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Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition
Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition
Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition
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Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition

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"Absorbing.artfully narrat[es] a possible course of events in the expedition's demise, based on the one official note and bits of debris (including evidence of cannibalism) found by searchers sent to look for Franklin in the 1850s. Adventure readers will flock to this fine regaling of the enduring mystery surrounding the best-known disaster in Arctic exploration."--Booklist

"A great Victorian adventure story rediscovered and re-presented for a more enquiring time."--The Scotsman

"A vivid, sometimes harrowing chronicle of miscalculation and overweening Victorian pride in untried technology.a work of great compassion."--The Australian

It has been called the greatest disaster in the history of polar exploration. Led by Arctic explorer Sir John Franklin, two state-of-the-art ships and 128 hand-picked men----the best and the brightest of the British empire----sailed from Greenland on July 12, 1845 in search of the elusive Northwest Passage. Fourteen days later, they were spotted for the last time by two whalers in Baffin Bay. What happened to these ships----and to the 129 men on board----has remained one of the most enduring mysteries in the annals of exploration. Drawing upon original research, Scott Cookman provides an unforgettable account of the ill-fated Franklin expedition, vividly reconstructing the lives of those touched by the voyage and its disaster. But, more importantly, he suggests a human culprit and presents a terrifying new explanation for what triggered the deaths of Franklin and all 128 of his men. This is a remarkable and shocking historical account of true-life suspense and intrigue.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateApr 21, 2008
ISBN9780470313299
Ice Blink: The Tragic Fate of Sir John Franklin's Lost Polar Expedition

