On the Psychobiology of Personality: Essays in Honor of Marvin Zuckerman

Canada

Part I

Historical Perspectives on the Biological Bases of Personality

Chapter 1

Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking: A Historical Perspective on Current Challenges

E. Barratt; L.F. Orozco-Cabal; F.G. Moeller

1 Introduction

Nowhere is the challenge of defining and measuring personality constructs more obvious than in a historical review of impulsivity and sensation seeking. Debates about these traits have revolved around their level of complexity, their relationship with other traits, and their relationship with each other. Examples of specific questions posed in these debates include: (1) Do impulsivity and sensation seeking have subdimensions? If so, what are they? (2) Do impulsivity and sensation seeking combine to define a superfactor? (3) How do these two traits relate to other higher-order personality constructs that have been identified in more encompassing personality models? (4) How do different measures of these traits as defined within different disciplines or subdisciplines relate to each other? For example, how do phenomenal self measures, e.g. self-report questionnaires, relate to behavioral measures involving delay of reward? What relative value do these discipline specific measures have as predictors of impulse-control disorders? Although both impulsivity and sensation seeking have a relatively long history within the general context of personality research, these debates have not been resolved. These questions per se will not be broached in depth in this chapter but, rather, general observations that currently preclude their being answered will be reviewed briefly and selected general suggestions for their resolution will be outlined.

The major goal of this chapter is to review the current pragmatic status of these two personality constructs at the cusp between past and future research. From the viewpoint of better understanding persons and achieving a more promising future for societies and individuals, is the current status of these two personality traits all there is? The answer is no if different approaches can be used to inter-relate data from the different disciplines that study persons from molecular biology to social interactions. An alternative strategy for defining and measuring personality dimensions in general and impulsivity and sensation seeking in particular must be found. The strategies proposed for new approaches are not meant to be the only approaches nor ones that will endure beyond a limited time frame. Most scientific methodologies are usually modified over time. The more basic the problems addressed by the methodologies, the longer will be their influence.

This chapter will not chronicle in depth the history of impulsivity and sensation seeking research and their role in clinical and social decision-making. The history of the study of both traits has been well documented in other sources. Reviews of both theoretical and applied impulsivity research include: (1) McCown and De Simone (1993); this source not only provides a historical overview but also defines important terms (e.g. impulsivity and impulses); this review is part of a book (McCown & De Simone 1993) whose chapters cover a wide range of theoretical and clinical approaches to understanding impulsivity; (2) Webster and Jackson (1997); the first five chapters review different approaches to impulsivity ranging across clinical, social psychology, sociological, legal, cybernautical perspectives; this book is more oriented toward social applications, especially forensic considerations; and (3) Evenden (1999); this article in an issue of Psychopharmacology is an overview of varieties of impulsivity. It is an excellent overview contrasting the theory and development of self-report measures of impulsivity with behavioral measures that are primarily based on learning theory principles. The article reviews a wide range of impulsivity research especially with lower animals.

Reviews of sensation seeking research include: (1) Zuckerman (1979); this book contains a historical review by the author whose pioneering research on sensation seeking has made his name almost synonymous with the study of this trait; and (2) Zuckerman (1991); chapter one provides an overview from a broader perspective of how sensation seeking and other personality traits are related to more encompassing personality theories; the difficulties in classifying personality traits are made obvious in this chapter.

The current chapter is divided into four parts: (1) Why are impulsivity and sensation seeking important personality traits? (2) Why is there confusion about defining and measuring impulsivity and sensation seeking? (3) What challenges and potential solutions confront researchers in defining these traits? (4) The future: selective alternative approaches.

2 Why are Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking Important Personality Traits?

Impulsivity and sensation seeking are implicated in a broad range of psychopathologies and social problems that are part of a wide spectrum of impulse control disorders. For example, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., Text Revision) (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association 2000), impulsivity is implicated in attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, conduct disorders, antisocial personality disorders, borderline personality disorder, substance abuse, aggression (intermittent explosive disorder), mood disorders, (especially mania), and eating disorders (especially binge eating). If this list is translated into the context of social problems that currently plague human kind, the basis for the importance of impulsivity is obvious. Sensation seeking has also been related to a wide range of psychopathologies and social problems including for example delinquency (Greene et al. 2000), aggression (Joireman et al. 2003), and antisocial and borderline personality disorders(DSMIV-TR). Zuckerman and Neeb (1979) in an early study relating the Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) to psychopathology found that the SSS was related primarily to a spectrum of sociopathic disorders.

