Operation Overlord, Design And Reality; The Allied Invasion Of Europe

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OPERATION OVERLORD: DESIGN AND REALITY

The Allied Invasion of Western Europe

by

Albert Norman, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of History

Norwich University

(Author of Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture, 1951)

Jubilant French crowds welcome the Supreme Commander at the climax of Operation Overlord—the liberation of Paris. At the Arch of Triumph, 27 August 1944, left to right: General Gerow, commanding V Corps; General Bradley, commanding 12th Army Group; General Eisenhower; General Koenig, French

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 6

DEDICATION 7

FOREWORD 8

PREFACE 9

MAPS 11

PHOTOGRAPHS 12

PART I—THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM 15

CHAPTER 1—THE ENGLISH CHANNEL-MEDITERRANEAN SEA CONTROVERSY 15

The Basic Issues 15

British Strategy and the U. S. Concept 15

The Arcadia Conference 18

The Pas-de-Calais Plan 20

No Second Front in 1942 22

The Channel Poses its Problems 23

The British Decision for 1942 24

Grave News from the Middle East 25

Roosevelt and the African Invasion 26

The London Conference 26

Decision to Invade North Africa 27

The Casablanca Conference and the Proposed Invasion of Sicily 27

Overlord to be Allied Main Effort 30

CHAPTER 2—CROSS-CHANNEL INVASION: STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES 32

The Preparations Begin 32

The Choice of Assault Areas 34

First Planning Headquarters 34

Initial Overlord Plan 36

Lessons of the Dieppe Raid 37

Planning a Landing at Normandy 38

The Quebec Conference Studies the Plan 39

Delegating Planning Responsibility 43

Coordinating Strategy, Tactics and Technique 45

The Development of Invasion Equipment 46

Artificial Harbors 47

Determining Soil Trafficability on the Beaches 48

Pipeline Under the Ocean 49

PART II—ORGANIZATION FOR THE INVASION 51

CHAPTER 3—UNITED STATES ARMY ORGANIZATION IN EUROPE 51

Need for an American Army Group Headquarters 51

Bradley to Command Army Group and First U. S. Army 53

The Army Group Staff 55

General Eisenhower and Logistical Planning 57

The American Chain of Command 59

CHAPTER 4—ALLIED COMMAND RELATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 60

