture Seoul, while also breaking out of the Pusan Perimeter (Eighth Army). They then attack north to the Yalu River (16 September-24 November 1950)

• (Phase IV) Chinese enter combat, UN forces pushed back below 38th parallel (25 November 1950-16 July 1951)

• (Phase V) A struggle for territory before the armistice (10 July 1951-27 July 1953)

Second Vietnam War (Viet Cong/North Vietnam—U.S.) 1965-1973¹

• Rolling Thunder Air Campaign (2 March 1965-31 October 1968)

• A Change in Administrations

• Linebacker I Air Campaign (8 May-23 October 1972)

• Linebacker II Air Campaign (18-29 December 1972)

Afghanistan War (Mujahideen—USSR) 1979-1989

• 1979—Soviet Invasion

• Pakistan’s Reaction

• Enter the Stinger—finally

Malvinas/Falklands War (Argentina—Great Britain) 1982

• Invasion

• British Reaction

• Strategic Air Strike

• British Landing

Gulf War (U.S. and other Coalition Nations—Iraq) 1990-1991

• Contingency Plan

• Desert Shield—Defense of Saudi Arabia (August-December 1990)

• Planning the Air Campaign

• The Ground Campaign Plan

• UN and U.S Congressional Approval of Use of Force

• Desert Storm (17 January-28 February 1991)

Executing the Air Campaign (17 January-28 February 1991)

Iraqi Ground Counterattack

Air Power uber alles?

Executing the Ground Campaign (24-28 February 1991)

• Air Power Effectiveness in the Gulf War

Air Superiority

Strategic Air Attack

Air Interdiction

Air Support of Ground Forces

Kosovo (NATO—FRY) March-June 1999

Bibliography

End Notes

Dedicated to the Fairest, Gentlest and Sweetest One of All

Jane Elsey O’Connell (1933-2002)

Preface

During 1991, I had the opportunity to write a review of a very fine book on the use of airpower during the Vietnam War for the Air Power Journal. The book was Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why, by Earl H. Tilford, Jr. I finished a complimentary review by stating It remains for someone to articulate a theory of airpower that will take into account all of the significant variables, including terrain and the nature of the society that comes under air attack, and to develop a comprehensive theory that explains a Gulf War victory and a Vietnam (or for that matter an Afghanistan) failure.

Those words flowed fairly easily off my pen at the time, but later I returned to them as articles about airpower, and the roles and missions of the U.S. services, and the like crossed my desk. I realized that I had unwittingly flung myself a challenge; however imperfectly prepared I was to take it up. This book is an attempt to describe the effectiveness of airpower, and to draw some elementary lessons there from for the use of strategists and others interested in the topic.

The central issue I wish to examine and discuss concerns the effectiveness of airpower in military operations in pursuit of political goals. This volume is an attempt to deal with that issue. I will not claim to have taken into account all the significant variables connected with the effectiveness of air power. I will attempt to cover as many as possible, realizing that this is merely a beginning.

Some comments are appropriate regarding sources, and numbers of aircraft involved in various battles. For the former, I have relied on what I believe to be good secondary sources concerning air operations. My intention is not to discover something new and different about a particular engagement, but rather to attempt to draw lessons about airpower effectiveness from the battle or campaign histories. Regarding the latter, whenever a specific number of aircraft are mentioned there is always room for error. For my purposes, whether 350 or 362 aircraft were lost in a particular engagement is relatively immaterial.

Where I have provided information on dates, the terminology 24/25 February refers to the night of the 24th extending into the 25th, whereas 24-25 February refers to a two-day period. In addition military time is used throughout, 1300 is 1 PM.

Although the theme of this book is the demonstrated effectiveness of air power, it became apparent early on during my research that there were few pure air power campaigns as such. During World War Two British Bomber Command’s aerial offensive against German industry and cities, and Eighth Air Force’s similar effort are prime examples. Elsewhere, it has been necessary to describe in detail other aspects of a war or campaign in which air power played a major or minor role. I believe that that the contexts presented are absolutely necessary to properly evaluate the effectiveness of airpower, both militarily and politically, in different settings.

This volume, part three of a planned three-volume set, deals with the effectiveness of air power after World War Two. During this period developing technology finally enabled air weapons systems to approach the claims of air power enthusiasts of many years before. The Kosovo conflict of 1999 was unique in that a desired military and political goal was reached without resort to ground warfare. Whether or not that model will be replicated in future years remains to be seen.

Introduction

December 17, 1903 marked the first manned, powered, controlled flight by the Wright Brothers at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. Starting with an inventory of one airplane, barely able to bear one man aloft, the world’s aircraft inventory grew fairly rapidly. World War One introduced the airplane as a new military tool, first as a reconnaissance asset, then as a bomber to destroy enemy formations and facilities, and finally as a fighter or interceptor to interfere with enemy reconnaissance and bombing efforts.

During WW I aircraft development proceeded at a high rate. Following that war both military and commercial aircraft development flourished despite the Great Depression of the 1930s. Military aircraft were used in a series of small wars, and some not so small. The main event came on September 1, 1939 when a revived Germany, now under Nazi leadership set out to conquer Europe. In 1945 the war ended with many nations’ infrastructure, both physical and economic, in ruins. But it was clear that the military aircraft was no mere auxiliary to ground and naval forces, but rather a force perhaps capable of winning wars on its own. That theory had been tested during World War Two and found wanting. However the development of nuclear weapons seemed to point to a new role for military aircraft, one that could be decisive by itself. The following chapters deal with selected conflicts during the period 1945 through 1999, which provide material for evaluating the effectiveness of aircraft in achieving military and political goals.

Korean War (North Korea/

China—UN Forces) 1950-1953¹

The Korean War was somewhat confusing from an airpower perspective. Unlike WW II, no vaunted prewar airpower theories were put to the test, such as daylight precision bombing or blitzkrieg tactics involving a highly integrated tactical air force supporting fast-moving armor. From the beginning the UN held air supremacy over South Korea and air superiority over most of North Korea. Nevertheless, political considerations prevented UN forces from achieving a decisive victory. The fighting ended with a new border between North and South Korea, not far from the previous boundary.²

The war came as a surprise to the United States, which had both secretly at the JCS level, and more publicly in several statements, withdrawn the hem of its protective garment from South Korea.³ Vice Admiral Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces Far East, commented that at the time of the invasion he thought the U.S. should oppose the aggression but he didn’t think that would happen. He also stated that General MacArthur was likewise surprised and commented to him that the U.S. action to intervene was a complete reversal of our Far East policy. He noted that MacArthur had not been consulted regarding intervention.

The war was also confusing from a political-military standpoint. The aggression was clear but the outcome was less than satisfying at least for those who remembered the stark end of the Axis powers five years earlier. When it was over, it was not over. An armistice had been signed but both South Korean and American troops remained technically at war and on guard on the southern boundary of a demilitarized zone. That condition still exists today.

In 1950 the new United States Air Force was busy concentrating on nuclear weapons delivery by B-36s, and its corollary—air defense of the continental United States against nuclear attack by aircraft of the Soviet Union. The Air Force emphasized long-range bombardment and the European Theater of Operations, and tactical air power was suffering from a period of neglect. Jet fighters provided greater speed and overall capability, but also suffered greatly reduced range because of increased fuel consumption rates, and the need for longer concrete runways as opposed to the shorter, rougher fields that had served well during WW II. These characteristics, coupled with a lack of enough competent aviation engineers capable of building and repairing adequate runways, would hamper USAF efforts to operate jet aircraft over Korea.

After WWII Alexander de Seversky, a prominent commentator on air power, predicted that sea power was finished and that it would survive only in a vestigial form as an auxiliary, with antisubmarine and transport forces.⁵ However, aircraft carriers were to play a prominent role in Korea, and significantly change their operating mode. During WWII, aircraft carrier battle forces had moved swiftly into a target area, struck rapidly, and then as quickly withdrew to avoid submarine and air attack that was sure to come if they operated long in one area. Off Korea, after an initial period of uncertainty, they occupied semi-permanent stations, launching strikes, dawn and dusk intruder missions, conducting routine flight operations, and withdrawing only short distances for a day to replenish food, supplies and ammunition. A total lack of air and submarine opposition afforded them this new luxury, which would be repeated during the Second Vietnam War.

The Korean War produced the first jet versus jet combat. It again showed the power of air interdiction against a conventional army’s communications, while revealing that air interdiction, whether land or sea-based, had serious limitations against an enemy whose logistic needs were significantly less than those of a highly mechanized American infantry division. Those limitations would appear again in Vietnam.

In early August 1945, as the end of World War II in the Pacific approached, it was obvious that arrangements would have to be made by the allies to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea. An arbitrary line was selected at the 38th parallel of North latitude, with American forces accepting the surrender south of the line and Soviet forces accepting the surrender north of the line. The 38th parallel inadvertently became the dividing line between two new, separate Korean nations and governments. The southern government was theoretically a democratic one, albeit arbitrary and dictatorial, under Syngman Rhee. The northern government was unabashedly communist and totalitarian, under Kim Il-sung.

American occupation troops were withdrawn from South Korea in June 1949, leaving behind a five hundred man military advisory group to assist the Republic of South Korea in organizing and training its armed forces to defend its new freedom. Both Korean governments wanted to reunify the country, on their own terms. The United States did not desire to encourage a South Korean invasion of the north, and denied the new South Korean armed forces combat aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. The 38th parallel became a scene of entrenchment and probe as both sides dug defenses and engaged in border clashes. During one week in March 1950 there were eighteen armed incidents along the parallel, and twenty-nine guerrilla attacks within South Korea. In May the incidents dropped off sharply.

It was the calm before the storm. Communist Chinese leader Mao Zedong had returned a large number of North Korean soldiers, who had served in the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) during the civil war in China, to North Korea. These experienced soldiers provided a stiffening core to the eight plus divisions of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). In addition the Soviets had provided a large amount of equipment including howitzers, self-propelled guns, anti-tank guns and 150 T-34 tanks, as well as advisors. Facing them were four South Korean divisions with no tanks, and ineffective American bazookas (anti-tank rocket launchers). The South Korean air force consisted of only twenty-two training and liaison planes. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) had 62 IL-10 ground attack aircraft, 70 Yak fighters of different models (-3,-7B and-9), as well as 22 Yak-16 transports and 8 PO-2 trainers.

In the early morning hours of Sunday, 26 June 1950, the NKPA launched a coordinated invasion all along the 38th parallel, catching the South Korean army, and its American advisors, by surprise. In Seoul, American Ambassador John J. Muccio called for evacuation of American dependents and all but a skeleton staff. A large number were transported to Inchon by road and loaded aboard a Norwegian tramp steamer, which steamed to Japan initially under USAF aerial escort and later, U.S. Navy destroyer escort. A day later as the fall of Seoul appeared certain; another embassy contingent was evacuated by air from Kimpo and Suwon by USAF transports from Japan. USAF combat aircraft from Japan protected both evacuations, and in each case NKAF aircraft attacked the escorts. Over Inchon, F-82 escorts escaped damage but their pilots did not pursue the attackers, apparently constrained by their understanding of the rules of engagement provided. At Kimpo and Suwon a day later, the escorts took on their attackers and shot down a number of them. The air war over Korea had begun.

It was mainly an air war involving interdiction and close air support. Air superiority was contested, but the airspace volume within which communist jet fighters operated was constrained by their political leaders, as well as their own range limitations, and the later failure of Chinese Air Force (CAF) plans to seize or build air fields.⁶ There was no attempt to employ CAF bombers against UN targets in Korea or at sea presumably because of Chinese fears of retaliatory strikes. There was some U. S. strategic bombing, but the relatively small number of suitable targets in North Korea limited it.⁷ Air power was limited on the UN side by a strong desire of NATO partners not to escalate the Korean War into World War III. Therefore, no retaliation against CAF MiGs operating from airfields in Manchuria was permitted. For their part, the Chinese (and Soviet) pilots did not operate very far from MiG Alley, near the Manchurian border with North Korea.

The attack was a sharp surprise to the United States. Although in retrospect there were some indicators, none of the U.S. intelligence organizations produced clear warning signs at the time. However, the subsequent action taken by President Truman was probably as great a shock to the North Koreans as their attack was to him. President Truman and his advisors viewed the invasion as the opening round of a greater Soviet-sponsored international communist offensive, and decided to repel the attack. The United States asked for and got UN condemnation of the attack, and authorization to throw the invaders out of South Korea, in concert with other members of the UN.

Although the United States had ended World War II as the most powerful nation on earth, with military forces second to none, five years of peace had drastically reduced the size of those forces, and their training and experience. Military spending had been arbitrarily reduced by one-third under President Truman’s direction and the enthusiastic stewardship of Defense Secretary Louis Johnson.⁸

Both the United States Air Force and the United States Navy were dealing with the problems of conversion of their fighter and bomber elements from piston engines to jets. The two services had emerged briefly from a violent internecine conflict over airpower.

The United States Army still suffered from the effects of the Doolittle Board, which had been set up to deal with egregious discrimination between officers and enlisted men during World War II. Among its recommendations was one involving the lessening of training hardship inflicted on enlisted recruits during basic training.⁹ An unintended result was to demand far too little of recruits, and thus to not prepare them properly for combat as infantrymen.

The four army divisions stationed in Japan were not ready for combat. Inadequate basic training, followed by soft occupation duty coupled with less than adequate training opportunity, had sharply reduced their potential combat effectiveness. Although there were officer and non-com veterans of World War II still on active duty, the bulk of infantry formations were comprised of eighteen and nineteen-year olds who had joined or were drafted after that war ended. The lack of a declaration of a war by Congress, and the categorization of the conflict as a UN police action, did little for the morale of the personnel involved.

The Truman administration had deliberately reduced military funding and consequently—readiness for a number of years, and then had accepted combat suddenly, with little apparent consideration of the possible military consequences. The next six months were to be enlightening, and deadly both to soldiers and politicians. Politically, it would result in a return of the Republicans to the White House after a 20-year absence.

Far East Air Force’s (FEAF) primary mission was an air defense role in defense of ground occupation forces in Japan against a Soviet attack. FEAF and Fifth Air Force (FAF) had not planned for air support operations in Korea or in fact for any air operations there after the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea the preceding year. Lack of adequate training affected airmen as well as infantrymen. There was inadequate fuel available for realistic Air Force navigation flight training in Japan, so navigation flights were only conducted between known points, lessening their effectiveness. Air-to-ground rocket firing training was conducted with sub-caliber rounds to save money. Unfortunately, the rocket trajectories for the sub-caliber training rounds and the real rockets were different, a lesson that was learned only while attempting interdiction and close air support missions after the Korean War started.¹⁰

However, ready or not, the United States by choosing to defend South Korea was in a war, the scale of which had yet to be determined. The Korean police action, for that was the official terminology for the fighting, lasted from 25 June 1950 until 27 July 1953, the date an armistice was signed. The war has never officially ended and American combat forces are still in South Korea, although at the time of writing, relationships between North and South Korea appear to be easing.

U.S. armed forces in the Western Pacific were responsible for the defense of Japan and Okinawa and the Philippines. South Korea and Taiwan lay outside the U.S. defense envelope.¹¹ General Douglas MacArthur was the Commander, Far East Command with subordinate Air Force (Far East Air Force) and Navy (Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE)) and Army (Eighth Army (EUSA)) commanders. Eighth Army consisted of four divisions stationed in Japan, commanded by General Walton Walker. Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanded Far East Air Force (FEAF) with headquarters in Nagoya. His forces included 13th Air Force in the Philippines, 20th Air Force at Kadena and Naha Air Bases in Okinawa and at Andersen Air Base on Guam, Fifth Air Force in Japan, and FEAF Material Command in Japan also. FEAF aircraft included B-29 medium bombers, F-80 fighter-interceptors (straight wing jets), F-82 all weather piston-engine fighters (twin Mustangs), B-26 light bombers, and reconnaissance and C-54 troop carrier aircraft.

This was the first war for the United States Air Force, which had achieved independent status as a service in 1947. The problems with initial operations over South Korea by FAF fighter aircraft were significant. Only Pusan had runways capable of handling F-80 jets.¹² Operations from air bases at Ashiya and Itazuke in Kyushu in Southern Japan meant that the F-80s had very little time over targets in Korea