Lessons learned in reviewing the relation of impulsivity and sensation seeking to clinical disorders include: (1) both traits are multidimensional; (2) different sub-dimensions of both traits relate to different impulse control disorders; (3) the two traits often interact with each other and with other personality traits in their involvement with selected psychopathologies.

Why do impulsivity and sensation seeking relate to a wide range of impulse-control disorders and social adjustment problems? It is proposed that not only are these traits multidimensional but they can also be characterized by a wide range of biological, behavioral, cognitive, and social/environment constructs and measurements. The substratum of the impulsivity and sensation seeking measures within these four categories of constructs have common variance with the substrates of the psychopathological and social disorders listed above and provide the bases for the relationships of the two personality traits to these disorders.

3 Why is There Confusion About Defining and Measuring Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking?

After reviewing a number of different approaches to analyzing impulsivity ranging from the study of human personality traits, through psychiatric symptoms to animal behavior, Evenden (1999: 358) noted that even though almost all authors are in agreement that impulsivity is multifactorial, there is little agreement as to what these factors are even within a single field of research such as human personality traits. It is proposed here that the main reason for lack of agreement on measuring impulsivity and sensation seeking lies within two contexts: First, the lack of general agreement on an encompassing personality model which can allow for the synthesis of data ranging from molecular biology measures to measures of social/pathological disorders; most models establish a structure of personality based on self-report measures or interview data even though they may have originally been conceived as personality measurements of biologically based constructs. For example, Zuckerman (1979) developed the SSS based on biological and behavioral research data related to an optimal level of arousal. Cloninger (1986) and his colleagues (Cloninger et al. 1993, 1994) started with biological data when developing the Temperament and Character Inventory. This test contains a novelty seeking trait which is similar to sensation seeking. Actually, most self-report measures of impulsivity and sensation seeking (as well as measures of other personality traits) were developed primarily within the context of phenomenal self data, primarily self-report measures. Parenthetically, this discussion is not meant to be a criticism of the use of self-report or phenomenal data to measure personality traits but rather, as will be discussed, an appeal to consider both the strengths and weaknesses of self-reports. Once a self-report measure is developed there is a tendency to forget the origins of its conception.

The second context leading to confusion is the complexity of impulsivity and sensation seeking as constructs. Both are multidimensional and involve multidisciplinary approaches and can be measured using a wide range of techniques. As noted, self-report measures are one common technique used in human personality level research. The value of this approach is evident in the everyday aphorism that the best way to find out what a person is thinking is to ask him/her. Asking persons to assess their thoughts and behaviors is a legitimate technique for arriving at one view of their personality (Damasio 1999). But often, as Rorer and Widiger (1983) noted two decades ago, trying to understand personality and to measure personality structure is another matter. We have tried to use assessment (individual difference) models that are inappropriate to the task (p. 433). Personality models must be broader in their scope than those based on one or a few techniques as will be discussed.

As noted, laboratory techniques from many disciplines have been used to define and measure impulsivity beyond self-report and interview phenomenal self data. For example, impulsivity has been measured by variations of the continuous performance task (Dougherty et al. 2003), gambling or risk-taking tasks (Bechara et al. 1994), and delay of reward (Rachlin et al. 1991). The latter tasks involve intolerance to reward delay and have been included in studies of both impulsivity and sensation seeking.

Electrophysiological recordings have also played an important role in understanding the possible neurological substrates of impulsivity and sensation seeking. Event-related potentials (ERPs) reflect electrophysiological activity of cortical neurons evoked by well-defined stimuli and regulated by the psychophysiological state of the organism (Coles & Rugg 1995; Stelmack & Houlihan 1995). Combined behavioral and electrophysiological measures suggest that high-impulsive subjects in contrast to low-impulsive subjects process information in the central nervous system less efficiently (Barratt 1993; Barratt et al. 1981; Barratt & Patton 1983). Dickman (1993) arrived at the same conclusion about information processing from his research using verbal learning paradigms.