International Command Relations 60

Command of Allied Ground Forces 61

Appointment of Supreme Commander 62

COSSAC Became SHAEF 63

Command Relationships Announced by Eisenhower 64

Naval Operations Plan 65

The Cover Plan 66

Additional Armies 67

PART III—THE DESIGN 70

CHAPTER 5—A HOPE THAT FAILED 70

The Rankin Plan for Collapse of Germany 70

Chaos Expected in Europe 72

Displaced Persons 73

But the Germans Fought On 74

CHAPTER 6—DESIGN FOR CROSSING THE NARROW SEA 75

The Neptune Initial Joint Plan 75

Invasion Problems 75

When to Attack? 77

Other Invasion Problems 78

American Troop Build-Up 79

Training and Rehearsals 80

The Shipping Problem 82

Air Supply 83

Petroleum Supply 84

Artillery Ammunition 84

Antiaircraft Defense 85

Prisoners of War 85

Evacuating Casualties 86

Recreation Facilities 86

Assessing German Strategy 86

Neptune Changes in Overlord Outline Plan 88

Air Force and Naval Tasks 91

Plans to Advance Inland 94

CHAPTER 7—DESIGN FOR THE DRIVE INLAND 95

Allied Strategy 95

Operation Chastity 100

CHAPTER 8—DECEPTION 102

The Fortitude Plan 102

The Threat to the Pas-de-Calais 103

Fictitious Radio Traffic 104

CHAPTER 9—THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 105

General Policy 105

Civil Affairs Detachments 106

Policies Employed in Liberated Territory 106

Military Government in Captured German Territory 107

Basic Relief Requirements 107

PART IV—THE REALITY 109

CHAPTER 10—SEA POWER AND AIR POWER 109

The Submarine Menace 109

The Contribution of Radar 111

Preparatory Air Operations 111

Strategic Bombing Results 112

Tactical Use of Strategic Bomber Forces 114

Success of Allied Sea Power 115

Results of Strategic Air Power 115

CHAPTER 11—THE INVASION OF FRANCE 117

The Armada Under Way 119

The German Reaction 119

Naval and Air Force Bombardment 121

The Paratrooper Attack 122

The Main Invasion Forces 124

Landings on Utah Beach 126

The Fight for Omaha Beach 127

The Landings on the British-Canadian Beaches 128

Consolidating the Beachhead 129

The Attack Inland 130

The Costly Struggle for Caen 132

Completion of the Battle of the Beachhead 133

CHAPTER 12—THE BEACHHEAD WIDENED 134

The Drive for Cherbourg 134

The Attack on Caen 136

Regrouping of First U. S. Army and Continued Attack 136

The Second British Army 139

Purpose of Allied Strategy 141

The Artificial Ports and the Storm 141

CHAPTER 13—BREAKTHROUGH, ENCIRCLEMENT, AND PURSUIT TO THE SEINE 144

The German Reaction 144

Breakthrough at St. Lo 146

Reorganization to Exploit the Breakthrough 150

The Effort to Trap the Germans 150

The German Counteroffensive 152

The Falaise Pocket and the Destruction of the Enemy 154

Invasion of Southern France 160

The Logistics of the Campaign 161

The Beginning of the End 163

CHAPTER 14—AFTERTHOUGHT 164

APPENDIX I—CALENDAR BASED ON D-DAY, 1944 166

APPENDIX II—GLOSSARY OF LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT USED IN WORLD WAR II 167

APPENDIX III—GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES APPEARING IN THE TEXT 169

APPENDIX IV—BIBLIOGRAPHY 171

DOCUMENTS 171

BOOKS 172

ARTICLES 177

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 180

DEDICATION

To

HILDA GORE NORMAN

General Walter Bedell Smith

FOREWORD

Overlord was unquestionably, as of this writing, the largest overseas military operation ever undertaken. In the pages which follow, Dr. Albert Norman presents, insofar as it can be compressed within one easily readable volume, a careful history of the planning which made its achievement possible and of the operation itself.

Dr. Norman’s topic is absorbing, both for its historical interest and for the lessons it holds for those who, perhaps unfortunately, must be concerned with the possibility of Overlords yet to come. It holds yet another and even more important interest. The staff groups which contributed to the success of Overlord and the ultimate defeat of Germany were the exemplification of an idea of allied unity, developed by General Eisenhower and perfected to such an extent that it has become the symbol of successful international cooperation.

WALTER BEDELL SMITH

General, United States Army

Washington, D. C.

7 March 1952

PREFACE

This work is a history of the years of planning and preparation for the invasion of Western Europe and of the staging of that invasion from England in the summer of 1944. It is to a considerable degree based on primary sources, which were accessible to me during my wartime military service in France and Germany on General Omar N. Bradley’s staff as historian of Headquarters 12th Army Group, under whose command came the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth United States Armies. Readings in post-war published works supplemented the primary material. These works are given in the bibliography appended to this study.

I have not confined myself in these pages to an investigation of the role played by the armed forces of any one single nation in the western European alliance. The approach is that of the military campaign itself, the problems it posed in diplomacy, strategy, and tactics, and how the interrelated aspects of these problems were resolved both in the planning stages and in the operational stage.

To Brigadier General C. R. Landon, wartime 12th Army Group Adjutant General and my immediate superior during my tour of duty at that headquarters, I am indebted for creating an atmosphere that was conducive to historical work while military operations were still in progress. Other members of the headquarters staff provided assistance and came forth with valuable suggestions. Major General A. Franklin Kibler and Brigadier General Raymond G. Moses were particularly helpful in this respect.

For personal counsel in preparing this work I owe thanks to Dr. Dwight E. Lee, Chairman of the Department of History and International Relations at Clark University, and to Dr. H. Donaldson Jordan. Their suggestions were at all times constructive, and I learned much from them.

The basic plan of this work is, first, to indicate the strategic problem posed by an invasion of the European continent from the British Isles and the complex tactical implications bearing on its solution. The controversies which the strategic problem engendered are also treated. Next follows the United States Army and Allied command organization for the invasion and the planning for translating the strategic idea into a workable operational plan that would reasonably guarantee success. Finally, the story of the invasion itself is told; The assault on the Normandy coast of France on June 6, 1944; the fighting for the expansion of the beachhead; the breakout from the beachhead and encirclement of the German forces west of the Orne River; the pursuit of the Germans to Paris and the Seine, and the crossing of the river in late August and early September, ending the campaign already known in history as Operation Overlord. In a final chapter are reviewed some of the lessons of the war in western Europe and the relative contribution to the Allied victory of the several arms and services.

In writing this story I have, in the main, laid greater emphasis on the events and their unfolding. Interpretation I have generally left to the judgment of the reader, for I believe that the truth, once known and accurately presented, speaks for itself. However, I have made no attempt to leave unnoticed the influence of motives and of leadership—or their absence—wherever they noticeably made themselves felt.

ALBERT NORMAN.

Northfield, Vermont

1952

MAPS

The Division of the Beaches

The March Expectations and the May Revision

The D+70 Forecast

The Forecast for D+90

The D-Day Assembly Phase

The Crucial Weeks of the Campaign

Summary to the Breakthrough at St. Lo

The Breakout from Normandy

The Germans Move East after the Falaise Pocket Defeat

The Broad Strategic Envelopment

Closing in on Paris and the Seine

PHOTOGRAPHS

(All pictures are official Department of Defense photographs.)

Liberation of Paris

General Walter Bedell Smith

Casablanca Conference

General Morgan, Overlord Planner

General Barker, Overlord Deputy

Quebec Conference

Admiral Ramsay, Naval Commander-in-Chief

Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory, Tactical Air Commander

Use of Artificial Harbors

Wire Matting for the Normandy Beaches

American Assault Training Center

The Senior Commanders in France

Commanders, First U. S. Army and Second British Army

Training, 101st Airborne Division

Generals Eisenhower and Smith

General Bradley with Army Commanders

Commander, 6th Army Group

Training, 6th Engineer Special Brigade

Vast Stocks of Power Generators

Gasoline Drums for Overlord

Western Task Force off French Coast

U. S. S. Augusta, General Bradley’s Headquarters Ship

Assault Troops in Landing Craft, D-Day

1st Division Infantry Ashore on D-Day

Reinforcements Wading Ashore

Chief of Staff Visits the Beachhead

Prime Minister Churchill and General Brooke

35th Division Unloading Equipment

The Fight to Enlarge the Bridgehead

29th Division Entering St. Lo

French Army Tank Unit Debarks

First Freight Cars Unload at Cherbourg

Reinforcements on Causeway

Wrecked Armor and Dead on the Fields of Normandy

Yet much remains to conquer still; peace hath her victories no less renowned than war.—MILTON, To the Lord General Cromwell

PART I—THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

CHAPTER 1—THE ENGLISH CHANNEL-MEDITERRANEAN SEA CONTROVERSY

The Basic Issues

Several fundamental issues of strategy faced the Western Allies in their war against Germany. The most fundamental of these was at what geographical point against the enemy-held territory to make the initial counteroffensive. And this in turn reduced itself, in the European theater of operations, to one central issue: should the counteroffensive be launched against some point on the enemy’s far-flung periphery or against the center of his economic, military, and political strength. To this issue was linked a second and no less vital one, an issue that had a direct bearing on the solution of the first. It was the question of the available means in manpower and technological resources to carry out one or the other of the two fundamental aspects of the strategic problem. Specifically, the problem resolved itself into a controversy over whether, taking into account the state of military preparedness of the Western Allies at the end of 1941 and the first half of 1942, initial offensive operations should be waged against the Germans’ periphery in the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa or from England against the center of their military and economic strength in northwestern Europe. On this basic problem were brought to bear traditional concepts of strategy and views based on individual understandings of the issues as well as individual proclivities.

