War in the West, The Battle of France, May-June, 1940

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Text originally published in 1942 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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WAR IN THE WEST

THE BATTLE OF FRANCE, MAY-JUNE, 1940

BY

DANIEL VILFROY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

DEDICATION 5

PREFACE 6

MAPS 7

PART 1—TOTAL WAR, ANCIENT AND MODERN 8

PART 2—THE BATTLE OF FRANCE 14

CHAPTER I—FRENCH STRATEGY 14

CHAPTER II—GERMAN STRATEGY 27

CHAPTER III—MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1940 33

1. Break-through on the Meuse 33

2. Break-through at Sedan 35

3. Breakthrough at Monthermè and Dinant 39

4. The Tactical Frontal Attack in Belgium 41

5. The Retreat to Dunkerque 53

6. The Defense In Depth 57

7. Desperate Essay At Breaking Through The German Glove Finger 61

8, The Campaign of France 64

9. The Fifth Column 68

10. The Refugees 70

PART 3—PRE-1940 CRISIS OF THE ART OF WAR IN FRANCE 72

CHAPTER I—FRANCE DID NOT HAVE THE ARMY REQUIRED BY HER FOREIGN POLICY 72

CHAPTER II—DID THE OFFENSIVE WIN THE FIRST WORLD WAR? 76

CHAPTER III—FRENCH MILITARY DOCTRINE 80

CHAPTER IV—THE QUARREL BETWEEN FORMALISM AND PROGRESS 83

PART 4—THE FRENCH SOLDIER IN 1940 92

EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, PSYCHOLOGY 92

PART V—ESSENTIALS OF MODERN WARFARE SPACE! SPEED! SURPRISE! 105

CHAPTER I—MECHANIZATION AND SPEED 105

CHAPTER II—INFANTRY 117

CHAPTER III—ARTILLERY 120

CHAPTER IV—TANKS AND CAVALRY 128

CHAPTER V—AVIATION 136

PART 6—CONCLUSION 139

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 143

DEDICATION

A mes camarades morts au champ

d’honneur; à mes camarades prisonniers

qui n’ont pas démérité; pour

prévenir une odieuse injustice!

PREFACE

I wish to pay homage to all those in military circles who have fanned the flame of the creative spirit of France.

From close and intimate contact with them I have been able to give this work its precise and vigorous lines, and to present the greatest operations in history as an illustration of the modern doctrine of mechanization. Without them, the modest torch of my knowledge and of my talent would not have been sufficiently bright to illuminate the mazes of so broad and so vital a subject.

The sense of discipline, the rigorous discretion of the French military, which they never lost, have always inhibited them from publicly bringing the issue of the military collapse of France under the German onrush before the public. It is even probable, at the present time, if they were permitted to be heard In secret sessions, that only secondary facts would be discussed.

They will appreciate, at least, that the outstanding military catastrophe of all time is presented here to the American nation from the particular point of view of what may be termed their professional heresies, toward which even the most pessimistic among them cannot fail to look, and to hope that, some day, salvation from so many errors will come.

The author desires to express his profound gratitude to Jewel de Bonilla for editorial contribution to this volume.

D. V.

New York City,

Autumn, 1942.

MAPS

The Stage For The Battle Of France

French And German Strategies 1940

The War Of 1914-1918

Sedan And The Ardennes

Tactical Frontal Attack In Belgium

The Situation On May 18, 1942

PART 1—TOTAL WAR, ANCIENT AND MODERN

War is waged with less and less sentiment. Perpetual peace is only a dream; it is not even a beautiful dream.—MARSHAL VON MOLTKE.

This is a portentous expression! As if the word war itself was not sufficiently suggestive of an exceptional condition affecting mankind, it appears that it must be coupled with an adjective which bestows upon it unique significance. Thanks to the Germans, to whom we owe our introduction to the phase, to use of the coupled words.

