A History of the Mediterranean Air War, 1940–1945: Volume Three: Tunisia and the End in Africa, November 1942–1943

CHAPTER 1

SETTING THE SCENE

Lt Mauri eased his Bloch 175 out of its climb at 8,000 feet over the Mediterranean and headed westwards searching for the Allied convoy which had been reported passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. The aircraft from the reconnaissance unit GR II/52 of the Vichy French Armée de l’Air, based at Oran, Algeria, was detailed to try and ascertain the destination of the ships – Malta, Libya, or perhaps even French North Africa. The autumnal sun was already beginning to sink in the sky when suddenly there they were – six, eight, ten – more, many more, surrounded by the escort of destroyers and cruisers – and there were aircraft carriers too. Yes, this was a big one like that which had passed three months previously to fight its way through to the beleaguered island of Malta. Was the destination once more the same? Suddenly from behind came the rattle of machine-gun fire. Fighters! The French aircraft was being attacked.

On the carrier HMS Formidable, part of Force H steaming eastwards, the intruder had been plotted on the radar screens and two Grumman Martlet IIs of 888 Squadron had been scrambled, led by Lt J.D.M.Jeram, a veteran of the Battle of Britain, during which he had flown Hurricanes ‘on loan’ to the RAF. Reaching 8,000 feet the pilots of these fighters suddenly saw the French machine and began to overhaul it from directly astern. The date was 6 November 1942, the place just off Cap Kramis, Algeria. Jeram closed to 250 yards, took aim and fired three long bursts; smoke poured from the starboard engine of the Bloch, which he mistakenly identified as a Potez 63 – a very similar aircraft in appearance – and it slowed down momentarily before crashing into the sea where the red and yellow-striped tail unit broke off on impact. The first shots of a new campaign had been fired.

A Bloch 175 of GR II/52 similar to that flown by Lt Mauri and shot down by Martlets of 888 Squadron, Royal Navy, on 6 November 1942. This particular aircraft, No.103, was destroyed on the ground at Oran-La Senia two days later.

This Grumman Martlet IV, FN112 of 888 Squadron is believed to have been the fighter in which Lt Denis Jeram shot down Lt Mauri’s MB 175. For the Torch operation all Royal Navy carrier-based aircraft had their British national roundels over-painted with US stars to give the impression that the landings were wholly American undertakings. It is noteworthy, however, that while carrying its Fleet Air Arm serial number, the aircraft also carries the legend ‘US Navy’.

A Martlet of 888 Squadron scrambles from the deck of HMS Formidable to intercept the French intruder.

H

OW HAD THIS SITUATION COME ABOUT

?

On the outbreak of World War II France and Britain were, of course, allies, the combined power of their naval forces considerably exceeding those of the Axis powers, even following the entry into the war of Italy and her Regia Marina.

Much of the French training was undertaken in the western Mediterranean, along the southern coast of that country. As early as November 1939 the Royal Navy’s aircraft carrier HMS Argus had arrived at Palyvestre, near Hyères, to deliver 24 Fairey Swordfish torpedo-bomber-reconnaissance biplanes to form 767 Deck Landing Training Squadron there. The personnel of this unit were drawn mainly from 811 and 822 Squadrons which units had been lost when HMS Courageous was sunk by a German U-Boat in the opening days of the war.

However, as the Blitzkrieg of May-June 1940 showed increasing signs of a French collapse, 767 Squadron was evacuated to North Africa via Corsica. Here 12 aircraft and the most experienced crews flew to Hal Far, Malta, to become 830 Squadron, providing the island with its first aerial striking force (see Malta: The Hurricane Years, 1940-41). The remaining dozen were flown to Gibraltar for subsequent return to the United Kingdom.

Gibraltar became the base for a new force rapidly formed after the Franco-German armistice to seek to remedy the loss of the French fleet to the Allied cause in the Mediterranean. Formed on 28 June under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James Somerville, the force was initially built around the battleship HMS Hood and the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, despatched in haste from the Home Fleet.

Sadly, the first duty of this new force was to try and neutralise the major elements of their collapsed ex-ally’s fleet. The Royal Navy now faced a perplexing situation. Generally, the British still maintained sufficient warships to oppose the combined German and Italian fleets adequately. However, should the French ships come under Axis control the balance of power would shift to the latter’s advantage. Although by the date of the armistice most French vessels had departed metropolitan France to prevent just such a takeover, the uncertainty regarding the attitude and policies of the new Vichy government in France, together with strong suspicions that the Axis nations would not maintain their promise simply to decommission the French warships should they return home as required by the terms of the armistice, were matters of great concern to the British authorities.

In the event quite a substantial proportion of the French fleet had arrived either at the main British Mediterranean fleet base at Alexandria in Egypt or at other British ports, and it had proved possible for British forces to capture all of these. However, the new 35,000 ton battleship Richelieu had left Brest and was making for Dakar in Senegal, French West Africa, and her as-yet uncommissioned sister ship, the Jean Bart, had got to Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. All that now remained in France were four heavy cruisers at Toulon.

Nonetheless, the bulk of the French fleet was still in Algeria, including six light cruisers at Algiers and, more importantly, two battlecruisers, two old battleships, six large destroyers, seven standard destroyers, four submarines and a seaplane carrier which were all at Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran. This represented a formidable force, regarding which it was considered something needed to be done. It was here that action by Force H was immediately required.

Lt Denis Jeram heads back up the deck of HMS Formidable after his interception of the Vichy French MB 175. Jeram had flown on loan to the RAF during 1940, and his success on 6 November 1942 was his fifth victory.