The British military, naval, and air chiefs, in virtually complete unanimity and with the backing of the War Cabinet, advocated what came to be known as the Mediterranean strategy for land operations and a cross-Channel strategy for heavy bomber operations in the initial stages of an Allied offensive against Germany. The cross-Channel strategy for an invasion by ground forces they favored only in the final phase of the war, when Germany would be weakened by harassing offensives against her periphery and the Allies had gained strength by devising the means with which an invasion from England could be undertaken.

British Strategy and the U. S. Concept

The United States Army chiefs and the Secretary of War, in general with but lukewarm support from the Navy and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were advocates of the cross-Channel strategy during the very outset of a campaign against Germany as a means of reaching and destroying the center of her strength. They recommended an invasion of the European continent at the most direct point in 1942. They considered operations in the Mediterranean as at best diversions, holding forth no prospects of decisive results. To the British Government, however, a full-scale invasion of the Continent at an early date was more a question of its feasibility than of opposition in principle. The timing, as the British authorities saw it, was based on the degree of preparedness of the Allies to launch a successful invasion. The British defense chiefs were indifferent to a premature amphibious operation across the English Channel. They considered such an operation as at best unduly dangerous and at worst as reckless rather than bold. They believed in the necessity of a cross-Channel invasion at a later date, when Allied resources would be equal to the task.{1} British defense authorities had begun to make preparations and to plan for such an invasion as early as 1940 and 1941. We shall return to this theme in chapter 2 of this work.

The strategy of both the United States and Great Britain was determined by their geography and history: Great Britain’s, largely by her insular position and historic imperial and Commonwealth ties; that of the United States, by her traditional isolationism from global affairs (outside the Pacific Ocean) and from areas in which she had little or no direct interest.

Since Great Britain, like the United States, is by tradition not a military nation, her war strategy, when attacked, has been, first, to defend the British Isles, then her vital oversea possessions and spheres of influence, which she was able to do by the exercise of superior sea power, and finally, to go over to the offensive. Until she garnered all her resources for a final engagement, however, Britain’s offensive actions were directed mostly at the enemy’s periphery—at distant points—in order to weaken his communications and to force him still further to disperse his military resources. This strategy was the foundation of Britain’s victory over Napoleon.{2} British defense chiefs employed it also in the Second World War. The battle of El Alamein, in Egypt, and the Allied invasion of North Africa in the autumn of 1942, as well as the invasions of Sicily and Italy the following year, were an extension of traditional British strategy of subjecting the adversary to a strategic encirclement, of driving him in, and of holding him as in a vise. So was the idea of invading France from England, once the resources had been accumulated. It was in line with well-established strategical thinking in Great Britain.

In the United States, owing to the absence of a global attitude and of direct strategic interest outside of the Pacific area, no general theory of world strategy had, it would appear, been evolved. Military and naval thinking, in its broadest sense, preoccupied itself mainly with Western Hemisphere defense. With few exceptions, military authorities in positions of responsibility did not appreciate the strategic trends of thought of their British colleagues, and military operations at distant peripheries seemed less justifiable to them than across 18 to 20 miles of sea.

At the outset of the war, Britain’s paramount strategic task was to safeguard the British Isles against invasion. The Royal Navy prevented Hitler from invading England in 1940 under the plan named Sea Lion. When, by late 1940, the danger of invasion had abated and the British Government felt that the homeland was reasonably secure, the possession of sea power enabled the British to reinforce their strategic areas. During the third year of the war they sent abroad five planes and 15 tanks for every one they received from the United States.{3} The Middle East offensive that followed toward the end of 1941 had as its strategic objective the denial of the Middle East oil resources to the Germans and Italians and of clearing Axis troops from the entire coast of North Africa. A proposed occupation of the northwestern coast of Africa, extending from Casablanca on the Atlantic to Algiers and Tunis in the Mediterranean was mooted as an auxiliary operation. Great Britain then intended to invade Sicily and Italy as part of her encircling movement of her adversaries. She planned these operations,