Strategic Thinking and Stratagemical Thoughts in China

Strategic Thinking & Stratagemical Thoughts in China

中華謀略思想與計策思維

Published by Alexander Goldstein

Smashwords Edition

Copyright 2015 Alexander Goldstein

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Contents

Author’s Notes

Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Sequential Structure of Chinese Stratagems

Chapter 2: The Linear Layout of the First 18 Stratagems (Yang) with Historical Examples

Category 1: Victorious strategy generation at the best of times when the favourable conditions (Yang) prevail over the unfavourable (Yin) (勝戰計)

Stratagem 01: [man tian guo hai; 瞞天過海]

Stratagem 02: [wei wei jiu zhao; 圍魏救趙]

Stratagem 03: [jie dao sha ren; 借刀殺人]

Stratagem 04: [yi yi dai lao; 以逸待勞]

Stratagem 05: [chen huo da jie; 趁火打劫]

Stratagem 06: [sheng dong ji xi; 聲東擊西]

Category 2: Face to face confrontation when ‘Me-Enemy’ pattern prevails over others and implemented according to the square defensive design of the graph ‘工’ (the scheme of two wheels with an axle in-between), correlation of external firmness and stability (敵戦計)

Stratagem 07: [wu zhong sheng you; 無中生有]

Stratagem 08: [an du chencang; 暗渡陳倉]

Stratagem 09: [ge an guan huo; 隔岸觀火]

Stratagem 10: [xiao li cang dao; 笑裡藏刀]

Stratagem 11: [li dai tao jiang; 李代桃僵]

Stratagem 12: [shun shou qian yang; 順手牽羊]

Category 3: All-out offensive while a situation is in hand due to the thorough preparation for a sword-like strike on the base of a troop leader’s skills and experience (攻戦計)

Stratagem 13: [da cao jing she; 打草驚蛇]

Stratagem 14: [jie shi huan hun; 借屍還魂]

Stratagem 15: [diao-hu li-shan; 調虎離山]

Stratagem 16: [yu qin gu zong; 欲擒故縱]

Stratagem 17: [pao zhuan yin yu; 拋磚引玉]

Stratagem 18: [qin zei qin wang; 擒賊擒王]

Chapter 3: The Linear Layout of the Second 18 Stratagems (Yin) with Historical Examples

Category 4: Post-attacking measures and countermeasures when a situation gets out of hand to be regulated by means of workaround and mopping-up the post-attacking chaos (混戦計)

Stratagem 19: [fu di chou xin; 釜底抽薪]

Stratagem 20: [混水摸魚hun shui mo yu]

Stratagem 21: [jin-chan tuo ke; 金蟬脫殼]

Stratagem 22: [guan men zhuo zei; 關門捉賊]

Stratagem 23: [yuan jiao jin gong; 遠交近攻]

Stratagem 24: [jia dao fa guo; 假道伐虢]

Category 5: The art of ‘dual track’ exploited on the highest level of strategic operation when your coalition leadership and consolidation of strengths lead to the enemy force dispersion (倂戰計)

Stratagem 25: [tou liang huan zhu; 偷梁換柱]

Stratagem 26: [zhi sang ma huai; 指桑罵槐]

Stratagem 27: [jia chi bu dian; 假痴不癲]

Stratagem 28: [shang wu chou di; 上屋抽梯]

Stratagem 29: [shu shang kai hua; 樹上開花]

Stratagem 30: [fan ke wei zhu; 反客為主]

Category 6: Strategic schemes of breaking out defeat at the worst of times, forcing one resort to retreat, re-formation and redeployment to fight another day (敗戰計)

Stratagem 31: [mei ren ji; 美人計]

Stratagem 32: [kong cheng ji; 空城計]

Stratagem 33: [fan jian ji; 反間計]

Stratagem 34: [ku rou ji; 苦肉計]

Stratagem 35: [lian huan ji; 連環計]

Stratagem 36: [zou wei shang; 走為上]

About the Author

Endnotes

Author’s Notes

There is a Chinese saying that it is better to be a dog in peaceful times than a man in times of unrest. All Chinese are wishing they were dogs in peaceful times, but they have not that luck. In martial arts’ parlance, all boxing defensive process consists of three parts: acceptance, transformation (redirection or redistribution of forces) and counter-attack. All three parts are interrelated and interact with one another for the benefit of a defender, not an attacker.

