LABOR LAW CASES

September 25, 2020

 Abella v. National Labor Relations Commission G.R. No.
71812, July 20, 1987
Labor Code, Article 4 – Construction in favor of Labor

FACTS:
Abella leased a farm land known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years,
renewable, at her option, for another ten (10) years. After 10 yrs, she opted to extend the lease
contract for another ten (10) years. She employed Quitco & Dionele as farm workers. When her
leasehold rights expired, she dismissed the two and turned over the hacienda to the land owners.
Quitco & Dionele filed a complaint against Abella for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the
cessation of business, but granted the private respondents separation pay. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
Abella claimed that since her lease agreement had already expired, she is not liable for payment of
separation pay. She invoked Article 272 of the Labor Code, which pertains to the just causes of
termination. The Labor Arbiter does not argue the justification of the termination of employment
but applied Article 284 as amended by BP 130, which provides for the rights of the employees
under the circumstances of termination. She contended that the provision quoted by the LA
violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts, because
when she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of
the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled to separation pay.
Ruling:
Yes. The purpose of Article 284 as amended is the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated
because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
It is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the working man's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
Under Article 4 of the New Labor Code, " all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor ."
Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.
 CEBU ROYAL PLANT (SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION), vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY
MINISTER OF LABOR and RAMON PILONES, G.R.
No. L-58639, August 12, 1987
Labor Standards
FACTS:
 Ramon Pilones, private respondent, was employed on February 16, 1978 on a probationary period of
employment for six (6) months with petitioner CRP. After said period, he underwent medical examination for
qualification as regular employee but the results showed that he is suffering from PTB minimal. Consequently,
he was informed of the termination of his employment by respondent since his illness was not curable within 6
months.
 Pilones complained against his termination before the Ministry of Labor which dismissed the same. The
dismissal was reversed by the public respondent who ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages.
 Granting reinstatement, the public respondent argues that Pilones was already a permanent employee at the time
of his dismissal and so was entitled to security of tenure. The alleged ground for his removal, to wit,
“pulmonary tuberculosis minimal,” was not certified as incurable within six months as to justify his separation
and that the petitioner should have first obtained a clearance, as required by the regulations then in force, for
the termination of his employment. CRP claims that the private respondent was still on probation at the time of
his dismissal and so had no security of tenure. The dismissal was necessary for the protection of the public
health, as he was handling ingredients in the processing of soft drinks which were being sold to the public.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal was proper.

HELD:
No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, “an employee who is allowed to
work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.” Pilones was already on
permanent status when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to be a
probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure guaranteed to him by the Constitution
and the Labor Code.
The petitioner claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because the xray
examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results were not immediately available. That
excuse is untenable. We note that when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct such
examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation period.
The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8,
Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code which
states that “the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a
certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature
or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with
proper medical treatment.” The record does not contain the certification required by
the above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal. It is also worth noting that the
petitioner’s application for clearance to terminate the employment of the private
respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28, 1978, or seven
days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and correctly said, the prior
clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was not a “trivial technicality.” It
required “not just the mere filing of a petition or the mere attempt to procure a
clearance” but that “the said clearance be obtained prior to the operative act of
termination.
Although we must rule in favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness
to resume his work, as certified by competent authority. **Another Doctrine under Sec. 4
of Labor Code on construction:
Concern for the lowly worker who, often at the mercy of his employers, must look up to the
law for his protection. Fittingly, that law regards him with tenderness and even favor and
always with faith and hope in his capacity to help in shaping the nation’s future. It is error
to take him for granted. He deserves our abiding respect. How society treats him will
determine whether the knife in his hands shall be a caring tool for beauty and progress or an
angry weapon of defiance and revenge. The choice is obvious, of course. If we cherish him
as we should, we must resolve to lighten “the weight of centuries” of exploitation and
disdain that bends his back but does not bow his head.
 National Housing Corp. v. Juco 134 SCRA 172 (1985)
Applicability of Article 6

Facts:
Juco was an employee of the NHC. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ DOLE
but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a government-
owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHC
in turn appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter,
covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
Held:
Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled
corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the
framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service
system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This constitutional provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC
belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without
exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the
government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt.- owned or controlled corps. whether created
by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact
that private corps. owned or controlled by the govt. may be created by special charter does not mean that such
corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
The infirmity of the respondent’s position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art.
XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Constitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt. to
create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt.-owned corp.
could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their
officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil
Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in
the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all govt.-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through
incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil
service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed.
 NSC vs NLRC
GR No. L-69870
FACTS:
Eugenia Credo, Chief of Property and Records of NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
(NASECO) filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor after
having been placed in forced leave without due process. Said forced leave was a product of her
alleged non-compliance of a memorandum coming from a Finance Manager, and other past
acts of misconduct as found by NASECO’s committee on Personnel Affairs. In the Manager’s
office, Credo was made to explain her side in connection with the conducts for which she is
complained of. But because she failed to explain, she was handed a Notice of Termination.
Credo thus filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal and lack of opportunity to be
heard.
ISSUE:
Was there an illegal dismissal?