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Rating: 3.7441860697674416 out of 5 stars
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  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    This is a non-fiction account of Franklin's last polar expedition, and its tragic failure. Cookman makes the case that the major cause of the failure and loss of life was the poor food, particularly the canned food. The book contends that the supplier used sub-standard ingredients, and did not properly sterilize the food during the canning process. As a result, the author believes that many of the men died from botulism poisoning.This book provided a fascinating look at the sheer logistics and complexity of planning and provisioning the Terror and the Erebus for the years' long voyages. Its descriptions of the conditions under which the food was processed rivals those in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle."The provisioner, Goldner certainly knew stinking meat from fresh, whole vegetables from peelings, and bone, animal hair, mold and rat droppings when he saw them. Even if he did not venture out of his tiny paper-filled office, he could hardly have avoided smelling them. But to Goldner, it looked and smelled like money. What he couldn't see or smell was the fact that it was a bacterial and viral Chernobyl approaching meltdown."Although, other than its demonization of the provisioner Goldner, the book, as nonfiction, is not generally character-driven, it does portray Franklin as an incompetent, over-the-hill commander, and sypathetically portrays Crozier as the experienced and able arctic explorer who was passed over for command for class reasons. A very interesting read.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    Heard about this particular book from a client who had a family member searching by air for any remains/artifacts from this expedition.
    It's of great interest and I have other books on the subject, also.
    Started reading aloud with Winston - during the summer on the MI cottage sunny hillside. But, he still didn't want to hear anymore about just how cold it was and how these men suffered from the cold.
    It is a bit gruesome at times.
    So I finished and shared the highlights of rest of book.
    Read in 2005.
  • Rating: 2 out of 5 stars
    2/5
    The problem of historical mysteries is that they are often very hard to solve. The problem with mystical historians is that they often think they can solve them anyway.We know, in very broad outline, what happened to John Franklin's Northwest Passage expedition: The men went to the ice, they were frozen in, they abandoned their ships, they died trying to get home. But we don't know why. There are many oddities about their behavior, even though their senior officers should have been well-equipped to handle the job.The result has inevitably been much speculation. Driven mad by lead? Poisoned by botulism? Depressed by the lack of sun? Dead of scurvy?Many scholars have backed one or another hypothesis. Sadly, the data does not exist to prove any of them. That there was lead in the men seems certain. That there were problems with some of the Goldner canned goods they carried seems likely. That they suffered from scurvy seems certain. But if I had to bet, I'd bet on scurvy above all.Cookman doesn't. It's all one hypothesis for him, and he beats on it with droning regularity. One gets the feeling that he's perfectly willing to chase Goldner's soul into Hell if it will help him get back at this long-dead innovator (who may, in fact, have been guilty of nothing worse than poor quality control in his still-experimental process). Is it possible that Cookman's hypothesis is right? Yes, it is. But he puts too much effort into his thesis, and not enough into studying the alternative. Throw in some rather blatant errors, and a rather overwhelming intensity, and the result is simply not very convincing. What is needed is a more neutral analysis. I hope it happens someday.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    I have read several stories of the Franklin Expedition. This book covered material others didn't. I was especially interested in the background of , the supplier of the tinned food taken on the expedition. Between his greed and the drive of the British navy to cut corners at almost any costs, it doomed this expedition from the beginning. It is a book well worth reading.
  • Rating: 2 out of 5 stars
    2/5
    A remarkably error- and conjecture-filled book -- nevertheless, contains much useful information about Franklin's last expedition that's hard to get elsewhere, such as crew-lists complete with names, and Admiralty documents on the ships' outfitting.Here's a copy of the review I wrote when the book first came out:Sir John Franklin's disappearance in the Arctic -- along with two ships and 128 officers and crew -- was a celebrated mystery in the nineteenth century, attracting enormous public attention both in Great Britain and the United States. Some forty expeditions were launched in search of his party, funded both by governments and public subscriptions. In a way, Franklin's expedition was the Apollo 13 of his times -- only, in his times, without radio or modern communications, such potential martyrdom came with painful slowness. It was three years, and possibly longer, before the last of his crews, scurvy-ridden and likely starving, resorted to cannibalism, having abandoned their ships and dropped their possessions in the snow as they marched wearily towards nowhere. The debate over the ultimate cause of this disaster has been going on for well over a century, and in recent years the old conventional wisdoms have been widely challenged. The lead poisoning hypothesis, suggested by the sloppily-applied beads of lead solder on cans left behind by the expedition, was supported by Owen Beattie's exhumation of three Franklin crewmen in the 1980's, and corroborated by dry-bone analyses conducted by Anne Keenleyside in the 1990's. Cannibalism, so long denied by Franklin worshippers, has similarly gained strong scientific support, as Dr. Keenleyside's microscopic studies of the bones of a group of Franklin's men showed clear cut-marks made by metal-edged weapons at likely sites for de-fleshing. Scurvy, of course, was known about and considered a factor from the start. With so much evidence of the collapse and ill-health of its last survivors, it hardly seems that a new culprit is needed, but this hasn't stopped Scott Cookman from trying. Cookman., a journalist who writes for outdoor magazines, hit upon the idea that it might have been botulism -- again the fault of the badly lead-soldered cans supplied to the expedition by Stephen Goldner -- which was the chief cause of the high rate of mortality of Franklin's men, and the major cause of the failure of his expedition.Cookman has certainly done some worthwhile new research; his study of Goldner and his patent canning factory is well-documented and full of suggestive -- though far from definitive -- evidence. The chief trouble is, I think, that Cookman overstates his case; like many who succumb to the monomania of a single, unified, explain-it-all theory, he wants botulism to solve every mystery. Thus, he argues that the low number of deaths early on was due to the fact that the tinned meat & soup was well-cooked, and that therefore botulism toxins were eliminated, whereas later when fuel ran low, or on sledge trips where food was not heated thoroughly, the toxin ran rampant. The