The famous statement of Sun-zi (Sun Wu) that knowledge of the enemy and knowledge of yourself set you out of defeat in a hundred battles emphasizes significance of the word 'knowledge' with respect to a strategy implementation. Of course, be well informed beforehand about the location and terms of forthcoming fighting is a crucial factor for achieving success. Such an obvious thing goes without any saying. However, to have full information at one's disposal is not enough; there also must be good mental ability for producing active performance.

One of the most important movements in mainland China today is the discovery by young generation of their own country. A generation ago the most progressive of PRC’s leaders were beginning to feel a stirring discontent with their own country, as it was not able to meet the dangerous and aggressive modernity of the West. It was not so much of the political reform, as the developments of economic, educational and military affairs. At that, the Chinese leaders, fathers of the present generation who studied abroad and who imbibed the doctrine of Confucius and who learned the Classics and revolted against them, were the real reformers and revolutionists who have been battered by many forces of the new times. They forced out of existence the old ideological rules, they changed with incredible speed the overall system of the country’s infrastructure, and with unremitting zeal they planned and set up a scheme of modern government conferred with wisdom of the remote past. No ancient government in all under heaven ever accomplished with more imperial speed such tremendous changes in the land between the four seas. They have found the path to compete effectively in the world market and go the way of conquering the West without fighting. For this, they have resorted to the strategic thinking and stratagemical thoughts—the greatest heritage of ‘ancient wisdom,’ a significant part of which rightfully belongs to The Thirty-six Chinese Stratagems written by unknown author(s) about three and a half centuries ago.

Written in a very compressed linguistic style the 36 Chinese stratagems provide a wide scope of variety for interpretations, which, in turn, require some additional clarifications and explanations. It is a common mistake to consider that the 36 stratagems are conceived by Sun-zi, and although the body text of the booklet only consists of 138 Chinese characters (plus 18 characters of the six-category titles), they have systematically been crystallized into the Chinese nation’s experience and wisdom. When taken singly, the stratagems can be used to explain a variety of phenomena, but taken as a pair they can be considered as a precept of turning a defeat into winning, retreat into advance; while taken as a whole, the stratagems can be seen as a way of constructive (strategic) thinking worked out and developed on the base of historic events attached to each one correspondingly. In addition, we have to treat the booklet as the most concise Classic on military organization drawn from various outstanding ideological and philosophical sources of antiquity and compatible with all kinds of creative thinking. It represents the result of collective wisdom, by means of which an individual can upgrade oneself and rise to a higher level of intellectual attainments scored by the ancients throughout history.

At first sight, it seems that Chinese stratagems make no pretence of being anything but ruthless. However, at close examination we see that it is not true. Why? It's simply because they all are completed on the Yin-Yang principle, which means that where there is solid there should be soft, where there is ruthless there must be mercy in any way. According to Lao-zi who was a good judge of the Zhou-period rituals (12th-8th centuries BCE), including the military stuff, statecraft and strategic policy of a state in general, Mercy can help to be victorious in an attack and unbeatable by acting on the defensive. / For Heaven will come to protect such a king who first protects his people with his mercy (Verse 67). Lao-zi’s term ‘mercy’ (ci) is equal to Confucius’s ‘benevolence’ (ren), or ‘love,’ reflecting the ‘parent-child’ relationship between Water (north) and Wood (east); at large, it is relationship between Heaven represented by Water and Man represented by Wood, pardon and penalty.

On the base of performed earlier analysis of traditional Zhou Yi's model of understanding and modes of thinking, I’ve arrived at a conclusion that the stratagems are based on historical practice on military strategy and statecraft. Summarizing strategic experience accumulated from historical practice, we can go with environmental conditions, requirements and principles in many allied fields, which require some regularity with strategic and logical deductions. This anonymous classical edition has focused on the human activity and emphasizes the dialectical thought that reflects the excellences and unique national traditions attained in the field of strategic and tactical operations. The Thirty-six Stratagems has a great significance in in-depth study of Chinese military dialectics and military strategy, and inspires many researchers in the Greater China and abroad to put a number of interesting questions in study their overall characteristics, their systematic structure, as well as strategic thinking in general.