RULING:
Yes. These guidelines [1] mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two
(2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are
the:
(1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. The
dictates of procedural due process require that decision to dismiss can only be handed after employer
has afforded employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself. In the case at bar,
the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a
chance to prepare her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the
legal requirements.
[1] As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just causes, the law
provides that:
“Section 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal . . .
“Section 5. Answer and Hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of
dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
“Section 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.”
SSS Employee Association v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July
28, 1989)
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on
the subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to
strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the
petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not SSS employees have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among
workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand,
Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which
states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government
employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore, in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government
employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is now granted by law authority to issue
writ of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the
general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
 WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT
LTD. vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSELITO V.
MACATUNO,G.R. No. 108433 October 15, 1996

FACTS:
Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by Wallem Ship Management Limited thru its local manning agent, Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc., as an able-bodied seaman on board the M/T Fortuna, a vessel of Liberian registry. Pursuant to the
contract of employment, private respondent was employed for ten (10) months covering the period February 26, 1989 until
December 26, 1989 with a monthly salary of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US $276); among others xxxx
On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took place between private
respondent and fellow Filipino crew member, Julius E. Gurimbao, on the one hand, and a cadet/apprentice officer of the same
nationality as the captain of the vessel on the other hand. The master entered the incident in the tanker’s logbook.
As a consequence, private respondent and Gurimbao were repatriated to the Philippines where they lost no time in lodging
separate complaints for illegal dismissal with the POEA. According to the affidavit private respondent executed before a POEA
administering officer, the following facts led to the filing of the complaint.
At about 5:50 a.m. of June 24, 1989, private respondent was on duty along with Gurimbao, checking the manifold of the vessel
and looking for oil leakages, when a cadet/apprentice who was of the same nationality as the vessel’s captain (Singh),
approached them. He ordered Gurimbao to use a shovel in draining the water which, mixed with oil and dirt, had accumulated at
the rear portion of the upper deck of the vessel.
Gurimbao explained to the cadet/apprentice that throwing dirty and oily water overboard was prohibited by the laws of Japan; in
fact, port authorities were roaming and checking the sanitary conditions of the port. The cadet/apprentice got mad and, shouting,
ordered Gurimbao to get a hose and siphon off the water. To avoid trouble, Gurimbao used a shovel in throwing the dirty water
into the sea.
Having finished his job, Gurimbao complained to private respondent about the “improper and unauthorized act” of the
cadet/apprentice. The two then went to the cadet/apprentice who was idly standing in a corner. They reminded him that as a mere
apprentice and not an officer of the vessel, he had no right whatsoever to order around any member of the crew. However, the
cadet/apprentice reacted violently — shouting invectives and gesturing “as if challenging” the two to a fight. To prevent him from
“intimidating” them, private respondent pushed twice the cadet/apprentice’s chest while Gurimbao “mildly hit” his arm. Frantic
and shouting, the cadet/apprentice ran to the captain “who happened to witness the incident” from the cabin’s window.
The captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao. With their bosun (head of the deck crew), they went to the captain’s
cabin. The captain told them to pack up their things as their services were being terminated. They would disembark at the next
port, the Port of Ube, from where they would be flown home to the Philippines, the repatriation expenses to be shouldered by
them. The two attempted to explain their side of the incident but the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home.
xxxxx
A few days after their arrival in Manila or on July 1, 1989, one James Nichols told private respondent that they could not secure a
reimbursement of their repatriation expenses nor could they get their salaries for the month of June.
Petitioner’s Defense: [basta pasaway daw ung mga respondents] alleged that the incident was not the first infraction committed
by the two xxx
POEA held the dismissal to be illegal; NLRC affirmed; Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.
HELD:
YES.
An employer may dismiss or lay off an employee only for the just and authorized causes enumerated in Articles
282 and 283 of the Labor Code. However, this basic and normal prerogative of an employer is subject to regulation
by the State in the exercise of its paramount police power. One’ s employment, profession, trade or calling is a
property right within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
We agree with petitioners that the ship captain’s logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of
Commerce requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel’s head. Thus, in Haverton
Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, the Court held that a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves
as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find unqualified application in the case at bar. In said case, an
investigation of the incident which led to the seaman’s dismissal was conducted before he was dismissed.
Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were supported by the facts gathered at the investigation. In this
case, because no investigation was conducted by the ship captain before repatriating private respondent, the
contents of the logbook have to be duly identified and authenticated lest an injustice result from a blind adoption of
such contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in question.
Moreover, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of documents. What was offered in
evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from what could be the logbook because by
their format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel in accordance with
Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.
Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties appended to the contract of
employment entered into by petitioners and private respondent, the offense described by the logbook
entry may well fall under insubordination and may constitute assaulting a superior officer “with the
use of deadly weapon” punishable with dismissal if the victim is indeed a “superior officer.”
However, an “apprentice officer” cannot be considered a “superior officer.”
The aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so
many questions unanswered.
Petitioners’ failure to substantiate the grounds for a valid dismissal was aggravated by the manner by
which the employment of private respondent was terminated. Thus, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130,
amending paragraph (b) of Article 278 of the Labor Code, imposed as a condition sine qua non that
any termination of employment under the grounds provided in Article 283 must be done only after
notice and formal investigation have been accorded the supposed errant worker.
As regards the notice requirement, the Court has stated:
On the issue of due process . . . , the law requires the employer to furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause or causes
for termination and shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of a representative. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2) written
notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (b) the subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
Neither is the ship captain’s having witnessed the altercation an excuse for dispensing with the notice
and hearing requirements. Serving notice to private respondent under the circumstances cannot be
regarded as an “absurdity and superfluity.”
Petition Denied.
 VIR-JEN SHIPPING v. NLRC,
GR No. 58011-12, 1982-07-20
Facts:
Private respondents have a manning contract for a period of one (1) year with petitioner in
representation of its principal Kyoei Tanker Co. Ltd.
The manning contract was approved by the NSB. One of the private respondents sent a cable to
petitioner stating that private respondents were not contented with the salary and benefits
stipulated in the manning contract, and demanded that they be given 50% increase thereof, as the
“best and only solution to solve the problem.”
Petitioner wrote a letter to the NSB denouncing the conduct of private respondents.
URINFO ENTIRE JANNU OFFICERS AND CREW NOT CONTENTED WITH PRESENT
SALARY BASED ON VOLUME OF WORK TYPE OF SHIP WITH HAZARDOUS CARGO
AND REGISTERED IN A WORLDWIDE TRADE STOP. WHAT WE DEMAND IS ONLY
FIFTY PERCENT INCREASE BASED ON PRESENT BASIC SALARY. STOP THIS
DEMAND. THE
BEST AND ONLY SOLUTION TO SOLVE PROBLEM DUE YOUR PRESENT RATES ESPECIALLY
TANKERS VERY FAR IN COMPARISON WITH OTHER SHIPPING AGENCIES IN MANILA. WE
PROPOSE AN INCREASE OF TWENTY FIVE PERCENT ON YOUR BASIC PAY . WE CONDITIONALLY
COOPERATE WITH YOUR PROPOSED INCREASE AND TWENTY FIVE PERCENT BASED ON
INDIVIDUAL BASIC PAY WITH THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITION...