In addition, neurochemical, cognitive, and combinations of tasks in the four categories mentioned above have also been used to measure impulsivity and sensation seeking but no model has encompassed all of these measures. Further, it has been rare that the behavioral, biological, and cognitive measures per se have been used to assess impulsivity and sensation seeking. They are usually listed as correlates of the personality dimensions that were defined by self-report questionnaires.

4 Challenges and Potential Solutions to Defining and Measuring Impulsivity and Sensation Seeking

As discussed, research on impulsivity and sensation seeking is multidisciplinary, as evidenced in an overview of relevant work. Both constructs are implicated in a variety of psychopathologies within DSM-IV-TR. Further, as noted, this resulted in different disciplines using discipline-specific techniques to measure these traits. An important challenge is to develop a discipline neutral personality model that allows data to be synthesized across disciplines in order to define and measure personality constructs. This is not a new problem (Hyland 1985). Nor are suggestions for broaching it new, but it is a problem that still lacks a solution. Parenthetically, Davidson (2003) also suggested that psychophysiology should pursue new synthesizing approaches rather than becoming technique bound which indicates that this problem is broader than the study of personality.

How can a model that encompasses the wide range of human characteristics be developed? Duke (1986) proposed developing a science of personality to achieve this goal, but this approach did not catch-on. Biopsychosocial models have been proposed implicitly or explicitly for many years without gaining anything near universal acceptance. One reason for new hope is that times have changed. New techniques are available that were not present even a decade ago. Kluckhon and Murray (1949) noted we have failed to produce a ‘personality’ system which invites unanimous assent (p. 3). They noted, further, the limitations in understanding of brain correlates of cognition: Since we know next to nothing about the electrical field of forces which constitute the physical aspect of the stream of consciousness, the best terminology available for conceptualizing each pattern of regnant processes is that which has been derived from introspection (p. 9). Five decades later, we have made unbelievable advances in the study of the nervous system as evidenced in research using event-related potentials, magnetoencephalography, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and molecular genetics. However, we still do not have a universally accepted model of personality encompassing cognition and biology. How do we proceed with developing a model?

In the mid 1970s, one of the co-authors (ESB) was faced with the problem of integrating data from different disciplines including biological, behavioral, self-report, and social data. He had been exposed to system theory models, as described by Weiss (1969), von Bertalanffy (1968) and Ashby (1960). He was especially impressed with Ashby’s closed systems model for a brain that interrelates behavior, brain functioning, the environment, and motivation. He was also impressed with Lazare’s (1973) discussion of hidden conceptual models in psychiatry in which Lazare reviewed four models of psychiatric practice: the medical (biological); the behavioral; the social (environmental/milieu); and the psychological (cognitive). Within a broad context of systems models, Barratt asked what are the minimal number of categories of constructs and measurements necessary to describe a person and how can they be described in a general systems model? He wedded Ashby’s and Lazare’s models into a general systems personality model (Barratt 1985; Barratt & Patton 1983; Barratt & Slaughter 1998) and included four categories of basic concepts and measurements that describe humans: biological, behavioral, social/environmental, and cognitive variables. The system was a closed feedback system. Most systems of human personality dimensions or brain functions are open systems, the logic being that human beings are exposed to a wide range of environmental influences and a closed system would result in endless oscillatory (negative) feedback. He defended a closed system on several grounds including Lewin’s (1935) concept of life space (Métraux 1981). Because he included the environment as one category of constructs, life space could be argued to be part of a closed system that would avoid feedback oscillation. Parenthetically, the current emerging discipline of social cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner & Lieberman 2001) includes the same four basic categories of human characteristics that were included in this early model.

How does Barratt’s model help resolve the multidisciplinary turf issues in defining and measuring impulsivity and sensation seeking? As noted, impulsivity and sensation seeking are multi-dimensional as defined by self-report questionnaires (Eysenck & Eysenck 1977; Patton et al. 1995; Zuckerman 1979). For example, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al. 1995) has three independent subdimensions: attention or the ability to focus and be vigilant; non-planning, living for the moment; motor or acting without thinking. The three subdimensions combine to provide a total impulsivity score.