Among Chinese experts and scholars, particular attention should be given to works of Li Bing-yan, the author of a series of books on Chinese stratagems with the highest circulation so far. In the 1990s he was distinguished for promoting the development of the instruction of the study of military stratagems at Chinese military academies to be then awarded by Jiang Ze-min, the Chairman of the Communist Party and PRC’s government, with the State Prize. The list of distinguished researchers in theme goes on with the names of Chu Li-dao and Zhao Ying-lu, professors of the University of International Relations under the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA), who undertake studies of Chinese stratagems on different levels. They have emphasized that the main characteristic of the 36 stratagems lies in the Zhou Yi's strategic ideology.

Again, my apologies to serious scholars for I retranslate the stratagem explanations and historical anecdotes so that they would be clearer to the western readers. Any mistakes and errors are my own. I also added opening quotes from other Oriental works on strategy, as well as on statecraft. As a result, this book is not a direct translation, nor a list of historical facts around Chinese stratagems, but rather a retelling of some psychological patterns on more specifically military lore. If the reader merely brushes through this book, he or she will not reach the way of strategic thinking. One should absorb the things written on these pages; not just read and memorize, but try to realize the stratagemical principles from within, absorbing these things into the body with one’s daily practice in the office, stadium, as well as at home.

This book is an attempt to throw light on Chinese stratagems from the viewpoint of their overall characteristics, the linear structure and strategic thinking. It will bring, I hope, a double effect in the field of strategic development on its theoretical background and practical benefits. Some parts of it are dedicated to the anthropological study, which is also the result of my long-term experience in communicating with people in the Far-eastern countries. Some findings of this study are directed to the future; they could lay a good foundation for all those who are interested in mastering conceptually the stratagemical thoughts, putting them into practice on the level of intercultural and international communications, promoting Chinese stratagems as an operable armament for achieving success.

--A.G.

Written on the third day of the fourth lunar month of the cyclical year Yi-wei

Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Sequential Structure of Chinese Stratagems

Introduction to this part of the book is good to start directly from the statement of a question: What is strategic thinking? And also: What is the difference between strategic thinking and stratagemical thoughts? In the past, military strategy was confined to the action of warlords, generals and their armies in solving warfare issues. However, in modern times, strategy is used to define the overall plan, but it is only a part of its essence; another part correlates with what is laconic and simple in the complex process of a strategy generation and its successful implementation, which is the soul of wit.

The concise treatise entitled The Thirty-six Stratagems (sanshiliu ji; 三十六計) is composed of 36 short idiomatic sayings taken from various sources from different historical periods, stretching back over 2,500 years. Many of these 36 precepts are well-known to most Chinese, even those who have never read one of the modern Chinese books on the 36 stratagems, which have become increasingly popular in mainland China since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and beginning of the period of Reform and Opening up in 1979.

As described in the previous book entitled Deciphering the 36 Chinese Stratagems, using the stratagems are useful to resolve ‘life-and-death’ situations and any clever leader should know them well. However, it is the overall strategy generation and political environment that really make the difference between winning and losing. Some people believe that the art of strategy is a combination of science and craftsmanship, the essence of which is implemented by a leader, Commander-in-chief, with his enriched experience and individual approach of a strategist who has to know the natural rules and the rules of the statecraft, the rules of human behaviour and many other crucial things, including the norms and standards of house making, etc. This is the way of a worthy leader and military strategist. If we take a step deeper and look at the term ‘zhanlue’ (戰略), military strategy, we will see that it consists of two characters: the first one depicts an armoured figure with a halberd in hand, while the second has three parts: a field, a plough and a mouth below, correlation of crop. To put all the three together, we need a manly plan (layout), the earthly endeavour (toil) and heavenly timing (season). Here, we have all the three elements of the universe: Earth (field), Man (plough) and Heaven (the seasonal crop). As is well-known, the way of Heaven is to fill to the brim; the way of Man is to decline; the way of Earth is to multiply through dividing into pieces (the picture of divided into cells field with a cross point in the centre); hence the boundless and holistic significance of the term. A military leader, who bears his strategic plan in secret, makes one with Heaven’s will and Earth’s resources and succeeds indeed if he has found a proper balance between the underlying objective (a mouth, crop and profit of final victory) and capacity (a plough, individual skill and material basis) also termed ‘correlation of forces.’