Wednesday, 3 July 1940

On 3 July Force H, now increased in size by the arrival of two more capital ships, arrived off Oran where the French vessels had not so far fired up their boilers. An attempt was made to try and persuade the French either to come over to the British cause or to sail to neutral ports where they could be decommissioned. As a final option it was also suggested that the vessels might be scuttled. This latter option was clearly most unlikely, although the chief off the navy, Amiral Jean François Darlan, had assured Winston Churchill, the new British prime minister, that he would order the fleet to be scuttled should the Axis make any attempt to take it over.

There was some confusion and misunderstanding regarding these options, and unwilling to risk reliance on Amiral Darlan’s undertaking, an action to disable the vessels at Mers-el-Kebir was ordered.

In fact, the French vessels actually outgunned those of Force H, but the presence of Ark Royal appeared to swing the advantage in favour of the Royal Navy. Initially, therefore, Swordfish spotted for a dawn bombardment and laid mines at the entrance to the naval base to try and prevent any escape. The old battleship Bretagne blew up while Dunkerque was damaged and was beached to save her. However, the fast and modern Strasbourg and five of the larger destroyers managed to slip past the mines and escaped towards Bizerta in Tunisia. As they did so, two air strikes were laid on against them by bomb-carrying Swordfish, and a second by six carrying torpedoes. All achieved surprise but no hits were obtained.

The Oran area was defended by the Curtiss Hawk 75As of Groupe de Chasse II/5 at this time, the pilot of one such aircraft claiming a Blackburn Skua fighter/dive bomber shot down. British aircrews reported that generally the French fighters – which considerably outperformed their own aircraft – did not press home their attacks, allowing claims to be made for at least two or three French aircraft damaged.

Thursday-Friday, 4/5 July 1940

The French immediately sought to hit back, and on the evening of the next day an attack on Gibraltar was ordered by LeO 451 bombers from Port Lyautey in Morocco.

Eight aircraft were despatched, but two were forced to return early due to mechanical faults. The other six attacked at 0020 on the 5th, but with little effect.

Friday, 5 July 1940

By day three H-75As encountered a Sunderland flyingboat of 228 Squadron on reconnaissance off the coast near Oran. The French pilots thought that they had failed to inflict much damage, returning to base with their own aircraft unharmed. The Sunderland had in fact suffered quite considerable damage, although in defence its gunners claimed one fighter shot down and a second probably so.

Saturday, 6 July 1940

As the Dunkerque showed no signs of significant damage despite her beaching, Somerville decided upon a torpedo strike against her, and consequently on the 6th six 820 Squadron Swordfish undertook such an attack. Only one hit was obtained and in this case the torpedo failed to detonate. However, one of the others had hit an armed trawler, the depth-charges aboard which blew up violently, causing slight damage to the adjacent battleship. Two follow-up strikes were launched, this time escorted by Skuas; during the course of these one more hit on the Dunkerque was achieved. Once again the defending fighters were able to claim one Skua shot down.

Monday, 8 July 1940

While this melancholy action had been underway, HMS Hermes a small aircraft carrier, had been shadowing the Richelieu for the past two weeks, hoping to capture her. As she reached Dakar, the British proposals were presented to her captain, but were refused. At dawn on the 8th, therefore, six Swordfish of 814 Squadron were launched to undertake a torpedo attack. This had to be delivered across two rows of merchant vessels and in the face of some fairly concentrated AA fire. Again, only a single hit was obtained, but in this case extreme damage was inflicted. Richelieu’s propeller shafts were twisted and the steering gear was damaged, considerable flooding also occurring. With the limited repair facilities available at Dakar, Richelieu would be out of action for at least a year, although her main 15inch armament remained intact and useable.

O

PERATION

M

ENACE

No further hostilities between the two ex-allies occurred for more than two months, Force H being involved during this period in a number of engagements with Italian forces (see Malta: The Hurricane Years, 1940-41). The activities relating to Operation Menace occurred largely along the Atlantic coast of West Africa (notably the French colony of Senegal), rather than in the Mediterranean area. However, they were so connected with, and influenced by, actions in that area that it is both necessary and appropriate to detail them here.

Following the arrival at Dakar of the battleship Richelieu and the cruisers Georges Leygues, Montcalm and Glorie, the defences of that port by aviation units were substantially enhanced. From Meknès 19 H-75As of GC I/4 had been moved to Dakar-Ouakam on 17 July, followed by 35 M-187F bombers. First, the aircraft of GB I/62 and II/62 arrived at Dakar during July, followed on 8 August by a detachment of eight of these aircraft from GB I/63. The Aeronavale flew in three Loire 302s of Escadrille E4 (which now became 4E), while Esc 18S arrived in mid August with just two Loire 130s. Difficulties in obtaining supplies for this unit led to its dissolution on 1 September when its aircraft were incorporated with 4E as SS4E; the unit also received the only Potez-CAMS 141 Antares flyingboat, which arrived at Dakar on 10 September. Finally, the cruisers already mentioned brought with them three more Loire 130s on their catapults – 4HS-1, 4HS-2 and 4HS-7. The cruisers had passed through the Gibraltar Strait on 11 September, the Vichy authorities fully expecting an attack on Dakar around 17 September. However, when by the 23rd nothing had transpired, there was some relaxation of the state of readiness.

Saturday, 14 September 1940

During 14 September H-75As of GC II/5, now operating over the Casablanca area, engaged and shot down a British flyingboat which Cne Monraise identified as another Sunderland. On this occasion he had been successful in bringing down his opponent, but it was in fact an elderly Saro London of 202 Squadron from Gibraltar.

Meanwhile in England a growing body of ‘Free Frenchmen’ were gathering under the leadership of Général Charles de Gaulle, anxious and pressing for action to bring more of the French colonial empire into the anti-Axis fold. Force H had therefore sailed out into the Atlantic to take part in a new attempt to land Free French forces south of Dakar in the mistaken belief that the Vichy defenders would not fire on their fellow countrymen, and that the port might thereby be occupied unopposed. Initially, it had been the intention of de Gaulle to set up the headquarters of his planned government in exile there. However, the authorities were swiftly disabused of these notions and the operation became something of a fiasco.

