From Down Under To Nippon: The Story Of Sixth Army In World War II

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Text originally published in 1953 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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FROM DOWN UNDER TO NIPPON: THE STORY OF SIXTH ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

BY

GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER

United States Army, Retired

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

DEDICATION 5

FOREWORD 6

GLOSSARY 7

1—THE BEGINNINGS 10

CHAPTER ONE—ACTIVATION 10

CHAPTER TWO—THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA 15

2—INITIAL OPERATIONS 25

CHAPTER THREE—THE CHRONICLE OPERATION 25

CHAPTER FOUR—THE DEXTERITY OPERATION 32

3—THE ROAD TO THE PHILIPPINES 50

CHAPTER FIVE—THE BREWER OPERATION 50

CHAPTER SIX—THE RECKLESS OPERATION 63

CHAPTER SEVEN—WAKDE AND BIAK 91

CHAPTER EIGHT—THE TABLETENNIS OPERATION 124

CHAPTER NINE—THE GLOBETROTTER OPERATION 133

CHAPTER TEN—THE MOROTAI OPERATION 142

CHAPTER ELEVEN—SIDELIGHTS ON EARLY OPERATIONS 154

4—LEYTE 159

CHAPTER TWELVE—RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES 159

CHAPTER THIRTEEN—THE OBJECTIVE AREA 163

CHAPTER FOURTEEN—PLANS AND ORDERS 166

CHAPTER FIFTEEN—MOVE TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA 172

CHAPTER SIXTEEN—INITIAL OPERATIONS 174

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN—PHASE III ON LEYTE 186

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN—FINAL OPERATIONS ON LEYTE 248

CHAPTER NINETEEN—SIDELIGHTS ON LEYTE 252

5—MINDORO 260

CHAPTER TWENTY—PLANNING FOR MINDORO 260

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE—MINDORO SECURED 268

6—LUZON 271

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO—THE PLANNING PHASE 271

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE—THE AMPHIBIOUS PHASE 282

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR—EXPANDING THE BEACHHEAD 285

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE—THE ADVANCE ON MANILA 298

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX—THE FIGHT FOR MANILA 310

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN—NORTH, EAST AND WEST OF MANILA 317

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT—CLEARING MANILA BAY 327

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE—SHIFT OF FORCES 339

CHAPTER THIRTY—THE SHIMBU LINE TO BATANGAS 341

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE—UP FROM LEGASPI 347

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO—SOUTH OF LAGUNA DE BAY AND IN NORTHWEST BICOL 351

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE—SMASHING THE SHIMBU LINE 359

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR—SIDELIGHTS ON LUZON 394

7—OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 403

CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE—OLYMPIC AND BLACKLIST 403

CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX—MOVEMENT TO JAPAN 412

CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN—OCCUPATION OPERATIONS 416

CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT—SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE OCCUPATION 424

CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE—SIXTH ARMY’S STAFF SECTIONS 431

CHAPTER FORTY—INACTIVATION 442

8—APPENDIX 444

APPENDIX 1—OFFICERS TRANSFERRED TO HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY 444

APPENDIX 2—THIRD ARMY MAJOR UNITS 450

APPENDIX 3—SIXTH ARMY MAJOR UNITS 451

APPENDIX 4—CASUALTIES 452

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 454

DEDICATION

TO MY COMRADES OF SIXTH ARMY

FOREWORD

ALTHOUGH NEARLY EIGHT YEARS have passed since the end of the war with Japan, the story of the conspicuous part Sixth Army played in it remains to be told. Instead of publishing my personal reminiscences of the events in which I participated, I decided to write the story of Sixth Army. I felt that I owed this to all who served under me there—in particular to the many thousands who laid down their lives.

The result is an unadorned narrative of the long trek of Sixth Army from Down Under to Nippon; of much bitter fighting; of hardships and shortcomings, as well as outstanding performances; of luck and of victory. The story is based upon my own official reports and those from my subordinate units, and upon my own notes and recollections. It stresses the bold and brilliant strategic plans of our Commander in Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, which charted our course to victory in the Southwest Pacific and which were effectively carried out by his Army-Navy-Air Forces team, of which Sixth Army formed an essential part.

I have endeavored to describe the achievements of Sixth Army and its units; the trying conditions of climate and terrain and the great distances; the complexities of the operations, the difficulties of supply and communications, and the limited means with which we frequently had to operate; and above all, the valor and fortitude of the troops, the ability and skill of their commanders, and the outstanding work of my own staff.

I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Major-General Clyde D. Eddleman and Colonel George S. Price for information they furnished me in connection with this history; and to Mr. George Parker of San Antonio, Texas, for his generous assistance. My grateful acknowledgments also go to Brigadier-General Harvey C. Allen (retired) and Brigadier-General Charles R. Lehner (retired), for reviewing the manuscript, and to Major-General Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr., Colonel William H. Mills and Sergeant Robert B. Reynolds, for preparing the charts on which some of the maps in this book are based. My thanks are also due to Horace B. Damon, Jr., Edward J. Wisniewski, Edgar A. Lewis, and Henry L. Kibler, for preparing the finished maps.

All photographs are by Signal Corps, U.S. Army.