Since the way of strategy is considered to be both the art and science, it is categorized for different subjects and possesses some characteristics, such as targeting, environmental conditions, formation structuring, central plot, turns and curves, the interior lines transforming into exterior lines and vice versa, offensive front, defensive line, retreat, advance and so forth. There are some principles, rules, regulations, patterns and models, including some highly specific, such as ‘striking where the enemy is the weakest’ or ‘concentration of forces’ or ‘a curve way to the straight target’ or ‘knowing the opponent and oneself,’ without which any empirical perception of a situation cannot be probably correct. The principles of stratagemical thoughts are written down here in terms of the military affairs, but the reader must think broadly so that he or she can attain an understanding for ten thousand detached situations. For all that, the term ‘strategy’ should be read as learning to use one’s forces effectively, starting from the general concept and moving to the particular details.

As is said, strategy is a complex phenomenon, both in structural and applicable ways, with three objective functions: (1) to reinforce one’s position, increasing effectivity of one’s action through concentration of forces; (2) to weaken an opponent’s strength and disperse his forces; and (3) to set off one’s strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses, opposing one’s strong points to his weak ones in full accord with the Mortar-pestle (MP) modelling, a true manifestation of the ‘dual track’ concept. The final victory, with all its profits, is the main target of any strategy generation and its successful implementation.

According to Li Bing-yan, one of the leading experts on Chinese science of ancient and modern warfare, including the problems of stratagemical wisdom, a military strategy may be treated as the picture which, through meticulously devising plans and making calculations, emerges from the weaving together of the army quantitative formation and its qualitative capability. To sum up, the Chinese term ‘strategy’ has two kinds of interpretation: to make a decision and map out a plan -- in both parts it is a verb that one can see as being the result of the act of thinking and thorough contemplation, like a brilliant stratagem which derives spontaneously as a sudden result of a long and measurable analysis. This is the left-to-right horizontal of a strategy generation that makes its vertical implementation consisted of victory (勝) and yielding (柔) available through the other eight specifics of the operation.

On a wider scale, it also includes the thought principles and holistic plans summarized by the sage kings and founders of Chinese doctrine of statecraft, the military thought and Chinese way of thinking in general that reflect the guiding principles of governing and management in peacetime and in a war, such as ‘avoid the enemy’s strong points and attack his weak spots’ (literally, ‘get round his stronghold to penetrate into his weaknesses’) in full accord with the Mortar and pestle modelling, ‘carry out an operation when and/or where the opponent does not expect it’ and the like, to be deliberately flexible and always able to adapt yourself to frequently changeable situations. Strategic thinking and stratagemical thoughts can be summarized as a theory that specializes in researching the system patterns concerning the holistic plans employed in confrontations between opposing sides by contradiction. Therefore, it can be called ‘the science of oppositions united by opposing thoughts of each other.’ It is a kind of philosophy on gaining victory in activities of military and/or competitive confrontation; it is a theory which examines the thought patterns with which in military confrontations one uses one’s cleverness to win; one takes a smaller cost and exchanges it for a larger profit, or one does not pay any price and seeks the way to obtain and preserve a certain or super profit. We can also say that it is the science of military/competitive thinking. It represents the thought process and the result of searching for stratagems and holistic plans, with which one can defeat the opponent and gain victory in one’s activities of military confrontation, including both the covert and overt phases of it.

In the classical literature, such as The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, one of the four greatest classical novels of China, the characters are commonly described according to how much stratagemical wisdom and exceptional courage they have. For example, in Chapter 42, when warned that Zhang Fei might have seized a certain bridge as a ruse of war, Cao Cao with certainty replied: Zhang Fei is a courageous man, but how could he have any catch?! This statement of Cao Cao may have been what Mao Ze-dong was recalling when he wrote the following in his lecture notes Dialectical Materialism (1937): Ferocious courage is important, but one also needs stratagemical wisdom; although Zhang Fei was good so much, in the end he could not compare to Zhao Zi Long in performing tactically. (It is interesting to notice here that when a part of the above-mentioned lecture was revised and republished in 1952 under the title On Contradictions, the paragraph with this statement on necessity of stratagemical thought was omitted so far.) Hence, the term ‘strategy’ can be interpreted in a broad sense and in a narrow sense, both. In a broad sense it is the general term for the 30 stratagems and six schemes that guide a military leader’s conduct, which are formed by objective things acting on his brains and then by being processed by means of contemplation and targeted thinking. In a narrow sense, it can be understood as a guideline with which one resolves a certain contradiction. A strategy is an important intellectual weapon for defeating hostile opponents and obtaining victory in war; it is a thought guide for strengthening the building up of army formation and managing the military operation.