Monday, 23 September 1940

Following this latter engagement, Force H arrived off Dakar on 23 September, Swordfish from HMS Ark Royal plus two Caudron Luciole aircraft which were aboard, then flew the Free French representatives ashore with leaflets being dropped. The Vichy authorities ashore remained loyal to the Vichy regime, refusing to negotiate with de Gaulle, who they considered to be a renegade and traitor. Coastal batteries and Richelieu’s guns opened fire and French submarines left harbour in an attempt to torpedo some of the British and Free French ships.

Upon learning of the actions at Dakar the Vichy government was infuriated, putting the Armée de l’Air in North Africa on alert. As matters became a little clearer, particularly regarding the actions of the dissident Gaullist raiding party, preparations were put in hand for a demonstration of force to cool the ardour of the British and the Gaullists.

Several objectives were considered, but Gibraltar quickly became the best choice. Poorly defended, close to the coast of Morocco and of little military importance other than its strategic position commanding the entrance to the Mediterranean, it was the opposite of Malta, Crete or Cyprus. It was, however, a good target for a payback blow for propaganda purposes.

Tuesday, 24 September 1940

As the 24th dawned, Skuas and Swordfish attempted to attack, but missed the main warships, although inflicting some damage on the shore installations. Early on a trio of H-75As from GC I/4 intercepted one of the Swordfish, their fire wounding all three members of the crew. The pilot, Lt Corbet-Milward, managed to escape their attacks and crash-landed on Ark Royal, the crew believing that they had shot down one of their attackers. In fact, it appears that the French pilot, Aspirant Duval, had pulled out of his attacking dive too low and had crashed into the sea.

The French fighters remained active throughout the morning, shooting down at least two or three of 810 Squadron’s Swordfish, one of which was shared with the gunners in a Laté 302 amphibian. The Vichy authorities now ordered that two bombing raids be prepared, the first to take place on the 24th and the second next day. Consequently, as the Royal Navy’s attacks on Dakar were underway, a force of 64 bombers set out for Gibraltar between 1300-1415, escorted by 24 H-75As of GC II/5 and 12 D.520s of GC II/3. The latter were provided in ignorance of the fact that no RAF or RN defenders were based on ‘The Rock’.

The bombing force despatched initially comprised:

This H-75A, No.295 of GC I/4 was flown by Sgt Georges Lemare, who claimed a Swordfish shot down over Dakar on 24 September 1940 and subsequently inflicted damage on a 204 Squadron Sunderland. He would later claim nine more victories over the Eastern Front with GC 3 ‘Normadie-Niemen’.

59 of the 64 aircraft sent out dropped 41 tons of bombs of 100kg, 200kg and 500kg on the arsenal and south mole. Hits were claimed on ‘an important building’ and a ship, numerous fires being seen in the northern part of the arsenal. Four M.167Fs from Rabat-Sale were then sent out by GB I/22 to photograph the results, but these showed that only about six per cent of hits had actually been achieved on intended targets. One of GB I/32’s DB-7s was damaged by AA fire, one suffered an oil leak and one crashed on landing at Médiouna.

Wednesday, 25 September 1940

At Dakar raids continued on the 25th during which one 820 Squadron Swordfish was damaged by AA fire and fighter attack, while three pilots of GC I/4 shot down a Walrus amphibian of the Fleet Air Arm, on loan to the Royal Australian Air Force with its British crew, which had been launched by the cruiser HMAS Australia.

The French attack on Gibraltar was repeated by 83 bombers although this time the fighter escort was dispensed with as it had become clear that no opposing interceptors were to be met. On this occasion 56 tons of bombs were dropped between 1500-1615. Units taking part this time were:

The AA, already quite intense on the previous day, was more effective this time, and one LeO of GB I/23 was shot down and a second from GB I/11 was damaged. GB I/22 again sent four aircraft to record the damage, but although the percentage of hits was higher than on the previous day, photographs revealed that no important damage had been caused and many of the bombs had fallen into the sea.

Thursday, 26 September 1940

By the 26th several British ships had been hit, including the battleship Barham, and one of the French submarines had put a torpedo into a second battleship, the Resolution. In return two of the Vichy submarines had been sunk. At much the same time one of the British battleships at last managed to gain a direct hit on Richelieu. However, neither she nor any of the three cruisers in harbour were seriously damaged, and Force H now withdrew, Ark Royal heading for the UK for some urgent repairs.

As it transpired, at the time of this departure the Governor of Dakar had been in the process of drafting his proposed conditions for a surrender. By now Vichy felt that honour had been satisfied and that a demonstration had been given which indicated that the Armée de l’Air was still capable of hitting back, blow for blow.

The operation did, however, teach the Royal Navy a salutary lesson – Swordfish would never again willingly be despatched to undertake torpedo attacks on a defended location by the light of day.

NB. Readers should note that records of the events at Dakar were somewhat confused and this account has been put together from available information as best as proved possible. There may, however, be some errors of omissions.

Following these events it would be some months before there was a further substantial outbreak of fraternal hostilities between British and Vichy forces although occasional encounters and engagements occurred, details of which follow:

Thursday, 7 November 1940

A Walrus (L2268) catapulted from HMS Dartmouth, in the hands of Petty Officer P.H.Parsons, bombed the French submarine Poncelet in the Gulf of Guinea. The vessel was damaged and was forced to surrender, later being scuttled. Parsons was subsequently awarded the British Empire Medal.

S

YRIA AND

M

ADAGASCAR

Relations between the two governments reached their nadir in June 1941 when British Commonwealth and Free French forces invaded Syria and Lebanon following co-operation between the Vichy authorities and Germany when the latter nation sought to provide aid to anti-British elements in Iraq. This action led to a major war between Britain and Vichy France which lasted until 12 July. This was followed by further hostilities commencing early in May 1942 when a British occupation of the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar commenced following the Japanese entry into the war in December 1941 and the Imperial Japanese Navy’s major attacks on the British bases in Ceylon.