proportion of officer deaths to that of seamen is accounted for by two sledge parties which, we are to assume, were more or less wiped out by tainted food (yet would not sledge crews take pemmican, biscuit, and salt pork instead of the heavy and bulky canned food, and the equally cumbersome stoves required to heat it?). Yet these sledge trips -- as Cookman fails to make clear -- are entirely conjectural; we know only that one party, led by Gore, deposited records in cairns in May of 1847, and we know that Gore died between then and the record left in April of 1848. But to conclude, on this basis, that Gore and his men, as well as a second, hypothetical sledge crew, suffered a 100% mortality rate, is, at best, highly speculative.In further pursuit of his hypothesis, Cookman invents scores of other similar "facts." He assumes that Lieutenant Irving, whose presumed grave was found not far from Victory Point by Schwatka decades later, must have died on the spot within days of the May 1847 record, which indicated he was alive and carrying out his duties. He further assumes that somehow, the correlation between eating tinned supplies and sudden death went unnoticed for a considerable time. Perhaps lead poisoning could be brought in to explain this extraordinary lapse of judgment, but Cookman doesn't even bother to address the issue. Most disturbingly, Cookman omits any evidence about Goldner's meats that might undermine his case. In January of 1852, as part of an investigation that is the key to Cookman's entire argument, inspectors at the Royal Navy's Clarence Victualling-yard went through eighteen cases' worth of Goldner's meats, finding that an extraordinary portion of the cans -- 85% -- contained putrid or inedible meat. You'd think that Cookman would tout this statistic, but he hardly mentions it. The inspectors' report, however, contains an observation that strongly contradicts Cookman's hypothesis:In many of the cases is appeared that the putridity had arisen from the atmosphere not being thoroughly expelled previously to the meat being put in.The bacterium which produces the botulin toxin is, as Cookman emphasizes, anaerobic. This means that it cannot survive in an incompletely sealed can in which air is present, and that the cans observed by the Navy's inspectors, despite their admittedly putrid contents, could not possibly have given anyone botulism.If it is true, as Cookman alleges, that Goldner hired unskilled workers instead of tinsmiths or plumbers (professional solderers) to seal up his cans, workers who used only one sloppily applied bead of solder (instead of the two, internal and external beads called for), would not the problem with spoilage more likely be due to the cans being poorly sealed? Cookman never addresses this gap in his argument, relying on hyperbole to plaster over his omission. Yet if botulism were a widespread problem with Goldner's foods, one would expect very high mortality indeed -- as Cookman himself often notes, the botulin toxin is so powerful even a single milligram could kill a whole ships' crew. One would expect 40 or 50 casualties in the first year instead of three! His claim that the cooks heated the cans and thus eliminated the toxin is a tenuous one -- it takes at least 10 minutes at a full boil to do this, and with fuel (as Cookman notes) strictly budgeted, what cook would boil food so long? The food may well have not been boiled at all, excepting the soups, merely heated and served. That coal later ran quite short is likely -- but it was known all along that it was very limited, and no reason to imagine it was at first squandered through endless boiling of soup only later to be rationed to the point where food would hardly be cooked at all. More likely coal was rationed from the start, and when available alternate fuel (barrel staves, crate slats, etc.) would have been used, none of which supports the notion that shipboard cooks would have wasted it on a ten-minute boiling regimen.Goldner himself is vilified to such a degree that he begins to take on an almost cartoonish degree of evil; like Lex Luthor, if there is any ill wind blowing, it's Goldner who operates the bellows. Cookman's purple prose, which abounds in fanciful scene-setting and fictive filler, doesn't help matters. Still, the carelessness and greed of Goldner, and the inadequate inspection of the Admiralty, certainly come through dramatically, and the hazards of early canning techniques have rarely been so thoroughly analyzed or so vividly described. As with other disasters in the history of exploration, it is often the very newest technology, whose presence reassures both explorers and the public that everything is the 'latest,' which proves to be the weak link in the chain. Alas, Victorian medicine understood neither lead poisoning nor botulism, and failed to follow up on what little it knew about scurvy. Competitive bidding, which meant that an inexperienced cut-corner supplier such as Goldner could underbid those who had safely supplied previous Arctic expeditions, and lack of meaningful inspection, laid the groundwork for disaster. Owen Beattie and others have made a clear, laboratory- corroborated case for lead-poisoning from Goldner's cans being a significant factor in the Franklin disaster, but Cookman's arguments, like Goldner's meats, are both half-cooked and packed with filler. The unfortunate thing is that the reading public will likely consume them without so much as a stomach-ache.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    It says something about a nonfiction book when you have a hard time putting it down. But this book was amazing. It's in a much more readable style than Frozen in Time was, and it focused exclusively on the Franklin expedition and the probable factors in its fate, whereas Frozen in Time focused mostly on exhuming the bodies of the three men found on Beechey Island and learning what they could from the bodies. There are times when Cookman seems to over-dramaticize(sp?) things he couldn't possibly have known. He describes Goldner sipping fine wine, cozy next to a warm fire, while the men on the Terror and Erebus freeze and suffer from botulism due to his tainted canned goods, or Crozier deserting his ship with tears in his eyes. Other than that, though, I found this book highly enjoyable and at a few points, terrifying (the chapter on the possibility of cannibalism will likely give me nightmares). I have purchased both Ice Blink and Frozen in Time. I'd like to reread the books and write in them, something I can't do with my library copies.All in all, if you're interested in polar exploration or the Franklin expedition, I highly recommend this book.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    I found this book after seeing Dan Simmons fictional tale "The Terror" being based on the incident. A tragic and very interesting read. Ice Blink is the story of Sir John Franklin's doomed expedition to find the Northwest Passage in 1845. There is a lot of founded speculation as to the behavior and thoughts of the ill fated men, but backed by other examples of similar tragedies. Though Cookman clearly sites Beattie and Geiger's "Frozen in Time" as an inspiration, he never heavily relies on it. An intense telling of over a hundred men trapped on two ships in the winter arctic, stuck, desperate and diseased. Despite all the greatness of "modern technologies", ego and greed can bring downfall. Recommended for those fascinated with stranded isolationism and Polar Expeditions.