The abovementioned demands of the officers and crew (25% increase in basic pay, increase in overtime
pay and increase in representation allowance) involve an additional amount of US$3,096.50 per month, which
our company is not in a position to shoulder.

In view of private respondents' conduct and breach of contract, petitioner's principal, Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd.
terminated the manning contract in a letter dated April 4, 1979. “We fully agree with you that this action taken
by your officers and crew in demanding increase in their salaries and overtime after being on board for only
three months was very unreasonable. Considering the circumstances when the demand was made, we believe
that their action was definitely abusive and plain blackmail. Your crew should respect their employment
contracts which was approved by your government and your National Seamen Board should make sure that all
seamen should follow their contracts.”
“Our common and final decision is not to grant your request but also to terminate our Manning Agreement
effective upon crew's change when the vessel arrives at Japan or at any possible port about end April, 1979. “
The NSB, through its Executive Director Cresencio C. Dayao, wrote petitioner authorizing it to cancel the
manning contract. The seamen were accordingly disembarked in Japan and repatriated to Manila. They then
filed a complaint with the NSB for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages.
After trial, the NSB found that the termination of the services of the seamen before the expiration of their
employment contract was justified when they demanded over and above the contracted rates which in effect was
an alteration and modification of a valid and existing contract. The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC
which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the wages and other monetary
benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the termination of
the said contract by petitioner was without valid cause.
The seamen demanded and in fact received from the Company wages over and above their contracted rates,
which in effect, is an alteration or modification of a valid and subsisting contract; and the same not having been
done thru mutual consent and without the prior approval of the Board the alteration or modification is contrary
to the provisions of the New Labor Code.
While the Board recognizes the rights of the Seamen to seek higher wages, provided the increase
is arrived at thru mutual consent. It could not however, sanction the same if the consent of the
employer is secured thru threats, intimidation or force. The company was compelled to accede to
the demand of the Seamen for a salary increase to forestall the possibility of the vessel being
interdicted by the ITF at Kwinana, Australia, for in the event the vessel would be detained and/or
interdicted the Company would suffer more losses than paying the Seamen 25% increase of their
salary.