Full accounts of both these campaigns may be found in Dust Clouds in the Middle East which forms an earlier volume in this Mediterranean Air War series.

Friday, 8 May 1942

This claim has been found in French records which occurred at just the time that the invasion of Madagascar was taking place many hundreds of miles away. No record of such an engagement has been discovered in British Fleet Air Arm accounts and this remains something of a mystery.

During August 1942 a major convoy sailed into the Mediterranean in an urgent effort to deliver supplies to the besieged island of Malta. This required some crews of Wellington bombers undertaking delivery flights to the area from Britain to avoid their normal delivery route via Gibraltar and Malta, and fly instead along the Atlantic coast off Morocco and Senegal, impinging on French territory. In consequence, there were four interceptions of such flights during the month. (See also Vol 2). There was also one clash over the convoy referred to (See full details in Malta: The Spitfire Year). These proved to be the final aerial clashes prior to the commencement of Operation Torch – the Allied invasion of French North-West Africa. The events, which have been described here from July 1940 to September 1942, indicate clearly why there was no love lost between the Vichy government of France and Great Britain.

Wednesday, 2 September 1942

Another delivery Wellington was lost, having radioed that engine trouble was being experienced, leading to the port engine failing. Sgt Mayers force-landed on a beach at Safi where he and his crew were interned. However, three H-75A pilots of GC I/5 considered that they had forced the aircraft down, their claim for this victory being confirmed.

T

HE

P

OSITION

P

RIOR TO

O

PERATION

T

ORCH

By the spring of 1942 matters had changed fairly radically for the Allies. The Soviet Union had managed to halt the first devastating assault by the Axis and had even launched counter-attacks in front of Moscow, aided by the traditional ally of the Russians – the awful weather of the autumn, winter and spring. To what extent a renewed offensive by the Axis armies in the east might restrain the ability of the Soviets to continue to withstand defeat was, however, distinctly questionable. Indeed, an absence of major Anglo-American action might well lead the Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, to seek a separate peace with Adolf Hitler.

The arrival of the United States of America into the world conflict, occasioned by the Japanese attacks on the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor and on the US, British, Dutch and Australian territories in the Philippines and South-East Asia generally, had virtually ensured that the Allies, of which the USA now became a formidable part, must prevail eventually. The initial Allied losses of all types in this area were proving to be extremely costly and painful, but the unwisdom of Hitler in honouring the Axis Tripartite Pact by declaring war on the USA in support of his Japanese partners appeared ill-conceived. The events in the Pacific area generally relieved the Soviet Union of the considerable threat that had remained close to the forefront of Stalin’s mind, that an invasion in the area of Manchuria and Mongolia by Japanese forces might well have to be dealt with as well as the German onslaught. The changed circumstances here would allow substantial elements of the powerful eastern armies to be drawn upon to provide reinforcements for the west.

Until May 1942 the priority for the USA had to remain the halting of the Japanese expansion in the south-eastern basin of the Pacific Ocean, which had seemed difficult in the extreme. However, the fortuitous, and rather unexpected victory by the US Navy over its opponents at the Battle of Midway, had changed the balance of power there considerably and at virtually a single blow.

Moreover, a considerably increased delivery of war materials from an industry already geared up to meet the earlier demands of re-armament together with production for the Lend-Lease Programme to both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, allowed preparations to be made for offensive action to be planned in the west too.

Amongst both military and political opinion in the US (not to forget public opinion also) there was a considerable divide between those favouring the first priority being given to the defeat of Japan – the initial aggressor – and defeating Germany as the first major goal. President Franklin D.Roosevelt, following discussions with Winston S.Churchill, ruled upon the latter course. There were major and pressing reasons for this decision, based upon two primary requirements. Firstly, to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of the war it was critically necessary to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union and aid it in all possible ways to reverse the direction of the conflict with the major Axis land armies. The second requirement was to maintain the integrity of the UK as the only realistic venue for a major invasion of Western Europe, aimed principally at the German heartlands. Potentially, this could even require the despatch of US forces to join in the defence of any Axis invasion should, for instance, the Soviet Union be defeated.

It was perceived from the start that any invasion of Europe would require an air attack to be launched on a grand scale, ostensibly to damage the opponent’s industrial capacity, but principally to bring the opposing air force to battle and to ensure its destruction. This latter goal could also be at least partially achieved by attacking aircraft factories and other associated plants. By this destruction it would be possible to ensure air superiority at least, and ideally aerial supremacy. Again, the only suitable base for the scale of operations required and within range of the targets to be attacked, was the United Kingdom.

When preparations of plans for this aerial offensive began to be made, the only area where direct conflict was occurring in the west was in North Africa – essentially along the coastal belt encompassing Egypt and Libya – both beyond the realistic range of a full-scale attack on southern Europe.

American military philosophy deemed the way to defeat the European Axis was to undertake direct invasion as early as possible. However, as US/British discussions got fully underway, the situation that had developed in North Africa was that pertaining at the conclusion of the initially successful Operation Crusader offensive (November 1941-January 1942). The 8th Army’s subsequent withdrawal to the Gazala Line had then occurred and here from February to May a stalemate had existed.

At this time both the US and UK were suffering a period of severe and rising shipping losses both to the German U-Boat fleet and to Japanese attacks. In Russia damaging reverses were again being suffered, particularly in the Caucasus area in the south. This also posed a potential threat of a German breakthrough from this southern extension of the Soviet Union, allowing an advance into the oil fields of Iran, and thence into the eastern fringes of the Mediterranean.