As a heuristic exercise, we define impulsivity by interrelating the four categories of constructs and measurements from the general systems model with the four measures from the BIS-11 in a matrix (Figure 1). We then search for patterns across the matrix based on our theories about each BIS-11 dimension. For example, we have used a wide range of timing and rhythm (e.g. paced tapping and pursuit rotor) behavioral tasks in our research because early research indicated that subjects with high levels of impulsivity were more variable in performing fine perceptual motor tasks. We hypothesized that motor impulsivity was a timing and rhythm sub-dimension (Barratt 1983).

Figure 1 Multidimensional characterization of impulsivity. Entries in the matrix are examples and are in some instances speculative.

Reviewing the laboratory behavioral measures of impulsivity across the matrix led to identifying the etiological basis of motor impulsivity as the processing of sequential information related to performance on fine perceptual-motor tasks. We could have done this without the use of the model but using the model forced us to consider how other measures (e.g. biological) might overlap with other sub-dimensions of impulsivity. As noted, this is a discipline neutral heuristic model that allows one to interrelate data from the molecular to the social. Although we used this model to study impulsivity, it can also be used to assess sensation seeking and other personality constructs.

This is a brief review of one alternative approach. Within this approach, biological and behavioral measures are not considered correlates of personality traits defined by self-report questionnaires. Rather, all measures included in the matrix (Figure 1) are potential measures of personality traits. This is a shift from the more traditional approaches within individual differences research.

5 The Future

5.1 Introduction: The Challenge for the Future

As Rorer and Widiger (1983) earlier challenged the individual difference approach to measuring personality, the challenge to us seems obvious. Scientists must agree on a general systematic approach to interrelating data from the molecular to the social and also use selected common measurements across studies. One method for modeling was suggested here, a heuristic working type model but one that is discipline neutral. We should also explore at both the theoretical and applied levels new approaches to use within our models. Marks-Tarlow’s (1993) suggestion that impulsivity is a system in chaos is not a familiar concept to most personality theorists but one that has promise. Finn’s (2002) use of assessment devices as a basis for significant interpersonal encounters in therapy could possibly lead to impulsivity and sensation seeking questionnaires being developed to extend their usefulness to therapeutic interventions. New approaches need to be explored.

Our research group is currently working on establishing the role of impulsivity in a spectrum of impulse-control disorders using the general approach discussed above. In this research we consider impulsivity and sensation seeking to be different personality dimensions. Impulsivity can be combined with sensation seeking tendencies just as it can be combined with aggression or the drive to eat and related binge eating behaviors. Both impulsivity and sensation seeking have been related to psychopathological and social problems (e.g. substance abuse) but both play different roles in these personal and social disorders. When impulsivity is combined with sensation seeking, the resulting behaviors involve a higher probability of being at risk for harm than when sensation seeking alone influences the behaviors (Zuckerman & Kuhlman 2000).

5.2 Consciousness and Impulsivity/Sensation Seeking

To illustrate another possible construct that has not been explored in depth in impulsivity and sensation seeking research, the potential role of consciousness in motor impulsivity research will be reviewed. Both impulsivity and sensation seeking raise general questions about the control of behaviors and thoughts. To what extent do persons have control of their behavior at any given moment? Is this control conscious? This, of course, is a relevant social question, especially in a forensic context (Barratt & Felthous 2003). A key construct in research related to behavioral control is consciousness that we think will play a more pivotal role in future research on impulsivity and sensation seeking. The following brief review of the role of consciousness in motor impulsivity will illustrate integration of cognitive, behavioral (both clinical and laboratory), and biological measures.