The antipode of total war, is a type of war, militarily prudent and wise, waged by an army of specialists, in which a country, except in the event of invasion, may not be profoundly upset. It aims only at victory, not at destruction, or plunder or annihilation. Such was the nature of the strife in which the three Horatian brothers vanquished the Curiacae. Wherein by compromise between Alba and Rome a stop was put, at least cost to all concerned, to a war in which the national existence of both belligerents was threatened.

Shall we ever see again, if not this striking and noble relinquishment of ultimate vengeance by exceptional men and military captains, at least a reasonably imitative type of modern warfare in which the decision will be made, not on the field, but around the conference table? Failing to reach an understanding by negotiation why, then, should duly appointed representatives themselves not be allowed the privilege of setting by personal combat on the field of honor, the quarrels of their respective nations? As armored champions battled in the lists during the days of chivalry.

Roman history shows that only the combatant armies and the towns that resisted them were objects of martial ire. Devastation appeared, from its very origin, unjust and inhuman. Experience showed also that it was unpolitic as well. These methods also were applied in later times, generally in colonial wars, where desire existed to conquer populated countries and not devastated areas. The notable work of French colonization in Morocco testifies to the success in operation of the clever political mind and great administrative talents of Marshal Lyautey, who allowed in Africa traditional and predominant Moslem customs and culture a continued and vigorous existence side by side with ultra-modern innovations.

It should be recognized that this form of war—conquest—while ranking higher in the humanitarian order, is in military technic inferior to total war. It originates from amongst the more civilized peoples, who deem that man, over and above war, should find far more worthy occupations. Agriculture, commerce, industry, education in all its forms, appear to them to be of precious quality, capable of affording results and satisfactions that are higher and purer than those of warfare. Instead of being an end in itself, war appears to them to be what it really is: A necessary means, without ignoring at the same time a desire for a better means, for assuring the free development of peace-time activities and protection against attacks from foreign foes. That, among other benefits, the industrial worker and the scholar might toil and study without fear or molestation. This was French thought when the cataclysm of 1940 fell upon her. The peasant of Lorraine or Beauce, the vine-grower of Burgundy, the mountaineer of Savoy looked upon war as a sordid job, even if an indispensable one. If willingly they consented to abandon the plough, the wine press, the axe, it is not because they believed they would find greater joys in the hardships of the campaigns, or in the lethal bursts of their machine guns, but because of their realization that once again all their wealth and well-being, which sprang only from the soil and from their smooth and well balanced daily work and existence, was menaced.

They were determined to defend something which for them was concrete and alive. This determination was even antecedent to a consciousness that what they were resolved upon doing was possible of accomplishment only by admitting the existence of certain values. The vocal terms into which they translated this resolution were not the same as those of the American businessman, or of the British shopkeeper, but the result of their cogitations was the same, and equally stern. In peacetime they reluctantly devoted an ever increasing share of their efforts and their resources to preparation for this war. When war began, it quickly became natural for them to think it would again develop itself in a certain zone, behind which the normal life of France would go on. Hence, as in the past, that everything back of the front would be protected from the enterprises of the enemy. Reserves, stores, communications, population would all be in a zone of security.

That old idea relates to what might properly be called a linear war. Since in that conception hostilities are but a regrettable accident, the economic organization of a country at war is based upon its peace-time needs, unless circumstances, local or otherwise, impose a different rule. It is usually sufficient to take precautions destined to assure the war-time functioning of the economic organization by adopting only simple modifications; by superimposing war-economy upon the system of business as usual. The wars of Athens, of imperial Rome, of the nations of Western Europe and of the United States belong to this type.