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Ice Blink - Scott Cookman

Ice Blink

Ice Blink

The Tragic Fate of Sir Jokn Franklin’s Lost Polar Expedition

Scott Cookman

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Copyright © 2000 by Scott Cookman. All rights reserved

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Published simultaneously in Canada.

Illustrations on pages 12, 68, 77, and 97 © 2000 by Rob Ebersol.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning, or otherwise, except as permitted under Section 107 or 108 of the 1976 United States Copyright Act, without either the prior written permission of the Publisher, or authorization through payment of the appropriate per-copy fee to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, fax (978) 750-4744. Requests to the Publisher for permission should be addressed to the Permissions Department, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158-0012, (212) 850-6011, fax (212) 850-6008, e-mail: PERMREQ@WILEY.COM.

This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional person should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data:

Cookman, Scott.

Ice blink : the tragic fate of Sir John Franklin’s lost polar expedition / Scott Cookman.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 233)

ISBN 0-471-37790-2 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. Franklin, John, Sir, 1786-1847. 2. Northwest Passage—Discovery and exploration. 3. Arctic regions—Discovery and exploration. I. Title.

G660.C66 2000

For my sister, Constance Lee Cookman, who in her losing struggle with cancer displayed the same sublime courage and grace as the gallant officers and men of the Franklin Expedition

Ice blink—the name nineteenth-century sailors gave polar mirages, caused by light reflected off the pack ice.

Contents

Preface

1   The Epitaphs

2   Messages from the Dead

3   The Enigma: Sir John

4   The Passage

5   Two Ships

6   Specters

7   Ships’ Commanders

8   Ships’ Companies

9   Outward Bound

10   Beechey Island

11   The Last Summer

12   Beset

13   Imprisoned

14   The Curse

15   The Culprit

16   Houndsditch

17   Schedules

18   The Dying Time

19   Killer at Large

20   The Death March

21   Cannibalism

22   The Culprit’s Footprints

23   The Empty Prize

Afterword       Anatomy of a Disaster

Appendix I      Provisions

Appendix II    Northwest Passage Voyages: Mortality Rates

Appendix III   Mid-Nineteenth-Century Naval Medicine

Appendix IV   Expedition Muster

Bibliography

Index

Preface

I didn’t encounter the ghost of Sir John Franklin until I went north. In the summer of 1988, a bush plane dropped me at a remote outpost cabin in northern Ontario. My purpose was two weeks of solitude and fishing, nothing else. But in my backpack was a book I’d picked up, literally at the last minute, entitled Frozen In Time by Dr. Owen Beattie and John Geiger. It was the first account I’d ever read of the 1845-1848 Franklin Expedition disaster—the disappearance of the largest, best-equipped expedition England ever sent in search of the Northwest Passage. In the years that followed, I read dozens of equally fascinating accounts, but Beattie and Geiger’s book first opened the door on the Franklin mystery for me and suggested that its solution was still waiting to be found.

What triggered the disaster—the deaths of Sir John Franklin and all 128 of his officers and men—will always be open to debate. Yet arguably, the most abundant and tangible evidence available for reconstructing Franklin’s voyage and the events that led to its doom doesn’t lie in the Arctic. It lies in British Admiralty records, made firsthand and documented at the time. These provided a comprehensive look at Franklin’s ships, the men manning them, their clothing, stores and provisions, rationing plans, and a wealth of other details. Since the expedition was completely self-contained, its survival—or death—hinged wholly upon what it took into the Arctic. But the records also revealed a paper trail implicating a cause and a culprit behind the tragedy that followed. In ferreting out these records, I’m indebted to two exceptionally capable researchers accredited by the United Kingdom’s Public Records Office (PRO): Robert O’Hara, accredited PRO military and naval researcher, and Lydia Amey, accredited PRO naval researcher. Thanks must also be given to the librarians at the Public Records Office, Ms. Eleanor Heron at the National Maritime Museum, and Ms. Philippa Smith at the Scott Polar Research Institute. In evaluating the thesis suggested, I’m especially grateful to Dr. David L. Swerdlow, Medical Epidemiologist, Foodborne and Diarrheal Disease Branch at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Lacking original source narratives left by the expedition itself—in the form of messages, diaries, or log books yet to be found, or other such undiscovered smoking guns—reconstructing the events of Franklin’s voyage is a delicate, demanding exercise in fill-in-the-blanks. Fortunately, there is no shortage of contemporary accounts of polar voyages tracking the route of Franklin’s. Through the eyes of these men we can experience, as nearly as possible, what Franklin’s men did. Likewise, contemporary accounts detailing the agonies of polar manhauling, snow blindness, frostbite, starvation, and scurvy also paint a vivid picture of the ordeal that must have been endured by Franklin’s crews. A listing of the sources of these accounts can be found in the bibliography; they are all fascinating and highly recommended reading.

As general reference relating to cannibalism practiced by the Franklin survivors, the expert forensic findings presented by Dr. Owen Beattie in Frozen In Time and various periodicals, and those reported by Anne Keenleyside in Arctic Magazine must be fully and gratefully acknowledged.

The encouragement of my parents, Jane and Leon Cookman, also helped immeasurably in completing the book. Few parents, I think, understand a son quitting a well-paid career in advertising to take up the dubious path of the pen.

Lastly, I must freely acknowledge the unfailing support of my coauthor: a black Lab named Kelly, who was there at the inception of the book on Hematite Lake in Ontario and patiently under my desk in the years it took to complete it. Interestingly, the Franklin Expedition embarked a dog named Neptune on its voyage. If it served them half as faithfully as Kelly has me, then man’s best friend is the least tribute that can be paid.

CHAPTER 1

The Epitaphs

By Admiralty Order, 18 January 1854: It is directed that if they are not heard of previous to 31 March 1854, the Officers & Ships companies are to be removed from the Navy List & are to be considered as having died in the service. Wages are to be paid to their Relatives to that date; as of 1 April 1854, all books and papers are to be dispensed with.

—Admiralty Order No. 263

The only thing Sir John Franklin left behind were two faded ship’s muster books. He sent them back from Greenland on July 12, 1845, just before his entire expedition—the largest, best-equipped England had ever sent in search of the Northwest Passage—disappeared in the Arctic.

By Admiralty regulation, the muster listed the Names of all Persons forming the complement of the ships, with particulars. By twist of fate, this accounting proved the epitaph of Franklin and every man aboard.

William Orren’s was typical. The paymaster simply listed him AB, or able-bodied seaman, aboard Franklin’s flagship HMS Erebus. He was thirty-four that summer. He gave his birthplace as Chatham, Kent, near the mouth of the River Thames. He signed on with the expedition and appeared for duty the same day—March 19, 1845—exactly two months before it sailed.

Orren was either eager to get back to sea or, more likely, to collect the higher pay the Royal Navy offered for Discovery Service. His previous posting had been the Woolwich dockyards, where skeleton crews manned a mothball fleet of ships laid up in ordinary, or out of service. He’d been in the navy for fifteen years. His first entry was recorded at age nineteen, when he signed aboard the HMS Swan. He must’ve been a rather dull-witted fellow or happy being a simple jack tar, because in all those years he never advanced a grade in rank.