In the DSM-IV-TR, it is stated for selected impulse-control disorders (e.g. intermittent explosive disorder) that the individual feels an increasing sense of tension or arousal before committing the act and then experiences pleasure, gratification, or relief at the time of committing the act (p. 663). It is also noted that regret, self-reproach, or guilt may follow the act (p. 663). Damasio (1999) in discussing feelings noted that perhaps the most startling idea in this book is that, in the end, consciousness begins as a feeling, a special kind of feeling, to be sure, but a feeling nonetheless (p. 312). Question: is the tension described in the DSM-IV-TR for selected impulse control disorders a feeling? When we were studying aggression among inmates in prison (Barratt et al. 1997), we often asked them why do you continue to commit aggressive acts since the outcome for you is not desirable … you will be moved to less desirable living conditions and you will less likely be considered for early parole. The inmates who committed the impulsive aggressive acts noted that we can’t help it, we just do it. Further, many of them noted that following the aggressive act, they felt guilty and swore not to do it again. The inmates who committed primarily premeditated aggressive acts did not in general report these feelings. In contrast, the inmates who committed impulsive aggressive acts when their aggression was being controlled by medication (phenytoin) would say that we still experience anger and a feeling to hit and yell at someone but we don’t. Do these observations involve conscious awareness of impulsive tendencies? The feeling of guilt following an impulsive aggressive act was also commonly reported.

In a factor analytic study aimed at noting whether persons could classify their behaviors as impulsive or aggressive (Barratt et al. 1999), we demonstrated that non-clinical subjects could describe their aggressive behaviors in terms of impulsive and premeditated acts. Further, items on the impulsive aggressive factor were characterized by lack of control, guilt feelings following the act, and thought confusion. Their general feelings on the day the act occurred defined a separate dimension from impulsive or premeditated aggression. Items that defined general feelings included: the day the act occurred I was having a bad day in general; I was feeling more aggressive than usual the day act occurred; I was in a good mood before the act occurred (negative factor loading).

Damasio (1999) proposes that consciousness consists of simple and complex kinds (p. 16). He describes the simplest kind as core consciousness which is a sense about one moment — now — and one place — here (p. 16). He proposes that sense of self comes from a complex form of consciousness called extended consciousness. He further notes that knowing that we feel an emotion, "feeling that feeling, occurs only after we build the second-order representations necessary for core consciousness" (Damasio 1999: 280).

Orozco-Cabal (2000) also noted that one can be aware that one is aware of phenomena that are not within the limits of the physical world. To the extent that humans can be aware of awareness suggests that they can potentially control plans for executing behavior. This would assume that the nervous system could, for example, use serial and parallel processing of information with an objective goal of making accurate predictions about events in our surroundings in order to anticipate and conform our behaviors to the coping demands of society (Llinás, 2001; Morin 1986; Young 1978). This would assure that sensory-motor programs could be configured in the brain and reviewed before hand without physically performing them. This would be similar to writing a script and rehearsing it before the play begins in a self-recreated space. What brain functions relate to this process? Parenthetically, an important observation by Brunia and van Boxtel (2000) related to this discussion is that it is impossible to exclusively discuss motor processes without taking into account the related perception (p. 507). Their observation emphasizes the need to integrate across different categories of techniques.

5.3 A Conceptual Brain Model for Motor Preparation and Consciousness

Let us briefly review a conceptual neural model that could sub-serve motor preparation and consciousness. Direct current scalp recordings of the brain’s electrical activity during self-initiated acts in human subjects have shown that conscious intention to act is preceded by a preparatory phase (Libet 1985). Preparation for a motor response correlates with the appearance of a progressive negative shift of the electrical potential over the vertex. These ERPs are labeled readiness potentials (RP) or Bereitschaftspotentials (Kornhuber & Deecke 1965). Negativity is initially bilateral and symmetrical with maximal amplitude over the vertex electrodes suggesting activation of the underlying supplementary motor cortex and basal ganglia circuitry; this activity then lateralizes shortly before muscle activation towards the primary motor cortical area contralateral to the side of the limb that performs the movement (Brunia & van Boxtel 2000; Deecke 1987; Praamstra et al. 1996). The first symmetrical component of the RP is believed to correspond to automatic activation of premotor structures by generated inputs or drives originating in the limbic system. The next asymmetrical component of the RP has been proposed to indicate the possible role of a motor plan for the engagement of the motor system for movement. Libet (1985) provided data that they interpret as a conscious urge to make a movement. This urge occurs 150–200 ms before the onset of muscular activity in self-initiated movements.

