Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Giving the devil more than his due?

Introduction

"The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective. A limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms. Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to the strategic level. Pakistan would be prudent not to assume otherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhaps deploying theatre nuclear weapons."

– Ambassador Shyam Saran,

Former Foreign Secretary and Chairman, NSAB of India

Overview

On April 19, 2011, Pakistan surprised the world by testing the HATF IX or NASR, a delivery system for Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs). The Pakistani Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) described the missile as a ‘Short Range Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile which carries a nuclear warhead of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes’. Since then there have been numerous tests of the system. After each of the first three flight tests, the ISPR put out a largely identical press statement which stressed that the "missile has been developed to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges."¹ However, after the test in September 14, Pakistan declared that "It contributes to the full spectrum deterrence against the prevailing threat spectrum. A military official further clarified, Full spectrum of threat means that we cannot remain oblivious to all aspects including conventional and sub-conventional."² In Mar 2015, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (Retd), ex Director Pakistan’s SPD, specifically related it to India’s conventional military capabilities.³ With NASR, Pakistan aims to explore the feasibility of a flexible response to a possible Indian conventional attack by lowering the nuclear threshold. Being a short range nuclear weapon with low yield, it believes, it may not justify a massive second strike from India, thereby blocking the space for short swift offensive actions as propounded by Indian Cold Start or Proactive Operations Doctrine.

Induction of TNWs in the region has been a topic of intense debate ever since. Not only have there been numerous seminars and policy discussions on the subject, volumes of opinions and prognoses have been published by many eminent scholars. The interest generated is an indicator of the ramifications this development is bound have on the regional, as well as the global security environments; the Indian subcontinent being one of the focal points of global security. Geo-politically, it is home to almost half the world’s population and is part of the battle ground of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Economically, it remains a region of immense promise in an otherwise gloomy era of stagnated growth and recession. Therefore, stakes remain high for global powers as well as regional players.

For India, a nation with great aspirations, the stakes are perhaps the highest. Positioned as a growing power with its economy on the rise, it can ill afford such security worries, especially when Pakistan has a history of fuelling terror activities on Indian soil. However, the fact that TNWs are India centric and aimed at toppling the conventional military edge that it enjoys over Pakistan, there is an exigent need for the Indian security establishment to correctly assess the implications of this shift in the Indo-Pak security equation and arrive at plausible and enduring response options. The evolving security situation in the sub-continent and its surroundings, as indicated by periodic terror strikes in India, persistent fluid environment in Afghanistan, China’s increasingly overt leanings & support to Pakistan including its terror machinery; further add to the alacrity with which India needs to act to assess and address the emerging situation. Introduction of TNWs in the South Asian security lexicon carries with it enormous complexities. While these may be weapons of relatively smaller reach and limited destruction, associated costs and implications are enormous. As a case in point, while these need to be deployed in the battlefield under the field commanders, their usage demands strict control at the highest level; a typical paradoxical situation. Further, proliferation of such lethal munitions comes with the inherent risk of their falling into wrong hands, given the disturbed security environment of the region. More importantly, possession and deployment of such weapons in the battlefield signal a major shift in the way a nation intends to go to war – a shift fraught with inherent risks of unbridled and uncontrollable escalation. This aspect assumes importance because hithertofore, both nations, despite their bitter animosity have not allowed any of their many conflicts to escalate into a full blown and prolonged war. With induction of TNWs and conceptualisation of a New Concept of War-fighting which promotes a nuclear inter-phase to conventional hostilities, Pakistan may possibly be on the road to irreversibly damage the deterrence stability witnessed in the sub-continent so far. Therefore, the issue merits a holistic, all-encompassing analysis with implications on all types of potential conflicts across all dimensions of the security paradigm, at a time when Pakistan continues to persist with an almost no holds barred proxy war against India.

Though large amount of literature on Pakistan’s TNWs is available, most of the analyses address the issue piecemeal, particularly restricted to issues of nuclear stability. Not much attention has been directed at a comprehensive assessment of the shift in Indo-Pak nuclear balance and its implications in the overall context of a conflict continuum across all three planes i.e. sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear; particularly from an Indian perspective.