Fortunately for the Allies, the situation here coincided with the Midway victory, which improved matters considerably, particularly in regard to the future supply of shipping. However, it was immediately following Midway that Rommel’s offensive at Gazala sent 8th Army back into Egypt in defeat and confusion, with the loss of Tobruk and with a state of general crisis in Africa.

Even before their entry into the war, during August 1941 the US authorities had considered the possibility of a seizure of Dakar in Vichy French Senegal to provide bases for the protection of their merchant shipping. Now, following the Arcadia Conference in Washington at the turn of the year, a proposal to land at Casablanca on the north-west Atlantic coast of Morocco was raised under the codename Gymnast. The British had also considered the feasibility of landing on the Mediterranean coast and these plans now became the subject of further consideration as Super-Gymnast.

Gymnast envisaged putting about 180,000 troops – half US and half British – into the area. However, in January 1942 the two countries did not have enough landing craft to carry more than 24,000 men. This would only be possible with the complete support of the French, so was set aside as impracticable. It was also realised that such a move would depend on the retention of the existing lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar and no hostile action from Spanish Morocco. Consequently, no further work took place on these proposals after the start of March 1942. Joint thoughts then turned to the possibility of a direct attack on the Germans in France following a preparatory day and night offensive (the latter by RAF Bomber Command). This was Operation Round-up with a target date of spring 1943.

Prior to this some more thought had been given to potential landings in Vichy French Africa, but urgency for such an eventuality had reduced and work had stopped again on this possibility during April. Thus by mid-summer 1942 the main consideration was being given to stabilizing the Western Desert situation, and the related maintenance and defence of Malta, coupled with discussion on how best to employ available Allied forces so as to relieve the pressure on the Russians. Shipments of US Army troops to the UK had now begun (at first mainly into Northern Ireland) and the commencement of the arrival of air units – to become the US 8th Army Air Force, which would be based in the main in Eastern England.

The US Chiefs of Staff expressed enthusiasm for a major raid on the European coast which they felt might harden into a full-scale invasion (Operation Sledgehammer). Their British opposite numbers were willing to undertake small-scale commando raids, but considered that in 1942 anything larger was bound to fail. Such an attack, they stressed, would be unlikely to draw substantial German forces from the Eastern Front, while the Luftwaffe in the west was currently strong enough to contain and drive off such an incursion. The failure of such an invasion would do little to assist the Russians but would be likely to be disastrous to the French Resistance. It would also delay the planned later invasion. At this stage it would not even ‘blood’ many US troops since the force involved would have to come largely from the British.

The Americans, with little current experience of calculating the resources required (particularly in regard to landing craft) began to suspect that the British were cool on the idea of a major crossing of the English Channel even in 1943. Was this, they wondered, at least partly due to a preference by Winston Churchill for operations which offered some post-war imperialist benefit? In fact, the British Chiefs of Staff were much more concerned with the security of the sea communications worldwide, and of the Middle East and its oil.

At a second Washington Conference during June 1942 (during which news of the loss of Tobruk arrived) the western leaders agreed to concentrate on Operation Round-up and to leave ‘Sledgehammer’ for the time being. Roosevelt was impressed with the British arguments, but he remained unhappy to oppose those of his own commanders. He therefore decided to despatch his chief advisor, Harry Hopkins, and his two Chiefs of Staff, General George C.Marshall and Admiral Ernest J.King to London in July to try and persuade the British to commit to Sledgehammer. If they could not do this, then they were to choose another plan. The latter situation resulted, and all agreed that the best alternative would be the occupation of French North Africa.

This had the advantage that it would provide experience of a major landing, and if successful, would have the effect of greatly reducing the tonnage of shipping currently being sent round the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. Further, this scheme, now coded Torch, would require fewer landing craft than Sledgehammer and would be more suitable to be undertaken by untried troops. It might also perhaps bring France back into the war on the Allied side.

T

HE

P

LAN

T

AKES

S

HAPE

Following the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare for Torch, serious planning commenced at the beginning of August 1942. On 6 August Lt Gen Dwight D.Eisenhower, who since June had been commander of the US Army in the European Theatre of Operations, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force which was to be formed; he would report directly to the Combined Chiefs.

The appointment of an American commander was considered particularly apposite as this was thought likely to be more acceptable to the French given the levels of hostility to the British at this time. The Allied Forces Headquarters were set up in London with staff officers from the three services of each nation. Eisenhower’s deputy was Maj Gen Mark W.Clark and his Chief of Staff was Brig Gen Walter Beddell-Smith. Command of British land forces was given to Lt Gen Harold Alexander, who was well thought-of by the Americans; however, here the first problem arose. Early in August Alexander was chosen by Churchill to replace Gen Claude Auchinleck in the Middle East. His place in Torch was given instead to Lt Gen Bernard Montgomery, but no sooner had this appointment been confirmed than the new commander of 8th Army, Lt Gen ‘Strafer’ Gott, was killed when a Bombay transport aircraft in which he was a passenger, was shot down (see Vol 2 for more details of these events). In this emergency, Montgomery was chosen in his place. After two such swift changes, the post went to Lt Gen Kenneth A.N.Anderson. Gen Sir Kenneth Anderson, KCB, MC, was a rather dour Scot who had commanded 11 Brigade at Dunkirk during the evacuation.

The Allied naval commander, directly under Eisenhower, was Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, who returned to the Mediterranean after spending seven months in Washington as British naval member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. His was another appointment applauded by the Americans. His deputy was Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay who had planned the Dunkirk evacuation in 1940. For the forthcoming operations the Mediterranean was notionally divided into two parts. Admiral Harwood remained Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in regard to the eastern section of the sea, while Cunningham was responsible for the western part, together with a large section of the Atlantic to the west of Gibraltar. Thus he would be responsible to Eisenhower for the security of the sea communications, for supporting the armies in any further amphibious operations following the initial landings, and for the seaward defence of the North African coastal ports.

