Incident Management in Australasia: Lessons Learnt from Emergency Responses

Introduction

Stuart Ellis AM

Chief Executive Officer, Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council

Firefighting, flood rescue, earthquake rescue and other responses required of fire and emergency services are inherently dangerous and even more so if the hazards are not understood. The dangers to personnel have been well mitigated over the years with excellent training, equipment, personal protective clothing and operational procedures that minimise the risk.

That said, managing the major incidents that inevitably occur, and developing the capability of our personnel to be best prepared, has not always received a high level of priority and resourcing. While the safety of our people and the broader community remains our highest priority, the incident management skills required to maximise this require constant development and practice to remain current.

I have maintained the view for many years that our industry has placed too little attention on incident management. Although we have developed some very capable individuals, there has been an expectation that they will simply develop almost ‘automatically’ through ‘the system’ with experience. Individuals have been exceedingly committed, but the commitment of the industry to developing incident management capabilities has not always been optimal. In the last 15 years we as an industry have been repeatedly advised we need to place greater resources on developing incident management; now our Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) agencies and our jurisdictions recognise this is required and indeed are resourcing this requirement.

Some agencies have been better listeners and have taken up the challenge with formal courses and even some professional screening and development pathways. This has certainly been of benefit. Until recently, however, even the need has not been well recognised by some of our agencies, let alone transformed into an implemented strategy, training and development.

We have heavily relied on Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System™ (AIIMS) as our incident management doctrine and it has supported incident management well. The system reflected in the manuals, courses and training materials continues to be the foundation for our incident managers. It is one of the core elements binding AFAC agencies. Agencies have also contributed numerous courses in AIIMS roles and conduct exercises. The analysis contained in numerous post incident reports, independent inquiries, coronial reports and royal commissions have added significant depth to our incident management knowledge. These formal reports have provided greater understanding and, at times, specific criticism regarding how we have managed operational incidents.

The publishing of this book was seen as part of that greater commitment by the industry to inform and educate incident managers. It is a further element to progressing our understanding of incident management and managing major events and multiple incidents at state and regional level. It is not intended as an academic work. Rather, it is a collection of stories – some very personal and specific, some more generic – from people who were there, who felt the strain and the pain, or from people who reviewed the incidents subsequently and gained significant knowledge and understanding through that process. All relate to managing operational events and all contribute to what we already know.

I have been reliably informed that there is far too little academic literature on incident management. While we have used AIIMS since the 1980s, little has been written in academic literature. I am aware some progress is being made and I welcome this; however, this book is not part of that academic library. It is the words of practitioners recalling what they had to manage and the impact that had.

The stories in this book traverse the roles of an incident manager, a regional manager and indeed State Controller, Chief Officer and Commissioner. There are clear operational lessons and impacts, which this book captures across a range of incidents no one person is likely to ever face in a career – certainly not at the intensity and impact of the incidents discussed in this book. There is also significant discussion about the strictly non-operational considerations, the reflections and approaches adopted. They reflect several initiatives that are changing and indeed improving our incident management.

The stories in this book, linked with more formal inquiry and research, will assist incident managers and all those working in incident management teams. Together with research conducted previously by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and now by the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre, it will increase the body of knowledge available to those completing this challenging task.

Like many, I truly value the power of our leaders telling their story. They do so in this book – not just relating what happened, but in many instances how they felt and reacted, the impact and the pain and the lessons they identified. In one volume this book provides a range of experiences across a diverse series of hazards. This includes some of the most significant fires that have shaped our incident management and operational procedures, as well as our equipment and personal protective clothing, through to floods, earthquakes and broader reflections on emergency management.

The recently introduced Emergency Management Professionalisation Scheme will further recognise, support and assist incident managers. The introduction of this scheme emphasises messages from the stories in this book: that incident management is demanding and challenging; it requires the application of professional skills; and knowledge and currency can only be maintained by ongoing engagement and professional study. I recommend the book to you all.