Separated from France by a barrier, Germany, greedy for conquest, had forced upon its peaceful neighbor the necessity for taking military measures, for organizing in order to meet this threat. But essentially peaceful nations are always tempted to accord more importance and to at-tribute more efficiency to the defensive obstacles with which they provide their territory than to the troops who are depended upon to front the enemy. The long walls of Athens, the great wall of China, the Rhenish fortresses of the Roman Empire were among such obstacles. Unfortunately for France, as it turned out, a defense similar to these was provided it in the Maginot Line. Natural obstacles, such as an immense expanse of ocean, also contributed to extreme over-confidence amongst the nations of the western hemisphere. It is at any rate most fortunate that God, through nature, provided for these countries much better and more resistant bulwarks than the industry and genius of man!

But this reasonable way of preparing for and waging war proved to be no longer efficacious. Formerly, in consonance with this model, war was prosecuted within the confines of certain provinces, while peoples and chancelleries patiently awaited the result of the contest. But now war is carried on by the nation, not only at the expense of the blood of the whole youth of the nation, but by old men, women; with the products of the soil, the output of the industrial plants, by use of the railroads, the highways, the ports, the shipping. The war that involves human, natural and mechanical masses is total, reducing the individual to insignificance. It is a fact against which, for the time being, nothing can be done.

Conceived in this aspect, war is a means of existence; it must be waged as a paying war. Since, for the German, war is depended upon to become a source of special revenues and national profit and aggrandisement, the enemy is not the state itself, which is of no avail to him. The enemy is not even the soldier, who is a mere obstacle in the way of the German’s desires; who defends the loot for which the German lusts.

The real enemy and the object of conquest and permanent possession is the private possessor, or the direct beneficiary, of the goods which he loots; the owners of houses and fields, of machinery, of animals, of wealth of all kinds. The vanquished, first of all, is to be exploited. The economic complexity of modern countries prevents these expropriations from becoming noticeable immediately as such. It is possible to acquire what the German covets and fights for by intermediaries, or merely by pretended purchase. But a transaction which exchanges the true value of a product for an illusory monetary symbol is only a bluff, window-dressing, that cannot long deceive. Thus, at the end of the war we shall realize that in this fashion most of the bonds and shares of French corporations will have passed, apparently by normal and legitimate transaction, into German hands.

On this point illuminating information was given in October, 1942, by Kenneth DeCourcy of London in his monthly review of World Affairs, who wrote that against the actual and considerably effective resistance of German-hating Frenchmen in occupied France "must be set the German’s ruthless and efficient methods of ruining France,

The proceeds of the indemnity paid under the terms of the Armistice are partly being used to buy up properties and shares in French companies. Commissioners have been appointed to control all important business. German goods are extensively sold in the French markets, with a view to getting a firm footing for the future. All safe deposit boxes in the occupied zone have been opened, and the contents seized. This has brought in assets of various kinds, including foreign currency. The Germans are still closing down French factories, allowing only those which are 75 percent on essential war work to carry on.

Modern war, of which the present is an ideal demonstration, is also total because it assumes aspects hitherto unknown. It attacks all manifestations of the national life and productive activities of the conquered countries. Should these measures prove insufficient for garnering riches, then it becomes necessary permanently to annex part of the territory Seized by the victor. Previously undertakings of this sort caused difficulties; the annexed populations were recalcitrant. To overcome this, those among the conquered peoples of Europe and elsewhere who cooperate, yield to assimilation, are permitted to remain in their own land and to retain their belongings. But those whose ability or disposition to adapt themselves to the new order is doubtful are expatriated in whole or part. One could hardly imagine for the Germans an easier and at the same time more satisfactory solution to a complex problem. They can lose nothing by the process, and profitable results thus being assured, a multitude of thorny problems can be ignored.

In order to prevent a dangerous recurrence of revengeful spirit amongst the conquered, annihilation of all enemy subjects might be considered. But this undertaking, when not rejected a priori cannot be realized. It may be essayed by use of devious means. However, instead of destroying the body of a country with all that this implies, it is possible to destroy its soul, and with it all that spiritually and patriotically is noble and great. This in any case appears to be the easier task. Superlatively the soul of a country is made up of the contributions of its best minds in letters, arts, sciences. And what is more, of its creative originality. So the Germans say: We shall burn books, we shall reduce to silence the intellectuals! These passive things, these men silently bent over their papers—here lies the real danger !

