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    Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure
    Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure
    Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure
    Ebook96 pages1 hour

    Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure

    By Major Roger N. Sangvic

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    By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherTannenberg Publishing
    Release dateNov 6, 2015
    ISBN9781782899891
    Battle Of Mogadishu: Anatomy Of A Failure
    Author

    Major Roger N. Sangvic

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      Book preview

      Battle Of Mogadishu - Major Roger N. Sangvic

      This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

      To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

      Or on Facebook

      Text originally published in 1998 under the same title.

      © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

      Publisher’s Note

      Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

      We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

      BATTLE OF MOGADISHU: ANATOMY OF A FAILURE

      By

      MAJ Roger N. Sangvic, USA

      TABLE OF CONTENTS

      ABSTRACT

      By applying Cohen and Gooch’s model to the Battle of Mogadishu, this paper shows that the failure of the TFR mission on 3-4 October 1993 was the result of a system failure. Secretary Aspin received far more blame than he deserved for making the decision. Misperception of the real impact tanks and APCs could have had on the overall mission is the real cause of this disproportionate blame. GEN Hoar and GEN Powell, in addition, bear as much responsibility as Secretary Aspin for the decision. Neither of these generals strongly advocated the deployment to Aspin even though the worsening situation on the ground merited their strong support. Both Hoar and Powell’s approval recommendations can be characterized as lukewarm. Aspin’s real failure was of not being more critical of the conduct of the TFR operations. In light of Secretary Aspin’s acknowledged concern over the number of similar operations conducted by TFR and his knowledge that the Administration was seeking a political solution, he should have notified MG Garrison of the policy shift though the JCS and CINCCENT and provided additional guidance on risk. Had Aspin either reassessed the risk of each TFR operation more thoroughly or done a better job coordinating the policy shift in light of the increased risks, it is likely that the three October raid would not have occurred.

      While better policy coordination from the Secretary of Defense down to TFR could have prevented the 3 October 1993 raid from occurring, TFR did have all the means in Mogadishu to successfully accomplish the mission. However, overconfidence in TFR’s capabilities and underestimation of the enemy’s ability to find and attack TFR vulnerabilities were critical failures that led to a series of other failures. First, TFR did not request the AC-130s and extra platoon. Second, TFR conducted the 3 October raid without protecting its vulnerable helicopters. Third, TF planners failed to utilize all their available resources and integrate these resources into a plan that could be flexible enough to handle the threat and all the friction in this risky operation.

      This paper demonstrates that TF Ranger’s 3 October mission failed as a result of the organization, not the decisions of Secretary Aspin alone. As Cohen and Gooch observed, military misfortune is not merely the result of an individual mistake, but rather, the result of series of mistakes throughout a system. Ultimately, TFR and the system it was working in failed to anticipate and adapt.

      Introduction

      Failure is something that most organizations have great difficulty dealing with. The military, as an organization, has an especially difficult challenge in dealing with failure because military failures normally result in more than lost debates, dollars, resources, or market shares. Military misfortunes result in lives being lost, soldiers being crippled and maimed, future policies being altered, and hard earned prestige and credibility diminished. These were just a few of the consequences of the failed U.S.-led effort to capture the Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed,{1} on 3-4 October 1993 in an effort to shore up the foundering United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOMII). Regardless of how difficult failure is to deal with emotionally, understanding the nature of military failures is essential for the U.S. military to learn its hard gained lessons and develop systems to prevent the reoccurrence of similar failures. A detailed critical analysis of military failures like the Battle of Mogadishu is required to avoid emotionalism and the natural tendency to seek a simple cause for the failure.

      Clausewitz advocated detailed critical analysis of a battle in order to understand it in its totality and complexity rather than analyzing many battles in only a superficial manner.{2} Clausewitz probably understood the complexity of war far better than most military theorists did. Although his perspective was mainly the Napoleonic campaigns of his era, his advocacy of critical analysis is just as valid for today’s urban combat zones as it was for the fields of battle in his day. Critical analysis of the Battle of Mogadishu is especially important because U.S. forces may have to deal with combat circumstances similar to what Task Force Ranger (TFR) and the 10th Mountain Division’s Quick Reaction Force (QRF) encountered in the U.S. Army’s largest single fire fight since Vietnam.{3} The events leading up to this battle provide an important case study of how decisions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level interacted to achieve the unintended end state — a withdrawal of U.S. support for UNOSOM II, a future reluctance of the Clinton Administration to intervene militarily in places such as Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, and an even greater aversion for U.S. troops to be under U.N. control in other risky operations.{4}

      This monograph investigates the causes for the failure experienced by the U.S. military in attempting to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed in Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 October 1993. Using the systematic Clausewitzian

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