1

Fire catastrophe at Wangary on the Eyre Peninsula, South Australia

Euan Ferguson AFSM

Chief Officer, Country Fire Authority, Victoria (Formerly Chief Officer of the South Australian Country Fire Service 2001–10)

Introduction

From December 2001 to November 2010, I was the Chief Officer of the South Australian Country Fire Service. On Tuesday, 11 January 2005 a major bushfire burned across much of the southern Eyre Peninsula in South Australia, causing significant damage and loss of life. The country was in long-term drought. The grassland and roadside scrub was tinder dry, as was the stubble from the recent harvest. The whole of South Australia was under a total fire ban. Flames were initially fanned by scorching hot and dry winds from the north. Spread rates were consistently over 30 km/h – the fastest ever recorded grassfire rate of spread. In the late morning, a strong and intense dry wind change from the south-west swept the eastern flank of the fire and roared towards the east coast of the Eyre Peninsula. Through luck and circumstance, the fire skirted around the north of Port Lincoln. Other communities, farm houses, stock and infrastructure were not so lucky. Over 70 000 ha were burnt; most of that was burnt in about a four-hour period. Nine people died. Over 100 dwellings and buildings were destroyed. Communications infrastructure, power lines, water pipelines, fences and even road surfaces were scorched, melted and twisted by heat.

The fire had a catastrophic impact and a long-lasting effect on the southern Eyre Peninsula. It would take many weeks and months to restore essential infrastructure. For the people, their homes and farming livelihoods, it would be many years to get to a new normality. For some, the memory, loss and hurt from the Wangary fire will never be gone.

This chapter is a personalised account of how we prepared for the fire, how we responded to and managed it, as well the consequences of the fire and the subsequent coronial inquest. In particular, I refer to how I as Chief Officer, along with the Country Fire Service (CFS) team, took the initiative after the fire to develop and implement a change strategy within CFS. The changes we made in the years after the fire were lauded by the Coroner at the time.

This chapter deals with the effect that the fire had on me, both professionally and personally. As I write this on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the fire, I have had 10 years to ponder and reflect on the enduring lessons this fire taught me. I am using this chapter as an opportunity to influence women and men who might be in, or aspire to, senior operational roles in fire, emergency management and crisis management roles. I offer 10 tips for successfully managing an emergency which have worked for me over the years. I have gone on to be Chief Officer of the Victorian CFA and, to a large degree, I still use the 10 tips outlined here to good effect. They have stood the test of time and served me well.

The day before the fire

Some parts of the Wangary fire stand out very clearly in my mind. Other parts are lost in a fog. I do recall the briefing teleconference we had at the CFS (the South Australian Country Fire Service) headquarters on Monday, 10 January 2005 in the late afternoon. The Bureau of Meteorology forecaster read out a grim set of weather statistics – in today’s terms, extreme and ‘catastrophic’ fire dangers across the state. The experienced forecaster said that these were about the worst set of weather conditions he had ever seen. I still recall the unease that comment triggered in my gut: a nervous discomfort that would persist for the next few days. There was a chill of nervous anticipation amongst those around the briefing table.

Following the briefing our discussions centred around preparations for the next day. A grass fire had occurred near Wangary late in the afternoon. (Later, the Coroner would determine that the cause was a modified exhaust on a prospector’s four-wheel drive that was driven across long grass.) We discussed our concerns about the fire. Details seemed sketchy. We teleconferenced with the local CFS region. There were offers of help, met by reassurances that the fire was in hand. But the sense of unease persisted.

As was our practice, on Monday afternoon and evening we were busy preparing. Specialist personnel had to be contacted and rosters activated. Other agencies had to be warned and briefed. Total fire bans were declared for the whole state. Media messages and community warnings were issued. CFS people were briefed and tasked, and discussions were held with senior police, the Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH) and the Minister’s staff. Briefings were arranged for a range of government agencies and emergency management bodies early the following day.

11 January 2005

Dawn on Tuesday, 11 January heralded the dry heat of an untrustworthy wind, mild at first but building in strength. It had been a sweaty, uncomfortable night. I awoke to the alarming news that the size of the fire at Wangary the previous day was far larger than we had first believed. Crews on the fireground had worked hard overnight to secure the edge of the fire. They reported that the fire had been contained, but it was tenuous. As local controllers described the task confronting them, I was filled with a sickening dread.

At CFS headquarters, our team assembled to deal with new fires across the state. At this time, the Wangary fire was contained. Everyone was anxious. We knew that crews would have their work cut out for them with the winds that were building quickly on the southern Eyre Peninsula. The time and distance involved in sending support to the CFS teams on the Eyre Peninsula were problematic. This day was a day of extreme fire danger across all of South Australia. Even if we had taken a decision to move scarce resources from other parts of the state to the Eyre Peninsula, it would take many hours for them to arrive; and we were potentially robbing our initial attack capability for new fire starts elsewhere.

