Enhancing Combat Effectiveness;: The Evolution Of The United States Army Infantry Rifle Squad Since The End Of World War II
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Combat effectiveness is determined by applying the evaluative criteria of control, sustainability, flexibility, and lethality. By applying these four criteria to analyze various squad organizations, one can determine the strengths and weaknesses inherent to these organizations, thereby recommending the most combat effective rifle squad organization.
The US Army’s current focus on strategic deployability and emerging weapons capabilities is not a new phenomenon, but potentially could cloud the essential issue, developing a military force for optimum combat effectiveness. This study concludes by recommending the optimum squad-level organization for the “Objective Force.”
Major Timothy M. Karcher
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Enhancing Combat Effectiveness; - Major Timothy M. Karcher
Comparison
CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION
An Overview of Army Transformation
In October 1999, General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA), announced that the US Army would transform
to a lighter, more rapidly deployable force. According to General Shinseki, the US Army’s current force was no longer relevant, due to issues of strategic deployability and tactical capability. In light of these discrepancies, he proposed the development of new forces to fill the void. The goal of this proposed Transformation
was to develop forces capable of rapid strategic deployability, while retaining the necessary force structure to defeat virtually any enemy on any battlefield. As the US Army begins to build new units, force developers must analyze organizational models to ensure that they develop the most combat effective force possible, based on available resources. The US Army consists of what is now referred to as a Legacy Force;
with a heavy force designed to fight and defeat the former Soviet Union on the plains of Northern Europe and a light force to fight brush fire
wars in Central and South America. General Shinseki’s proposed force with enhanced strategic deployability would be capable, at least in theory, of filling the role of either heavy or light Legacy Forces,
thus better able to respond to the changing operational requirements, based on the physical environment and future threats.
The Legacy heavy mechanized infantry and armor forces were designed and equipped to combat enemy armor in open terrain, with such advanced weapons as M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs), Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs), heavy artillery and rockets, and sophisticated attack helicopters. Unfortunately, these forces lack the strategic deployability necessary to quickly react to a volatile, changing world situation. The heavy forces are just that: heavy. Once they arrive in theater, the heavy forces possess extraordinary capability for defeating an enemy armor-based force, but they are significantly less capable of defeating an enemy force organized around light infantry units or insurgent forces. On the other hand, the Legacy light infantry forces, although capable of rapid strategic deployment, have a limited capability against a broad range of enemy forces, primarily enemy armor, since the US Army designed these forces to defeat insurgents and enemy light infantry. Also, the light forces, due to limited vehicular assets, lack tactical mobility, and move about their assigned area of operations in much the same manner as the infantryman of World War II, by foot. Thus, the two primary Legacy Forces possess different capabilities and limitations, making them specialized, but neither has the well-rounded capabilities necessary to meet General Shinseki’s vision.
In recent years, the US Army has attempted to reduce the limitations of each force by task organizing units with a mix of heavy and light forces. On the surface, this appears to be a solution, but problems persist. The issue of strategic deployability still delays the introduction of heavy forces in significant quantities (brigade-sized or greater) into a troubled region. Even with prepositioned equipment and assets for personnel to draw and use upon arrival into the theater, it still would take a week to ten days to have a viable heavy force on the ground. Although the light forces are capable of rapid strategic mobility upon their arrival, they would be alone, without support from the follow-on heavy force, and at the mercy of enemy tanks. Prior to the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, Operation Desert Shield illustrated the worst-case scenario: a US airborne division facing numerous Iraqi armored and mechanized infantry divisions. This was a golden opportunity for Saddam Hussein to strike a significant blow against the United States, but instead he allowed US forces to build up over the following six months, causing his eventual defeat. It is safe to assume the potential enemies took note of this almost foolish inaction, and will not make a similar mistake. Thus, the heavy-light task organization still allows exploitation of each force’s limitations for a period of time.
Due to these limitations the need for a new force arose. This force is initially embodied in the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), currently being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington. The IBCT will be rapidly deployable as an early entry force, expanding the foothold initially seized by the forced entry units (Rangers, airborne forces, or Marines). The goal is to develop a force that has all of the strengths of the heavy and light forces, while reducing the limitations associated with both. In essence, General Shinseki envisions a brigade-sized force capable of arriving in a troubled region within a matter of days and capable of defeating any enemy threat, heavy or light. This force also has the added advantage over the current light forces, in that it has protected tactical mobility, due to light armored vehicles. Although this vehicle is not a tank or an infantry-fighting vehicle (IFV), it provides the infantryman with a level of protection and tactical mobility unheard of for a light force. This force is similar to the light units in that it uses infantry as the decisive element. It is essentially developed and in the process of fielding; therefore, the ability to influence its force structure is limited. This study will not examine the IBCT in great detail, as it is a constantly evolving force.
The study next focuses on the Objective Force,
which the US Army plans to develop over the next ten to fifteen years. This force must be capable of defeating any known or projected threat, in any environment, and will be the basic organization of the army. Due to global commitments, this force also needs to be capable of rapid strategic deployability, arriving in brigade strength in a threatened region within seventy-two to ninety-six hours. This force, along with all of its basic equipment, is currently under development.
Since the Army is in the initial stages of developing the Objective Force, the opportunity exists to develop the organization for maximum combat effectiveness. One must determine what one wants this organization and its subordinate units to do, and its optimum organization. Starting at the bottom, and working the way to the top, the infantry rifle squad becomes the focus of this study. Typically, the Army would need to conduct costly studies and research to determine optimum unit organizations, but, fortunately, past studies provide potential conclusions, which are still relevant today.
Problem
The US Army is at the crossroads of change as it enters the twenty-first century, working to define what type forces will be relevant in the future. Regardless of talk about the waning importance of some branches within the US Army, history has shown that an infantry force will be relevant throughout the foreseeable future and that it is likely that this infantry force will remain central to US Army military operations.
Since the infantry rifle squad is the basic building block for platoons, companies, and eventually battalions, it is important to determine the optimum squad organization. Since the end of World War II, the US Army has been trying to gain and, once gained, maintain the optimal capability for its infantry rifle squad to conduct fire and maneuver. The organization of the rifle squad is defined by its size (number of infantrymen within the unit) and composition (how the squad is organized for combat). The critical factor in designing the infantry squad of the future is to focus on what capability this organization must have. Currently, an opportunity exists to determine the optimal organization of the infantry rifle squad within the Objective Force. To determine the optimum organization for the infantry rifle squad, one must resolve the issue of what organization provides the squad the greatest capability for conducting fire and maneuver.
Defining Terms
First, a rifle squad must be defined. In 1946, at the completion of World War II, combat leaders from the US military met