The Alpine Corps on the Dolomite-Front, 1915: Myth and reality

truth."

Introduction

On Pentacostal Sunday, 1915, the First World War began to also expand to the Alps Mountains. None of the warring nations were sufficiently prepared for this situation because past experience for such a case was completely lacking. Never before had a war been fought in the high mountains over an extended period of time. The military had tried to avoid that kind of terrain, as the reigning opinion held that a war in the mountains would be difficult to direct and promised little chance of success. Until 1915, the German Empire possessed no mountain troops because they were considered unnecessary. However, as the situation reached a critical point in 1915 and an imminent war with Italy seemed to be unavoidable, Germany decided she would also form mountain troops in order to protect her southern borders in case of an attack, as well as to provide support for Austria against Italy. Consequently, the declaration of war by Italy against Austria-Hungary coincided with the hour of birth of the German mountain troops, specifically the Alpenkorps (Alpine Corps).

Among the following pages, the unique nature of the high mountain theater of combat is presented and evaluated in order to accentuate the differences between it and the flatland theaters of operation. Moreover, the Alpenkorps was markedly distinctive from other units in the German Army during the First World War. These differences and peculiarities will likewise be clarified. In order to give the reader a better understanding of the period when the Alpenkorps was created and of its first mission, an historical summary will first be presented.

In this context, the book at hand explores the relationship between Italy and Austria-Hungary on the eve of the Italian declaration of war. It additionally deals with the military situation of the Central Powers in the spring of 1915. And it will analyze particular aspects, which are directly associated with the so-called Mission in Tyrol. One will find, for example, an examination of the Edelweiss insignia on the headgear worn by the Alpenkorps soldiers, which clearly distinguished these men from the rest of the German Army. Or, one will likewise read an analysis in this book of the German-Austrian Brothers-in-Arms concept, which had become well-known even during the war. The Leader of the Alpenkorps, Lieutenant-General Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, will be studied in its own section. Above all, his personal wartime diary – in which he wrote about the Mission in Tyrol – is especially information-rich and provides a very interesting contemporary resource.

Men of Mechanical Transport Column Nr. 695 stand in front of the Gasthaus Ladinien (Ladinien Restaurant/Inn) in Stern (La Villa). The abundance of automobiles with which the Alpenkorps was richly supplied is evident in this picture. In fact, only cars are present, indicating that this is probably the advance element of a supply column composed of trucks following behind.

The operational history of the Mission in Tyrol will be completely examined, meaning the reader will find individual aspects discussed concerning the types of missions carried out by the Alpenkorps. In so doing, the obstacles and problems it encountered will be especially addressed, the surmounting of which helped turn the Alpenkorps into mountain troops.

To the present day, the 1915–1917 Mountain War in the Alps has played only a minor role in German world war research. Accordingly, very few scholarly works are to be found that deal with the first German mountain troops, i.e., the Alpenkorps. For a long time, it was primarily popular research literature that painted the picture of the war in the Alps and likewise of the Alpenkorps. As opposed to this, the war in the Alps and its perception on the so-called Home Front (primarily in Austria, especially in Tyrol) has been pulled into the focus of research in the last few years.

In the second part of this book, an attempt is made to fill a void. By means of selected works, the image of the Alpenkorps will be examined that emerged in the period between the two world wars and which was broadly disseminated. This image primarily contributed to the passing along of the Alpenkorps myth, which remained unchallenged for a long time. Therefore, the authors’ themes will be studied in order to prove and evaluate them by means of available individual examples from the text.

The final attempt to provide a picture of the Alpenkorps concerns itself with the 1936 movie Standschütze Bruggler, whose scenes depicting the Alpenkorps are analyzed. This film offers a unique cinematic source, in which the Alpenkorps is depicted during its Mission in Tyrol.

The present book originated from the author’s Master’s Degree thesis written in the 2010/11 timeframe. It had been intended for a more general readership, but was re-worked and expanded specifically for this book. In it, the author casts a fresh look at the perception of the first German mountain troops, and more thoroughly investigates and attempts to correct the myth of the Alpenkorps. The first mission of the Alpenkorps in South Tyrol in 1915 stands squarely at the center of this effort. At the same time, the author wishes to present a realistic assessment of the conditions to which the Alpenkorps was subjected in South Tyrol between May and October, 1915. This is intended to show the reader that even the Alpenkorps had to undergo a learning and developmental stage, and in no way represented an outstanding and fully matured mountain troop formation from its beginning, as has been maintained up until now.

An Alpine Corps’ mechanical transport column in a rear area in the Dolomites. In the background, the small Dolomite locale of Stern (La Villa) can be discerned.

Finally, please note:

The names used in this book for mountains, valleys, mountain passes, towns and locales were the ones in force at the time of the Mission in Tyrol during the 1915 timeframe when South Tyrol was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the past century, national possession and names have changed for some of these places, including South Tyrol belonging to Italy today. Two examples of name changes would be Bozen/Bolzano and Bruneck/Brunico, the modern Italian name being the second of the two. The reader is advised that he may use an Internet search to find the modern equivalent to the original names cited in this work.

Immanuel Voigt

Jena, Germany

The Situation on the Eve of the Italian Intervention

The Negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Italy Up to the Declaration of War

In the following pages, the situation between the Central Powers and Italy up to the time of the declaration of war on May 23, 1915, will be presented to the reader. The negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Italy stand squarely at the center of this situation. In this connection, preparations for war and Italy’s war goals will be made clear. In conclusion, the focus will fall upon Austria-Hungary, in that its reactions and first measures taken will be addressed.

After the First World War had broken out in August, 1914, Italy initially considered herself neutral. The Triple Alliance that had united Italy, Austria-Hungary and the German Empire by treaty since 1882 was for all intents and purposes as good as virtually dead¹ by 1914. The alliance that had been forged from a marginally friendly relationship markedly intensified the mistrust primarily between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Shortly after the beginning of the war in August, 1914, Austria-Hungary resigned herself to the probability that despite Italy’s announcement of her neutrality, aggression against South Tyrol could occur. This clearly shows that in the years prior to the First World War, Italy was already increasingly distancing herself from the Triple Alliance. Even before 1914, the Italian-speaking territories around Triest and Trient had a special significance for Italy as the point of reference for the Irredenta, an ideology whose goal was to unite as many areas as possible containing a certain ethnicity into a common state. They were to be added to the Italian state in order to complete the national unification called Risorgimento. From the Italian point of view, this goal could be achieved relatively easily by means of a short, limited campaign against Austria-Hungary. Hans-Jürgen Pantenius makes the following observation: It was a theory of a limited conflict with the goal of crowning the Risorgimento wars with a final easy success, and adding the ‘unliberated’ territories to the previous acquisitions without great bloodshed.²

The outbreak of war in August, 1914, appeared to deliver a welcome opportunity to attain this goal. Although Italy officially declared herself neutral, she worked behind the scenes on preparing her army for war, as well as on a general armament program. The relations between Italy and the Hapsburg Monarchy began to become ever more strained after Italy demanded compensation from Austria-Hungary for its incursion into Serbia in September, 1914. These demands were based upon Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. By this time, Italy was already convinced that the completion of the Risorgimento could only be realized if she sided with the Entente powers. The fact that the war had not gone well for the Central Powers so far – in that they had been unable to achieve a quick victory – contributed significantly to Italy’s decision to side with the Entente.

In October, 1914, Italian Prime Minister Antonio Salandra spoke of a sacro egoismo (Sacred Self-Interest), which would influence Italy’s future dealings. At the beginning of 1915, the Italians renewed their demands for the assignment of the Trentino to them, as well as the border up to the Brenner Pass and portions of Istria. The continuing unfavorable course of the war for the Central Powers and the draining of their strength that the war was causing had emboldened Italy’s demands anew. Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron Burian flatly rejected the demands, which were viewed in the eyes of Austria-Hungary as attempted extortion. For its part, the government in Rome had lost its patience and began negotiations about a possible entry into the war on the side of the Entente. In order to also ensure Italy’s continued neutrality, the Germans came to the conclusion that this could be achieved by further concessions. Consequently, in March of 1915, the German Empire pressed Austria-Hungary to resume negotiations with Italy over territorial transfers.

Cletus Pichler, in his capacity as former Chief of Staff of the Tyrolean Homeland Defense Command, candidly expressed the situation from the Austrian viewpoint: "Relentlessly pressured by the Germans to pay dearly for Italy’s neutrality – a deceitful member of the Triple Alliance – the Austrians were obliged to give