Updates to briefings and warnings were made, as we monitored the worsening conditions. Under these conditions I had regular contact with the Chief of the Metropolitan Fire Service (MFS), the Police Commissioner and his Deputy, and the Minister’s Office. My key people, senior CFS and DEH fire managers, helped me analyse where the greatest risk lay. Sometime after 10 a.m. I was advised that the Wangary fire had broken through its containment lines. The fire was running again – totally out of control on the southern section – in harvest stubble, roadside scrub and through the Wanilla Forest. My worst fears were being realised. I recall standing with a small group in the CFS planning cell, looking at a map of the southern Eyre Peninsula. With a highlighter pen I drew a broad swathe to the south then, knowing that a south-westerly wind change was imminent, I continued the swathe to the east and north-east. Some weeks later I compared that actual fire area to the roughly drawn map of that morning; it was tragically accurate.

Warnings were prepared and issued for settlements in the path of the fire. Additional resources from across the Eyre Peninsula, including from the South Australian MFS, were activated. Incident management personnel, already weary from their efforts the previous night, were recalled to the Incident Control Centre at Port Lincoln.

Coordinating a major fire

It was clear that this was going to be a major emergency, so Police Commissioner Mal Hyde, his Deputy John White, and MFS Chief Grant Lupton and I gathered in the State Coordination Centre (SCC). Between us, we were able to gather and share information on the progression of the fire at Wangary. In the mid-afternoon, under strong winds, a new fire started on the edge of the Adelaide-Crafers Highway, burning up towards Crafers. From a corner of our room at the SCC we could peer out the window and see billowing grey-black smoke in the direction of Mount Osmond and the freeway. We could only wonder what it was like for residents, crews and emergency workers out there in these hostile conditions. Fortunately that fire was controlled late in the day with little loss, thanks to the tireless efforts of firefighters from all the South Australian fire services.

At the SCC we received new information. We were noting changes to weather, locations of the fire head, road closures, warnings, resource movements and supporting requests from incident management teams. By mid-afternoon, police advised of the first fatalities: two bodies were found near a burnt out farm fire unit. Then more bodies were discovered in a burnt out car. This sobering news put a new scale of gravity on the situation.

The afternoon wore on. The details are now a blur in my memory. My CFS official log book is my enduring record of the day. There were regular calls to and from my location at the State Emergency Centre and the CFS headquarters. Support, in the form of fixed wing firebombing aircraft from the Adelaide Hills, ‘strike teams’ of additional firefighting trucks, and incident management personnel was sent from Adelaide and from surrounding districts. We arranged additional CFS staff officers to fly to Port Lincoln. There were regular situation and damage updates – each passed on to the Police Commissioner and the Chief of the MFS, as well as to the Minister or to his advisor. Major highways and roads were blocked, the main water pipeline burst and the count of houses, farms, stock and fences destroyed grew.

That evening we held a press conference: lines of cameras, voice recorders and dazzling spotlights. While the tally of losses would take days to confirm, we knew that nine people had lost their lives in the Wangary fire. We were all shocked at this loss of life. I recall my own numbness at the extent of the fire and the reports of widespread damage to properties and infrastructure. It is hard to fully describe the surreal feeling of exhausted detachment – a combination of shock, grief, weariness and anxiety probably overcame me.

That evening there was a briefing of the State Emergency Committee, Premier, Ministers and senior government officials. Mal Hyde and I were the key speakers. The Premier Mike Rann and the Emergency Services Minister Patrick Conlon were keenly interested. They asked questions and sought details. By the time the briefing finished it was dark and, thankfully, cooler. I still recall the pent-up emotion. Outside the building, MFS Chief Grant Lupton and I shared a moment to check and reassure each other.

Later that evening, I returned to the CFS headquarters. I was physically and emotionally drained. The mood at the headquarters was sombre – something that would take many months to turn around.