The Board believes that the termination of the services of the Seamen was legal and in accordance
with the provisions of their respective employment contract despite the fact that it was compelled
to accede to a 25% salary increase for the Seamen. Disagreeing with the foregoing findings of the
NSB, the NLRC held that
respondent NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the petitioner Virjen to
pay to the private respondents their “wages corresponding to the unexpired portion of their
contracts” petitioner having already lost its trust and confidence on the private respondents. The
employer cannot be legally compelled to continue with the employment of persons in whom it has
already lost its trust and confidence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Seamen were illegally dismissed by the
Company;

2. Whether or not the monetary claims of the seamen are valid and
meritorious;

3. Whether the Seamen violated their employment contracts when

they demanded or proposed and in fact accepted wages over and
above their contracted rates;

4. Could the Seamen rightfully demand or propose the revision of

their employment contracts?
Ruling:

 While employees may be free to request their employers to increase their wages, they should not
use threat of such a nature and in such a situation as to put the employer at their complete mercy
and with no choice but to accede to their demands or to face bankruptcy; an act of bad conduct
prejudicial to the vessel, and a material breach of the existing manning contract.

 In the light of all the foregoing and the law and policy on the matter, it is submitted that there was
valid justification on the part of petitioner and/or its principal to terminate the manning contract.
 Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. vs Sec. of Labor GR No L-79436-50
January 17, 1990 Parties: EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA,
ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al., respondents.

Facts:
In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) of J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in
business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the
applicant and the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation in virtue of which they
both held themselves firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS ONLY (Pl50,000.00).
The bond stipulated that:

a) it was conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and observance of the principal (J & B
Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties and obligations in accordance with all the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration and with the terms and conditions stipulated in the License;
b) the liability of the Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY;
c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; and
d) LIABILITY of the surety shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be automatically
cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not
discovered and presented to it in writing within said period of from expiration and the obligee
hereby expressly waives the rights to file any court action against the Surety after termination of
said period of above cited.
Issues:
EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not
expressly covered by the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of
the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the period of
effectivity of the bond.
Held:
EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to 19
named complainants (in contrast to verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which
both 63 ordered payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was correspondingly
reduced from P308,751.75 and US $ 400.00 to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75.
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for
violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. The Secretary of Labor has the
power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority,
conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-
making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA "on its own initiative
or upon filing of a complaint or
report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person (authority to) conduct the necessary
proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for
certain enumerated offenses including — 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of
any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the
Administration, and 2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other
relevant laws, rules and regulations. The Administrator was also given the power to "order the
dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or
contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." EASCO's claim that it had not
been properly served with summons as regards a few of the complaints must be rejected, the issue
being factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error invalidating the respondent
Secretary's conclusion that summons had indeed been duly served. EASCO's half-hearted argument
that its liability should be limited to the maximum amount set in its surety bond, i.e., P150,000.00, is
palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on it, P140,817.75, supra, does not in
fact exceed that limit.

Decision: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared
to be immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ
(at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL
FACTS:
In April 1993, eight (8) information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight
(8) information for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda
Reichl, together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted
by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of illegal recruitment.
HELD:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor
Code. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to private complainants
and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did
not have any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the
necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.
Accusedappellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants,
which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating
that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We are not convinced.
Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl
and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that
they would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the
truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely
testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter
represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor
lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused appellants in their brief do not impair
their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with
the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment, and
that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. It has been held that
truth telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory. Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked
as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private 75 complainants for the
processing of their papers.
We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to
sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony or in that of his wife, that
private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document. Mr. Reichl is an
educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper he was
signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to
ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad.
Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused
to private complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they
promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that they also
promised to procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants
admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in
Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each
complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00.
 This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for
securing visas but also for their placement abroad. Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to
impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City.
Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the
Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that
he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City
is only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does not
prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that
the three accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting
domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl
to the job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to
private complainants that they would seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the
payments given by the applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants'
papers. There being conspiracy, each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused
even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution.
 PEOPLE VS. TIONG
FACTS:
Six(6) complainants went to Borja’s house to meet accused, Tan Tiong Meng, allegedly a job recruiter . Accused
promised to complainants that they could get jobs as factory worker in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20K.
Accused required them to submit their passports, bio-data and their high school diploma as well as to pay P15K
each for placement and processing fees. Accused kept on promising to complainants that they would be able to
leave, but the promises were never fulfilled. When complainants knew that accused was not a licensed or
authorized overseas recruiter, they filed for complaints for illegal recruitment and estafa against accused. Accused
contend that he merely acted as a collector of money for the principal recruiter Borja who made the
representations that he(accused) could give the applicants jobs in Taiwan.
ISSUE:
WON accused is guilty of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale and 6 counts of estafa.
HELD:

YES. Circumstances belie the version of accused: (1) Mascardo(one of the complainants) testified that
accused could no longer return the money because he had already sent it to his brother-in-law in Taiwan;
(2) all the receipts issued to complainants were signed by accused; (3) Accused admitted that he and his
wife are respondents in about 70 cases of estafa and illegal recruitment; (4) complainants pointed to Tan
and not Borja as the one who had represented to them that he could give them jobs in Taiwan. The accused’
acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and representing to said applicants that he could get
them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the Labor Code and is deemed illegal and
punishable under Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The offense committed against the 6 complainants is illegal
recruitment in large scale. Accused is also guilty of 6 separate crimes of estafa. A person convicted for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the RPC provisions on estafa
provided the elements are present: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means
of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person.
 G.R. Nos. 138431-36 September 12, 2001 THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DIOSCORA M. ARABIA and FRANCISCA L. TOMAS,
accused-appellants.
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102, finding accused-
appellants Dioscora M. Arabia and Francisca L. Tomas both guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and
sentencing them to each suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to each pay a fine of P100,000.00; and five
(5) counts each of estafa for which both were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twentyone (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, five (5) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum for each of the four counts. In another count of estafa,
they were each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional as maximum. They were further ordered to solidarily pay the complainants the following
amounts by way of actual damages: (1) P3,000.00 to Rolando Rustia; (2) P16,000.00 to Noel de la Cruz; (3)
P16,000.00 to Teresita Julva Lorenzo; (4) P16,000.00 to Violeta S. de la Cruz; and (5) P16,000.00 to
Remelyn Nona Jacinto. Appellants argued that receipts were never presented to prove the allegations against
them. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT LARGE-SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT EXIST

HELD:
Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:
(1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited
practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
(2) He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers.
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as follows:
[A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers
[which] includes referrals, contact services, promis[es] or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engagement in recruitment
and placement." There is no doubt as to accused-appellants' guilt for all the essential elements of the
crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Accused
appellants recruited at least four persons, giving them the impression that they had the capability to
send them to Taiwan for employment. They collected various amounts allegedly for recruitment and
placement fees without license or authority to do so. It is settled that "the fact that an accused in an
illegal recruitment case did not issue the receipts for amounts received from the complainants has no
bearing on his culpability so long as complainants show through their respective testimonies and
affidavits that the accused was involved in the prohibited recruitment. It has also been held that "the
Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentations of receipts in order to
prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment
cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the testimony of witnesses."
 G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995 People of the
Phil., plaintiff-appellee vs Loma Goce, et. al.,
accused-appellant.
Facts:
On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale, punishable under
Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the
RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates
inclusive in the City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino
workers for employment abroad.
January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested. Hence, on February
1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but issued a standing warrant os arrest against the accused.
Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest and
eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police. Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and
requested to set a hearing for purpose of due process and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the
arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty and the trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and
reciepts of the processing fees they paid.
Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her participation in the recruitment
and denied knowledge of the receipts as well.
On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale with sentence of life imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.
Issues:
Agustin appealed with the following arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the
couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 in
relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is no proof that
appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:
The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview with Agustin (as employee of the
Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral. Agustin collected the
payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other
expenses.On the issue of proof, the court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear
enough to prove the payments and transaction made.
 PEOPLE VS CALONZO GR NOS. 115150-
55 SEPTEMBER 27, 1996
FACTS:

Reydante Calonzo Y Ambrosio was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and 5 counts of estafa
by Brenando Miranda, Danilo de los Reyes, Elmer Clamor, Belarmino Torregrosa and Hazel de Paula.
The complainants recounted that they met the accused-appellant who was then employed in R.A.C
Business Agency and offered to them employment in Italy. The accused was glib and persuasive that
they were lured to give payment for the processing of their application for work in Italy. The accused-
appellant was able to send the complainants to Bangkok and were brought to P.S Guest Hotel. While in
Bangkok, the complainants again gave additional amounts to the accused. However, they only remain in
Bangkok and the promise of employment in Italy was not fulfilled. Upon return to the Philippines, the
complainants verified from POEA to which the latter issued a certification that the accused and R.A.C
Business Agency were not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. As for his part, accused-
appellant denies involvement in any recruitment activities.
ISSUE:
WON accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

HELD:
Yes, Illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person "(a) undertakes any recruitment
activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.“
The above requisites to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale are present in this case, the
testimony of complainants evidently showed that Calonzo was engaged in recruitment activities in large
scale. Firstly, he deluded complainants into believing that jobs awaited them in Italy by distinctly
impressing upon them that he had the facility to send them for work abroad. He even showed them his
passport to lend credence to his claim. To top it all, he brought them to Bangkok and not to Italy.
Neither did he have any arrangements in Bangkok for the transfer of his recruits to Italy. Secondly,
POEA likewise certified that neither Calonzo nor R.A.C. Business Agency was licensed to recruit
workers for employment abroad. Appellant admitted this fact himself. Thirdly, appellant recruited five
(5) workers thus making the crime illegal recruitment in large scale constituting economic sabotage.
PEOPLE V. DE REICHL PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (AT LARGE), KARL REICHL, AND YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, ACCUSED. KARL REICHL AND YOLANDA GUTIERREZ
DE REICHL, ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS. G.R. NOS. 141221-36 MARCH 7, 2002 PUNO, J.