The manner in which total war is waged recommends itself by the very ends that it accomplishes. For France, at present to have a stabilized battlefield on its own territory means laboring under the heaviest portion of the war burden itself, to the consequent lightening of the burden for the Germans; to suffer the most grievous effects of the war of annihilation. The status quo means that France’s cities, its war production, its communications, its ports are within easy reach of German bombers. It also results in situating corresponding objectives in Germany beyond reach of blows from French aviators.

A much more widely spread front of destruction has been added to the fighting front proper. This is no longer a linear war; it is a war in depth. As in the past, in the Middle Ages, everybody, every interest, now has to worry about his or its own security. War reserves must be established where they can be defended; convoys have to be escorted. Army reserves have to be protected, just as do front line troops. During the campaign of France, old territorials, who thought themselves quite safe in camps 200 miles back of the most advanced engagements, were made prisoners, while engaged only in non-combatant activities. When battles were fought south of the Vosges, German troops reached the Spanish border. Ammunition dumps, supply depots, ports, big railroad stations, important crossroads, however remote, became objectives of the enemy. Their attack and their defense became essential phases of the war.

No longer was it sufficient to guard against the menace of air attack by means of shelters—the only protection against which provisions were made. The methods of the Middle Ages would have been efficient against panzers: moats filled with water, high ramparts defying assault, forts and castles closed with heavy gates and protected by draw-bridges or other means.

But this total war is also a war of terror which designs to shake the morale of the foe. It may be regarded as a prolongation of a state of semi-peace, which suffices to reduce a weak or undecided foe. Never previously had it been possible to obtain such surrenders without fighting, by the mere brandishing of the terrible weapon of fear, as during the years that preceded the outbreak of hostilities.

A process of war which relates to the war of terror in its material results is the creation of scorched earth intentionally left behind it by a retreating army, to delay its pursuers; even to starve or vanquish them. The Russians have applied this method of devastation most effectively, and its effects have been multiplied by the immensity of the territory to which it was applied. Charles XII and Napoleon were vanquished by the projection into war of a merciless nihilism of this sort.

How remote we are here from the point of view of the Frenchman, who is cautious. Conditioned by the feeling of ownership, by property-sense in his blood and brain, either in war or peace, as a rule he will always strive to limit or cut his losses. Beaten, he is sustained by an incredible faith in his ultimate destinies, incomprehensible to many foreign observers. If, as the saying goes, the Englishman is sure to win the last battle, so likewise is the Frenchman supremely confident of rising from the depths of national or personal misfortune.

This total war is rapid. Because no temporizing is allowed, war, per se, interrupts the normal life of nations and absorbs their activities and their forces in all fields, and stakes their very existence on its result, favorable or fatal. It is only an act of prudence to do everything possible which tends to shorten the crisis, to seek to obtain at any price a quick decision resulting in the destruction of one of the antagonists by a merciless fight. What is aimed at is to bring the foe to his knees. Peace negotiations usually are opened only when one antagonist has been shown that he can be disposed of at will. In this way the wars between barbarians have been conducted since the downfall of the Roman Empire, and so also the struggle between Rome and Carthage. This is the manner in which the German troops eliminated the French army so quickly. The quicker one strikes, the greater the surprise, and the more difficult is the riposte. A long minute preparation for an offense will never be worth the immediate exploitation of a temporary strategic advantage. The German infantrymen have frequently advanced, rifle hanging from the shoulder, in deployed formation, without utilizing the terrain, to attack an enemy in position. It was necessary to do this, to save time, and not to wait for the foes’ reserves to arrive. The cost was high; many fell, but it paid in results.

Therefore this method is to be preferred to the custom of the old school to gain terrain, which at the instigation of von Kluck, in 1914 brought him to his defeat on the Marne and to the pursuit of the German forces.