The days after the fire

Amongst the death toll from the fire were two CFS volunteers, Neil Richardson and Trent Murnane. Brave men, they were on a farm fire unit and died trying to fight the fire shortly after the wind change. Each was loved by a family – a family that would never again be able to share special days, never be able to see their loved ones grow old and wise. The saddest day of my life was, with CFS Board members Ray Dundon and Russell Branson, visiting these two families shortly after the fire. There was no anger or bitterness, just sadness, hugs and many tears. If I were to dedicate changes to CFS since the Wangary fire to anyone, it would be to the memory of Neil and Trent.

I recall driving around the fire area the day after, with Emergency Services Minister Pat Conlon. We visited the Incident Control Centre and the CFS Regional Office. The government moved quickly to establish Minister Patrick Conlon as a ‘Duty Minister’, located at Port Lincoln. He was effectively delegated the authority of the Premier and Cabinet to get relief and recovery efforts underway quickly and without fuss. Pat was a larger than life personality who gave clear and unambiguous direction. He was a no-nonsense, pragmatic Minister who was tough but fair, and he was ideal for this role in the first week after the fire.

The media’s attention was constant. Initially they were seeking facts and accounts by various players. Much of the media was positive. But as journalists do, over time there were theories and differing views on the fire cause and the CFS effort at managing the fire. Questions were asked as to the timing of warnings: why were there not more aircraft – specifically why didn’t South Australia have more aircraft and why no Aircrane (heavy firebombing helicopter)?

Some of the social media was brutal. An email (from a disaffected person) that accused us of being murderers reduced our small, talented media team to tears. The calls would start before dawn and often go late into the evening. The media people had to synthesise messages with government and other agencies. Wherever possible I tried to take the media load (especially where it was critical of CFS). I tried to ensure that the media team were well supported and rested. In spite of this, each of the media team, in their own way, needed time out to recover after the fire.

At the end of the first week after the fire, Pat rang me and asked that I meet with some angry farmers from the fire-affected area who had been in contact with him. When I met with these farmers at the Wangary hall, I was told of the disappointment that they felt about how CFS fought the fire. I listened for several hours, then toured the fireground with them. I took on board their concerns, most of which seemed to be reasonable and to have validity. Before leaving, I made sure that I could work through one of their leaders in the future. This was the start of an ongoing and very productive relationship. I think it was on the flight back to Adelaide that evening that I first realised that, as Chief Officer, I had a responsibility to fix the issues that they had identified.

Project Phoenix

I set about forming a team to carry out our own analysis and report of what had happened in the lead-up to and during the Wangary fire. We had a group of people from other government organisations and from local government and the then South Australian Farmers Federation, who helped steer our analysis. We engaged a small group of ex-military consultants to guide us through the process and to help the process to be objective and (as much as it could be) inclusive and transparent. These consultants injected new thinking and (because they weren’t involved in the firefight) they were able to be optimistic when we lost our focus and our energy ran low. This improvement process developed into what we called ‘Project Phoenix’ – a report that made over 130 recommendations for change. Two of the principles for Project Phoenix were ‘no blame’, and that change has not occurred until it has been implemented and validated. Another principle was that everyone works in a system. If a mistake or error occurs, it is because the system has broken down. Don’t look to blame the people in the system – look to the design of the system. Change needs to focus on improving the systems of work.

Project Phoenix was completed around three months after the fire. It quickly became our template for future CFS activities and for controlling the agenda – including the media. I kept coming back to the Project Phoenix Steering Committee, local farmer leaders and CFS leaders and testing whether we were on the right track or not. I was determined that I was going to be responsible for seeing the CFS systems of work improve to make CFS a better, stronger fire service and to set up systems to better warn and protect the community.

Support for CFS

The government of the day was very supportive. Premier Mike Rann and Emergency Services Minister Patrick Conlon both were significantly involved and I felt that they were both with us at every step along the way. In the first week after the fire I had a telephone call from the head of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, Warren McCann. Warren wanted to specifically tell me that Cabinet supported CFS and me in my role as Chief Officer. It was a reassuring phone call. Others too were there to offer advice and constructive views: Police Commissioner Mal Hyde and Mal’s Deputy, John White, were constant supporters along the journey; Grant Lupton, Chief of MFS, was a collaborator as was the Environment Department chief Allan Holmes and former CFS CEO Vince Monterola. Vince was tireless in his role leading the recovery effort after the fire. He played a crucial role in joining up local Eyre Peninsula property owners with local government agencies and getting the task of recovery done with a minimum of fuss. He was always watching to ensure any concerns about CFS were channelled back to me. Each of these people, in their own way, took time out to provide personal support to me and organisational support to CFS. This is something I have never forgotten. The lesson here is that the seeds of trust, sown while developing relationships, can bear a rich harvest.