What is known about the function of premotor areas in motor programming? In humans, the supplementary motor area is located in superior-lateral and medial aspects of the frontal lobe rostral to the precentral gyrus (Broadman’s area 6). Because of its particular anatomical localization and functional connectivity, the supplementary motor area has been hypothesized to serve as the context for the integration of incoming external signals with our intentions and motives for action (Wiesendanger 1993). Embryologically related to the anterior cingulate cortex, it has been proposed that the supplementary motor area is part of a medial system loop which includes the ventral striatopallidal system, anterior cingulate cortex, somatosensory cortex (linkage between sensation and action), open cortico-thalamo-cortical loops, nucleus reticularis thalami, nucleus ventralis lateralis pars oralis, striatum and internal division of the globus pallidus. Structures within this extensive loop interconnect via excitatory pathways through the ventral thalamus creating a positive feedback circuitry (Brunia & van Boxtel 2000; Goldberg 1985).

The medial loop system is involved in processing of sequential information related to motor programming. Activity within the loop has been suggested to be responsible for generating a series of short temporal sequences of alternative plans of action (Coterill 2001; Goldberg 1985). Efferent copies of such plans travel to other premotor and sensory areas in the brain where they are integrated (e.g. eyes-hand movement coordination) and contrasted with afferent information to determine the appropriateness of the movement sequence and its rate of progression (Flanagan & Johansson 2003; Guillery 2003).

All of the above is a logically coherent model from a neuroanatomical and physiological viewpoint and shows how cognitive, biological, and behavioral constructs can be integrated in a discipline neutral model. But how could this neural model relate to consciousness and motor impulsivity? Pursuing answers to that question is part of our current research.

5.4 Lateralized Readiness Potentials and Impulsivity/Sensation Seeking

As part of studying biological constructs related to impulsivity we have been measuring lateralized readiness potentials (LRP) in subjects with high and low levels of impulsivity as defined by self-report questionnaire measures. LRPs are ERPs that are recorded over motor areas of the cortex … and occur before the movement itself (Coles et al. 1995: 97). They are normally "larger over scalp sites that are contra-lateral to the side of the body that is to be moved … and may be useful in monitoring covert aspects of motor preparation (Coles et al. 1995: 97).

High-impulsive subjects have lower LRP amplitudes compared to those of low-impulsive subjects in a non-clinical group (Barratt et al. 2002; Barratt unpublished data). One possible interpretation of these findings is that impulsivity is related to an increased tendency within the conceptual nervous system model outlined above to act as a closed system, partially inactivating the modulatory effect on motor programming exerted by afferent input and attentional systems. This would be consistent with our hypothesis that processing of sequential information related to performance on fine motor tasks is related to motor impulsivity. The basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex circuitry have rich inter-connections that could be related to motor impulsivity in terms of processing sequential information as described above. It has often been conjectured that impulsivity is clinically related to frontal lobe activity. Within the context of this chapter, LRPs could be considered not only as correlates of self-report measures of impulsivity, but also as potential measures per se of impulsivity which when added to other measures give an overall index of impulsivity.

6 Summary

In summary, this chapter suggests that research on impulsivity and sensation seeking is hindered by: (1) the lack of an encompassing personality model which can allow the synthesis of data from molecular biology measures to measures of social/pathological disorders; and (2) the lack of integration of multidisciplinary measures into prediction indices. One possible solution to these challenges was described as an example of one potential approach. Whatever approach is used, the obstacles hindering research on impulsivity and sensation seeking must be overcome for the field to advance beyond the groundbreaking work of the last 50 years.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by a grant from the Health Foundation, Rogosin Institute, New York Hospital, Cornell Medical Center.

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Chapter 2

On Personality and Arousal: A Historical Perspective on Eysenck and Zuckerman

R.M. Stelmack

1 Introduction

Elizabeth Duffy (1904–1970) was an emeritus professor at the University of North Carolina who made significant, seminal contributions to the areas of emotion and motivation in 40 years of research activity. Her early writings were influenced by the work of W. B. Cannon (1915) who is largely responsible for elaborating the principle of homeostasis. An important tenet in this work is that the body functions to maintain an optimal state of physiological activity. With respect to motivation and emotion, Cannon’s research also advanced the idea that aversive physical and emotional stimuli that disrupt homeostasis elicit generalized sympathetic nervous system activity, manifest as fight or flight responses.