Facts:

In April 1993, eight informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight
informations for estafa were filed against accusedappellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl,
together with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial
court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large.

The complainants namely, Narcisa Autor de Hernandez, Leonora Perez, Melanie Bautista Annaliza
Perez, Edwin Coling, Estela Abel de Manalo, Anicel Umahon and Charito Balmes have their own
similar stories about the illegal recruitment conducted by the accused-appellants.
They recounted that accused Hernandez was the one convincing each of them to apply for
employment abroad. Accused Hernandez asked for the payment for the processing of their
papers, travel documents and visas. Complainants then were introduced by Hernandez to
spouse Reichl who in turn promised them for employment abroad. The spouse issued reciept
for the payments made by the complainants. The promises of employment however did not
pushed through and the complainants remained in the Philippines. Upon demands, the
accused spouse promise them to refund the payment if their employments never materialized.
These agreements were reduced into a document but the accused spouse never complies with
their obligations. There was also a certification from the Philippine overseas employment
Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl
in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
As for their part, the spouse denied any of involvement of Hernandez's recruitment and their
knowledge of promises for overseas employment. They further contended that they cannot be
convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as the several information were only
filed by single complainant.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellants were guilty of syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment.

Held:

They cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. Where only one
complainant filed individual complaints as in this case, there is no illegal recruitment in large
scale. However, they are guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl,
Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in convincing
private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that
they would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do
so. Thus, the accused appellants are liable for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate.
 PEOPLE VS VERANO
GR NO 90017-18 MARCH 1, 1994
FACTS:
Elena Verano was convicted of the CRIME ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE as defined under
paragraph (b) of Article 38 in relation to Article 39 of the New Labor Code of the Philippines with the
corresponding penalty of life imprisonment, a fine of P100,000 and payment of P10,000 and P7,150 plus
interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of information on February 22, 1988 to the offended parties
Arturo Espiel and Alfonso Abanes.
She was likewise convicted of ESTAFA and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six(6) years
of pricion correccional in its maximum period to nine (9) years of prision mayor medium period, and also to
pay Jose Daep P15,000 as actual damages plus interest of 12 % per annum from the date of filing of the
information.
However, in her argument as to the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale to the Supreme Court, she
alleges that she never represented herself having the capacity to contract workers for overseas employment.
She added that she merely introduced the complainants to a certain Juliet Majestrado who was the one who
claimed to have such capacity.
As to the crime of estafa, she alleged that although she issued receipts to the complainants, she never profited
from the money paid since all were given to and personally received by Juliet Majestrado.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Verano is liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and
estafa.

HELD:
YES RATIO: In deciding the case, the Supreme Court the well-settled doctrine that
findings of fact made by the trial court are final and conclusive and CANNOT be
reviewed on appeal. Moreover, the abovementioned case does not fall within the
recognized exceptions.
The Supreme Court maintained the factual findings of the trial court wherein Verano
persuaded Daep, Espiel and Abanes to accept as overseas salesmen in Bahrain, required
them to pay P10,000 each to cover processing expenses. Moreover, Verano even signed a
contract of employment with her as employer and Arturo as employee to further
convince them of her capacity to send them abroad. However, Verano failed to fulfill
said promises for three(3) times which prompted the victims to lodge complaints.
OTHER DISCUSSIONS:
Definition of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale - Article 38. Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
paragraph (b). Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with
Article 39 hereof.
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IS DEEMED COMMITTED BY A SYNDICATE if carried out
by a group of three(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT is deemed committed IN LARGE SCALE if
committed against three(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Article 39 Labor Code. Penalties.- (a) The penalty of life imprisonment AND a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitute economic
sabotage
Salazar vs. Achacoso GR No. 81510 DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D.
ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ,
respondents.

FACTS:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. On October 21,
1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained
that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order.
There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering
the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the
studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes
which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the
confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the
house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery. On February 2, 1988, the
petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already
fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for
certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor)
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD:
PETITION GRANTED. It is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have
held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: Under
Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may
issue warrants of arrest and search: The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
 General Milling Corporation vs. Torres
G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991
FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant
and assistant coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-
arranged employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s employment permit be changed to a full-fledged
coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the Philippines.
Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the Philippines to do
the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
Cone’s Alien Employment Permit.

HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s
Alien Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an
employer’s prerogative
has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer seeking
employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the Department
of labor. GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory
requirement of an employment permit.
The Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of
the services of a “person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the
time of the application to perform the services for which an alien is desired.”
 CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS
GR No. 47800 December 12, 1940
Summary:
Calalang filed a petition for writ of prohibition against certain officials in enforcing the
prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles in certain areas and during certain periods of the day.
The Court ruled that Commonwealth Act No 548, the law in question, is constitutional.
Doctrine:
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."
Facts:
Maximo Calalang brought a petition for a writ of prohibition against the following
respondents: Chairman of the National Traffic Commission (A.D. Williams), Director of
Public Works (Vicente Fragante), Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications
(Sergio Bayan), Mayor of the City of Manila (Eulogio Rodriguez), and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila (Juan Dominguez). It is alleged in the petition that the respondents have
caused and enforced the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario
St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarinas Street (from 7:30am-12:30pm and from 1:30-5:30p.m.); and Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street (from 7-
11a.m.) for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge, to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 548, infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people Issues Ratio: WON CA No 548 is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
legislative power – NO The provisions of CA No 548 do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly.

The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the
proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise
of such discretion is the making of the law.
ISSUES:

1. WON CA No 548 constitutes as an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion – NO

2. WON CA No 548 infringes upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice – NO

HELD:

1. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state.
2. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any
given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of
the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."

Dispositive: In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered
 DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner, vs. NOTRE DAME OF GREATER
MANILA, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents
G.R. No. 75093 February 23, 1990 TOPIC: Modalities of an act: Contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy (Art 20 and 21 NCC)

FACTS:
Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private respondent Notre Dame of
Greater Manila, she was compensated on a 12-month basis, although she worked only during the
ten-month period of classes.
She was not required to report for work for the entire Christmas and summer vacations. However,
respondent's director, Fr. Gonzales, requested her to shorten her summer vacation, From two weeks
after the last day of classes to two weeks before the first day of classes of the next school year.
Petitioner acceded to the request .
Fr. Gonzales required petitioner to report during that summer to help in the library. Petitioner
contested the order, stating that: it will necessitate a change in the terms and conditions of her
employment; that library work is alien to her profession as nurse.
 Later on, Fr. Gonzales was replaced by Fr. Pablo Garcia, as new director. The latter required
petitioner to report for work during the summer before the beginning of school year. Petitioner
informed him that her contract does not require her to report for work during the summer vacation. Fr.
Garcia promised to verify her allegation. However, he failed to inform petitioner of his findings.
Thus, in order that her failure to report for work may not be misinterpreted, petitioner filed leaves of
absence during the summer break. Petitioner failed to receive her vacation pay.
During school year 1981-1982, petitioner was assigned to teach health subjects. This situation came
about because the two (2) teachers of the health subjects had left the school. Petitioner, however, was
not given compensation for teaching, notwithstanding the fact that other teachers were duly
compensated for extra work done.  During the school year petitioner tried to arrange for a meeting
with Fr. Garcia regarding her vacation pay, but to no avail because Fr. Garcia was always busy and
also suffered a heart attack which necessitated his hospitalization.
In December 1981, petitioner received her 13th month pay which was computed on the
basis of a 10-month period only. Fr. Garcia again required petitioner to work during that
summer to update all the clinical records of the students. Petitioner objected by
reiterating that her contract does not require her to report for work during summer
Respondent said that it was imperative for her to report for work during the summer
because it is the best time to update the clinical records when no students could disturb
her. In addition, she reminded Fr. Garcia that she had not received any compensation for
teaching health subjects the past school year. Respondent said that petitioner was not
entitled to extra compensation for teaching because teaching was allegedly part of her
regular working program as a school nurse.On April 14, 1982, petitioner, apart from
reiterating her objection to the order, called the attention of Fr. Garcia to the school's
failure to pay her salary for the summer of 1981 and of the deficiency in her 13th month
pay for that year. Fr. Garcia refused to consider petitioner's demands and threatened to
take drastic measures against her if she remains obstinate in her refusal to follow his order
to report for work that summer.
 Petitioner, for the fourth time, informed Fr. Garcia that her contract does not
require her to report for work during summer, and she does not intend to do so
that summer of 1982. Petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of the
following; (1) vacation pay for four (4) summer months; (2) compensation for
teaching health subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 13th month pay for 1981.
Summons was served on respondent school on the opening day of classes on
June 14, 1982. That very day when petitioner reported for work, respondent
school served petitioner her letter of termination effective immediately and it also
submitted a copy of the termination paper to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE). The following day, petitioner filed an amended
complaint, adding two more charges: illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
Petitioner’s allegations:
o Respondent NLRC failed to give full respect to the constitutional mandate on security of tenure when the
majority decision affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter:  Separating and dismissing petitioner on the
basis of her perception that petitioner and the director could no longer work harmoniously. The award of
separation pay would defeat and render nugatory the Constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. o
Petitioner is entitled to compensation relative to her teaching job which is distinct and separate from her
duties as school nurse.