The endeavour in this book has been to holistically analyze the impact of induction of TNWs by Pakistan on the Indo-Pak Nuclear balance and suggest plausible options for conflict management by India.

It is important to understand how both nations view the usage of nuclear weapons and their respective interpretation of nuclear deterrence before we proceed to analyze the true impact of the TNWs on their inter-se nuclear balance.

Indian Perspective

India being the stronger sibling in terms of size and economy enjoys a conventional military edge over Pakistan. Politically too, it is a stable, flourishing democracy with strong civilian control over its armed forces. Current trends indicate that this disparity in status would continue to grow exponentially. While it views Pakistan as a belligerent adversary, it has no ambitions to invade or annex territory in Pakistan, unless its own security and territorial integrity is threatened. In addition to Pakistan, it also considers China as a potential rival, not only because of long pending territorial disputes, but also due to conflict of interests in the region. In this backdrop it views Nuclear Weapons purely as instruments of deterrence against a nuclear attack and not of war fighting. Due to its flourishing economy, stable democracy and geo-strategic location, it is gradually evolving as a global player and is seen by many as a champion of the Third World. Conscious of its status as an emerging responsible world power, its Nuclear Doctrine is well defined and not targeted at any particular country. It espouses No First Use (NFU) and credible minimum deterrence with massive retaliation in case of a first strike by an adversary. In order to safeguard its security interests, India primarily relies on conventional military action by its strong and disciplined armed forces which accede to civilian authority.

Pakistan’s Worldview

Pakistan, being the weaker partner in terms of economy, size and conventional military might has traditionally relied on the strength of asymmetry. Parity, or even an edge in its nuclear arsenal, is therefore seen as an answer to its security requirements vis-à-vis India. While it has not chosen to declare a Nuclear Doctrine per se, a conscious decision to retain ambiguity, there is considerable clarity on the basic tenets. Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy is India centric and relies on First Use. In addition, Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as deterring all forms of external aggression including any conventional military offensive by India.⁴ Towards this end, Pakistani leadership is believed to have decided to initiate its nuclear weapons programme as early as the late 1960s while it actually began to take shape in the later part of 1970s after Dr AQ Khan founded the Kahuta Research Laboratories in 1976. It is also imperative to draw reference to the fact that the psyche of Pakistan’s security establishment is greatly influenced by an overbearing military, largely seen as a parallel government with a strong bearing on matters of defence, internal security and foreign policy. It is also commonly believed that there is significant proliferation of religious fundamentalists and radicalized elements, including sections of the government and the military.

In light of the aforementioned issues, emerges the universe in which the induction of TNWs is to be analysed. Fielding of TNWs as a deterrent is in line with Pakistan’s policy of avoiding war with India, as it does not wish to face India’s conventional military might.

While the nuclearization of the sub-continent in 1998 was seen to have limited Indian offensive options to operational depths within the perceived nuclear redlines, the Kargil Conflict of 1999 proved that India would respond when pushed beyond a point. Subsequently, mobilisation of Indian Forces, post the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001-2002, provided further proof of India’s resolve to retaliate in case its limits of tolerance were tested. This was followed by the enunciation of India’s Proactive Strategy in 2004, which was viewed to be predicated on ‘shallow multiple objectives’ at tactical depths. Given this chronology of events, induction of NASR as a TNW is aimed at "Full Spectrum Deterrence" to further limit articulation of India’s Proactive Strategy, emasculating its conventional superiority. Concurrently, Pakistan has also embarked on an exercise to modernise, restructure and re-position its Armed Forces to orchestrate what it terms as the ‘New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF)’. In concert with the TNWs, the NCWF propounds an early nuclear interface to conventional war-fighting, in case of a conflict with India.

