Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad
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In Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Michael Walzer revises and extends the arguments in his influential Spheres of Justice, framing his ideas about justice, social criticism, and national identity in light of the new political world that has arisen in the past three decades. Walzer focuses on two different but interrelated kinds of moral argument: maximalist and minimalist, thick and thin, local and universal. This new edition has a new preface and afterword, written by the author, describing how the reasoning of the book connects with arguments he made in Just and Unjust Wars about the morality of warfare.
Walzer's highly literate and fascinating blend of philosophy and historical analysis will appeal not only to those interested in the polemics surrounding Spheres of Justice and Just and Unjust Wars but also to intelligent readers who are more concerned with getting the arguments right.
Michael Walzer
Michael Walzer is Emeritus Professor of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University. He is the author of Arguing About War, On Toleration, and Just and Unjust Wars.
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Thick and Thin - Michael Walzer
Preface to the 2019 Edition
First published in 1994, this book was an effort to define my position in the ongoing discussions of distributive justice and social criticism. The effort brought me about as close to philosophical argument as I have ever come. But Thick and Thin is chiefly a political book; I meant to defend a certain kind of left politics focused on equality at home and a liberal and constrained version of self-determination abroad. Home and abroad require different kinds of argument, which I represented with the metaphor of thick and thin—thick or maximalist arguments when we are talking to our fellow citizens, thin and minimalist arguments when we are talking to (or about) the others, citizens of foreign countries.
I am grateful to the editors at the University of Notre Dame Press for choosing this moment for a second edition—for this is a time when equality needs all the defenders it can find here in the United States, and when populists and nationalists abroad need to be reminded of the obligations that come with self-determination.
Like everyone else, I did not anticipate the revival of religious zealotry, which also requires liberal constraint in principle and (sometimes) forceful constraint in practice. Religion is obviously a form of thick or maximalist morality—in its more extreme versions it is a form of maximalist immorality. The extreme versions are open to a thin or universalist critique in aid of all the victims of zealotry: heretics, apostates, and infidels. I think that the argument in chapter four, about the return of the tribes, can be extended—in fact, needs to be extended—to include the faithful.
But what I want to add in this edition (in my new afterword) is something different. Since some of the tribes have gone to war with one another (as in the former Yugoslavia) and since some of the faithful (Al Qaeda, ISIS) imagine themselves at war with infidels everywhere, I will describe the morally necessary constraints on war, on when to fight and how to fight, as further examples of moral minimalism. As chapter 2 is a reflection on the basic idea of my Spheres of Justice, so the afterword is a reflection on my arguments in Just and Unjust Wars. Though there have been many civil wars in recent decades, people fight most often across political and cultural boundaries. Even civil wars are commonly fought by hostile tribes or sects—hence across ethnic or religious boundaries. All arguments about these wars are arguments abroad.
Whatever our thick or maximalist commitments, these are arguments that all of us can join.
Michael Walzer
Princeton, 2018
Introduction
My aim in this book is twofold: first, to rehearse, revise, and extend a set of arguments about justice, social criticism, and nationalist politics that I have been involved in making for some ten years. The revisions and extensions also represent so many responses to my critics (I am grateful to all of them). But I shall not engage in any polemics here; I want only to get the arguments right—what that might mean is taken up in my third chapter—not to gain some advantage in the critical wars. These are wars that can never in any case be won, since none of the participants are inclined, nor can they be forced, to surrender. There is no final arbiter, like the sovereign in Hobbes’s Leviathan. So I shall strengthen my arguments as best I can and wait for further criticism. Nothing in these pages is finished or done with.
But I also want, second, to put my arguments to work in the new political world that has arisen since I first presented them. This new world is marked by the collapse of the totalitarian project—and then by a pervasive, at least ostensible, commitment to democratic government and an equally pervasive, and more actual, commitment to cultural autonomy and national independence. A universal or near-universal ideology side-by-side with an extraordinarily intense pursuit of the politics of difference
: what are we to make of this? The two are not necessarily incompatible, though their simultaneous success is bound to pluralize democracy in a radical way. It will produce a number of different roads to democracy
and a variety of democracies
at the end of the road—a prospect difficult to accept for those who believe that democracy is the single best form of government. And sometimes, at least, difference will triumph at the expense of democracy, generating political regimes more closely attuned to this or that historical culture: religious republics, liberal oligarchies, military chiefdoms, and so on. Nonetheless, I want to endorse the politics of difference and, at the same time, to describe and defend a certain sort of universalism. This won’t be a universalism that requires democratic government in all times and places, but it opens the way for democracy wherever there are enough prospective and willing citizens. More important, perhaps, it prohibits the brutal repression of both minority and majority groups in democratic and non-democratic states. (I count myself among the willing citizens; I think it best to be governed democratically; but I don’t claim that my political views have the definitive endorsement of God or Nature or History or Reason.)