Historically, over time the rise of technologies has resulted in ever more complex planning, which eventually led to the hierarchical set of strategies. This process involved planning for the efficiency of a country at war as a whole and not only for the war activity itself. Lao-zi’s statement that when the war capability grows mighty, the country’s capacity hastens then decayed may be correlated with ‘the course off the ways of Dao,’ and, as is stated, ‘he who gets out of the ways of Dao will soon come to his untimely end,’ resolving the dilemma.

Two and a half millenniums later, Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929), a French statesman who played a key role in negotiating the Treaty of Versailles, famously pronounced that war is too important business to be left to soldiers. An important part of any ‘grand strategy’ is diplomacy, which is the top method in the threefold method approach. A nation may use diplomacy to avoid hot conflicts altogether and strive to achieve its goal by anything other than brute force. This may involve alliances and negotiations with other nations to resolve conflicts without resorting to fighting. For example, let’s consider chess. One might argue that at any point in the game, one seeks to find the absolute best move. If one takes that best move, one will eventually end up in a better situation. However, in the Mortar-pestle (MP) modelling, due to the fact that it reflects Sun-zi’s concept of ‘dual track’ or ‘doublespeak’ (gui dao; 詭道), diplomacy and politics add an endless number of possible paths to a win. The large number of options at one’s disposal is that it makes the MPM a truly wonderful solution, so-called ‘win-win,’ as well as a strategic tool based on the doctrine that the offensive comes out from the defensive and vice versa. It resembles a spring effect with two main functions at receiving the enemy’s attack: one is to neutralize and dissolve the enemy’s forces while another is to concentrate one’s own forces.

At any point in the game, there is never a move that can be classified as the perfect move. You always have many more solutions than you can think of. When exercising MPM, you are constantly reminded of historical events as actions of warriors which are analogous to actions of generals and rulers, the great leaders of the nation. One can certainly learn from the evolution of their ideas and also understand the importance of decisions they have made. The huge human cost of wars is something that no one wants to bear. Rational reasoning and morality suggest that wars should be the last resort to resolve conflicts and avoid the damage they inflict on mankind. Of course, as history shows, humans are not always rational, because the way of Man is not that of Heaven but always tends to decline; hence a whole set of stratagemical precepts worked out and developed in ancient China.

As for the linear arrangement of stratagems, the reader will find them along with historical examples and explanations in regard with their probable applications. Each stratagem corresponds to a separate section organized as six strategic categories, which should be learned by heart, one by one, and tried to exercise in practice before moving to the next. One has to memorize them all and make sure if he or she knows them fluently. One needs to use the techniques over and over again until a true proficiency will be achieved. Some of these stratagems may sound politically incorrect with today’s standards. However, one needs to know them all to make them be one’s second nature. We may not be inclined to use them, but our competitors or our hostile rivals may be willing to use them anyway against us, so we must be combat ready and know all the ‘tricks of the trade.’ As the famous strategist of Ming dynasty named Hong Zi Cheng declared: To have the evil heart that harms others is painful, but to have not the heart that would beware you from evil people is much more painful. So, let’s go ahead and develop new strata of the trade!

The Linear or Sequential Structure

The linear nature of a path, no matter how winding, exhibits bias to process, to movement and time; as for the time, it is what makes the process be bounded. Dao is the bias to blending Yin-Yang: now it is bright and now it is dark; the solid and the weak alternate so fast that it is uneasy to apprehend. To know Yin is to be able to go against the flow (ni), upstream; to know Yang is to be good in going with it (shun), downstream. Meanwhile, the sun and moon are the fixed sources of light; the five phases of activity (wu-xing) hold the categories of things together; the five sacred peaks (wu-shan) serve as masters to the other mountains; the four great rivers (si-chuan) serve as elders to the other waterways and so on, and so on. How do we know that it is so? Looking up, we contemplate the heavenly starry images; looking down, we view the earthly conditions; but looking at ourselves, our own bodies, we decode the living numbers of the universe. As Heaven governs its way above, Earth disposes its tasks in the lower regions below; Yin and Yang interact to produce the myriad things, among which male and female are stood out. It is fairly said that the way of Heaven is a perfect compass, and the way of Earth is a perfect carpenter’s square. The compass in motion describes a complete circle through the sites; the square brings things to the state of rest, securing them in their proper places in the four corners. All affairs and all things contained in the womb of the universe are to be organized directly from darkness, and the Pole Star is the exact centre of it in the night sky. The sun and the moon establish boundaries for their spheres of influence to the left and to the right from the centre; Yin and Yang in deep secrecy make contacts; the four seasons sneak up without being noticed by others, by stealth taking their places in the phase of domination; the five phases of activity (wu-xing) conceal their actions until the proper moment. Once all the six directions: up and down, north and south, east and west become cohered with no apparent separation, the four season palaces revolve in succession around the Southern Dipper, as if a heavenly dial plate. The question naturally arises: What is the way to orientate oneself in the rich spectrum of spatiotemporal variability? And the answer lies in catching the rhythm of the Yin-Yang’s correlation. Since everything can collapse, then the rhythm becomes deranged. The rationale truth of the life-and-death stratagems and schemes lies not in the abstract principles deducible from them but in the idiomatic texture and dynamic of its connotation. Likewise, its true poetry underlies not so much in its rhythm, metre, rhyme and suchlike, as in its broader conception of things; its practical doctrine, its attitude to experience, its view of strategic thinking itself. Since the 36 stratagems—an eclectic assemblage of stratagemical wisdom, not an argument or essay in the western sense—is built up so that we are moving organically from one precept to another in grasping their meanings according to their unfolding numerically, rising; hence the linear arrangement.

In large-scale strategy, when the enemy starts to collapse, we should pursue him without letting the chance recover his morale as Stratagem 16, for example, dictates us to do. If we fail to take advantage of the enemy’s collapse, he may recover. On the other hand, we should not overdo it, driving him into a corner and forcing him fight back like a beast. This is what is called catching the rhythm of pursuit the enemy to capture him without much bloodshed.

As it has been mentioned earlier, one of the stratagem features is called ‘positioning application,’ which means that each stratagem has certain odd or even number in the fixed list of stratagems. Theoretically speaking, when a situation occurs, the only thing one needs to do is to pick up an appropriate stratagem allocated to a certain category of warfare in handy to resolve the problem efficiently on the spot. However, it is not that easy in practice as it is on the face of it. Reality seems to be much more complicated and sophisticated. Different problems need to be solved in a complex; therefore, we have to pair the odd and even-numbered stratagems into one single strategy unit to be able to resolve an issue from both ends. Since each pair of stratagems totals the number 10 (for example, 1+36=37; 3+7=10), this method of finding an appropriate solution works more effectively than if we resort to each separate stratagem, the independent use of which is less efficient and never predictable. It is so because each problem has its beginning and ending; therefore, one has to follow this and other general rules in one’s decision-making and problem-solving. In addition, each and every stratagem is a piece of Chinese wisdom crystallized throughout the ages of historical practice. Strategic thinking is the way the Chinese deal with difficulties to put things right; it is a process of integrated thinking when some available countermeasures of troubleshooting should be taken promptly and with least cost.