Pakistan has gone great lengths to project NASR as a weapon aimed at peace, "real purpose of the TNWs is that of reinforcing deterrence, preventing war in South Asia, ensuring peace…"⁵ Nevertheless, there exist doubts on the credibility of this proposition as possessing a capability is one thing, ability to effectively utilize it is another. Deterrence being a two sided affair, a lot would depend on how India perceives the threat from TNWs. While the delivery means may have been demonstrated, does Pakistan have the technology to develop a miniaturized warhead? Would it be able to produce, deploy and sustain the numbers required for effective deterrence? Given its limited strategic depth and the highly populated border areas, are these usable in time and space to deter an Indian offensive? These are pertinent questions to be answered to establish credibility.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that introduction of TNWs has lowered the nuclear threshold, further exacerbating the already fragile nuclear stability in the region. Further, there is a strong possibility that instead of seeking a stable relationship on the basis of nuclear weapon capabilities, Pakistan uses nuclear deterrence to support aggression and proxy war. The Kargil experience provides ample evidence to establish that armed with nuclear weapons, Pakistan developed increased confidence to raise the conflict thresholds with India and demonstrated a willingness to take greater risks in conflict escalation.⁶ Sporadic, yet persistent incidents of cross border terrorist strikes in India, such as the recent attack on IAF base at Pathankot, Army’s administrative base at Uri and the Officers’ accommodation at Nagrota in 2016, are pointers that Pakistan stands further emboldened to continue waging proxy war against India.

Viewed in the aforementioned perspective, serious doubts emerge regarding efficacy of TNWs as instruments of credible nuclear deterrence, and therefore those of peace and stability. There is, therefore, a need to contextualize the issue in the frame of Indo-Pakistan security dynamics including a possible conflict and arrive at realistic and plausible conclusions.

From an Indian perspective it is important to contextualize the issue in the perspective of a conflict across all three planes i.e. sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear; with credible response options for India. While there are a number of publications on the issue, most of them are in the form of either articles in defence journals or occasional papers by foreign think tanks. At the time this project was initiated, it was felt that a comprehensive research from an Indian perspective, covering the issues highlighted above was lacking. It is this gap in research, pertaining to a real situation as it exists today, that this book attempts to bridge.

The study attempted to find the answers to the following primary questions regarding the envisaged deployment of TNWs by Pakistan and the threat posed by them:-

•    Is the threat of TNWs credible enough to deter India from launching a suitable military response to a Pakistan supported terror attack?

•    Does induction of TNWs by Pakistan materially alter the Indo-Pak nuclear balance and consequently, the direction any future conflict may assume?

•    What are the response options for India to retain/ restore the nuclear as well as overall security balance?

The following secondary questions have been identified in support of the primary research areas:-

•    Is the threat technically feasible?

•    Is the plan sustainable?

•    Does employment of TNWs conform to doctrinal and operational logic in terms of time and space?

•    Given the past dynamics of Indo-Pak security environment as well as contemporary realities of the emerging geo-politics in the region, what is the envisaged trajectory of relations between these countries?

•    What are the likely scenarios over the next ten years period and how would a possible conflict pan out?

•    Is threat of use of TNWs credible in the overall context of a possible conflict?

•    How does it impact deterrence dynamics in the region?

•    What is the impact on Indo-Pak nuclear stability?

•    What is the world opinion on these developments?

•    Should India also go in for similar class of weapons?

•    Is there a need for India to review its Nuclear Doctrine? If yes, what areas need to be addressed?

•    Is there a need for India to develop or refine any other capabilities for a suitable response?

Keeping in mind the identified study areas, focus of the research was confined to issues identified above. An attempt has been made to identify the influence of Pakistan’s TNWs on the nuclear balance as well as the emerging deterrence dynamics between India & Pakistan. In doing so, plausible options for India to retain its military dominance, and consequently play the prevailing role in maintaining peace and stability in the region, have been explored.

The research was aimed at providing long term enduring solutions against the destabilizing effects of Pakistan’s TNWs. This involved a descriptive and objective analysis of the capabilities and drivers of the two competitors. Analytical tools as well as Scenario Building were used depending on the type of data collected. A questionnaire was also prepared and views of a selected target population obtained for data collection and analysis to validate the findings of the research.

Layout

The book has