Final Muster Book, HMS Erebus Sent back from Greenland just before the expedition vanished, this was its last communication with the outside world. The scribbled Admiralty notation—written more than ten years later—sealed its fate. "Officers & Ships Co. are to be considered as having died in the service and their Wages are to be paid to their Relatives to 31 March 1854." (Public Records Office, London, England)

The muster book shows 16 shillings (worth about U.S. $55 in 1998 values)¹ deducted from his pay for tobacco, slop (heavy) clothing, and a horsehair mattress. This wasn’t much; an experienced sailor, his seabag must have been ready. Offsetting the deductions was two months’ advance pay—10 pounds and 4 shillings (about U.S. $688 today). At a time when a common laborer made 18 pounds a year ($1,210 U.S.), this was quite a windfall.

The paymaster counted the coins out to him at pay parade—ten gold sovereigns and four silver shillings—and by tradition placed them on top of his outstretched cap. Knowing he was bound for three years in the Arctic, with no ports of call or chance to spend it, the money was probably gone before he was—most of it gone on gambling, rounds of gin (a penny a glass), and prostitutes (sixpence for a knee trembler in an alley) before sailing.

Nothing more was ever heard of Abie-Bodied Seaman Orren, or of Sir Franklin himself for that matter. Their names—and 127 others—were checked off in the muster books in 1854. On each page, an Admiralty clerk repeatedly made the same notation: See Memo in Red Ink on Muster Table. There the clerk inked a single sentence:

Officers & Ships Co. are to be considered as having died in the service and their Wages are to be paid to their Relatives to 31 March 1854.

Thus the Admiralty closed the book on the Franklin Expedition—the greatest disaster in the history of polar exploration and one that rocked Victorian England to its core. Franklin and the rest—129 hand-picked officers and men—were written off with no more explanation. Indeed the Royal Navy, stunned by the dimensions of the catastrophe, had no explanation to offer. Its most advanced, expensive, and sophisticated technology had inexplicably failed; its finest, most qualified personnel had inexplicably failed. It was as if Apollo 11, confidently embarked for mankind’s first lunar landing, had disappeared on the dark side of the moon.

The shock was devastating, the failure to find a reason for it humiliating. The navy simply closed ranks and officially, bureaucratically, put an end to the whole affair.

For the families of the men who perished, the Wages to be paid to their Relatives were little comfort. The men had been missing for nine years before the Admiralty reckoned them dead, during which their loved ones had been living on nothing but hope. As the clerk forcefully underlined, they would be compensated no longer.

The cause of the disaster was never determined.

The Franklin Expedition remains one of the most enduring mysteries in the annals of exploration. Something—or someone—turned the greatest Arctic expedition of its time into the greatest Arctic tragedy of the age.

What, or more intriguingly, who was responsible will always be open to debate. But an answer to the expedition’s fate lies, riddlelike, in its story.

¹ Based upon the Bank of England’s Equivalent Contemporary Values of the Pound, one pound in 1845 would be worth about 42 pounds in 1998 or approx. U.S. $67 at current exchange rates.

CHAPTER 2

Messages from the Dead

Around the cairn a vast quantity of clothing and stores of all sorts lay strewed about, as if at this very spot every article was thrown away which could possibly be dispensed with.

—Capt. F. L. M’Clintock, RN, on visiting Victory Point, King William Island, in 1859

On May 5, 1859, Royal Navy Lieutenant William Hobson staggered from the pack ice of the Arctic Ocean onto one of the loneliest places on earth. Lying in the heart of the Arctic archipelago, King William Island was almost 1,200 miles from the nearest whaling station in Greenland and nearly 900 miles from the northernmost Hudson’s Bay Company outpost in all Canada. It was entombed in sea ice for up to nine months a year and almost perpetually cloaked by fog. But Hobson was grateful to reach it at all.

He could scarcely walk. His legs were swollen twice their size and the pain in his joints was excruciating. His skin was like dough, hemorrhaging brown and purple wherever it was touched, his gums bled and he could not shake the awful chill: signs he knew full well meant scurvy.

His party—two sleds, four seamen, an Eskimo named Christian, and seven dogs—had left the steam-schooner Fox thirty-four days earlier. It was one of three sledge parties from the Fox scouring the Arctic moonscape that spring for signs of the missing Franklin Expedition. King William Island was one of the last, most forbidding places to look.