‘Six-Character Keynote Thread’ and the Linear Structure

Upon studying the material, I have found out that from the first set of six stratagems to the last one, there are keywords which represent each category of stratagems. These keywords highlight six sets of warfare guiding principles to be translated as: victorious, defensive, offensive, workaround, coalition and defeatist; and the ultimate task of a strategist and military leader is to take a proper disposition of his army according to any categorized situation. For example, having weaknesses (termed ‘emptiness’) on one’s side, then showing the enemy strengths (‘fullness’) belongs to the methods of ‘showing false formations’ and thus confusing the enemy, which in turn belong to the stratagems for defeatist (6) and workaround or chaotic (4) categories, which are often used when suddenly surrounded or when retreating. Thus, the stratagem no. 21 of the workaround category teaches us to make false appearances to mislead an opponent in the manner of ‘an autumn cicada shedding its slough.’ This stratagem refers to methods used to escape a precarious situation. Then, by ‘hanging sheep to keep the drums beaten,’ which is an equivalent of ‘putting on a good bluff’ and which comes from The Jade Dew of Crane Forest written by the Song-period author Luo Da Jing (1196-1242), one openly appears to keep one’s disposition while secretly withdrawing the troops. (This episode describes the army of Lu that was surrounded by its enemy and planned to make an escape attempt out of their camp at night. To buy time they left up their banners and flags and propped the two front legs of a sheep onto a drum, thus creating the impression that they had not left yet.) The same purpose one chases by using the method of increasing the number of kettles whereas using few troops to show the enemy that one has many troops, and in a state of weakness showing the enemy feigned strength. In a word, both belong to the application of strategic thinking expressed itself completely in the stratagem no. 36 of ‘running away as the best among the other solutions in order to fight another day’ pertained to defeatist category. It refers to the superiority of sometimes making a tactical retreat in order to come back to more favourable conditions and strike the enemy at a more opportune time.

Thus, when a military leader doesn’t have full assurance of triumph (sheng; 勝), he comes to take up a defensive (merciful) disposition of facing an enemy, head-on (di; 敵); if it doesn’t work properly, he launches an attack (gong; 攻); in a case his assault gets bogged down, he employs the tangled warfare of workaround and mopping-up (hun; 混) to benefit from wearing the enemy down in a situation of chaos and disarray; once he fails to back out of the situation, he tries to find an ally (pin; 拼) to reinforce his position through unification of forces; if he fails in this too and lose his keen morale (bai; 敗), the only way out is to retreat in order to produce re-formation and prepare for the next offensive in conditions of victorious category with its guiding principles to loop the thread.

Upon researching on the Thirty-six Stratagems macrostructure (See my ebook "Deciphering the 36 Stratagems"), I have arrived at a conclusion that the ‘six-character keynote thread,’ which represents a series of victorious – defensive – offensive – workaround – alliance – defeatist principles, thread throughout all 36 stratagems as the guideline of grasping macrostructure and general layout of Chinese stratagems as a wholly closed system. There are two points we have to keep in mind regarding the macrostructure: first is that it is result-oriented system; second, the stratagem macrosystem derives its strength and stability from the fixed sequence of its elements and comprehensive contrast; hence variety of circular patterns with their opposed significance threaded on the linear arrangement of the stratagems. It is not difficult to notice that all the six categories, from winning (1) to defeat (6), represent a thoroughly selected integrated framework of a strategy generation and its implementation.

The selected integrated framework includes three aspects of strategic thinking, which are: (1) Sun-zi’s famously known statement that fighting and conquering in all battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting; (2) the final victory doctrine; and (3) the ‘strong-weak’ principle, which supposes that the weak gets over the strong according to the formula ‘soft-rigid-soft.’

According to Sun-zi’s warfare doctrine, the superior method of using the army is to attack the enemy’s design, not his manpower. Using the army can also be defined as using frequently changing methods of ‘dual track’ (gui dao; 詭道). In fact, the whole doctrine of ancient warfare reduces to the art of using ‘dual track’ indeed. This thought promoted by Sun-zi is of epoch-making significance.

Hence, the idea of ‘dual track’ boils down to the following twelve device methods of its implementation, which are: 1) when able to attack, you must seem unable; 2) when using your forces, you must seem inactive; 3) when you are near, you must make the enemy believe you are far away and when far away, you must make him believe you are near; 4) hold out baits to entice the enemy; 5) feign disorder and crush him by surprise; 6) if he is really strong, compel him to produce a preparation for your alleged attacking him on all fronts to disperse his forces; 7) if he is in superior strength, evade direct confrontation with him; 8) if the enemy is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him; 9) pretend to be weak that he may grow arrogant, losing his vigilant; 10) if he is taking his ease, give him no rest; 11) if his forces are united, seek the way to separate them; 12) attack him where he is unprotected and appear where you are not expected.