WALTER KRUEGER

General, U.S. Army, Retired

San Antonio, Texas

June 1953

GLOSSARY

A-20—Douglas Havoc light bomber

A-26—Douglas Invader light bomber

AA—Antiaircraft

AAA—Antiaircraft artillery

AAF—Army Air Forces

Acorn—Construction unit (amphibious)

ADC—Aide-de-camp

AFPC—Army Forces, Pacific

AFWESPAC—Army Forces, Western Pacific

AGC—Amphibious force flagship

AKA—Attack cargo ship

ANGAU—Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit

AP—Associated Press

APA—Attack transport

APD—High-speed transport

ASCOM—Army Service Command

ASCOMO—Army Service Command O

AUS—Army of the United States

AW—Automatic weapons

B-17—Boeing Flying Fortress bomber

B-24—Martin Liberator bomber

B-25—North American Mitchell bomber

B-29—Boeing Superfortress bomber

BLT—Battalion landing team

C-45—Beech Expeditor transport

C-46—Curtiss Commando transport

C-47—Douglas Skytrain transport

C-54—Douglas Skymaster transport

CG—Commanding general

CIC—Counterintelligence Corps

CinC—Commander in Chief

CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific

cm—centimeter

CO—Commanding officer

CP—Command post

CW—Morse code

D-day—Day of attack

DMS—High-speed minesweeper

DUKW—Amphibian truck

DWT—Dead-weight tons

EB&SR—Engineer boat-and-shore regiment

ESB—Engineer special brigade

FA—Field artillery

G1—Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel

G2—Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

G3—Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations

G4—Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics

GHQ—General Headquarters

H-hour—Hour of attack

HMAS—His Majesty’s Australian Ship

JASCO—Joint Assault Signal Company

LCI—Landing craft, infantry

LCM—Landing craft, mechanized

LCT—Landing craft, tank

LCV—Landing craft, vehicle

LCVP—Landing craft, vehicle and personnel

LSD—Landing ship, dock

LSM—Landing ship, medium

LST—Landing ship, tank

LSV—Landing ship, vehicle

Lubsec—Luzon Base Section

LVT—Landing vehicle, tracked

MG—Machine gun

mm—Millimeter

MT—Motor transport

NICA—Netherlands Indies Civil Administration

OP—Observation post

P-38—Lockheed Lightning fighter

P-40—Curtiss Warhawk fighter

P-51—North American Mustang fighter

PBY—Consolidated Catalina patrol bomber

PCAU—Philippine Civil Affairs Unit

PCE—Patrol vessel, escort

PF—Patrol vessel, frigate

PG—Patrol vessel, gunboat

Phibsec—Philippines Base Section

POA—Pacific Ocean Area

PRO—Public relations officer

PT—Motor torpedo boat

RAAF—Royal Australian Air Force

RCT—Regimental combat team

RTO—Railway transportation officer

SBD—Douglas Dauntless scout-bomber

SCAP—Supreme Commander, Allied Powers

Seabee—Naval construction unit

SoPac—South Pacific Area (Navy)

SWPA—Southwest Pacific Area

TD—Tank destroyer

T/O—Table of organization

USAFFE—United States Army Forces, Far East

USASOS—United States Army Services of Supply

USMC—United States Marine Corps

USN—United States Navy

VMAC—V Marine Amphibious Corps

1—THE BEGINNINGS

CHAPTER ONE—ACTIVATION

ON 12 JANUARY 1943, while inspecting the 89th Infantry Division at Camp Carson, Colorado, I received the following radiogram from General MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area: I have just recommended to the Chief of Staff that you and the Third Army Headquarters be transferred to this area. I am particularly anxious to have you with me at this critical time.

The opportunity thus presented was most welcome but wholly unexpected. I had about concluded that being practically sixty-two I would be thought too old for active overseas service. My reply to General MacArthur expressed my gratification and my appreciation of his confidence in me.

Lieutenant-General Lesley J. McNair, CG of Army Ground Forces, telephoned me on the 13th, while I was at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma, that my assignment had been approved. That same day the War Department ordered me to Washington with some of my staff on the 14th to work out the details of the transfer of my headquarters to the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). I returned at once to Fort Sam Houston and with several key members of my staff flew to Washington where we set to work. We were disappointed to learn that General MacArthur’s recommendation for transfer of Headquarters Third Army to SWPA had been disapproved. Instead, I was directed to organize and activate the headquarters of a new army—the Sixth—but at a strength considerably below that authorized by the existing table of organization (T/O), and even below the number I had requested.{1} Major-General (later General) Courtney H. Hodges, who then commanded X Corps, was designated to succeed me as CG, Third Army.

Upon our return from Washington on 21 January 1943, we activated Headquarters, Headquarters Company and Headquarters Special Troops, Sixth Army, at Fort Sam Houston, on 25 January 1943, and made final preparations for moving to SWPA.

Although Headquarters Third Army as such could not go overseas with me, a substantial part of its key personnel was transferred to Headquarters Sixth Army. (For complete list of officers, see Appendix. 1.) It included Brigadier-General George Honnen (Chief of Staff); Colonel George H. Decker (Deputy Chief of Staff); Colonel George S. Price (G1); Colonel Horton V. White (G2); Colonel Clyde D. Eddleman (G3); Colonel Kenneth Pierce (G4); the chiefs of a number of the administrative and technical staff sections; and other selected officers, warrant officers and enlisted men. This gave Sixth Army a staff that had gained invaluable experience by rigorous training in Third Army.