The establishment of the Allied air commander was less straightforward. Eisenhower would have preferred a single nominee as with the army and navy, but here he got two for the task in hand – Brig Gen James H.Doolittle (who had gained fame leading the first air raid on Tokyo from the deck of the carrier USS Hornet) and Air Marshal Sir William Welsh. Both had direct access to Eisenhower, who was also provided with two air advisors on his staff – Air Vice-Marshal A.P.M.Sanders and Brig Gen Howard Craig.

This was an awkward arrangement, and with hindsight probably had much to do with the fact that at this time the Royal Air Force was an independent service in its own right, while the US Army Air Force was still a part of the US Army. A desire to prevent the American air commanders being too exposed to the independence of their British colleagues would have been understandable. Certainly it was known at this time that Doolittle did not want his units too exposed to the British.

In practice a much greater disadvantage to both air forces was that the considerable experience gained by both the RAF and USAAF components of the Western Desert Air Force in the conduct of operations in co-operation with the forces on the ground, and in the handling of large air forces in unified command, was not drawn upon while Torch was being set up.

The aims set out by the Combined Chiefs and sent to Eisenhower, were threefold:

1. To establish firm and mutually supporting lodgements in Oran, Algiers and Tunis along the north coast of Africa, and in the Casablanca area on the north-west coast;

2. To exploit these to acquire complete control of French North Africa, and, if necessary, Spanish Morocco;

3. To complete the expulsion of the Axis forces from North Africa and thereafter exploit any opportunities to further the prosecution of the war northwards across the Mediterranean.

Air and sea operations against Axis installations in the Mediterranean were to be intensified to ensure that sea convoys could be pushed through to the east and operations facilitated against the Axis on the European continent.

The problems facing the planning staff were considerable. Of particular concern to the Americans was the question of Spanish Morocco – would the Germans be able, if they so wished, to bring General Franco’s Spain into the war, at least sufficiently to allow Axis forces to pass through that country to neutralise and capture Gibraltar? At the least, might forces in Spanish Morocco prove hostile and attack the supply lines to be set up between Casablanca, Algeria and Tunisia?

Further, would the Germans respond by moving into unoccupied France, at least to obtain air and submarine bases on the French Mediterranean coast, and to prepare defences against any invasion attempt there? At worst, might they be able to seize the French fleet at Toulon?

Thought had to be given urgently to the ability of the Vichy forces in North-West Africa should their government decide to contest the Allied landings. Under the terms of the 1940 Armistice, the French forces in the area amounted to about 120,000 men, divided roughly as follows:

These troops were mainly infantry, made up largely of native forces with French officers, but including units of the Foreign Legion, Chasseurs d’Afrique (Frenchmen in colonial service) and Zouaves (Africanborn Frenchmen). Morale was thought to be good and military traditions high, but weapons, munitions and equipment were scarce, while much of it and the training was obsolete (see more later).

Naval forces in Bizerta and Oran on the main north coast amounted only to destroyers, submarines and miscellaneous smaller craft. In the Casablanca area ‘round the corner’ on the Atlantic coast, however, was one six-inch cruiser, seven destroyers, eight submarines – and the modern battleship Jean Bart. The latter vessel was uncompleted, but would be able to fire from her main gun turrets. Further south at Dakar was the other battleship Richelieu and three cruisers. The main part of the fleet was at Toulon on the French south coast, comprising three capital ships, seven cruisers, 28 destroyers and 15 submarines – a formidable force.

In respect of the main Axis forces in the area, there remained still the Italian fleet comprising six capital ships, nine cruisers, 28 destroyers and 35 submarines. Like the French fleet, however, the Italians were seriously short of fuel. Also in the Mediterranean were 15 German U-Boats.

The British Air Ministry provided an estimate of Axis air strength in the area, considering that by October these would be 395 German and 500 Italian aircraft based mainly in Sicily and Sardinia, both of which islands were within 200 miles of Tunis and Bizerta. In the event these estimates were not desperately far out in total, amounting actually to 298 German and 574 Italian. Of course, these numbers could swiftly be increased from the north, and it was known that the Luftwaffe particularly had a large air transport fleet, providing great mobility and able to carry units and light equipment to Tunisia at short notice.

One of the main problems associated with the planning remained the question of shipping – particularly of how to get the troops and their equipment ashore. A degree of early experience had just been gained at this time by both the British and Americans. Against hostile, but (initially) lightly defended locations, British landings in Madagascar during May 1942 and US landings in the South Solomons (Guadalcanal and Tulagi) in August had taken place. In the very midst of the Torch planning came the disastrous landings at Dieppe on 19 August, demonstrating in no uncertain terms precisely what the British Chiefs of Staff had been trying to get across to their US colleagues regarding the likely results of too early an attempt to get ashore on the main European coast. The primary message to come out of these operations – particularly the latter two – was that well-planned combined operations of all arms were very important to achieve any lasting success.

The British had, of course, learned much at Gallipoli in 1915, the main message here having been that opposed landings over open beaches were impossible in the face of modern weapons without huge losses unless considerable and appropriate support was provided. Ideally, such support should include the use of armoured landing craft and substantial covering fire.

In the interwar years, with money critically short, little development had been undertaken in the UK, while in the US no need for such was perceived to exist. After 1940 the British had realized the requirement for such equipment if any return to the continent in the future was to take place. At that stage, with survival the first priority, the urgency was for other types of shipping simply to keep the country supplied.

Consequently both British and US shipbuilders were concentrating their efforts elsewhere; landing craft or larger landing vessels were not a high priority and remained so until mid 1942. Once design began it was initially aimed to deliver men and equipment direct to beaches. If the sea passage was short it could be undertaken directly from shore to shore. However, with longer distances, larger ships were required which generally would not be capable of beaching. These would need not only to carry the invasion force, but also the smaller craft necessary to put the men and their equipment safely ashore.