Throughout the history of ancient military thought, from the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty (12th century BCE) to the end of the Springs and Autumns period (3rd century BCE), the transformation of the theories on military methods more or less went through three stages. In the beginning, due to restrictions imposed by the rites of Zhou, military experts implemented the concept of humane and righteous warfare (ren yi zhi bing) and promoted the idea of the art of direct track characterized by perfecting the order of action and beating the battle drums. Furthermore, they said clearly: If two armies face each other, no one may attack until the enemy’s battle formation is in order. While the enemy is experiencing difficulties, one may not take advantage of it and launch a surprise attack. One should not pursue a fleeing enemy and suchlike. Under the guidance of the idea of the art of ‘direct track,’ it was impossible to speak of attacking with stratagems because the duration of warfare was too short, a couple of days only. The practice of warfare made a mockery of these ignorant theories. Later, Guan Zhong (725-645 BCE), Prime minister of the state of Qi, revised and developed the idea of humane and righteous warfare, promoting the restrained warfare (jiezhi zhi bing) and emphasizing the ideas of honouring the kings and ousting the barbarians. For this, strict and impartial military discipline was added to the army armoury and used prestige to frighten enemy states into submission. Yet he also failed to clearly recognize the special nature of warfare. At the end of the Springs and Autumns period, when the theory of the idea of the humane and righteous warfare was completely shaken up, Sun-zi opportunely advocated replacing the art of direct track with the art of indirect track, developing the restrained warfare into dual-track-based warfare. Further to carrying on the best historical features, such as the ideas of people-rootism (minben-zhuyi) and loving the people and making discipline strict (ai min yan ji), the 13 chapters of Sun-zi’s The Art of War emphasized that, in tactics, one must be flexible and capable of change. He also stressed showing false appearances and using stratagems in order to mislead the enemy and use a ruse of war. Although Sun-zi overestimated the function of working out a victory by attacking with stratagems, and his concepts of ‘a bearer of highly effective strategy in the person of the well-versed commander’ and ‘hero-based historical perspective’ were a little over-exaggerated, nevertheless, the ideas he promoted, such as ‘breaking the enemy’s design,’ ‘undermining the enemy’s morale,’ ‘taking a circuitous route and turning it into a direct route’ did reflect general guiding principles of warfare and possess a very high level of military theory on strategy as the art and science.

From the perspective of its structure, the whole process of a victorious strategy generation boils down to a final decision one makes quite effectively or not within the overall framework of ‘victory-defeat-victory’ scheduling (categories 1-6-1). From the perspective of operational activities (categories 3 and 4), each scheme represents a model of strategic thinking and traditional methods of coping with incipient problems in conditions of the extraordinary situation. The whole process of integrated thinking and problem-solving should also be considered as ‘a wide spectrum’ of fight back (countermeasures) and reasoned decisions. Therefore, we can discern two types of a result-oriented (profit-oriented) strategy: generative and accomplished. As it has been mentioned earlier, the linear or consequential arrangement includes the following six categories: (1) victorious strategy generation in outline; (2) defensive tactical measures; (3) escalation of one’s own operative activities; (4) neutralization (suppression) of the enemy’s activities; (5) entering into an alliance and taking a leadership role; (6) retreat, redeployment and re-formation that threads through the complete list of 36 stratagems from the head (Stratagem 1) to tail (Stratagem 36) to form the overall guidelines of the system structure.

In the first three categories, which include 18 stratagems of the first (Yang) half, the troop leaders and decision makers have advantageous conditions while in the next three categories of the second (Yin) half they have disadvantageous terms to find the way out.

If to read the stratagems in the linear arrangement, each category has certain sequence of six precepts:

Generative Guidelines in Favourable Conditions (Yang):

Category 1 of Victorious Strategy Generation (stratagems no. 1-6) consists of: acting in broad daylight to secure one’s full secrecy (1); setting up the ally to let the enemy fight on two fronts (2); borrowing the enemy’s weapon or strength of the third party against him (3) and forcing him act in a rush to wear himself out and make fatal mistakes (4); smashing the enemy down decisively as soon as he gets into trouble (5), however, arranging the matter as if it has been done by someone else, not by you (6).

Category 2 of Facing the Enemy from Defensive Disposition (7-12) consists