I had assumed command of Third Army on 16 May 1941, upon the retirement of Lieutenant-General Herbert J. Brees. When, shortly thereafter, Brigadier-General Joseph A. Atkins (Chief of Staff, Third Army) also prepared to retire, I asked General Marshall to let me have Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower to fill the vacancy. He approved, and after Eisenhower reported I detailed him as Deputy Chief of Staff on 2 July 1941 and as Chief of Staff of Third Army and of Southern Defense Command on 9 August 1941. (This command had been established on 7 July 1941 under my command. It embraced the states of Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.) He proved to be invaluable, effectively coordinating the activities of the staff and handling much of the administrative work, thus enabling me to devote myself primarily to inspections, training, and tactical exercises, especially the great Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 and the critiques on it. Upon my recommendation Colonel Eisenhower was promoted to Brigadier-General on 3 October 1941.

Toward the end of the Louisiana Maneuvers, when General Marshall asked me whom I regarded as best fitted to head the War Plans Division which I had headed several years before, I named Eisenhower, though I was loath to lose him. He was directed to report to the Chief of Staff of the Army in Washington on 12 December 1941. I replaced him with Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Alfred M. Gruenther who, after being promoted in turn to colonel and Brigadier-General upon my recommendation, was taken away from me without warning to become Chief of Staff of Fifth Army. I promptly detailed the then Deputy Chief of Staff—Lieutenant Colonel (later Major-General) George Honnen, to replace him as Chief of Staff of Third Army and of Southern Defense Command.

Third Army’s staff was composed largely of Regulars when I assumed command, but as time went on many of them were transferred to other duties and their places filled by National Guard and Reserve officers. The staff consisted of carefully selected officers and the successive chiefs of staff and I made constant efforts to increase its efficiency. My insistence that its prime function was to serve the troops, my policy of confining its membership to officers who had the faculty of working effectively in a team, and actual practice for which there was ample opportunity, did the rest.

In May 1941, and until after Pearl Harbor, Third Army consisted of three corps with eleven infantry divisions distributed among them, a cavalry division, a separate cavalry brigade, and numerous separate field artillery, antiaircraft artillery, engineer, signal, medical, and service units (see Appendix 2).

Although a number of divisions and other elements were withdrawn during 1942, it was largely augmented during that year, being charged with the organization, administration and training of an additional corps headquarters, fourteen new divisions and many other units (see Appendix 2).

The administration, training and inspection of such a large command as Third Army, with its units scattered over the entire southern tier of states from Florida to eastern Arizona, inclusive of Oklahoma and eastern Colorado, required unremitting attention and effort. But it was tremendously interesting and excellent preparation for the problems that were destined to face my staff and me later on in SWPA. The training exercises and especially the great Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, in which Third Army was pitted against Second Army (Lieutenant-General Ben Lear), gave my staff a thorough workout and welded it into a smoothly functioning, highly effective team.

My service of forty-four years had given me ample opportunity to command troops and gain general staff experience. After commanding various minor infantry units earlier in my career, I had commanded the 6th Infantry Regiment for two years, the 16th Infantry Brigade for some eight months, the 2d Infantry Division from March 1939 to October 1940, and then VIII Corps until 16 May 1941, when I assumed command of Third Army. The Louisiana Maneuvers gave me command of an army of nearly 300,000 men in the field, over varying terrain and under simulated war conditions against an opposing force.

The conditions we were destined to face in SWPA differed materially from those of Louisiana and required novel expedients and improvisation of tactics. But the experience gained in the 1941 maneuvers was invaluable. The basic principles and vital importance of competent staff performance, morale and discipline, teamwork, efficient troop management and care of the men were the same. Moreover, the woeful shortage of weapons and equipment of all kinds taught my staff and me how to do much with little and get along with what we had.

The secrecy of the movement and destination of Headquarters Sixth Army was remarkably well preserved. Our wives naturally suspected that we were about to go overseas but did not know where. They shed tears when the moment of parting came and we said farewell and they wished us godspeed. But they faced the issue bravely, no one more so than my own wife, who bore it all as the mate of a soldier should.

We made the movement to SWPA in two echelons. The advance party of the first echelon consisted of myself, Brigadier-General Honnen, Colonels Price, White, Eddleman and Pierce, Lieutenant Colonel Ray H. Martin (my ADC and pilot), Chief Warrant Officer Curtis R. Kirkland, and Technical Sergeant Durward E. McCain and Sergeant Emery K. Conoway. It moved by air on 2 February 1943 from San Antonio, Texas, to Hamilton Field, California, left there the following night, and flew via Oahu, Canton Island, Fiji and New Caledonia to Amberley Field, near Brisbane, Australia, where it arrived on the 7th.

We were met there by one of General MacArthur’s senior staff officers, who conducted us to our quarters in Lennon’s Hotel in Brisbane. When I reported to General MacArthur the next day, he welcomed me cordially and told me something of the situation and what he expected of me.

The rest of the first echelon, some twenty-seven officers and thirty other ranks, moved to Hamilton Field by rail and then in five planes for Brisbane, the second echelon following later by rail and water. On 9 February we got the news that one of the planes had crashed at Canton Island on the 7th. All but three had perished.{2}

By direction of the President, I was relieved from command of Third Army, effective 15 February 1943, and assigned to command Sixth Army on 16 February. (This action was delayed to permit the processing of my reappointment, without loss of seniority, to the grade of Lieutenant-General, a rank I had held under existing law since 16 May 1941, by virtue of being CG, Third Army.)

My assignment having been published in general orders of GHQ, SWPA, I assumed command of Sixth Army on 16 February 1943, established its headquarters at Camp Columbia, some ten miles west of Brisbane, where an adequate number of shacks were available, and moved there with my staff.