The coronial inquest

There was the long period of the coronial inquest under the control of Deputy State Coroner Anthony Schapel. At the time, this became the longest running coronial inquest in Australia’s history. There were few stones left unturned. One of the experts, CSIRO’s Dr Jim Gould, gave evidence that for much of its run the Wangary fire burnt at a rate of spread in excess of 30 km/h. This is an exceptional speed – easily the fastest ever documented. It is proof that the fire on 11 January was one of the most severe and ferocious in Australia’s history.

By the time my turn came to give evidence to the Coroner, CFS was well down the track of making significant changes and improvements through Project Phoenix. I spent a long time, many days, in the witness box. This is accountability at work. It was a stressful period. I was subjected to death threats and for a time during my evidence had a police detail for my protection.

There was a rare light-hearted moment. As a forester I have fought many fires using a rake-hoe, a basic hand tool that enables the user, alone or in a team, to scratch a mineral earth trail, or control line, around a fire. At a particular stage in my evidence the Coroner was keen to explore my views on how the fire could have been fought differently. In my view, a vulnerable edge of the fire in a creek bed on the southern part of the fire could have been strengthened by using a rake-hoe trail supported by hose lines on the Monday evening before the fire broke away. I am somewhat an aficionado of the rake-hoe and I enjoy teaching people about their use. My evidence started with the words: ‘The rake-hoe is a much maligned and most underrated, but versatile and effective firefighting tool …’ Lunch followed soon after my explanation finished. A few days later I was told that my account about rake-hoes was the longest response to a single question of the whole inquest. Months later I used my explanation about rake-hoes in a short handout that I gave to CFS people (along with a small metal rake-hoe lapel pin). The rake-hoe remains an effective and relevant firefighting tool today. I continue to extoll the effectiveness of its use.

The day the Coroner brought down his findings was another strong memory. It had been over two years from the time of the fire. The Minister of the day Carmel Zollo had asked me not to go to Port Lincoln where the Coroner was delivering the findings. I think this was partly because there was some concern for my welfare, but also because of the high media interest and an uncertainty about what the findings would contain. The Coroner, in making his findings and recommendations, applauded the fact that CFS had recognised the need for change and had effected many of our own changes. In delivering his findings the Coroner specifically said that I continued to be the right person for the job. I can still recall the surge of relief and the emotion that washed over me when the Coroner uttered these words. Later that afternoon there was a media conference with the Acting Premier Kevin Foley and Minister Carmel Zollo. Both the Minister and the Acting Premier spoke. I answered questions. One journalist, who knew me well, asked if I had ever considered resigning. My throat, already dry and tense, seized up. My emotions welled. Kevin Foley jumped to be by my side, took the stand and said that if I had offered my resignation that it would not have been accepted by the government. The strength of his response quashed any further discussion on that subject.

Managing myself

I have several books, newspapers and videos of the fire and the period of the recovery. The statistics and many stories of the fire are well told in those publications. Many of the books are on my bookshelf, unread to this day. For weeks after the fire I could not read newspaper reports and I avoided the nightly news. The pain of memories evoked was too real, too deep and for a long time the emotion was too difficult to deal with.

The fire had a deep impact on me. I had to purposefully analyse my own role and actions on the days around the fire. I had to lift the morale of tragically affected CFS personnel. I felt that many – in CFS, in government and in the community – were looking to me for direction and to provide hope for the future. I engineered time (I tried to get half a day a fortnight) to think things through and plan the recovery and transformation of CFS. I deliberated on a set of behaviours that I needed to display to give confidence to those around me and to the community. I found myself constantly reviewing my own performance and seeking feedback.

I was lucky to have some very close and dear friends and a wonderfully supportive family. Each of these, in their own way, would understand when I came home sad or grumpy, or if I called but didn’t have the composure to utter the words that I wanted to spill out of my mind.

I recall one evening, after some particularly gruelling media, coming home late. The family had eaten. I was tired, upset and sensitive, but trying hard to hide all this from those who were closest to me. I walked into the kitchen and my eldest son Ben, then about 17, just came up to me and gave me a big long hug. He didn’t say