Difference is, as it has always been, my major theme and abiding interest. But I mean to begin, in the first chapter, by describing what I take to be a universal moment—not a philosophical but an actual moment—and the politics and morality it requires. I will then go on to restate my own particularist account of justice, in the second chapter, and of social criticism, in the third—always keeping in mind the memory of the universal moment. In the fourth chapter, I will try to show how the universalism of self-determination,
always congenial to difference, can also constrain it, setting limits to our particularist projects. And at the end, in the fifth chapter, I will provide a differentiated account of the self that will, I hope, render my defense of difference elsewhere more plausible and persuasive. When I wrote Spheres of Justice ten years ago, I argued (and I still believe) that we need focus only on things, the objects of distribution, to work out a critical account of distributive justice. The account does not require or rest on
a theory of human nature. But there is a picture of the self, nothing so grand as a theory, that is consistent with complex equality
as I described it there and with versions of complexity that I have defended elsewhere. So I will appeal, at the end, to the inner divisions of my readers—assuming that these are not unlike my own—and invite them to recognize themselves in the thick, particularist stories I want to tell about distributive justice, social criticism, and national identity.
I will describe in these chapters two different but inter-related kinds of moral argument—a way of talking among ourselves, here at home, about the thickness of our own history and culture (including our democratic political culture) and a way of talking to people abroad, across different cultures, about the thinner life we have in common. There is a thin man inside every fat man,
George Orwell once wrote, just as … there’s a statue inside every block of stone.
¹ Similarly, there are the makings of a thin and universalist morality inside every thick and particularist morality—but the story of these two is not at all like the statue and the stone. They are differently formed and differently related, as we shall see.
¹George Orwell, Coming Up for Air (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), Part 1, chapter 3. I have borrowed the idea of thickness from Clifford Geertz’s defense of thick description
in his much-cited The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), see especially chap. 1. But it is not my claim to offer a thick description of moral argument, rather to point to a kind of argument that is itself thick
—richly referential, culturally resonant, locked into a locally established symbolic system or network of meanings. Thin
is simply the contrasting term; its use is illustrated in the first chapter.
ONE: Moral Minimalism
I
I want to begin my argument by recalling a picture (I have in mind a film clip from the television news, late in that wonderful year 1989), which is the actual starting point, the conceptual occasion, of this chapter. It is a picture of people marching in the streets of Prague; they carry signs, some of which say, simply, Truth
and others Justice.
When I saw the picture, I knew immediately what the signs meant—and so did everyone else who saw the same picture. Not only that: I also recognized and acknowledged the values that the marchers were defending—and so did (almost) everyone else. Is there any recent account, any post-modernist account, of political language that can explain this understanding and acknowledgment? How could I penetrate so quickly and join so unreservedly in the language game or the power play of a distant demonstration? The marchers shared a culture with which I was largely unfamiliar; they were responding to an experience I had never had. And yet, I could have walked comfortably in their midst. I could carry the same signs.
The reasons for this easy friendliness and agreement probably have as much to do with what the marchers did not mean as with what they did mean. They were not marching in defense of the coherence theory, or the consensus theory, or the correspondence theory of truth. Perhaps they disagreed about such theories among themselves; more likely, they did not care about them. No particular account of truth was at issue here. The march had nothing to do with epistemology. Or, better, the epistemological commitments of the marchers were so elementary that they could be expressed in any of the available theories—except for those that denied the very possibility of statements being true.
The marchers wanted to hear true statements from their political leaders; they wanted to be able to believe what they read in the newspapers; they didn’t want to be lied to anymore.
Similarly, these citizens of Prague were not marching in defense of utilitarian equality or John Rawls’s difference principle or any philosophical