Hobson was no stranger to the hardships of Arctic sledging. In the two years the Fox had been beset in Bellot Strait, some 200 miles to the north, he’d led countless sled parties searching for Franklin. But he had never gotten used to it. Few men ever did. As Captain Henry Kellett, another Royal Navy veteran of man-hauling sleds in the Arctic, described the experience: I have been a long time at sea and seen varying trying experiences, but never have seen such labour before and misery after. No amount of money is an equivalent. Men require much more heart and stamina to undertake an extended (sled) travelling party than to go into action.

But a month into the search mission, Hobson was convinced it was the worst he’d ever experienced. Ironically, it was the fine, clear weather—cloudless skies and a cutting north wind—that made it so bad. Since leaving the ship, the temperature had averaged a bone-numbing 30 degrees below zero. Every man had frostbite; he could see it growing on their faces like a cancer. The cheeks turned an odd scaly gray, almost reptilian, as the flesh froze, but he could at least watch for that and warn a fellow. That didn’t frighten him half as much as their feet. A man who couldn’t walk, couldn’t haul. Almost from the moment he pulled his icy boots onto his feet in the morning, he lost all feeling in them. It was the same with the rest. As they walked, he constantly called out, How are your feet? If a man complained more than usual, they’d halt, remove the man’s boots, and take a look.

Thomas Blackwell, the ship’s steward, was in the worst shape. His feet were as white as two lumps of ice and just as cold. By turns, every man in the party warmed them with their bare hands. As circulation returned, huge blisters formed, as if his feet had been severely scalded. Getting his socks and boots back on caused him agony and he limped as he walked, but there was nothing for it. The frost-burned parts swelled grotesquely, turned black as the tissue died, and made a terrible stink in the tent at night. Hobson knew there was no saving the black parts. If they got back to the ship, the surgeon would only be able to slice or hack the dead flesh away and hope no contagion spread. Hobson expected that.

Among the other cruelties of Arctic sledging, the men burned as they froze. The brutal glare of the sun reflected off the ice not only blistered their faces, it sunburned the inside of their nostrils, the undersides of their eyelids, even the roofs of their mouths as they gasped for breath. The thirst was altogether overwhelming. Though he tried to stop them, Hobson could not prevent his men from eating snow. It didn’t slake their thirst; it only made them colder.

The men’s only relief was three days of foul weather. A ferocious southeast gale pinned them in their brown Holland tent and wolfskin sleeping bags. But although they were spared hauling the sleds on frostbitten feet under the sun, they could still not escape the cold. It remained 18 degrees below zero. Frost a half inch thick built up on the inside walls of the tent. Their breath rose in a crystalline pall that fell back like snow. The sleeping bags froze into body casts. When the storm stopped, the men did not have to be ordered to march, no matter how painful their feet. They were anxious to move so they could generate warmth in their bodies again.

Crossing Rae Strait, some 50 miles of jumbled pack ice separating King William Island from the mainland, almost broke them completely. Pressure ridges up to 40 feet high blocked the way. Paths had to be hacked up the jagged slopes with pickaxes before the sleds—one hauled by the men and one by the dogs, each sled weighing 800 pounds—could be dragged forward. Leads—lanes of open water veining the pack—appeared without warning. These blocked their advance, forced long detours, and threatened their return. It was sometimes necessary to travel 5 miles to advance one. The crossing took nearly a week.

When Hobson reached the ice-littered shore of King William Island, he was 200 miles or more from the ship. He couldn’t be sure. Squarely atop the magnetic North Pole, his compass was useless. Half his provisions—canned pemmican, ship’s biscuit, tea, and rum calculated to last eighty-four days—were gone. The split codfish carried to feed the dogs was completely exhausted. Once ashore, he shot the weakest animal to feed the rest, and went on.

To make matters worse, he could hardly see. Two hundred miles above the Arctic Circle, the sun shone almost eighteen hours a day and left him and nearly everyone else snow-blind. Everything was white, brilliant and dazzling, without a particle of shade. Even wearing colored snow goggles, he felt a dull aching in his eyes that grew in intensity until it felt as if someone had thrown a handful of sand into them. The landscape before him tinged pink, then blood red until his eyes watered so constantly he could barely see at all.