It was also realized that any element of surprise during the last stage of any opposed landing was likely to be difficult to achieve other than during the hours of darkness. Further, the way in which the troops were to be landed would differ if the landings were to be opposed or not. A change in these circumstances once the invasion was underway could create immediate problems, as happened later in the war.

Despite all these matters to be considered, and much pressure to bring forward the date of Torch so that Round-up would not be interrupted, Eisenhower presented his first plan on 9 August, setting D-Day as 5 November, later changed to 8 November. This change proved fortuitous, coming at the same time as news of the results of the El Alamein battle in Egypt, and coinciding with a day when sea conditions for the landings in the Casablanca area were at their best.

Factors governing the decision as to where to land had been affected by the question of air cover. The huge convoys necessary to launch this operation would require protection from Luftwaffe long-range patrol aircraft and U-Boats not just at the time of the landings, but during their time at sea between their ports of departure and Gibraltar. Following losses during the Pedestal operation to Malta and in the Pacific, aircraft carriers were in short supply and these would need to be carrying the greatest possible number of fighters from first light on D-Day until the arrival of Allied land-based aircraft on captured airfields. This would be particularly the case for the Algerian ports which would be in range of Axis air attack at an early date.

The British Chiefs of Staff were critically aware of the need to move as far east as possible at the earliest date achievable. They had to get to Tunis very rapidly to forestall the Axis, and the furthest point which could realistically be reached was probably Bône. In the west to secure Casablanca as the main base lodgement was considered essential, but between these two points were Algiers and Oran, both of which were important ports with good airfields.

Critically, there were simply not enough British and US troops, ships and landing craft to undertake more than three landings. Coupled with this factor, many US commanders were very concerned about putting their heads into a bag by going through the Straits of Gibraltar. Politically, the first US operation in the west had to work and in no way be an ‘adventure’ which might fail. At this stage there were still many in the USA who retained the desire to continue attacking the Japanese as the priority and who considered Torch to be peripheral.

Consequently those most concerned about potential failure in the planning team wanted to cut out Algiers and limit the landings to Casablanca and Oran only. The British riposte, while recognising the risk to the sea communications, nonetheless considered reaching Tunis a priority. If the Axis got there first and in strength, this could have a very bad effect on the French and Spanish governments. The informed naval view was that the Germans probably could not close the Straits of Gibraltar as they had failed to close the Straits of Dover. It was also pointed out that the surf on the Atlantic coast after October would only allow landings to be made onto open beaches on one day in five, putting the whole operation at risk if only Oran were to be taken.

After several days of back-and-forth discussion (to Eisenhower’s embarrassment) finally Churchill and Roosevelt intervened, deciding that the landings should be made at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers, but not at Bône or Philippeville, further east. 10,000 men from the Oran and Casablanca landings were withdrawn to form the nucleus of the Algiers force, the balance being made up with British troops. So it was that by 6 September the decisions had been made and the plans issued to accommodate landings on the Atlantic coast of Morocco and inside the Mediterranean at beaches on either side of Oran and of Algiers. The first two were to be entirely by US troops, while that at Algiers would be half-and-half US and British. Following the initial seizures, the troops in Morocco and at Oran were to join up to form the 5th US Army, ready to meet any German threat through Spain or Spanish Morocco where 130,000 troops of uneven quality were known to be based.

At Algiers, once ashore, the forces there were to become the British 1st Army, ready to move east towards Tunisia with all possible haste. Everything now depended on the attitude of the French, particularly at Algiers. To be ready for anything and to be as flexible as possible, ships and landing craft were to be loaded for opposed landings.

In preparation for Oran and Algiers all troops were to sail from the UK, escorted by the Royal Navy. Those for Morocco would come direct from the US, escorted by the US Navy. Planning for this particular part of the operation would be undertaken in Washington.

The assault forces – Eastern, Central and Western – amounted to some 65,000 men:

Eastern (Algiers) Assault Force

These units were carried aboard 15 LSIs, including four US combat loaders and 16 merchant vessels. Their priority task was to capture the airfields at Blida and Maison Blanche. In order to give the impression at first of a purely US operation, Maj Gen Charles W.Ryder, US Army, was the initial commander, but was to hand over to Lt Gen Anderson, commander designate of 1st Army; this force was to thrust east to the port of Bougie and the airfield at Djidjelli at the earliest possible moment, and to exploit eastwards from there.

Central (Oran) Assault Force

These units were carried aboard 15 LSIs; their priority task was to capture the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia. They were commanded by Maj Gen Lloyd R.Fredendall.

Western (Moroccan) Assault Force

These units were to occupy all available airfields and to passify all French forces along the Atlantic coastal strip; they were commanded by Maj Gen George S.Patton, while their naval escort was under the command of Rear Admiral H.Kent Hewitt.

In the case of this latter force, if surf made landings impossible on D-Day, the whole force was to wait for several days in the offing, for conditions to improve. If the French attitude then made landings too risky, they were to land instead between Oran and the eastern border of Spanish Morocco. To cater for the possibility of German or Spanish action from Spanish Morocco before US troops had become firmly established, a force was being held in the UK ready to be landed in the Tagura-Centra area. (This force was in the event to be held in readiness until February 1943, but was not needed.)

These movements would require huge numbers of vessels covering many thousands of miles – an unprecedented demand. Only by drawing from the British Home Fleet, by reducing the trans-Atlantic escort forces and by suspending convoys to north Russia and those between the UK and South America, could this be met. It would upset the Allied shipping programme throughout the world, although it was hoped that by January 1943 the whole North African coastline from the Atlantic to Port Said (with the possible exception of Spanish Morocco) would be in Allied hands and beginning to give great relief to shipping needs.

For the approach phase to Gibraltar and Algeria, Force H, commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Neville Syfret, had available three capital ships, three aircraft carriers, three cruisers and 17 destroyers ready to prevent the Italian and French fleets from interfering. Warships escorting the Oran force were to be adequate to prevent any French operations based on Oran or Algiers. An oiling force of two tankers with their own escorts would enable ships to fuel without needing to return to Gibraltar. Two British cruisers and three destroyers (Force G) would cruise to the south of the Azores as additional southern flank cover to the Western Assault Force.

After the landings had been undertaken, the Royal Navy was to continue to supply and support troops already moving to the east and to aid the RAF and USAAF in cutting the Axis supply route across the Sicilian straits. Subsequently these forces would also have to escort the large build-up of homeward bound vessels which would be waiting to clear the area.

Meanwhile, prior to Torch commencing, a series of night raids had been launched against the industrial areas of northern Italy by units of Bomber Command in the UK, partially designed to bring home to the Italian government that the war was beginning to impact on them as never before. Although launched from England, these attacks were very much a part of the overall Mediterranean air war in just the same way as had the Italian attacks on southern France in June 1940. Five attacks were made on Genoa and Milan prior to the commencement of the Torch landings, followed by some dozen others – mainly on Turin – prior to the fall of Tunisia to the Allies. A summary of these 17 raids is provided, for the sake of the completeness of our coverage, in the Appendix.

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It was the RAF which possessed the predominance of operational experience in the autumn of 1942. While the USAAF was rapidly becoming involved in the United Kingdom in the setting up of its 8th Air Force, such operations in which it had been involved thus far had been strictly limited.

The RAF, faced with this completely new call upon its resources, sought rapidly to create a new command structure to shoulder this responsibility. The main call would come upon the units of Fighter Command which did, of course, now have some three years of first-hand knowledge and experience to draw upon.

The build-up of fighter squadrons during this period had been substantial, and many lessons had been learned. Of particular importance, a growing supply of experienced pilots, rested since the hard fighting of 1940 and the costly cross-channel operations of 1941, now existed. They were available to provide that all-important leavening of guidance and leadership to the more recently-qualified men who made up the greater part of the strength of most units.

The involvement of the USA and the Soviet Union in the war now made the possibility of a German invasion of the home country – or, indeed, even of a major renewal of the air offensive against it – considerably less likely. It was only some six months since the despatch of the first Spitfires to the Mediterranean area, first for the defence of Malta and then to operate over the Western Desert. Now there were a considerable number of squadrons available throughout the UK which could be spared for this new theatre of operations.

However, while the command structure being set up was entirely new, the units allocated to it were drawn virtually entirely from those already existing. Unfortunately, as plans were being formalized, Fighter Command and elements of Army Co-operation Command became heavily involved in providing air cover for the ill-fated limited invasion of the French port of Dieppe on 19 August 1942. During this single day Fighter Command suffered its heaviest losses since the beginning of the war in one 24-hour period. More than 100 aircraft casualties were lost, exceeding even the heaviest day’s numbers throughout the Battle of Britain.

First of the new command units to be formed was 242 Group on 24 August. This was rapidly followed on 1 September by 333 Group and Eastern Air Command, both formed at Ruislip in the north-west London suburbs. A series of wing establishments were then set up in the 300 series, four of them created during a period of ten days. These included 326 Wing on 5 September, 322 Wing two days later at West Kirby, followed by 324 and 325 Wings, both at Wilmslow on the 14th. 322 Wing was to be commanded by Grp Capt Charles Appleton, and led in the air by Wg Cdr P.H. ‘Dutch’ Hugo, DSO, DFC & Bar, a notable South African pilot who had already claimed more than ten enemy aircraft shot down.

323 Wing would not be formed until immediately after the planned initial landings had taken place. It would be commanded by Grp Capt Edwardes-Jones and led by Wg Cdr M.G.F.Pedley, DFC. 324 Wing would be commanded by Grp Capt R.B.‘Ronnie’ Lees, DFC & Bar, the wing leader being Wg Cdr D.A.P.McMullen, DFC & two Bars, a very successful pilot, credited with nearly 20 victories. 325 Wing was to be commanded by Grp Capt D.F.W.Atcherley, DFC, with Wg Cdr G.K.‘Sheep’ Gilroy, DFC & Bar, yet another highly successful fighter pilot. It was not just the wing leaders who were outstanding for most of the commanding officers were also experienced pilots who had seen action and achieved combat successes.

These wings would all operate day fighters in the main, equipped with single-engined aircraft, but they were to be joined by 326 Wing (mentioned above). This wing was to comprise four squadrons of Bristol Bisley light bombers and two squadrons of Beaufighter VIf night fighters. The four bomber squadrons had all recently been re-equipped with the Bisley – a somewhat lack-lustre aircraft which had not served with 2 Group of Bomber Command (responsible for nearly all day bomber operations from the UK over Western Europe). Indeed, only two of these units had actually served in this role with that command. 18 and 114 Squadrons had recently undertaken the last day-bombing sorties of the war from England with the older, long-serving, Blenheim IVs; both units were at this time based at West Raynham. The other two units, 13 and 614 Squadrons, although previously also equipped with Blenheim IVs, had in fact formed a part of Army Co-operation Command and were based at Odiham. Both had undertaken some specialist sorties over Dieppe on 19 August, dropping flares and laying smoke screens.

In addition to the fighter squadrons, two units of Hurricane IIcs were also withdrawn from Army Cooperation Command to operate in the tactical reconnaissance (TacR) and fighter-bomber roles. These were 225 and 241 Squadrons, neither of which had so far been involved in any operational flying, and had been awaiting re-equipment with Mustang I aircraft – which would not now occur. While preparations were underway in great secrecy, all the squadrons involved began packing up and moving to the vicinity of embarkation ports, although the vast majority of the personnel, both air and groundcrews and including both squadron and flight commanders, had no idea where they were due to go.

The basic Orders of Battle for these units as they prepared for their new role were to be: