Synchronizing Airpower And Firepower In The Deep Battle
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Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum
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Synchronizing Airpower And Firepower In The Deep Battle - Lt.-Col. R. Kent Lauchbaum
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Text originally published in 1999 under the same title.
© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
SYNCHRONIZING AIRPOWER AND FIREPOWER IN THE DEEP BATTLE
BY
R. KENT LAUGHBAUM
LT COL, USAF
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ILLUSTRATIONS 5
FOREWORD 6
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 8
CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION 9
CHAPTER 2—EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR 13
Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle 16
Evolution of the Fire Support Coordination Line 20
Synthesis 23
CHAPTER 3—DEEP BATTLE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR 25
IX Tactical Air Command, 1944 25
Deep-Battle Targeting 27
Fire Support Coordination Line Friction 32
Synthesis and Challenges 37
CHAPTER 4—DEEP BATTLE TODAY 39
Army Doctrinal Evolution since the Persian Gulf War 39
Air Force Doctrine since the Persian Gulf War 44
Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle 48
Synthesis and Final Analysis 52
CHAPTER 5—CONCLUSION 54
GLOSSARY 59
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61
Air Force Doctrine Documents and Manuals and Army Field Manuals 61
Books 61
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 65
ILLUSTRATIONS
Combat Missions during the Persian Gulf War
Coalition Ground Offensive
Air Interdiction Missions Supporting Battlefield Preparation by Kill Box
Fire Support Coordination Line Movements by Day, 1800L
FOREWORD
The concept of deep battle
was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive close battle.
The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle.
During the late 1980s the Army began fielding a potent deep-battle capability of its own. Concurrently, Army doctrine assigned to the ground force commander responsibility for synchronizing deep operations with the close battle. Thus were planted the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over management of the deep battle. To better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also extended the range of the FSCL from the FLOT.
The Persian Gulf War field tested
US deep-battle doctrine. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures approved by the joint force commander (JFC). By most Air Force accounts, the deep battle was well managed and executed, except for the Army’s use of the FSCL during the last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly disappointed with prosecution of the deep battle during Operation Desert Storm. Army frustration arose from the fact that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not by the ground force commander—a direct violation of joint and Army doctrine.
Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War has attempted to create a framework for synchronizing airpower and land-based firepower in the deep battle. In spite of that effort, many contentious issues between airmen and soldiers remain unresolved, chief among them the matter of command relationships on and above the deep battlefield.
In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization, Colonel Laughbaum proposes five modifications to current joint doctrine:
assign the joint force commander responsibility for establishing and positioning the fire support coordination line;
redefine the fire support coordination line as a restrictive fire support coordination measure;
include all planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver operations beyond the fire support coordination line in the air tasking order;
position the fire support coordination line relatively close to the forward line of own troops, typically no farther than the maximum range of tube artillery; and
restrict planned air interdiction missions from targets short of the fire support coordination line.
Originally submitted as a thesis for Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle won the 1997 Air Force Armament Museum Foundation Prize as the best SAAS thesis on technology and airpower.
We commend Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle to all war fighters—airmen and soldiers alike—who are seeking an informed perspective on the hotly contested issue of orchestration of the deep battle.
JAMES R. W. TITUS
Dean of Research
Air University
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum (BS, Texas A&M University; MAS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) is chief of nuclear operations and a joint operations planner for NATO’s Central Region, Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe in the Netherlands. He completed pilot training in 1984 and is a senior pilot with 3,300 hours in F-15E and A-10 aircraft. Previous assignments include England Air Force Base (AFB), Louisiana, Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Royal Air Force (RAF) Lakenheath, United Kingdom. At England AFB, Colonel Laughbaum flew the A-10 with the 23d Fighter Wing and served as flight commander, weapons and tactics officer, and chief of electronic combat. His positions at Nellis AFB were instructor pilot and flight commander in the A-10 Division, chief of conventional weapons employment, and member of the initial cadre of F-15E Division instructor pilots. At RAF Lakenheath he was assigned for two years to the 48th Fighter Wing and then served as assistant operations officer and chief of F-15E weapons and tactics for the 494th Fighter Squadron.
Colonel Laughbaum is a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a 1997 graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He and his wife, Mary, have two daughters, Christen and Rachel.
CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION
Modern combat resources allow the attack to be mounted in such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously over his whole depth and to delay the movement of his reserves to the threatened sector. We now have at our disposal resources like aviation...which can make these deep sallies [raids]. In this way the enemy should be pinned down over the entire depth of his dispositions, encircled and destroyed.
—Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski, Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1934
During the 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle. Their objective was to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force