Duffy’s work on physiological arousal and behavior in children revealed a continuity of energy mobilization in emotional and motivated behavior. The generalized activation of the sympathetic nervous system was often as evident under conditions of high motivation as it was in the emotional states that Cannon explored, with differences being a matter of degree. Duffy pioneered the application of psychophysiological methods to study the degree of physiological activation of different individuals in different situations. Despite the continuity with Cannon’s work, the concept of activation that she explicated, especially in her later writing, bore little resemblance to the undifferentiated activation of the sympathetic nervous system that Cannon described in 1915. In her view, "the description of behavior at a given moment requires the consideration of two basic aspects: (a) direction, approach or withdrawal with respect to persons, things, ideas, or any aspect of the environment; and (b) activation, arousal, or intensity" (Duffy 1972: 577). Activation was a term that she came to regard as synonymous with arousal, intensity, energy mobilization, and drive. Arousal eventually emerged as a concept that incorporated all of those terms. In this sense, arousal became a unifying concept, bringing diverse areas of physiological research into common focus. In terms of physiological activity, however, arousal was not conceived as a unitary construct, a fact for which she and other arousal advocates, such as Malmo, were harshly but mistakenly criticized.

Activation is both general and specific …. Changes constantly occur in the physiological functioning of the organism as it lives and meets, as best it can, the demands of the situations in which it finds itself …. Any change in the situation to which the organism is responding might be expected to cause, to some degree, a change in one or more of the systems of the organism. The same statement might be made in regard to any change in an attitude or a set for a particular kind of action…. The number of different patterns of physiological response employed by an organism must, then, be staggering in number (Duffy 1972: 578). Some systems operate in an antagonistic fashion to maintain homeostasis. Different situations, or interpretations of situations, may require maximal activity in different parts of the organism to secure an effective response (Duffy 1972: 580).

As early as 1934, Duffy proposed that a continuum of psychological states could be understood in terms of their correspondence to a continuum of energy mobilization. This view of arousal was widely shared, notably by Lindsley (1951) and by Malmo (1959). In this view, arousal (activation) was conceived as a dimension that described a continuum of neurophysiological states, ranging from deep sleep at the low end of the continuum to excited states at the high end. In this period, research on the reticular formation marked an important advance in the neurophysiology of arousal. It had been established that low-amplitude, high-frequency EEG activity was associated with wakefulness and attention, while high-amplitude, low-frequency EEG activity was associated with sleep and drowsiness (Jasper 1949). Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) demonstrated that these indices of arousal were modulated by activity in the ascending reticular activation system (ARAS). In pursuing the functional significance of this system, it was proposed that the relation between the state of arousal along this sleep/excited continuum and performance was described by an inverted-U shaped curve (Hebb 1949, 1955). Although this conception of arousal emphasized the important role that the ARAS could play in mediating a wide range of neuropsychological states along the arousal continuum, all of these luminaries of arousal theory acknowledged the complex relations between the physiological systems, the neuropsychological states that they supported, and the behavior that was expressed.

The term ubiquitous is certainly an adjective that fits the concept of arousal, i.e. existing or being everywhere. For example, Duffy stated that almost any physiological response might be considered an indicator (rough or refined) of the degree of activation (1972: 580). The use of multiple psychophysiological recording methods was also encouraged, again, with a view to identifying systems and response patterns that corresponded to specific phenomena along the arousal continuum and with their interaction with environmental conditions and individual differences in behavior. Another influential writer, D. O. Hebb, shared Duffy’s view. In describing his version of arousal, Hebb conceptualized the motivational and psychological implications that stemmed from the ARAS. In his view, arousal (drive) was likened to an energizer but not a guide … and functionally efficient learning is only possible in the waking, alert responsive animal, in which the level of arousal is high. He was clear in stating that the nervous system that he conceptualized was a working simplification to facilitate research. There is reason to think that the arousal system may not be homogeneous, but may consist of a number of subsystems with distinctive functions. He noted that the "Olds and Milner (1954) study, reporting ‘reward’ by direct intracranial stimulation, is not easy to fit into the notion of a single, homogeneous system …. and it may be reasonably anticipated that arousal will eventually be found to vary qualitatively as well as quantitatively" (Hebb 1955: