Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Democracy Research:
Participation, representation, electoral choice, institutions, bureaucracy (Campbell, Converse, Stokes and Miller, 1960; Verba, Nie and Petrocik, 1972; and Fiorina, 1981). Freedom House Index, Polity IV (democracy/ autocracy), Governance Indicators.
Theoretical issues
These approaches each fall into the trap of measuring the consequences or reflecting phenomena other than capabilities but have the advantage of measuring the phenomena directly. Measures of well being reflect government and elite choice in resource allocation Measures of governance favor democratic systems of government over other forms of governance.
Claremont Conference on Political Economy Indicators
Predicted Performance
Poor
Developing
Developed
Thailand Botswana
Angola
1960 1970 1980 2000 2005 1990 1970 1960 1970 1980 1980 2005 2000 1990
1960
1980 1990
2000
2005
1970
1990
Low RPC
2005
2000
2000
6000
8000
RPC 2000
positive
Lesotho Brazil Hungary Barbados Poland Israel Portugal Sweden Austria
0 negative
New Zealand Denmark Uruguay Kenya Finland Morocco Malta Greece Singapore Papua New Guinea USA Indonesia South Korea Jordan Fiji Malaysia Sri Lanka Thailand Bolivia Philippines Mauritius Iran Argentina Kuwait Bangladesh Gabon Paraguay Haiti Myanmar
RPC
Income
Claremont Conference on Political Economy Indicators
40,000
Yit = Adjusted tax revenue for country i at time t X it = Vector of variables that determine potential tax collection Vr= White noise disturbance
Empirical Inventory
National Level model Unit of analysis: country Number of countries in the sample: 129 Time span: 1960-2005 Notes: Sample includes Poland 86-on, Hungary 89-on, Romania 88 on. These countries use NMP in their National Accounts before those dates so the data is not comparable to GNP/GDP methodology). The sample includes China.
Claremont Conference on Political Economy Indicators
nontax
Non tax revenue divided by GDP*. Main Source GFS, IMF 1972-2005; World Bank 1960 1972, Where data was missing we used overlapping series and National Sources. Social security revenues divided by GDP*. Main Source GFS, IMF 1972-2005; World Bank 1960 1972, Where data was missing we used overlapping series and National Sources. Agriculture GDP divided by total GDP*. Main Source GFS, IMF 1972-2005; World Bank 1960 1972, Where data was missing we used overlapping series and National Sources. Exports divided by total GDP*. Main Source GFS, IMF 1972-2005; World Bank 1960 1972, Where data was missing we used overlapping series and National Sources. Mining production GDP divided by total GDP*. Main Source GFS, IMF 1972-2005; World Bank 1960 1972, Where data was missing we used overlapping series and National Sources. Real GDP per capita in constant dollars. Main Source: Penn World Tables, Summers & Heston, additional sources include the IMF GFS & World Bank, World Development Indicators. Where data was lacking we used national sources. Totrev nontax - socsec
socsec
agri
exp
mining
Realgdp
taxratio
Oil
Data relies on national government accounts Variances in tax reporting and accounting are noted by IMF or WB, in most cases. Currency changes and differences in reporting timing in high inflation situations need to be normalized. National sources may be necessary to supplement
Health expenditures: before 1990s mostly government reported public expenditures, now private are part of the mix in both developed and developing but not always reported Social Security: 1) some countries have privatized part of SS. 2) The argument to exclude social security has been that those transfers have been allocated previous to the collection and therefore there is little room for any further manipulation by the government. This is not the case, those funds are not untouchable, and the deficit can be manipulated by Central Banks or Congress Agriculture: Still our best empirical fit for developing countries (not for developed) but 1960s is the anchor so we need to control for time. Taxation: Indirect vs. direct taxation
Claremont Conference on Political Economy Indicators
Yit = Adjusted tax revenue for country i at time t X it = Vector of variables that determine potential tax collection Vr= White noise disturbance
Xit
+ Vr
Conceptually, the same model as national level. Constraints to choosing the variables are country specific
Empirical Inventory
Sub National Level Model Unit of analysis: province/state/region Time span: Ideally 1990 2005, dependant on individual country Bolivia, Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Thailand, Sudan, USA,
Data Collection
In many countries the transfers are decided according to a Congressional Allocation Funds formula. If the allocations are decided on annual negotiations (1), the variable captures the concept of RPPC. If the formula is inflexible (2), the flexibility comes from the allocation of central government expenditures to the provinces. It is also important to know that the General Appropriation Act does not show if or how much of the money is released, so instead of following to entry number (Transfers, Subsidies. Models 1& 3) in some cases is better to look at the exit number (Expenditures. Model 2)
Variables: RPPC
province state Year Code Split province name State name 1980-2005 2 digit codes except for split provinces (3rd digit added for identification) 1 or 0 for provinces that have not split
Population
Totrev
Localrev Transfers
Taxes collected by the local government from the local population transfers, from General Allocation Fund
Transf_gdp
Expend_gdp Grdp constant YEAR Grdp market agriculture mining Oil Production RPC1 RPC2
agriculture
mining
Rev_gdp
agriculture
mining
Main Source: Economic & Financial Review, The Central Bank of Nigeria 1979 1987; ISSN: 008-9281; Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report & Statement of Accounts. 1980 2005. ISSN: 0069-1577
Applications
International Conflict
Organski & Kugler 1980; Lemke 1996; Tammen et al 2002. Kugler et al 1997; Benson & Kugler 1998; Johnson 2007. Arbetman, Kugler & Organski 1980, 1994, 1999; Feng Kugler & Zak 2000, 2007. Exchange Rates: Arbetman 1990; Growth: Leblang 1997; Inflation: Alcazar 1997; Private Investment: Feng & Chen 1997, Feng 2004; Policy Implementation: Snider 1997; Informal Markets: Arbetman 1990, 1994; Arbetman & Ghosh 1997. Rouyer 1997; Swaminanthan 2005; 2007; Johnson 2007.
Claremont Conference on Political Economy Indicators
Internal Conflict
Demographic Transitions
Economic Applications
Sub National
High
Average
Predicted Performance
Low
Very Low