Laws in History

by Stephan Berry
(Lifted from Blackwell Companions to Philosophy: A Companion to the Philosophy of
History and Historiography)

A presentation by:
Shaine Christian Ocampo
II-9 BSSE
2S-SOC04- Historiography
 Lesson Objectives
1. Identify the issues in natural sciences and its philosophy.
2. Establish the connection between natural science and
historiography.
3. Describe covering-law model of history and its criticisms.
4. Establish the way of explaining and reconstructing events
from historical evidences.
5. Identify the problems and debates about history and its
neighboring principles and how it could be resolved.
6. Answer the question about the existence of laws of history.
 5 Essential/ Specific Questions
1. What are the issues in natural sciences and its philosophy?
2. How does the present-day natural science related to
historiography?
3. Why the symmetry of prediction and reconstruction is needs to be
stressed more than explanation and prediction?
4. What is covering-law model of history and what are its criticisms?
5. What are the problems and debates in history and neighboring
disciplines and what does the author had suggested to address
these problems?
Conceptual Framework
 The issues in natural sciences and its philosophy
1. There are many indeterministic
laws in nature.
2. There are several physical laws
are derived and used in a “sloppy”
way.
3. The complete computability of
the world is no longer an objective
of science.
4. The large scale of scientific
inquiry had changed.
References:
Berry, S. (1999). “On the Problem of Laws in Nature in
History: A Comparison.” History and Theory, 38, pp. 121-
37.
Davey, K. (2003). “Is Mathematical Rigor Necessary in
Physics?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
54, pp. 439-63.
Schmidt, J.C. (2003). “Zwischen Berechenbarkeit und
Nichtberenchenbarkeit. Die Thematisierung der
Berechenbarkeit in der aktuellen Physik komplexer
Systeme,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science,
34, pp. 99-131.
Hawking, S.W., and Hertog, T. (2006). “Populating the
Landscape: A Top-down Approach,” Physical Review D,
731 123527-1 TO 123527- 9.
 Synthesis
 The laws of nature, though still cling to natural
science, had its status changed over the years,
as new ideas about the origins and nature of
things that we see and observe arise.
 The laws of nature, when applied in natural
history, must be free from determinism and
should not be used to restrict the boundaries of
inquiry.
 The relationship between present-day natural science and
historiography

1. Both deals with evidences to reconstruct

the past events trough gathered evidences. References:

2. As proposed by Hawking and Hertog,

natural science, cosmology in particular,
should work backward in time, which
closely resembles the methodology of
historiography.
3. The complexity of beings that are the
subject matter of natural science (i.e.
weather) resembles the complexity of
societies (cultures, states, etc.) which is the
subject matter of historiography.
Bojowald, M. (2006). “Unique or Not
Unique?” Nature, 442, pp. 988-90.
Hartmann, N. (1950). “Philosophie der
Natur (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter).
Hawking, S.W., and Hertog, T. (2006).
“Populating the Landscape: A Top-down
Approach,” Physical Review D, 731
123527-1 TO 123527- 9.
 Synthesis
 The natural science and historiography
had a close resemblance both in
approach to its respective subject
matter and methodologies applied.
 Both natural science and historiography
straddles into each other.
 The covering-law model of history and its
criticisms
 Covering- law model, also known as
Hempel-
Oppenheim Scheme is a deductive-nomological
concept of explanation.
 The model goes as followed: An event [E(n)] will be
explained by a general law G of the form A(X)→E(X)
and the antecedent in the form A(N). In a more general
version, it refers to a series of antecedent conditions A1
. . . AK and a corresponding series of general laws G1 .
. . GK.
 It was criticized because of problematic formulating of
general laws and in most cases, proposed laws for
explaining singular events turned out to be defective.
References:
Berlin, I. (1974). “Historical Inevitability,” in P.Gardiner
(ed.), The Philosophy of History (London: Oxford
University Press), pp. 161-86. Repr. From Four Essays on
Liberty (London, 1969), pp. 51-81.
Dray, W. (1974). “The Historical Explanation of Actions
Reconsidered,” in P. Gardiner (ed.), The Philosophy of
History (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 66-89.
Repr. From Philosophy and History: A Symposium, ed. S.
Hook, (New York, 1963), pp. 105-35.
Hempel, C.G. (1963). “The Function of General Laws in
History,” in P. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History (Glencoe:
Free Press), pp. 334-56, Repr. From Journal of Philosophy
(1942).
Mandelbaum, M. (1974). “The Problem of Covering
Laws,’” in P. Gardiner (ed.), The Philosophy of History
(London: Oxford University Press), pp. 51-65. Repr. From
History and Theory, 1(3), 1961, pp. 229-42
Popper, K.R. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul).
 Synthesis
 Laws should be independent of determinism and
teleology.
 The bias of law-based explanations is contrary to the
nature of natural sciences, which is different from
laboratory sciences (where the covering-law model was
formulated).
 “The symmetry between prediction and reconstruction needs to be
stressed more than symmetry of explanation and prediction.”
 According to Hempel (1963), “the logical structure of a
scientific prediction is the same as that of a scientific
explanation,” but it was rejected by Scriven, because the
logical argument for correlation of good predictions with
good explanations is not well established and limited. And
“symmetry between explanation and prediction can exist
only for those laws which are symmetric with respect to
time-reversal, such as the Newtonian equations of motion,”
according to Penrose (2005).
 Stressing the symmetry between “prediction and
reconstruction” rather than “explanation and prediction”
finds a useful possible role for laws in reconstruction of past
events and it is relevant for prehistoric and early historical
times, wherein evidences were either scarce, absent of
fragmented.
References:
Berry, S. (1999). “On the Problem of Laws in
Nature and History: A Comparison,” History
and Theory, pp. 121-37.
Hempel, C.G. (1963). “The Function of
General Laws in History,” in P. Gardiner
(ed.), Theories of History (Glencoe: Free
Press), pp. 334-56, Repr. From Journal of
Philosophy (1942).
Penrose, O. (2005). “An asymmetric world,”
Nature, 438, p.919.
Thompson, T.I. (1999). The Mythic Past.
Biblical Archaeology and the Myth of Israel
(New York: Basic Books).
 Synthesis
 Stressing the symmetry between prediction and explanation
is not advisable in writing natural history and historiography.
 Reconstructing the past events through the evidences
gathered about a certain subject matter will give the scientist
or historiographer a concrete basis for historical
generalization. Thus, a prediction with a basis of
reconstructed past events will be conceived.
 The problems and debates in history and neighboring disciplines
and the author’s suggestions to address those issues

 “The Rise of the West” which was among the first research agendas after Second
World War, which tackles the differences of Europe, and the Chinese and Arab
empires. Historiographic generalizations were at the forefront of these investigation,
though the notion of “laws” was carefully avoided.
 Application of ecology in historiography, which was speculated as new form of
historical determinism. It is important to know that laws of ecology act as boundary
conditions, which provides a framework for historical processes, and those laws act
from the outside, thus creating recurrent features of history.
 The issue of “theory of empires” which is the issue on the interactions of societies
around the world. This issue can be addressed by having a comparative theory and
better theories or deeper epistemic problems to address the methodological
problems.
 Synthesis
 The different problems and debates in history and its neighboring
principles are merely application of historical generalizations and
different methodologies.
 These problems in history and neighboring disciplines can be addressed
by proper methodological approach, better theories and inquiry.

References:
Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fall or Succed (New York: Viking).

Fagan, B.M. (2004). The Long Summer: How Climate Changed Civilization (New York: Basic Books).

Gellner, E. (1988). Plough, Sword and Book (London: Collins Harvill).

Kalb, D. (2005). “From Flows to Violence: Politics and Knowledge in the Debates of Globalization and Empire,” Anthropological Theory, 5, pp. 176-
204.

McNeill, J.R. (2003). Navigating World Hstory: Historians Create a Global Past (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

McNeill, W.H. (1963). The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).

Münkler, H. (2005). Imperien, Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: Rowohlt).

Pomper, P. (2005). “The History and Theory of Empires,” History and Theory, 44, pp. 1-27.
 Conclusion
 Laws in sciences are and should be independent from determinism and
teleology.
 Natural Science and the discipline of History and Historiography are almost
the same when it comes to methodology.
 Natural Science and Natural History, which deals with origin, evolution and
nature of observable beings, should be worked out the same principles as
History or Historiography.
 There were debates and issues in history and its neighboring disciplines, but
given its background and context, there were ways to address this depending
on the theoretical and methodological approach a historian will use to treat
the subject matter.
 The definite laws of history are yet to be find by the scholars.