Sixth Army was initially very small and its units widely scattered. It consisted of I Corps (with only two divisions: the 32d at Camp Cable, near Brisbane, and the 41st in the Dobodura area of New Guinea); the 1st Marine Division (under my operational command only) at Melbourne, Victoria; the 2d Engineer Special Brigade{3} at Rockhampton and Cairns, Queensland, respectively; the 40th and 41st Antiaircraft Brigades in Papua and northern Queensland, respectively; and some smaller units, among them: at Cairns, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; at Camp Cable, the 158th Infantry Regiment; and at Port Moresby, New Guinea, the 98th Field Artillery (Pack) Battalion, which was later converted into the 6th Ranger Battalion. But after a few months the army was reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Division (dismounted) and the 24th Infantry Division, and later on still other units.{4}

Headquarters Sixth Army was handicapped until its second echelon, in charge of Colonel Decker (Deputy Chief of Staff) arrived in Brisbane on 17 April. But in the meantime we had familiarized ourselves with the command set-up in SWPA, and with the military situation and conditions in New Guinea; and we had inspected all Sixth Army troops and were prepared for such demands as might be made upon us.

Training in jungle warfare had already been started but this was now amplified by instruction in amphibious operations, troop management, and care for the health and welfare of the men.

The prevalence of malaria gave me serious concern. It was especially marked in the 1st Marine Division, which had fought in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi operation, in the infantry of the 32d Division, which had fought in the Buna operation, and in the 41st Division, which was still in New Guinea.

Drastic measures were instituted to combat this disease, which had already caused a great many casualties. I made prevention of malaria a command responsibility and had a Sixth Army rehabilitation center established at Rockhampton. A large number of men were cured of malaria there and returned to duty. Its success was due to Colonel Frank LaRue, its commander, and in particular to Colonel Garfield G. Duncan, its chief medical officer, a former professor of clinical medicine at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia.

Inspection of troops and supervision over their training activities took most of my time and that of my staff. The troops were scattered from Melbourne to New Guinea—an air-line distance of over two thousand miles. Inspection trips required adequate air transportation. Yet a suitable plane could not be obtained. The C-40 first assigned to me was a small, much-battered, old Netherlands passenger plane. It was wholly inadequate and its very limited range frequently placed me in most awkward situations. In spite of my urgent representations, it was a long time before a C-47 transport was provided. Even after operations had begun in earnest and required flights that entailed probable encounters with hostile planes, it is doubtful whether a more adequate plane would ever have been made available, if it had not been for the personal interposition of General MacArthur, who directed that an armed B-17 (Flying Fortress) be assigned to me.

CHAPTER TWO—THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA had been set up in April 1942. It embraced Australia, New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies exclusive of Sumatra. General MacArthur had been appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied forces in that area.

When I arrived in Australia, GHQ was in Brisbane and United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS), which was responsible for the administration and supply of U.S. Army forces, was in Sydney, but later moved to Brisbane.

It had become evident that USASOS could no longer handle both administration and supply, so the CinC on 26 February 1943 reconstituted United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE){5} and assigned all U.S. Army forces in SWPA to it. The orders specified, among other things, that the CinC would assign USAFFE units, as required, to the operational control of CG, Allied Land Forces (General Sir Thomas A. Blamey, Australian Army), to CG, Allied Air Forces (Lieutenant-General George C. Kenney), to Commander, Allied Naval Forces (Vice-Admiral A. S. Carpender),{6} to special task forces, or to GHQ reserve.

GHQ remained the over-all command echelon of the CinC and it controlled all shipping. Headquarters USAFFE became his administrative command echelon for U.S. Army forces—though the Army Air Forces handled its own administration—and USASOS constituted his supply echelon for U.S. Army forces. The forces of our allies naturally handled their own administration, as did our Navy and its Marine Corps. The staff activities of GHQ and USAFFE were coordinated by Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Richard K. Sutherland (Chief of Staff), assisted by Major-General Richard J. Marshall (Deputy Chief of Staff), who was also CG, USASOS.

General MacArthur commanded all Allied army, navy and air forces in SWPA, but did not exercise direct personal command over any of these contingents. He formulated all strategic plans, issued directives designating the operations to be undertaken, the commanders to conduct them, the forces and means to be used, the objectives, and the missions to be accomplished. But in conformity with the principle of unity of command, he did not prescribe the tactical measures or methods to be employed.

The strategic unity of command exercised by the CinC was vitally necessary to success. In my opinion, however, tactical unity of command—important as it was, might well have been delegated with advantage when operations grew more complicated and were in progress simultaneously at a number of places hundreds of miles apart. But be that as it may, the CinC charged me with the responsibility for coordinating the plans of the ground forces and supporting air and naval forces in all operations in which my command participated. My coordinated plans necessarily required his approval. I do not recall that he ever disapproved one.

The approved plan thus governed. But problems that arose between the different services after an operation had started could be solved only by cooperation, or by obtaining a decision by radio from the CinC—who could not, of course, be present at every operation nor throughout its progress. Such a radio appeal to the CinC was never made. This was largely due to the effective spirit of cooperation that prevailed and to the fact that we were invariably victorious. Whether cooperation would have sufficed in graver situations is open to question in my judgment. Cooperation is bound to be inadequate in a crisis when prompt decisions are vital.