Public respondent NLRC’s contention:

o The relationship between petitioner and respondent school had come to the point that reinstatement of
petitioner would cause undue burden on both parties.  It would affect petitioner's performance of her
duties as school nurse and private respondent's business. o Teaching health subjects is allied to petitioner's
job as school nurse, particularly so when the same is done within the official eight (8) working hour
schedule.
NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner is not entitled to compensation for teaching health
subjects allegedly because: o petitioner taught during her regular working hours; o the subject Health is
allied to her profession as nurse; o she and respondent school had no clear understanding regarding extra
compensation.
ISSUE(S):

1. Whether or not the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement is the proper remedy
under the circumstances;
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects; and
3. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to moral damages.
HELD:
1. Yes. The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of petitioner was not supported by
any just cause or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement with
backwages based on the alleged reason that petitioner's working relations with the former director,
Father Garcia, had become so strained and deteriorated that it became impossible for them to work
harmoniously again. And the NLRC affirmed such finding which is untrue and merely speculative. It
should be noted that the alleged conflict between the petitioner and the director was strictly official
in nature, the cause of which was the violation of the terms of employment by the latter. Petitioner's
assertion of her right to unpaid salaries and bonus differential was not motivated by any personal
consideration. Rather, she simply claimed benefits which, under the law, she was entitled to and
legally due her. In her act of asserting these money claims, petitioner observed utmost tact, courtesy
and civility so as not to unduly offend the sensibilities of the director by waiting for his frill recovery
from his illness before sending her formal letter of demand; and only after the school refused to
satisfy her money claims did she file the formal complaint with the proper NLRC branch.
Thus, in the case of Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. (145 SCRA 268), this Court held that one's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right", and the wrongful interference therewith
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law.

Significantly, about a month after petitioner's termination on June 14, 1982, more than twenty teachers
and personnel of respondent school, backed by the Faculty Association, petitioned for the ouster of
Director Fr. Garcia for serious charges under P.D. 176. Consequently, Fr. Garcia was replaced on
September 8, 1983. Clearly, therefore, when the assailed NLRC decision was rendered on April 11,
1986, the alleged "strained relations" or "irritant factors" which the Labor Arbiter capitalized on had
been totally eliminated.
2. YES. Petitioner's teaching the subject in the classroom and her administering to the
health needs of students in the clinic involve two different and distinct jobs. They cannot
be equated with each other for they refer to different functions. Teaching requires
preparation of lesson plans, examinations and grades, while clinical work entails
preparation of clinical records and treating illnesses of students in school. There can be
no doubt that teaching health subjects is extra work for petitioner, and therefore
necessitates extra compensation. It has also been the practice of the school to pay extra
compensation to teachers who were given extra load even during regular working hours.
o The court cited that in University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of
Pangasinan: that semestral breaks may be considered as "hours worked" under the Rules
implementing the Labor Code o that regular professors and teachers are entitled to
ECOLA (Emergency Cost of Living Allowance) during the semestral breaks, their
"absence" from work not being of their own will
3. Yes. The Solicitor General has submitted this valid justification for the award of moral
damages under Art. 1701 of the Labor Code:
Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before she was ultimately
dismissed. When she justifiably refused to obey the order to report for work for two summers,
she was not given her vacation pay for both occasions. Unlike her, the doctor and dentist who
worked in the same clinic, were not required to report during summer and were given their
respective vacation pay. Again, petitioner, unlike the teachers who accepted extra load, was
not given extra compensation when she taught health subjects to 900 students for one year. By
withholding such compensation, respondent school stood to gain at the expense of petitioner,
the amount of the salary which it could have paid to two (2) health teachers. Petitioner's 13th
month pay was likewise underpaid because the basis for computation was only ten months,
and not one year as in the case of other regular office personnel.
Finally, petitioner's travails culminated in her unceremonious termination without due process
at the beginning of the school year on June 14, 1982, by the service of her termination paper
antedated June 11, 1982. Termination without due process is specifically prohibited by Rule
XIV Section 1 under Section 8 of the Rules Implementing BP Blg. 130:
Security of tenure and due process. — No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law and after due process.
The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against petitioner
invariably makes respondent liable for moral damages under Art. 1701, which prohibits acts
of capital or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human relations in relation to Art. 2219
No. 10 and Art. 2220, all of the Civil Code (Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, 18 SCRA
107).
 Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor
G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and
Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club
itself as well as from paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government. Petitioner has fortyone (41) employees. Aside from salary
and living allowances, the employees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their respective
salaries On May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positions filed a complaint
with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X, for underpayment of their salaries and
ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW- 71-86. On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his
Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the allegations in the
complaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issued an Order dated August 4,
1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's
employees. Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who
rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs should be
computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986, On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial
and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.

Held:
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both
visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by
existing laws, rules, and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits, including occupational, safety,
and health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated September 16, 1987).
Decision:

ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as

regards all persons still employed in the Hospital at the time of the filing of the
complaint, but GRANTED as regards those employees no longer employed at that
time. SO ORDERED.
 Bernardo vs NLRC
GR 122917 07/03/99
Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters
and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their
contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and
should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were
“special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.

Issue:
WON petitioners have become regular employees.
Held:
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one
month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month
term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and
reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the
end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts
of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and
necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for
the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be
given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the
Magna Carta provides:
“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities
for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.”
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified
able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall
be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in
its entirety.
Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is
not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity,
and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the
conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other
words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business
of respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for
more than six months.

Petition granted