Still, atop a point on the island’s northwest coast, he was sure he saw something. But even through the naval telescope, he couldn’t make it out. He made for it nonetheless. The closer he got, the more fantastic it appeared. He glassed it again and pulled up short. It wasn’t an ice blink—one of those damnable Arctic mirages. Above the sea stood a 6-foot-tall chinked stone cairn. Around it, piled in heaps 4 feet high, was a surreal hoard of discarded clothing, blankets, mattresses, and other debris.

Hobson was flabbergasted. He counted four iron boat’s stoves, with kettles and pans stacked nearby as if they’d just been left. A bewildering assortment of tools—adzes, awls, mallets, mattocks, pickaxes, shovels, and saws—were scattered everywhere. Rope, chain, sail cloth, iron barrel hoops, lightning rods, even brass curtain rods, poked out of the snow. There were stacks of rusted meat tins and bottle fragments bearing the Royal Navy’s broad arrow mark. The evidence was overwhelming. It could only be Franklin.

With urgency, he tore down the cairn. At its base, in a carefully sealed tin, was a single sheet of standard Admiralty record paper. Printed in six languages, it directed: WHOEVER finds this paper is requested to forward it to the Secretary of the Admiralty, London, with a note of the time and place it was found.

Through tearing eyes, he made out two messages inked on the paper. The first was prosaic. It gave a position fix of the Franklin Expedition 12 years earlier and was noteworthy only for its optimism:

28 of May 1847. HM Ships Erebus and Terror wintered in the ice in Lat. 70-05′ N. Long. 98-23′ W. Having wintered in 1846-47 at Beechey Island in Lat. 74-43′-28″ N. Long. 90-39′-15″ W., after having ascended Wellington Channel to Lat. 77, and returned by the west side of Cornwallis Island. Sir John Franklin commanding the expedition. All well. Party consisting of 2 officers and 6 men left the ships on Monday 24th May 1847.—Gm. Gore, Lieut., Chas. D. DesVoeux, Mate.

In his hand, Hobson held the only written record of the Franklin Expedition ever found. If his hopes were buoyed by it, they were just as quickly crushed. There was a second message inked around the margins of the first—by a hand shaking with cold or terror. Dated eleven months later, it reported catastrophe:

April 25th, 1848—HM’s Ships Terror and Erebus were deserted on 22nd April, 5 leagues N.N.W. of this, having been beset since 12th September 1846. The Officers and crews, consisting of 105 souls, under the command of Captain F. R. M. Crozier, landed here in Lat. 69-37′-42″ N., long. 98-41′ W. . . Sir John Franklin died on 11th June 1847; the total loss by deaths in the Expedition has been to this date 9 officers and 15 men.

—James Fitzjames, Captain HMS Erebus

—F. R. M. Crozier, Captain and Senior Officer

And start tomorrow, 26th, for Back’s Fish River.

In the eerie, never-ending twilight of that Arctic evening, Hobson was sick. Over eleven years had passed since the last message was left. By that time one-fifth of Franklin’s party was already dead, including over one-third of its officers. No polar expedition had ever suffered such appalling losses. The prospect the survivors faced—a 900-mile march inland—was unthinkable. It was clear to Hobson that there was no hope of finding anyone alive. If he found anything, he was certain it would only be bodies.

He followed the ice-foot along the shore, the route he guessed the survivors had taken. To avoid snow blindness, he largely marched during the brief hours of semidarkness. His eyes improved, but the scurvy redoubled. The first of his teeth fell out. His mouth was so bubbled with lesions he could no longer eat the flintlike ship’s biscuit. Blood seeped from the hair follicles on his head and spontaneous hemorrhages purpled his skin. He traced the coastline for another 45 miles, some of the time obliged to ride in the sled like an invalid.

Expedition’s Last Record Found by Hobson on King William Island, it shows an All Well message left in May, 1847, and around the margins another dated April, 1848—reporting the desertion of both ships, death of Franklin and twenty others, and 105 survivors desperately headed inland. (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England)

As the spring temperatures warmed, the men’s misery increased. The shore ice turned to meltwater and

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