Shortly after USAFFE had been revived, I was informed that it was not contemplated to have Sixth Army, as such, conduct operations. Instead, operations would be conducted by a task force composed of Sixth Army troops, augmented as required by elements of other forces. I was designated to command this force in addition to my duties as CG, Sixth Army. It originally operated under the code name Escalator Force, and was later given the non-secret designation Alamo Force, which I will call it hereafter.

The reasons for creating Alamo Force and having it, rather than Sixth Army, conduct operations, were not divulged to me. But it was plain that this arrangement would obviate placing Sixth Army under the operational control of CG, Allied Land Forces, although that army formed part of those forces. Since CG, Allied Land Forces, likewise could not exercise administrative command over Sixth Army, it never came under his command at all.

But the arrangement required the Sixth Army staff to operate in a dual capacity, since sufficient staff personnel were not available for a separate Alamo staff. Besides, since Sixth Army provided the commander, the staff, and practically all the troops for Alamo Force, the arrangement inevitably deprived Sixth Army of the credit for operations which in reality it conducted in the guise of Alamo Force. I hoped the arrangement was merely a temporary expedient. I did not anticipate that it would continue until September 1944 and produce a great many perplexing difficulties.

Military Situation in Early 1943

The Japanese had scored notable victories during the early weeks of the war. They had taken Wake, Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines. Elated by these successes, they had pushed south and southeast into SWPA and deep into the Solomons with the evident purpose of cutting our communications with the United States and depriving us of Australia as a base. But they had been stopped everywhere.

The armada they had dispatched to take Port Moresby had been smashed by Allied air and naval forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea on 8 May 1942. Their threat to our line of communications to the United States had been removed by the victory of the 1st Marine Division in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi operation. And their amphibious assault against Milne Bay had been stopped on 26 August 1942 by American engineers and beaten back by Australian troops. The large force they had sent overland through Kokoda Pass in the Owen Stanley Range of New Guinea to seize Port Moresby had been defeated on 15 September 1942 by veteran Australian troops supported by U.S. units and Allied air forces. It had been driven back in confusion when it was almost in sight of its goal.

Following the Allied successes at Port Moresby and Milne Bay, General MacArthur dispatched American troops under Lieutenant-General Eichelberger and Australian troops under Lieutenant-General Herring (Australian Army) to the north shore of New Guinea by sea, by air, and overland. The ensuing Buna-Gona operation ended in January 1943 after bitter fighting, with the total defeat of the Japanese, and gave us badly needed base and airfield sites.

But in spite of this defeat, the Japanese made another offensive sally by suddenly attacking Wau airfield near Salamaua in late January 1943, but veteran Australian troops flown there in transport planes beat them back.

All their offensive thrusts had been frustrated, but the Japanese had managed by early February 1943 to concentrate troops and to construct airfields at Hansa Bay, Alexishafen, Madang, Finschhafen, Lae and Salamaua, Cape Gloucester, and Gasmata in the SWPA, and at Buka, Buin-Faisi, Vella Lavella and Munda in the South Pacific (SoPac) area. Thus they occupied positions on a line that ran along the northern New Guinea coast from Hansa Bay to Huon Peninsula and thence in a wide arc through New Britain to Munda in the Solomons. They were also making strenuous efforts to develop Wewak, Rabaul and Kavieng into strongpoints back of that line. These they fortified heavily, garrisoned with strong forces and stocked with supplies of all kinds.

The Allied means available in SWPA in February 1943 were far from adequate for an offensive against this formidable Japanese line. Allied ground forces were weak; Allied naval forces equally so; shipping, landing craft and equipment generally were extremely limited, and Allied air forces had to make tremendous efforts to keep their planes in condition to fly. Besides, SWPA forces were seven thousand miles away from their nearest home bases, the Japanese within three thousand of theirs.

Moreover, Europe was the primary theater of operations, SWPA secondary. SWPA forces were not expected to play more than a defensive role for the time being and the prospects of their early, material augmentation were not bright.

On the face of it, our own military situation did not look favorable at the moment. But I was confident that General MacArthur would master the situation. Knowing his audacity, I was sure that he would not be satisfied to maintain a defensive attitude, but would take the offensive at the first opportunity, even if it had to be virtually on a shoestring. How accurate my estimate was will appear in due course.

As a prelude, General MacArthur kept his air forces very busy. They had been somewhat augmented and now roamed far and wide to blast hostile bases and send many enemy vessels to the bottom. In the Bismarck Sea, for example, early in March 1943 they intercepted a large troop convoy, reportedly carrying 15,000 troops, and by skip bombing—a new technique—sank most of its vessels with all on board. And in April when the Japanese made a number of 100-plane daylight raids on Port Moresby and Milne Bay, causing considerable damage at both places, the Allied air forces inflicted such extremely heavy losses on the raiders as to whittle down materially the offensive power of the Japanese air arm.

Conditions Affecting Operations

Australia continued to be the base and communications zone of SWPA for a long time, although after December 1943 some ships from the States began discharging at the advance base at Milne Bay and beyond that point. The distances between the Australian ports we depended on and the scene of operations were very considerable. Melbourne is about 2,200, Sydney 1,800, Brisbane over 1,200, and Townsville 700 miles by air from Milne Bay—much farther by sea.

The dock facilities of Australian ports were also quite inadequate to meet the heavy demands. This deficiency was made worse by insufficient storage facilities, limited freight-handling equipment and shortage of stevedores, and by the stevedores’ habit of working practically as they would in time of peace. All of these conditions contributed to delay the unloading and loading of vessels, and caused a serious backlog of shipping and congestion in the various Australian harbors. The worst instance occurred at Townsville where once 185 vessels were simultaneously in port awaiting discharge, with just eight docks available.

But local conditions were not alone at fault. In a number of cases, personnel and equipment even of minor units were loaded at home ports on different vessels and routed to three or four different ports. Since the vessels had to be unloaded at those ports, this naturally caused delay and time-consuming reshipment by rail or water, or both.

Further, the Australian railroads—the only ones in SWPA except in the Philippines and Java—were inadequate to carry the load that war imposed. And the several Australian states had different railway gauges, which entailed unloading and reloading at each state boundary.

Conditions on New Guinea and other islands were infinitely worse and presented problems of enormous difficulty, since all facilities required for military operations had to be created. A large number of airdromes, many miles of roads and great bases with their supply, hospital and other installations had to be carved out of the virgin jungle and many docks had to be built where none had ever been dreamed of. Even after these bases had been established, they were wholly isolated places, surrounded by a vast wilderness of tangled mountains and impenetrable jungle, accessible only by water or air.

Between Australia and Luzon there was no land area capable of accommodating both combat and communications zones or permitting connected ground operations of any magnitude. New Guinea, in spite of its great size (312,329 square miles—very nearly the size of Texas and Louisiana combined) was wholly unsuited to these purposes. It has extremely rugged mountains, especially its towering Owen Stanley Range rising to heights of 16,000 feet, and it has dense rain forests, jungles and swamps, and it completely lacks roads and railroads.

Outside of Australia and the Philippines, there were neither cities nor towns for troop rest and recuperation, and there was no escape from the steaming heat that sapped everyone’s strength, or from the torrential rains which in the Milne Bay area were about 180 inches per year. Besides, the many tropical diseases—malaria, elephantiasis, scrofula, scrub typhus, dysentery, jungle rot, and so on—were ever-present dangers.

From January 1944 until the invasion of the Philippines in October 1944, Sixth Army units were scattered over an area several thousand miles in extent. Some of them were fighting simultaneously at three, four, and even five different places, hundreds of miles apart. Troop and supply movements depended wholly upon water transportation which, though inherently advantageous, was seriously handicapped by shortage of shipping, harbor craft and dock facilities, as well as port and dock companies and similar service units.

Conditions in SWPA were in short unique. They differed radically from those normally encountered in war. They did not permit an army to conduct its operations with roads and railroads behind it as a line of communications except on Luzon, and even there to a limited extent only. Moreover, the conditions caused each major headquarters to be echeloned in great depth, with its elements separated by great distances, so that the only ready communication between them was by radio.

GHQ, for example, operated initially in Brisbane and from late June 1943 in Brisbane with an advance echelon in Port Moresby, over 1,200 miles to the north. Headquarters USAFFE and Headquarters USASOS were in Brisbane and Sydney, respectively.

Meanwhile, Headquarters Sixth Army, which operated initially at Camp Columbia, near Brisbane, moved that part of it which constituted Headquarters Alamo Force to Milne Bay in mid-June 1943, and then successively to Goodenough Island in October and to Cape Cretin, near Finschhafen, in December, where the rest of Headquarters Sixth Army joined it in early February 1944.

In May 1944, in order to enable me better to supervise the progress of operations, I established my command post (CP) on the beach at Hollekang in Humboldt Bay in the Hollandia area. This was nearly 600 miles in advance of the rest of my headquarters at Cape Cretin, and 700 miles by air from the advance echelon of GHQ at Port Moresby, and about 2,000 miles from the main echelons of GHQ and Headquarters USAFFE at Brisbane.

In June 1944, however, the rest of my headquarters joined my CP at Hollekang and in late August GHQ also moved to Hollandia. The advance echelons of USAFFE and USASOS came up shortly thereafter, but their main echelons stayed in Brisbane.

In October 1944 the advance echelons of GHQ and Headquarters Sixth Army moved to Leyte, in the Philippines, where they remained until early January 1945, when both departed for Lingayen Gulf, in Luzon. The main echelon of GHQ had meantime reached Leyte and was followed by the advance echelon of USAFFE, though its main echelon remained in Hollandia and a rear echelon in Brisbane. Hollandia is about 1,500 miles from Leyte, the same distance as from Washington to Denver. Brisbane is about 3,600 miles air line from Leyte, about the distance from Panama to San Francisco; but the sailing distance is very much greater.

The difficulties caused by such echelonment of major headquarters disappeared after the Luzon operation was well advanced and all their elements were reunited on Luzon.

Up to the invasion of Leyte, the inspection of my scattered forces, supervision over widely separated, concurrently conducted operations, and attendance at conferences, necessarily required much air travel by my senior staff members and me.{7} The frequent absences from headquarters imposed special hardship on those senior officers, for they were already seriously overburdened. Although the Chief of Staff also made many trips, it was my practice to have him remain at headquarters when I was away.

2—INITIAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER THREE—THE CHRONICLE OPERATION

THE INITIAL OPERATIONS were important to the general strategic plan of the CinC. This plan projected a double envelopment of Rabaul, the great Japanese stronghold on New Britain, by a series of operations to be conducted under his direction. SoPac forces were to advance on the right through the Solomon Islands and SWPA forces in the center and on the left.

As a preliminary step, Woodlark Island was to be seized to form a link in the line Buna-Guadalcanal. SWPA forces, after neutralizing Gasmata on New Britain, were then to gain control of the Vitiaz Strait area, while SoPac forces advanced through the Solomons to the southern Bougainville area. SoPac forces were then to seize Buka and Kavieng, while SWPA forces simultaneously attacked the Hansa Bay area, whereupon they were to launch an attack against the Admiralties. The Hansa Bay attack was abandoned for a more daring plan.

As this plan had to be formulated a long time in advance, the changing situation naturally caused it to be revised in many particulars although its main concept remained the same. On 6 May 1943, however, GHQ issued the general offensive plan with the operations required for the capture of Rabaul and seizure of the Admiralties. The plan assigned the following objectives:

Occupation of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands: to Alamo Force;

Seizure of the northeast coast of New Guinea to include Huon Peninsula: to New Guinea Force (composed of Australian troops);

Seizure and occupation of the Solomons to include southern Bougainville: to SoPac forces;

Seizure and occupation of western New Britain: to Alamo Force.

Possession of Kiriwina and Woodlark would furnish advance airdrome sites for the support of subsequent operations. Control of Vitiaz Strait would give Allied forces unhampered access into the Bismarck Sea. And occupation of southern Bougainville would give SoPac forces a stepping stone for a later advance against Buka and Kavieng.

My narrative of initial operations is confined to those of Alamo Force. Those conducted by other forces are mentioned only to the extent necessary to keep things clear. The Kiriwina-Woodlark operation was given the code name Chronicle, and the Arawe-Cape Gloucester-Saidor operations were collectively designated by the code name Dexterity.{8}

The GHQ instructions of 6 May were closely followed by GHQ operations instructions directing Alamo Force to occupy and defend Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, and construct airdromes and install air force elements on both. Specifications for airdromes and air-warning facilities for Kiriwina were to be furnished me by CG, Allied Air Forces, SWPA, and for Woodlark by Commander, SoPac. The instructions required Allied naval and air forces to support the operation and charged me with coordination of the plans of the three services and responsibility for defense of the small island group north of southeastern New Guinea.

The plan for the occupation and defense of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands—Chronicle Operation—was prepared by the Sixth Army staff in collaboration with representatives of the supporting Allied naval and air forces. At a conference attended at Headquarters Sixth Army by Commander, Allied Naval Forces; CG, Allied Air Forces; Commander, Naval Amphibious Force; and myself, we reached full agreement on the plan and recommended 30 June 1943 as D-day. After GHQ had approved the plan on 28 May, orders for executing it were issued by Headquarters Alamo Force to the two task forces set up for the operation.

Field Order No. 1, 2 June 1943, directed Byproduct Task Force, composed of the 158th Regimental Combat Team (less one battalion), reinforced by the 46th Engineer Regiment, several seacoast and AAA batteries, medical and service units, and a naval shore establishment, under Colonel Prugh J. Herndon,{9} to occupy and defend Kiriwina Island and construct airdromes, air warning, port and base facilities and navigational aids there.

Leatherback Task Force, composed of the 112th Cavalry RCT, reinforced by the 12th Marine Defense Battalion, a naval base unit, Acorn 5 (a naval construction unit, commonly called Seabees), and medical and service units, under Brigadier-General Julian W. Cunningham, was directed by Field Order No. 2 of the same date to carry out a like mission on Woodlark Island.

A reinforced battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was designated as Alamo Force reserve. For better supervision I moved my Alamo Force CP to Milne Bay, leaving the bulk of Headquarters Sixth Army and Headquarters Alamo Force at Camp Columbia.

The concentration of Byproduct Task Force troops presented some difficulty. They were scattered from Sydney to Townsville and Port Moresby and had to be staged at Milne Bay without interfering with necessary supply movements But in spite of this and the scanty unloading facilities, absence of roads from unloading points to staging areas, and the dense jungle and heavy rains at Milne Bay, the troops completed their concentration by 25 June.

Leatherback Task Force concentration was easy: all but one of its units came directly from SoPac to Townsville where it assembled by 4 June. The whole Force moved directly from Townsville to Woodlark Island, but troops transported in (landing craft, infantry) were restaged at Milne Bay where, owing to lack of service units, they and Byproduct Task Force troops had to be used in unloading vessels. This deprived them of adequate amphibious training but there was no other solution. Natives were useless as stevedores. Unloading was complicated, moreover, by the fact that cargo manifests often arrived at the base weeks after the ships did.

Advance detachments of engineers and naval personnel were sent to Kiriwina and Woodlark in APDs (high-speed transport) a week before D-day to locate suitable approaches, reefs, landing beaches, bivouacs and dump areas, and determine the availability of native labor and make preparation for the main landings They reported the islands unoccupied.

The main elements of the two task forces were transported in convoys composed of LSTs (landing ship, tank) and LCIs, with a few LCMs (landing craft mechanized) added to Byproduct Task Force.

Movement of all convoys was so regulated as to have them pass through the sea north and northeast of Milne Bay at night, in order to make the landings at or before dawn on D-day. The leading elements of the two task forces landed as scheduled and they were followed daily by other elements until the whole movement was completed. The shipping schedule worked without a hitch, though it had to be modified suddenly to provide for moving the Australian 29th Brigade Group from Milne Bay to Buna, the 186th Infantry Regiment from Buna to Milne Bay, and additional Air Corps elements to Kiriwina and Woodlark. The Air Forces had failed to include them in the original troop list.

Except for occasional rough seas, high surf and poor beach conditions, the grounding of some vessels at destination, and difficult approaches, especially at Kiriwina, the whole movement went off remarkably well. But the limited amphibian shipping made it extremely slow. The movement to Kiriwina was not completed until 23 July and that to Woodlark not until some days later.

Meanwhile, on 15 July, in accordance with GHQ instructions, I had assumed command of the Australian and U.S. troops on Goodenough Island and responsibility for its defense and that of adjacent small islands. Field Order No. 3, 14 July 1943, put Colonel Clarence M. Tomlinson in direct charge of that defense.

Although these landings were unopposed, an adequate defense system had to be provided on each island to guard against a possible enemy counter stroke, but logistics and engineer construction outweighed all other considerations. Airdrome construction and installation of air-warning facilities were the primary mission of the two task forces; but engineers and Seabees and their equipment, and even combat troops, had to be constantly diverted from their normal tasks to build roads and ship landings. Fortunately we had made allowance for these contingencies. Otherwise, our arrival and unloading schedules could not have been maintained.

Personal inspections impressed me with the difficulties of the 46th Engineers on Kiriwina and those of the Seabees on Woodlark in their construction work, and with the excellent performance of both units.

Constant torrential rains and shortage of heavy engineering equipment seriously retarded construction on Kiriwina, where the ground was flat and devoid of drainage. But by early August one air strip of 5,000 by 100 feet, had been completed and soon the RAAF’s 79th Squadron was operating from it.

Construction on Woodlark was likewise retarded by rains though drainage was better here. By 15 July, however, a serviceable 3,000-foot landing strip was ready for transport planes. And by the 21st a runway 5,050 feet long and 100 to 150 feet wide, with a cleared area 7,700 feet long and 300 feet wide, together with a parallel taxiway, was nearing completion. The 67th Fighter Squadron began to operate from the field on the 23d.

Besides terrain and weather, the frequent alterations made by Allied Air Forces in airdrome specifications also slowed up their construction, both here and at other places later on. These frequent changes made it hard to prepare material and labor estimates and formulate plans for locating roads, bivouac and dump areas.

For some unknown reason, the enemy made no attempt to interfere with this operation, either by attacking the convoys or the troops during and after landing. His activities were confined to air reconnaissance and several bombing raids against Kiriwina, Woodlark and Goodenough Islands. None of these was serious, but they did cause some casualties and damage.

Chronicle Operation having accomplished its purpose, I terminated it on 5 August. Its success may be ascribed to thorough planning, to the secrecy assured by moving all convoys at night, to the effective cooperation between ground, naval and air forces, and the fine performance of the troops and their commanders.

Chronicle Operation involved an amazing amount of detailed planning. This covered concentration and staging of troops, preparation of equipment tables, allotment of shipping, escorts for convoys, air coverage, movement tables, loading diagrams for all vessels and other matters. All this was required for a minor operation. The immense amount of staff work required for subsequent operations even more complex, which followed one another in rapid succession and involved forces of considerable size, can readily be imagined.

It was extremely unfortunate that some weeks before the operation started, Brigadier-General George Honnen, the able Chief of Staff of Sixth Army and Alamo Force, became ill and had to be evacuated to the United States. His loss was keenly felt by myself and by the staff. He was succeeded by Brigadier-General (later Major-General) Edwin D. Patrick, whom I detailed as Chief of Staff in July 1943. Colonel Decker, the Deputy Chief of Staff, meanwhile acted as Chief of Staff.

As D-day for Chronicle Operation approached, it became apparent that development of Milne Bay Base had not progressed to the point where it could support Chronicle and later operations. Its development and that of the Oro Bay Base were in fact so far behind schedule that drastic measures were required to enable them to support impending operations.

When General MacArthur visited me at Milne Bay on 28 June and then Oro Bay, he was so disturbed by the lack of progress made at both bases that he placed me in charge of their development, an additional responsibility that continued until 15 August 1943. Shortly after his visit to Milne and Oro Bays, the CinC detailed Brigadier-General (later Major-General) James L. Frink, whose name I had suggested to him, as CG, USASOS, relieving the Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ, of that onerous additional duty.

My staff drew up a comprehensive plan for developing the two bases after a thorough reconnaissance of them. The difficulties were very great, especially since speed was of the essence. Extensive jungle areas had to be cleared, swamps drained, many miles of roads built where not even trails had existed before, many bridges and a dozen docks constructed at Milne Bay alone, shelter and hospitals erected, and numerous other facilities provided. But by putting many members of my staff on this job and by using all available troops, and a very large number of native laborers, and using locally available materials, such as bamboo, nipa, and so on, wherever possible, the development of the two bases made good progress.

The heaviest load fell upon the following members of the Sixth Army (Alamo Force) staff: Colonel Sturgis (Engineer); Colonel Lehner (Quartermaster); Colonel Blackmore (Ordnance Officer); Colonel Reichelderfer (Signal Officer); and Colonel Pierce (G4), who coordinated the work. All of these officers and their assistants did outstanding work in this base development, and Colonel Hagins (Surgeon) also deserves great credit for his effective measures to suppress the Anopheles mosquito pest which had made Milne Bay one of the most deadly malaria regions in the world.

The many diseases prevalent on New Guinea and other islands in SWPA presented another serious problem. The troops were warned against these diseases and measures instituted to prevent infection and facilitate treatment.

Relations between troops and natives also presented a serious problem now as later on. I issued stringent orders to govern in the premises. Money meant nothing to the simple natives.